1..

G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission
on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld."

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:

"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and
exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her
right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1 (as
originally underscored)

The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque."2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly
proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions
regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.

We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC,
no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of
her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that
the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
 1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has
already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First
Division that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o
candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed.
Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become
final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that
will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five
(5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That
did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed.
Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled.
She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a
restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision
adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She
would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will
have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at
the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law
into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was
final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that
the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision,
unrestrained, moves from promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of
Rule 18 it is stated:

Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be
made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys
personally or by registered mail or by telegram.

5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation
on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision
on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal
way to remove the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two
days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her
proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on
the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as the very reason
to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it
is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.

7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she directs, as well as in
her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies
the COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the
COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial
actions thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that
she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the
objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless
proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.

8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is
NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation,
was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to
decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The
bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days
from 14 May 2013.

9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First
Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May
2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the
Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was
indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with
the Supreme Court decision as basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for a writ of
Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.

a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best
indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the
case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; x x x and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing
and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x
x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.6

It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the COMELEC
summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL
COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be
adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration.
She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in
order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue
her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately,
she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or
right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires that
she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it
is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent
resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30
2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of
a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No.
9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the
assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1wphi1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this
effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present
in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already
part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact
that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did
petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not
present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her
natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since
she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is
deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner,
however, failed to clear such doubt.7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the
petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of
petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions
that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and
unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of
the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular,
not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear
though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House
because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate
of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux
of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is
yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be attributed, as the
dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the
exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was
done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner
can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained in a letter to the
members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the
Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind
petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is
terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court
exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal
of the petition by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal
consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's
Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having
sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her
interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of
Judgment is ordered.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Footnotes

3 "The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or 'executory' as of
right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action
on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as
far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may
consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of
course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, 'final and executory. ' See Investments Inc v Court o Appeals 231 Phil. 302, 307 (1987).

Thus, when the COMELEC En Bane rendered its Resolution dated 14 May 2013, such was a final
judgment the issue of petitioner's eligibility was already definitively disposed of and there was no
longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for office, and the COMELEC's task of
ruling on the propriety of the cancellation of petitioner's COC has ended. This final judgment, by
operation of Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, became final and executory on 19
May 2013, or five days from its promulgation, as it was not RJ restrained by the Supreme Court. See
rollo pp. 163-165.

4 Rollo p. 5.

Parenthetically, the surrounding facts of the case show that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), as
well as the parties, already had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 before
petitioner was proclaimed. As alleged in the Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, and which was not
disputed by petitioner, the COMELEC En Bane found that On May 15 2013, the Villa PBOC was already in
receipt of the May 14 2013 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner thereby affirming
the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the First Division that cancelled petitioner's COC. The receipt was
acknowledged by Rossini M. Ocsadin of the PBOC on May 15,2013. On May 16,2013, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus,
petitioner's counsel of record, received a copy of the same resolution. On May 18 2013, the PBOC under
ARED Ignacio is already aware of the May 14,2013 Resolution of the Commission En Bane which is already
on file with the PBOC. Furthermore, PBOC members Provincial Prosecutor Bimbo Mercado and Magdalena
Lim knew of the 14 May 2013 Resolution since they are the original members of the Villa PBOC. However,
while counsel for petitioner, Atty. Aureus, already received a copy of said resolution on May 16, 2013, the
counsel for petitioner, Atty. Ferdinand Rivera (who is an UNA lawyer), who appeared before the Ignacio
PBOC on May 18,2013, misrepresented to said PBOC that [petitioner] has not received a copy of the said
May 14 2013 Resolution of this Commission. This has mislead the Ignacio PBOC in deciding to proclaim
petitioner believing that petitioner is not yet bound by the said resolution. See rollo pp. 392-393.

5 In the case at bar, as the PBOC and the parties all had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated
14 May 2013, the PBOC should have, at the very least, suspended petitioner's proclamation. Although
COMELEC Resolution No. 9648 or the General Instructions for the Board of Canvassers on the
Consolidation/Canvass and Transmission of Votes in Connection with the 3 May 2013 National and Local
Elections authorizes the PBOC to proclaim a winning candidate if there is a pending disqualification or
petition to cancel COC and no order of suspension was issued by the COMELEC, the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, as ordered in the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013, is of greater
significance and import than an order of suspension of proclamation. The PBOC should have taken the
COMELEC En Bane s cue. To now countenance this precipitate act of the PBOC is to allow it to render
nugatory a decision of its superior. Besides, on 18 May 2013, there was no longer any pending case as the
COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 is already a final judgment.

6 Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.

In De Ia Cruz v COMELEC and Pacete the Court ruled that the COMELEC being a specialized
agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions,
rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with
by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.
(G.R. No. 192221, 13 November 2012, 685 SCRA 347, 359).

In Mastura v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies
will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns
the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC -created and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself -on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means
available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rut of evidence. (G R. No.
124 521, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499).

7 Rollo, pp. 181-184.

8 Petitioner before the HRET, can manifest what she desires in this Motion for Reconsideration concerning
the existence of Identification Certificate No. 05-05424 issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 13
October 2005, ostensibly recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines as per (pursuant) to the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, S. of 24
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2004-01 per order of this no. CRR No. 05-10/03-5455 AFF No. 05-4961
signed by Commissioner ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ dated October 6 2005. Petitioner belatedly submitted this
manifestation in her Motion for Reconsideration for the stated reason that her records with the Bureau of
Immigration has been missing. Fortunately, her Index Card on file at the Fingerprint Section was found and it
became the basis, together with Petitioner's copy of the certificate which she just unearthed lately, for the
issuance of a certified true copy of her Identification Certificate No. 05-05424." See rollo, pp. 364 and 311.

9 Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 172700,23 July 2010, 625 SCRA 299, 307.
 2.a
G.R. No. 181644 December 8, 2008
HERMILINA N. ABAINZA, petitioner, vs.ERNESTO ARELLANO and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents. R E S O L U T I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated September 3, 2007 and January 30, 2008, respectively.

The Facts

Private respondent Ernesto C. Arellano and petitioner Hermilina N. Abainza were among the candidates for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Jovellar, Albay, in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and
local elections.

On May 15, 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the following as the duly elected members of the
Sangguniang Bayan:

Winning Candidates Votes Obtained

1. Mirabete, Moises 4,111

2. Vibar, Eddie Ll. 3,604

3. Quirona, Felipe M. 3,589

4. Nobleza, Jose Jr. A. 3,414

5. Romualdo, Victor M. 3,119

6. Millano, Precioso O. 3,107

7. Lovendino, Wiro A. 3,018

8. Abainza, Hermelina N. 3,014

Private respondent received 2,983 votes and held the 9th spot.

On May 21, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for correction of the number of votes in Clustered Precinct Nos.
46-A/47-A due to erroneous tally. Meanwhile, on June 29, 2007, petitioner took her oath of office.
On September 3, 2007, the COMELEC 1st Division rendered a Resolution2 annulling the proclamation of petitioner
as councilor of the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, due to erroneous tally of votes. Election Return No. 2900930 from
Clustered Precinct Nos. 46-A/47-A showed a tally of one hundred fourteen (114) votes in favor of private respondent
but indicated a corresponding total in words and figures of only fourteen (14) votes. The said election return was
counterchecked with the copy of the Election Records and Statistical Division, and the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors executed an affidavit admitting the clerical error in the canvass of votes.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC en banc denied the same in a Resolution3
dated January 30, 2008.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raised the following issues for resolution, viz.:

(1) Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of manifest error;4 and

(2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the petition for correction of manifest error which was in the
nature of a pre-proclamation controversy despite the proclamation and oath by petitioner as elected
councilor.5

The Ruling of the Court

We resolve to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:

First, the COMELEC is empowered by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election.6 It exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.7 In relation thereto, it is empowered to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies.8

Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. - (a) The
following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:

x x x 2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the
results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was
tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more
copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there has been a mistake in the copying of the
figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during
the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had
already been made.9

Under this rule, correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be filed
directly with the Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning candidates. In the instant case, the
proclamation of petitioner as councilor of the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, was due to a manifest error when what
was entered in the election return was 14 instead of 114 as the number of votes obtained by private respondent.
A "manifest error" is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding; that which is open, palpable,
incontrovertible, needing no evidence to make it more clear.10 As stated in the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC,
the error in the entry in the election return is very evident to the eye, needing no evidence to make it clear. Petitioner's
proclamation, and eventual assumption of office, was predicated on a clerical and "manifest" error, not on the
legitimate will of the electorate.

Despite the proclamation of the winning candidates, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to correct manifest errors in
the election returns for the Sangguniang Bayan candidates. Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
for the correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the Board of Canvassers, viz.:

Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. - (a) Where
it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or
tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the
election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated more than
once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a
mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of
votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass,
the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or
coalition or political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.11

It is true that this provision deals with pre-proclamation controversies. However, it has also been held applicable to
cases when a proclamation had already been made, where the validity of the candidate's proclamation was precisely in
question.12 After all, the election returns that are later on reflected in the statement of votes form the basis of the
certificate of canvass and of the proclamation. Any error in the election returns ultimately affects the validity of the
proclamation.

With the finding by the COMELEC of a manifest error in Election Return No. 2900930 from Clustered Precinct Nos.
46-A/47-A, petitioner's proclamation was, therefore, flawed from the very beginning. It was not a valid proclamation.
And when a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all; thus, the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the
proclamation.13

In Duremdes v. Commission on Elections,14 it was Duremdes' submission that his proclamation could not be declared
null and void because a pre-proclamation controversy was not proper after a proclamation had been made, the proper
recourse being an election protest. However, the Court ruled that Duremdes' contention was proper only if there had
been a valid proclamation.

Second, petitioner maintains that private respondent should have filed a pre-proclamation controversy before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jovellar, Albay, during the canvassing and not with the COMELEC eight (8) days
after her proclamation.15

Under Section 5(b), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for correction of manifest errors before
the Commission must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation. Indeed, private
respondent failed to file his petition for manifest error on time. Nonetheless, the COMELEC committed no reversible
error in granting his petition. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 3. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
 elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.

Clearly, then, the COMELEC has the discretion to construe its rules liberally and, at the same time, suspend the rules
or any portion thereof in the interest of justice.16 That is what the COMELEC has done in this case.

We have consistently held that election laws should be construed liberally to give effect to the popular will, without
resort to technicalities. The court frowns upon any interpretation of election laws that would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.17

In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute the finding of the COMELEC on the error in the total number of votes
reflected in the election return. Petitioner raises only purely technical objections. Considering that the will of the
electorate is of paramount importance and should be upheld, technicalities must yield.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

2.
G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of
the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO V.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their
capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE C. DEE, JACINTO G.
ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND
MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION FRAUD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199118

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT
FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA)1 in
G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a
second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec
Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found by the Court in the
assailed decision, to wit:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation
on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding
Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which
can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 74 of the
Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.

In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the
May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated.6 The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos)
be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in
North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating
the election results in Maguindanao;7 and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.8 The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit9 for Electoral Sabotage against
petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No.
002-2011.

On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-
2011 and 002-2011.10 On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee11
and respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the
Joint Panel.13 The petitions were eventually consolidated.

On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings14 before the Joint Committee, in view of
the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam15 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-
affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that
she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents.16 Petitioner
Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency
of his petition brought before the Court.

In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA,
subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration.19

On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the
Comelec.20 On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc issued a Resolution21 approving and adopting the Joint
Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage
be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H.
Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646,
docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding
Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day.23

On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam24 with leave to allow the
Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a
hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec
a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25 praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC,
nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea
of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion
for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution
No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact- Finding Teams
Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of
Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral
sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, these motions for reconsideration.

Issues

Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-
Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists
that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.28
Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.29 Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings
before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because
of pressures from the executive branch of the government.30

For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised her earnest
efforts to defend herself and should not have been deemed by the Court as acts which purportedly tend to demonstrate
that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.31 Citing
several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults the Court in not upholding her right to ask for additional time
within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec
Resolution creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to
assign prosecutors to assist the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized agency in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the
primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.33

In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue that it does not
undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the Comelec that ultimately
determines probable cause.35 As to the conduct of the preliminary investigation, respondents maintain that no rights
were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit and other
countervailing evidence.36 They, thus, consider GMAs claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying
tactics" employed to thwart the investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee.37

The Courts Ruling

Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the Court in the
assailed decision. The issues were all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive, thus, we find no reason to disturb
the Courts conclusions.

At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions attached to the
creation of the Joint Panel and, consequently, to the performance of their assigned tasks, we hereby reiterate our
findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA
936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code,
the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a
legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 3467 41 dated January
12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA
seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec
Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint
Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342 and 905743 mentioned in the assailed decision but
missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec
and other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election
offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec
maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code.
However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new
mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus,
the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise
the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later
resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section
265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To
maintain the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment
would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in Banat.

To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized
by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office
(such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing
of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that
first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

xxxx

None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they
would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the
basis of two complaints the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both
complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary
investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of
the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the
resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.44

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses
shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason,
therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.

The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the respondent shall submit his
counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10)
days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.47 Also in both Rules,
respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.48

As to the alleged denial of GMAs right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated in view of the
limitation of such right as set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed decision, to wit:

While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in the allegations of
significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the
complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However,
Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.
Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the
right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were
the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If there are other documents that were referred
to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not submitted to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those
documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented
during the trial) as the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x
x491wphi1

Neither was GMAs right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her counter-affidavit
and countervailing evidence was consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to
submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is
settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory character of the
rule.50 As in any other rule, though, liberality in the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to
present a compelling justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008 Revised Manual for
Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit counter-
affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to
engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in support of the complaint or undertake
research on novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51

In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period because she
needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentels complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said
documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the only supporting documents available were those
attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at
the time she asked for the extension of time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the
documents she was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents
because they were not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. We
cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit
as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she was earlier required to follow.

And as we held in the assailed decision:

There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing
the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the information in court.

However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The orderly administration of justice remains the paramount
consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each case. To be sure, petitioners were given the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with the Joint Committees directive, several
motions were filed but were denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases and following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn,
performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They
even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent
with the constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided.52

Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty,"
she also filed a Motion for Bail and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she benefited from the RTC Order
giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and actively participating therein, she has chosen to
seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of
going back to the Joint Committee for the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides,
as thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the absence of preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the information filed against her.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

3.
G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y.
ESTRELLADA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) comes before this Court on a Petition for Review under Rule 64 with
an extremely urgent application for the issuance of a status quo order and for the conduct of a special
raffle, 1 assailing the 04 June 20102 and 19 August 20103 Resolutions in SPA No. 09-161 (DC) of the
Commission on Elections (respondent COMELEC). These Resolutions granted the Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y.
Estrellada (private respondents) against petitioner. At the heart of this controversy is whether petitioner
complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and
residence as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of
birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.4 To support this claim, they presented the following as
evidence:
1. Certification from the Assessors Office of Baliangao that there was no tax declaration
covering any real property in the name of petitioner located at any place in the municipality;5
2. Certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no record of birth in the
civil registry of the municipality;6
3. Joint Affidavit of three residents of Baliangao incumbent Barangay Chairperson Gregorio P.
Gayola (Gayola) and incumbent 3rd Kagawad Felicisimo T. Pastrano (Pastrano), both officials
of Barangay Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, and former police officer Adolfo L.
Alcoran (Alcoran);7

4. Affidavit of Patricio D. Andilab (Andilab), official of Purok 5, Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao.8

On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said barangay since
December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in the
house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her
house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her
secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the declaration of the place of birth is not a material
misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications
provided by law.9 Petitioner presented the following evidence to sustain her claims:

1. Certificate of Live Birth;10

2. Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale executed by the heirs of Agapito Yap, Jr. (Yap,
Jr.) pertaining to two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 12410
and P-33289 in favor of petitioner;11

3. TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289 in the name of Yap, Jr.;12

4. Two Declarations of Real Property in the name of Yap, Jr.;13

5. Two sketch plans of lots covered by TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289 prepared by the Office of
the Provincial Assessor for Yap, Jr.;14
6. Photographs of the alleged residence of petitioner in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental;
7. Sketches of structures petitioner constructed in the resort she developed in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental;15
8. Petitioners Application for Voters Registration and Voters Certification issued by the
Office of the Election Officer of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental;16

9. Petitioners CoC;17
 10. Joint Affidavit of Rodolio R. Yap III (Yap III), Roger V. Villanueva (Villanueva), Romeo A.
Duhaylungsod, Jr. (Duhaylungsod) and Dennis M. Estrellada (Estrellada), who undertook the
construction and development of petitioners residential house and resort;18
11. Affidavit of incumbent Barangay Chairperson Marichu Michel Acas-Yap (Acas-Yap) of
Barangay Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Punta Miray);19
12. Affidavit of Nellie E. Jumawan (Jumawan), the president of the Center for Agriculture and
Rural Development, Inc.;20
13. Affidavit of Dolores B. Medija (Medija), the president of Women for Children
Association;21
14. Joint Affidavit of Emily J. Bagundol (Bagundol) and Nelia D. Colaljo (Colaljo), presidents
of the Paglaum Multi-purpose Cooperative;22
15. Joint Affidavit of Charles C. Tenorio (Tenorio) and Reynold C. Analasan (Analasan),
presidents of Tamban Multi-Purpose Cooperative and Balas Diut Brotherhood Association,
respectively;23
16. Affidavit of Pedro Rio G. Bation (Bation), president of the Del Pilar Lawn Tennis Club of
Baliangao;24
17. Affidavit of Jessie P. Maghilum (Maghilum), a member of the Phi Omega Sigma
Fraternity/Sorority of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental Chapter;25 and

