Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Plaintiffs,
10-CV-0961
-against-
(GTS)
N.Y.S. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.
Defendants.
ANDREW M. CUOMO
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224-0341
Preliminary Statement......................................................................................................................1
Argument .........................................................................................................................................2
C. The Requested Injunctive Relief Would Substantially Harm the Defendants and
the Public…………………………………………………………………….…..21
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................24
i
Preliminary Statement
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the New York State
United Teachers ("NYSUT") and its political action committee ("PAC"), Voice of Teacher
restrictions imposed by the New York State Board of Elections (the "Board") in enforcing provisions
of the state Election Law. The defendants are the Board and its individual commissioners.
Plaintiffs have also filed an application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a
preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 8. That motion seeks to enjoin defendants from: "1) prohibiting
political action committees from making independent expenditures to support or oppose political
candidates; 2) limiting the contributions that can be made to political committees that make only
independent expenditures; 3) prohibiting unions from communicating with their own members to
support or oppose political candidates or ballot issues outside the context of their regular members
unless they first [comply with certain registration and filing requirements]; 4) requiring political
committees to list the candidates or ballot issues they intend to support or oppose and file committee
authorization status forms prior to making any contributions or expenditures." Id. For the reasons
set forth below, plaintiffs are not entitled to the injunctive relief they seek and their motion should be
denied.
behalf of candidates running for election this Fall. Compl., ¶ 26. Campaign "expenditures" are
direct payments for goods and services related to a candidacy (e.g., direct mail, phone calls, polling)
-- as opposed to contributions to the candidate. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28, 37. "Independent expenditures" are
1
expenditures that are not coordinated with the candidate. Id. at ¶ 27. The Board, however, prohibits
independent expenditures by PACs. Id. at ¶ 43. PACs, such as VOTE-COPE, are restricted to
making contributions, which, for the State Senate, as an example, are limited to $6,000 for primary
Plaintiffs first allege that the Board's prohibition on PACs making independent expenditures
violates their free speech and association rights under the First Amendment. Compl., First Cause of
Action; Pls.’ Mem., 10-13. Second, they claim that the Board's limitations on contributions to
unauthorized committees that make only independent expenditures violate their First Amendment
rights. Compl., Second Cause of Action; Pls.’ Mem. 13-14. Third, plaintiffs allege that NYSUT
may, in the future, be subjected to classification as a political committee if it takes certain actions.
Pls.’ Mem., 3-5. This, according to plaintiffs, would infringe upon the right of NYSUT to
communicate its political views to its members. Id. at 14-15. Finally, plaintiffs allege that Election
Law section 14-118, by requiring unauthorized committees to identify the candidates they intend to
support or oppose when they register with the Board of Elections, acts as an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech. See generally Compl., ¶¶ 16, 55-62, 82; Pls.’ Mem., 5-7, 15-16. Plaintiffs seek
Argument
The standards for issuing a TRO and granting preliminary injunctive relief are the same. See
Harris v. Diaz, 2004 WL 2912888, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. December 14, 2004) (copy attached to Appendix
as Exhibit 1). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy” that may only be
awarded upon “a clear showing” that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
2
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
Moreover,
[w]hen, as here, the moving party seeks a preliminary injunction that will affect
government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory
scheme, the injunction should be granted only if the moving party meets the more
rigorous likelihood-of-success standard. That is, plaintiffs must establish a clear or
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
Sussman v. Crawford, 488 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2007). This is especially true here where the
injunctive relief requested does not merely maintain the status quo, but grants the movants
substantially all the relief they ultimately seek. See Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1988).
It is respectfully submitted that under these controlling standards plaintiffs cannot meet their
While plaintiffs suggest that the Court presume irreparable harm based on their allegation of
a First Amendment violation, Pls.’ Memo of Law ("Pls.’ Mem."), p. 8, the law in this Circuit “has
‘not consistently presumed irreparable harm in cases involving allegations of the abridgement of
First Amendment rights’." New York Civ. Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 675 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
N.Y., 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003)). Instead, “in circumstances in which a plaintiff does not
allege injury from a rule or regulation that directly limits speech, irreparable harm is not presumed
and must still be shown.” Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, plaintiffs’
arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, it is far from clear that the record establishes irreparable
3
harm as to certain of plaintiffs’ claims.
expenditures, involves a statute which “directly limits speech, the irreparable nature of the harm may
be presumed." New York Civ. Liberties Union, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 428. Plaintiffs remaining
arguments, however, do not concern direct speech limitations and they cannot, on this record,
establish that the alleged violations pose any imminent or substantial threat to their First Amendment
rights.
In Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, the Supreme Court found an
abuse of discretion where the lower courts applied a preliminary injunction standard that was too
lenient and “addressed [the relevant] considerations in only a cursory fashion.” Id. at 370, 378, 382.
As the Court explained, an injunction cannot issue merely because it is possible that there will be an
irreparable injury to the plaintiff; it must be likely that there will be. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
It emphasized that: “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm
is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 375-76.
The Second Circuit has also recognized that “a showing of probable irreparable harm is the
single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Reuters Ltd. v.
United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). “A plaintiff
seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of demonstrating [he] will suffer ‘real and imminent, not
remote, irreparable harm’ in the absence of a remedy.” Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
290 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1992)), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 936 (2004). Here, the record presents no basis for finding that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable
harm without the imposition of the injunction with respect to their second, third and fourth claims,
4
which relate to contributions VOTE/COPE might someday make to an unauthorized committee that
is not yet formed, communications by NYSUT to its members and the legality of New York Election
committees that make only independent expenditures violate their First Amendment rights. Compl.,
Second Cause of Action; Pls.’ Mem. 13-14. However, this claim is purely hypothetical. The limits
about which they complain relate to contributions from PACs to an unauthorized committee,
however, plaintiffs concede that they have not created such an unauthorized committee. Therefore,
the contribution limits challenged herein do not, at this point, apply to VOTE/COPE, and cannot
serve as a basis for injunctive relief. See Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d
510, 535 (1986) (“The general rule is that a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment is
premature if the harm to the plaintiff is contingent upon events that may never occur.”); Kamerling
v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (“irreparable harm must be shown to be actual and
imminent, not remote or speculative”); New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 550 F.2d 745, 756
(2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir.
1969)) (Courts must take caution so that A[t]he dramatic and drastic power of injunctive force may
be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual threat; it may not be used
simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of rights."). see also
Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (“irreparable harm must be shown to be
From plaintiffs’ perspective, the third issue concerns an alleged infringement on the right of
NYSUT to communicate its political views to its members. Pls.’ Mem., 3-5, 14-15. As will be
outlined below, defendants strongly disagree with plaintiffs’ characterization of that claim.
5
However construed, it is clear that the alleged harm is hypothetical and contingent and certainly not
imminent. Plaintiffs' allegation, in summary, is that NYSUT may in the future be subjected to
classification as a political committee if it takes certain actions. Id. at 3-5. In and of itself this
argument clearly is speculative. More importantly, however, the adverse designation plaintiffs seek
to avoid would not result simply from their own actions. Under the advisory opinion with which
they now take issue, they would be designated a political committee only if they undertake a
particular type of expenditure and the candidate in whose interest they acted does not then report the
expenditures as a “contribution in kind.” Id. at 4-5, Reilly Aff, ¶¶ 46-48. Consequently, viewed in
the light most favorable to it, NYSUT would suffer an injury only if an as of yet unidentified third
party, i.e. a candidate, took certain actions. The speculative nature of this claim makes injunctive
relief inappropriate. Kamerling, 295 F.3d at 214; New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 550
F.2d at 756.
The final issue raised in the complaint and pending motions concerns the requirement of New
York Election Law section 14-118 that certain types of committees recognized under New York’s
regulatory scheme identify the candidates they intend to support or oppose during an election cycle.
See generally Compl., ¶¶ 16, 55-62, 82. Plaintiff VOTE/COPE is a political action committee
organized under New York law. Id. at ¶ 5. By its own allegation, however, section 14-118 does not
apply to political action committees. Id. at ¶ 58. VOTE/COPE certainly cannot claim to suffer
irreparable injury from a statutory provision to which it is not currently subject. The possibility that
VOTE/COPE might at some future time establish a committee subject to section 14-118, id. at ¶ 60,
or that NYSUT might be deemed subject to the provision as the result of the actions of third parties,
see supra; Pls.’ Mem., 3-5, is purely hypothetical and plainly insufficient to establish irreparable
6
harm at this juncture. Kamerling, 295 F.3d at 214; New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 550
F.2d at 756.
