1. Intervention: G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012 LORENZA C. ONGCO vs. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain
purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy,
however, is not a right. The rules on intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy
of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.

It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must
not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice
to the original parties that the intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is
not more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. To help ensure that delay does not result
from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.

In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight, this Court explained intervention in this wise:

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession
of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character
so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material,
a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect
and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to
intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."

Indeed, in Manalo v. CA, the Court said:The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court
x x x."After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically, intervention is not an independent
action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.

There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise,
undue delay would result from many belated filings of motions for intervention after judgment has already been rendered, because a
reassessment of claims would have to be done. Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted privilege to intervene will be rewarded,
while the original parties will be unduly prejudiced. This rule should apply more strictly to land registration cases, in which there is a
possibility that a great number of claimant-oppositors may cause a delay in the proceedings by filing motions to intervene after the
trial court sitting as a land registration court has rendered judgment.

Petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to exceptionally allow intervention even after judgment has been rendered by the MTC
in the land registration case. She cites instances in which this Court allowed intervention on appeal. However, the cases she cited are
inapplicable to the present case, because the movants therein who wanted to intervene were found by the Court to be
indispensable parties. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they had to be joined because, without them, there could
be no final determination of the actions. Indeed, if indispensable parties are not impleaded, any judgment would have no effect.

In Galicia v. Manliquez, the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found that the defendant-intervenors were indispensable parties,
being the indisputable compulsory co-heirs of the original defendants in the case for recovery of possession and ownership, and
annulment of title. Thus, without them, there could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they certainly stood to be
affected by any judgment in the case, considering their "ostensible ownership of the property."

In Mago v. CA, the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land that was mistakenly awarded by the NHA to another awardee.
Thus, the latter was given title to land with an area that was more than that intended to be awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled
the title mistakenly awarded and ordered the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the mistakenly awarded title filed a
Petition for injunction to enjoin the NHA from cancelling the title awarded. The Petition was granted and the judgment became final.
The other awardee filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a Petition for Relief from Judgment, which were both denied by the trial
court. The CA affirmed the Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however, found that the intervention should have been granted,
considering the indisputable admission of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the rightful awardee of half of
the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor stood to be deprived of his rightful award when the trial court enjoined the
cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the subdivision of the lot covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other
words, was directly affected.
2. modes of discovery: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991

FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having
been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out Some Portions
of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the
opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of
which the PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed
an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and
inspection of documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an
opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND
THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PCGG.

HELD:

1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is
axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to
the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to
represent or act for the State.

2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already
been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and
even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these
documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
Modes of discovery: SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIAand LETICIA AFULUGENCIA,-versus - METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and
EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan,

G.R. No. 185145 Feb 5, 2014

Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. and Emmanuel L. Ortega
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City,

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff
of the Malolos RTC.

After the filing of the parties pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobanks officers to appear and testify as the petitioners initial witnesses during the August
31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as
well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan

Metrobank filed an Opposition10 arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated
motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and that pursuant to Sections
1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse parties may not be compelled to appear and
testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories.

Petitioners submitted a Reply12 to Metrobanks Opposition, stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing
of Metrobanks Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality,

On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order13 denying petitioners Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum, thus: Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 pleading for leniency in the application of the Rules and claiming
that the defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobanks Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice

In an Opposition16 to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted on the procedural defect of improper notice of hearing,
arguing that the rule relative to motions and the requirement of a valid notice of hearing are mandatory and must be strictly observed.
The trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena is not a litigated
motion; it does not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. For these reasons, the Motion need not be heard.

The CA dismissed the petition Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the Court allow the issuance of the
subpoena, petitioners assert that the questioned Motion is not a litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the issuance of process.
They insist that a motion which is subject to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an application for relief other than
a pleading; since no relief is sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice requirements may be done away with.

Petitioners add that the Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and that Metrobanks filing of its Opposition be
considered to have cured whatever defect the Motion suffered from.

Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment30 that the subject Motion for the issuance of a subpoena is a litigated motion, especially
as it is directed toward its officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence would affect it as the adverse party in the civil case.
Thus, the lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper.

Issue: WON the ca committed reversible errors in requiring notice and hearing for a mere motion for subpoena of respondent
banks officers when such requirements apply only to deposition under sec. 6, rule 25, rules of court.

Held: The Court denies the Petition.