18. Affidavit of Ophelia P. Javier (Javier), petitioners personal secretary.26

The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the
day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected
municipal mayor.27
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor in the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for this coming May 10, 2010 elections.28
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division
denying due course to or cancelling her CoC.
COMELEC Ruling
Respondent COMELEC ruled in its 04 June 2010 Resolution that misrepresentation as to ones place of
birth is not a ground for the cancellation of a CoC. Petitioner merely committed an oversight when she
declared that she was born in Baliangao when she was actually born in San Juan. However, the
COMELEC ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner never acquired a new domicile in
Baliangao, because she failed to prove her bodily presence at that place, her intention to remain there,
and her intention never to return to her domicile of origin. Hence, respondent COMELEC disqualified
her from running for the position of mayor of Baliangao29 pursuant to Section 78 in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code.30
In response to this adverse ruling, petitioner elevated her case through a Motion for Reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that the evidence she presented proved that she had
established her domicile in the said municipality.31
Nonetheless, in its 19 August 2010 Resolution, respondent COMELEC affirmed the earlier ruling of
the Second Division. In upholding the latters ruling, COMELEC En Banc said that (1) the
Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale was not sufficient proof that petitioner had purchased
two parcels of land, because she was never a party to the agreement, and it was quite unusual that she
never acquired a deed of sale or title to protect her interests; (2) the sketch plans were not signed by the
corporate engineer who purportedly prepared them, nor was there an affidavit from the engineer to
authenticate the plans; (3) the application of petitioner for voter registration only proved that she had
met the minimum six-month residency requirement and nothing more; and (4) the affiants of the Sworn
Statements were all partial, because they either worked for her or were members of organizations that
received financial assistance from her.32
Hence, the instant Petition arguing that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental and in thus justifying the cancellation of her CoC. She also asserts that the 04 June
2010 and 19 August 2010 COMELEC Resolutions are null and void, being violative of her right to due
process, because there was no promulgation or prior notice as required by Sec. 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 or by the Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the 10 May
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
In a Resolution dated 07 September 2010, we issued a Status Quo Ante Order, which required the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions.33 Thereafter, the parties filed their respective pleadings.
Issues
The issues before us can be summarized as follows:
I. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its 04
June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
II. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Our Ruling
COMELECs failure to serve
advance notice of the promulgation
of the 04 June 2010 and 19 August
2010 Resolutions does not invalidate
them.
Petitioner assails the validity of the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions, because she was not
served an advance notice that these Resolutions were going to be promulgated. This failure was
allegedly a violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Hence, she argues that her right to due
process was violated. In response, respondent COMELEC asserts that it suspended COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 through an En Banc Order dated 04 May 2010.34 Furthermore, the suspension
was in accordance with its power to promulgate its own rules as provided by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of
her defense.
We agree with respondent COMELEC.
As stated by respondent COMELEC, Resolution No. 8696 was suspended through an Order dated 04
May 2010. However, assuming that this Resolution was still in effect, the failure to serve notice of the
promulgation under Section 6 thereof did not make the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 COMELEC
Resolutions invalid. The Court held thus in Sabili v. COMELEC:35
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,[49] petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation of a
Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties, instead of
first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of
Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a
date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after
promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the
parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack
of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a
procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially
announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice
to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23
SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication
(Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court
(Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional
requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the
process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioners contention that there was no
promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the
decision public. From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's
counsel of record and petitioners [sic] himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of
the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its
decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the
promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not
prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court
nor [sic] of the promulgation of said decision.
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,[50] citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,[51] we further held in the
same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set
aside the COMELECs judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in
the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient
enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec.
Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them [sic] due process to the deviation
by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties
in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding of
the countrys first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule
on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of
the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused
thereby. The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still
furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an
appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules of
procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on the
ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the promulgation
thereto. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, even if COMELEC failed to give advance notice of the promulgation of the 04 June 2010 and 19
August 2010 Resolutions, its failure to do so did not invalidate them.
Petitioner failed to comply with the
one-year residency requirement for
local elective officials.
Petitioners uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she was able to
establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with
domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Guray36 held as follows:
The term residence as so used, is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.37
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the
old domicile.38
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC39 and subsequently in Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:40
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.41
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of
the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior
to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had
resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod,
Estrellada, Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008. However, they declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray
while her house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and Estrellada asserted that in
December 2009, construction was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months
before the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited Baliangao occasionally when
they stated that "at times when she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of
Lourdes Yap while her residential house was being constructed."42
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not and never
had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that
petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only
stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the
house.1wphi1

Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC43 has
established that the ownership of a house or some other property does not establish domicile. This
principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the
locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit:
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court
would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, at most, that
she had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter.44 This minimum requirement is different
from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.
Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her statement of her eligibility to run for office constitutes a
material misrepresentation that warrants its cancellation.45 She contends that respondent COMELEC
never made a finding that she had committed material misrepresentation. Her contention, however, is
belied by its factual determination in its 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions that she had
failed to meet the one-year residency requirement.
During the pendency of the case, we deemed it proper to issue an Order dated 07 September 2010
directing the parties to observe the status quo before the issuance of these COMELEC Resolutions
disqualifying petitioner from the mayoralty race in Baliangao. We issued the Order, considering that
petitioner, having garnered the highest number of votes in the 10 May 2010 elections, had assumed
office as municipal mayor. However, with this final determination of her ineligibility to run for office,
there is now a permanent vacancy in the office of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence, the vice-mayor of
Baliangao shall become its mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by
this Court on 07 September 2010 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

4.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,
Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution 1 in SPA No. 10-
1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section
44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February
2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use
of a U.S. passport.
FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of
full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
 1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03
April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
familys ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to
the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government
Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that
he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03
April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as
an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the
evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He
raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his
Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the
First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced
by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First
Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take
effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April
3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate
to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not
natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The
Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not
on all fours with the case at bar.
 xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied
for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified
of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months
later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the
same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a certified
true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January
31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then
shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not
yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used
whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US
citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the
twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running
for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at
the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty
post cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply
it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as
the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks
to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner
in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed
in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer
rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein
have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the
case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the
issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and
again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession
of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who,
in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from
3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing
his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain
his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport
less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation
as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation,
his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring
of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring
issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in
the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045
having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two
situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some
other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and
the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner
of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be
that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because
of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town
on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected
and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing
upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon
prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis
to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We
say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To
state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election
victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula
to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible
as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who
placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed
to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June
2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to
the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En
Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN
MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

5.
G.R. No. 206698 February 25, 2014
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed via petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the Resolution1 dated April 1, 2013 issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, which affirmed the Resolution2 dated January 15,
2013 of its First Division dismissing petitioner Luis R. Villafuerte's verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Miguel R. Villafuerte (respondent).
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of
Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a Verified Petition3 to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
(COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and
deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that
"L-RAY JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to appear on the
official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his
first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY JR.," which is the nickname of his father, the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte, Jr."
In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses,4 respondent denied the commission of any
material misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname "LRAY JR.
MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was solely his
choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters would be confused on the simple fact that
his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit and disposed
as follows:
x x x no compelling reason why the COC of respondent should be denied due course to or cancelled on
the sole basis of an alleged irregularity in his name/nickname. Laws and jurisprudence on the matter
are clear that material misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a candidate, such
as citizenship, residency, registration as a voter, age, etc.
Nothing has been mentioned about a candidate's name/nickname as a ground to deny due course or
cancel his/her COC. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same in a
Resolution dated April 1, 2013.
The COMELEC found that its First Division did not err in denying the petition as existing law and
jurisprudence are clear in providing that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material
when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility; and that a
misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. It found that petitioner's allegations did not
pertain to respondent's qualifications or eligibility for the office to which he sought to be elected. The
candidate's use of a name or nickname is a not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging the following
issues:
I
Respondent COMELEC palpably and seriously committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or in excess of jurisdiction when it whimsically and capriciously limited the grounds provided in
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code to a candidate's qualifications only
and excluding as a ground a candidate's material representation that is FALSE on his identity which
renders him ineligible to be voted for as a candidate, because a FALSE representation of ones' true
name/nickname as a candidate is a deliberate attempt to misinform, mislead, and deceive the electorate
and notwithstanding that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code expressly states that "any" material
misrepresentation in violation of Section 74 of the same Code is a ground for cancellation of a
Certificate of Candidacy.
II
Respondent COMELEC committed serious errors and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or in excess of jurisdiction in failing or refusing to apply prevailing jurisprudence and law,
wherein it was held: that cancellation of COC is not based on the lack of qualification although it may
relate to qualification based on a "finding that a candidate made a material representation that is false";
thereby disregarding the well-entrenched rulings of this Honorable Court that material
misrepresentation may also include ineligibilities to run for office or to assume office and is not limited
to qualifications; utterly ignoring the ruling of this Honorable Court that votes cast in favor of a
candidate using a nickname in violation of Section 74 are STRAY votes, and in turning a blind eye to
its constitutional and statutory duty and responsibility to protect the rights of the voters and the
integrity of the electoral processes in our country, among others.
III
Respondent COMELEC whimsically, capriciously and despotically allowed herein respondent
MIGUEL to use "LRAY JR.-MIGZ" and thereby illegally disregarded the effects of R.A. 8436 as
amended by R.A. 9369 or the Automation Law and the requirement therein for the alphabetical
arrangement of the names of the candidates and for allowing respondent Miguel to deliberately and
misleadingly omit his baptismal first name MIGUEL which is mandatorily required by Section 74 to be
included in his COC and for respondent Miguel to use more than one nickname for which he is not
generally or popularly known in Camarines Sur.
IV
Material misrepresentation as contemplated by law is NOT to protect respondent as a candidate, but
MORESO, to protect the right of other candidates under the Automation Law, and more importantly to
protect the electorate from being misinformed, misled and deceived.6
The main issue for resolution is whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code claiming that respondent
committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his COC that his name/nickname to
be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ instead of his baptismal name,
VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL-MIGZ; that such declaration made under oath constitutes material
misrepresentation even if the material misrepresentation did not refer to his qualifications but referred
to his eligibility to be validly voted for as a candidate and, consequently, to his eligibility to assume
office.
We find no merit in the argument.
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code states that no person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn COC within the period fixed herein. Section 74 thereof enumerates the
contents of the COC, to wit:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that
the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a certificate
shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been
baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any
other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more
candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or
such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use
the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include
one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred
words, if he so desires.
And the proper procedure to be taken if a misrepresentation is committed by a candidate in his COC is
to question the same by filing a verified petition pursuant to Section 78, thus:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.- A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under
Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. What then
constitutes a material misrepresentation?
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,7 petitioner Victorino Salcedo II filed with the COMELEC a
petition seeking cancellation of respondent Ermelita Salcedo's (Ermelita) COC on the ground that she
had made material misrepresentation by stating her surname as Salcedo. Petitioner claimed that
Ermelita had no right to use the surname Salcedo, since her marriage to Neptali Salcedo was void. The
COMELEC En Banc found that Ermelita did not commit any misrepresentation nor usurp another's
name since she had the right to use her husband's surname for being married to him, and thus, validated
her proclamation as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo appealed the COMELEC's resolution, and we held:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized
to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to
Section 78 x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78,
it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the
sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run
for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify
what would be considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line
of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.8
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the
Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate
of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.
xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones
qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the
public as to one's identity is not within the scope of the provision.9
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections,10 we proclaimed Estela D. Antipolo, the alleged second placer,
as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, being the one who remained as the sole qualified candidate for the
mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, since the COC of Romeo D. Lonzanida, the
first placer, was declared void ab initio. We find that violation of the three-term limit is an eligibility
affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office and the misrepresentation of such is a ground
to grant the petition to deny due course or cancel a COC. We said that:
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is
eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties and to enhance the electorates freedom of choice, is found both in the Constitution and the
law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible. One who
has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section
74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.11
xxxx
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such
fact is material in determining a candidates eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to
and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible
from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility
because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for
mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas representation that he was eligible for the office
that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for
the office.12
In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections,13 where petitioner therein claimed that respondent
committed material misrepresentation when he stated his name in the COC as Rustico Besa Balderian
instead of Chu Teck Siao, we found that it had been established that in all of respondent's school
records, he had been using Rustico Besa Balderian, the name under which he was baptized and known
since he can remember. He never used the name Chu Teck Siao by which he was registered. It was also
established that he had filed a petition for change of name to avoid any confusion and which the RTC
had granted. We then said, that
AT ALL EVENTS, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office." It need not be emphasized that there is no
showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondents identity, nor that by
using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived.14
Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship
or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local
Government Code.15 Hence, petitioners allegation that respondents nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ"
written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in
the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to
run for public office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent's
nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing
the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to
his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.
Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then
incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as "LRay." Their relationship is shown by the
posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on
them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover, it was
established by the affidavits of respondents witnesses that as the father and son have striking
similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY
JR. has been used to refer to respondent. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name
MIGZ16 written as respondents nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in fact,
such name distinguishes respondent from his father, the then incumbent "Governor LRAY," who was
running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of Camarines Sur. As we ruled in Salcedo II v.
COMELEC,17 the use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones
identity, is not within the scope of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, respondent's
nickname written in his COC, without intending to mislead the voters as to his identity, cannot be
canceled. We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc in finding that
respondent did not commit material misrepresentation in his COC.
Petitioner relies on Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal18 to justify the annulment
of respondent's COC. In Villarosa, which involves the counting of ballots under the manual elections,
respondent Quintos filed an election protest relating to the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa (Villarosa)
alleging that the "JTV" votes should not be counted in the latter's favor. We then held that Villarosas
use of "JTV" as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election process; thus, votes
of "JTV" were considered stray votes. In so ruling, we found that "JTV" is the nickname of Villarosas
husband, who was then the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro; that when Villarosa's
husband ran and campaigned for as representative in both the 1992 and 1995 elections in the same
legislative district where Villarosa ran in the May 1998 elections, he was generally known as "JTV."
We thus ruled that the voters who wrote "JTV" in the ballots had no other person in mind except then
incumbent representative Jose Tapales Villarosa, or the same person whom they have known for a long
time as "JTV." We also took into consideration Villarosa's statement in her affidavit admitting that she
was generally and popularly known in every barangay in Occidental Mindoro as "GIRLIE" before and
after she filed her COC; and even her counsel asserted during the oral argument that her other
nickname before she filed her COC was "Mrs. JTV" and not "JTV." We also found that since the name
"GIRLIE" written on the space for representative was in fact claimed by petitioner Villarosa and
credited in her favor, then the "JTV" votes under the idem sonans rule cannot be counted for Villarosa,
because only one nickname or stagename is allowed; and that Rule 13 of Section 211 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which allows the use of a nickname and appellation of affection and friendship,
provided that it is accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate, was not applied since the
"JTV" votes were unaccompanied by her first name or surname. Thus, we found that malice and bad
faith on the part of Villarosa was evident when, in her COC and campaign materials, she appropriated
the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent representative of the district in question.
Villarosa is not on all fours with this case. This case is a petition to deny due course and to cancel COC
on the ground of a statement of a material representation that is false; to be material, such must refer to
an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold. Here, respondent's
nickname is not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. Notably, respondent's
father, who won 3 consecutive terms as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, is popularly
known as "LRAY," so when respondent wrote in his COC, "LRAY JR. MIGZ" as his nickname, he
differentiated himself from Governor "LRAY," which negates any intention to mislead or misinform or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. Also, the appellation LRAY JR. was
accompanied by the name MIGZ which was not so in the Villarosa case.
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a COC the name
by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through court-approved
proceedings, and that he may include one nickname or stagename by which he is generally or popularly
known in the locality, which respondent did. As we have discussed, the name which respondent wrote
in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, as it does not pertain to his qualification or eligibility to run for an elective
public office. By invoking the case of Villarosa which is in the nature of an election protest relating to
the proclamation of Villarosa, petitioner should have instead filed an election protest and prayed that
the votes for respondent be declared as stray votes, and not a petition to deny due course or cancel the
COC.
Finally, petitioner claims that the false representation of respondent's nickname written on the COC is
meant to undermine the statutory requirement regarding the alphabetical listing/arrangement of names
of the candidate as provided under Section 1319 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9369 amending RA 8436,
the automated election system; that he would be put to a great and undue disadvantage as he became no.
5, while respondent was in no. 4 in the list of candidates for Governor of Camarines Sur.
We are not persuaded.
Considering that respondent's name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ, his name would indeed be
ahead of petitioner's name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot which contains the
alphabetical listing of the candidates for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur.
However, petitioner's claim that such listing would lead to confusion as to put him to undue
disadvantage is merely speculative and without basis as the voters can identify the candidate they want
to vote for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013, of the Commission on
Elections En Banc, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

6.

G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-
GOMEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March
22, 2012 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-
031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomezs substitution
as the Liberal Partys replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth
Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.
The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009,
one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, 3 alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard,
Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richards CoC be
denied due course and/or cancelled.5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntillas
petition without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to
GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as
a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted
the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary
documents for substitution."8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys official
substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various
letter-requests submitted to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En
Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010,
approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of
private respondent. The recommendation reads:
STUDY AND OBSERVATION
On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his
counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr.
Richard I. Gomez.
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is
no candidate to substitute for.
It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059
speaks for disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT
the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman,
Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.
The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel ones certificate of candidacy,
especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a
privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.
Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to
run in the public office.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:
xxxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE
FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution
Pending resolution of Juntillas May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted
as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots,
garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner
Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.13 In view of the aforementioned
substitution, Richards votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was
proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010
Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1)
year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer
of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for
on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3)
private respondents CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial
requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer.17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioners allegations and claimed that she
validly substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to
the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to
have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly,
she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she
continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she was born and raised.
During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated
September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;
2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the
necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondents COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District
of Leyte for lack of residency requirement.19
Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed the
quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of
Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying Richards
candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disqualification
and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard
was legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondents CoC due to petitioners
failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her
CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent resides in
Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she continued to retain her
domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in
finding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the formers failure to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
It is petitioners submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of
private respondents substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is
impermissible where the substituted candidates CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in
the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richards CoC was not denied due
course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly
substituted by private respondent.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidates
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain
acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance ones candidacy; (3) spending in ones
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating
Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the
OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had
already been elected.35
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which
do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidates compliance
with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in
question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction
brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78
of the OEC36 is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required
for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or
she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78
petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the
lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that
the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
(Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less ones
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the persons
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether ones CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is
that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of ones
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.40
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate
for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to
and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is
that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
necessarily, to valid votes.41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:
x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as
a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on
candidate substitution.
B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same
political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states
that:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.43
As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must
have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC
obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a
persons public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be
elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidates political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a
public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible
for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-
office address for all election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate.
In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As
held in Talaga:45
x x x a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he
possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such
declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as
well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it
necessarily follows that if a persons CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.46
C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases
vis--vis candidate substitution
Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case
under Section 78 vis--vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.1wphi1

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.48 Stated differently, since there would
be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then
there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification
case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is
discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
"dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not
included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.
D. Application to the case at bar
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to
his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed
from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a
finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or
cancelled would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby
legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have obviated the
COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondents substitution. It should be
stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richards "disqualification" is his failure to comply
with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation
contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting ones qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.51 There
is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election laws.
Accordingly, given Richards non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it cannot be
mistaken that the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of Juntillas "Verified Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification"52 which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard
"DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of
Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or
CANCELLED"53 carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC
pursuant to Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and
the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidates
CoC in in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the
COMELEC En Bancs nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC
Divisions unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of the candidates CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in the
COMELEC Divisions resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by
the COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC
ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition.
Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No.
98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was
GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply
ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy.
xxxx
There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one
to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is
likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is
rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019
by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:
3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs
intention to declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
xxxx
In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due
course and/or cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced
in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the
COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at
the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas CoC.
xxxx
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of
cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to
any qualification. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Departments finding that Richard
was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of private respondents substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC
First Divisions ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richards CoC and in consequence, disallowed
the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondents substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error as above-discussed, the HRET
committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the
HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over
it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and
settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth
District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntillas
petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC
First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and
essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Bancs erroneous finding
that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification
and not of cancellation of Richards CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private
respondent.
Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to
the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory.
Instructive on this point is the Courts disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-
equal", to the COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the
House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to
the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member
of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed
upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Members qualification while the
Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same parties
and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and
character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. More particularly, the term
"qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-
claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.61 In this relation, private respondents own qualification to run for public office which
was inextricably linked to her husbands own qualifications due to her substitution was the proper
subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and
independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide between
the two be blurred.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRETs independence is not without limitation. As earlier
mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has
gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine
the HRETs independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws
are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the
COMELEC En Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents eligibility to run for public
office which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the
HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office,
which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no
cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification to
office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

7.