Plaintiffs’ “cries of urgency are [also] sharply undercut by [their] own rather leisurely
approach to . . . preliminary injunctive relief.” Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds To Go, Inc.,
370 F.3d 151, 163 (lst Cir. 2004). Accord, e.g., Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass’n v. Hodel, 872
F.2d 75, 80 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[A] period of delay may . . . indicate an absence of the kind of
irreparable harm required to support a preliminary injunction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.));
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d § 2948.1,
at 156 & n.12. Although Citizens United, upon which plaintiffs largely rely, was decided on January
21, 2010, plaintiffs did not file their application for injunctive relief until the eve of the primary
election season. The Board of Elections Advisory Opinion with which they now take issue was
issued more than thirty years ago. To the extent they claim they may not be able to speak as freely
as they would wish about the rapidly approaching elections, the potential harm they speak of is
caused by their own delay. See, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC v. AT & T Corp., 320
F.3d1081, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We will not consider a self-inflicted harm to be irreparable.”).
enforcement proceeding. Plaintiffs claim that they face punishment for breaking the law, but they
provide only a hypothetical sequence of events that is far too speculative to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief.
The alleged harm depends upon the Board’s instituting and completing an investigation,
which must be preceded by an assessment and review of the matter. Affidavit of Elizabeth Hogan
("Hogan Aff."), ¶¶ 71-72. The harm plaintiffs fear is far from imminent. Indeed, an
overcontribution analysis would not be conducted by the Board until after the completion of the
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2010 election cycle, in or about January, 2011. Id. at ¶ 70. Accordingly, the likelihood that
plaintiffs would suffer anything beyond an investigative proceeding during the life of a preliminary
injunction is remote.
“‘Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable
injury.’” FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980), quoting Renegotiation Board v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). Thus, any burden associated with responding to a
possible future Board enforcement proceeding cannot constitute irreparable harm warranting
In sum, with respect to plaintiffs' second, third and fourth claims, which do not concern
direct speech limitations, plaintiffs cannot, on this record, establish that the alleged violations pose
any imminent or substantial threat to their First Amendment rights. Injunctive relief with respect to
The requested injunctive relief should be denied on the ground that plaintiffs cannot make
the requisite showing of a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits." Sussman, 488 F.3d at
140.
independent expenditures. Compl., ¶¶ 80, 83-85. In support of their argument, plaintiffs rely
heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn., __ U.S.
__, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). See Pls. Mem. pp.11-13. The Court in Citizens United addressed the
8
ability of corporations and unions to make independent expenditures for speech expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 130 S.Ct. at 886. However, VOTE/COPE is
neither a corporation nor a union. Rather it is a PAC. Compl., ¶ 5. As explained by the Court in
Citizens Union, a PAC is a creation of a corporation that has the ability to speak. Id. at 896.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that a PAC "is a 'different animal' from the other types of political
committees.'" Pls'. Mem. p. 9, citing Kermani v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 487 F.Supp.2d
101, 104, n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). Indeed, PACs are created for a specific purpose: to make
contributions. Hogan Aff. ¶ 43. Because the purpose, activities and reporting requirements of PACs
differ from those of corporations, the holding in Citizens United should not be extended to
incorporate PACs.
In New York, a PAC is a political committee created under Election Law. Hogan Aff. ¶¶ 14,
16. PACs, which are created for a specific purpose, may make contributions to candidates, up to
each candidate's contribution level, but may not make expenditures to aid or take part in the
nomination, election or defeat of a candidate. Hogan Aff. ¶¶ 16, 29, 43. Unlike other entities, PACs
are not required to file authorization statements, nor are they required to file Committee
Registration/Treasurer and Bank Information forms. Hogan Aff. ¶¶ 17, 22. PACs are relieved of
these reporting requirements because by their nature, they may only make contributions. As the
contributions are disclosed in both the PAC's campaign finance report and the recipient
candidate/committee's report, the Board is able to obtain the necessary information necessary to
ascertain applicable limits, without the additional disclosures. Hogan Aff. ¶ 29.
