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In Search of a Common Transatlantic
“Whole-Of-Government” Approach
to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
(the Case of Sudan)
August 2010
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Transatlantic Donors and their “Whole-of-Government” Approaches
to Peace-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Transatlantic Donor Policies Toward an Enhanced Inter-Government Cooperation . . . .19
4 From Policy to Practice: The Application of “The Whole-of-Government”
Approach in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 The U.S. Involvement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 The U.K. Engagement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 The EU’s Sudan Engagement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Joint Involvement of Transatlantic Donors in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
6 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
7 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Abbreviations
The rationale for this paper emerges from under- The lack of these comprehensive national policy
standing the vital importance of peace-building frameworks means transatlantic donors have
processes, which provide a new start for many insufficient coordination, which makes it difficult
fragile and conflict-ridden African states, and from to jointly implement their peace-building agendas
the need for coherent donor engagement strategies, in practice. Tensions between donors can arise
which would help effectively address pressing issues not only on account of different goals and pri-
in these states. However, the broadening of the orities, whether perceived or real, but also due to
peace-building agenda during the past two decades undefined objectives and unbalanced/incoherent
made such engagements increasingly challenging in national approaches.
terms of their complex and medium- to long-term
nature, and the necessary levels of financial and Nevertheless, transatlantic donors appear to have
other assistance, which exposed the need for greater been committed to improving their cooperation
intra-government cooperation (e.g., Whole-of- record during their involvement in Sudan peace
Government (WOG) approach) on one hand and processes. To this end, they all expressed support
enhanced donor cooperation on the other. Since for the implementation of the Comprehensive
the transatlantic donors (e.g., the United States, the Peace Agreement (CPA) and for the Darfur peace-
United Kingdom, and the EU) are seen as the most building process. Moreover, they have made an
active and influential supporters of peace-building attempt to put their development assistance under
processes on the African continent, their endeavors one umbrella (the Multi-Donor Trust Funds), and
to pursue the WOG approach in this regard repre- to use various joint mechanisms, such as joint pro-
sent a particular focus of this paper. gramming and joint donor offices, to further their
objectives in Sudan. These attempts at enhanced
Consequently, two main research questions are donor coordination have underlined the relevance
addressed in this paper: To what extent has the of a focused approach to peace-building through
WOG approach been mainstreamed in peace- outlining developmental and other priorities for
building policies of transatlantic donors? And, donors and recipient states, and have revealed
what impact have moves toward the increased donor preference for a bilateral approach when
intra-government coordination had on transatlan- joint initiatives could not address their national
tic donor cooperation in terms of challenges and interests in Sudan at the same time.
opportunities? Based on the review of policy docu-
ments and relevant literature, with some additional By recognizing this and other related challenges,
insights from interviews conducted in 2009, this this paper puts forward some recommendations on
paper argues that transatlantic donors have taken possible future directions for transatlantic donor
steps toward developing a comprehensive WOG cooperation. Such cooperation should be rooted
approach to peace-building that fits into their par- in a comprehensive national peace-building policy
ticular political and institutional contexts, although framework to offer a clear vision for all national
with varying speeds, and that the development actors, and to provide guidance on possible areas
and application of this approach remains a work in of cooperation for partner states. After reaching
progress. The remaining challenges are numerous, agreement on joint interests and objectives, trans-
the most crucial probably being the absence of a atlantic donors could explore complementarity as a
comprehensive national policy framework. principle of engagement in Africa’s peace-building
The history of independent African states has been time. Initially, peace-building was seen as a series of
characterized by tragic realities of violent conflicts activities aimed at strengthening and solidifying peace
and civil wars, which have also been fueled by Cold in the aftermath of civil strife, such as disarming the
War dynamics. These types of violent conflicts warring parties, restoring order, destroying weapons,
subsided with the demise of the Soviet Union, but repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, advancing
new conflicts broke out as a result, which have efforts to protect human rights, strengthening govern-
been largely attributed to the fragility of post-colo- mental institutions, and promoting political participa-
nial African states with their many faces, causes, tion. However, when applied in practice, the concept Peace-building has
and consequences. proved to be too narrow and has consequently gained received growing
some “weight” to encompass measures in the context international
As they stopped functioning as credible states, of emerging, current, or post-conflict situations for
African countries attracted considerable attention attention,
the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and
from the international community as a potential especially over
promoting lasting and sustainable peace.
source of threats to human security and regional the past decade,
and international peace. Consequently, peace- As such, peace-building has roughly three mutually as a “shifting
building2 has received growing international reinforcing dimensions: constellation
attention, especially over the past decade, as a of international
“shifting constellation of international and regional 1. Security: includes disarmament, demobilization,
and regional
organizations, national governments, and non- and reintegration of ex-combatants;
organizations,
governmental organizations has conducted a series humanitarian and mine action; improvement of
control over small arms and light weapons; and
national
of complex ‘peace-building’ operations aimed at governments, and
stabilizing countries just emerging from periods of security sector reform.
non-governmental
internal war.”3 With some successes (Sierra Leone) 2. Governance and political: entails the support organizations
and many failures (Somalia), peace-building pro- for political and administrative authorities
cesses have seen many trials and errors and have
has conducted a
and structures; support for the peace-oriented series of complex
provided continuous lessons for all parties involved. elements of civil society, including the media; ‘peace-building’
At the same time, peace-building as a discourse reconciliation and the promotion of non-violent
operations aimed
and practice has been evolving over the past two conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels
at stabilizing
decades with two notable developments. The first of society; promotion of good governance,
democracy, and human rights; and legal action
countries just
one relates to the broadening of peace-building as emerging from
a concept and the consequent practical implica- and truth commissions.
periods of
tion for peace-building activities in terms of scope 3. Social, economic, and environmental: involves internal war.”
and duration of donor engagement. The second the repatriation and reintegration of refugees
one relates to the intensified attempts at deepen- and internally displaced persons; (re)building
ing inter-donor cooperation to better deal with the of infrastructure and important government
challenging tasks of peace-building processes. functions; long-term development programs
First, the definition and understanding of peace- for high-quality and accessible education
building as a concept introduced by the UN Secretary- and health services; technical and financial
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 An assistance; and measures to stimulate productive
Agenda for Peace4 has gradually expanded over sector development, employment, trade,
and investment.5
The other side of this coin is, as some have argued, Other initiatives that could address the above chal-
the erosion of USAID’s budgeting role and its lenges are President Obama’s proposal to establish a
policy planning capacity, and degradation of Mediation Unit within the DOS, which would bring
development in U.S. foreign policy as a result of the together experienced diplomats and other practitio-
“F process,” ironically at a time when U.S. foreign ners to develop an inventory of peace-building best
aid was in fact increasing.34 While recognizing the practices and lessons learned; and the DOD’s recent
need for multiple U.S. agencies working together proposal on a new model of shared responsibil-
on development problems, Senator Richard Lugar ity and pooled resources for cross-cutting security
(R-IN) recently expressed concerns about the WOG challenges involving DOD and DOS,37 modeled on
approach being used to redefine development as a the U.K.’s Conflict Prevention Pool (see below).
series of technical decisions and devalue the disci-
pline of development.35 2.3 The United Kingdom
Another challenge at hand is fragmentation of The United Kingdom has long been seen by many
U.S. government initiatives and programs related policy analysts and donors as one of the models for
to development and other assistance. Although bilateral donor assistance in applying a relatively
the Director of Foreign Assistance/Administrator coherent WOG approach. The U.K. government’s
of USAID has authority over all aid programs of policy started shifting toward a greater coherence
USAID and DOS, other foreign assistance pro- in dealing with failed and fragile states in the late
grams remain outside the director’s budgetary 1990s with the establishment of the Department
authority, including those undertaken by DOD.36 for International Development (DFID) as a min-
istry in 1997 to enhance the foreign policy role of
However, this situation might improve in the development and the fight against poverty, and the
future after the completion of two key initia- publication of the 1998 Strategic Defense Review,
tives. In September 2009, President Obama which was at the time praised for bringing foreign
signed a Presidential Study Directive on Global and defense policy together in a clear, coherent, and
Development Policy, which provides the basis for affordable fashion.38
an extensive review of U.S. development efforts, and
is currently carried out by numerous government As was the case in the United States, the foreign
agencies with the National Security Council in the policy of the U.K. Labour government under-
lead. Moreover, the DOS announced a Quadrennial went some changes after the terrorist attacks
Diplomacy and Development Review in June 2009 on September 11, 2001. Prior to the attacks,
to assess diplomatic and developmental efforts of Whitehall saw its primary security concern
the DOS and USAID. These reviews, together with residing in Europe and the NATO alliance, and
the expected Obama administration’s first NSS, any instability outside Europe was perceived as
could provide a good starting point for discus- an indirect threat. Since 2001, the U.K. govern-
sion about the possible ways of improving the U.S. ment has been increasingly focusing on the
WOG approach to address the acute problems of need to address failed and fragile states,39 also
fragility and underdevelopment of African states, to pursue its counter-terrorism objectives.
4.3 The U.K. Engagement in Sudan • meet humanitarian, recovery, and reintegration
needs to benefit the poor;
The U.K.’s involvement in Sudan has been char-
acterized by strategic cooperation between DFID, • provide assistance to implement the peace
the MOD, and the FCO. There has been a fair agreement by supporting demobilization and
reintegration of combatants and the like;
This paper has tried to provide a brief analysis EU’s preventative approach.98 Since any major
of policy and institutional changes undertaken shifts in these policies are not likely to occur, at
by transatlantic donors to improve intra- and least in the near future, the main challenge for
inter-government coordination for dealing with transatlantic donors remains how to transcend
the complex tasks of peace-building processes in their policy differences in pursuit of enhanced
African fragile states. As the implementation of donor cooperation.
such coordination requires adopting a practical,
multidimensional, and integrated approach, the 2. Although there seems to be a consensus at least
transatlantic donors recognized the relevance of at the highest level about the benefits of a WOG
applying the WOG approach to peace-building in approach to engagement in fragile states, this
African states. consensus has so far failed to materialize in a
comprehensive policy framework. Nevertheless,
The record of all three transatlantic donors in terms such a document might ultimately crystallize on
of mainstreaming the WOG approach to peace- the basis of and through refining the national
building has been mixed at best. Although some security, development, and foreign policy
similarities pointed out below can be observed, documents. This problem is exacerbated by
donors seem to be progressing with “varying the fact that none of the transatlantic donors
speeds,” and preserving the main features of their currently possesses a strong central coordinating
“traditional” approach to peace-building. This situ- authority over individual departments, agencies,
ation also has an impact on inter-donor coopera- or institutions, although mechanisms exist in the
tion, which is still the subject of diverging national U.K. Cabinet Office and U.S. executive branch
interests and priorities. Below are some of the that could be used to that effect. A coherent
findings of this paper. peace-building strategy with an oversight of a
strong central authority is more likely to result
1. All transatlantic donors have changed their in effective transatlantic cooperation with other
conceptions of peace-building in line with their donors and aid recipients alike.
experiences on the ground. Both the United
Kingdom and the United States have recognized 3. All transatlantic donors have realized the
that a military approach does not necessarily importance of post-conflict stabilization and
bring security and stability to a country, while reconstruction as an inherently civilian-military
the EU has realized that its development operation, thus establishing mechanisms
partnerships will not work without peace and to deal with these challenges. However, in
reasonable levels of security. However, while the the United Kingdom, and even more in the
EU is still mainly advancing “policy coherence United States, these mechanisms were slow to
for development” by focusing on conflict- gather enough political and financial backing
prevention, the United States seems to prefer to be fully operational. However, the post-
“policy coherence for national security” and conflict reconstruction and development
focuses mainly on post-conflict stabilization and could be a possible future area of successful
reconstruction with democracy as the ultimate donor cooperation.
goal of U.S. engagement. The United Kingdom’s
policy is somewhere in between, although its 4. In both the United Kingdom and the United
approach of supporting effective state-building States, the government departments dealing with
and economic development resembles the foreign policy — the FCO and DOS, respectively
Based on the overview of transatlantic donors’ poli- • taking an incremental approach or an ambi-
cies toward Africa in general, and their engagement tious redesign to improve intra-governmental
in Sudan in particular, some of the recommenda- coordination;
tions for advancing the WOG approach in transat-
lantic donor engagement in peace-building process • institutionalizing a WOG approach or relying
— and their cooperation in these processes — are on ad hoc/periodic intra-government coop-
put forward as the basis for further discussions. eration on a need-to-need basis;
In advancing the WOG approach in their peace- • coordinating policies at the highest level or
building strategies, mostly relying on government departments
themselves to pursue the WOG approach; and
R1. The governments of transatlantic donors
should be encouraged to adopt a national • pooling financial resources or using indi-
policy framework, which would provide a clear vidual thematic budget lines.
vision and unified strategy, covering various R4. Donors should be encouraged to work
stages of peace-building in failed and fragile toward providing sufficient incentives for
states. Such a strategy would be relevant for the adoption of an integrated approach to
at least two reasons: first it would provide a peace-building in fragile states in order to
basis for intra-government cooperation and avoid competition and tensions between the
peace-building efforts, and indicate the priority relevant government departments. Better
areas in terms of action and the allocation of coordination between government departments
financial and human resources. Second, such could be achieved by each department embed-
policy frameworks would offer other donor/ ding its activities within other departments in
partner states some information and guidance the donor’s overall peace-building framework,
as to which potential areas of cooperation which could lead to better operational effective-
and common engagement in peace-building ness. In addition, the roles of actors involved
processes are worth pursuing. need to be clarified and differences in organi-
R2. Such policy frameworks should be compre- zational culture among the relevant institutions
hensive enough to cover all the basic entry taken into account. At the same time, cross-
points of engagement (security, political and staffing (inter-departmental “secondments”)
diplomatic, developmental) in peace-building could help improve understanding between
processes in line with the WOG approach, as various departments.
well as flexible enough to adapt to various pos- Regarding the improvement in transatlantic donor
sible situations in African fragile states, and to coordination to increase the effectiveness of their
absorb the lessons learned on the ground. support for peace-building processes in African
R3. At the same time, common policy frameworks states, it can be suggested that:
could address several dilemmas for national R5. The efficient and continuous coordination
governments regarding WOG approach to between transatlantic donors is more likely to
peace-building: succeed if undertaken within a permanent
• balancing national interests versus fragile common framework or international orga-
states’ needs; nization such as the UN. The latter has the
1 At the time this paper was written, Timothy Othieno was 10 This paper mainly covers the analysis of relevant policy
an independent consultant. He is currently a Conflict and documents; however, this does not suggest the WOG approach
Peacebuilding Adviser at the Department for International should not be mainstreamed in the policy implementation
Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom. Vita Sebek is and evaluation as well. At the same time, the paper does not
an independent consultant whose area of expertise is Africa’s cover the coordination between institutions in the capital
security architecture and political economy. and diplomatic and other representations abroad, the latter
representing a valuable “asset” in terms of policy input,
2 In this paper, peace-building refers to all those activities
implementation, and feedback.
and measures that are aimed at preventing and resolving
conflicts, and sustaining peace, such as unilateral or multilateral 11 An example of an incoherent approach to peace-building
diplomatic initiatives, military interventions, developmental and would be concomitant implementation of arms exports policy
humanitarian assistance, and the like. For more, see section 2.2. and conflict resolution efforts in aid-recipient states.
3 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of 12 Further differences between various government
Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace departments might include incompatible goals and different
Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008). operational language, methods, approaches, and the like.
According to U.S. government sources, these differences are
4 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace — Preventive
especially notable when comparing DOD on one hand, and
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111,
DOS and USAID on the other. For example, the DOD has
17 June 1992), http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
understandably a different point of engagement in fragile states
(accessed 20.01.2010).
than the DOS and USAID, and a shorter timeline in terms of
5 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate — the expectations and requirements.
Development Assistance Committee, Mainstreaming Conflict
13 See Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the
Prevention: Peacebuilding Overview, Issues Briefs (Paris: OECD
Military in Humanitarian Crisis,” International Journal of Peace
DAC, 2005), http:/www.oecd.org/13/28/ 35034360.pdf (accessed
Studies 7, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 2002), 35-56; and Ho-Won
14.10.2009). See also OECD, Development Cooperation
Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies, (Boulder, Colorado:
Directorate, The Development Assistance Committee, Principles
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 198.
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and
Situations (Paris: OECD DAC, April 2007), http://www.oecd.org/ 14 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs,
dataoecd/ 61/45/38368714.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010). “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,”
in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
6 Alina Rocha Menocal, “State-Building for Peace — A New
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile
van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 49.
States?” Paper prepared for Transforming Political Structures:
Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms 15 William M. Bellamy “Making Better Sense of U.S. Security
Workshop, the European Report on Development, Florence, Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush
Italy 16-17 April 2009. Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration,
ed. Jennifer G. Cooke, and Stephen J. Morrison (Washington
7 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of
DC, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 10. See
Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
also Nancy Birdsall, “Righting the Three-Legged Stool: Why
Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008).
Global Development Matters for Americans and What the
8 These donors have been selected as a focus of this paper Next President Should Do About It,” in The White House and
since they represent the most active and influential supporters of the World — A Global Development Agenda for the Next U.S.
peace-building processes in Africa in terms of security, political, President, ed. Nancy Birdsall (Washington: Center for Global
and developmental assistance. Development, 2008), 1–42.
9 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs. 16 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence.” Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches
In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy,
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim 2007), 32.
van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 17.