G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL
B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L.
LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 file under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Bane Resolution No. 96132 dated January 15, 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.
The Facts
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.4 Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer
the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively,
which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).6 On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an
order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March
18, 2009.7
On April 26, 2012,8 petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of
his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1
(MTCC).9 Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013
Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a
registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial
was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012
Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELECs First and Second Divisions
(COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioners CoC.
Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 14 on January 15,
2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G.
Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement. As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Courts pronouncement in the
consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC 15
(Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
Submitted for the Courts determination are the following issues: (a) whether the COMELEC En Banc
acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated
petitioners right to due process; and (b) whether petitioners perpetual absolute disqualification to run
for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by the
exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections. Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the
issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the bench and the bar in the future, the Court takes
this opportunity to discuss on the same.
A. Nature and validity of motu
proprio issuance of Resolution No.
9613.
Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions jurisdiction by
cancelling motu proprio petitioners CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which reads:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Concomitantly, he also claims that his right to procedural due process had been violated by the
aforementioned issuance.
The Court is not persuaded.
The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELECs exercise of
administrative functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v.
COMELEC:16
The term administrative connotes, or pertains, to administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. While a quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised by
the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.
The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held
that the COMELECs denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidates
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to
enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it
is the COMELECs duty to cancel motu proprio the candidates CoC, notwithstanding the absence of
any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Thus, the Court
stated:17
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive
branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is
duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."
The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by
final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating
to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so
grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and
served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and
administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for
public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18 the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a
convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.19
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely
performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioners CoC on the basis
of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of ones CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition
based on either Sections 1220 or 7821 of the OEC, or Section 4022 of the LGC, when the grounds
therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidates
disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction such exercise falls within the
COMELECs administrative functions, as in this case.
In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would
be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.23 As petitioners
disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands
beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course,
else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.
Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioners Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter
in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTCs Order dated October 31, 2012.
In this accord, petitioners non-compliance with the voter registration requirement under Section 39(a)
of the LGC24 is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation
of his CoC altogether.
B. Petitioners right to run for
elective office.
It is petitioners submission that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Section 40(a) of the
LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.
The argument is untenable.
Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together,
if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.25
On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
 In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and
3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict
between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the
LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time
he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law26
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,27 which has the effect of disqualifying the convict
to run for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the
penalty of perpetual28 absolute29 disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal:
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office.
To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that
one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,30 as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants only
to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.31
Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more
direct and specific in nature insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to his
conviction as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses involving
moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment without any
consideration of certain disqualifying effects to ones right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of
the LGC should be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more
definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor
should prevail.32
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to
run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a
penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioners service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said
accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.33 In this case, the same accessory
penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and
as such, petitioners disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.
Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term
which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Courts ruling in Lacuna v.
Abes,34 where the court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office:
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of
the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary
special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea,35 Jalosjos, Jr. and
Cardino,36 held:
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment
of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration
of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of
Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any
elective public office perpetually. (Emphasis underscoring supplied)
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly,
considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that Section
40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner
continues to suffer.1wphi1 Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to
Article 30 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

8.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even
choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely
because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public
policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands
of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically
opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about
what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is
better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse
viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed
a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of
individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use
into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman,
burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving
in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who
do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement
to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty
of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are
prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of
 prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs,
established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have
not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible
teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the
youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article
II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while
three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking
the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution,
stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also
the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of
their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the
social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are
being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all
unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad
also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment
on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January
12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner
also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have
been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported
violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG
maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the
sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements
of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that
it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims
that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available
to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of
petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in
its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
 Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila

Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs
findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang
Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941
or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads
morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it
was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of
Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse
that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions
and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the
temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it
must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of
religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals
and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The
COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish
in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted
into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups
members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more
than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between
thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC
would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly
this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to
regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and
a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval
of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists
to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even
if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest
here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of
or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with
the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade
society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that
deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment
has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the
bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have
equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through
a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally
crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution
and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however
small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on
the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception
that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41
European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both
privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have
reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive
influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free
speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition
of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by
"something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that
a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it
uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles.
The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the
exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the
authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because
it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs
and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals
of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well
may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional
analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that
public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on
Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there
has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the
right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity
of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list
elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the
party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC
was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates,
we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal,
standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right
to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection
of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation
is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the
ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be
construed to include "sexual orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have
declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international
agreements.49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
 (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public
Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on
the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures
that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for
election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who
are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory
requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person
should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of
persons from elective office.50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect
to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which
are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 52
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added
to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a
much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims
that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they
are no longer controversial.1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more
than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in
opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply
the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the
knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

9.
G.R. No. 182088 January 30, 2009
ROBERTO L. DIZON, Petitioner,
vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P. MORALES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
present petition seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated 27 July 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division which dismissed the petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Marino P.
Morales (Morales) certificate of candidacy, as well as the Resolution dated 14 February 2008 of the
COMELEC En Banc which denied Roberto L. Dizons (Dizon) motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The COMELEC Second Division stated the facts as follows:
Roberto L. Dizon, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is the incumbent
Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during
the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate
of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same municipality.
Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same position for the
May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under the said
provision, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the
same position.
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. He avers that the Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-058, entitled Atty. Venancio Q.
Rivera III and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 1998 elections.
Respondent alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor
of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second
term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to him.
Respondent further argues that the grounds stated in the instant petition are not covered under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent further contend [sic] that even if it is covered under the
aforementioned provision, the instant petition failed to allege any material misrepresentation in the
respondents Certificate of Candidacy.1
The Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division
In its Resolution dated 27 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division took judicial notice of this
Courts ruling in the consolidated cases of Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera III v. COMELEC and Marino
"Boking" Morales in G.R. No. 167591 and Anthony Dee v. COMELEC and Marino "Boking" Morales
in G.R. No. 170577 (Rivera case) promulgated on 9 May 2007. The pertinent portions of the
COMELEC Second Divisions ruling read as follows:
Respondent was elected as mayor of Mabalacat from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998. There was no
interruption of his second term from 1998 to 2001. He was able to exercise the powers and enjoy the
position of a mayor as "caretaker of the office" or a "de facto officer" until June 30, 2001
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in an electoral protest case. He was again elected as mayor
from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003 [sic].
It is worthy to emphasize that the Supreme Court ruled that respondent has violated the three-term limit
under Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Respondent was considered not a candidate in the
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is
a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to
DENY the instant Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Petition for the
Disqualification of Marino P. Morales for lack of merit.2
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
The pertinent portions of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution read as follows:
Respondents certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections
was cancelled pursuant to the above-mentioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on
May 9, 2007. As a result, respondent was not only disqualified but was also not considered a candidate
in the May 2004 elections.
Another factor which is worth mentioning is the fact that respondent has relinquished the disputed
position on May 16, 2007. The vice-mayor elect then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of
Mabalacat on May 17, 2007 until the term ended on June 30, 2007. For failure to serve for the full term,
such involuntary interruption in his term of office should be considered a gap which renders the three-
term limit inapplicable.
The three-term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary break. The Constitution does not
require that the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. What the law requires is for an
interruption, break or a rest period from a candidates term of office "for any length of time." The
Supreme Court in the case of Latasa v. Comelec ruled:
Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
In sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in the instant case for lack of the two conditions: 1)
respondent was not the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term
primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) respondent has failed to
serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on
May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT. The Resolution of the
Commission Second Division is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.3
The Issues
Dizon submits that the factual findings made in the Rivera case should still be applied in the present
case because Morales had, except for one month and 14 days, served the full term of 2004-2007.
Morales assumption of the mayoralty position on 1 July 2007 makes the 2007-2010 term Morales
fifth term in office. Dizon raises the following grounds before this Court:
1. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT MORALES
DID NOT VIOLATE THE THREE-YEAR TERM LIMIT WHEN HE RAN AND WON AS
MAYOR OF MABALACAT, PAMPANGA DURING THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTION.
2. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT DUE TO THIS HONORABLE
COURTS RULING IN THE AFORESAID CONSOLIDATED CASES, RESPONDENT
MORALES FOURTH TERM IS CONSIDERED A GAP IN THE LATTERS SERVICE
WHEN HE FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE 2007 ELECTIONS.
3. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
FOURTH TERM OF MORALES WAS INTERRUPTED WHEN HE "RELINQUISHED" HIS
POSITION FOR ONE MONTH AND 14 DAYS PRIOR TO THE MAY 14, 2007
ELECTION.4
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The present case covers a situation wherein we have previously ruled that Morales had been elected to
the same office and had served three consecutive terms, and wherein we disqualified and removed
Morales during his fourth term. Dizon claims that Morales is currently serving his fifth term as mayor.
Is the 2007-2010 term really Morales fifth term?
The Effect of our Ruling in the Rivera Case
In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We
cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales
from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray
votes. The dispositive portion in the Rivera case reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent Morales Certificate of
Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall serve as such for the remaining
duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for
being moot.
This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.5
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code restated Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution as
follows:
No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term limit, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times.6 There should be a
concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.7lavvphil.net
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive
terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1
July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections
because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation for
the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales service with
respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or
after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with respect to the
2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.8 Our decision in the Rivera case
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the
vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how
short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
2007-2010: Morales Fifth Term?
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. Dizon asserts that even after
receipt of our decision on 10 May 2007, Morales "waited for the election to be held on 14 May 2007 to
ensure his victory for a fifth term."9
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July
1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16
May 2007. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the
2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat
from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-
term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. x x
x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of
litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom."10 To this, we
quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners
incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be
imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any
political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not
without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending
before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial courts decision
declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal
was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected
and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.11
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated 14 February 2008 as well as the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
Second Division dated 27 July 2007.
SO ORDERED.

10.
 G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the
full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution
of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had
ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008
Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule; and
 2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in
Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution,
but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To
be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been
mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a
controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term
rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an
official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on
November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term" connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period
during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by
law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of
public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].1avvphi1
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no more than three consecutive
terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear
reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render.1awphi1 In other words, the
limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary
renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the
first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is
the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a full term" for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an
interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned
under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with
"renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in
other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such
loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term "voluntary
renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary renunciation":
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term "voluntary
renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by
merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is more general
than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term "voluntary
renunciation," the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to
defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as
a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision,
we note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the
first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding
its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for,
values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation
with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the
provisions contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term" that it speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the
basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the
proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in
a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present.
In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title,
that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there
had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however,
presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the
contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the
Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the
election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of
the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the
deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest)
would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation
made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the Court to rule differently from
Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election
contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court obeserved that
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully
served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on
indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they
directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect
to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to
service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official
lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that
term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen;
hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections11 also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit disqualification.
Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he
did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the
petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for
a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but
Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior
to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We
decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question
asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no
immediate reelection" after three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive
fourth term.12

Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who
had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening
conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a
city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city
officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office
of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor the
territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same
group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same
inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.14
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term
limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective
post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for
a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases
establish that the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official
steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction
of a particular local government unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,15 where
the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law.
The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor
was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-
term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor.
This result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective
official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the interim. The
common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the
office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he
ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term
limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does
not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his
office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the
right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and
substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive
terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary
renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and
loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or
authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To
quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,18 or the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of
an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is
strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information
(that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it
is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title
to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or
liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and
gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise
of the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as
the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results,
no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all
powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension,
however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws20 themselves that the courts
can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is
present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should
not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective office
holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials
service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept
interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and
term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to
the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to
each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not
be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence
of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close
our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the
temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some
of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective
office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A
serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a
penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions
of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it
disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service
as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the
possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual
service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of
what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on
the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed
the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension
does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary
incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension
is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary,
and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion
therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of
how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall
disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or
loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge
that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent
than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the
COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it
granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the
COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one
undertaken outside the contemplation of law.21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed
COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.

11.
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11
September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of
the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against
Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The
immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These
two provisions determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of
candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion
of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the
partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done
before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate
of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person
engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which
under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then
no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such
last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day
immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since
Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to
acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one
candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were
committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004
to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing
the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004
immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political
activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/
manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before
the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-
president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for
purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as
petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February
9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on
March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing
requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign
watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial
number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive
hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification
marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot
for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to
give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the
same[,] uniform for local and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the

present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, hes already
a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began
(sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that the filing of the
certificate will not bring about ones being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also
provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet
commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough
time to prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House
Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the
Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan

acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?
 THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is
just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to
change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by
existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other
prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no

conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last
day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is
election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots,
Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the
filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet
the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed
by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated
election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into
law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law"
prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political
act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote
the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436,
thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of
the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without
repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any
portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot
but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so
doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section
15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses
can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that
before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus
file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining ones possible
violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the
campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider
Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start
of the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009
only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March
2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign
period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third
paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for
which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in
the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign
period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate
(thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts
be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after
said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start
of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting
his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds
involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare
an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the
campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are
lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign
period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the
start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says
is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is
clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a
criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither
can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but
the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as
the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET
ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as
the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Decision, p. 23 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied).
2 G.R. No. 164858, 16 November 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
3 Id. at 147-152.
4 Id. at 152.
5 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, pp. 4-6.
6 Decision, p. 24.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 11 September 2009, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case disqualifying Rosalinda A.
Penera from running as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte for engaging in the prohibited act of
premature campaigning.

Penera forthwith filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the above Decision, invoking the following
arguments, to wit:
1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.2
2) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No.
9369.3
3) The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against
Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.4
4) Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning.5
5) The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.6
I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Peneras Motion for Reconsideration
The basic issues in the Motion for Reconsideration were already passed upon in the Decision dated 11
September 2009 and no substantial arguments were raised.
The grounds that: (1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369; (2) Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 9369; and (3) the petition for
disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are all reiterations of her previous arguments before the
Court and the same had already been adequately addressed in the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
Incidentally, Penera herself disclosed in her Motion for Reconsideration that she is the respondent in a
criminal case filed by Edgar T. Andanar for the commission of election offenses in violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is docketed as EO Case No. 08-99.7 Thus, the pronouncement in the
Decision dated 11 September 2009 that the instant case should concern only the electoral aspect of the
disqualification case finds more reason. As noted in the Decision, any discussion on the matter of
Peneras criminal liability for premature campaigning would have been preemptive and nothing more
than obiter dictum.
With respect to the assertion that Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for
disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning, the same is utterly
without merit. Penera admitted participating in the motorcade after filing her COC. What she merely
denied and/or refuted were the minor details concerning the conduct of said motorcade.
Likewise, Peneras contention that her admission of participating in the motorcade in this case is not
the same as admitting that she engaged in premature campaigning deserves scant consideration.
Logically, to admit to the elements constituting the offense of premature campaigning is to admit to the
commission of the said offense. Precisely, it is the act of participating in the motorcade after the filing
of her COC that constituted the prohibited act of premature campaigning in the instant case.
Finally, the claim of Penera that not all motorcades are designed to promote the election of a candidate
is unimpressive. Clearly, the context of the discussion on motorcades in the Decision dated 11
September 2009 was disregarded. The discussion pertained to motorcades conducted during election
periods by candidates and their supporters. In such an instance, a motorcade assumes an entirely
different significance and that is to promote a candidate.
As held in the Decision dated 11 September 2009, the conduct of a motorcade during election periods
is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section
79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on "[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]" The obvious purpose of the conduct of
motorcades during election periods is to introduce the candidates and the positions to which they seek
to be elected to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and
recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time.
The pretense that the motorcade was only a convoy of vehicles, which was entirely an unplanned event
that dispersed eventually, does not hold water. After filing their certificates of candidacy, Rosalinda
Penera and the other members of her political party conducted a motorcade and went around the
different barangays in the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte. The motorcade consisted of
two (2) jeepneys and ten (10) motorcycles, which were all festooned with multi-colored balloons.
There was marching music being played on the background and the individuals onboard the vehicles
threw candies to the people they passed by along the streets. With the number of vehicles, the balloons,
the background marching music, the candies on hand and the route that took them to the different
barangays, the motorcade could hardly be considered as spontaneous and unplanned.
Majority Opinion
Although the majority opinion initially mentions the above-stated grounds of Peneras Motion for
Reconsideration, the same were not at all discussed. The Resolution of the majority purely involves an
exposition of the grounds set forth in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio to the
Decision dated 11 September 2009.
At the outset, the majority opinion highlights the relevant provisions of law defining the meaning of a
candidate.
Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties." On the other hand, the second sentence in the
third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, states
that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The first
proviso in the same paragraph provides that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period."
The majority opinion goes on to quote a paragraph in the Decision dated 11 September 2009,
underscoring a portion of the same as follows:
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her [certificate of
candidacy (COC)] and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.
According to the interpretation of the majority of the above pronouncement, the Decision dated 11
September 2009 already considers a person who filed a COC a "candidate" even before the start of the
campaign period. From the filing of the COC, even before the start of the campaign period, the ponente
allegedly considers the partisan political acts of a person filing a COC "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate."
The majority clearly mistook the import of the above-quoted portion and read the same out of context.
Absolutely nowhere in the Decision dated 11 September 2009 was it stated that a person who filed a
COC is already deemed a candidate even before the start of the campaign period.
To recall, the Court held in its Decision that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines
the prohibited act of premature campaigning, was not repealed, expressly or impliedly, by Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period: x x x.
While relevant portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, provide:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. x x x
xxxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period[.]
The Court harmonized and reconciled the above provisions in this wise:
The following points are explanatory:
First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during
the campaign period." Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who
is not a candidate.
For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the
campaign period," is clearly erroneous.
Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan political
activity in the following manner:
SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
xxxx
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
 (1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the
COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate.
Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to
run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts
enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her
intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to
the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
The last paragraph of the aforequoted portion of the Decision dated 11 September 2009 should be read
together with, and qualified by, the paragraph immediately preceding it. Clearly, the ponente was quite
explicit in stating that, after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person
is not yet considered a candidate. After filing the COC, however, the commission by such person of the
acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code can already be construed as being
for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
Thereafter, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when said person is already a formal candidate,
that the partisan political acts that he/she committed after the filing of the COC can already be
considered as being for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate; hence, constituting premature
campaigning.
Reversal of Lanot v. Commission on Elections
The majority likewise ascribes error on the part of the ponente for reversing Lanot, which held that a
person should be a candidate before premature campaigning may be committed. Resolved under the
auspices of Republic Act No. 8436,8 the previous automation law, Lanot was allegedly decided on the
ground that one who files a COC is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Supposably, Congress wanted to ensure that any person filing a COC under the early deadline required
by the automated election system would not be disqualified for any partisan political act done prior to
the start of the campaign period. In enacting Republic Act No. 9369, Congress expressly wrote the
Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph, Sec. 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, which
states that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing COCs] shall
only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy."
The majority, therefore, concludes that the ponente cannot reverse Lanot without repealing the above
sentence, since to reverse Lanot would mean repealing the said sentence. The ponente, however, in
reversing Lanot does not claim that the second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. Thus, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is supposedly
self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which
embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the majority avers that the majority decision is irreconcilably
in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
The majority opinion arrives at an erroneous conclusion based on a faulty premise.
Lanot was decided on the basis of the requirement therein that there must be first a candidate before the
prohibited act of premature campaigning may be committed.