Disclosure provisions serve an important public purpose in that they inform the electorate "as
to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976). They further "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
9
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Id. at 67.
Finally, they are "an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of . . .
contribution limitations." Id. at 67-68. New York uses an electronic filing system for campaign
disclosures, which permits the Board to make this information available to the public in an
expeditious manner, thereby providing the highest level of transparency. Hogan Aff. ¶ 10.
Under current New York law and the current electronic filing system used by New York, a
PAC does not, and cannot, report independent expenditures. Hogan Aff. ¶ 43. As such, should
Citizens United be applicable to PACs, the electorate would be deprived of information as to how
much money was being spent and on whom. Put another way, applying Citizens United to PACs
would undermine the important public purposes of disclosure as identified by the Supreme Court in
Buckley.
Notably, in its decision, the Supreme Court distinguishes PACs from other entities. 130
S.Ct. 876, 897. Indeed, unlike pre-Citizens United corporations, it expressly finds that PACs, by
their nature, are afforded the First Amendment right to speech. Id. While the Court discusses the
"onerous restrictions" to which a PAC's speech is subjected, it does not suggest that such restrictions
are impermissible. See id. at 897-98. Indeed, there is, in fact, nothing in Citizens United to suggest
that the Court intended its holding to be extended to PACs, which in New York are created for the
While Citizens United dismissed the corporation’s ability to speak through a PAC as a
potential remedy for the purported constitutional problem, it did so on the basis of sweeping factual
conclusions about PACs that do not apply here. See id. Based upon the burdens associated with
creating a PAC, the Court expressed its concern that “a corporation may not be able to establish a
PAC in time to make its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.” Id. at
10
898. Those concerns are not present factually in this case. First, NYSUT has already established
and operates a PAC. More importantly for purposes of the instant motion, under Citizens United
such, it will be able “make its views known” during this election cycle even in the absence of an
injunction.
In support of their argument that Citizens United applies to PACs, plaintiffs rely upon the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603
F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010).1 See Pls. Mem. pp. 10-12. While the Long Beach court conducted an
extensive First Amendment analysis as set forth in Citizens United, it completely failed to analyze
the distinction between a corporation and a PAC. See 603 F.3d at 694-695. The court ignored the
fact that a PAC, unlike a corporation, is a political creature created solely to make political
contributions. See id. Because the Ninth Circuit does not address the unique purpose and function
In sum, by its very language, Citizens United addresses the ability of corporations and unions
to make independent expenditures to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 886. The
Court did not extend its holding to PACs, which are unique entities created for the sole purpose of
providing contributions to political campaigns and committees. In fact, the Court expressly
distinguished PACs from the corporations at issue in that case. As such, the holding in Citizens
United should not be extended to apply to PACs. Therefore, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a
1 The defendant in Long Beach filed a petition for certiorari on July 28, 2010.
11
2. Plaintiffs Fail To Demonstrate A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Because They
Fail To Demonstrate That New York's Contribution Limitations Violate the First
Amendment
As stated above, the speculative nature of plaintiffs' claim that New York's contribution
limits violate the First Amendment, namely, that the challenged contribution limits do not, at this
point, apply to VOTE/COPE, makes injunctive relief inappropriate. In any event, as noted by the
United States Supreme Court, "a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20, 96 S.Ct.
612 (1976). Consequently, such a limitation is not subject to the strict scrutiny standard applicable
to a limitation upon expenditures. Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL
2737134, *5 (2d Cir. July 13, 2010). Rather, the standard to be applied is whether it is "closely
drawn to match a sufficiently important interest." Id. (internal quotations omitted), quoting,
The rationale behind the lesser standard applied to contributions is based on the "speech by
proxy" nature of contributions. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Commission, 453 U.S.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Thus, a cap on contributions "involves little direct restraint" on speech
because it "does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues."
Id.
12
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United did not disturb the Court's holding in
Buckley or its progeny. See Green Party of Connecticut, 2010 WL 2737134, at 5-6 (applying the
standard set forth in Buckley). Indeed, the Court explained its holding in Buckley and upheld it.
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908. As the Buckley holding has not been disturbed, it is controlling
here.
Plaintiffs challenge the limit on contributions, alleging that if VOTE/COPE were to form an
unauthorized committee, it would be limited in the amount it could contribute. Pls. Mem. pp. 13-14.
Notably, VOTE/COPE does not allege that it currently has such an unauthorized committee, or even
that it intends to create on. See generally, Complaint. In support of its argument with respect to
contributions, plaintiffs rely heavily upon the D.C. Circuit's decision in SpeechNow.Org v. Federal
Election Commn., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See Pls. Mem. pp. 13-14. Plaintiffs' reliance is
misplaced for two reasons. First, SpeechNow.Org. cannot be applied to this case or any other
because it expressly limited its holding to SpeechNow, "an independent expenditure-only group."
599 F.3d at 696. Notably, SpeechNow, unlike the union and PAC plaintiffs here, is an
individuals." Id. at 689. Moreover, in contrast to VOTE/COPE, SpeechNow was not affiliated with
Secondly, and more importantly, the court in SpeechNow.Org relied upon the analysis in
United Citizens to support its holding. Id. at 695-96. United Citizens expressly used the strict
scrutiny standard of review. 130 S.Ct. at 898. However, such a high standard is not applicable in a
case involving political contributions. See id. at 908; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20; Green Party of
Connecticut, 2010 WL 2737134, at 5. The SpeechNow.Org court expressly declined to consider the
standard of review, relying solely on the analysis in United Citizens. 599 F.3d at 696. In cursory
13
fashion, the court found that because a ban on expenditures does not implicate the "anticorruption
interest," a limit on contributions cannot. 599 F.3d at 696. The SpeechNow.Org. court's perfunctory
treatment failed to examine whether contributions to political groups may have a corrupting effect
distinct from expenditures by such groups. Moreover, it failed to apply the proper standard of
review.
interest" blatantly ignores the Supreme Court's holdings in Buckley and its progeny. However, the
Court in Citizens United distinguished its holding from that in Buckley and expressly declined to
consider the precedents involving campaign contributions. 130 S.Ct. at 908-09. Thus, the Citizens
United Court did not determine whether a limitation on contributions to parties for indirect
expenditures is "closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest." Because the holdings in
the contribution cases remain good law, the limitations on contributions must be analyzed using the
It cannot be disputed that defendants here have a legitimate public interest basis to limit
contributions. An "anticorruption interest" has long been recognized as a legitimate basis to restrict
campaign contributions. Green Party of Connecticut, 2010 WL 2737134, at *7; see, e.g., Buckley,
424 U.S. at 26; McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 150, 124 S. Ct. 619
(2003), overruled on other grounds, Citizens' United v. Federal Election Commn. __ U.S. __, 130
2 Plaintiffs also rely upon the D.C. Circuit's decision in Emily's List v. Federal Election Commn.,
581 F.3d 1 (2009) and the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Long Beach Area Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010). See Pls. Mem. pp. 13-14. Notably,
the defendant in Long Beach filed a petition for certiorari on July 28, 2010. Defendants submit that
the reasoning in these cases is flawed and further note that the Second Circuit has not ruled on
whether contribution limits are permissible. However, it has confirmed that the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens Union did not disturb the holding in Buckley. See Green Party of Connecticut,
1010 WL 2737134, at *5.
14
S.Ct. 876, 881 (2010); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389. The anticorruption interest "extends beyond simple
appearance of such influence.'" McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150, quoting, Federal Election Commn. v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431. 456, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
The fact that the contributions at issue here are to a committee rather than a candidate is of
little consequence because the middleman character of the committee does not remove the threat of
corruption. In McConnell, the Supreme Court noted that even contributions to indirect expenditures
may lead to the appearance of corruption. See 540 U.S. at 144-45. Parties receiving contributions to
indirectly assist candidates "serve as 'agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce
Indeed, a recent Supreme Court case amply illustrates the danger of this type of corruption.
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., __ U.S. __, 129 S.CT. 2252 (2009), an individual whose
company had interests in litigation pending before the West Virginia Supreme Court made multi-
million dollar donations to a political organization knows as "And for the Sake of the Kids." The
organization used the funds to make independent expenditures to advance the campaign of a state
Supreme Court judicial candidate who was believed likely to support the donor's interest. Id. at
2257. The candidate won the election and subsequently provided the decisive vote in favor of the
donor's company. Id. The United States Supreme Court found that the large contributions, made to
an independent expenditure committee, created such a substantial risk of actual bias that the judge
should have recused himself. Id. at 2263-65. The mere fact that contributions are made to a conduit,
rather than directly to a candidate, does not diminish the danger or the perception of corruption.
In this case, contribution limits established by the Election Law primarily apply to candidates
seeking office, and are established for the purposes of the Governmental interest in deterring
15
corruption and the appearance of corruption by contributors. Hogan Aff. ¶ 25. These limits, closely
drawn by statute, are specifically determined based upon factors including the geographic scope and
size of the office/district for the candidate, as well as the number of voters registered or enrolled as
may be applicable. Id.; see N.Y. Election L. § 14-114 (setting forth limitations). Therefore, the
contribution limit for a candidate seeking a statewide office, such as governor, is significantly higher
than the contribution limit for an individual seeking a state assembly seat, which would be one of
150 office holders in that body, and the corresponding number of voters therein. Hogan Aff. ¶25; see
Election Law 14-114. Money, in the form of contributions, is influence. Hogan Aff. ¶ 25. As
demonstrated in the facts underlying Caperton, such influence has the very real potential to create
corruption. Accordingly, the contribution limits, which are based upon the office for which each
Plaintiffs allege that NYSUT may, in the future, be subjected to classification as a political
committee if it takes certain actions. Pls.’ Mem., 3-5. Specifically, plaintiffs challenge Board
Opinion #16 (1978) (Reilly Aff, Exh G) which provides that, if a union either circulates a special
edition of its own publication to endorse a candidate or pays for a separate literature which is
enclosed with its regularly scheduled union publication -- and the candidate or the candidate's
committee fails to report the union's expenditures as "contributions in kind," those expenditures
would not be considered to be contributions, and the union would be deemed by the Board to be a
political committee which is subject to certain filing requirements. Id. This, according to plaintiffs,
would infringe upon the right of NYSUT to communicate its political views to its members. Id. at
14-15.
16
As stated in Section A, above, the speculative nature of this claim, namely, that NYSUT
would suffer an injury only if an as of yet unidentified third party, i.e. a candidate, took certain
actions, makes injunctive relief inappropriate. This claim, in any event, vastly overstates the
Apart from the fact that NYSUT may communicate with its members in a variety of ways
without being deemed a political committee (see Reilly Aff, Exh G), there is no allegation that
defendants are prohibiting NYSUT from speaking. The sole consequence of being deemed a
NYSUT would then be obligated to comply with the filing and reporting requirements of Article 14
of the Election Law. These requirements, which simply involve reporting the candidates supported
or opposed by the committee, and the committee's authorization status, impose no prohibition on
speech and only a minimal administrative burden that does not run afoul of the First Amendment.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003) (citation and brackets omitted), the strict scrutiny standard does not
apply to them. Instead, a court analyzes whether the disclosure requirement at issue bears a
U.S. 1, 64, 66, 75 (1976) (citation omitted). Thus, this Court should apply an intermediate standard
of scrutiny.
The Buckley Court listed three important interests such reporting and disclosure
requirements serve. First, they inform the electorate “as to where political campaign money comes
from,” thereby aiding voters “in evaluating those who seek federal office” by placing “each
candidate in the political spectrum” and alerting voters “to the interests to which a candidate is most
likely to be responsive.” Id. at 66-67. Second, the requirements “deter actual corruption and avoid
17
the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations” of the Act.
Id. at 67-68. Those same interests are served by the reporting and disclosure requirements
challenged herein to political committees that make only independent expenditures. As the Court
observed in upholding FECA’s independent expenditure reporting requirements for individuals and
groups other than political committees, “the informational interest can be as strong as it is in
coordinated spending, for disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates’ constituencies.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196-97 (upholding disclosure
requirements for “electioneering communications” against a facial challenge because, among other
reasons, “citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace” have “First
The Board's political committee disclosure requirements will deter corruption and the
appearance of corruption by large contributors to VOTE/COPE. Hogan Aff., ¶ 67. The public and
the press will know who gives large contributions to VOTE/COPE, including for its administrative
expenses, and they can keep watch on candidates and officeholders to see if they change their policy
positions or take legislative actions beneficial to the large contributors’ interests. Id.
