GDR Orchestras-Allmendiger y Hackman

Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East
German Symphony Orchestras
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Citation Allmendinger, Jutta, and J. Richard Hackman. 1996.

Organizations in changing environments: the case of East
German symphony orchestras. Administrative Science Quarterly
41, no. 3: 337-369.
Published Version doi:10.2307/2393935
Accessed June 19, 2015 2:11:03 PM EDT
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Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East German Symphony Orchestras
Author(s): Jutta Allmendinger and J. Richard Hackman
Source: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 337-369
Published by: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
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Organizationsin Two periods of radical political-economic change in the
Changing former East Germany illuminate dynamics of
organization-environment relationships that generally are
Environments:The hidden from view. Historical, qualitative, and survey data
Case of East German from a longitudinal comparative study of 78 orchestras in
Symphony Orchestras four nations show that the contexts of East German
orchestras changed significantly when the socialist
Jutta Allmendinger regime took power after World War 11,and then again in
Munich University 1990 when that regime fell. Socialist rule only modestly
J. Richard Hackman affected orchestras' institutional features, however; they
HarvardUniversity continued to reflect centuries-old German musical
traditions. The collapse of socialism in 1990, by contrast,
provoked differentiation among orchestras-some
adapted successfully to the new political-economic
context, but others floundered. Successful adaptation
was found to be a joint function of an orchestra's prior
strength as an organization and the kinds of leadership
initiatives taken by orchestra leaders and players.
Overall, the findings suggest that the size and character
of environmental effects depend on the degree to which
contextual changes alter (a) the strength of the link
between organizational actions and resources obtained
(resource contingency) and (b) organizations' latitude to
manage their own affairs (operational autonomy).
In the decades since Stinchcombe's (1965) landmark
statements on the relationshipbetween organizationsand
their societal contexts, an abundantresearch and theoretical
literatureon organization-environment relationshipshas
developed. In this paper,we take a fresh look at those
? relationsin historicallyuniquecircumstances-specifically,
1996 by CornellUniversity.
0001-8392/96/4103-0337/$1.00. duringthe two periods of radicalpolitical-economicchange
0 that occurredin the former East Germanyin the last
Portionsof the researchreportedhere half-century.The first change took place in the years
were supportedby the Max Planck immediatelyafter WorldWar 11when the socialist regime
Institutefor Bildungsforschung and by
the HarvardGraduateSchool of Business took power; the second occurredin 1990 when that regime
Administration. We thankLarissa fell and the Germanstates reunified.Ourfocal institutionis
Kowal-Wolk, ErinLehman,and Rebecca the professionalsymphony orchestra,which has been
Rotersfor theircollaborationon the
project;Jay Tuckerfor help in translating integralto East Germanculturefor over a century. By
and coding researchmaterials;and Ben examiningthe impactof the two revolutionarychanges on
Dattner,AdamGalinsky,and Tuck
Pescosolido for assistance in library this deeply rooted culturalinstitution,we seek to identify
researchand data analysis.Helpful and illuminatedynamics of organization-environment
comments on this paperwere provided relationshipsthat generallyare hiddenfrom scholarlyview.
by JudithBlau,HannahBruckner,
Thomas Ertman,PaulDiMaggio,Connie There is no dearthof conceptual models of organization-
Gersick,StephanLiebfried,Andy
Molinsky,FrancieOstrower,Charles environmentrelations(fora brief review, see Allmendinger
Perrow,KlausJOrgenPeter, and Aage and Hackman,1994). Institutionalmodels (Meyer and
Sorensen. Assistance in enumeratingthe Rowan, 1977; Zucker,1977; DiMaggioand Powell, 1983;
populationof orchestrasand in gaining
access to those selected for the research Scott, 1987) describe the processes by which organizations
was providedby the AmericanFederation situated in similarenvironmentstend to become isomorphic
of Musicians(AFM),the American
SymphonyOrchestraLeague(ASOL),the with those environments,increasinglysimilarto one another,
Arts Councilof GreatBritain(ACGB),the and persistent over time. Populationecology models
EuropeanConferenceof Symphony (Hannanand Freeman, 1977, 1989; Aldrich,1979) explain
Orchestras(ECSO),the International
Conferenceof Symphonyand Opera how environmentalchanges reshape the populationof
Musicians(ICSOM),and the Regional organizationsin a domain. Over time, organizationsthat fit
OrchestraPlayersAssociation(ROPA). well with their environmentsprosperand reproduce,
We give special thanksto KennethBaird
(ACGB),BradBuckley(ICSOM), whereas those that do not eventuallydie out. In the
RosemaryEstes (ROPA),Catherine populationecology view, there is little that organizational
French(ASOL),KenHaas (Boston
SymphonyOrchestra),and Lew Waldeck actors can do to alter ecological forces or to adapt to them.
(AFM). Adaptationmodels, such as organization-environment fit
337/AdministrativeScience Quarterly,41 (1996): 337-369
theory (Lawrenceand Lorsch,1967; Thompson, 1967),
resource dependency theory (Salancikand Pfeffer, 1977;
Pfeffer and Salancik,1978), and models of organizational
responses to threat and failure(Staw, Sandelands, and
Dutton, 1981; Meyer, 1982; Haveman,1992; Ocasio, 1995),
derive from a conception of organizationsas rationalactors
(Barnard,1938; Child,1972). Althoughadaptationmodels
vary in the strength of their presumptionof managerial
rationality-intheir view of organizationalaction as
instrumentalor mainlysymbolic and in their relativefocus on
actions that are internallyor externallyoriented-a common
theme in these models is that leaders can do constructive
things to help their organizationsrespond appropriatelyto
environmentalchanges.
All of these approachescan provideuseful explanationsof
organization-environment relationships.Despite the fact that
they sometimes generate incompatiblepredictions,and
despite the occasional attempts by scholars to pit them
against one another (Singh, House, and Tucker,1986;
Zucker,1987: 457-459; Astley and Van de Ven, 1983), they
are not directlycompeting theories (Hambrickand
Finkelstein,1987: 370). We view them, instead, as likelyto
be differentiallyuseful in explainingorganization-environment
relationsin differenthistoricaland organizational
circumstances.As Gersick(1994: 11) noted, now may be
the time to cease asking whether or not organizationsadapt
or managerialchoices matterand to focus instead on "when
and how organizationssteer successfully throughchanging
environments"(emphasis added).
The overallaim of the present study is to identifythe times
and circumstances underwhich significantenvironmental
changes engender institutionaldynamics or ecological
processes or adaptiveinitiativesby affected organizations.
We draw on quantitative,observational,archival,and
interviewdata about professionalsymphony orchestras in
the former East Germany-supplemented by paralleldata
from orchestras in the formerWest Germany,the United
Kingdom,and the United States-to do this.
Symphonyorchestras in East Germanyprovidea uniquely
appropriatesetting for this analysis because they
experienced in this centurytwo episodes of radicalsocietal
change-both well defined but invokingopposite social
policies-separated by a long interveningperiodof relative
social stability.The experience of East Germanorchestras
between 1945 and 1990 has many of the features of a
naturallyoccurringexperiment. State centralcontrolwas
introducedafter 1945, allowed to runfor over 40 years, and
then abruptlydismantledin 1990. There are, moreover,
several nonequivalentcontrolgroups availablefor use in
interpretingfindingsfrom East Germanorchestras-those in
West Germany,which have the same musical traditionas
orchestras in East Germanybut, after 1945, a sharply
differentpolitical-economiccontext; and those in other
Western nations, which share with East Germanorchestras
neither musicaltraditionnor political-economiccontext.
Research Focus
We approachour overallresearch agenda of identifyingthe
kinds of processes set in motion by significant
338/ASQ, September 1996
Symphony Orchestras
environmentalchange by first disaggregatingthe problem