On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena; in fact, it filed a timely
Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories
are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate
the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will
most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead,
the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and
thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party
from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present
documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be
allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobanks officers who are
considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized
agents34 as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and
evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse
party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony
in court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of
justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from
the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
3. Consolidation: ROMEO TESTON, represented by Conrado Colarina vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. NO. 144374 November 11, 2005

This case involves the consolidation of two cases for the sale of property to the DAR (SCC no. 4242 and 4243).

Facts: On November 3, 1993, petitioner Romeo Teston, through his attorney-in-fact, Conrado Colarina (petitioner), filed a complaint
against respondents Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR Secretary) for the determination and payment of just compensation of two parcels of agricultural land,
docketed as SCC No. 4243.

In his complaint, petitioner alleges that: he is the owner of the said two parcels of agricultural land, situated inBarangay Lantangan,
Mandaon, Masbate, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-6176 and TCT No. T-6177, having purchased the same from
DBP by way of Deed of Conditional Sale dated July 15, 1987;

Colarina, voluntarily offered to sell the said parcels of land to the DAR Secretary, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657; the DAR Secretary accepted the voluntary offer to sell.

The DBP, without notifying him and ignoring the Conditional Sale, transferred the parcels of land to the Government, through the DAR,
for the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and immediate distribution to farmer beneficiaries;

After execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale in his favor, DBP has no more right to sell and transfer to the DAR the subject properties,
which were already previously voluntarily offered for sale by him and accepted by the DAR.

On the same day, Colarina filed his own personal complaint against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), LBP and the
DAR Secretary for the determination and payment of just compensation of fifteen parcels of agricultural land, docketed as SCC No.
4242.

Colarina alleged that: the said fifteen parcels of agricultural land, situated in Barrio Malaran and Lamintao, Municipality of Dimasalong
(now Uson), were mortgaged by the Associated Agricultural Activities, Inc. (AAA) to the GSIS as security for the payment of its loan;
when AAA failed to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage on the lands, at public auction, GSIS was the highest bidder; on May
19, 1988, certificates of sale were issued and registered in the name of GSIS; on December 8, 1988, he bought the lots from AAA;

He voluntarily offered to sell said properties to the DAR under R.A. No. 6657; on May 6, 1989, he informed GSIS of his offer to sell the
properties to the DAR; subsequently, GSIS consolidated ownership over the lots in its name; on November 5, 1990, GSIS executed a
Deed of Transfer in favor of the DAR, by virtue of which, TCT Nos. T-7882 to T-7891 were issued on December 11, 1990 in the name
the Republic of the Philippines by the Register of Deeds of Masbate; on April 16, 1991, TCT Nos. T-94 to T-103 were issued in the
names of farmer beneficiaries; despite repeated demands, the LBP and the DAR refused to determine and pay the just compensation
for the lots.

Both cases were raffled to RTC, Masbate, Branch 48.

In separate Answers in SCC No. 4243, respondents DBP, LBP and the DAR Secretary commonly averred that petitioner has no cause of
action since he was never the owner of the properties under TCT Nos. T-6176 and T-6177 because DBP rescinded the Deed of
Conditional Sale for nonpayment of the purchase price.

On the other hand, in separate Answers in SCC No. 4242, respondents GSIS, LBP and DAR Secretary contend that Colarina has no cause
of action since he is not the owner of the lands he voluntarily offered for CARP coverage; he only bought from AAA the right to redeem
the property and he failed to exercise such right on May 19, 1989, within the one-year period allowed by the law.

Without any order of the RTC expressly consolidating SCC No. 4242 and No. 4243, a notice of hearing of both cases was sent to the
parties by the clerk of the RTC. In an Order dated November 16, 1994, the RTC terminated the pre-trial in both cases.

The RTC Dismissed SCC 4242 and 4243

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC order. The Petitioner filed a MR, but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in moto proprio consolidating both cases (SCC 4242 and 4243) without an order for consolidation?

