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Our Afghanistan policy

Ashraf Jehangir QaziUpdated September 09, 2017

THE National Assembly, the government and the COAS


have categorically rejectedPresident Trumps allegations against
Pakistan. The furious outrage of the political and military elite in
Pakistan brings to mind Hamlets mother who said the lady doth
protest too much, methinks which questions the credibility of
overreactions. The reaction in Pakistan obscures the fact that none of
Trumps charges against Pakistan are new and none of Pakistans
denials are entirely convincing even among Pakistanis. The first
sensible reaction has been from Pakistans much maligned diplomatic
envoys who reportedly urged the government to avoid any knee-jerk
reactions and prefer diplomacy to confrontation.

It is true the US has not provided evidence of alleged Pakistani


assistance to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The border is
porous, people flow back and forth, and complete border control is
impossible. Building border fences unilaterally will exacerbate rather
than alleviate tensions. Moreover, there are legitimate Pakistani
contacts with the political wings of the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqani network apparently to urge them to come to the negotiating
table for a peace settlement with Kabul. However, this is a scenario in
which games can be played and are played.

Pakistans reaction does not take into account that a frustrated Trump,
whose presidency hangs in the balance, may be looking for a splendid
little war to divert domestic attention from his dismal and
embarrassing performance at home and whip up support for the chief
slaying monsters abroad. North Korea is not on the menu because
China would intervene in any American assault. It is less clear what
Chinas reaction would be to another Abbottabad-like assault on targets
in Pakistan beyond robust denunciation.

Alienating Kabul and relying on the Taliban to


provide leverage is demonstrably stupid.
Trumps generals in Washington and Afghanistan approved his
warnings to Pakistan and his authorising them to take any action they
think appropriate without seeking his further approval. These are likely
to be drone attacks and black ops by special forces who do not require
access to air or ground routes in Pakistan. The generals saw the reaction
of Pakistan to the raid on Abbottabad in May 2011 and are not likely to
be deterred from similar or escalated action again. Given the
professional advice of Pakistans diplomats, it is not clear what the
foreign minister meant by a paradigm shift in foreign policy.

The BRICS statement referred to four extremist organisations located in


Pakistan as threats to regional security. They are on the UN terrorist list
and are banned but active in Pakistan. Given Trumps statement, the
China-India disengagement from Doklam, and the Xi-Modi meeting on
the sidelines of the Xiamen summit there is a worrying query: is China
gently but publicly pressing Pakistan to take down organisations on its
territory who have links with insurgents on Chinese territory? If
Pakistan is silly enough to ignore this message it will progressively
upset China and sow doubts in Chinese minds about their strategic
partnership with Pakistan. This would inevitably impact CPEC. If this
happens Pakistan will have kicked itself in the face again!

A central failing of Pakistans regional strategy is its failure to generate


Afghan trust in its policies and in allowing America and the Arabs to
complicate its relations with neighbouring Iran. This has facilitated the
growth of Indian political influence in both countries. The opportunities
presented by President Ashraf Ghanis visit to Rawalpindi in November
2014 after he became president have been wasted. The same mistake
was made with former president Hamid Karzai who spoke of the two
countries as conjoined twins. But instead of learning from failed
policies, self-serving narratives were constructed to demonise Afghan
leaders as Indian puppets. These blunders have cost Pakistan dearly.
What is required in Afghanistan is not a continued American military
presence but Pakistans unqualified support for Kabuls search for a
broad-based political settlement. An unstable Afghanistan will
inevitably negate all the gains claimed for the various counterterrorism
operations inside Pakistan.

The US war on terror in Afghanistan has been an abject failure due to


arrogant militarism and political ignorance. The recent blasphemous
leaflets showered upon Afghans about the Taliban demonstrate an
incorrigible American disdain. US allegations against Pakistan are
motivated by frustration. But Pakistans policies in Afghanistan have
also been counterproductive. Alienating Kabul and relying on the
Taliban to provide leverage is demonstrably stupid. Pakistans policy
has also been unnecessarily India-centric. This alienates Afghan
political opinion and ensures that Pakistan will lose zero-sum games
with India inside Afghanistan. Afghan goodwill for India will not
translate into ill will towards Pakistan unless its policies are seen by
Afghans as forcing upon them an unwanted choice between India and
Pakistan. We need to have more confidence in our natural links with
Afghanistan.

Accordingly, Pakistans regional priorities should include (i) developing


longer-term strategic coordination and regional crisis management
with China; (ii) rebuilding trust with Kabul by convincing it that
Pakistan will have no truck with organisations that take up arms against
it; (iii) avoiding ill-considered and self-defeating Afghan policies that
confound Chinese strategic calculations; (iv) developing a predictable,
substantial, mutually beneficial if non-strategic relationship with the
US to minimise negative policy fallout; and (v) maintaining its
principled stance on the Kashmir dispute, while focusing on a dialogue
with India that (a) helps to alleviate the unspeakable human rights
situation in the Valley and (b) builds on the tentative understandings
reached in the 2005-6 back-channel talks through confidence-building
measures and agreed modalities for APHC and other independent
Kashmiri participation in a settlement process. This is neither easy nor
impossible. A reliable bilateral relationship with Iran is also a priority.

Such an integrated approach could progressively limit Indias


ability to use Afghanistan against Pakistan; improve
Pakistans image in Afghanistan and Iran enabling its views
to elicit sympathy and understanding; and reduce US
suspicion and Indian hostility. This will require strong
leadership; policy realism and imagination; a well-resourced
and influential foreign service; and an intellectually active
foreign policy community. These priorities will need to be
embedded in a national transformation process. Correcting a
dysfunctional Afghanistan and regional policy requires
holistic change, yes, a paradigm shift.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and
head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.

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