into three more specific and empiricallytractablequeries.
Then, after we have reportedwhat our data have to say
about these questions, we integratethe findings into a new
conceptualframeworkfor analyzinghow organizations
respond to changingenvironments.
1. Did regulatory agencies and/or local governments buffer East
German orchestras from the impact of national political and
economic changes?
That majorpolitical-economicchanges occurredin Germany
after WorldWar 11and again in 1990 is evident in the
historicalrecord. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that those national-leveljolts were felt with full force by East
Germansymphony orchestras. Any nationalregime
necessarily implements its social and economic policies
througha varietyof administrativeand regulatoryagencies,
which form the proximalcontext of operatingorganizations
(Carroll,Delacroix,and Goodstein, 1988). It is possible for
these agencies to absorb the impact of even radical
national-levelchanges, leavingthe proximalenvironmentof
regulatedorganizationsmostly unchanged (Aldrich,1979:
196). We draw on qualitativeand historicaldata to determine
whether the proximalenvironmentof East German
orchestras actuallydid change after 1945 or in 1990-or
whether mid-rangegovernment entities bluntedor redirected
nationalpolicies in ways that preserved orchestras'
traditionaloperatingenvironments.
2. To what extent, and in what ways, did orchestral functioning
and the life and work of orchestra players change in response
to the two national-level political-economic changes?
Symphonyorchestras in East Germanyare strong and
deeply rooted culturalinstitutions.Even if their proximal
environmentswere altered by the two rounds of
political-economicchanges in that country,institutional
forces might have been strong enough for orchestras to
weather the changes. If so, we would expect to find
orchestras persisting in their traditionalways of operating
and few changes in the life and work of orchestra players
followingthe societal-levelshocks. Alternatively,the societal
changes may have been strong and pervasive enough to
overcome inertialforces and recast the very institutional
form of the East Germansymphony orchestra.We draw on
quantitativedata from orchestras and players to assess
empiricallywhat happens when radicalpolitical-economic
changes collide with strong institutionalforces.
3. What factors distinguish those orchestras that adapted
successfully to the potentially threatening political-economic
changes in East Germany from those that did not?
A changingexternalenvironmentalways offers the
possibilityof adaptationin which opportunitiesfor
improvementare exploited or, at least, potentialnegative
consequences of the changes are avoided. Some orchestras
in East Germanyfared better after the dismantlingof the
socialist state in 1990 than did others. We draw on both
quantitativeand qualitativedata to distinguishbetween
these two groups of orchestras. Specifically,we empirically
explore the possibilitythat successful adaptationdepends
jointlyon (a) an organization'sstrength priorto the
contextualshock and (b) the kinds of leadershipinitiatives
taken by organizationmanagers and members.
Trustworthyanswers to these three research questions
would contributeto sociological knowledge about cultural
institutionsas well as to organizationtheory. Althoughthere
has been considerableresearch on how culturaltraditions
and political-economicfactors affect publicsupport for
culturalinstitutions(Blau,1988, 1989), less is known about
contextualinfluences on the organizationsthat actually
produce culturalproducts. Because of the extraordinary
variationin the societal context of East Germanorchestras
over the last four decades, East Germanyoffers a unique
setting for assessing factors that affect the viabilityof
culturalorganizations.Moreover,because symphony
orchestras, relativeto other culturalinstitutions,tend to be
insulatedfrom direct politicaland ideologicalinfluence
(Shostakovich,1983), any findingsof effects from political
changes are likelyto be conservative. Rueschemeyer's
(1991) research on East Germanvisual arts and Goldfarb's
(1980) study of Polish student theater supplement the
results reportedhere by providingtests of the relation
between politicalsystems and more politicallysensitive
culturalforms.
Research Setting and Strategy
Symphony orchestras. Professionalsymphony orchestras
are defined as ensembles whose primarymission is public
performanceof those orchestralworks generallyconsidered
to fall withinthe standardsymphonic repertoireand whose
members are compensated nontriviallyfor their services.
Both concert and broadcastorchestras fall within our
domain, as do orchestrasthat performspecialized works
such as operas or pops programsin additionto the standard
repertoire.Excludedare chamber ensembles, orchestras that
performoperaticor theater works exclusively, university
orchestras, and amateurorchestras.
The core task of symphony orchestras is well defined and
similarboth withinand across nations, in that symphony
orchestras aroundthe world play largelythe same repertoire
with roughlythe same numberand mix of players. By
includingin our domainonly orchestras that performthe
standardsymphonic repertoire,most task-based varianceis
automaticallycontrolled.This reduces the problem,common
in comparativeresearch, that differences in tasks or
compositionR are confoundedwith organizationalor national
contexts.
German orchestras. Orchestralmusic in Germanyhas
received much publicattentionand consistent financial
supportover the last 200 years (Pfannkuch,1962; Weineck,
1985). In the eighteenth century,orchestras were supported
mainlyby the nobility;by the twentieth century, almost all
fundingwas providedby states and municipalities(Becker,
1962; Raynor,1978), supplemented by limitedfederal funds
and occasional privatedonationsfor special projects. The
state also was the dominantproviderof musical training,
with music schools and conservatoriesspread throughout
the land.The state-centered supportfor music in Germany
contrasts sharplywith the situationin the other two
Symphony Orchestras
countries in our sample. Duringthe periodaddressed in our

research (1945-1991), most symphony orchestras in the
United Kingdomand almost all orchestras in the United
States were freestandingentities, subject to the vagaries of
marketforces and privatephilanthropy(DiMaggioand
Useem, 1983: 200; Martorella,1983: 282).
Churchesalso played an importantrole in promotingmusical
culturein Germanyby supplementingstate-providedmusical
training,encouragingthe composition of new works, and
supplyingregularaudiences for performances.With
sustained government support,widespread opportunitiesfor
musicaltraining,a continuousflow of new compositions,
and numerous performancevenues, symphonic music
became partof the culturalfabricof the land. People from all
strata of Germansociety, not just the elite, were familiar
with symphonic music and accustomed to hearingit
routinelyin their own communities.
This patternpersisted throughmany periods of politicaland
economic turbulence,includingeven the Nazi regime
(Prieberg,1982). The patternchanged abruptlyin 1945,
however, when Germanywas partitioned,and each nation
began to go its own way. That musical culturecontinued to
be importantto both Germanstates in the ensuing historical
periodis not in question. The question, instead, is to what
extent-and in what ways-East Germanorchestras and
their proximalcontexts changed after 1945 and then again in
the late 1980s.
Analytic strategy. Archival,interview,observational,and
survey data about orchestras and their contexts were
collected in 1990 and 1991 as partof a comparativestudy of
78 symphony orchestras in four nations. We rely on different
subsets of those data for each of our three research
questions.
Forthe first question, on the degree to which mid-range
government entities bufferedorchestras from the full impact
of societal-levelchanges, we draw mainlyon archivaland
interviewdata. We document changes in the immediate
context of East Germanorchestras that resulted from the
advent of the socialist regime followingWorldWar 11and
those that occurredas the events leadingto German
reunificationbegan to unfoldin the late 1980s.
Forthe second question, on how orchestras and players
responded to the societal-levelchanges, we rely on survey
and interviewdata. To assess the impact of socialism, we
draw mainlyon survey data collected from members of
orchestras in the four countries in our sample as the
communist era came to an end in early 1990. If four
decades of socialist policies and practices had significantly
affected East Germanorchestras, then the reportsof players
in those orchestras should differ substantiallyboth from
those of their counterpartsin West Germanorchestras
(which, duringthe same historicalperiod,operated in a
democracythat became increasinglymarket-oriented)and
from those of musicians in the two English-speakingnations.
To assess the impactof the second majorpolitical-economic
change, we collected an additionalwave of survey data in
the summer of 1991, after the socialist regime had fallen.
These data allow us to trackdirectlythe impact of this
second change on orchestras and players.
Forthe thirdquestion, about the factors that distinguish
orchestras that prospered under reunificationfrom those that
began to flounder,we rely on survey, interview,and
observationaldata. These data identifycertainstructural
features of orchestras and patternsof behaviorby orchestra
leaders and members that moderatedthe impact of
reunificationon orchestras and players.Throughout,we give
special attentionto mechanisms that cross levels of
analysis-particularlyto the interactionsamong (a) contextual
factors (the two political-economicshocks and government
policies and practices),(b) organization-levelvariables
(structuralfeatures of orchestras),and (c) the behaviorand
attitudes of individualplayersand leaders.
METHOD
Selection of Orchestras
The populationof symphony orchestras in each of the four
countrieswas enumerated by listingall orchestras that
advertisedat least one open playerposition between 1985
and 1989. We obtainedthe 1989 playersalarybudget for
each of those orchestras and used the distributionof salary
budgets to select approximatelyequal numbers of "major"
and "regional"orchestras from each country.Major
orchestraswere randomlydrawnfrom the top decile (or, in
the United Kingdom,which had relativelyfewer orchestras,
quintile)of the distribution;regionalorchestras were
randomlydrawnfrom each of the remainingdeciles (or
quintiles)untilwe obtaineda sample of about 20 orchestras
from each country.Of the 81 orchestras invitedto
participatein the study, 78 agreed (96 percent). One regional
orchestrain the United States and one majorand one
regionalorchestrain the United Kingdomdeclined.
Characteristicsof the orchestras in the sample are
summarizedin Table 1. A numberof differences across
nationand orchestrastanding (majorvs. regional)are
evident. Only in the UnitedStates do all orchestras perform
concerts exclusively.The United Kingdomand the two
Germannations have several orchestras whose main
mission is broadcastperformances.Only half of the German
orchestras performconcerts exclusively; many also perform
for opera and theater productions.As might be expected,
given their multiplemissions, the mean size of German
orchestras is largerthan that of orchestras in the two
English-speakingcountries. Regionalorchestras in all
countries tend to be more recentlyfounded than major
orchestras, to have a largerpercentage of women players
(especiallyin the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom),
and (for East and West Germanyonly) to have a larger
percentage of foreign workers. There are no major
differences across nations in playerdemographics.
Qualitative and Archival Data
Before beginningfieldwork,we studied published
informationsuch as orchestra histories, scholarlypapers, and
newspaper or magazinearticles about orchestras in each
Symphony Orchestras
Table 1
Characteristics of Orchestras by Country and Standing
East Germany West Germany United States United Kingdom
Characteristic Major Regional Major Regional Major Regional Major Regional
Number of orchestras in sample 9 13 12 8 13 11 7 5

Concerts exclusively 5 6 4 5 13 11 6 2
Opera and/or theater 2 7 3 3 0 0 0 0
Broadcast 2 0 5 0 0 0 1 3
Mean orchestra size 133 67 121 71 101 79 93 76
Mean date founded 1818 1867 1920 1917 1904 1943 1904 1931
Orchestra composition
Mean percent women players 11 23 11 23 25 47 24 39
Mean percent foreign players 1 20 21 42 3 1 4 3
Player demographics (means)

Age 42.0 40.0 41.0 37.0 44.0 35.0 37.0 38.0
Years in orchestra 6.9 6.1 6.0 5.6 6.1 5.1 5.2 5.3
Years in position 6.6 5.7 5.9 5.4 5.6 4.6 4.9 5.0
Number of previous orchestras 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.0 1.9 2.0
country. We then visited each of the 78 orchestras in the