Ruling: Yes the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in setting the joint trial of the two cases. Consolidation should be denied when prejudice
would result to any of the parties or would cause complications, delay, cut off, or restrict the rights of a party.
In the present case, although both cases which were raffled to the same branch of RTC Masbate (Branch 48), involve the prayer for
determination and payment of just compensation, and petitioner and Colarina are represented by the same counsel, Pejo Buenviaje
& Associates, and respondents LBP and DAR Secretary are common defendants, these are not sufficient justifications for joint trial and
joint order dismissing both cases. It cannot be denied that there is no real identity of parties, facts or rights asserted. SCC No. 4242
was instituted by Colarina in his own name principally against GSIS and concerns fifteen parcels of agricultural land in Barrio Malaran
and Lamintao, Municipality of Dimasalong (now Uson), Masbate, while SCC No. 4243 was instituted by petitioner represented by
Colarina principally against DBP and concerns two parcels of agricultural land in BarangayLantangan, Mandaon, Masbate.
Furthermore, a perusal of the complaints in SCC Nos. 4242 and 4243 plainly shows that Colarina claims ownership as redemptioner
while petitioner claims ownership as buyer. Clearly, the causes of action in the two cases arose from different events or transactions,
involve different issues, and ultimately will depend on different evidence.

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction,
involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over
the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any
of the parties. The obvious purpose of the rule allowing consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits to guard against oppression or
abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and its
action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion.
4. Demurrer: Casent Realty v. Philbanking GR 150731 sept 14,2007
Facts: Casent failed to pay so Philbanking filed complaint for ca ction. In Answer, Casent-alleged dacion en pago
that extinguished all their obligations + confirmation agreement. No amicable settlement in the pretrial. Dem
er to evidence Failed to submit reply to answer. So admitted genuineness of dacion en pago. RTC granted
demurrer, CA ; Reversed
Held: WON failure to reply is equal to judicial admission. the failure to specifically deny such documents is equal
to an admission. So demurrer properly is granted! Should deny under oath actionable documents. If actionable
documents alleged in the answer, should deny specifically in the reply.
Demurrer not only on the basis, of the plaintiffs evidence, but all matters which are already in the records.
5.Judgment based on compromise: NESTOR T. GADRINAB vs. NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO ANDELENA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 194560 June 11, 2014

Respondents entered into compromise agreement with the petitioner. It attained finality. However, petitioner questioned its validity.
The court ruled that a judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is
immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars
courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact
or law. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced. It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation
has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result. Its validity is dependent upon the fulfilment of the requisites and
principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy,
and public order. When given judicial approval, a compromise agreement becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties.
Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It
is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or Page 19 of 82 Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March
2015) Remedial Law forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an
instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

6. Interlocutory order: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO ROXAS CHUA G.R. No.
110147 April 17, 2001

If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final. Once determined to be final, the order may be the subject of an appeal.

Relying on Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, the CA ruled that a defendant may appeal a judgment of default without
need to set aside the order declaring him in default. The private respondent can appeal from the denial of the Motion to hold in
abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void.

In its Decision, the CA stated that parties in default did not need to have the order of default against them lifted before they could
appeal. In other words, a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, as provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules
of Court (in effect at the time), which states: Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders shall be
subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the
merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.

A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.

It has been held that [a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It refers to something between the commencement and end
of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. Conversely, a final order is
one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final
is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does
not, it is final.

In the present case, the April 10, 1992 Order denied private respondents Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of
Sale of his Club Filipino share and to declare the sale void. After rendering the Order, the trial court did not need to do anything more
to settle the rights of the parties. Upon the affirmation of the validity of the sale, the Certificate of Sale was to be delivered to petitioner
as the new owner. Indeed, while appeal does not lie against the execution of a judgment, it is available in case of an irregular
implementation of a writ of execution as in the present case.
7. Remedy against judgment: DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND
DOMINGO CABACUNGAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 20058.

New Trial/MOR Summary: March 3, RTC dismissed the case. Petitioner filed an MOR on March 18. RTC denied the MOR and
received the notice on July 22; Petitioner filed an appeal on July 27. Court a quo denied it for being late. SC: to standardize, allow a
fresh period of 15 days to file notice of appeal in RTC counted from receipt of order dismissing the motion for new trial or MOR Facts:
Petitioner Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgement and titles of land and /or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before RTC against respondents. Petitioners filed motion to declare the respondents in default while
respondents LBP and Heirs of Del Mundo filed a motion to dismiss. RTC declared Bureau of Lands and BFD in default except the heirs
because the substituted service of summons was improper and the motion to dismiss denied. Respondent Heirs filed MOR as the
action had already prescribed. RTC granted. Petitioner received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and filed a MOR in
March 18, 1998. RTC denied the MOR and petitioner received a notice on July 22, 1998. On July 27, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
which was denied by court a quo for being filed 8 days late. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under rule 65. CA
dismissed the petition. CA denied their MOR.

