Ron Christian T.

Eupea

Llb-3

Succession (Sat. 4-6pm; 6:30-8:30pm)

Nora Parulan vs. Rosario Garcia

Facts:

Respondents prayed for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of property.

Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with the
respondents mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents
acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio.
Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the
same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang.
According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for
free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in
such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing
the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of Pedro
Calalang only.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang.7 Pedro
Calalang died.

Issue:

WON the subject property belonged exclusively to Pedro Calalang prior to its transfer to his daughter
Nora

Ruling:

Pedro Calalang is the sole owner of the property prior to the transfer

A close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete
proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents maternal grandparents. The
evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of
Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember
and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal
grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor
was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name
of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of
Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage.
Additionally, the subject property could not be conjugally owned by the second marriage only for the
reason that the name registered in the title is Pedro Calalang married to Elvira Calalang as it
merely describes their civil status.

Worthy to note is that only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate.
At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter
vivos), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that
their father deprived them of their respective shares.

Dolores Hacbang vs. Basilio Alo

Facts:

Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings: Perfecto
Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner Dolores
L. Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang (Bernardo) is a son of
Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.

Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his
properties to his parents and devised the other half - including the subject lot - to his sister Dolores

On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate.5

The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show, however, that the CFI
ordered the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 1957.

On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to have issued TCT No.
169342 over the subject lot in the name of respondent Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled
TCT No. 117322/T-500. However, this Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of TCT No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT No.
(19896) 227644 due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.

Issue:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing

2. WON the subject property was tainted with fraud in securing the TCT

Ruling:

1. Petitioners have no legal standing. Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny
Hacbang, never acquired the title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their
estate. Clearly, the petitioners - who claim to represent the children of Basilio and Maria
Gaborny in the spouses' estate -have no legal right or interest over the subject lot.

The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet they
failed to show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over the
subject lot and the respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot.
Even if we assume that the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certificate of
 title, the bottom-line is that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation
of this title. This right only belongs to the rightful owner of the subject lot.

2. Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether
under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code

Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy.13 As much as possible, a testator's will
is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative.

Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his
compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents.15 Their legitime
was one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate.16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his
parents half of his estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor
of his sister, Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.

On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores
Hacbang Alo, at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was
free to dispose of the subject lot as a consequence of her ownership.

On the above cited jurisprudence, it is clear that both cases focus on the topic of successional rights
of the decedents heirs and the corresponding ruling of the SC in both instances. However, both
cases differ in the manner of transferring the decedents properties. The first case deals with an
intestate proceeding for the facts did not mention of any will. The latter case deals with a testate
proceeding as provided by the facts.

They also differ in the parties in interest. The first case has no issue regarding the legal standing of
the parties for they are considered compulsory heirs with regards to the first marriage. The latter
case however ruled that the petitioners has no legal standing because they are not compulsory
heirs, they are merely representing the compulsory heirs, and that only the compulsory heirs has a
legal standing to question the distribution of the properties of the decedent.

A law that was passed by congress, R.A. 7170 or the Organ Donation Act of 1991 is an interesting
exception to the fundamental rules in succession.

The law on succession as defined in Art. 774 is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which, the
property, rights, and obligations, to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. As can be gleaned in the
definition, only properties, rights, and obligations can be inherited by the heirs of the decedent.
Properties, in its basic definition, are things that are capable of ownership by a natural or juridical
person. Properties can be an immovable or movable one.

Now, R.A. 7170 makes the human body like a property because the main intent of this law is to have
the body of the decedent be donated for medical research advancement or for transplantation. This
is a very different approach on our basic rules in succession because it is nowhere found in Title IV
of the civil code about donating a body, and should be considered as an exception to the general
rules on succession.

Succession can take place whether the decedent made a will called a testamentary succession or
preferred not to or the legal or intestate succession. Succession can also be a mix of testamentary
and intestate succession. Properties, rights, and obligations will be passed through the heirs of the
decedent or to third persons not related to the decedent in the event that the will be included in the
will. The rules governing these types of succession are exhaustively provided under our civil code.

R.A. 7170 provided that for a body to be donated, it must be made by will or any document other
than a will as provided by Sec. 8 of the said law by the testator. Section 4 of the law provided the
individuals who, in the absence of actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent or actual
notice of opposition by a member of the immediate family of the decedent, may donate all or any
part of the decedents body. This is the only exception of the law in case of the absence of a will.

Much like the will on succession, the will on R.A. 7170 provides that the legacy may be made to a
specific legatee or without specifying a legatee as provided in Sec. 8(c) thereof:

The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or without specifying a legatee

However, the same section provides for the exceptions regarding the absence of the legatee. To wit:

If the legacy is made to a specified legatee who is not available at the time and place of
the testator's death, the attending physician or surgeon, in the absence of any expressed
indication that the testator desired otherwise, may accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy
does not specify a legatee, the legacy may be accepted by the attending physician or
surgeon as legatee upon or following the testator's death. The physician who becomes a
legatee under this subsection shall not participate in the procedures for removing or
transplanting a part or parts of the body of the decedent.

On the above stated provision, it is clear that only the physician or a surgeon is entitled to the body
of the decedent in case of the absence of the legatee at the time and death of the testators death or
when the testator did not specify a legatee. This is the different in the rule on succession because
the compulsory heirs are the rightful heirs of the properties of the decedent and not third persons.

The rules on R.A. 7170 may be different than what we have already known by studying law, but as
we all know, laws have exceptions and this for me, is the exception on the rules of succession.