In addition, the Board's recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements for political
committees will help the Board and the public “gather[ ] the data necessary to detect violations” of
the state Election Law. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68; Hogan Aff., ¶ 67.
The sole case on which plaintiffs rely in support of this claim, Ariz. Right to Life PAC v.
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Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003), is clearly inapposite. At issue in Bayless was an
Arizona statute which required political committees preparing to make an expenditure supporting or
opposing a candidate to “send by certified mail a copy of the campaign literature or advertisement to
each candidate named or otherwise referred to in the literature or advertisement twenty-four hours
before” mailing, publishing, or broadcasting the advertisement. Id. at 1005. No such “waiting
Nor is the proposition for which plaintiffs cite Bayless, namely that restrictions on
“spontaneous political expression” unconstitutionally burden the speaker’s free speech rights,
implicated by these facts. NYSUT apparently objects to being unable to pay to mail to its members
a newsletter or other written endorsement of a candidate, other than its regularly scheduled
newsletter, without the possibility of being deemed a political committee. Pls.’ Mem., 3-5.
Preparation of such a publication, which presumably would require drafting of endorsement text,
making formatting and layout selections, et cetera, can hardly be characterized as “spontaneous”
speech. Clearly more spontaneous acts, including urging union members at a union meeting to
support or oppose a candidate and endorsing a candidate through statements to the general public or
the media are expressly permitted by the Board. See Reilly Aff., Exh. G.
For all of these reasons, there has been no infringement of NYSUT's right to communicate its
4. Election Law section 14-118 Does Not Act as an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint on
Speech
Finally, plaintiffs allege that Election Law section 14-118, by requiring unauthorized
committees to identify the candidates they intend to support or oppose when they register with the
Board of Elections, acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. Pls.’ Mem., 5-7. Because
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plaintiffs clearly misconstrue the statute, their claim in this regard lacks merit and they cannot
“A ‘prior restraint’ on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses speech - or
provides for its suppression at the discretion of government officials - on the basis of the speech's
content and in advance of its actual expression.” United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (2d
Cir.2005). Section 14-118, which relates primarily to the designation of a treasurer and depository
for political committees, does require that a statement filed with the Board of Elections identify “the
candidate or candidates or ballot proposal or proposals the success or defeat of which the committee
is to aid or take part.” N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-118(1) (2010). The same provision, however, also
specifically provides that “[a]ny change in the information required in any statement shall be
reported, in an amended statement filed in the same manner and in the same office as an original
statement filed under this section, within two days after it occurs. Id. (emphasis added).
The record before the Court clearly establishes that should a committee subject to the
requirements of section 14-118, which VOTE/COPE (and NYSUT, for that matter) is not, wish to
speak out in favor of or opposition to a candidate not currently listed on their registration form, they
clearly could do so the instant they wished to and would then simply be required to amend their
registration certificate within two days. Hogan Aff., ¶¶63-64. By the plain language of the statute it
Reporting and disclosure requirements such as those challenged here have been upheld by
the Supreme Court. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-84 (upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act
's reporting and disclosure requirements). And as outlined above, the burden imposed by disclosure
and reporting requirements such as those at issue here, which currently do not even apply to
plaintiffs, is not a direct burden on the ability to speak, and in any event imposes only the smallest of
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administrative burdens that is far outweighed by the legitimate interests behind those requirements.