Petitioners argument: upon denial of MOR, they have a fresh 15 day period to file the notice of appeal. Trial Court: MOR only
interrupted filing of notice of appeal.

Issue: WON there is a fresh 15 period after denial of MOR. Yes

Held: the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules; under BP 129, Sec 39 it is 15 days from notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Also Rule 41 Sec 3 of Rules of Civil Pro states that it be 15 days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Final order;

Defined In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal
of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that
they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Also needs definite time for finality. According to
BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP129, however,
reduced this appeal period to 15 days. Reason: shorten period of appeal and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is
an essential part of our judicial system and rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated
that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in
the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and
to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling
reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize, allow a fresh period of 15
days to file notice of appeal in RTC counted from receipt of order dismissing the motion for new trial or MOR. this "fresh period rule"
shall also apply to 1. Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; 2. Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; 3. Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
and 4. Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Rule not inconsistent with Rule 41, Sec 3 This pronouncement is
not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.
It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that
the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Rule not inconsistent
with BP 129, Sec 39. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration

8. Remedy against judgement: WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, CHI TIM CORDOVA AND ROBERT TIONG KING YOUNG vs.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION G.R. No. 153867 February 17, 2005

FACTS:nWTC obtained from respondent a loan in the amount of US$75,000, with 8.75% interest per annum, as evidenced by a
Promissory Note, signed by Cordova and Young as representatives of WTC. Cordova and Young executed a Surety Agreement binding
themselves as sureties of WTC for the loan. Respondent bank made a final demand for WTC to pay its obligation, but petitioners failed
to pay. Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay it $75,603.65 or P2,018,617.46 plus interest, penalty, attorneys fees
and other expenses of litigation; and the cost of suit.

In their Answer, petitioners stated that WTC obtained the $75,000 loan; that Cordova and Young bound themselves as its sureties.
They claimed that only one demand letter, dated was made by respondent. They added that the promissory note did not provide the
due date for payment. Petitioners also claimed that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date was purposely left blank, to be
agreed upon by the parties at a later date. Since no maturity date had been fixed, the filing of the Complaint was premature, and it
failed to state a cause of action. They further claimed that the promissory note and surety agreement were contracts of adhesion with
terms on interest, penalty, charges and attorneys fees that were excessive, unconscionable and not reflective of the parties real
intent. Petitioners prayed for the reformation of the promissory note and surety agreement to make their terms and conditions fair,
just and reasonable. They also asked payment of damages by respondent.

The RTC, rendered decision that the judgment is rendered based on the pleadings filed by the opposing parties and the documents
annexed thereto. The defendants are ordered to pay solidarily and to pay the stipulated interest of 8.75% per annum to be reckoned
from the date that the obligation was contracted until the filing of this suit. Thereafter, the legal rate shall apply. Petitioners appealed,
but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred when it affirmed the RTCs judgment on the pleadings.

HELD: Petitioners argue that a judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered because their Answer tendered genuine issues and
disputed the material allegations in the Complaint. In this case, at issue is the propriety and validity of a judgment on the pleadings.
Both the RTC and Court of Appeals recognize that issues were raised by petitioners in their Answer before the trial court. The essential
question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. This is the distinction between a proper case of
summary judgment, compared to a proper case for judgment on the pleadings.

In sum, no cause to disturb the findings of fact the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the RTC as to the reasonableness of the interest
rate of 8.75% per annum on the loan. No persuasive reason to contradict the ruling of both courts that the loan secured by petitioner
WTC, with co-petitioners as sureties, was payable on demand. Respondents complaint could not be considered premature. Nor could
it be said to be without sufficient cause of action therein set forth. The judgment rendered by the trial court is valid as a summary
judgment, and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals.

9. Remedy against judgment: JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting
in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No.
199283 June 9, 2014

A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be
filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed
period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required
because a petition for relief from judg-ment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to
erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order
to put an end to litigation. In the present case, [Contreras] counsel received a copy of the RTCs decision dated September 13, 1993
on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment should have been filed on or before November 14, 1993. However,
the records showed that the petition was filed only on December 15, 1993, or ninety-one (91) days later.

A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding and
within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and
should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court
which rendered the assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal,
considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision
on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of
appeal for having been filed out of time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the
reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsels failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake
or excusable negligence.