In Lanot v. Commission on Elections,9 Lanot, et al., filed a petition for disqualification against the then
Pasig City mayoralty candidate Vicente P. Eusebio for engaging in various forms of election campaign
on different occasions outside of the designated campaign period after he filed his COC during the
2004 local elections. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department recommended the
disqualification of Eusebio for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
recommendation was approved by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC en banc referred the
case back to the COMELEC Law Department to determine whether Eusebio actually committed the
acts subject of the petition for disqualification.
The Court, speaking through Justice Carpio, adjudged that Eusebio was not liable for premature
campaigning given that the latter committed partisan political acts before he became a candidate. The
Court construed the application of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8463 vis--vis the provisions of
Sections 80 and 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 moved the
deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. The Court ruled that
the only purpose for the early filing of COCs was to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.
Congress, however, never intended the early filing of a COC to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevented the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to
meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x
fixed by existing law" prior to Republic Act No. 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline
"will still not be considered as a candidate."10
Simply stated, the Court adjudged in Lanot that when Eusebio filed his COC to meet the early deadline
set by COMELEC, he did not thereby immediately become a candidate. Thus, there was no premature
campaigning since there was no candidate to begin with. It is on this ground that the majority reversed
Lanot.
The ponente reiterates that the existence of a candidate is not necessary before premature campaigning
may be committed. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally provides that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons,
to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period."
Very specific are the wordings of the law that the individual who may be held liable to commit the
unlawful act of premature campaigning can be any person: a voter or non-voter, a candidate or a non-
candidate.
Furthermore, as already previously discussed, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
repealed by Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369. In construing the said provisions, as well
as that of Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the meaning of the term
candidate, the majority has settled that, after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign
period, a person is yet to be considered a formal candidate. Nonetheless, by filing the COC, the person
categorically and explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate. Thereafter, if such person
commits the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, said acts can already
be construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.1avvphi1
Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is not self-contradictory.
The ponente can reverse Lanot and still uphold the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
The majority also stresses that in the enactment of Republic Act No. 9369, Congress inserted the word
"only" to the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 so that the
same now reads:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period.
Thus, Congress even strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a
candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. Accusing the ponente of giving a specious
reasoning in explaining the above proviso, the majority points out to the basic principle of law that any
act is lawful, unless expressly declared as unlawful. Therefore, the majority claims that there was no
need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. The logical conclusion is that
partisan political acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful. According to the
majority, any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period.
The ponente takes exception to the above sweeping and unwarranted reasoning. Not all election
offenses are required to be committed by a candidate and, like the prohibited act of premature
campaigning, not all election offenses are required to be committed after the start of the campaign
period. To reiterate, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of
premature campaigning is still good law despite the passage of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended. Precisely, the conduct of election campaign or partisan political activity before the campaign
period is the very evil that Section 80 seeks to prevent.
The majority opinion maintains its objection to the allegedly strained construction and/or interpretation
of the ponente of the particular provisions involved in this case. With equal vehemence, however, the
ponente adamantly rejects the majoritys absurd and unwarranted theory of repeal of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code put forth in both the Dissenting Opinion to the Decision dated 11 September
2009 and the Resolution of the majority.
As the majority repeatedly pointed out, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, was enacted merely to give the COMELEC ample time for the printing of ballots.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, is a substantive law which defines the
prohibited act of premature campaigning, an election offense punishable with the gravest of penalties
that can be imposed on a candidate, i.e., disqualification or, if elected, removal from office. If the
majority opinion indignantly rejects the attempts of the ponente to reconcile the provisions of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, then why
should they insist on repealing the former provision and not the latter?
The ponente emphasizes that whether the election would be held under the manual or the automated
system, the need for prohibiting premature campaigning to level the playing field between the
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period remains. Again, the choice as to who
among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public office should not be
swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some individuals who are able to spend
resources to promote their candidacies in advance of the period slated for campaign activities.
However, by virtue of the Resolution of the majority, premature campaigning will now be officially
decriminalized and, as a consequence, the value and significance of having a campaign period will now
be utterly negated. Thus, one year, five years or even ten years prior to the day of the elections, a
person aspiring for public office may now engage in election campaign or partisan political activities to
promote his candidacy, with impunity. All he needs to have is a very deep campaign war chest to be
able to carry out this shrewd activity.
Indeed, while fair elections has been dealt a fatal blow by the Resolution of the majority, it is fervently
hoped that the writing of the Decision dated 11 September 2009 and this Dissenting Opinion will not
be viewed as an effort made in vain if in the future the said Resolution can be revisited and somehow
rectified.
Premises considered, there is no reason to reverse and set aside the earlier ruling of the Court rendered
in this case.
I, therefore, vote to DENY WITH FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rosalinda A.
Penera on the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

12.
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11
September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of
the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against
Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The
immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These
two provisions determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of
candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion
of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the
partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done
before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate
of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person
engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which
under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then
no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such
last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day
immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since
Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to
acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one
candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were
committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004
to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing
the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004
immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political
activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/
manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before
the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-
president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for
purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as
petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February
9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on
March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing
requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign
watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial
number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive
hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification
marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot
for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to
give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the
same[,] uniform for local and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the

present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, hes already
a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began
(sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that the filing of the
certificate will not bring about ones being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also
provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet
commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough
time to prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House
Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the
Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan

acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is
just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to
change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by
existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other
prohibition.
 THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no

conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last
day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is
election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots,
Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the
filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet
the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed
by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated
election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into
law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law"
prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political
act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote
the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436,
thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of
the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without
repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any
portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot
but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so
doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section
15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses
can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that
before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus
file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining ones possible
violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the
campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider
Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start
of the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009
only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March
2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign
period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third
paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for
which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in
the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign
period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate
(thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts
be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after
said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start
of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting
his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds
involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare
an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the
campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are
lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign
period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the
start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says
is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is
clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a
criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither
can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but
the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as
the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET
ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as
the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 11 September 2009, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case disqualifying Rosalinda A.
Penera from running as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte for engaging in the prohibited act of
premature campaigning.

Penera forthwith filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the above Decision, invoking the following
arguments, to wit:
1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.2
2) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No.
9369.3
3) The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against
Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.4
4) Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning.5
5) The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.6
I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Peneras Motion for Reconsideration
The basic issues in the Motion for Reconsideration were already passed upon in the Decision dated 11
September 2009 and no substantial arguments were raised.
The grounds that: (1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369; (2) Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 9369; and (3) the petition for
disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are all reiterations of her previous arguments before the
Court and the same had already been adequately addressed in the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
Incidentally, Penera herself disclosed in her Motion for Reconsideration that she is the respondent in a
criminal case filed by Edgar T. Andanar for the commission of election offenses in violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is docketed as EO Case No. 08-99.7 Thus, the pronouncement in the
Decision dated 11 September 2009 that the instant case should concern only the electoral aspect of the
disqualification case finds more reason. As noted in the Decision, any discussion on the matter of
Peneras criminal liability for premature campaigning would have been preemptive and nothing more
than obiter dictum.
With respect to the assertion that Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for
disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning, the same is utterly
without merit. Penera admitted participating in the motorcade after filing her COC. What she merely
denied and/or refuted were the minor details concerning the conduct of said motorcade.
Likewise, Peneras contention that her admission of participating in the motorcade in this case is not
the same as admitting that she engaged in premature campaigning deserves scant consideration.
Logically, to admit to the elements constituting the offense of premature campaigning is to admit to the
commission of the said offense. Precisely, it is the act of participating in the motorcade after the filing
of her COC that constituted the prohibited act of premature campaigning in the instant case.
Finally, the claim of Penera that not all motorcades are designed to promote the election of a candidate
is unimpressive. Clearly, the context of the discussion on motorcades in the Decision dated 11
September 2009 was disregarded. The discussion pertained to motorcades conducted during election
periods by candidates and their supporters. In such an instance, a motorcade assumes an entirely
different significance and that is to promote a candidate.
As held in the Decision dated 11 September 2009, the conduct of a motorcade during election periods
is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section
79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on "[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]" The obvious purpose of the conduct of
motorcades during election periods is to introduce the candidates and the positions to which they seek
to be elected to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and
recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time.
The pretense that the motorcade was only a convoy of vehicles, which was entirely an unplanned event
that dispersed eventually, does not hold water. After filing their certificates of candidacy, Rosalinda
Penera and the other members of her political party conducted a motorcade and went around the
different barangays in the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte. The motorcade consisted of
two (2) jeepneys and ten (10) motorcycles, which were all festooned with multi-colored balloons.
There was marching music being played on the background and the individuals onboard the vehicles
threw candies to the people they passed by along the streets. With the number of vehicles, the balloons,
the background marching music, the candies on hand and the route that took them to the different
barangays, the motorcade could hardly be considered as spontaneous and unplanned.
Majority Opinion
Although the majority opinion initially mentions the above-stated grounds of Peneras Motion for
Reconsideration, the same were not at all discussed. The Resolution of the majority purely involves an
exposition of the grounds set forth in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio to the
Decision dated 11 September 2009.
At the outset, the majority opinion highlights the relevant provisions of law defining the meaning of a
candidate.
Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties." On the other hand, the second sentence in the
third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, states
that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The first
proviso in the same paragraph provides that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period."
The majority opinion goes on to quote a paragraph in the Decision dated 11 September 2009,
underscoring a portion of the same as follows:
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her [certificate of
candidacy (COC)] and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.
According to the interpretation of the majority of the above pronouncement, the Decision dated 11
September 2009 already considers a person who filed a COC a "candidate" even before the start of the
campaign period. From the filing of the COC, even before the start of the campaign period, the ponente
allegedly considers the partisan political acts of a person filing a COC "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate."
The majority clearly mistook the import of the above-quoted portion and read the same out of context.
Absolutely nowhere in the Decision dated 11 September 2009 was it stated that a person who filed a
COC is already deemed a candidate even before the start of the campaign period.
To recall, the Court held in its Decision that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines
the prohibited act of premature campaigning, was not repealed, expressly or impliedly, by Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period: x x x.
While relevant portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, provide:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. x x x
xxxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period[.]
The Court harmonized and reconciled the above provisions in this wise:
The following points are explanatory:
First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during
the campaign period." Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who
is not a candidate.
For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the
campaign period," is clearly erroneous.
Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan political
activity in the following manner:
SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
xxxx
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
 (4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the
COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate.
Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to
run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts
enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her
intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to
the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
The last paragraph of the aforequoted portion of the Decision dated 11 September 2009 should be read
together with, and qualified by, the paragraph immediately preceding it. Clearly, the ponente was quite
explicit in stating that, after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person
is not yet considered a candidate. After filing the COC, however, the commission by such person of the
acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code can already be construed as being
for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
Thereafter, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when said person is already a formal candidate,
that the partisan political acts that he/she committed after the filing of the COC can already be
considered as being for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate; hence, constituting premature
campaigning.
Reversal of Lanot v. Commission on Elections
The majority likewise ascribes error on the part of the ponente for reversing Lanot, which held that a
person should be a candidate before premature campaigning may be committed. Resolved under the
auspices of Republic Act No. 8436,8 the previous automation law, Lanot was allegedly decided on the
ground that one who files a COC is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Supposably, Congress wanted to ensure that any person filing a COC under the early deadline required
by the automated election system would not be disqualified for any partisan political act done prior to
the start of the campaign period. In enacting Republic Act No. 9369, Congress expressly wrote the
Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph, Sec. 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, which
states that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing COCs] shall
only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy."
The majority, therefore, concludes that the ponente cannot reverse Lanot without repealing the above
sentence, since to reverse Lanot would mean repealing the said sentence. The ponente, however, in
reversing Lanot does not claim that the second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. Thus, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is supposedly
self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which
embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the majority avers that the majority decision is irreconcilably
in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
The majority opinion arrives at an erroneous conclusion based on a faulty premise.
Lanot was decided on the basis of the requirement therein that there must be first a candidate before the
prohibited act of premature campaigning may be committed.

In Lanot v. Commission on Elections,9 Lanot, et al., filed a petition for disqualification against the then
Pasig City mayoralty candidate Vicente P. Eusebio for engaging in various forms of election campaign
on different occasions outside of the designated campaign period after he filed his COC during the
2004 local elections. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department recommended the
disqualification of Eusebio for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
recommendation was approved by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC en banc referred the
case back to the COMELEC Law Department to determine whether Eusebio actually committed the
acts subject of the petition for disqualification.
The Court, speaking through Justice Carpio, adjudged that Eusebio was not liable for premature
campaigning given that the latter committed partisan political acts before he became a candidate. The
Court construed the application of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8463 vis--vis the provisions of
Sections 80 and 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 moved the
deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. The Court ruled that
the only purpose for the early filing of COCs was to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.
Congress, however, never intended the early filing of a COC to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevented the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to
meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x
fixed by existing law" prior to Republic Act No. 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline
"will still not be considered as a candidate."10
Simply stated, the Court adjudged in Lanot that when Eusebio filed his COC to meet the early deadline
set by COMELEC, he did not thereby immediately become a candidate. Thus, there was no premature
campaigning since there was no candidate to begin with. It is on this ground that the majority reversed
Lanot.
The ponente reiterates that the existence of a candidate is not necessary before premature campaigning
may be committed. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally provides that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons,
to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period."
Very specific are the wordings of the law that the individual who may be held liable to commit the
unlawful act of premature campaigning can be any person: a voter or non-voter, a candidate or a non-
candidate.
Furthermore, as already previously discussed, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
repealed by Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369. In construing the said provisions, as well
as that of Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the meaning of the term
candidate, the majority has settled that, after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign
period, a person is yet to be considered a formal candidate. Nonetheless, by filing the COC, the person
categorically and explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate. Thereafter, if such person
commits the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, said acts can already
be construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.1avvphi1
Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is not self-contradictory.
The ponente can reverse Lanot and still uphold the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
The majority also stresses that in the enactment of Republic Act No. 9369, Congress inserted the word
"only" to the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 so that the
same now reads:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period.
Thus, Congress even strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a
candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. Accusing the ponente of giving a specious
reasoning in explaining the above proviso, the majority points out to the basic principle of law that any
act is lawful, unless expressly declared as unlawful. Therefore, the majority claims that there was no
need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. The logical conclusion is that
partisan political acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful. According to the
majority, any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period.
The ponente takes exception to the above sweeping and unwarranted reasoning. Not all election
offenses are required to be committed by a candidate and, like the prohibited act of premature
campaigning, not all election offenses are required to be committed after the start of the campaign
period. To reiterate, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of
premature campaigning is still good law despite the passage of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended. Precisely, the conduct of election campaign or partisan political activity before the campaign
period is the very evil that Section 80 seeks to prevent.
The majority opinion maintains its objection to the allegedly strained construction and/or interpretation
of the ponente of the particular provisions involved in this case. With equal vehemence, however, the
ponente adamantly rejects the majoritys absurd and unwarranted theory of repeal of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code put forth in both the Dissenting Opinion to the Decision dated 11 September
2009 and the Resolution of the majority.
As the majority repeatedly pointed out, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, was enacted merely to give the COMELEC ample time for the printing of ballots.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, is a substantive law which defines the
prohibited act of premature campaigning, an election offense punishable with the gravest of penalties
that can be imposed on a candidate, i.e., disqualification or, if elected, removal from office. If the
majority opinion indignantly rejects the attempts of the ponente to reconcile the provisions of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, then why
should they insist on repealing the former provision and not the latter?
The ponente emphasizes that whether the election would be held under the manual or the automated
system, the need for prohibiting premature campaigning to level the playing field between the
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period remains. Again, the choice as to who
among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public office should not be
swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some individuals who are able to spend
resources to promote their candidacies in advance of the period slated for campaign activities.
However, by virtue of the Resolution of the majority, premature campaigning will now be officially
decriminalized and, as a consequence, the value and significance of having a campaign period will now
be utterly negated. Thus, one year, five years or even ten years prior to the day of the elections, a
person aspiring for public office may now engage in election campaign or partisan political activities to
promote his candidacy, with impunity. All he needs to have is a very deep campaign war chest to be
able to carry out this shrewd activity.
Indeed, while fair elections has been dealt a fatal blow by the Resolution of the majority, it is fervently
hoped that the writing of the Decision dated 11 September 2009 and this Dissenting Opinion will not
be viewed as an effort made in vain if in the future the said Resolution can be revisited and somehow
rectified.
Premises considered, there is no reason to reverse and set aside the earlier ruling of the Court rendered
in this case.
I, therefore, vote to DENY WITH FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rosalinda A.
Penera on the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

13.
G.R. No. 204637 April 16, 2013
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Prohibitory Injunction1 assailing the Decision2 rendered on October
15, 2012 and Resolution3 issued on December 3, 2012 by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-040 (EP). The Decision dated October 15, 2012 and
Resolution dated December 3, 2012 denied herein petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chatos (Chato)
electoral protest filed before the HRET to challenge the proclamation of herein respondent, Elmer
Panotes (Panotes), as the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Camarines Norte.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, Chato and Panotes both ran for the congressional seat to represent the
Second District of Camarines Norte. On May 12, 2010, Panotes was proclaimed as the winner for
having garnered 51,704 votes. The votes cast for Chato totalled 47,822.

