GENERAL, APPLIED AND THEORETICAL
least as often: culture. This new anthro-
pology will still be true t o its heritage;
anthropology will remain distinctive by the
centrality of the study of culture in its
endeavors. Whatever culture is (and these
essays do not address themselves to this
anthropological perennial), it retains its
dominant place in the anthropological con-
sciousness.
As remarked earlier, in many places the
authors call for the introduction of new
problems and the dropping of old. Almost as
often, attached t o the insistence that new
problems be tackled, is the remark that new
methods are not needed. Keep the old
methods, use them on new problems. Only
one essay (Naders) recognizes that new
problems will probably require new methods
to solve them. She shows, with good ex-
amples, that studying organizations with
power and responsibility in American
society (insurance companies, public
agencies) requires something other than par-
ticipant observation and other traditional
ethnographic tools. Nader implicitly recog-
nizes that problem, method, and theory are
locked together in a dialectic where they
create each other. For this reason, Naders
essay will be of far greater use than any of
the others to an anthropologist wanting to
do some reinvented anthropology rather
than merely talk about it.
There are other continuities between the
old and the reinvented anthropology. As I
see it, a common feature of the old anthro-
pology is the divorce between data and
theory. Programmatic statements (which
anthropologists often think of as theoretical)
are rarely accompanied by extensive bodies
of data that support the program. At best,
casual snippets of data illustrate the points
of the theoretical anthropological essay.
All of the essays in this book are, in one way
or another, programmatic, and none con-
tains data, except in an illustrative way. For
example, many assertions are made about
the current state and character of anthro-
pology and academic anthropological organ-
izations, but we are given no empirical
evidence about anthropology departments,
what they are like, or what they do. In his
introduction, Hymes regrets that limitations
of space prevented inclusion of an essay on
the structural types of anthropology depart-
ments. A significant and typical choice for
861
space-induced cuts in a book by anthropolo-
gists!
In summary, this reinvented anthro-
pology looks to me very much like the same
old anthropology at the same old stand.
There is one important difference. This new
anthropology will be candid about its
politics. This is a positive step, but I suspect
that this reinvented anthropology will be
about as much use to serious revolutionaries
as the old anthropology was to reformers-
none.
Reference Cited
Frank, Andre Gunder
1968 Comment on Social Responsi-
bilities Symposium. Current Anthro-
pology 9:412-414.
Belief, Language, and Experience. RODNEY
NEEDHAM. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press (published in England by Basil Black-
well & Mott, Oxford), 1972 (publication
date 1973). xvii + 269 pp., bibliography,
index. $10.00 (cloth).
Reoiewed by BENSON SALER
Brandeis University
This book raises and explores some fun-
damental issues regarding the nature of
belief and relates them t o the problem of
specifying natural human capacities. Need-
ham offers his essay as a contribution to the
development of an empirical philosophy of
human nature. He writes (p. 188)that The
prime objective of the present mono-
graph. . . has been to prove that [the] tacit
presumption [that people in all societies
share certain posited, logical and psychic
capacities] is not well founded, and that the
essential capacities of man have yet to be
empirically determined by comparative re-
search .
Needham was influenced in the crafting
of his essay by his understanding of the later
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Need-
hams intellectual debt to that philosopher
seems evident in his attentions t o the uses of
words in the effort to illuminate their
meanings, in his employment of the idea of
family resemblances (overlapping similar-
ities), and in the character of his skepticism
regarding the appropriateness of certain
862 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
kinds of mentalistic formulations. But while
it might prove to be an interesting exercise
to explore the convergence and divergence in
views as between Wittgenstein and Needham,
and though such a study might well aid in
clarifying the positions of each, it is un-
necessary that I attempt to do so here. The
book under review, after all, was written by
Needham, not Wittgenstein. Our foremost
concern must be with Needhams inquiry
and argument as they are presented t o us.
Before actually proceeding to Needhams
essay, however, it will prove useful t o pause
and consider what many anthropologists
seem to mean by beliefs. Goodenough
defines them as propositions that people
accept as true (1963:155). By accept I relating to the translation of such state-
take him to mean a psychic act. He avers,
moreover, that people are likely to behave in
accordance with their beliefs, that beliefs are
of significance in the organization of be-
havior. A number of anthropologists would
seem to think of beliefs in a similar fashion.
In doing so, they approximate certain con-
ceptualizations of belief offered by
philosophers.