sample to conduct interviews, make observations, and
obtain archival data (concert programs, rosters of players and
managers, financial data, and concert attendance figures) for
1985-1990. Interviewees included orchestra managers,
officials of governing boards or agencies, players, and
support staff. When possible, we also observed rehearsals
and concerts. We summarized and coded archival, interview,
and observational data on a recording form designed to
maximize the comparability of data across orchestras and
countries (for details, see Allmendinger et al., 1993).
Data about the social and regulatory context of East German
orchestras were obtained primarilyfrom interviews with
officials of the government agency responsible for theaters
and orchestras (the Direktion fOrTheater und Orchester, or
DTO) and with the spokesman for the acting East German
Minister of Culture, and from the official press organ Theater
der Zeit from 1960 through 1989, the occasional publication
Decisions and Announcements of the Ministry of Culture,
and the East German collective contract for artists. Detailed
information about specific orchestras was taken from the
annual Ensembles der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
from 1985 to 1990 and from several editions of Information,
published by the DTO.
Archival data supplied by East German orchestras presented
some special interpretive challenges. Budgets, a managerial
staple in Western orchestras, were not used by (or, in some
cases, even available to) most East German orchestra
managers. Attendance data were of questionable reliability
because of political requirements that concert halls be full,
and even seemingly straightforward historical data, such as
lists of former conductors, could not be taken at face value.
Also, because smaller orchestras often exchanged
musicians, their official rosters sometimes did not provide
complete data about who actuallyplayed in them. Despite
these difficulties,the cooperationof East Germanplayers,
managers, and publicofficialswas exemplary.No orchestra
declined to participate,no one we sought to interview
turned us away, and the survey returnrate was higher in
East Germanythan in any other country.
Survey Data
To tap players'views of their orchestras, we developed and
administereda survey to a subset of players of each
orchestra.The survey, which consisted of 87 items
distributedacross six sections, was based on previous
research by one of the authors (Hackman,1990),
supplemented by observationsand interviews at a subset of
orchestras in the present sample. It assessed players'
perceptions of the organizationalfeatures of their orchestras,
within-orchestrainterpersonalprocesses, and the behaviors
of orchestraleaders. Inaddition,the survey asked about
each respondent's own work motivation,satisfaction, and
career history.Originallydraftedin English,the survey was
translatedinto Germanand partiallyback-translatedby
bilingualmembers of the research team.
The survey was administeredto a stratifiedrandomsample
of 15 players in each orchestra:two first violins, two second
violins, one viola, one cello, one bass, two woodwinds, two
brass, one percussion, and three principalplayers (one each
from the strings, woodwinds, and brass/percussion).Six
orchestras did not participatein the survey portionof the
research: two majorand two regionalorchestras in West
Germanyand one majorand one regionalorchestra in the
UnitedStates. Afterthe first roundof surveys had been
returned,we sent additionalsurveys to most orchestras. The
same samplingplanwas used in the second round,except
that women were deliberatelyoversampledto permit
comparativeanalyses of the responses of male and female
players (see Allmendingerand Hackman,1995).
Surveys were anonymous, althoughthey did identifythe
respondent's orchestra,section, and status as a principalor
tutti player.Totalsample size for the main analyses reported
in this paper is 72 orchestras and 992 respondents. The
numberof orchestras, numberof respondents, and response
rates for each countryare as follows: East Germany:22
orchestras, 357 respondents (59 percent);West Germany:
20 orchestras, 186 respondents (45 percent); United States:
24 orchestras, 290 respondents (52 percent); United
Kingdom:12 orchestras, 159 respondents (51 percent).
We derivedsixteen composite measures from the survey
items. These were based on the a prioriframeworkused to
select and generate items, supplemented by factor analyses
of data from 924 respondents and by inspections of item
means, standarddeviations,and intercorrelations.We
retainedfive single items of special interest, resultingin a
total of 21 measures. They are grouped into four domains:
(a) organizationalfeatures of the orchestra, (b) orchestral
process and performance,(c) playermotivationand
satisfaction,and (d) music directorbehavior.All measures
range from 1 (low) to 7 (high),except for those assessing
the behaviorof the music director,which range from 1 to 5.
Symphony Orchestras
Table2
Means and Standard Deviations of Measures*
Measure Items Mean S.D. Reliability
Organizationalfeatures of the orchestra
Integrityas an ensemble 8 5.05 1.00 .73
Orchestrastructure:Taskand composition 5 4.86 1.03 .65
Playerinvolvementand opportunities 8 4.10 1.11 .76
Adequacyof resources 2 4.20 1.81 .59
Single items:
Recognition(Excellentplayingpays off) 5.50 1.51
Recruitment(Fairand effective) 5.28 1.60
Orchestralprocess and performance

Qualityof internalprocesses 7 4.76 1.03 .78
Musicaloutcomes 3 4.81 1.25 .70
Single items:
Finances(Gettingstrongerfinancially) 3.35 1.84
not fallingapart)
Stability(Organization 5.92 1.54
Playermotivationand satisfaction
Generalsatisfaction 3 5.61 1.21 .74
Internalwork motivation 3 6.21 0.79 .69
Job involvement 1 4.70 2.04
Satisfactionwith:
Compensation 2 3.87 1.75 .73
Job security 2 4.82 1.48 .88
Management 3 4.28 1.48 .86
Workrelationships 3 4.93 0.98 .58
Growthopportunities 4 4.84 1.17 .79
Behaviorof the music director

Direction-setting 5 3.67 1.09 .92
Organizationalinitiatives 7 3.15 0.98 .84
Coaching 5 2.82 0.90 .79
* Based on respondentsfrom all countries.Numberof responses ranges from 886 to 924.
The measures, grouped by domain,are described in the

Appendix.Means, standarddeviations, and internal
consistency reliabilitiesare reportedin Table 2. We assessed
discriminantvaliditiesof the measures by comparingthe
average intercorrelation among items that make up a given
composite score with those items in the same section of
the survey that do not contributeto that score (off-diagonal
correlations).The medianwithin-compositecorrelationis .46,
comparedwith a median off-diagonalcorrelationof .24,
which is satisfactory.Three measures have relativelyweak
discriminantvalidities:integrityas an ensemble, music
directororganizationalinitiatives,and music director
coaching.
We comparedwithin-composite,off-diagonal,and
between-composite correlationsfor the 21 measures across
countries. Patternsof intercorrelationswere quite similar
across nations,which providesassurance about the
comparabilityof players' responses to the Englishand
Germanversions of the instrumentand permits use of the
same composite scores for all countries (Allmendingeret al.,
1993).
Finally,we computed intraclasscorrelationsacross
orchestras for all survey variablesfor which players
described their orchestraand leaders. All of these
correlationswere significant,which allowed us to aggregate
the responses of playerswithin orchestras to generate
organization-levelscores for each of these variables(Kenny
and LaVoie,1985).
Supplementary Data
We collected survey data from East Germanplayers
between Januaryand May 1990, which was after the Berlin
Wall had been breached but before formal reunificationof
the two Germanies.Because it was becoming evident that
reunificationthreatened the survivalof some orchestras we
were studying (Allmendinger,1990; Allmendingerand
Hackman,1991), we collected three sets of additionaldata
to trackempiricallywhat was happening.
First,we sent a semistructuredquestionnaireto the senior
managers of all 76 orchestras in East Germanyin June 1991,
asking them what had changed and what had remainedthe
same for their orchestras.Twenty-two managers (29
percent) returnedcompleted questionnaires.Second,
musicianswho had been sent playersurveys in 1990 were
contacted again in May-andJune 1991 and asked if they
would be willingto (a) retakethe same survey and (b)
complete a briefsupplementaryinstrumentthat asked
specificallyabout any recent changes in their orchestras. Of
the 90 musicianswho returnedthese materials,there were
65 matched pairs (72 percent)who responded in both 1990
and 1991. With these data we were able to do a
comparativeanalysis of the 1990 and 1991 data using
playersas their own controls. Finally,we sent the player
survey to an additional300 musicians who had not
participatedin the 1990 survey, followingthe same sampling
planthat was used for second-rounddata collection in the
other countries.We received usable responses from 158
players (53 percent).
RESULTS1:CONTEXTUAL CHANGES
The historicaland archivaldata reportedin this section
address our first research question-namely, the degree to
which East Germansymphony orchestras were buffered
from the full impactof the national-levelpoliticaland
economic changes that occurredafter WorldWar 11and then
again in the late 1980s.
The Making of a Socialist CulturalEnvironment:
1945-1990
The socialist regime took power in East Germanyin 1945.
Subsequently,the bordersof the countrywere closed, the
state assumed controlover virtuallyall aspects of society,
and there was a sharp breakfrom previous political,
economic, and culturalpolicies. The Germanstates (Lander),
which had providedthe financialsupportfor symphony
orchestras,were abolished in 1952. Churcheswere
disenfranchisedand no longer providedvenues for musical
performances.By the mid-1950s, both the financialsupport
and the controlof symphony orchestras were firmlyin the
hands of the centralgovernment.
Culturalpolicy. One tenet of state culturalpolicy was to
bringthe Germanmusicaltraditionto all the people of the
Symphony Orchestras
land (Mehner,1990). Before the socialist regime came to