On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest claiming that in four of the seven municipalities 4
comprising the Second District of Camarines Norte, the following irregularities occurred: (a) the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines rejected and failed to count the votes, which if manually
counted and visually appreciated, were in fact validly cast for her; (b) the PCOS machines broke down
in some clustered precincts (CPs) and the ballots were inserted in contingency machines at later times
rendering uncertain the actual inclusion of the votes in the final tally; (c) the protocols prescribed by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) relative to the installation of the PCOS machines and
Canvassing and Consolidation System (CCS), counting of ballots, canvassing and transmission of
results, and closing of the voting were either not followed or modified making it possible for the
tampering and manipulation of the election results; (d) several compact flash (CF) cards in the PCOS
machines were reconfigured on the eve of the May 10, 2010 elections; (e) there were errors or lapses in
transmitting results from several PCOS machines to the CCS of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers
(MBOCs) resulting to the need to manually insert CF cards into the CCS, but in some instances, the
insertions were made after significant and unaccounted lapse of time in cases where before transporting
the CF cards to the MBOCs, the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) went home first
or did private business; and (f) after the closing of the polls, some CF cards failed to show recorded
results.5
On March 21, 2011, the HRET started the initial revision of ballots in 25% of the pilot protested CPs.
The revision ended on March 24, 2011. Per physical count, Chatos votes increased by 518, while those
cast for Panotes decreased by 2,875 votes. The detailed results follow:6
VOTES FOR CHATO VOTES FOR PANOTES
 Municipalities Per Gain Per Per Gain or
Election or Election Physical
Per (Loss)
Returns Physical (Loss) Returns Count

(ERs) Count

Basud 1,735 1,891 156 3,067 2,242 (825)

Daet 3,337 3,704 367 5,229 3,186 (2,043)

Mercedes 779 779 0 1,573 1,573 0

Vinzons 1,628 1,623 (5) 3,224 3,217 (7)

Total 7,479 7,997 518 13,093 10,218 (2,875)

Panotes filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings with Motion for Preliminary Hearing to
Determine the Integrity of the Ballots and Ballot Boxes Used in the May 10, 2010 Elections in the
Contested Precincts of the Second District of Camarines Norte and to Direct the Printing of the Picture
Images of the Ballots of the Subject Precincts.7 Panotes claimed that in Daet and Basud: (a) the top
cover of some of the ballot boxes were loose, and ballots, Minutes of Voting (MOV) and ERs can be
taken out; (b) when keys were inserted into the padlocks of the ballot boxes, the upper portion of the
locks disconnected from the bodies indicating tampering; (c) the packing tape seals, which he was able
to put in some of the ballot boxes, were broken or cut, leading to the conclusion that the boxes had been
opened prior to the initial revision; (d) some self-locking security seals were not properly attached; and
(e) the contents of some of the ballot boxes, such as the MOV and ERs were either missing or in
disarray, with the ballots unnecessarily folded or crumpled in the CPs, where the votes cast for him
substantially decreased as per physical count when compared to the figures found in the ERs.
On March 22, 2012, the HRET issued Resolution No. 12-079 directing the continuance of the revision
of ballots in 75% of the contested CPs. The proceeding commenced on May 2, 2012 and ended on May
9, 2012. The results were:8
VOTES FOR CHATO VOTES FOR PANOTES

Municipalities Per Gain Per Per Gain or

Election or Election Physical
Per (Loss)
Returns Physical (Loss) Returns Count
 (ERs) Count

Basud 4,792 5,259 467 4,812 3,163 (1,649)

Daet 12,569 13,312 743 12,856 9,029 (3,827)

Mercedes 8,553 8,554 1 6,166 6,166 0

Vinzons 5,085 5,087 2 4,883 4,883 0

Total 30,999 32,212 1,213 28,717 23,241 (5,476)

As shown above, there was a substantial discrepancy between the figures indicated in the
ERs/Statements of Votes by Precinct (SOVPs) on one hand, and the results of the physical count during
the revision, on the other. Thereafter, the HRET issued Resolution No. 11-208 directing the decryption
and copying of the picture image files of ballots (PIBs). The proceeding was conducted within the
COMELEC premises. However, Chato alleged that the back-up CF card for CP No. 44 of the
Municipality of Daet and the CF card for CP No. 29 of the Municipality of Mercedes did not contain
the PIBs. Chato filed before the HRET an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the
Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images. The HRET denied Chatos motion through Resolution No. 11-
321 issued on June 8, 2011.

Panotes filed before us a petition9 assailing HRET Resolution No. 12-079. On her part, Chato instituted
a petition10 challenging HRET Resolution No. 11-321. We ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions, and both were dismissed in a decision which we rendered on January 22, 2013. Panotes
petition was moot and academic since revision was in fact completed. Chato, on the other hand, was
not able to present sufficient evidence to prove that the integrity of the CF cards was not preserved.
Going back to HRET Case No. 10-040 (EP), in the 160 protested CPs, there were substantial variances
in the figures per machine count as indicated in the ERs, on one hand, and per physical count, on the
other, in a total of 69 CPs, 23 of which were in Basud and 46 in Daet. The HRET then tediously
compared the paper ballots that were fed to the PCOS machine in these 69 CPs with the corresponding
PIBs in the CF cards to resolve the discrepancies. The bar codes at the bottom right of the PIBs were
compared with those indicated in the paper ballots. However, the HRET found that while the name of
Chato was shaded in some of the paper ballots objected to by Panotes, there were no votes (NV) for
congressional representative reflected in the PIBs.11 Notably, the number of ballots gained by Chato
during the physical count of votes is directly proportional with the number of paper ballots for her
objected to by Panotes with NV on the congressional representative line per PIBs.12 The HRET
likewise observed that per physical count, there was a substantial increase in the number of stray votes
by reason of over voting (OV) for congressional representative. The decryption and copying of the
PIBs revealed that there were only a few PIBs with OV for the said position. 13 Panotes loss per
physical count is more or less proportionate with the number of ballots, which Chato claimed as having
exhibited stray over voting for the congressional representative line.14
Chato and Panotes presented their respective evidence before the HRET.
Among the evidence offered by Chato were: (a) certified true copies of the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN) of the testimony of Atty. Anne A. Romero-Cortez15 (Atty. Cortez) on June 2, 2010 when
she explicitly said before the Congress, acting as the Presidential and Vice Presidential Board of
Canvassers, that "for the municipalities of Labo, Vinzons and Basud, there were CF cards that had to
be replaced because they were defective"; (b) the testimony of Angel Averia (Averia),16 who, during
the decryption and copying of the PIBs in the COMELEC premises on April 26, 2011, had allegedly
heard COMELEC Director Esther Roxas (Director Roxas) admit that there was no inventory of the CF
cards; (c) Panotes own admission in his Opposition to the Motion to Reiterate the Continuation of
Revision, dated March 22, 2011, to the effect that "the main CF card for CP 44 of the Municipality of
Daet is missing and it would appear that the Election Officer submitted the back-up CF card in lieu
thereof" but the "back-up CF card did not contain the picture image of the ballots"; and (d) Panotes
admission in the aforesaid Opposition that "in the Municipality of Mercedes, the BEI re-zeroed the
results of the elections in CP No. 29," and consequently, the PIBs for these precincts were erased from
the CF cards memory.17
Following are among Panotes claims to establish that in order to tilt the results of the electoral protest
in Chatos favor, the paper ballots were tampered after the canvassing, counting and transmission of the
voting results in the May 10, 2010 elections were completed: (a) the testimonies of Philip Fabia and
Danilo Sibbaluca that "the ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections could be turned upside
down and the bottom portion of the ballot box could be lifted so that the contents could be taken out";18
(b) the reports of the HRET Revision Committees stating that in Daet and Basud, some of the padlocks
and self-locking security seals in the ballot boxes were either missing or not properly attached, and the
MOVs and ERs were likewise nowhere to be found;19 (c) the testimony of Benjamina Camino that
during the revision, in the matched paper ballots and PIBs, the votes were identical except those for the
position of congressional representative;20 (d) testimony of Florivida Mago21 indicating that in the
Random Manual Audit (RMA) conducted on the same day right after the closing of the polls, the team
found that out of 420 valid votes counted by the PCOS machine, there was none with an over-vote for
the congressional seat line, and there was only a single difference between the automated result and the
manual count;22 (e) in direct contrast with the RMA teams findings, in the revision report for CP No.
23 of Basud, 99 ballots reflected over-votes for the congressional seat line;23 (f) the main CF card for
CP No. 44 of Daet had already been retrieved from the ballot box of the municipalitys MBOC and its
contents decrypted;24 (g) even granting for arguments sake that in Mercedes, the BEI re-zeroed the
results of the elections in CP No. 29, this has no bearing since the physical count of the ballots jived
with the results indicated in the ER;25 (h) Chato took out of context Atty. Cortezs testimony before the
Congress because what the latter stated was that the defective CF cards were replaced with working
ones on May 10, 2010 and not after;26 and (i) Atty. Cortez and Director Roxas were not presented as
witnesses before the HRET, hence, the statements ascribed to them by Chato do not bear weight.27
The HRET found that out of the 160 contested CPs, there were 91 without substantial variances
between the results of the automatic and the manual count. However, in 69 CPs in Basud and Daet, the
variances were glaring.
On October 15, 2012, the HRET rendered the herein assailed decision dismissing Chatos electoral
protest based on the following grounds:
The settled rule in election contests is that the ballots themselves constitute the best evidence of the will
of the voters, but the ballots lose this character and give way to the acceptance of the election returns
when it has been shown that they have been the subject of tampering, either by substituting them with
other official or fake ballots, or by substantially altering or changing their contents.
Consequently, the votes determined after the revision in the foregoing 69 CPs in Basud and Daet,
which yielded a reversal of votes, cannot be relied upon, as they do not reflect the true will of the
electorate. Hence, the Tribunal has to rely on what is reflected in the election returns and/or statement
of votes by precinct[,] the same being the best evidence of the results of the election in said precincts in
lieu of the altered ballots.
xxxx
The votes of the parties per physical count in all the 120 [sic] protested CPs in the concerned district
are 40,209 for protestant Chato and 33,459 for protestee Panotes.
Considering that 69 CPs have substantial variances, the Tribunal decided to disregard the ballots
therein, i.e., 18,535 for protestant and 10,858 for protestee, and to consider, instead, the results in the
election returns, i.e., 16,802 for protestant and 19,202 for protestee.
Hence, only the ballots in the 91 CPs without substantial variances, i.e., 21,674 for protestant and
22,601 for protestee, had undergone appreciation of ballots. Of the ballots appreciated, the Tribunal
rejected two (2) ballots for protestant and two (2) ballots for protestee, while it admitted 176 ballots
claimed by the protestant and 183 claimed by the protestee.
The votes of the parties in the uncontested municipalities are 9,338 for protestant and 9,894 for
protestee.
Accordingly, the parties votes, after recount and appreciation and examination of the evidence
presented in the 160 protested CPs as well as in the uncontested municipalities, are summarized below:

[Chato] [Panotes]

Votes in the 91 revised 21,674 22,601

protested CPs without SV

[substantial variance] per

recount and appreciation

Add: Votes per ER/SOVP 16,802 19,202

in 69 revised protested

CPs with SV

Less: Rejected Ballots (2) (2)

Objected to in the 91

revised protested CPs

without SV

Add: Admitted PCOS 176 183

Rejected Ballots Claimed

in the 91 revised protested

CPs without SV

Add: Votes in the 9,338 9,894

uncontested

municipalities

Equals: Total votes of the 47,988 51,878

parties in the

congressional district

Winning Margin of 3,890

 Protestee

The foregoing results of revision and appreciation of ballots in the protested CPs, and the evidence of
the parties indicate that protestees proclamation margin of 3,882 votes increased by eight (8).28
(Citations omitted)
On December 3, 2012, the HRET denied Chatos motion for reconsideration to the Decision dated
October 15, 2012.
Central to the resolution of the instant petition are the issues of whether or not the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion when it:
(a) disregarded the results of the physical count in the 69 CPs when the HRET had previously held that
the integrity of the ballot boxes was preserved and that the results of the revision proceedings can be
the bases to overturn those reflected in the election returns;
(b) resorted to the PIBs, regarded them as the equivalent of the paper ballots, and thereafter ruled that
the integrity of the latter was doubtful;
(c) held that Chato had failed to prove by substantial evidence that the CF cards used in the May 10,
2010 elections were not preserved.
In support of the instant petition, Chato reiterates her allegations in the proceedings before the HRET.
She stresses that in the Order29 issued on April 10, 2012, the HRET ruled that as regards the conditions
of the ballot boxes in Basud and Daet, the self-locking security seals and padlocks were attached and
locked, hence, "there was substantial compliance with statutory safety measures to prevent reasonable
opportunity for tampering with their contents x x x."30 Chato likewise argues that under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9369,31 the May 10, 2010 Automated Election System was paper-based32 and the PIBs are
not the official ballots. Further, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, what should be regarded as the
official ballots are those printed by the National Printing Office (NPO) and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), or by private printers contracted by the COMELEC in the event that the NPO and the
BSP both certify that they cannot meet the printing requirements. Chato once again referred to the
statements allegedly made by Atty. Cortez, Averia and Panotes himself to prove that serious doubt
exists relative to the integrity of the CF cards used in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Panotes refutes the foregoing in his Comment33 to the instant petition. He points out that in Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato v. HRET and Elmer Panotes,34 we sustained the PIBs as the functional equivalent of
paper ballots, thus, they may be used for revision purposes. Further, the HRET had categorically ruled
in the herein assailed decision that the physical ballots were altered or tampered, hence, not reflective
of the true will of the electorate. Besides, Chatos electoral protest was flimsily anchored on the alleged
missing CF card in CP No. 44 of Daet. Panotes emphasizes that the CF card had already been retrieved.
Even if it were not found, there are 14 CPs in Daet and one incident of a missing CF card cannot create
a strong presumption that all such cards in the entire Second District of Camarines Norte had been
tampered.
There is no merit in the instant petition.
Chato posits that since the HRET, in its Order dated April 10, 2012, had already considered the
conditions of the ballot boxes as indicative of having substantially complied with "statutory safety
measures to prevent reasonable opportunity for tampering with their contents",35 its subsequent
disregard of the results of the physical count in the 69 CPs in Daet and Basud was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
We do not agree.
It bears stressing that the HRETs Order dated April 10, 2012 was issued to resolve Panotes motion to
suspend the continuance of the revision proceedings in 75% of the contested CPs. The HRETs
findings then anent the integrity of the ballot boxes were at the most, preliminary in nature. The HRET
was in no way estopped from subsequently holding otherwise after it had the opportunity to
exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the entire revision proceedings the conditions of all
the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots themselves, the MOV, SOVs and ERs.
We need not belabor the second and third issues raised herein as the same had been resolved in the
following wise in Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. HRET and Elmer Panotes36 and Elmer E. Panotes v.
HRET and Liwayway Vinzons-Chato:37
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES (Automated Election System) is
utilized as the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully
captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form."
xxxx
The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official
paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then
required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which
scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established during the
required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when
decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.
As such, the printouts thereof PIBs are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the
voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
xxxx
x x x The HRET found Chatos evidence insufficient. The testimonies of the witnesses she presented
were declared irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to the CF cards used in the 20 precincts in
the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with substantial variances x x x.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion into
its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary
weight of testimonies presented before it. Thus, for failure of Chato to discharge her burden of proving
that the integrity of the questioned cards had not been preserved, no further protestations to the use of
the picture images of the ballots as stored in the CF cards should be entertained. (Citations omitted)
Chato attempts to convince us that the integrity of the physical ballots was preserved, while that of the
CF cards was not. As mentioned above, the integrity of the CF cards is already a settled matter. Anent
that of the physical ballots, this is a factual issue which calls for a re-calibration of evidence. Generally,
we do not resolve factual questions unless the decision, resolution or order brought to us for review can
be shown to have been rendered or issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In Dueas, Jr. v. HRET,38 we defined grave abuse of discretion, viz:

It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to
prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There
is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. x x x.39 (Citation omitted)
In the case at bar, the HRET disposed of Chatos electoral protest without grave abuse of discretion.
The herein assailed decision and resolution were rendered on the bases of existing evidence and records
presented before the HRET.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated October 15, 2012 and Resolution dated December 3, 2012 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-040 (EP) are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

14.
.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order,1 filed by petitioner Mamerto T. Sevilla, Jr., to nullify the
May 14, 2012 Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division and the
October 6, 2012 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc in SPR (BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011. These assailed
Resolutions reversed and set aside the May 4, 2011 Order of the Muntinlupa City Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 80
(MeTC), dismissing respondent Renato R. Sos election protest against Sevilla.
The Facts
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa
City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010,
the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning
margin of 628 votes over Sos 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest
with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all
the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the protested
precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.4
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated
May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration
from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.5
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that
in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of
how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two
persons.6
The Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted Sos petition. The Comelec
Second Division held that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, as in the case before it. It also
ruled that the assailed Order was fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the
ballots, and was couched in general terms: "these are not written by one person observing the different
strokes, slant, spacing, size and indentation of handwriting and the variance in writing."7
The Comelec En Banc Ruling

The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the Comelec Second Divisions ruling in its October
6, 2012 Resolution whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Respondent judge is directed to conduct another revision of the contested ballots in Election
Protest Case No. SP-6719 with dispatch.9
It ruled that where the dismissal was capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. The Comelec en banc emphasized that procedural
technicalities should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution of election cases inasmuch
as ballots should be read and appreciated with utmost liberality so that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
It found that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when she did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 2(d), Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC on the form of the decision in election protests involving pairs or groups of ballots written by
two persons. It noted that based on the general and repetitive phraseology of the Order, the MeTC
Judges findings were "copy-pasted" into the decision and ran counter to the mandate of the
aforementioned rule. Also, the MeTC Judge failed to mention in her appreciation of the ballots that she
examined the Minutes of Voting and Counting to ascertain whether there were illiterate voters or
assisted voters in the protested precincts.10

Commissioner Lims Dissent 11

The dissent posited that Sos petition should be dismissed outright as it was mired in procedural errors.
First, So should have filed an appeal within five (5) days from receipt of the MeTCs Order; a motion
for reconsideration was improper as the Order amounted to the final disposition of the protest. Second,
So should not have filed the motion for reconsideration even if he believed that the Order was
interlocutory since a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Also, he could have simply
filed the petition for certiorari without the necessity of filing the motion for reconsideration. Third, the
petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost appeal. The Comelec could not even treat the
certiorari as an appeal since the petition was filed 25 days after So received the assailed Order; thus, the
Order already attained finality. Finally, procedural rules should not be lightly shunned in favor of
liberality when, as in this case, So did not give a valid excuse for his errors.
The Petition
The Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari
Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained Sos petition despite
its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quos dismissal order became final and
executory due to Sos wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within five (5) days from
receipt of the Order and paying the required appeal fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration a
prohibited pleading that did not stop the running of the prescriptive period to file an appeal. Sevilla also
emphasizes that Sos petition for certiorari should not have been given due course since it is not a
substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.12
The dismissal of the election protest was proper
Sevilla also contends that the dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the MeTC
Judge complied with the rules; she made clear, specific and detailed explanations pertaining to the
specific strokes, figures or letters showing that the ballots had been written by one person. Granting
that the decision was tainted with errors, certiorari would still not lie because a mere error of judgment
is not synonymous with grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, a liberal application of the rules cannot be
made to a petition which offers no explanation for the non-observance of the rules.13

On November 13, 2012,14 the Court resolved to require the Comelec and the respondent to comment
on the petition and to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed Comelec
Second Divisions Resolution of May 14, 2012 and the Comelec en bancs Resolution of October 6,
2012.15
In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that
the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority decision considering that
three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others voted
to grant the same. So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by
six (6) Commissioners because the 7th
Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time. Considering that the October 6,
2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by the Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the
petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec for a rehearing by a full and complete
Commission.16
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court, and remand the
case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en bancs Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision
required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution."17 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec
provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the
Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order
or ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc.
In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,18 we declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all
the members of the Comelec en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling."
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have
affirmed the Comelec Second Divisions Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevillas motion for
reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the
Comelec en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second
Divisions findings on the basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and
Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three
dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either
side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A
of the Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to
arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to
decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except
to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en bancs Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec
en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the
members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.19 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided
in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]

In Juliano v. Commission on Elections,20 only three members of the Comelec en banc voted in favor of
granting Estrelita Julianos motion for reconsideration (from the Decision of the Comelec Second
Division dismissing her petition for annulment of proclamation of Muslimin Sema as the duly elected
Mayor of Cotabato City), three members dissented, and one member took no part. In ruling that the
Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to order a rehearing required by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the
Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that the
Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was a
mere "re-consultation."
A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing."
A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation means a second
deliberation of persons on some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to courts or
administrative boards attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. A retrial of
issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be heard." (italics
supplied). But as held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals,
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.1wphi1 The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of
presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments; whereas,
a re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only by the
members of the tribunal, without the participation of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioners motion for
reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an order setting the case for
hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda before voting anew on therein
petitioners motion for reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc
to act on herein petitioners motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its
own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc
of the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing
required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.21 (italics
supplied; emphases ours)

