Ravina v.

Abrille, GR 160708 (2009)

G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, FOR HERSELF AND IN
BEHALF OF INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS
VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE

QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.

In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao
City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to
a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name
under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but
the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage
their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell
the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots
without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary
Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro
together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in
connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it.
They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police
Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged
that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at
school.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being
contrary to law and evidence.[10]

RULING:

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her children
were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously
transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to
enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be
held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.
[23] It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil law
standards.

Buado v. CA, GR 145222 (2009)

ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL

FACTS:

- Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol.
- On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the
petitioners.
- The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages.
- The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.
- An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued
in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.
- After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.
- He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed
that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado
obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685.
- The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to
act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case.
- The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse
of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.
HELD:

NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to
be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the
third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable
not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by
Romulo Nicol was proper.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

G.R. No. 75410 August 17, 1987

CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO D. DIAZ as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NORMA
DIAZ SARMIENTO, respondents.

No. 75409 August 17, 1987

CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, as the
Presiding Judge of Branch XXVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, NORMA SARMIENTO, LORNA SARMIENTO and LERMA SARMIENTO, respondents.

PARAS., J.:

This is a petition to review and reverse the decision * dated June 13, 1986 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 09159 and 09160 denying the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit and
correspondingly dismissing these cases.

The facts of the aforecited cases will be presented separately since they involve different
proceedings heard before different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

G.R. No. 75409

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

 It appears that on May 10, 1977, the private respondent Norma Sarmiento sued her
husband, the petitioner Cesar Sarmiento, for support. The case was filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and later assigned to Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLVII, presided over by Judge Regina Ordoez-Benitez, after the
reorganization of the Judiciary in 1983. On March 1, 1984, Judge Ordoez-Benitez
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant,

Cesar Sarmiento, to pay his plaintiff-wife, Norma Sarmiento, the sum
of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00)monthly as support commencing on
May 10, 1977 up to March, 1984, which shall be paid thirty (30) days
after the Decision shall have become final and executory and the
monthly support, starting April 1984, shall be deposited with the
Cashier of the Regional Trial Courts, City Hall, Manila within the first
five (6) days of April 1984 and every month thereafter from which
plaintiff-wife or her duly authorized representative may withdraw the
same. Support; shall be Immediately payable, notwithstanding any
appeal which may be interposed by defendant.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Cashier of the Regional

Trial Courts of City Hall, Manila, for his information and guidance.

On April 9,1984 the private respondent moved for execution of the judgment pending
appeal The petitioner actually filed a notice of appeal four days later on April 13. On
May 3, 1984, Judge Ordoez-Benitez issued the following order:

Acting on the "Motion for Execution of Decision Pending Appeal

dated April 9, 1984, and the Notice of Appeal filed by the defendant
on April 13, 1984, the Philippine National Bank is hereby directed that
no amount due the defendant be released without authority from this
Court and until final disposition of said case.

Let a copy of this Order be directed to the Philippine National Bank

for its guidance and information.

On May 29, 1985 the private respondent filed a motion to require the Philippine
National Bank to deliver to the private respondent the accrued support out of the
retirement benefits due to the Petitioner as a former employee of the PNB.

The petitioner prays

That a restraining order and/or writ of pre injunction forthwith issue,

ENJOINING AND PROHIBITING the respondent JUDGE REGINA G.
ORDOEZ-BENITEZ and all the respondents in Civil-Case No. E-
02184, their agents and employees, and all persons acting for them
or on their behalf, from enforcing, executing or otherwise giving force
and effect to the Decision (Annex "A " hereof, and the Order
Annex "B hereof). "

On June 13, 1966, the Court of Appeals found petitioner's appeal unmeritorious and thus dismissed
the same. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence this petition.

G.R. No. 75410

The Court of Appeals sums up the facts as follows:

It appears that, on August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another action
against the petitioner for a declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner
from the PNB were conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private
respondent as her share. The case was assigned to Branch XXVII of the RTC of
Manila, presided over by Judge Ricardo Diaz. The petitioner filed an answer in which
he contended that the complaint did not state a cause of action' that there was
another action peding between him and the plaintiff and that the plaintiff did not
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the suit. However, the trial court
refused to dismiss the complaint because the grounds cited were not indubitable.
The case was therefore set for pre-trial conference. For failure of the petitioner to
appear at the pretrial conference on December 19, 1985, the trial court declared him
as in default. Thereafter, on February 20, 1986, judgment was rendered as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

and against the defendants, ordering defendant Philippine National
Bank to desist and refrain from releasing to defendant Cesar
Sarmiento all monetary benefits and emoluments which may be due
him by reason of his retirement from service, but instead, to deliver
one-half (1/2) thereof to the herein plaintiff; and if in the event that all
such monetary benefits and emoluments, for one reason or another,
had already been paid to defendant Cesar Sarmiento, said defendant
is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff one-half (1/2) of whatever monetary
benefits, emoluments and pivileges he received from defendant
Philippine National Bank by reason of his retirement. Likewise,
defendant Cesar Sarmiento is hereby ordered the costs of suit.'

On April 21, 1986, the private respondent moved for the immediate execution of the
judgment in her favor, on the ground that any appeal that the petitioner might take
would merely be dilatory in the light of the admission in his answer. The petitioner
filed an opposition to the motion wherein he manifested that he was not going to
appeal the decision of the trial court but that he would instead filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the trial coourt.