The philosopher Price (1969) dis-
tinguishes two major approaches to belief
belief as occurrence and belief as disposi- mental states on the basis of such evidence.
tion. Occurrence analysts suppose beliefs t o
be kinds of mental acts: entertaining or
holding in mind propositions and deeming
them to be true. Proponents of this view
generally regard beliefs as inner experiences
that could be introspected by the believer if
he took the trouble to do so. Dispositional
analysts regard beliefs as dispositions t o act
or feel in certain ways. In this view beliefs
are likely t o be manifested in occurrences
but are not themselves occurrences. While
occurrence analysts are usually willing t o
accept a dispositional sense of beliefs,
though treating it as secondary or derivative,
dispositional analysts are disposed t o view
occurrent acts of believing as mythical.
While some anthropologists seem to have
naively conflated or juxtaposed the occur-
rence and dispositional views, on balance
most could probably be termed occurrentists
who are attracted t o and often employ a
dispositional viewpoint (as when, for ex-
ample, they assert that beliefs are manifested
in rituals). In a recent and sophisticated
essay, the anthropologist Hahn attempts to
relate the two approaches explicitly. He
[76,1974]
defines beliefs as general propositions
about the world (consciously) held t o be
true, and he states that Holding a belief is
here explicated as exhibiting a disposition to
behavior symbolic of that belief
(1973:208).
In getting at what they commonly sup-
pose t o be inner mental acts or states of
diverse sorts, anthropologists perforce
depend on selective observations of behavior
and their inferences about what they
observe. In the case of beliefs, the major sort
of evidence that is grist for observation and
inference is verbal behavior: public state-
ments that people make and seem to affirm
as true. There are often vexing problems
ments, but I do not want to consider them
at this moment. The point that I do want to
make is this: many anthropologists appear to
treat their informants utterances as good
(and perhaps sufficient) evidence for beliefs
as inner mental conditions or acts, and they
often seem willing to suppose that their
informants really believe what they seem
to say. A few anthropologists, most notably
Leach (1967,1968), have warned against the
facile description and ascription of inner
But insofar as I am aware, those warnings
have not gained much currency.
Needham is critical of the ways eth-
nographers use the term belief. If they
suggest that they are reporting the inner
mental states of the peoples they study, they
offer no real evidence t o support that
assertion. If, on the other hand, eth-
nographic statements about beliefs refer
only to the collective representations that
prevail in particular cultures, then according
to the standard acceptation of belief as a
psychic phenomenon the ethnographers
reports are misleadingly phrased (p. 5).
Anthropologists seem to suppose that all
men everywhere have a distinct capacity to
believe. But Needham questions that s u p
position. It is his contention, moreover, that
the supposed reality of a distinct, interior
state denominated belief requires examina-
tion. These issues are put in the form of two
questions that dominate his essay. The first
is the early Wittgensteins question, Is
belief an experience? The second is, Does
a capacity for belief constitute a natural
resemblance among men? Needham
 GENERAL, APPLIED AND THEORETICAL
answers no to both:
the notion of belief is not appropriate to
an empirical philosophy of mind or to an
exact account of human motives and
conduct. Belief is not a discriminable
experience, it does not constitute a natural
resemblance among men, and it does not
belong to the common behaviour of
mankind [p. 1881.
Needham takes up his inquiry by ex-
amining data on various languages in order
to discover if they have words that can be
cogently glossed by our word belief. He
finds that the lexicons of several languages
possess terms some of whose meanings over-
lap various of the connotations of our belief
but whose other meanings do not. In other
languages meanings are so conjoined that it
would be unjustified to abstract out one of
them as definitive of belief. It is alleged that
in Cuicatec and Tzeltal, for example, there is
no way (according to Nida) of distinguishing
between Yo believe and to obey. And in
still other languages, we are told, there is
apparently no verbal concept at all which
can convey exactly what may be understood
by the English word believe (p. 37). Most
immediately, this suggests the great dif-
ficulties of translating from one language to
another. But there are other conclusions to
be drawn as well.
The larger lesson to be gleaned from a
comparison of languages is not clearly stated
in the section on comparison. Rather, it is
gradually explicated throughout the essay in
consonance with other considerations. Need-
ham does not endorse the simple (-minded)
notion, no word, no concept. He writes
that we cannot infer from the absence of a
word that a certain thing does not exist (p.
128). He seems to take seriously, moreover,
Whorfs idea of covert categories or crypto-
types, and he allows that belief might exist
as a covert concept in the absence of a
clear verbal label. But he states that this
extreme hypothesis offers no more than a
formal possibility, and. . . I have been able
to detect n o positive evidence whatever in
favour of it (p. 131). His comparative
approach is predicated on the assumption
that we get at interior mental states, if at all,
through language, and that psychological
vocabularies incline men to recognize
psychological capacities and discriminable
modes of consciousness. His inquiry leads
863
him to suppose that LLWehave discovered
grounds enough to conclude that the con-
cept of belief is not expressed in all lan-
guages, which provides occasion to doubt
that there is a universal capacity to be
recognized. . . (p. 175).
In a crucial section of the essay (pp.
64-108)Needham takes up various criteria
that others have offered for establishing the
reality and nature of belief. He challenges
each. Thus, for example, he considers
Humes criterion that belief is marked by a
firmness and strength of conception. He
argues against this view, pointing out that in
ordinary discourse belief statements often
connote uncertainty. Conviction is thus a
most uncertain feature to rely upon in any
objective investigation of belief (p. 92). He
concludes this section by avering that
philosophers have been baffled by the
descriptive task of stating the criteria of
belief, that when they try to describe
belief it proves to be indeterminate and
unanalysable, and that one can conclude
that there are no criteria of belief (p.
108). Where, then, does belief come from?
Needham answers:
From the verb believe, and its inflected
forms, in everyday English usage. State-
ments of belief are the only evidence for
the phenomenon; but the phenomenon
itself appears to be no more than the
custom of making such statements [p.
1081.
There are, we are told, experiential
discriminations.. . that are universally made
by men among their states of mind (p.
136). Some have their locus, as it were, in
the human body, the one thing in nature
that is internally experienced, the only
object of which we have subjective knowl-
edge (p. 139), and these constitute natural
resemblances among men that all men recog-
nize. They permit direct inferences about
certain inner states of other people. Thus
neither familiarity with convention nor
power of analysis is required in order to
grasp something essential to the inner state
of a man who is actually in pain (p. 140).
Further, to attempt, to want, to regret are
modes of consciousness that are fairly
readily identified and differentiated; there
can be, it seems, no language which fails to
provide for their conventional recognition,
864 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
and they are kinds of natural resemblance
among men (p. 144). So, too, are inten-
ding and imagination (but see p. 235).
But belief is not. Imagination is real, belief
is not (p. 135).
Our attention is also directed t o Livy-
Bruhl who warned against a simplistic a p
plication of our concepts of belief and
experience to the thoughts of primitive men.
Primitives, the French theorist supposed, are
not indifferent to a distinction between
belief and experience, but they sometimes
take for experience what we take for belief.
We must be careful, therefore, not to revert
imprudently to the postulate that there is
some definition of experience that is
uniquely and universally valid. Needham
makes of this a radical issue for his inquiry
and for any comparative interpretation of
forms of human understanding:
The concept of experience, which is
commonly treated as though it denoted a
constant possibility of apprehension and
a permanent background to the varieties
of categorical thought, is itself an idio-
cratic and problematical construct [ pp.
171-1721.
Indeed, Needham suggests that some lan-
guages may have no verbal concepts that
are at all equivalent to the acceptations of
experience upon which we have relied in
assessing the status of belief (p. 172),and
the outside observer cannot justifiably
presume a distinction between experience
and belief (p. 174). To the ext ent . . . that
the concept of beiief depends on that of
experience, Lby-Bruhls invalidation of ex-
perience as a term of universal application,
in the comparative analysis of alien con-
cepts, is a further indication that belief
cannot be regarded as a natural resemblance
among men and is not to be expected among
their collective representations (p. 175).
In the last chapter of the essay, Needham
urges that the use of the word belief be
abandoned in ethnographical reports, or in
comparative epistemology (p. 193).
Needham once again asserts his opinion
that conceptions of human capacities are
represented, with immense variation, in the
categories of natural languages, and it is to
language that we have t o look for the
formulation of problems and their resolu-
tion (p. 211). An empirical philosophy
will be advanced by a universal comparative
[76,1974]
analysis of collective representations (p.
216). But because of the relativity intrinsic
to linguistic representation (p. 223), there
will always be some uncertainty and
variability in the categories by which any
language organizes collective thoughts and
actions. We cannot ever achieve an objec-
tive certainty in conceptual analysis (p.
223). Language is an imperfect tool. We do
not always mean what we say or say what
we mean, and, in any event, we risk being
misunderstood. Yet we seek to understand
man through language.