To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,22 the Court ruled that the Comelec en
banc did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered a rehearing of its November 6, 2007
Resolution for failing to muster the required majority voting. The Court held:
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the
First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding
for the body to have a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes
the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and
further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of
November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a record of voters, lacking in legal effect
despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Resolution. According, the Comelec did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.23 (italics supplied; citation omitted)
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a
rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla.
In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec en banc
for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these
considerations, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply
with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and REMAND SPR (BR GY-SK) No. 70-2011 to the
Comelec en bane for the conduct of the required rehearing under the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The
Comelec en bane is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the rehearing with utmost dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

15.
G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS
ARARO PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is beyond human expectations that we charge voters with knowledge as to which among the many
party-list groups listed in the ballot they are presented with during election day is disqualified. To do so
will amount to their disenfranchisement and the failure to comply with the proportionality for party-list
representatives required by the Constitution and by law.
We are asked to decide the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a party-list group that ran for the
2010 national elections. The petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the Commission on
Elections in determining and proclaiming the winning party-list groups.1
We rule that the Petition is moot and academic. However, we provide guidance for the bench and the
bar with respect to the formula used in determining the winning party-list groups. We refine the divisor
in the formula use din getting the percentage of votes garnered by a party-list.
The facts as established on record are as follows:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly accredited party-
list under Republic Act No. 7941.2Itgarnered a total of one hundred forty-seven thousand two hundred
four (147,204) votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked fiftieth (50th).3 The Commission on
Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28)
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional
seats.4 The result was based on the Commission on Elections count of one hundred twenty-one (121)
Certificates of Canvass or a total of twenty-nine million seven hundred fifty thousand and forty-one
(29,750,041) votes for the Party-List System.5
The winning party-list groups were the following:6

NUMBER OF
PARTY
SEATS
1 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS OF THE 2
PHILIPPINES, INC.
2 AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY 2
3 GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY 2
4 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY 2
5 ABONO 2
6 BAYAN MUNA 2
7 AN WARAY 2
8 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE SECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1
INC.
9 ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS PARTY 1
10 ANAKPAWIS 1
11 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 1
12 ABANTE MINDANAO, INC. 1
13 ACT TEACHERS 1
14 YOU AGAINST CORRUPTION AND POVERTY 1
15 KASANGGA SA KAUNLARAN, INC. 1
16 BAGONG HENERASYON 1
17 ANG GALING PINOY 1
18 AGBIAG! TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. 1
19 PUWERSA NG BAYANing ATLETA 1
20 ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS 1
21 TRADE UNION CONGRESS PARTY 1
22 ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT 1
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC.
23 DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT WORKERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 1
24 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA 1
25 KALINGA-ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND NATION 1
BUILDING THROUGH EASING POVERTY, INC.
26 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 1
27 UNA ANG PAMILYA FORMERLY ALLIANCE OF NEO- 1
CONSERVATIVES
28 ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS 1
TOTAL SEATS 35
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups
listed above.7
Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order.8 The petitioner asks that this Court:
1. modify the Commission on Elections interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v.
COMELEC9 by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total
number of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total
number of votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified;
2. enjoin the public respondent Commission on Elections from proclaiming the remaining
winning party-list candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT
v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by the petitioner; and
3. issue a Temporary Restraining Order against the public respondent until it modifies the
present formula for computing the number of seats for the winning party-list candidates to the
formula proposed by the petitioner.10This Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining
Order.11By Resolution, the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning party-list
groups with the following computation:12
WHEREAS, as of May 17, 2010, the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than thirty million two hundred sixty[-]four thousand five hundred seventy[-]nine (30,264,579)given
the following statistical data:

REGISTERED
DESCRIPTION
VOTERS
Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 29,750,041
Less: Votes garnered by the eight (8) disqualified parties 308,335
Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated after deducting votes of the eight 29,441,706
 (8) disqualified parties
Add: Party-list votes still uncanvassed Lanao del Sur 515,488
Local Absentee Voting 19,071
Overseas Absentee Voting 9,299
Due to lowering of threshold 92,740
Precincts reporting Final Testing and Sealing results 186,275
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 30,264,579
WHEREAS, since there are twohundred twenty-nine (229) legislative districts, the total number of
party-list seats available for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections is fifty-seven (57)
based on the following formula: number of legislative districts/0.80 x 0.20;
WHEREAS, the provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides, in part, that:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two [sic] (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization or coalitions shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."
WHEREAS, applying the formula in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections, and [sic] Bayan Muna, Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., and Abono
[v.]Commission on Elections, the ranking of the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered as of May 17, 2010, and the seats that may be
obtained by each party to complete the allocation of the available 57 party-list seats, are shown
below:13

VOTES
GARNERED
(B) plus
OVER GUARANTEED ADDITIONAL
(C), in
VOTES TOTAL SEAT First SEATS
RANK PARTY whole
GARNERED VOTES FOR Round Second Round
integers
PARTY (B) (C)
(D)
LIST, in %
(A)
1 AKO BICOL POLITICAL 1,522,986 5.0322% 1 2.26 3
PARTY
2 COALITION OF 1,292,182 4.2696% 1 1.92 2
ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
3 BUHAY HAYAAN 1,249,555 4.1288% 1 1.85 2
YUMABONG
4 AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S 1,058,691 3.4981% 1 1.57 2
ACTION PARTY
5 GABRIELAWOMENS 1,001,421 3.3089% 1 1.48 2
PARTY
6 COOPERATIVE 943,529 3.1176% 1 1.40 2
NATCCO NETWORK
PARTY
7 1ST CONSUMERS 768,829 2.5404% 1 1.14 2
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL
ENERGY
8 ABONO 766,615 2.5330% 1 1.13 2
9 BAYAN MUNA 746,019 2.4650% 1 1.10 2
10 AN WARAY 711,631 2.3514% 1 1.05 2
11 CITIZEN'S BATTLE 647,483 2.1394% 1 0.96 1
AGAINST CORRUPTION
12 ADVOCACY FOR 614,725 2.0312% 1 0.91 1
TEACHER
EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION
COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS
13 AGRICULTURAL 515,501 1.7033% 0 1 1
SECTOR ALLIANCE
SECTOR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
14 BUTIL FARMERS 506,703 1.6742% 0 1 1
PARTY
15 ALLIANCE FOR 469,093 1.5500% 0 1 1
BARANGAY CONCERNS
PARTY
16 ANAKPAWIS 445,628 1.4724% 0 1 1
17 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 417,923 1.3809% 0 1 1
18 LPG MARKETERS 417,600 1.3798% 0 1 1
ASSOCIATION, INC.
19 ABANTE MINDANAO, 376,011 1.2424% 0 1 1
 INC.
20 ACT TEACHERS 369,564 1.2211% 0 1 1
21 ANG ASOSASYON 357,009 1.1796% 0 1 1
SANG MANGUNGUMA
NGA BISAYA-OWA
MANGUNGUMA, INC.
22 YOU AGAINST 335,635 1.1090% 0 1 1
CORRUPTION AND
POVERTY
23 ASSOCIATION OF 313,359 1.0354% 0 1 1
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES
24 KASANGGA SA 296,368 0.9793% 0 1 1
KAUNLARAN, INC.
25 BAGONG 292,875 0.9677% 0 1 1
HENERASYON
26 ALLIANCE FOR 292,057 0.9650% 0 1 1
NATIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY
27 ANG GALING PINOY 269,009 0.8889% 0 1 1
28 AGBIAG! TIMBUYOG 262,298 0.8667% 0 1 1
ILOCANO, INC.
29 PUWERSA NG 258,498 0.8541% 0 1 1
BAYANING ATLETA
30 ARTS BUSINESS AND 257,301 0.8502% 0 1 1
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS
31 TRADE UNION 244,623 0.8083% 0 1 1
CONGRESS PARTY
32 ALYANSA NG MGA 241,898 0.7993% 0 1 1
GRUPONG HALIGI NG
AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA
SA MAMAMAYAN, INC.
33 DEMOCRATIC 238,675 0.7886% 0 1 1
INDEPENDENT
WORKERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.
34 KAPATIRAN NG MGA 234,717 0.7756% 0 1 1
NAKULONG NA
 WALANG SALA
35 KALINGA-ADVOCACY 229,198 0.7573% 0 1 1
FOR SOCIAL
EMPOWERMENT AND
NATION BUILDING
THROUGH EASING
POVERTY, INC.
36 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 227,116 0.7504% 0 1 1
37 1-UNITED TRANSPORT 220,002 0.7269% 0 1 1
KOALISYON
38 UNA ANG PAMILYA 217,032 0.7171% 0 1 1
FORMERLY ALLIANCE
OF NEO-
CONSERVATIVES
39 ALLIANCE OF 214,760 0.7096% 0 1 1
VOLUNTEER
EDUCATORS
40 AANGAT TAYO 176,074 0.5818% 0 1 1
41 ADHIKAING 173,711 0.5740% 0 1 1
TINATAGUYOD NG
KOOPERATIBA
42 ANG LABAN NG 170,304 0.5627% 0 1 1
INDIGONG FILIPINO
43 ASSOCIATION OF 167,654 0.5540% 0 1 1
LABORERS AND
EMPLOYEES
44 KASOSYO PRODUCER- 166,432 0.5499% 0 1 1
CONSUMER
EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION, INC.
45 ALAY BUHAY 163,164 0.5391% 0 1 1
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.
46 AKSYON MAGSASAKA 161,674 0.5342% 0 1 1
PARTIDO TINIG NG
MASA
47 KATIPUNAN NG MGA 160,745 0.5311% 0 0 0
ANAK NG BAYAN ALL
FILIPINO DEMOCRATIC
MOVEMENT
48 ANAK MINDANAO 157,733 0.5212% 0 0 0
49 VETERANS FREEDOM 154,183 0.5095% 0 0 0
PARTY
50 ALLIANCE FOR RURAL 147,204 0.4864% 0 0 0
RECONSTRUCTION,
INC.
51 ATONG PAGLAOM 145,435 0.4805% 0 0 0
52 PILIPINO ASSOCIATION 143,151 0.4730% 0 0 0
FOR COUNTRY-URBAN
POOR YOUTH
ADVANCEMENT AND
WELFARE
53 ABANTE TRIBUNG 142,013 0.4692% 0 0 0
MAKABANSA
54 ANGAT ATING 141,780 0.4685% 0 0 0
KABUHAYAN
PILIPINAS, INC.
55 PARTIDO NG 140,000 0.4626% 0 0 0
MANGGAGAWA
56 ALYANSANG 137,842 0.4555% 0 0 0
BAYANIHAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG-
BUKID AT
MANGINGISDA
57 ALLIANCE TRANSPORT 136,710 0.4517% 0 0 0
SECTOR
58 KAUNLARAN NG 130,270 0.4304% 0 0 0
AGRIKULTURA
ASENSADONG
PROBINSYA ANGAT NG
BAYAN
59 BARANGAY NATIN 126,462 0.4179% 0 0 0
60 1-AKO BABAENG ASTIG 120,734 0.3989% 0 0 0
AASENSO
61 1GUARDIANS 120,727 0.3989% 0 0 0
NATIONALIST OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
62 BABAE PARA SA 117,299 0.3876% 0 0 0
KAUNLARAN
63 BAGONG BAYAN 115,428 0.3814% 0 0 0
NAGTATAGUYOD SA
DEMOKRATIKONG
IDEOLOHIYA AT
LAYUNIN
64 AHON PINOY 115,197 0.3806% 0 0 0
65 ACTION FOR DYNAMIC 115,058 0.3802% 0 0 0
DEVELOPMENT, INC.
66 KATRIBU INDIGINOUS 114,891 0.3796% 0 0 0
PEOPLES SECTORAL
PARTY
67 ANG LADLAD LBGT 113,187 0.3740% 0 0 0
PARTY
68 CONFEDERATION OF 110,759 0.3660% 0 0 0
NON-STOCK SAVINGS
AND LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
69 KABALIKAT NG MGA 109,739 0.3626% 0 0 0
MAMAMAYAN
70 ONE ADVOCACY FOR 109,682 0.3624% 0 0 0
HEALTH, PROGRESS
AND OPPORTUNITY
71 BINHI; PARTIDO NG 108,005 0.3569% 0 0 0
MGA MAGSASAKA
PARA SA MGA
MAGSASAKA
72 1-AANI 107,970 0.3568% 0 0 0
73 AKAP BATA, INC. 107,154 0.3541% 0 0 0
74 ANG ASOSASYON NG 107,135 0.3540% 0 0 0
MGA TRABAHADOR AT
PAHINANTE
75 AGILA NG MGA 105,009 0.3470% 0 0 0
KATUTUBONG
PILIPINO, INC.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes
that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the
petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on
Elections erroneous interpretation. The figure presented by petitioner resulted from the following
computations:14
 37,377,371 (Number of voters who actually voted LESS votes
for disqualified party lists)
less 30,264,579 (Number of votes for party-list candidates LESS
number of votes for disqualified party-list candidates)
7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes
according to petitioner ARARO)
First, the total number of votes for disqualified party-lists is deducted from the total number of voters
that actually voted. The total number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is three hundred eight
thousand three hundred thirty-five (308,335). 15 The total number of voters that actually voted is
thirty-seven million six hundred eighty-five thousand seven hundred six (37,685,706).16 After
subtracting the amounts, the result is thirty-seven million three hundred seventy-seven thousand three
hundred seventy-one (37,377,371)votes.
Second, the number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is again deducted from the number of
votes for party-list candidates which the petitioner pegged at thirty million five hundred seventy-two
thousand nine hundred fourteen votes (30,572,914).17 The difference then is thirty million two hundred
sixty-four thousand five hundred seventy-nine (30,264,579) votes.
Lastly, to get the total number of votes disregarded by the Commission on Elections interpretation,
30,264,579 is subtracted from 37,377,371.The computation then results to seven million one hundred
twelve thousand seven hundred ninety-two (7,112,792) votes disregarded using the Commission on
Elections interpretation.
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers is the following:

Number of seats available to

legislative districts Number of seats
x .20 = available to party-list
representatives
.08
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:

229
x .20 = 57
.80
The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the
winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where:

Number of votes of party-list

Proportion or
= Percentage of votes
Total number of votes for garnered by party-list
party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to 2% or
0.02 to entitle a party-list candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the
total number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of party-list
seats available. Thus:

Proportion or
Total number Number of
Percentage of Additional seats
of party-list - seats allocated x =
votes garnered awarded
seats available in first round
by party-list
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is computed by
getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats awarded in the second
round), the next in the party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully
distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning groups. Fractional seats are
not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v.
COMELEC is flawed because it is not in accordance with the law.19 The petitioner distinguishes the
phrases, valid votes cast for party-list candidates on the one hand as against votes cast for the party-list
system on the other.
The petitioner puts in issue the interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.7941 or "An
Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The sections provide the guidelines in allocating seats to party-list
representatives:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of
the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
 Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC
shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis
provided)

The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 or the
Party-list Law does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes, to wit:
Therefore, votes for specific party lists are not the same as votes for the party-list system. Hence,
people whose votes were spoiled for instance (like checking or failure to properly shade the ovals in the
ballots, or voted for two party lists when the requirement is only one, or had erasures on their ballots
for instance), or did not vote for any party-list at all are still voters for the party-list system. The votes
for the party-list system [include] all those people who voted whether their votes were counted or not
as long as the mechanism for the selection of party-list is in place.20 (Emphasis provided)
In its November 12, 2010 Comment,21 the Commission on Elections through the Office of the
Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the
divisor. The Commission on Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any
qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-
list system."24
The issues in this case are as follows:
I. Whether the case is already moot and academic
II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its
interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups
that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The
options are:
A. All votes cast for the party-list system less the votes cast for subsequently disqualified party-
list groups and votes declared spoiled
B. The total votes cast
C. The total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-
list groups listed in the ballot even if subsequently declared disqualified. The divisor should not
include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.
We decide as follows:
I
This case is moot and academic. Mendoza v. Villas26 defines a moot and academic case:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.27
Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot and academic. First, the Commission
on Elections En Banc already proclaimed other winning party-list groups.28 Second, the term of office
of the winning party-list groups in the May 2010 national elections ended on June 30, 2013. Finally, the
conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections resulted in a new set of party-list groups.
We held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition moot
and academic.29 This leaves any ruling on the issues raised by the petitioner with no practical or useful
value.30
However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over moot and academic cases
are allowed: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review.31 On the importance of the assailed formula, this Court will
discuss the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review32 and
for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.33
II
The petitioner is not the real party in interest
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."34 The partys interest must be direct, substantial, and
material.35 In this case, the petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT. It
also proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the proportional representation of
party-list candidates in the House of Representatives. However despite any new computation,
ARAROs proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system whether valid or invalid still
fails to secure one seat for ARARO. Reviewing the figures presented by the petitioner:36

With Divisor of total valid votes With Divisor of votes cast for the
cast for party-list system minus party-list system as proposed by
votes cast for disqualified party- ARARO
lists or invalid votes (37,377,371)
(30,264,579)
Votes garnered 147,204 147,204
Votes garnered over 0.4864 0.3939
total votes cast for party-lists
(%)
Guaranteed Seat 0 0
This table clearly shows that the petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury from
the application of the formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning party-lists in
the assailed National Board of Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed by petitioner
ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its
arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument
in this Court.
III
However, we review the interpretation of the formula used for the determination of wining party-list
candidates with respect to the divisor used for the guidance of bench and bar and for future elections.
The textual references for determining the formula to be used are found in the Constitution and the
statute interpreting the relevant provisions.
Article VI, Section 5,paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1987 Constitution provide the following:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,thus, provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
 (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally
all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis provided)
In Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,37 we reversed the Commission on Elections
ruling that the respondent parties, coalitions, and organizations were each entitled to a party-list seat
despite their failure to reach the 2% threshold in the 1998 party-list election. Veterans also stated that
the 20% requirement in the Constitution is merely a ceiling.
Veterans laid down the "four inviolable parameters" in determining the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941:
First, the twenty percent allocation-the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold-only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit-each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation-the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."38 (Emphasis provided)
In Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. COMELEC,39 the petitioning
party-list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the Commission on Elections of their
respective second nominee, claiming that they were entitled to one (1) additional seat each in the House
of Representatives. We held that the correct formula to be used is the one used in Veterans and
reiterated it in Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.40 This Court in CIBAC v.
COMELEC41 differentiates the formula used in Ang Bagong Bayani but upholds the validity of the
Veterans formula.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,42 we declared the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as void. We said in that case that:
x x x The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." (Republic Act No. 7941, Section
2)
xxxx
x x x There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved
under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until
all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.43
The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC44 does not in any way modify the formula set in
Veterans. It only corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-list groups
maybe national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. We abandoned the requirement
introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list groups should prove that they represent a
"marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941.45 BANAT overturned
Veterans interpretation of the phrase in proportion to their total number of votes. We clarified that the
interpretation that only those that obtained at least 2% of the votes may get additional seats will not
result in proportional representation because it will make it impossible for the party-list seats to be
filled completely. As demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share may never be filled if the 2% threshold
is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of party-list groups as
intended by the law. This is part of the index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to
the House of Representatives.46 It measures the relation between the share of the total seats and the
share of the total votes of the party-list.47 In Veterans, where the 20% requirement in the Constitution
was treated only as a ceiling, the mandate for proportional representation was not achieved, and thus,
was held void by this Court.
The petitioner now argues that the votes of all the registered voters who actually voted in the May 2010
elections should be included in the computation of the divisor whether valid or invalid.48 According to
the petitioner, votes cast for the party-list candidates is not the same as the votes cast under or for the
party-list system. Specifically, it said that: The party list system is not just for the specific party lists as
provided in the ballot, but pertains to the system of selection of the party list to be part of the House of
Representatives.49 The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and
invalid votes. Invalid votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes
that were spoiled due to improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for
any party-list candidate at all.50 All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2%
threshold.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid
due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words,
votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be
counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted
on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However,
following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained
finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the
divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the
petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list
system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats. (Emphasisprovided)
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper
shading or having no shade at all;51 existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot;
and/or ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-
based53automated election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be
attributable to the voters action.
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups
contained in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by
our courts. Thus, the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-
list component of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast
for the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise
a substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes
validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his
or her choices.
To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for
an electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted
by the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his
or her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be counted.
In Reyes v.COMELEC54 as cited in Loreto v. Brion,55 this Court said "that the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified."56 Therefore,
the votes cast for disqualified candidates are presumed to be made with a sincere belief that the voters
choices were qualified candidates and that they were without any intention to misapply their
franchise.57 Their votes may not be treated as stray, void or meaningless58for purposes of the divisor
in the party-list elections. Assuming arguendo that petitions for certiorari do not stay the execution of
the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,59 the finality of the disqualification of
a candidate should not be a means for the disenfranchisement of the votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 10 of the Party-list Law should thus be read in conjunction with the intention of the law as seen
in Section 2, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis provided)

