Estate of K.H. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co.

FACTS: The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H.
Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having
guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity
agreements. The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the
twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for
the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the lower court, by
order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were
not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor
(Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable
to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.
ISSUE: Whether the Contract of Guarantee is transmissible to the heirs of K.H. Hemady?

RULING: YES. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his
estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment
is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of
the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has
evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is
marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor
does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal
inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it
accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that
the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This
reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be
made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being
exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but
must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract
itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted
for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate
upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a
mortgage indicates nothing more than the companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of
the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are not
transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law
expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article
300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726),
partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that
regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is
extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one who is obliged
to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and
sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that
the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of
guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening
incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has
contracted; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also
be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts
themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death
to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under
section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43
Phil. 810, 814).
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estates liability for premiums and stamp
taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of
action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Union Bank vs. Santibanez
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May
31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980. Sometime in
February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died,
leaving a holographic will. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund
and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. On August 20, 1981, a
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were
sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same
and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address
or the date of his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola. The R.T.C and C.A. ruled in favor of Florence Ariola.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the partition is valid? (2) Whether or not the heirs assumption of the debt is
valid?
RULING: 1st issue: NO. The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition
in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the
obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall
be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund
and Florence, my children.

We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his
will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors.
This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties
of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate
courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.[26] Every act
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the
court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no showing
that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed,
the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
2nd issue: NO. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness
of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any
such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedents
estate in the probate court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:[31]

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.[32]

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim
with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the
said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated
August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines[34] However, the documentary evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of
assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented
during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by
the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107
SCRA 504).[36]
ALVAREZES vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS: The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which
were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Aniceto Yanes
was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado
and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not
clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time
up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her
brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. The heirs of Yanes then
filed a case against the Alvarez for reconveyance of the land. During the pendency of such case, Alvarez
sold the said lots to Dr. Siason. The R.T.C. ruled that they cannot go against Dr. Siason as he was a buyer
in good faith. But the R.T.C. and I.A.C. ordered the heirs of Alvarez to pay the monetary value of lots 773
A and 773 b to Yaneses for they have inherited the liability of their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have inherited the liability of their father?

RULING: YES. Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and
773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo
Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.

Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except
in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the
value of the property received from the decedent.

As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated
and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
 Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.

The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights

and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation
is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of
their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties
left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents,
we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
Maria Uson vs. Maria Del Rosario and Nebredas

FACTS: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by
her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute
without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant appellants are entitled to the lands?

RULING: NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no
dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the
late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this
background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized
of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657,
old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of
the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave
upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it
be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).

But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for
the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be
declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already
stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
Tasiano Ongsingco vs. Jose De Borja

FACTS: It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de
Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate
estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a
second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The
validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding. The relationship between
the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and
counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination
in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a
century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir
and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr. Ongsingco thereafter assailed the invalidity of the
agreement contending that there a decision coming from the probate court before the agreement,
based on the case of Guevarra vs. Guevarra.

ISSUE: Whether or not there should be a decision coming from the probate court?

RULING: NO. the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an
examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2
of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco

shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in

the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to
any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last
Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed
to her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases
at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance
by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or
legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen
of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law
favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana
Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore,
barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco
de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the
prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can
not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of
Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose
estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the
estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned
from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of
her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such
alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not
be forbidden.
Bonilla vs. Barcena

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra. On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to
dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the
complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. On August 4,
1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August
14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked
for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the
hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in
interest and has no legal personality to sue. Motions for reconsiderations were filed but again denied by
the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the minors can substitute their mother?

RULING: YES. The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal.
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata
Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that
when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty
of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata
Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground
that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of
his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial
declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for
the deceased plaintiff.

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to
whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the
causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to
quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property
rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent
Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her.
But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that
the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to
appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only
asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as
guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the
respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors
and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known
that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff
has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
Heirs of Conti vs. Rosario Cuario

FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the
property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa
Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T15374, with a house erected thereon.[1] On 17 March 1986
Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.[2] Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents
Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo,
Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo,
Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and
Norma A. Sampayo, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo
acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral
relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTCBr. 54,
Lucena City. The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that
private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo.[4] On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as party-defendant by
his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti. The
R.T.C. and the C.A. ruled in favor of the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.

ISSUE: 1st issue: Whether or not publication is necessary in an intestate succession to allow partition?
2nd isue: What is intestate succession?

RULING: 1st issue: NO. There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential
before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in
Quison v. Salud [31] -

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs,
but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no
evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro
Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this
point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a
person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law,
subject to theclaims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of
paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death
of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of
Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494[32] of the Civil Code,
from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so
demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been
for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value.[33] But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from
her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The
applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -

Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously
maintained by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether theplaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if
answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should go to
which co-owner.[34]Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by
preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as
collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a
niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before respondent
Court of Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of
filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on
non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation
of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged
daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were
incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida
testified on matters merely narrated to her.[35]
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent
and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private
respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property
by way of legal or intestate succession.
2nd issue: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.[36] Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person
dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity.[37] If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[38] It was established during the trial that Lourdes died
intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the
collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Valente Raymundo vs. Teofista Isagon and Suarez

FACTS: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez[4] marriage was blessed with both material wealth
and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,[5] Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and
Reggineo,[6] all surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains regime, they acquired numerous properties. After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955,
Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez,[7] executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate,[8] partitioning Marcelo Sr.s estate. In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal
Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the formers shares of stock, were
sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion
Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal
Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs for damages
in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.[9] When the judgment of the CFI became
final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24,
1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs
were the highest bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a
result, a certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in their favor on August 1, 1983.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale over the subject
properties. Before the expiration of the period of redemtion, the heirs of Marcelo Suarez
instituted Civil Case no. 51203. In which case, the R.T.C. ruled that the subject auction sale be
declared null and void. In another case, Civil cases 21376 and 21379, the C.A. ordered that
Teofista Isagon and heirs of Marcelo Suarez vacate the lands owned by Marcelo. The Supreme
court in this case reversed such ruling raciocinating that:

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner [herein
respondents] and private respondents [petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria
Concepcion] and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, [w]e
cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and
the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with,
only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should have been the subject
of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the
institution of the case:

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.