power, there were 48 orchestras in the geographicalarea
that was to become the East Germanstate. By 1990, East
Germanyhad 76 professionalsymphony orchestras in a
countryslightlysmallerthan the state of Tennessee. There
was one symphony orchestrain East Germanyfor every
220,000 citizens, a higherdensity than in any other country
in the world (Allmendingerand Hackman,1994).
Not all orchestraswere created equal, however. Although
state policyexplicitlypromotedthe democratizationof
culture,its implementationresulted in a few world-class
ensembles, designated "Class A" orchestras, scattered
among a much largernumberof "B" and "C" class
orchestras.The higherthe class, the more fixed positions,
the largerthe annualbudget, and the higherthe pay of
players.Orchestrascould not improvetheir standing, nor
was there any real riskof demotion to a lower class.
The state policyof democratizingculturewent far beyond
simply creatingmore orchestras. Manyorchestras were
requiredto travelto communities that did not have their
own, to performin schools, and to hold concerts in industrial
complexes (Kombinate).Moreover,"culturalbrigades"were
created as an incentivefor culturalparticipation.Members of
these self-composed groups engaged in activities consistent
with state ideology, includingattendingconcerts and other
culturalevents, and were rewardedwith salaryincreases.
State policyoriented orchestras almost exclusively toward
East Germanaudiences. Few orchestras were allowed to
traveloutside the countryor to produce recordingsfor
internationaldistribution.The government did, however,
make sure that the country'svery best orchestras received
internationalexposure, which furtherelaboratedthe status
hierarchyamong orchestras.
The socialist regime closed all but four of the nation's
conservatories,which severely limitedthe supply of
orchestraplayersand kept orchestrasize small-a mean of
63 playerscomparedwith 76 in West Germany.Highly
qualifiedmusicianswere in especially short supply because
state policy requiredthat conservatoriesgive preference to
applicantsfrom working-classbackgroundsratherthan
admit students strictlyon the basis of talent. Over time,
musicianshortages became so serious that orchestras
began to importplayersfrom other socialist states.
Eventually,even the traditionin Germanorchestras of
all-maleplayerswas breached,and women were recruited
(Allmendingerand Hackman,1995). Even so, lower-class
orchestras often needed to borrowplayers from one another
to cover all the parts of large-ensembleworks.
Control of orchestras. Centralplannersexercised almost
complete controlover the administrationand economics of
East Germanorchestras. Orchestranames, the composition
of their audiences, and even the size of their audiences all
were centrallydetermined.Communistpartyofficialswere
given subscriptions,for example, whether they wanted them
or not. And they were counted as attendingthe concerts to
which they had been subscribed,whether they were actually
there or not.
Inthe earlyyears of the socialist regime, three different
state agencies controlledorchestraactivities. In 1986, these
agencies were merged into the DTO,which assumed
responsibilityfor all aspects of orchestraoperations,
includingartisticpolicy, personnel matters, and the
management of supportstaff. The centralityof the DTOto
the day-to-dayoperationsof orchestras is illustratedby the
playerselection process. DTOofficialsauditionedall
graduates of the four music schools and assigned each one
a technical proficiencyscore. Orchestraswere allowed to
consider only musicians whose scores fell within a
DTO-specifiedrange. The top-rankedorchestras auditioned
and employed the highest-scoringplayers; lower-ranked
orchestraswere permittedto consider only playerswho had
received lower scores-if any playersat all were available.
Because the wage and price structureof the culturalsector
of the economy was artificiallystabilized,East German
orchestraswere protected from internationalcompetition
and from economic uncertainty.The pay of orchestra
musicians, however, was quite low relativeto playersalaries
in other nations. Forexample, in 1990 a musician in a
top-rankedEast Germanorchestra,such as the Berliner
Sinfonie Orchester,earned 1,800 marks (roughly$1200) per
month, plus a numberof state-suppliedgoods and services;
a typicalplayerin the BerlinerPhilharmonischesOrchester, a
top West Germanorchestrajust across the wall, earned
more than four times as much. The wage structurewithin
East Germanorchestraswas flat as well. Whereas principal
players in Western orchestrastypicallyearn substantially
more than do tutti (section) players,all members of a section
were paid nearlythe same in East Germanorchestras.
Orchestras'expense budgets were centrallydetermined and
rarelychanged from year to year. Overallbudgets were
partitionedinto funds for specific purposes, and orchestra
managers had almost no flexibilityin using those funds. An
orchestrawith money in its instrumentfund, for example,
rarelycould purchase instrumentsmanufacturedin East
Germanybecause almost all of them were sold to other
nations for hardcurrency.By contrast, funds for instrument
repairwere relativelyeasy to spend, promptingorchestras to
repaireven instrumentsthat could have been more
inexpensivelyreplaced.
The East Germanpolicyof "bringingmusic to the people"
was not mere propaganda;the socialist musical culturedid
result in East Germancitizens havinggreater access to
serious music. In implementingthis policy, the government
took controlof virtuallyall decisions that were consequential
for orchestras and players. Mid-rangegovernment agencies,
such as the DTO,did not bufferorchestras from national
policies. The opposite happened: With a few exceptions,
such as the slow applicationto orchestras of national
policies about women's employment and the relatively
greater latitudeenjoyed by a few of the country'sfinest
orchestras, these agencies vigorouslyenforced national
culturalpolicyfor all orchestras in the land.The result was
high differentiationamong the three classes of orchestras,
little differentiationand greater interdependence among
Symphony Orchestras
orchestraswithin the lower classes, and a sharp reductionin

autonomyand managerialexpertise at the orchestra level.
The Disintegration of the Socialist CulturalContext:
1990-1991
With reunification,much that had been done after the
socialist regime took power in 1945 was immediately
undone. The borderbetween East and West Germanywas
abolished,five new federal states were created or
reconstituted,churches were re-legitimized,and the
Kombinatewere closed.
Culturalpolicy. The UnificationTreatybetween the two
Germannations signed in August 1990 requiredthat
unificationdo no damage to the culturalinfrastructureor to
the culturaltraditionsof the former East Germany(Article
35, Paragraph6). Yet the means by which that policy would
be implemented-for operas, theaters, and museums as
well as for orchestras-was not specified.
Policymakersinitiallyattended almost exclusively to the
financialresources needed to ensure the survivalof East
Germanculturalinstitutions.The nation had been spending
246 marksper citizen per year to support culture; by
contrast,West Germanywas spending only 150 marks per
person for culture(estimates from the 1988 Conference of
the Ministersof Culturein West Germany).Moreover,
financialresponsibilityfor orchestras was differentlysituated
in the two countries: Fundswere supplied mainlyby state
and local agencies in West Germanybut by the federal
government in East Germany.
These differences between the two countries did not bode
well for East Germanorchestras (Allmendinger,1990;
Zimmer,1990; M6ller,1991). Not only might centralfunding
be lost, but the precariousfinances of the cities and the new
states in the former East Germanymade it extremely
unlikelythat they could take up the slack. The Bonn
government did establish a transitionalplanthat provided
some federal funds for East Germanorchestras and gave
each playera pay raise of 200 marksper month. In addition,
the newly created states were given some funds to support
culture,and a few cities were able to providelimitedsupport
for their own culturalinstitutions.
The collective impactof these programswas a modest
increase in resources for East Germanorchestras-and
considerableconfusion throughoutthe countryabout the
amount, purposes, and conditionsof those resources. The
federal transitionalfunds, for example, were intended merely
to help orchestras survivethe periodof change, during
which a numberof smallerorchestras were expected to
merge. But many East Germanorchestra players and
managers mistakenlyviewed the funds as signalingthe
beginningof a periodof relativeaffluence.
Control of orchestras. By the end of 1990, East German
regulatoryagencies such as the DTOhad ceased to function,
and the government no longer had the capabilityto control
the nation's symphony orchestras. Althoughnone were
closed (the government did not have the capabilityto do that
either),the new and unfamiliarpolitical-economiccontext
posed some significantthreats. There were, for example,
fewer places for orchestrasto perform.The closing of the
Kombinatehad eliminatedone regularvenue, many of the
communityhalls where smaller orchestras had performed
were no longeravailableto them, and as Gymnasia
deemphasized culturalactivities,they stopped inviting
orchestrasto performfor students. Althoughcorporate
sponsors appearedon the East Germanorchestralscene for
the first time ever, they had little immediate impact on either
finances or performanceopportunities.
Economicrealitiesrequiredthat ticket prices be raised, even
as people's abilityto affordthem was dropping.Moreover,
publicofficials no longerwere obligatedto attend orchestra
concerts. The result was audiences that were both smaller
(ourdata show a 30-percent drop in occupied seats between
1985 and 1991) and differentlycomposed than those to
which musicians had become accustomed.
As the situationworsened, some top players departed for
better-payingorchestras in the West, raisingthe specter of
competitionamong orchestrasfor players-something that
had not happened since the socialist regime took power in
the 1940s. With the bordersof the countrynow open, there
was an abundanceof new playersavailableto fill vacancies,
but orchestras had neitherthe know-how nor the
wherewithalto screen these applicantsand select among
them.
The societal-levelchanges that occurredin 1990, like those
of the late 1940s, resulted in direct and consequential
alterationsof the proximalenvironmentof East German
orchestras.The previouslysecure base of resources to
supportsymphonic music vanished, even as the collapse of
the DTOdramaticallyincreased orchestras' autonomy over
their own affairs.But four decades of centralcontrol had
been competence-destroyingratherthan competence-
enhancingfor East Germanorchestras (Tushmanand
Anderson, 1986). Few of them had the expertise needed
either to solve the problemsor to exploit the opportunities
that accompaniedthe revolutionaryevents of 1990.
Conclusion
The answer to our first research question-about whether
mid-rangegovernmentagencies buffered East German
symphony orchestrasfrom the two national-level
changes-is clearlynegative. In the first instance, high-level
decision makers eliminatedsome entities that had been
importantfeatures of the orchestralcontext (such as
churches)and created new agencies that became highly
salient for orchestras (such as the DTOand the Kombinate).
The mid-rangegovernmentagencies that remainedin place,
such as municipalities,potentiallycould have buffered
orchestras from the full impactof these changes, but they
did not. Inthe second instance, the collapse of the
government renderedfinanciallyand administratively
impotentthe very institutionsthat had become the most
consequentialfeatures of the orchestralcontext under
socialsm.
Symphony Orchestras
The contextualchanges were realjolts. They were neither

invented by orchestras (Starbuck,1976: 1069) nor merely
enacted by them (Weick, 1993: 372-373). Nor were they
gradualadjustmentsthat organizationalactors perceived as
discontinuousonly retrospectively(Lenzand Engledow,
1986: 343-344). Thatsymphony orchestras in East Germany
were partof a longstandingand widely valued cultural
institutionaffordedthem virtuallyno protectionfrom the
profoundchanges that took place at the center of the
nationalgovernment.
RESULTS11:ORCHESTRAS AND PLAYERS
To address our second research question, we turn from
contextualanalysis to an examinationof East German
orchestras as organizations.How did orchestra operations
and the life and work of orchestraplayers change in
response to the two national-levelpolitical-economic
changes?
The Impact of the Socialist Context on Orchestras and
Players: 1945-1990
Althoughlongitudinaldata are not availablefor East German
orchestras for the 1945-1990 period,certainwithin-and
between-countrycomparisons using 1990 data can be used
to assess the impactof the socialist context on orchestras
and their members. It was clear in 1990 that significant
politicalchanges were on the horizon,but little had actually
changed yet. The survey and observationaldata collected
that year therefore providea reasonabledepiction of East
Germanorchestras at the very end of the socialist regime.
Three comparisonsinformour research question. The first is
within the Germanculturaltradition:East vs. West German
orchestras. The second is between traditions:the two
Germanstates vs. the UnitedStates and the United
Kingdom.And the thirdis within nation: majorvs. regional
orchestras. If differences between the two Germanstates
(the within-traditioncomparison)are more substantialthan
those between traditionsand within nations, that would
suggest that the contextualchanges institutedby the
socialist regime did alter the functioningof orchestras as
organizations.If the differences between the two German
states are smaller in magnitudethan either the
between-traditionor the within-nationcomparisons,
however, that would suggest that the changes in the East
Germanpolitical-economiccontext had relativelylittle effect
on orchestras and their players.
Cross-nationaldifferences were analyzedusing the SAS
GeneralLinearModels program.We first computed
orchestrameans using the 1990 survey data. These means
were then analyzedin a model that includedterms for
country,standing (majorvs. regionalorchestras), countryby
standing,and specific orchestranested within standing.
Orchestrawas treated as a randomeffect, and the error
term for testing the effect of standingwas adjusted
accordingly.
Findingsare shown in Table3. East vs. West German
comparisons,on average, controlfar less variancethan do
either (a) comparisonsof the two Germannations, taken
Table3
Sources of Variation: Orchestra Standing, German-German,and InternationalComparisons*
Percent variance controlled
East vs. East + West Germany Majorvs.
Measure West Germany vs. USA + UK regional orchestras
Organizationalfeatures of the orchestra
Integrityas an ensemble 0% 19% 11%
Orchestrastructure:Task and composition 8% 0% 16%
Playerinvolvementand opportunities 5% 16% 8%
Adequacyof resources 8% 0% 8%
Single items:
Recognition(Excellentplayingpays off) 1% 19% 26%
Recruitment(Fairand effective) 0% 11% 5%
Orchestralprocess and performance