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7941, which governs party-list elections, states that votes cast for a
party-list "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." It does not specify any reckoning period of
the finding of disqualification or cancellation of registration for the validity or the invalidity of votes
unlike that in Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act No.
6646.60 Taking Sections 2 and 10 together, this Court must consider the intention of the law and the
nature of Philippine style party-list elections. Party-list groups provide for a different and special
representation in Congress. To disregard votes of party-list groups disqualified after the conduct of the
elections means the disenfranchisement of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of votes, of the
Filipino people. Definitely, it is not the voters fault that the party-list group in the ballot it votes for
will be subsequently disqualified. The voter should not be penalized.
The counting of votes for party-list groups in the ballot but subsequently declared as disqualified is,
thus, corollary to the "fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed
to choose whom they please to govern them."61 It is also part of the right of suffrage, and the laws
intention to ensure a more representative Congress should be given priority.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently
disqualified for so long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount to a disenfranchisement
of a basic constitutional right to be able to choose representatives of the House of Representatives in
two ways. First, his or her vote will be nullified. Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing another
party-list group to represent his or her interest should the party listed in the ballot be declared
disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list
group in the ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and
interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,we said in Cayat v. Commission on
Elections62 that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered
stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified
with finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on
Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as
well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth
be:

Number of votes of party-list

Proportion or Percentage of
=
Total number of valid votes for party-list votes garnered by party-list
candidates
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in
the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any
tribunal in relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-
list groups whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the
electorate is notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The
divisor also shall not include invalid votes.
WHEREFORE from the above discussion:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified party-list
groups is denied for being moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case
of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or
Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast
for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups
listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are
declared spoiled or invalid.
The refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list elections from the date of finality
of this case.
SO ORDERED.

16.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its
President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael
Abas Kida, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-
LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by
its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),
formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA),
represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua Causing,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE,
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER
EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI),
represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C.
Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante
Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by
its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS
(AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),
represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,
HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC
HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN),
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and
Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND
WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR
AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC.
(ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective
capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20
November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February
2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC
Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 201210
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
5 204367 12-104 Akbay - Failure of the group to show
(PL) Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(PP) (AAB) marginalized sector of
 society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
(PP), Party (AI) party represents a
12-165 marginalized and
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
(PL) Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations sectors; - The sectors of
of homeowners
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track
(PL) Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
 - Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(PP) (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
11 204394 12-145 Association of - Failure to prove
(PL) Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track
record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
 and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
 broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 201228
10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
 bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230
12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
 and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
 officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
 represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system;
Progress and
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201236
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201237
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201240
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
 projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 201242
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 201243
34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 201244
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
 underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 201248
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-
PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS)
were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the
54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM) (APEC)
203960 12-260 1st
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
 (PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(PLM) (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM)
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM)
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
 (PLM)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
 204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the
party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win
in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects
two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another
for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not
be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its
framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on
the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of
which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean
that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit
in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had
in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors
or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be
included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the
more limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers
and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor
may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I
am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to
avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First,
he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will
be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And
here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the
COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party.
At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party
or each organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in
favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for
the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any
party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names.
They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a
Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a
womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason
why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not
have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor
groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them
get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they
really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the
vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a
chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district
basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and
party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is
adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be
banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor
leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this
matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral
parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with
the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections
held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that the party-list
system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled
down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors
which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the
proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the
1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and
brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win
in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be
the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties
that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers
of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they
would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never
their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of
the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of
one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
 (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate
in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option
the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from
a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party
must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties
in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC
to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2
on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned
in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution
on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral
party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral
party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who
fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an
opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in
poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national
or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list
system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have
members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani,
in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the
COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT
merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth
wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in
party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in
the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have
only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose
and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats,
reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to
apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may
appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by
the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not
belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record
of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is
contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which
have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots,
are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary
evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

17.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House
of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now
praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organizations incumbent
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the
Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organizations erstwhile third
nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the
Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or
Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO])1 filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol Groups petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)2 filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep.
Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Groups petition.

The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 643 in relation to Rule 654 of the Rules of Court, both
assailing the Omnibus Resolution5 dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said Resolution disqualified SENIOR
CITIZENS from participating in the May 13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation as a party-list organization.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list
organization in a Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to
get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast.7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted
leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.8 In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the
allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in
Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served as a member of the House of
Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable
Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote:
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT

We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as
follows:

ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS

1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and

residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and representing the
Senior Citizens Party-list in my capacity as President with our General Headquarters
at Room 404 West Trade Center, 132 West Avenue, hereinafter referred to as the
FIRST PARTY;

2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35

Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;

3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at

North Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the THIRD PARTY;

4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881

C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH
PARTY;

5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don
Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred
to as the FIFTH PARTY;

xxxx

ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES

We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST and in the
following order shall be:

Name CTC No. Issued at Issued on

1. Godofredo V. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila 04-02-04
2. David L. Kho 16836192 Quezon City 03-15-09
 3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197 Quezon City 02-10-10
4. Remedios D. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#50696 Quezon City 01-02-07
5. Linda Gaddi David CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga 01-04-10
ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER

The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as
the legal privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the following
circumstances and events:

ELECTION RESULTS

Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the
Office of Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and
shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume
said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013;

In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for
three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.

In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for
three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second
seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat
for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5,
who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.

In Fine:

If only one (1) seat is won If three (3) seats are won:
No. 1 nominee = 2 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 year No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 2 years
If two (2) seats are won No. 3 nominee = 2 years
No. 1 nominee = 3 years No. 4 nominee = 1 year
No. 2 nominee = 1 years No. 5 nominee = 1 year
No. 3 nominee = 1 years
All beginning July 1, 2010
SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES

That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and
qualified shall observe proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, to
include among others, appointment of persons in his office, projects which may redound to
the benefits and privileges that may be possible under the law.

The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in
QUEZON CITY.

(Signed) (Signed)

Godofredo V. Arquiza David L. Kho

S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila CTC#16836192 Iss. at
on 04-02-04 Quezon City on 03-15-09

(Signed) (Signed)

Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Remedios D. Arquiza

CTC#16836192 Iss. at S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09 Quezon City on 01-02-07

(Signed)

Linda Gaddi David

CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
San Fernando, Pampanga on 01-04-109

After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second
among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of
Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the
second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to
the Datol Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention
on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to
his constituents."10 Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of
the organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS
third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organizations
Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was
expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep.
Arquiza.11

Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry
as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.

The Resignation of Rep. Kho

On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. in a letter12 dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR
CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December
 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in
view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G.
Datol, Jr.

The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition13 dated December 14, 2011
in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and
approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G.
Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of her assumption into the
office."14 Before the COMELEC, the petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.

Attached to the petition was the resignation letter15 of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The letter stated thus:

THE HONORABLE SPEAKER

House of Representatives
Congress
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City

Sir:

I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior Citizens

Party-list in the House of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the event that
only two (2) seats are won by our party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case
three seats are won.

As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the

Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.

Please accept my esteem and respect.

Truly yours,

(Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
Party-list Congressman

Copy furnished:
The Board of Trustees
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.16

According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011, notifying
them of his resignation in this wise:
December 31, 2011
 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City

Gentlemen/Ladies:

It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign as
the party-list nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Congress for personal
reason already conveyed to you.

Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17

In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 936618 was
promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among
nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza
issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Series of 2012

A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN

RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L.
KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE SENIOR
CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM
TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON HIM TO
BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;

WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as
representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;

WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution
signed unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in view of his
determination to resign and return to private life, x x x;

WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind
and requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also reconsidered
his resignation, and requested to continue his term;
 WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in view of the
forthcoming elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and
allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term;

WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing
certain conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the

acceptance of the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and
change of mind, hence allow him to continue his term subject to conditions stated above.19

Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS
petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group)
admitted that Rep. Khos tender of resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the
organizations nominees.20 However, said counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the
organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Khos resignation and the latter was, instead, to
complete his term.21 Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group
previously manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol
Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.22

On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution23 in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the
petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated,
thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his nomination
is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While we can
consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are
constrained however NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of
petitioners nominees as submitted to the Commission.
xxxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior
agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and
accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the order of nominees for being contrary to public
policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties.
Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private
agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the
Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among
nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizens
Party-List null and void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing
arrangementincluding the resignation of Congressman David Khocannot be recognized and be
given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the
resignation of Rep. Kho and there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the petitioner
party-list.
Second, the expulsion of Datol
even if proven true has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
xxxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this Commission, is meant to
be permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is
submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee
dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of nominees
of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under
one of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic effect on the
organizations representative in the House of Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected"
into office and becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular
district representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or suspended upon the concurrence of the
two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list organization.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner organization, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby
remains the same as it was submitted to us there being no legally recognizable ground to cause any
changes thereat.24 (Citation omitted.)

The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration25 of the above resolution, but the
same remained unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of
SENIOR CITIZENS.26 The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).

On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,27 which, inter alia, set for summary
evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing party-list
organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24, 2012
and they both submitted their respective evidence, which established their continuing compliance with
the requirements of accreditation as a party-list organization.28

On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution29 in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and
12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of
SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that
involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned
PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said case,
this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010
and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Khos term
starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Khos resignation. By
virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut
short to one year and six months which is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to
the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence,
when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made
a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for
cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR
CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by filing
their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No.
204421, while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the
COMELEC to include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May
13, 2013 party-list elections. Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the petition in Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand to
the COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of
the petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the Courts Decision, the
COMELEC was to determine whether said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the May 13, 2013
elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in
SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission
on Elections], as well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941")
or the Party-List System Act, and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and exhaustive
reevaluation of the documents submitted by the petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No.
9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) SENIOR CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations relating to
elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the Resolution for SPP
Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution
for E.M. No. 12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the petitioner Senior
Citizens was disqualified was because of the term-sharing agreement between its nominees, which the
Commission En Banc found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is
independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in
that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the Commission En Banc, is a
clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution as
implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides that Members of the House of
Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a term of three years. A term,
in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite period of time during which an officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right, a fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another.
Thus, service of the term is for the entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who
are not entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it
was promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no
moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified and as it
was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public
policy because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective office to
contractual bargaining and negotiation, and treats the same as though it were nothing more than a
contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense
will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render
inutile Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the
available seats for a party-list group or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens
cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to
achieve the ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex post facto laws
under Section 22, Article III of the Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal
laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner Senior
Citizens is therefore in order, and consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed
with the Commission should be denied.
 xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc.;
xxxx
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and
organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for
the Party-List System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections
thereafter.30 (Citations omitted.)
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its disqualification,
SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and its disqualification to participate
in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.

On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very2 Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order,31 alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the
stoppage of the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list groups. The Datol Group urged the Court
to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order during the pendency of its petition.

Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, 32 which considered as
final and executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS.
On even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC),
promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13,33 proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list organizations as
initial winners in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.

The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari,"34
also reiterating its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.

On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13,35 which partially
proclaimed the winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the
available fifty-eight (58) seats for party-list organizations.

On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO,36 which ordered the COMELEC to submit a
Comment on the instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from
among the party-list candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite.37
In a Resolution38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed the COMELEC to
refrain from implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to observe the
status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered
the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the number
of votes it garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the COMELEC to
hold in abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned until the instant
petitions are decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to
Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for lack of merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Comment39 on the instant petitions. In a Resolution40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its Reply41 to
the Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their
separate memoranda.42 On the other hand, the OSG manifested43 that it was adopting its Comment as
its memorandum in the instant case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Groups memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

4.1

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ADDED ANOTHER GROUND (VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTYLIST GROUP AS PROVIDED
UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.

4.2

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CANCELLED PETITIONERS CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

4.3

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM
SHARING.

4.4
 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE
REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY ITS DIVISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT THE EN BANC
CAN ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.)

Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following arguments:
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for
being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the
directive of the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY
ISSUES arising therefrom are:
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be followed by
respondent Comelec in determining which partylist groups are qualified to
participate in party-list elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these adhered to by
respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees -- a
legal ground to cancel Senior Citizens Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for
being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and
executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS (NBOC) RESOLUTION No.
0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
 4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being
contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications of
the candidates after the election where they have received the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC Resolutions
of May 24 and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside?45
THE COURTS RULING
After reviewing the parties pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find merit
in the petitioners contentions.1wphi1
SENIOR CITIZENS Right to Due Process
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR
CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the organizations disqualification and cancellation of its
registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the
cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza
Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in the
afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELECs review therein focused on the groups programs,
accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was
not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing agreement would constitute
a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the
parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the promulgation of
Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing
SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For
Hearing Or To Be Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel found that
SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were heard by the
COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion To
Set Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it
only found out after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and
the Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy thereof.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the
registration of party-list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the
COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on
Elections47 the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-
judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
 (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its
Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the
determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-
making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be
found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion,
reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to
the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon
which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to
give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered
in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be
thought through by the decision-maker. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24,
2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group
and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing
compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation
was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the
organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were
deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement
and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the
opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April
18, 2012.49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners continuing compliance for
accreditation as a party-list organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of
SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of
COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the
Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the
replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More
specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the
Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its
petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of
SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by
their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the
qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing
agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman
Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing
agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration
and accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the
disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded
the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a hearing or
through written memoranda. This was the proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about
to arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the
COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-
191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in
Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the instant
cases: whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the
prohibition against term-sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section
7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012.
Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as
nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the
cancellation of the organizations registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually
implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were
made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented, the
Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of
Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the
promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be
applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it
already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the general rule is that statutes
are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated
in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not
backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR
CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.

Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections52 teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a Public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the
COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions
already registered in order to ensure the latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by
law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in
party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition
for confirmation and approval of Rep. Khos replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27,
2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy
was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing,
the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this
fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to
hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously,
the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no
violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand
on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify
the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down
the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the
petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an
issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be
proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013
elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo
Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No.
206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in
SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to
based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

18.
G.R. No. 184286 February 26, 2010
MAYOR JOSE MARQUEZ LISBOA PANLILIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SAMUEL ARCEO DE JESUS, SR., Respondents.
 DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about an attempt by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to install the winning protestant in an
election protest case pending appeal by the protestee to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
despite the latters order to the parties to maintain the status quo.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Jose Panlilio (Panlilio) and respondent Samuel de Jesus, Sr. (De Jesus) ran against each other
for Mayor of Busuanga, Palawan, in the May 14, 2007 elections. De Jesus got 3,902 votes as against
Panlilios 3,150 votes, with De Jesus winning by 752 votes. On May 25, 2007 Panlilio filed an election
protest1 with the RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princesa City. On March 7, 2008 the RTC declared Panlilio
the winner over De Jesus by two votes.2

De Jesus appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC.3 Pending resolution of the appeal, petitioner
Panlilio filed with the RTC a motion for execution of its judgment pending appeal. 4 Initially, the RTC
denied the motion on the grounds a) that Panlilio gave no good reason that would justify immediate
execution; and b) that public interest would be better served if there were no disruptions in
governance.5 On April 17, 2008, however, the RTC issued an order,6 reversing itself and allowing
execution pending appeal because its previous order had brought more confusion and chaos in the
municipality7 and Panlilio had the support of the provincial government and the congressional district.