Article 888 further provides:

The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of

the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
 The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:

If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving

spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants.

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of
each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners
[herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of their mother
[Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo Sr.].
Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting
the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its
Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.

Thereafter, various pleadings were filed by both parties. There comes a point wherein branch 151 of
Pasig Court declared the the ruling by the Supreme Court be reversed in accordance with the
pronouncement declared in the case of Yaptinchay that heirs of Marcelo be declared first as his heirs
before partition of the property and the constitution of their title as heir of Marcelo must be filed in a
special proceeding and not in a Civil one. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment made by branch 151 of Pasig Court, based on the case of
Yaptinchay, is valid?

RULING: NO. Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario,[34] herein respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action
to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista and thus, Marcelo Sr.s
heirs has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court inSuarez v. Court of Appeals.[35] True,
this Court is not a trier of facts,[36] but as the final arbiter of disputes,[37] we found and so ruled that
herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been
settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In
short, petitioner Valentes, Violetas, Virginias, and Maria Concepcions representation in the RTC that our
ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased,
Marcelo Sr., is wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine
that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
There is clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled
issue i.e., herein respondents status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as
legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove
their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.s and Teofistas paternity of
herein respondents, and the latters status as legitimate children:

1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents,
questioned the RTC, Branch 151s Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA
ruled against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latters status as legitimate
children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and[38]

2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as
children of Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof,
bound by the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res
judicata.[39] We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the
conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the CAs factual finding of herein
respondents status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that the proprietary interest of
[herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of
[Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but
through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.].
Clearly, herein respondents long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista
cannot be indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.

Articles 262,[40] 263,[41] 265 and 266[42] of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelos
death, support the foregoing conclusion, to wit:

Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:
 (1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;

(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
from the same;

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from
the recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a
proper case, any of his heirs.

If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in
the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term
shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.

Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCTs was
dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate any proof or even a semblance of it that they had
been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the
records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.s estate, which
explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.s legitimate children and heirs. The same
document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofistas paraphernal properties,
and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there
is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject
properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment
obligation is solely Teofistas, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of
properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were,
in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s death, by
virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by
operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 [43] of
the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group
of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession.[44] The portion that is so
reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as that part of the testators
property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are,
therefore, called compulsory heirs. Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs,[45] excluding
secondary compulsory heirs,[46] and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the
decedents estate.[47]

Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.s estate in 1957, it must be stressed
that herein respondents rights to the succession vested from the moment of their fathers
death.[48] Herein respondents ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became
absolute upon Marcelos death, although their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso.
Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofistas
judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofistas ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente
does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only
a portion of the subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and
sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein
respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties.
Heirs of the Late Domingo Nicholas vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company

FACTS: Spouses Domingo and Josefa Nicolas are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located
at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 156339 and
156341 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On these lots is the residential house of spouses Nicolas and
their two children, herein petitioners.These properties are conjugal. On May 19, 1986, Domingo Nicolas
passed away. On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Among
the records destroyed were the original copies of TCTs Nos. 156339 and 156341. In 1991, the LRA
approved the application and ordered the reconstitution of the destroyed TCTs but only in the name of
applicant Josefa Nicolas. In 1998, petitioners learned that their mother mortgaged the lots with the
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., herein respondent; that the mortgage had been foreclosed; that
respondent had the land titles consolidated in its name; and that respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession (LRC Case No.
Q-8019[96]) which was granted on January 15, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion to quah the writ of
possession but was denied by both the R.T.C. and C.A. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of late Domingo were entitled to the portions of the land of Domingo
Nicholas?

RULING: YES. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition
for certiorari, invoking our ruling in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad[2] which reads:

The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit,
the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be
driven to an action in law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a
process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it
has power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious
litigation. But where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did
not acquire his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a
mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court
has no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the decree.Thus, it was held
that only parties to the suit, persons who came in under them pendente lite, and
trespassers or intruders without title, can be evicted by a writ of possession. The
reason for this limitation is that the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor will a
question of legal title be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the
power of the court to put a purchaser in possession. A very serious question may arise
upon full proofs as to where the legal title to the property rests, and should not be
disposed of in a summary way. The petitioner, it is held, should be required to establish
his title in a proceeding directed to that end.
Here, petitioners as children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of spouses Nicolas, acquired ownership of
portions of the lots as their legitime upon the death of their father or prior to the foreclosure of
mortgage and the filing by the respondent of its petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Consequently, petitioners are strangers or third parties therein whose rights cannot be
determined as they were not impleaded by respondent. Verily, they should not be deprived of their
legitime by the enforcement of the writ of possession. Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession should
not include parts of the two lots pertaining to petitioners.

Records indicate that the estate of Domingo Nicolas has not been judicially or extra-judicially settled.

It is basic that after consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right[3] and its issuance to a purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[4] However, considering the circumstances obtaining in this
case and following our ruling inRivero de Ortega, earlier cited, we hold that such writ of possession
should apply only to the share of Josefa as may be determined in Civil Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any
other proceeding that may be instituted by petitioners for the purpose of settling the undivided
estate of Domingo Nicolas.