We want, says Needham, to discern a
constant order in the world, and We can
do so only through language, if at all. We
can find distinct orders in different systems
of collective representations, but the
confused and contradictory testimonies of
the numerous cultural traditions argue only
against any universal order underlying
human affairs and concerns (p. 244). I am
not saying that human life is senseless, but
that we cannot make sense of it (p. 244).
Needham ends his book with this aphorism:
The solitary comprehensible fact about
human experience is that it is incompre-
hensible.
In the Introduction to his book Needham
addresses a plea to dissentient colleagues in
social anthropology: that they should
recognize a problem whether or not they
accept his conclusions. I think that most
anthropologists who read this stimulating
book will acknowledge that Needham has
made an impressive case for thinking serious-
ly about belief and not taking the term for
granted. We are in his debt for doing so. One
may anticipate that many ethnographers will
henceforth show greater circumspection in
talking about beliefs. Further, Needhams
inquiry is very likely to stimulate discussion
about our understanding of human nature,
o u r epistemological assumptions, the
significance of analytic philosophy for an-
thropology, and a host of other matters.
I suspect, moreover, that a number of
anthropologists will be impressed, and quite
possibly persuaded, by Needhams argument
regarding the unreality of belief as an experi-
ence. I think that many of us will agree that
there is no distinct feeling or emotion that
distinguishes belief, and that Needham pre-
sents a telling case for concluding that belief
is not a distinct and discriminable experi-
 GENERAL, APPLIED AND THEORETICAL 865

ence. But I suspect that many anthropol- number of twentieth century philosophers
ogists will be far less favorably disposed (Wittgenstein included) have opted for a
toward Needhams argument about the non- dispositional approach to belief, and they
existence of a universal human capacity for have made an interesting case for their point
belief and the radical skepticism and relativ- of view.
ism he espouses. Needham attempts to refute the dis-
Some anthropologists may call for a positional theory by attacking the idea that
common sense approach to the problem belief dispositions have duration:
of a capacity for belief. When we talk about If we inquire further into the mani-
a capacity for belief, they might ask, are festations of the belief disposition, we
we not talking about three capacities? A find that it has certain rather interesting
capacity to generate statements about the characteristics. It has duration, says Witt-
world, a capacity t o remember such state- genstein, and this independently of the
ments, and a capacity to deem them true. duration of its expression in a sentence,
Are we to doubt that all normal men for example. How do we know this? Well,
everywhere have those capacities? Do not there are recurrent acts and utterances
which we regularly designate as signs or
men regularly exercise those capacities? The expressions of belief. These are the
experiences of many anthropologists would evidences that we start from when we
lead them to conclude that men do have identify a persistent state of mind. But
such capacities and that the exercise of them what comes in between these recurrent
is important for culturally organized social signs? Nothing that we know of. And if
life. Whether or not all peoples have distinct we lack such evidence during the inter-
terms for the capacities that s u m to what we missions, in what consists the duration?
call belief is, in this view, immaterial and [p. 1041.
irrelevant. Elsewhere Needham writes: Does one ever
The view sketched above could be related at all say that one has believed something
to more sophisticated suppositions about uninterruptedly? Surely one does n o t . . .
symboling. Anthropologists maintain that all (p. 105). But this line of argument leaves me
normal men everywhere have highly evolved unconvinced.
capacities to create, manipulate, and store If man were burdened by the necessity of
symbols. These capacities and their realiza- having to keep all of his beliefs uninter-
tion are crucial for the possibility of a ruptedly in his conscious awareness, he
human form of existence. Through the would be rather limited BS to what he could
generation of symbols and their storage and retain. Fortunately, we have excellent
transmission in existential and normative storage facilities, and we can file things away
statements the experiences of past genera- in complex archives, retrieving them when
tions are utilized and built upon by succeed- we need them. I believe that studded snow
ing generations. Each generation is freed tires are useful on ice; but in August my tires
both from the burden of having to solve all and my belief are safely tucked away.
problems de nouo by trial and error and
from rigid dependence on in-born mechan-
isms. The capacity for belief is one aspect of References Cited
mans ability to symbol and, in this view, it Goodenough, Ward H.
clearly constitutes a natural resemblance 1963 Cooperation in Change. New
among men. York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Some anthropologists might link the Hahn, Robert A.
above considerations to the matter of dis- 1973 Understanding Beliefs: An h a y
position. In the section of his essay dealing on the Methodology of the Statement
with criteria for belief, Needham attempts to and Analysis of Belief Systems. Cur-
refute several posited criteria In my opinion rent Anthropology 14:207-229.
he does a skillful job in challenging most of Leach. Edmund R.