The fact that VOTE/COPE is a registered political committee spending money in elections supports
the conclusion that its major purpose is campaign activity. Hogan Aff., ¶61. Such an organization
"devoted almost entirely to campaign spending could not plead that the administrative burdens
associated with such spending were unconstitutional as applied to it.” Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731,
742 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). Yet that is precisely
C. The Requested Injunctive Relief Would Substantially Harm the Defendants and the
Public
“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at
376-77 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There can be no question that
Koerber v. Federal Election Com'n, 583 F.Supp.2d 740, 746 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (citing Buckley, 424
Permitting plaintiffs to evade the challenged campaign finance rule imposed by the Board in
enforcing provisions of the state Election Law would substantially injure the defendants and the
public. Both have a strong interest in enforcing the State's campaign finance laws, thereby
Injunctive relief of the sort now sought also poses a serious risk that the upcoming elections,
especially the primary elections which are just a few weeks away, will not be contested on a level
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playing field. Hogan Aff., ¶¶ 45-49. New York’s Election Law was enacted “to insure fair
elections.” Lauer v. Board of Elections, 262 N.Y. 416, 419 (1933). The Board of Elections has been
statutorily entrusted with the duty to administer the State’s elections and campaign finance practices.
N.Y. Elec. Law § 3-102 (2007). This obligation would be jeopardized if the Court were to enjoin
enforcement of such critical legislative directive so close to the election. Hogan Aff., ¶¶ 45-49.
The Supreme Court has recognized that it is entirely reasonable to require that everyone
“follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process.” McConnell
v. Federal Election Com'n, 540 U.S. 93, 159 (2003). The injunction plaintiffs seek threatens this
basic principle. The statutory regime plaintiffs now seek to modify has been in place for some time.
All groups with an interest in influencing elections have abided by it and, more importantly, have
structured their advocacy strategies in reliance upon it. Enjoining one or more of the provisions now
being challenged poses an undue risk that plaintiffs may be in an unduly advantageous position in
the upcoming elections. Plaintiffs could, for example, be prepared with advertising or advocacy
material in advance of the Court’s ruling and would be free to immediately speak if an injunction
were issued. Other groups, who might have interests contrary to plaintiffs, but are perhaps unaware
of even the pendency of this action3 could, therefore, be caught unaware of a sudden change in the
rules. It simply would be unfair to change the rules at this late date.
It is highly significant here that an injunction would substantially alter the status quo with
respect to electioneering in New York. Once plaintiffs or any of the myriad of similarly situated
interest groups are permitted to spend money, through independent expenditures or previously
3 It should go without saying that New York is a large and diverse state with many different interest
groups. It is hardly a stretch to assume that many interest groups who might wish to speak in the
upcoming elections are completely unaware of this litigation.
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impermissible contributions, that obviously cannot be undone. Such expenditures could
significantly4 affect the elections in a year when all state-wide offices are up for election as well as
the entire State Legislature. Hogan Aff., ¶ 35. Permitting such an influx of new money into the
election without allowing the Board of Elections to address potential gaps in the statutory and
regulatory regime for regulating campaign finances poses a significant threat to the underlying goal
The claims raised here are in some respects quite novel. Injunctive relief that so significantly
alters the status quo should not be granted before the Court has had a complete opportunity to
address the claims and defenses at issue. Money spent cannot be recouped and its impact on voters
obviously cannot be undone. “Though federal courts possess great authority, they lack the power,
once a bell has been rung, to unring it.” Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States, 175 F.3d 132,
143 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Knaust v. City of Kingston, N.Y., 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Finally, there is a significant risk of harm to the State here from issuance of an injunction.
As outlined above, a temporary lifting of the provisions of the Election Law and the Board's policies
challenged herein during the 2010 election cycle, even if limited to plaintiffs, would undermine the
public’s confidence in the integrity of the State campaign financing system. Moreover, New York
has an intricate and detailed campaign finance regulatory structure in place. Sudden and significant
changes like those that would result from the requested injunction pose a very real risk that there
may be gaps in the system that would render the Board of Elections unable to fulfill its statutory
obligation to monitor the upcoming elections. At the very least, these changes would entail
4 According to VOTE/COPE's most recent campaign financial disclosure report on file with the
Board, VOTE/COPE reported an available cash balance of $7,738,880.34. Hogan Aff., ¶ 33.
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additional reporting requirements and would require software changes to the electronic financial
disclosure system maintained by the Board. Hogan Aff., ¶¶ 39-42, 46. These changes would take
time and implementing them in the midst of an election cycle would be enormously difficult. Id. at
¶¶ 39-42, 46.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief should be denied.
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