Respondent De Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration8 but the RTC denied it on April 28, 2008.9
Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction with the COMELEC against the RTC and petitioner De Jesus,10 seeking to
annul the order of execution pending appeal.11
On May 15, 2008 the COMELECs Second Division issued a 60-day TRO, enjoining the execution
pending appeal or, in case petitioner Panlilio had already taken his oath, directing a return to the status
quo prior to the issuance of the order of execution pending appeal. The Second Division also directed
respondent De Jesus to continue discharging his duties as Mayor until further orders. Lastly, it required
Panlilio to answer De Jesus petition.12
On July 15, 2008 the Second Division issued a resolution, granting respondent De Jesus petition and
setting aside the RTCs orders of April 17 and 28, 2008.13 The Second Division did not find good
reasons for allowing execution of the RTC decision pending an appeal from it to the COMELEC. The
RTC declared petitioner Panlilio winner on a mere 2-vote margin, said the Second Division, after the
RTC deducted 754 votes from De Jesus. Before the peoples will can be enforced, it must be first
ascertained. Thus, the Second Division directed all parties "to observe the status quo" prior to the
issuance of the RTCs order of April 17, 2008 and directed respondent De Jesus to keep his post "until
the finality of the March 7, 2008 decision of the court a quo."
On July 19, 2008 Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 15, 2008 order,14 which motion
the COMELEC division elevated to the en banc for its resolution.15 Meanwhile, on July 21, 2008
Panlilio asked the RTC to implement the writ of execution it earlier issued in his favor, given that the
COMELECs 60-day TRO had already expired. The Court granted the motion in its order of August 27,
2008.16 After the sheriff served the writ of execution on the parties or on September 3, 2008, Panlilio
took his oath as Mayor.
On September 4, 2008 respondent De Jesus hurried to the COMELEC en banc to seek relief from
petitioner Panlilios threatened takeover of the mayors office.17 On September 5, 2008 the en banc set
aside the RTCs order.18 It also ordered the RTC and Panlilio to maintain the July 15, 2008 status quo
order of the COMELEC Second Division. Acting on a query of the Department of Interior and Local
Government regarding which mayor to recognize, the COMELEC en banc issued an order on
September 11, 2008, declaring incumbent De Jesus as the Mayor of Busuanga.19
Undeterred, on September 12, 2008 petitioner Panlilio filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against COMELEC and respondent De Jesus. 20
He asks this Court to annul the actions of the COMELEC that allowed De Jesus to keep the post of
Mayor of Busuanga.
The Issue
The key issue in this case is whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it enjoined the implementation of the RTCs order of execution pending appeal
notwithstanding the lapse of the 60-day TRO that the COMELEC Second Division had earlier issued.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner Panlilio points out that since the COMELEC Second Division did not issue a preliminary
injunction order after its 60-day TRO lapsed, nothing prevented the RTC from implementing its earlier
order installing Panlilio as Busuanga Mayor pending respondent De Jesus appeal from the decision
against him. And, since the resolution annulling the RTC orders of execution pending appeal had not
yet become final, the same cannot yet be implemented. Panlilio concludes from this that the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued its September 5, 2008 order
enjoining the RTC and the parties to comply with the Second Divisions status quo order.
But, the Second Division did better than just issue a preliminary injunction to supplant the expiring
TRO. It issued after hearing its resolution of July 15, 2008, already adjudicating the merits of the case.
It annulled the RTC order that allowed the execution of its decision pending appeal for lack of good
reasons to support its issuance. The dispositive portion of Second Divisions resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
GRANT the instant petition for certiorari. The Orders of the public respondent dated April 17 and 28,
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, all parties are directed to observe the status prior to issuance of the April 17, 2008 Special
Order of the public respondent and the petitioner Samuel Arce[o] de Jesus, Sr. is directed to continue to
function as municipal mayor of Busuanga, Palawan until the finality of the March 28, 2008 decision of
the court a quo.21
The first part of the above grants the main relief that respondent De Jesus sought: it SETS ASIDE the
RTCs orders of April 17 and 28, 2008 that allowed execution of its decision pending appeal. On the
other hand, the second part grants the preliminary injunction he sought. It took the place of the
TRO.1avvphi1 Although the Second Division did not here use the words "preliminary injunction," it
directed or enjoined all parties "to observe the status quo" that existed prior to the issuance of the
RTCs order of April 17, 2008. It was the same "status quo" that the expiring TRO enforced.
True, the implementation of the main relief grantedthe setting aside of the RTCs orders that allowed
execution pending appealmay be deemed suspended when petitioner Panlilio filed a motion for its
reconsideration.22 But the preliminary injunction component of the resolutionthe maintenance of the
status quo that existed before the RTC issued its April 17, 2008 orderis not suspended. It is expressly
kept in force.
Besides, if instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to decide the case
on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it stands to reason
that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction should be deemed in
force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of petitioner Panliliothat execution pending
appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court enjoining such execution
does not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before such court.
Parenthetically, respondent De Jesus accuses petitioner Panlilio of forum shopping in view of a
manifestation he filed with the COMELEC en banc on September 17, 2008, asking it to already resolve
his motion for reconsideration of the July 15, 2008 resolution of the Second Division 23 despite the
pendency of the present petition.
The Court does not have to resolve this issue considering its ruling above. At any rate, it seems clear
that the subject matter of the present petition is the COMELEC en bancs order of September 15, 2008,
enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo directed by its Second Division. On the other hand, the
subject matter of petitioner Panlilios September 17, 2008 manifestation urging action from the
COMELEC en banc is the motion for reconsideration that he filed from the resolution or decision of
the Second Division. Since the Court did not enjoin this, the COMELEC en banc was free to proceed
with its adjudication of the main case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the orders of the Commission on
Elections En Banc in SPR 76-2008 dated September 5 and 11, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

19.
 G.R. No. 182865 December 24, 2008
ROMULO F. PECSON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT and LYNDON A. CUNANAN, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This petition for certiorari - filed by Romulo F. Pecson (Pecson) under Rule 64, in relation with Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court - seeks to set aside and annul the Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of
the Commission on Elections en banc (COMELEC) in SPR 60-2007.1 The assailed Resolution nullified
the grant (via a Special Order) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Angeles City, of the
execution pending appeal of its Decision in the election contest between Pecson and the private
respondent Lyndon A. Cunanan (Cunanan), the proclaimed winner in the 2007 mayoralty election in
Magalang, Pampanga.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang,
Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the
winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes.
Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed
an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.
On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. The RTC ruled that Pecson
received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanan's 13,758 - a vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a Notice of Appeal the day
after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on November 28,
2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials2 (Rules) allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order dated December 3,
2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution
for twenty (20) days. The Special Order states the following reasons:
1. The result of the judicial revision show[s] that the protestant garnered 14,897 votes as against
protestee's 13,758 votes or a plurality of 1,139 votes. The victory of the protestant is clearly and
manifestly established by the rulings and tabulation of results made by the Court x x x;
 2. It is settled jurisprudence that execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted
"to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which is initially
ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers." The Court holds that this
wisp of judicial wisdom of the Supreme Court enunciated in the Gahol case and subsequent
cases citing it is borne by the recognition that the decision of the trial court in an election case is
nothing but the court upholding the mandate of the voter, which has as its source no other than
the exercise of the constitutional right to vote. While it is true that the protestee can avail of the
remedy of appeal before the COMELEC, the Court is more convinced that between upholding
the mandate of the electorate of Magalang, Pampanga which is the fruit of the exercise of the
constitutional right to vote and a procedural remedy, the Court is more inclined to uphold and
give effect to and actualize the mandate of the electorate of Magalang. To the mind of the Court,
in granting execution pending appeal the Court is being true to its bounden duty to uphold the
exercise of constitutional rights and gives flesh to the mandate of the people. The foregoing is,
as far as the Court is concerned, considered far superior circumstance that convinces the Court
to grant protestant's motion;
3. Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and given meaning;
4. In the case of Navarosa v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held that "In the Gahol case, the
Court gave an additional justification for allowing execution pending appeal of decisions of trial
courts, thus: Public policy underlies it, x x x [S]omething had to be done to strike the death
blow at the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not
invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the people's
verdict against them and persist in continuing in an office they very well know they have no
legitimate right to hold. x x x." A primordial public interest is served by the grant of the
protestant's motion, i.e., to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate. In the words
of Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, "The well known delay in the adjudication of election protests
often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of
office is about to expire or has expired."
Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2)
in entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance
of an order transmitting the records of the case.
Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction
with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate
Raffle. He argued in his petition that: (1) the RTC Decision did not clearly establish Pecson's victory or
his (Cunanan's) defeat - a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules; among other reasons, the
number of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those who actually voted and
the votes cast for the position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had constructively relinquished its
jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order dated November 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the
records of the case.
The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO directing: (1) the
RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the issuance of a writ of execution or implementing
the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang.
In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO, Pecson argued that: (1)
preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or incident of an independent action, being a mere
ancillary remedy that exists only as an incident of the main proceeding; (2) the "petition for application
of preliminary injunction," as an original action, should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan is
guilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order simultaneously
with the petition filed with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC's Second Division denied Cunanan's petition in a Resolution dated March 6, 2008. It
ruled that: (1) the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual
jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents; the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the
period to appeal and while the RTC was still in possession of the original record; and (2) there is good
reason to justify the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecson's victory was clearly and
manifestly established. Ruling on the alleged defect in the RTC count, the Second Division ruled:
[A]fter a careful scrutiny of the Decision, We found that the error lies in the trial court's
computation of the results. In its Decision, the trial court, to the votes obtained by the party (as
per proclamation of the MBOC), deducted the votes per physical count after revision and
deducted further the invalid/nullified ballots per the trial court's appreciation and thereafter
added the valid claimed ballots per the trial court's appreciation, thus:
Votes obtained per proclamation of the MBOC (-) Votes per physical count (-) Invalid or
nullified ballots (+) Valid claimed ballots = Total Votes Obtained
The formula used by the trial court is erroneous as it used as its reference the votes obtained by
the parties as per the proclamation of the MBOC. It complicated an otherwise simple and
straightforward computation, thus leading to the error. The correct formula should have been as
follows:
Total Number of Uncontested Ballots (+) Valid Contested Ballots (+) Valid Claimed Ballots =
Total Votes Obtained
Using this formula and applying the figures in pages 744 and 745 of the trial court's Decision,
the results will be as follows:
For the Petitioner Cunanan

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,656

Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,058

 Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 36

Total Votes of Petitioner 11,750

For the Private Respondent (Pecson)

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots 9,271

Add: Valid Contested Ballots 2,827

Add: Valid Claimed Ballots 39

Total Votes of Petitioner 12,134

Using the correct formula, private respondent still obtained a plurality of the votes cast and
enjoys a margin of 384 votes over the petitioner. Although not as wide as the margin found by
the trial court, We are nevertheless convinced that the victory of private respondent has been
clearly established in the trial court's decision for the following reasons:
First, the error lies merely in the computation and does not put in issue the appreciation
and tabulation of votes. The error is purely mathematical which will not involve the
opening of ballot boxes or an examination and appreciation of ballots. It is a matter of
arithmetic which calls for the mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes of
the candidates.
Second, the error did not affect the final outcome of the election protest as to which
candidate obtained the plurality of the votes cast.
We are likewise convinced that the assailed order states good or special reasons justifying the
execution pending appeal, to wit:
(1) The victory of the protestant was clearly and manifestly established;
(2) Execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by
the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers;
(3) Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and given meaning;
and
(4) Public policy underlies it, as something had to be done to strike the death blow at the
pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably
resorted to by unscrupulous politicians.
 Such reasons to Our mind constitute superior circumstances as to warrant the execution of the
trial court's decision pending appeal.
Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion. Despite Cunanan's
opposition, the RTC granted Pecson's motion and issued the writ of execution on March 11, 2008.
Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of Magalang.
The Assailed Resolution
On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution dated May 21, 2008 reversing the
ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good reasons to execute the
decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it
however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer
issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the
perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's period to
appeal).
On the propriety of executing the RTC Decision pending appeal, the COMELEC en banc ruled that it
was not convinced of the good reasons stated by the RTC in its Special Order. It ruled that recognition
of the worth of a trial judge's decision, on the one hand, and the right to appeal, including the
Commission's authority to review the decision of the trial court, on the other, requires a balancing act;
and not every invocation of public interest will suffice to justify an execution pending appeal. It added
that at a stage when the decision of the trial court has yet to attain finality, both the protestee and the
protestant are to be considered "presumptive winners." It noted too that the Second Division already
cast a doubt on the correctness of the number of votes obtained by the parties after the trial court's
revision; thus, the resolution of the pending appeal becomes all the more important. Between two
presumptive winners, considering the pending appeal of the election protest to the Commission and
public service being the prime consideration, the balance should tilt in favor of non-disruption of
government service. The execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal would necessarily entail the
unseating of the protestee, resulting not only in the disruption of public service, but also in confusion in
running the affairs of the government; a subsequent reversal too of the RTC Decision also results in the
unseating of the protestant. This situation (i.e., the series of turn-over of the seat of power from one
presumptive winner to another) cannot but cause irreparable damage to the people of Magalang, and
overweighs the reasons asserted by the RTC in its Special Order. In the end, according to the
COMELEC, public interest is best served when he who was really voted for the position is proclaimed
and adjudged as winner with finality.
The Petition and the Prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order
In imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc, Pecson argues that: (1) the RTC
Decision clearly showed Pecson's victory; (2) the reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision
practically render impossible a grant of an execution pending appeal; and (3) the RTC correctly found
the presence of the requisites for execution pending appeal.
Threatened to be unseated, Pecson asked, as interim relief, for the issuance of a Status Quo Order. He
claimed that: (1) the Department of Interior and Local Government already recognized (based on the
issuance of the assailed Resolution) Cunanan's assumption of office even if the assailed Resolution had
not attained finality; and (2) in order to prevent grave and irreparable injury to Pecson and the
perpetuation of a travesty of justice, a Status Quo Order must immediately issue.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The remedy of executing court decisions pending appeal in election contests is provided under the
Rules as follows:
SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion,
order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to
appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party.
Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good
reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or
special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or
damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or
the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working
days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo
order from the Supreme Court of the Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of
execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued.
During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. 3

This remedy is not new. Under prevailing jurisprudence,4 the remedy may be resorted to pursuant to
the suppletory application of the Rules of Court, specifically its Section 2, Rule 39. 5 What the Rules
(A.M. No. 07-4-15-C) has done is to give the availability of the remedy the element of certainty.
Significantly, the Rules similarly apply the good reason standard (in fact, the even greater superior
circumstances standard) for execution pending appeal under the Rules of Court, making the remedy an
exception rather than the rule.
At the heart of the present controversy is the question of whether there has been compliance with the
standards required for an execution pending appeal in an election contest. As heretofore cited, the RTC
found all these requisites present. The Second Division of the COMELEC supported the RTC's ruling,
but the COMELEC en banc held a contrary view and nullified the execution pending appeal. This en
banc ruling is now before us.
Our review of a COMELEC ruling or decision is via a petition for certiorari. This is a limited review
on jurisdictional grounds, specifically of the question on whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction, or
whether the assailed order or resolution is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."6
Because this case is essentially about the implementation of an RTC decision pending appeal, we must
first dwell on the writ the RTC issued. The COMELEC ruled in this regard that the writ of execution
the RTC issued on March 11, 2008 was void; the RTC could no longer issue the writ because of the
lapse of the period for appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records of the election contest
which had then been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC.
Cunanan argues in his Comment that this ruling has become final and executory because Pecson did
not question it in the present petition. In Cunanan's view, the finality of this aspect of the COMELEC
ruling renders the issue of the nullification of the Special Order moot and academic, as any ruling we
shall render would serve no practical purpose; it can no longer be implemented since the means
(obviously referring to the writ the RTC issued on March 11, 2008) of executing the RTC decision (i.e.,
seating Pecson as Mayor of Magalang) has, to all intents and purposes, been nullified and rendered
ineffective.
We see no merit in Cunanan's argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere
administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order - the main order supporting Pecson's motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself cannot and does not assume a life of its own
independent from the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not carry with
it the nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in the reverse
situation - the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries with it the nullification of its
implementing writ and removes the basis for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the present
case, the reality is that if and when we ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will
thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing another writ.
Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually
issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period
lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in
possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not
lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a
Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the
RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the issuance of the
writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the
issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot
legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day
waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the
ECAD of the COMELEC under Section 10 of the Rules.7
On the substantive issue of whether a writ of execution pending appeal should issue, we do not agree
with the COMELEC's view that there are "two presumptive winners" prior to its ruling on the protest
case. We likewise cannot support its "balancing act" view that essentially posits that given the
pendency of the appeal and the lack of finality of a decision in the election protest, the unseating of the
protestee, and the need for continuity of public service, the balance should tilt in favor of continuity or
non-disruption of public service; hence, the execution pending appeal should be denied.
As Pecson correctly argued, this reasoning effectively prevents a winner (at the level of the courts) of
an election protest from ever availing of an execution pending appeal; it gives too much emphasis to
the COMELEC's authority to decide the election contest and the losing party's right to appeal. What is
there to execute pending appeal if, as the COMELEC suggested, a party should await a COMELEC
final ruling on the protest case? Effectively, the "two presumptive winners" and the "balancing act"
views negate the execution pending appeal that we have categorically and unequivocally recognized in
our rulings and in the Rules we issued. To be sure, the COMELEC cannot, on its own, render
ineffective a rule of procedure we established by formulating its own ruling requiring a final
determination at its level before an RTC decision in a protest case can be implemented.
We additionally note that "disruption of public service" necessarily results from any order allowing
execution pending appeal and is a concern that this Court was aware of when it expressly provided the
remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in
and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.
What comes out clearly from this examination of the COMELEC ruling is that it looked at the wrong
material considerations when it nullified the RTC's Special Order. They are the wrong considerations
because they are not the standards outlined under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules against which the
validity of a Special Order must be tested. Significantly, the use of wrong considerations in arriving at
a decision constitutes grave abuse of discretion.8
The proper consideration that the COMELEC made relates to the correctness of the RTC's Decision in
light of the Rules' requirement that the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee be
clearly established for execution pending appeal to issue. According to the COMELEC, no less than the
Second Division cast a doubt on the correctness of the number of votes obtained by the parties after the
revision of ballots when the Second Division proposed a mathematical formula to correct the RTC
count. At the same time, the COMELEC noted that the Second Division could not have corrected the
RTC count, as the petition before it was one for certiorari while the correction of errors in computation
properly pertained to the resolution of Cunanan's pending appeal. To the COMELEC, all these showed
that the correctness of the RTC Decision in favor of Pecson was far from clear and cannot support an
execution pending appeal.
We disagree once more with the COMELEC en banc in this conclusion, as it failed to accurately and
completely appreciate the Second Division's findings. The RTC Decision, on its face, shows that
Pecson garnered more valid votes than Cunanan after the revision of ballots. The Second Division
properly recognized, however, that the RTC computation suffered from a facial defect that did not
affect the final results; as Cunanan pointed out, the votes for Pecson and Cunanan, if totally summed up,
exceeded the total number of valid votes for mayor.
Duly alerted, the Second Division looked into the purported error, analyzed it, and found the error to be
merely mathematical; the RTC formula would necessarily exceed the total number of votes cast for
mayor because it counted some votes twice. In making this finding, the Second Division was guided by
the rule that one of the requisites for an execution pending appeal is a clear showing in the decision of
the protestant's victory and the protestee's defeat. Its examination of the RTC Decision was only for this
limited purpose and this was what it did, no more no less. Specifically, it did not review the RTC's
appreciation of the ballots on revision; it did not review the intrinsic merits of the RTC Decision -
issues that properly belong to the appeal that is currently pending. It merely found that the defect
Cunanan noted was actually inconsequential with respect to the results, thus showing Pecson's clear
victory under the RTC Decision. In other words, the Second Division's corrected view of the RTC
count confirmed, rather than contradicted or placed in doubt, the conclusion that Pecson won.
Other than the clarity of Pecson's victory under the RTC Decision, the Special Order cited good and
special reasons that justified an execution pending appeal, specifically: (1) the need to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which is initially given by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers; (2) public interest and/or respect for and giving meaning to
the will of the electorate; and (3) public policy - something had to be done to deal a death blow to the
pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by
unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the people's verdict against them.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC en banc simply glossed over the RTC's cited reasons and did not fully
discuss why these reasons were not sufficient to justify execution pending appeal. A combination,
however, of the reasons the RTC cited, to our mind, justifies execution of the RTC Decision pending
appeal.
A striking feature of the present case is the time element involved. We have time and again noted the
well known delay in the adjudication of election contests that, more often than not, gives the protestant
an empty or hollow victory in a long drawn-out legal battle.9 Some petitions before us involving
election contests have been in fact dismissed for being moot, the term for the contested position having
long expired before the final ruling on the merits came.10 In the present case, the term for mayor
consists of only three (3) years. One year and six months has lapsed since the May 2007 election; thus,
less than two years are left of the elected mayor's term. The election protest, while already decided at
the RTC level, is still at the execution-pending-appeal stage and is still far from the finality of any
decision on the merits, given the available appellate remedies and the recourses available through
special civil actions. To be sure, there is nothing definite in the horizon on who will finally be declared
the lawfully elected mayor.
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election protest cases,
resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial
proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of
canvassers.11 This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case,
such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying the RTC's
Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it
committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted outside
of the contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL the assailed
COMELEC Resolution.
SO ORDERED.