1967 Virgin Birth. Proceedings of the
them. But I do not think that he is con- Royal Anthropological Institute
vincing when it comes to dismissing dis- 1966:39-50.
position. Disposition, however, is a 1968 Correspondence: Virgin Birth.
criterion of considerable importance. A Man (new series) 3:655-656.
866 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [76,1974]

Price, H. H. gists attention. Goddard gives a succinct if

1969 Belief. London: Allen & Unwin; predictable Structuralist critique of ortho-
New York: Humanities Press. dox British Structural-Functionalism, al-
though he weakens his point by unneces-
sarily simplifying the paradigm and by foot-
Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Criti- noting Ftadcliffe-Brown to the wrong book,
cal Social Theory. ROBIN BLACKBURN, e.g., notes 7, 8, and 9 on pages 66-68.But,
ed. New York: Random House (Pantheon), in 1974 is anyone surprised to be told that
1972 (publication date 1973). 382 pp., fig- normative facts may be shaped by facts
ures, further reading. $8.95 (cloth), $2.95 that are non-normative and which may be
(paper). [Originally published in England by hidden from view (p. 74)? Accepted or
Fontana/Collins, London.] denied, this formulation has been an object
of debate in anthropology for at least a
Reviewed by DAVID J. MCCREERY quarter century. Whether, on the other
University College, London hand, as he goes on to suggest, dialectical
materialism or the deep structures of
Although it seems likely that many Lkvi-Strauss do provide a more adequate per-
readers will wish to dispute specific theses or spective than traditional functionalism is
conclusions offered in this book, social another question. Godelier in his pioneer
anthropologists of whatever ideological 1966 essay reproduced here takes this up,
persuasion should find Ideology intriguing arguing for a rejection of both vulgar materi-
and stimulating. Often such collections fail alism and empiricism in favor of a synthesis
in the attempt to use the essays of several of purified Marxism-Marxism inaugu-
different writers, each of which was pro- rates the modern structuralist tradition (p.
duced in response t o a peculiar problem and 338)-with a modified Lbvi-Straussian
in the context of a peculiar problematic, to theory of structures. His analysis of the con-
support a broad central argument, but Robin tradictions within and between structures is
Blackburn overcomes this difficulty rather not easy to follow but worth attempting,
successfully by drawing his material from a particularly in conjunction with the fore-
limited theoretical perspective. Indeed, two- word t o the 1972 English language edition
thirds of the papers come from a single of Rationality and Irrationality in which he
source, the New Left Review, of which looks at some of the same ideas six years
Blackburn is an editor. At the same time, later.
however, such general theoretical consensus The position represented by Goddard and
does result in an occasional in-house debate Godelier is fairly well known in anthro-
which may mystify the non-initiate. pology, but it is interesting to see how
Together the sixteen papers argue that similar ideas are utilized by practitioners of
ideology is not solely the province of the other disciplines. To summarize here the
sectarian but pervades all social research, in- essays based in sociology, history, eco-
cluding that so often claimed to be value nomics, or political science would be impos-
free: The very notion that social science sible, but a brief indication of some of the
research can be conducted other than on the conclusions will suggest what is available.
basis of the prior development of concepts Martin Shaw applauds Alvin Gouldners dis-
and theories is held to be ideological (p. 9). section, in The Coming Crisis in Western
From the vantage points of various disci- Sociology, of empirical functionalism while
plines the essays explore the failings of in- faulting him for identifying Marxism with
ductive empiricism, examine certain key its disintegrating Stalinist shell (p. 44).
problems in social analysis, and, in a selec- Gareth Stedman Jones draws Marx, Lkvi-
tion of theoretical papers, suggest the Strauss, and Althusser into a consideration
holistic utility of a Marxist-Structuralist of alternatives to the weary process of fact
synthesis. accumulation (pp. 108-109)which, he says,
David Goddards Anthropology: the continues to characterize historical scholar-
Limits of Functionalism and M. Godeliers ship. The value of the concept of contradic-
Structure and Contradiction in Capital tion is studied by both E. J. Hobsbawm
most immediately draw the anthropolo- and Martin Nicolaus, and Norman G e m