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224 SCRA 792

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations
yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;


2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;


2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony
of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
224 SCRA 782
July 1993

FACTS:

Plaintiffs, who are minors represented by their parents, alleged that the then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,
Jr.s continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to
cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country will work great damage and injury to the plaintiffs and their
successors. Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the plaintiffs failed to state a
specific right violated by the defendant and that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question and cannot be tried in the Courts. The RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted
defendants motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case at bar subject to the judicial power of the Court

COURT RULING:

Being impressed with merit, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the Order of the RTC which
dismissed the case.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of
the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual
controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

Although concurring in the result, Justice Feliciano penned his separate opinions on a number of topics pointed by
Justice Davide, Jr. in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said that the concept of the word class is too broad
to cover the plaintiffs and their representatives alone, and that the Court may be deemed recognizing anyones
right to file action as against both the public administrative agency and the private entities of the sector involved
in the case at bar, to wit:

Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provisions of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.

Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in the case at bar in effect made Sections 15 and 16 of Article 2 of
the 1987 Constitution to be self-executing and judicially enforceable even in its present form, and that these
implications are too large and far reaching in nature ever to be hinted in this instant case.
231 SCRA 292

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals


Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards
environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if
steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction &
authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall
have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen
permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the
LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation
of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the
LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative
intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to
grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is
the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a
cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures
in Laguna de Bay.

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated thereinand the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
G.R 93981
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA

[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991]Facts:Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater whichwere being discharged directly into a canal leading
to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitionerPollution Adjudication Board
issued an ex parte Order based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant,
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as
they were clearly inviolation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section
103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.

Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a
temporary operation.However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the
Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal,the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollutionlevel of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards
set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other hand, contendsthat under the Board's own rules and
regulations, anex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediatethreat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that
Solar'swastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of
Execution against SolarTextile Finishing Corporation. YES.

RULING:Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders
under the following circumstances:(a)Public Hearing. . . .Provided , That whenever the Commission finds prima
facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes areof immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by theCommission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension orcessation
of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing.The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executor and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person preventsor abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court.

The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within its
lawful authority Ex partecease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like in this
case. The relevant pollution control statute andimplementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,health, and general welfare and comfort of
the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as thepolice power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities
ofprotecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the
trial court did not errwhen it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was
an appeal from the trial court to the Court ofAppeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on
the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appealsand its Resolution were set aside. The Order
of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial courtwere reinstated,
without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ
ofExecution at a public hearing before the Board.
G.R NO. 94759
Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)
Facts:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16,
1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested thecompany to show to the
office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without
notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus with preliminary injuction
against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court
ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant.YES.
Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion.NO.

Ruling:
1.No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to controland/or avoid injury to the health of
the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2.The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of
its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the
residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was
required to bring the following:

a.Building permit;
b.Mayor's permit; and
c.Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

3.This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4.The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made. It found that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, butinstead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA
G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received aletter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of its plant in Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office
of the mayor its building permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required documents. It
sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a Temporary Permit to
Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office
of the mayor to secure a mayors permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively causing the
stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was
issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was proper, ordering
the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology Developers
to resume its normal business operations until the case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may
contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and
operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology Developer

HELD:

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there
is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business
is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community
from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents
in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic
Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the
surrounding houses and that no proper airpollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead
presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution
Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner
had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning
industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health,
nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it
is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave
abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary reliefmay recall or
dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petition denied.
G.R NO 110249

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all
live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances
and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not
suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of
the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine
wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at
all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively
carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
Tano v Socrates (Environmental Law)

Tano v Socrates
GR No. 110249
August 21, 1997

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance N o. 15-92 which took effect on
January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND
LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

ISSUE:

Is the ordinance valid and constitutional?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 2 of Article X I I reads: The State shall protect the nation' s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law , allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as w ell
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x x x x x x x Sec. 7. The State
shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and
other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall ex tend
to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a
just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:


SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

RULING:

YES. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to
local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458
(a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:


(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years,
and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities. It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto
Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval
that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal
ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters. In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite
political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In
the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now
be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to
future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not,
irreversible.
G.R. No. L-41958

Donald Mead vs. Hon. Manuel Argel, CFI

July 20, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him for his
alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission.
Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the
authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING:

The filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal)(Sec 9). The
Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not pollution did exist is vested in the Commission,
who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific
matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the Commission on the
alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had been violated,
the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.

G.R NO 14862

FACTS:
A contract by and between Noguera and Tourist World Service (TWS), represented by Canilao, wherein TWSleased the premises
belonging to Noguera as branch office of TWS. When the branch office was opened, it was runby appellant Sevilla
payable to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4% was togo to Sevilla and
3% was to be withheld by the TWS.

Later, TWS was informed that Sevilla was connected with rival firm, and since the branch office was losing, TWS
considered closing down its office.

On January 3, 1962, the contract with appellee for the use of the branch office premises was terminatedand while the
effectivity thereof was January 31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. Because of this, Canilao, thesecretary of
TW S, went over to the branch office, and finding the premises locked, he padlocked the
premises.W hen neither appellant Sevilla nor any of his employees could enter, a complaint was filed
by the appellantsagainst the appellees.

TWS insisted that Sevilla was a mere employee, being the branch manager of its branch office and thatshe had
no say on the lease executed with the private respondent, Noguera.
ISSUE:
W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Sevilla and TWS

HELD:
The records show that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent TWS. In
thef i r s t p l a c e , u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t o f l e a s e , s h e h a d b o u n d h e r s e l f i n s o l i d u m a s a n d
f o r r e n t a l p a y m e n t s , a n arrangement that would belie claims of a master-servant relationship. That does not make her an
employee of TWS,since a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his
employers business, orotherwise, assume any liability thereof.

In the second place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run by the appellant Sevilla payable to TWS
by any airline for any fare brought in on the effort of Sevilla. Thus, it cannot be said that Sevilla was under the control of
TWS. Sevilla in pursuing the business, relied on her own capabilities.

It is further admitted that Sevilla was not in the companys payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in
commissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee, who earns a fixed salary,
she earned compensation in fluctuating amount depending on her booking successes.

The fact that Sevilla had been designated branch manager does not make her a TW S employee. It
appears that Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and she acquired an interest in the business entrusted to her.
She also had assumed personal obligation for the operation thereof, holding herself solidary liable for
the payment of rentals.

Wherefore, TWS and Canilao are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the petitioner, Sevilla.