Qualityof internalprocesses 6% 0% 17%
Musicaloutcomes 0% 13% 0%
Single items:
Finances(Gettingstrongerfinancially) 3% 38% 0%
not fallingapart)
Stability(Organization 0% 8% 14%
Playermotivationand satisfaction
Generalsatisfaction 0% 33% 4%
Internalwork motivation 17% 8% 0%
Job involvement 6% 61% 0%
Satisfactionwith:
Compensation 27% 0% 11%
Job security 5% 2% 12%
Management 0% 16% 2%
Workrelationships 10% 4% 6%
Growthopportunities 4% 7% 4%
* Based on plannedcontrasts of an analysisinvolvingthe mainand interactiveeffects of country,standing(majorvs.
regional),and orchestra.N = 72 orchestras.
together, with the United States and United Kingdomor (b)

comparisonsof majorvs. regionalorchestras within
countries.The East vs. West Germancomparisoncontrols
more than 10 percent of the variancefor only two of our 18
measures: internalwork motivationand satisfactionwith
compensation.These findingsare confirmedby a profile
analysis of the countrymeans for our ten measures of
organizationalfeatures and orchestralprocesses. The
D-squaredindex of profilesimilarity(Nunnally,1978: 443) for
East and West Germanorchestras is 1.9, compared with an
index of 5.6 for the means of East and West German
orchestras taken together relativeto the means of United
States and United Kingdomorchestras taken together (the
lower the index, the greater the profilesimilarity).
The substantive differences between East German

orchestras and those in the other three countries in the
sample are shown in Table4. Overall,East Germanplayers
reportedthat their orchestraswere, under socialism,
relativelywell structuredand stable as organizations,a
findingthat is generallyconsistent with our observational
and archivaldata (Allmendingerand Hackman,1994).
Relationshipsamong East Germanplayerswere more
positive than acrimonious,and playermotivation,
satisfaction,and job involvementwere quite high. At the
same time, resources were insufficient,players were
Symphony Orchestras
Table 4
Cross-national Comparison of Measures from the Player Survey*
East West United United

Measure Germany Germany States Kingdom F-ratio p
Organizational features of the orchestra
Integrity as an ensemble 5.34 5.23 4.67 4.68 8.73 .001
Orchestra structure: Task and composition 5.03 4.60 4.74 4.75 3.28 .030
Player involvement and opportunities 4.33 4.02 3.97 3.44 7.25 .001
Adequacy of resources 3.56 4.58 4.80 3.76 5.44 .003
Single items:
Recognition (Excellent playing pays off) 5.68 5.77 5.04 5.07 9.35 .001
Recruitment (Fairand effective) 5.51 5.53 5.06 4.81 3.59 .020
Orchestral process and performance

Quality of internal processes 4.78 4.42 4.79 4.62 2.68 .060
Musical outcomes 4.61 4.50 4.96 5.26 4.17 .010
Single items:
Finances (Getting stronger financially) 2.11 2.81 4.48 4.15 19.36 .001
Stability (Organization not falling apart) 5.98 6.09 5.88 5.46 2.31 .090
Player motivation and satisfaction

General satisfaction 5.87 5.80 5.38 4.83 15.70 .001
Internal work motivation 6.45 6.05 6.14 5.96 9.15 .001
Job involvement 6.30 5.19 3.24 3.33 139.81 .001
Satisfaction with:
Compensation 3.03 4.84 4.14 3.81 19.54 .001
Job security 4.15 5.03 5.14 4.77 5.44 .003
Management 4.36 4.45 4.24 3.51 6.39 .001
Work relationships 4.95 4.68 4.95 5.00 3.26 .030
Growth opportunities 5.00 4.73 4.85 4.29 5.84 .002
* Country means are the average of the means of individual orchestras. N = 72 orchestras.
concerned that their orchestraswere slippingmusicallyand

financially,and there was pervasive unhappinesswith pay
and job security.
The political-economicsystem withinwhich East German
orchestras operated from 1945 to 1990 did affect orchestra
operationsand playermotivationand satisfaction.Yet the
size of these effects is modest for most measures. Clearly,
the musicaland organizationaltraditionsof East German
orchestraswere not destroyed by the 45 years of socialist
rule.
Orchestrasin West Germanyalso were changing between
1945 and 1990-but in the opposite direction,which should
have increased the size of obtained differences between the
two nations. AlthoughWest Germanorchestras continued to
be supported mainlyby the Landerand the cities, the
nationaleconomic context in which they operated became
increasinglycapitalistand marketoriented. Moreover,
satisfactoryconcert halls were availableto all West German
orchestras, instrumentsand music librarieswere rarelya
problem,and there were both funds and opportunitiesfor
internationaltours by many orchestras. Yet these orchestras
also did not stray far from the continentaltraditionof a
state-supportedmusical culture.Overall,our findings
suggest that it was more consequential in 1990 to be a
Germanorchestrathan it was to be an orchestra in a
socialist nation.
The Impact of Reunification on Orchestras and Their
Players: 1990-1991
To examine how orchestras and players responded to this
second majorpolitical-economicchange, we analyzeddata
within the East Germannation,comparingthe 1990 and
1991 responses of those playerswho completed the
research survey both years. We excluded from this analysis
four playerswho were the only ones from their orchestras
to respond to both roundsof the survey. Data for the
remaining61 playerswere analyzedin a general linearmodel
that includedterms for standing (majorvs. regional),time
(1990 vs. 1991), standing by time, orchestra nested within
standing,time by orchestra,and individualrespondent
nested within orchestra.Orchestraand respondent were
treated as randomeffects, and errorterms were adjusted
accordingly.Because there were unequalnumbers of
respondents from differentorchestras, means were first
computed for each orchestraand then averaged to generate
overallmeans for the two years.
As is seen in Table 5, the trend is modestly positive. The
1990 and 1991 means differsignificantlyfor four measures,
two of which have to do with money: In 1991, players
reportedthat their orchestras were getting stronger
financiallyand that they were happierthan before with their
pay. This findingsurely reflects hope as well as reality,since
the promisedtransitionalfunds for orchestras had not yet
arrivedwhen the 1991 survey was administered.Apparently,
players'anticipationof those funds-coupled with the token
pay increase they had received-sufficed to alter their
perceptionof and their satisfactionwith orchestrafinances.
Playersin 1991 also reportedthat they now had heightened
involvementin their organizationsand expanded
opportunitiesfor influenceand mobility.This is consistent
with the movement, observed in many orchestras, for
playersto take the reins of leadershipfrom those
state-appointedofficialswho previouslyhad held them.
Finally,players reportedthat their orchestras had improved
musicallybetween 1990 and 1991. Giventhat attendance for
most East Germanorchestras was droppingsharplyin the
early months of 1991, this findingis unexpected. Yet the
people who now were attendingconcerts were more overtly
appreciativethan they had been before-they were, after all,
there because they wanted to be ratherthan because they
were expected to be. Givenmusicians'attentiveness to the
reactionsof their audiences, this may have been enough to
engender a perceptionthat their orchestras were, in fact,
improvingmusically.
Conclusion
East Germanorchestras exhibited remarkablestabilityand
continuitywith their traditionsdespite two radicalchanges in
the country'spolitical-economicsystem. This finding
providesadditionalevidence of the power of institutional
processes to foster continuityeven underconditions of
revolutionarychange (Skocpol,1976). The answer to our
second research question, then, is that the two major
political-economicchanges only modestly affected orchestral
functioningand the life and work of players.
Symphony Orchestras
Table 5
Comparison of East German Players' Responses in 1990 and 1991*
Main effects Time by

for time standing interactions
Measure 1990 1991 F-ratio F-ratio

Integrity as an ensemble 5.28 5.30 0.03 4.40-
Orchestra structure: Task and composition 5.05 4.95 0.71 0.01
Player involvement and opportunities 4.33 4.50 4.08- 10.17--
Adequacy of resources 3.86 4.08 2.07 1.92
Single items:
Recognition (Excellent playing pays off) 5.56 5.68 0.57 4.12-
Recruitment (Fair and effective) 5.48 5.57 0.57 3.91
Orchestral process and performance

Quality of internal processes 4.68 4.77 0.96 0.92
Musical outcomes 4.29 4.59 5.76- 1.89
Single items:
Finances (Getting stronger financially) 2.25 3.29 21.37-- 0.15
Stability (Organization not falling apart) 5.87 5.80 0.16 0.01

General satisfaction 5.72 5.84 1.58 0.61
Internal work motivation 6.38 6.22 3.40 0.05
Job involvement 6.10 6.11 0.02 1.43
Satisfaction with:
Compensation 2.88 3.56 13.91-- 0.16
Job security 4.25 4.57 1.69 1.56
Management 4.26 4.54 2.05 0.46
Work relationships 4.93 4.87 0.36 0.53
Growth opportunities 4.91 4.96 0.05 0.17
p < .05; *-p < .01.

* The 1990 and 1991 means are the averages of the means of individualorchestras. N = 61 players, each at two points
in time. Means for significant interactions between time (1990 vs. 1991) and orchestra standing (major vs. regional)
are presented in Figure 1.
The homogeneity that was observed duringthe socialist

periodwas overdetermined.Beyond institutionalforces, the
pervasiveadministrativeand economic controlof orchestras
made it virtuallyimpossible for any but a very few
international"showcase" ensembles to charttheir own
futures or to differentiatethemselves from others in their
state-specified class. When the socialist regime and its
regulatoryagencies collapsed in 1990, orchestras' latitudeto
manage themselves increased dramatically,even as their
financialsecurity disappeared.Ourdata show a modest
overallimprovementin orchestrafunctioningduringthis
period (Table5). But we also found that some orchestras
were adaptingmuch more successfully to their new
opportunitiesand challenges than were others. We turn next
to analysis of the reasons why.
RESULTSIII:ADAPTATIONPROCESSES
We address our thirdresearch question by drawingon
survey, interview,and observationaldata to identifythe
factors that distinguishthose East Germanorchestras that
fared relativelywell under reunificationfrom those whose
survivalbecame increasinglyuncertain.Ourfield
observationspointed to two factors, one structuraland one
behavioral,as likelymoderatorsof orchestras'
post-reunificationwell-being: (a) an orchestra's priorstanding
as a majorvs. regionalensemble and (b) the numberand
kindsof leadershipinitiativestaken by orchestra leaders and
players.We examine these two moderatorsseparately and
then show how theirjointeffects set in motion, for some
orchestras, self-fuelingspiralsof increasing(or decreasing)
viability.
Orchestra Standing
The political-economicevents of 1990-1991 had quite
differentconsequences for majorand regionalorchestras. As
is seen in Figure1 and Table 5, all statisticallyreliable
interactionsbetween time and standing have to do with the
orchestras'organizationalfeatures, and four of the five carry
the same message: that higher-standingorchestras were
getting strongerand lower-standingorchestras were getting
weaker as the events of reunificationunfolded.This pattern
is found for integrityas an ensemble, for playerinvolvement
and opportunities,for performance-contingentrecognition,
and for fairand effective recruitmentprocesses. It is
noteworthythat the measures for which the gap between
majorand regionalorchestras widened are those for which,
in 1990, East Germanmeans were relativelyhigh (Table4).
This suggests that reunificationof the Germanstate risked
Figure 1. Significant time by standing (major vs. regional) interactions:

East German orchestras.
6- Integrityas an Ensemble 6 Player Involvement and Opportunities
Major
5.. -.- Regional 5M

1 1 M a j~~~~~~~~~~~~~ao
r
_________4______-________ Regional
1990 1991 1990 1991
61 Recognition Major 6 Recruitment

Major
~--Regional -Regional
5- 5-
4r4 -
1990 1991 1990 1991
4.5 Music DirectorOrganizationalInitiatives
3.5 Regional.-, '_ ___
Major or-
1990 1991

Symphony Orchestras
compromisingsome of the special strengths of the many

smallerorchestras that had been dispersed so densely
throughoutthe nation.
Leader Initiatives
We measured three aspects of music directorbehavior:
direction-setting,takingorganizationalinitiatives,and
coaching (see the Appendixfor the specific behaviors
assessed). The significanttime-by-standinginteractionfound
for music directororganizationalinitiativesexhibits a pattern
complementaryto that of the other significantinteractions
shown in Figure1. In 1990, the music directorsof regional
orchestraswere takingmore initiativesto improvethe
structureand functioningof their orchestras than were their
counterpartsin majororchestras. A year later, however,
those differences had disappeared.Conductorsof regional
orchestraswere giving less attentionto organizational
matters than they had before, and those of majororchestras
were makingmore organizationalchanges than previously,a
patternconsistent both with the widening gap between
majorand regionalorchestras on other measures and with
our on-site observations.
To furtheranalyze how leader behaviormoderated the
impactof reunification,we calculatedthe difference in the
level of organizationalinitiativestaken by music directors
between 1990 and 1991, using data from playerswho
described their leaders both years, and then correlatedthat
difference with our dependent measures. Results are shown
in Table 6.
Table 6
Correlations between Change in Music Director Organizational Initiatives and Orchestra- and
Player-level Measures*
Measure Player-level data (N = 65) Orchestra-level data (N = 20)

Integrity as an ensemble .24- .11
Orchestra structure: Task and composition .20 .12
Player involvement and opportunities .29-- .66---
Adequacy of resources -.04 - .16
Single items:
Recognition (Excellent playing pays off) .20 .34
Recruitment (Fair and effective) .26- .30
Sections (Are a key organizational feature) -.24 -.16
Orchestral processes and outcomes (no significant correlations)

General satisfaction .28-- .23
Internal work motivation .08 .09
Job involvement .08 .11
Satisfaction with:
Compensation .12 .45--
Job security .20 .23
Management .44--- .66---
Work relationships .27- .43-
Growth opportunities .31 .42-
-p < .10; *-p < .05; *-p < .01.

* Player-level correlations were computed using data from the 65 players who completed surveys both in 1990 and
1991; orchestra-levelcorrelationswere computedusingaverageplayerscores for each of the 20 orchestrasforwhich
data were availableboth years.

Increasedorganizationalinitiativesby music directorswere
associated with improvementsin several organizational
features: greater playerinvolvementand opportunities,
improvedrecruitmentprocesses, and greater integrityof the
orchestraas a musical ensemble. Change in conductor
initiativeswas negativelyassociated with the centralityof
sections to the orchestra'swork (ameasure not discussed
elsewhere in this report),suggesting that conductors'
actions focused on consolidationof the orchestraas a
whole. Significanteffects also were obtained for player
satisfactionwith management, with work relationships,and
with growth opportunities.These are precisely the kinds of
affective changes that one would expect to find in an
orchestrain which the music directorhad expanded players'
opportunities,improvedrecruitmentprocesses, and
strengthened the orchestraas an ensemble-as the music
directorsof these orchestras had done.
The measures that did not covarywith music director
organizationalinitiativesalso are informative:orchestra task
and composition,adequacy of resources, work motivation
and involvement,and all four indicatorsof orchestral
processes and performance.The data reportedin Table 6,
althoughcorrelationaland therefore open to alternative
interpretations,do suggest that when conductors responded
to the events of reunificationby focussing their energies on
aspects of the organizationover which they had direct and
immediatecontrol,players subsequently expressed greater
satisfactionabout those same matters-but not about
others.
Change of Leadership
Six of the 21 orchestras in our sample changed music
directorsbetween 1990 and 1991, and seven of them
changed technicaldirectors.How did these orchestras fare
relativeto those whose former leaders remainedin place?
As shown in Table 7, orchestras that changed music
directorsscored significantlylower on three indicatorsof
financialand organizationalwell-being than did orchestras
that did not change conductors; orchestras that changed
technicaldirectorsscored lower on almost all of the
measures havingto do with organizationaldesign.
It is tempting to conclude from these findings that replacing
leaders duringa periodof radicalenvironmentalchange
invites disaster-an interpretationthat would fit well with
the populationecology perspective on organizationalchange
(Hannanand Freeman, 1984). In this case, however, the
opposite conclusion is more tenable. Ourobservationaldata
show that orchestras in which leadershipchanges were
made (often at the initiativeof players,who hoped that new
leaders would make things better)were those that had been
in especially poor shape as organizationspriorto
reunification.Althoughit no doubt is true that leader
behaviormakes more of a difference duringmajor
organizationalreorientationsthan duringperiods of stability
(Tushmanand Romanelli,1985), the improvements East
Germanplayers hoped for, if ever they were to come, were
not yet evident when we collected follow-updata on their
orchestras in 1991.
Symphony Orchestras
Table7
Comparison of Orchestras That Did and Did Not Change Leaders
between 1990 and 1991
Measure Yes No t
Music director replaced
Adequacyof resources 2.86 4.12 -2.29--
Stability(Organizationnot fallingapart) 5.23 6.31 - 2.74---
Satisfactionwith job security 3.58 4.80 - 2.29--
N 6 15
Technical director replaced
Integrityas an ensemble 5.20 5.59 - 1.75-
Adequacyof resources 2.96 4.05 -2.07--
Recognition(Excellentplayingpays off) 5.62 6.16 - 2.62--
Recruitment(Fairand effective) 5.13 5.82 -2.32--
Sections (Area key organizational
feature) 4.47 5.40 -2.15"
Qualityof internalprocesses 4.59 5.08 -2.15--
N 7 14
*p < .10; *-p < .05; seep < .01.
Player Initiatives
To further explore the role of players in shaping the
post-reunification prospects of East German orchestras, we
turned to our observational data to identify eight orchestras
in which players took significant leadership initiatives
between 1990 and 1991. As shown in Table 8, those eight
orchestras were significantly lower on many of our
measures than were the thirteen orchestras in which players
did not take organizational initiatives. This finding adds
credence to the interpretation that players more often take
action in orchestras with serious problems than in those that
are in relatively good shape. And it is organizational
difficulties that are especially likely to incite players:
Orchestras in which players took leadership initiatives scored
significantly lower on six of our seven measures of
organizational features, but on only three of the twelve
measures in other domains.
That the consequences of players taking control of their
orchestras varied from orchestra to orchestra is illustrated by
the following two cases. In a middle-size ensemble near a
large city, players fired their music director just as soon as
the collapsing political system made it possible to do so. As
a replacement, they chose a very young conductor
experienced in the ways of Western orchestras. They gave
him a short-term contract, keeping other candidates on hold,
so they could assess his performance before confirming the
appointment-which, after a year and a half, they did. At this
writing, the new music director is firmly in control and the
orchestra is prospering.
Players in another orchestra, located in a small community
near a resort area, were less successful. With the
cooperation of the town mayor, who wanted a fine orchestra
that would draw tourists and thereby help the local
economy, they fired both the music directorand the
technical director.A famous conductorfrom another country
Table8
Comparison of Orchestras in Which Players Did and Did Not Take LeadershipInitiatives
Player leadership initiatives
Measure Yes (N = 8) No (N = 13) t
features of the orchestra
Organizational
Integrity as an ensemble 5.14 5.59 - 2.15--
Orchestrastructure:Taskand composition 4.55 5.22 -2.55--
Playerinvolvementand opportunities 4.21 4.70 -2.77---
Adequacy of resources 2.95 4.16 -2.30--
Single items:
Recognition(Excellentplayingpays off) 5.77 6.08 - 1.36
Recruitment(Fairand effective) 5.24 5.76 - 1.76-
Sections (Area key organizational
feature) 4.43 5.41 -2.42--
Orchestralprocesses and outcomes

Qualityof internalprocesses 4.49 5.10 -2.51--
Musical outcomes 4.86 4.73 0.36
Single items:
Finances(Gettingstrongerfinancially) 2.99 2.95 0.09
not fallingapart)
Stability(Organization 5.25 6.38 - 2.45--
Respondent motivationand satisfaction

General satisfaction 5.68 6.07 -0.92
Internalwork motivation 6.37 6.37 -0.02
Job involvement 6.15 6.08 0.41
Satisfactionwith:
Compensation 3.46 3.71 - 0.55
Job security 3.67 4.85 -2.30--
Management 4.22 4.78 -1.30
Work relationships 4.88 4.88 0.01
Growth opportunities 4.66 5.02 -0.97
*p < .10; s-p < .05; U*p < .01.
was hiredwho, together with the new technical director,

decided to radicallyreduce the orchestra's size. That
decision was poorlyreceived by players and the
already-shakysituationof the orchestradeterioratedeven
further.Perhapsthe new leaders' decisions will turn out to
promote the long-termbest interest of the community,the
orchestra,and the players.The short-termconsequences,
however, were described by players-whose actions had set
the change process in motion-as decidedly negative.
Conclusion
Ourfindingspoint to a significantdifference in the abilityof
majorand regionalorchestras to adapt to the challenges and
opportunitiesposed by reunification.Majororchestras, which
were alreadyrelativelystrong and well financed, became
even more so, givingthem influence and opportunitiesthat
in other countries are accorded only to a few "star"
orchestras. Regionalorchestras continued to exist, but they
riskedlosing their special prestige as the orchestras of the
people, along with many of the materialresources they
needed to accomplishtheir musicalwork.
Orchestraleadershipalso clearlymoderatedthe impact of
reunificationon East Germanorchestras, in two contrasting
ways. On the one hand, leadershipinitiativesby music
directorsthat addressed organizationalfeatures of orchestras
were associated with favorableplayerreportsabout both
orchestrapropertiesand their own satisfaction.These
Symphony Orchestras
findings,althoughcorrelational,supportthe propositionthat
competent leadershipcan significantlyhelp organizations
adapt to exogenous shocks. On the other hand, leadership
initiativesby players-which often includedreplacement of
existing leaders with others of their own choosing-occurred
mainlyin orchestras that alreadywere troubled-and such
initiativeswere by no means certainto improveeither
orchestrahealth or playerwell-being.
How are these two findingsto be reconciled?We
hypothesize that the degree to which leadershipinitiatives
are helpfulto an organizationin respondingto an
environmentalshock depends on the priorhealth of the
organizationas a social system. When a shock hits an
organizationthat is alreadystrong, members are unlikely
either to replace their leaders or to take significant
leadershipinitiativesthemselves. In this case, competent
leadership(indexed here as increased organizational
initiativesby existing leaders) is likelyto aid adaptationto the
exogenous event (Table6). The situationis reversed,
however, when a shock hits an organizationthat alreadyis
dysfunctional.Members of such organizationsare more
likelyto replace existing leaders and/orto take over the
leadershipof the enterprisethan are members of stronger
organizations(Tables7 and 8). But if the organization's
troubles are serious, members' initiativesare unlikelyto
accomplishthe needed repairsand, perversely, may even
make things worse. This state of affairs,which is akin to
what is seen in the United States when employees convert
an already-failing business into a workercooperative,
characterizesthe experience of several small and struggling
East Germanorchestras duringthe reunificationyears.
Takentogether, our findingsabout the moderatingeffects of
orchestrastandingand organizationalleadershipsuggest that
as the economic context of East Germanorchestras
becomes even more market-oriented,self-fueling
performancespirals(Lindsley,Brass, and Thomas, 1995)
may furtherwiden the existing gap between majorand
regionalorchestras in that country.Only majororchestras,
for example, appearto have materialresources and network
contacts sufficientto engage technical directorsand music
directorsof the qualityneeded to see them throughwhat is
certainto be a highlyturbulenttransitionperiod.As McCann
and Selsky (1984: 465-466) noted, hyperturbulencecan
result in a kindof social triage that separates organizations
that have adequate adaptivecapacityfrom those that do not.
The eventual outcome could be a repartitioningof the
populationof orchestras in the former East Germany,from
the three classes of orchestras created by the socialist
government into two groups: strong orchestras occupying
what McCannand Selsky call "social enclaves" that
preserve their adaptivecapacities and weaker orchestras
caught in downward-spiraling "social vortices" of suboptimal
functioning.
DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSION
Two conceptualdimensions are helpfulin accounting for the
differentialimpact of the 1945 and the 1991
political-economicchanges on East Germanorchestras and
players: (1) the effect of the changes on resource
contingencies (the degree to which the resources available
to organizationsdepend on their actions) and (2) the impact
of the changes on organizations'operationalautonomy (the
amount of latitudeorganizationshave to manage their own
affairs).
The Advent of State Socialism
The first change, to state socialism, simultaneouslyreduced
both resource contingencyand operationalautonomy. Prior
to 1945, orchestras could negotiate with government agents
about resources and, throughtheir actions, potentially
improvetheir standing.This was no longer possible under
socialism. All orchestraswithin each of the three hierarchical
classes received roughlyequivalentfinancial,material,and
human resources. There was nothingan orchestra could do
to improveits situation,nor was there any real riskthat its
situationwould worsen.
Orchestras'operationalautonomyalso decreased sharply
undersocialism. State agencies, ratherthan orchestras, now
controlledmost personnel matters, how financialresources
were to be used, where orchestras were to performand for
whom, and more. The reductionof orchestras' autonomy
providedstabilityand predictability.But it also blurredthe
boundariesamong smallerand poorerorchestras as they
struggledtogether to accomplishtheir centrallyassigned
tasks with fewer resources than were actuallyneeded to do
so, fostering among them the kinds of linkages that can
mitigatethe impactof exogenous changes (Miner,
Amburgey, and Stearns, 1990).
The simultaneous reductionof resource contingency and
operationalautonomy undersocialism significantly
strengthened institutionalforces for East Germanorchestras.
Consistent with the predictionsof DiMaggioand Powell
(1983: 155), they became homogeneous within class as
their transactionswith state agencies became more
extensive and consequentialand as the numberof visible
alternativemodels decreased. Moreover,as both the need
and opportunityfor orchestras to take entrepreneurial
initiativesdeclined, the historicaland culturaltraditionsthat
orchestras shared with each other became increasingly
salient.
The power of these institutionalforces is illustratedby what
happened to the repertoireplayed by East German
orchestras understate socialism. The officialpolicy of the
state concert and theater agency was that orchestras would
emphasize in their programsmusic by contemporary
composers from socialist countries. Althoughmost people
we interviewedassured us that this policy had been
implemented,the data say otherwise. We selected one
concert programfrom each orchestra in our sample
(excludingspecial or festival programsand concerts led by
guest conductors)and recordedthe birthdatesof the
composers whose works were played. Only 8 percent of the
works performedby East Germanorchestras were by
composers born in the twentieth century, compared with 20
percentfor West Germany,24 percentfor the UnitedKingdom,
and 32 percent for the UnitedStates. Also informativeare
Symphony Orchestras
the median birthdatesof the composers of the works

performed.For East Germany,the median composer
birthdatewas 1809, comparedwith 1857 for West Germany,
1862 for the United States, and 1864 for the United
Kingdom.
Farfrom being on the cutting edge of contemporarymusic,
then, East Germanorchestras appearto have exhibited in
their music an especially deep commitment to the classical
repertoirethat was centralto their musical heritage.This
findingexemplifies Carroll,Delacroix,and Goodstein's (1988)
propositionthat politicallyimposed culturalsystems often
generate behavioropposite to that which is sought. Cultural
isomorphismstill operates in such circumstances, but "in
the sense that the state cultureserves as a negative
template for the observable organizationalculture"(p. 373).
The Fall of the Socialist Regime
The second majorpolitical-economicchange broughta nearly
complete reversalof the state of affairsjust described. The
availabilityof resources became increasinglycontingent on
orchestras'actions, and as centralgovernment agencies
stopped functioning,orchestras experienced a sudden and
dramaticincrease in their operationalautonomy. Once again,
orchestras had the rightand the obligationto handle such
matters as personnel decisions, budgets, concert venues,
and audience relations.
Althoughthese changes generated uncertaintyand threat for
East Germanorchestras, they also invitedadaptive
responses. Success was by no means assured, however,
because both a proactiveorientationand management skill
were required,and these were qualitiesthat had atrophied
for many orchestras duringtheir four decades under state
socialism. Ourfindingsshow that majororchestras were far
better positionedthan regionalorchestras to take advantage
of the situationin 1991. Both the staffing of major
orchestras and their recent histories contributedto their
abilityto respond competently to the threats and the
opportunitiesthat accompanied reunification.The structure
of these orchestras more closely approximatedthe
internationalstandard,and their managers generallywere
better qualifiedand more knowledgeablethan those of
regionalorchestras. Moreover,the top orchestras in East
Germanyhad toured internationally and produced
commercialrecordings,activitiesthat increased their
knowledge of the orchestralworld outside their own
country.When the time came to take action, therefore,
these orchestraswere more disposed to act, and they had a
greater capabilityto do so competently.
The Acuity of Conceptual Lenses
Ourfindingssuggest that differentconceptual paradigmsare
differentiallyuseful for examiningorganization-environment
relations,depending on the natureof the environmental
changes that are occurring(Tolbert,1985: 11-12; Singh,
House, and Tucker,1986; Hambrickand Finkelstein,1987;
Gersick,1991: 12; Meyer, Goes, and Brooks, 1993). On one
hand, when environmentalchanges decrease both the
degree to which resources are contingent on organizational
actions and organizations'level of operationalautonomy, as
happenedto East Germanorchestras after the socialist
regime took power, then organizationshave neither the need
nor the capabilityto take action to improvetheir situations.
Underthese conditions,institutionalmodels are particularly
useful in trackingwhat happens within and among
organizations.Consistent with the tenets of institutional
theory, we saw in our data both increased homogeneity and
reinforcementof orchestralheritageand traditionsamong
East Germanorchestras undersocialist rule.
When, on the other hand, environmentalchanges increase

both resource contingencies and operationalautonomy, then
adaptationmodels provideespecially useful analyticlenses.
In our data, such models apply in the periodafter the fall of
state socialism, when there was both need for action
(because resources became increasinglycontingent on what
orchestras did and did not do) and the opportunityto take it
(because externalagencies no longer dictated to orchestras
or constrainedtheir choices).
Some orchestras responded to the threat posed by

reunificationwith inactionor even retrenchment;others
exhibitedproactiveand innovativeresponses. Ourdata show
that the more proactivestrategy, when done with
competence, sharplydifferentiatedthose orchestras that
prosperedin the new context from those whose survival
began to come into question. It is noteworthythat the
actions taken by the most successful orchestras were
oriented simultaneouslyinternally,toward increased
efficiency and better alignmentwith the new contextual
realities,as would be predictedby rationaladaptation
models, and externally,in securing fundingand new
performancevenues, as would be predictedby the resource
dependency paradigm.
The two historicalperiods represented by our data fill the

diagonalcells of a 2 x 2 matrixdefined by resource
contingencyand operationalautonomy, as depicted in Figure
2. East Germanorchestras were low on both dimensions
duringstate socialism and became high on both as the
reunificationprocess began to unfold.We can speculate, as
well, on the two off-diagonalcells, even though our data do
not provideinformationon them. Consider,first, a situation
in which environmentalchanges result in high resource
contingency but low operationalautonomy. In such
circumstances, organizationsare at riskbecause of high
resource contingency, but there is littlethat leaders and
members can do about it because of low operational
autonomy. Ecologicalmodels, which are pessimistic about
the efficacy of actions by organizationalrepresentatives,are
especially useful in analyzingwhat happens in this cell of the
matrix.
Finally,when changes result in low resource contingency but

high operationalautonomy, conceptual paradigmsthat
address organization-environment relationsmay be mostly
irrelevantto organizationalanalysis. Organizationalleaders
Symphony Orchestras
Figure 2. The applicability of organization-environment models for

analyzing different types of environmental changes.
CHANGEIN RESOURCECONTINGENCY
Decrease Increase
InstitutionalModels Ecological Models

Decrease
[Advent of Socialism
in East Germany]
CHANGEIN
OPERATIONAL
AUTONOMY
Models of Organization- Adaptation Models
EnvironmentRelations
Increase Mostly Irrelevant;
AttributionalModels [The Fall of the
More Germane Socialist Regime]
and members can do pretty much whatever they wish, and

neither positive nor negative consequences will returnfrom
their environments.If resources become increasingly
munificent,the organizationmay performquite well; if they
become increasinglyscarce, it may do poorly.
Models of attributionalprocesses may be more germane to

such situationsthan theories of organization-environment
relations.In both of the cases just described, for example,
members may erroneouslyattributethe outcomes they
obtainto the actions they have taken (March,1981; Singh,
House, and Tucker,1986). Such attributionalerrorscan be
dangerous. An organizationthat is inefficientand
overstaffed, for example, may remainthat way (or even
grow largerand more cumbersome) if decision makers
erroneouslyconclude that it is their actions that have
generated the positive outcomes that are returningfrom the
munificentbut noncontingentenvironment.Similarly,leaders
of an organizationthat is doing poorlyin a noncontingentbut
resource-poorenvironmentmay initiateorganizational
changes that accomplish nothingother than to create
additionalthreatand uncertaintywithin the enterprise.
The entries in the matrixin Figure2 summarizeour overall

findingsabout the times and circumstances underwhich
institutionaldynamics, ecological processes, and
organizationaladaptationdominate responses to significant
societal-levelchange. Takenas a whole, the findings fit well
with the punctuatedequilibriumview of system change
processes (Millerand Friesen, 1984: chap. 8; Astley, 1985;
Tushmanand Romanelli,1985; Gersick,1991). These
theorists follow the lead of contemporaryevolutionary
biology in viewing organizationsas generallybeing in a state
of quasi-stationaryequilibriumthat occasionallyis punctuated
by periods of rapid,fundamental,and multidimensional
change (Gould,1980: chap. 17; 1989). Onlywhen the deep
structuresof a system become dismantled,it is argued, is
fundamentalchange likelyto occur (Gersick,1991).
The political-economicchanges that accompanied the advent
of socialism in East Germanyin 1945 were, without
question, highlysignificantfor people and for institutions
throughoutthe country.But they did not call into question
the centuries-oldinstitutionalfoundationof German
symphony orchestras. Ourfindings suggest the opposite:
The simultaneous reductionof both resource contingency
and operationalautonomy broughtby socialism actually
strengthened institutionalforces. When the socialist regime
fell in 1990, however, deep structureswere called into
question. The institutionalstructuresand systems to which
orchestraleaders and members had become well
accustomed over the previousfour decades no longer
operated predictablyor, in some cases, no longer operated
at all. Possibilitiesfor significantorganizationalchange
opened even as orchestra leaders and members throughout
the countrystruggled to make sense of and to begin to
respond to the radicalnew environmentin which they
suddenly found themselves.
No single model of organization-environment change can
adequatelyexplainthe experiences of East German
orchestras duringthe two periods of political-economic
upheavalthey encountered duringthe last half of this
century.The circumstances underwhich constructive
organizationaladaptationis even possible are very different
from those that conditionthe success of adaptiveactivities.
Ourfindingssuggest that the possibilityof constructive
adaptationdepends directlyon the degree to which
environmentalchanges strengthen resource contingencies
and expand organizations'operationalautonomy. Even then,
only those organizationsthat are alreadyrelativelystrong and
able to bringcompetent leadershipto bear on their new
problemsand opportunitieshave a realisticpossibilityof
adaptingsuccessfully to the exogenous changes.
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APPENDIX: Measures Derived from the Player Survey
I. Organizational Features of the Orchestra
Integrity as an ensemble. The degree to which the orchestra operates as

an intact, relatively stable ensemble, with clear and well-accepted norms of
behavior. (8 items)
Orchestra structure: Task and composition. The degree to which the

work of the orchestra is well-designed (i.e., the orchestra's tasks are
challenging and feedback-rich) and the orchestra itself is well-composed
(i.e., players have a sufficient level and mix of talent and experience for their
collective work). (5 items)

Symphony Orchestras
Player involvement and opportunities. The degree to which players have

information and influence in the orchestra, share in its leadership, and have
opportunities to improve their position within it. (8 items)
Adequacy of resources. The adequacy of the orchestra's facilities and
material resources. (2 items)
Single items retained:
Recognition: "Excellent playing pays off in this orchestra."
Recruitment: "The orchestra's recruitment and audition process is fair and
effective."
II. Orchestral Process and Performance
Quality of internal processes. The quality of the working relationships
among orchestra members. (7 items)
Musical outcomes. The degree to which the orchestra is improving (vs.
slipping) musically. (3 items)
Single items retained:
Finances: "Our orchestra is getting stronger and stronger financially."
Stability: "As an organization, our orchestra shows signs of falling apart."
(reverse-scored)
IlI. Player Motivation and Satisfaction
General satisfaction. The respondent's overall satisfaction with his or her
job and work. (3 items)
Internal work motivation. The degree to which the respondent is
self-motivated to perform well (i.e., feeling good when having performed
well and feeling bad when having performed poorly). (3 items)
Job involvement. A single item: " I live, eat, and breathe my job."
Satisfaction with specific aspects of the work environment:
Compensation (2 items)
Job Security (2 items)
Management (3 items)
Work Relationships (3 items)
Growth Opportunities (4 items)
IV. Behavior of the Music Director
Direction-setting. The degree to which the music director sets a clear and
engaging artistic direction for the orchestra. (5 items)
Organizational Initiatives. The degree to which the music director takes
organizational initiatives (both internally, such as by working with
management to improve the organizational structure or the recruitment
process, and externally, such as by building community support or
negotiating recording contracts). (7 items)
Coaching. The degree to which the music director makes himself or herself
available to orchestra members and actively coaches individual players and
sections. (5 items)

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Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East

German Symphony Orchestras

The Harvard community has made this article openly available.

Citation Allmendinger, Jutta, and J. Richard Hackman. 1996.

Published Version doi:10.2307/2393935

Accessed June 19, 2015 2:11:03 PM EDT

Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3168791

(Article begins on next page)

environmentalchange by first disaggregatingthe problem

countries in our sample. Duringthe periodaddressed in our

East Germany West Germany United States United Kingdom

Characteristic Major Regional Major Regional Major Regional Major Regional

Number of orchestras in sample 9 13 12 8 13 11 7 5

Mean orchestra size 133 67 121 71 101 79 93 76

Player demographics (means)

country. We then visited each of the 78 orchestras in the

Orchestralprocess and performance

Behaviorof the music director

The measures, grouped by domain,are described in the

land (Mehner,1990). Before the socialist regime came to

orchestraswithin the lower classes, and a sharp reductionin

The contextualchanges were realjolts. They were neither

Orchestralprocess and performance

together, with the United States and United Kingdomor (b)

The substantive differences between East German

East West United United

Orchestral process and performance

Player motivation and satisfaction

concerned that their orchestraswere slippingmusicallyand

Comparison of East German Players' Responses in 1990 and 1991*

Main effects Time by

Organizational features of the orchestra

Orchestral process and performance

Player motivation and satisfaction

p < .05; *-p < .01.

The homogeneity that was observed duringthe socialist

Figure 1. Significant time by standing (major vs. regional) interactions:

5.. -.- Regional 5M

61 Recognition Major 6 Recruitment

4.5 Music DirectorOrganizationalInitiatives

3.5 Regional.-, '_ ___

356/ASQ, September 1996

compromisingsome of the special strengths of the many

Measure Player-level data (N = 65) Orchestra-level data (N = 20)

Organizational features of the orchestra

Orchestral processes and outcomes (no significant correlations)

Player motivation and satisfaction

-p < .10; *-p < .05; *-p < .01.

357/ASQ, September 1996

Orchestralprocesses and outcomes

Respondent motivationand satisfaction

*p < .10; s-p < .05; U*p < .01.

was hiredwho, together with the new technical director,

the median birthdatesof the composers of the works

When, on the other hand, environmentalchanges increase

Some orchestras responded to the threat posed by

The two historicalperiods represented by our data fill the

Finally,when changes result in low resource contingency but

Figure 2. The applicability of organization-environment models for

InstitutionalModels Ecological Models

and members can do pretty much whatever they wish, and

Models of attributionalprocesses may be more germane to

The entries in the matrixin Figure2 summarizeour overall

366/ASQ, September 1996

-p < .10; -p < .05; -p < .01.

p < .10; s-p < .05; Up < .01.