Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation vs.

Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Kleto Chung

G.R No. 173252 July 17, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.

As Sandico's property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering
Sandico's property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioner's favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo's
property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under
TCT No. 121488.

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement
of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public
road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a
land registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the property.

On August 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that
the dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet
to a public road which is Matienza Street.

Issue:

Whether or not to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.

Held:

No, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of
respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way,
petitioner alleged that the easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a
certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It
further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y
Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory
easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order because `[the] Court
merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties." In its Memorandum
dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that "[t]he annotation
found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement."

As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable,

whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former is called legal,
and the latter, voluntary easements.
Alicia B. Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin Ramos, Francisco S. and Anatalia

G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

Facts:

On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against
respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.

In her Complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner alleged that she was the registered
owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan,
designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and covered by TCT No. T-343642-(M). The property used to
be a portion of Lot No. 3-B and was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons.

Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her

property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-
square-meter portion of respondents' property was also the "point least prejudicial to the
respondents. The easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents'
other lot.

According to petitioner, her and respondents' lots were previously owned by her mother.
Respondents' lot was given to Dominador Ramos who allegedly was respondents'
predecessor-in-interest. Dominador was also her mother's brother and caretaker of
properties. Petitioner's mother only learned about what Dominador did when a meeting was
called in 1989 regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
She did not cause the recovery of her title because at that time, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan was razed by fire, causing the destruction of the documents covering the subject
properties.

Issue:

Whether or not to grant of compulsory easement of right of way on a 113 square meter
portion of defendants' property to be devoid of merit.

Held:

The petition has no merit.

I. The issue of ownership is irrelevant

to the case; filing of a complaint for easement is a recognition of the servient
property owner's rights

Petitioner points out that respondents' property was previously owned by her mother. She alleged that her
uncle who was her mother's caretaker of property fraudulently caused the titling of the whole 1,500-square-
meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter portion under his name.

These allegations are relevant only if we are determining the issue of the property's ownership. However,
this is not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question the ownership or the registration of
respondents' title over the property. We are limited to the issue of petitioner's easement rights. On that
matter, petitioner's act of filing a Complaint for easement of right of way is an acknowledgement that the
property is owned by respondents. It is tantamount to a waiver of whatever right or claim of ownership
petitioner had over the property.
Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. (Bapci), vs. Edmundo O. Obias, Perfecto O. Obias, Victor
Bagasina, Elena Benosa, Melchor Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro Montero, Claudio Resari, Pilar Galon,
Antonio Buison, Prudencio Benosa, Jr., Maria Villamer And Roberto Padua,
G.R. No. 172077, October 09, 2009

Facts:

Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at Himaao,
Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road") - measuring
approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling
and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its
sugar milling operations. October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc.
acquired the assets of BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents.

Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners
of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and
relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner
contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of
way over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought
BISUDECO's assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from
barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free passage.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an easement of right of way.

Held:

No, the petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an agreement
between BISUDECO and respondent. The petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that BISUDECO
and respondents forged an agreement for the construction of the road in dispute. Petitioner thus asserts its
entitlement to an easement of right of way over the properties of respondents by virtue of said agreement.

An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by the CA in the following manner, to wit: Easement
or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is established either by law (in which case it is a
legal easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be
continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of way - the privilege of persons or a particular class of
persons to pass over another's land, usually through one particular path or linen - is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.

Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz: Art. 622. Continuous non-
apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of
a title.

Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right-of-way,
it was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the lands
that said road traversed. While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the alleged agreement,
petitioner posits that they presented circumstantial evidence which, if taken collectively, would prove its
existence
Bryan U. Villanueva vs. Hon. Tirso D.C. Velasco, Julio N. Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla

G.R. NO. 130845, November 27, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation,
the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at
a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on
its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel
spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way. The Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs,
successors, assigns, without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the
circumstances.

Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned
small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for
easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the
spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of
easement.

Issue:

Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.

Held:

No, the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the
Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a
legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest,
and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to
which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have
declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive
on this Court, hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house
occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement
mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled
that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner
ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents'
estate.
Sps. Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon vs. Sps. Santos and Erlinda Tan

G.R. No. 185240, January 21, 2010

Facts:

Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, Mandaue City.
Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos
executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among
themselves as follows: 1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right
of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision; 2. To Eduardo
Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary
in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision; 3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C; 4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D
subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot
B and E of the subdivision; and 5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right
of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision. Lots A, B, and C were
adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these interior lots
access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way
consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on
to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual
titles issued to the heirs. Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take the following
configurations, not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their relative locations. But,
realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their agreement
by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter
wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from
Lots D and E to the street.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the easement of right of way established by the partition
agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.

Held:

The Salimbangons point out that the partition agreement among the heirs established in their favor, as
owners of Lot A, an easement of right of way on Lot B from the interior of their lot to the city street. Since
theirs was an easement established by agreement of the parties, only by mutual agreement could the same
be extinguished. But, firstly, as Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the
establishment of an easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access
to the street, namely Lots D and E. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give
Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of
way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law. The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate
is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person. Secondly, there is no question
that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for
the easement of right of way when these lots were already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of
Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on
Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B. Although
the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of the easement
cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their
right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B.
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Magdaleno Valdez Sr.

G.R. No. 124699, July 31, 2003

Facts:

Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez, Angelina Valdez-Novabos,
Teresita Argawanon-Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres (hereafter the heirs), purchased from
Feliciana Santillan, on December 9, 1935, a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No.
3935 with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu.
He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name. Prior to the sale, however,
the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks
owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling
sugar cane from the fields to petitioner's sugar mill.

When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land.
However, unknown to them, Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the
railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965.

It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry
with the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's
claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as was
their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner reiterates its claim of ownership of the land through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.

Held:

Petitioner's claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code cannot be sustained. There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous
possession of petitioner since 1929. But possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless coupled with the element of
hostility towards the true owner, possession, however long, will not confer title by prescription. After a
careful review of the records, we are inclined to believe the version of respondent heirs that an easement
of right of way was actually granted to petitioner for which reason the latter was able to occupy Cadastral
Lot No. 954. We cannot disregard the fact that, for the years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and 1963, petitioner
unequivocally declared the property to be a "central railroad right of way" or "sugar central railroad right of
way" in its real estate tax receipts when it could have declared it to be "industrial land" as it did for the years
1975 and 1985. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all petitioner had was
possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the land,
petitioner would not have consistently used the phrases "central railroad right of way" and "sugar central
railroad right of way" in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have found no need for
these phrases. A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since all the uses of an easement are
fully comprehended in his general right of ownership. While it is true that, together with a person's actual
and adverse possession of the land, tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land
occupied by him, this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared to be a mere
easement of right of way.
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, Pelagio Tolosa, and Atanacio M. Villegas vs. The Court
of Appeals and General Santos Doctors' Hospital, Inc.

G.R. No. 136897, November 22, 2005

Facts:

The spouses Agustin Narciso and Aurora Narciso (the Narcisos, for short) were the original owners of two
(2) lots situated at Barrio Lagao, General Santos City, Cotabato. The first lot, which is a portion of a bigger
parcel of land known as Lot No. 908-B-6-L-3 and covered by TCT No. 22608, is identified as Lot No. 908-
B-6-L-3-A, hereinafter referred to as the interior lot, with an area of one (1) hectare. Adjacent to this lot and
abutting the national highway is the second lot, Lot No. 908-B-6-L-4-B, hereinafter referred to as the exterior
lot, covered by TCT No. 135. On September 6, 1968, the Narcisos executed in favor of herein respondent,
General Santos Doctor's Hospital, Inc. (GSDHI) an Option to Buy the interior lot, subject, among others, to
the conditions. Years later, or on September 30, 1977, the exterior lot was mortgaged by the Narcisos to
one of the petitioners herein, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP). Upon the
Narcisos' failure to pay the mortgage obligation, the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property
(exterior lot) sold at a public auction on June 21, 1982 with PDCP as the lone bidder. Accordingly, the
Narcisos' title covering the exterior lot was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 23202 was issued in the
name of PDCP. On April 18, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court at General Santos City, respondent GSDHI,
claiming that it has an easement of right-of-way over the foreclosed property (exterior lot), filed a complaint
for specific performance against PDCP, therein impleading the Register of Deeds of General Santos City,
Pelagio T. Tolosa, as a nominal party-defendant, to compel PDCP to present before the Register of Deeds
its duplicate copy of TCT No. 23202 over the exterior lot for the annotation thereon of the Memorandum of
Agreement establishing an easement of right-of-way in favor of GSDHI.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent GSDHI has an easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot.

Held:

The easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot in favor of respondent GSDHI was voluntarily constituted
by agreement between the latter and the original owner thereof, the Narcisos. It is beyond cavil that the
Narcisos did intend to establish an easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot for the respondent's
benefit. This is very evident from the fact that in the "Option to Buy" in connection with the interior lot, one
of the conditions stipulated upon is that the Narcisos will construct two (2) ten-meter wide roads along the
exterior lot from the interior lot leading to the national highway. True, the Deed of Absolute Sale between
respondent and the Narcisos covering the interior lot did not embody the aforementioned condition. It was
precisely to cure this deficiency, however, that on the very same day the deed of sale was executed, the
Narcisos and respondent forged a "Memorandum of Agreement" to reflect what they failed to state in the
document of sale. In the precise words of the trial court: "xxx the imperfection of the document of absolute
sale was discussed at once (Exhibit "D"). So a 'Memorandum of Agreement' was executed that same day
to rectify the omission and put in black and white the agreement regarding the direct access road to the
national highway passing through the adjoining lot 908-B-6-L-4-B then owned by Narciso". Moreover,
contrary to the petitioners' assertion, the Narcisos' grant of the easement to respondent was for a valuable
consideration. In any event, it bears stressing that the two courts below are one in their common factual
finding about the existence of the conventional easement of right of way in favor of respondent. Absent, as
here, of any credible evidence to the contrary, the Court is not inclined to disturb such a finding. After all,
this Court is not a trier of facts.
Privatization and Management Office vs. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.

G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009

Facts:

Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard,
Manila. Among them were contiguous lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 120311,
120312, 120313, and 127649 (now TCT No. 200760). Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a loan
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to finance the construction of a 21-storey condominium along
Roxas Boulevard. The loan accommodation was secured by a real estate mortgage over three (3) parcels
of land covered by TCT Nos. 120311, 120312, and 120313, where Caruff planned to erect the
condominium. In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the mortgaged parcels of land.
Along with the other appurtenances of the building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating
set) and two sump pumps in the adjacent lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760). After the
completion of the condominium project, it was constituted pursuant to the Condominium Act (Republic Act
No. 4726), as the Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. However, for Caruff's failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter
foreclosed the mortgage and acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the sheriff's auction sale held on
January 30, 1985. Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50 was issued. It was aimed to promote privatization "for
the prompt disposition of the large number of non-performing assets of the government financial institutions,
and certain government-owned and controlled corporations, which have been found unnecessary or
inappropriate for the government sector to maintain." It also provided for the creation of the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT). By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer executed by
PNB, the National Government, thru the APT, became the assignee and transferee of all its rights and titles
to and interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from the foreclosure of
Caruff's mortgage. Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC of Manila, Branch 2,
whereby Caruff sought the nullification of PNB's foreclosure of its properties. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 85-29512. A Compromise Agreement dated August 31, 1988 was later entered into by
Caruff, PNB, and the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other things, that Caruff
would transfer and convey in favor of the National Government, thru the APT, the lot covered by TCT No.
127649 (now TCT No. 200760), where it built the generating set and sump pumps. On September 9, 1988,
the RTC rendered a Decision approving the Compromise Agreement executed and submitted by the
parties.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an existence of easement.

Held:

No easement arose or was voluntarily created from the transfer of ownership, considering that the parties,
more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying the subject property in
favor of the National Government thru the APT "free from any and all liens and encumbrances."
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve
their differences, thus, avoiding litigation, or put an end to one already commenced. As a contract, when
the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged
intention of the parties; the terms are to be understood literally, just as they appear on the face of the
contract. Considering that Caruff never intended to transfer the subject property to PMO, burdened by the
generating set and sump pumps, respondent should remove them from the subject property. As regards
PMO's claim for rent, respondent has been enjoying the use of the subject property for free from the time
the rights over the property were transferred and conveyed by Caruff to the National Government. In the
present case, there is no dispute as to who owns the subject property and as to the fact that the National
Government has been deprived of the use thereof for almost two decades.