Petitioner appealed the February 20, 1986 decision of respondent Judge Diaz to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The assailed decision denied the above petition.

Hence, this joint petition.

Petitioner's averments can be narrowed down to the following:

1. The order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge Ordonez-Benitez, prohibiting the Philippine
National Bank to release any amount of the retirement gratuity due the petitioner without the trial
court's approval is contrary to law, because retirement benefits are exempt from execution.

2. Since the trial court had refused to give the course to his appeal, he was justified in resorting to
the extra-ordinary legal remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
3. The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz also ordering the PNB
to desist from releasing to petitioner any portion of his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half
thereof to herein private respondent is contrary to law.

From the foregoing, it can be gauged that what petitioner principally questions or protests against is
respondent appellate court's failure (actually refusal to resolve the issue on whether or not the
retirement benefits due the petitioner from the PNB are subject to attachment, execution or other
legal process).

Private respondent, however, claims that the issues raised by petitioner before respondent Court of
Appeals were issues relating to the merits of the cases then pending with respondents Judge
Ordonez-Benitez and Judge Diaz and hence the said issues were proper subject of an appeal, which
remedy was already availed of by petitioner in both cases. She likewise submits that since no
question of jurisdiciton or abuse of discretion had been raised and substantiated in the petitions
before the respondent Court of Appeals, said appellate court was legally justified in dismissing the
petition.

Just as We have dealt with the facts of these two cases, We now intend to resolve their issues and
questions also separately.

G.R. No. 75409

We do not find merit in petitioner's contention that simply because the trial court had refused to give
due course to his appeal, he was already justified in resorting to the extraordinary legal remedies of
certiorari and prohibition. What the respondent Court of Appeals found in this regard need not be
further elaborated upon.

Said appellate court ruled:

Under BP 129, sec. 39, no record on appeal is required to take an appeal. Nor is an
appeal bond required. (Interim Rules, sec. 18) A notice of appeal is sufficient. Unlike
before, where approval of the record on appeal and the appeal bond was required
before the appeal was perfected, under the present rule, the appeal is perfected
upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by a party by the mere filing of a notitce
of appeal (Interim Rules, sec. 23). The approval of the court is not required. This
means that within 30 days after the perfection of the appeal, the original record
should be transmitted to the Intermediate Appellate Court. If the clerk neglects the
performance of this duty, the appellant should ask the court to order the clerk. It does
not seem that the petitioner has done this, and it may even be that he is liable for
failure to prosecute his appeal. (Rule 46, sec. 3; Rule 50, sec. 1 [c].

On the allegation of petitioner that it is not the appellant but the appellee's duty to make the clerk of
court of the trial court transmit the record on appeal to the appellate court, respondent Court of
Appeals aptly points to the rullings under Rule 46, sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It has been held that, while it is the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to
immediately transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court a certified copy of the bill of
exceptions, (now, record on appeal) it is also the duty of the appellant to cause the
same to be presented to the clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty days after its
approval. He cannot simply fold his arms and say that it is the duty of the Clerk of
Court First Instance under the provisions of section 11, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
to transmit the record of appeal to the appellate court. It is appellant's duty to make
 the clerk act and, if necessary, procure a court order to compel him to act. He cannot
idly sit by and wait till this is done. He cannot afterwards wash his hands and say that
delay in the transmittal of the record on appeal was not his fault. For, indeed, this
duty imposed upon him was precisely to spur on the slothful. (2 Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court 480 [1979])."

Evidently, petitioner had no valid excuse to resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and
prohibition when appeal had been available to him and which he, in fact, already initiated but did not
pursue.

Petitioner, in questioning the Order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge Ordoez-Benitez, claims
that such order contravenes the law exempting retirement gratuity from legal process and liens. We
find merit in petitioner's stand in the light of the explicit provisions of Sec. 26 of CA 186, as amended,
which read as follows:

Sec. 26. Exemption from legal process and liens. No policy of life insurance issued
under this Act, or the proceeds thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor
any other benefit granted under this Act, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment,
or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or
equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such member, of
his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right thereunder, either before
or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof; when not made payable to a named
beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his debt;
Provided, however, That this section shall not apply when obligation, associated or
bank or other financial instituted, which is hereby authorized.

The aforecited freeze order of respondent Judge Benitez (directing PNB not to release any portion of
the retirement benefits due the petitioner) falls squarely within the restrictive provisions of the
aforequoted section. Notably, said section speaks of "any other benefit granted under this Act," or
"other process" and "applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law." This assailed
order clearly violates the aforestated provision and is, therefore, illegal and improper.

G.R. No 75410

Re the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the appellate court in dismissing the same, said:

But in this case, the petitioner could have appealed from the decision of Judge Diaz.
Instead, he announced he was not going to appeal. He was going to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition as he in fact did in this case. This certainly cannot be done,
even under the most liberal view of practice and procedure. Especially can this not
be done when the questions raised do not relate either to errors of jurisdiction or to
grave abuse of discretion but, if at all, to errors of judgment.

The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz which ordered then
defendant PNB to desist and refrain from releasing to petitioner all monetary benefits and
emoluments due him as retirement benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent also
comes within the prohibition imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of the GSIS Charter. This, in effect,
is also a freeze order.

The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private respondent makes the
default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or
reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property of
the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the government because of
previous work (like the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October
25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86),
this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code).

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. Let the records be remanded to the
trial courts of origin for further proceedings.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur