G.R. No.

137268 March 26, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA
SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga, ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO
NUÑEZ @ Rey Nuñez, accused-appellants.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding accused-
appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @
Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuñez @ Rey Nuñez guilty of
murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.

The information2 against accused-appellants alleged:

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries
caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.

The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January
27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing takyan in front of the
house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly they heard a child shout,
"Tabang ma!" ("Help mother!"). The cry came from the direction of the house of accused-appellant
Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala. The two children ran towards
Mother Perpetuala's house.3 What Honey Fe saw on which she testified in court, is summarized in the
decision of the trial court, to wit:

While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy Luntayao, . . . being
immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the waist of the body
while accused Reynario Nuñez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boy's head into the water. She heard the boy shouting
"Ma, help" for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or Rey Nuñez tie the boy on the bench with a
green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic container
(galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused Alexander
Sibonga banged the boy's head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down. She even heard the
banging sound everytime the boy's head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it. According to this
witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie alias Isabel
Fabie took turns in pounding the boy's chest with their clenched fists. All the time Rey Nuñez held down
the boy's feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped her weight, buttocks first, on
the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a knife from the
kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left side of the boy's body and with
the use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen [caught] the
blood dripping from the left side of the boy's body. Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from the tortured
boy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuñez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie,
and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.4

Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy, was 13
years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a "nervous breakdown" which
Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy with him to the farm.
According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the
suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuñez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children
(Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuñez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at
around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuñez's house in Tangke, Talisay.

The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo,5 where all of the
accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his son's condition.
He was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit," which accused-appellant Carmen said she could
exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct the healing
prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his wife and two
daughters were locked inside a room in the house.6

After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout "Ma, tabang!" ("Mother, help!"). Eddie tried to go out of the
room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an hour, the
Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of the house.7

A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer
room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy's face was bluish and
contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already
dead. He wanted to see his son's body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia
Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 o'clock that
evening.8

After 7 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the funeral
parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be transferred
to the house of accused-appellant Nuñez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-
appellant Nuñez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28,
1997, accused-appellant Nuñez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report
Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his son's
burial. Nuñez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.9

At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke,
Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring their
son's body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant
Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same
afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.10

After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the
Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder against accused-
appellant Nuñez and the other members of his group.11 He also asked for the exhumation and autopsy of
the remains of his son.12 As the incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office
in Cebu City.

Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He testified that
he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy Luntayao.13
Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitting that she and the other
accused-appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on January 27, 1997, accused-
appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in the kitchen of
Carmen's house, which, with Carmen's permission, he took with him to the NBI office for examination.
Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the examination.14

Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy Luntayao,
testified that he, the victim's father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victim's body on February 20, 1997
at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the autopsy on the same day and
later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):15
FINDINGS

Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed blanket
(white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet deep.

Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.

Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.

Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial fossae right to left down
to the occipital bone, left side.

Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.

Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.

Cranial vault almost empty.

CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head injury
and/or traumatic chest injury.

Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victim's chest was caused by contact with a hard blunt
instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of the skull
followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been caused by the forcible
contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench.16

On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victim's body but
explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and examined, it was
already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present, unrecognizable.17

Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged eyewitness to
the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing, alleged former "patients" of
accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d)
Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.

Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant Carmen, whom
she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997,
while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the latter
regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to
"treatment." After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to
decide not to continue with the "treatment," but the boy's parents allegedly prevailed upon her to continue.
As the boy continued to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and
Celedonia Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie
Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of
a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Fabie prayed
over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Carmen asked Nuñez to place his
hands under the boy's head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down his head.
To stop the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boy's legs, while accused-appellant
Nuñez held his shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house.
Accused-appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase said
she no longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry.18

Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the "pray-over" of their son from beginning to
end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim on his chest with their
fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She claimed that Randy was still
alive when he was taken inside the house.19
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39, who
testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying over them and
without applying any form of physical violence on them.20

Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to testify
on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of pneumonia.
According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the issuance of a death
certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough and fever.21

On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she merely relied
on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa, who
examined the victim's body.22

The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to identify the
resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)23 on the re-investigation of the case in which he recommended the
dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensed with, however, as the
prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the qualification that Solima's
recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.24

The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and Dr.
Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He reiterated his
earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two daughters were locked
inside a room. He disputed Blase's statement that his son was still alive when he was brought into the
prayer room. He said he saw that his son's head slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.25

As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-appellant
Nuñez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that his son was
suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown. He took exception to
Dr. Carloto's statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it was Nuñez who insisted that
he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate.26

On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are, however,
credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing that they will
abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.27

In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:

Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it is
presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar had contributed
different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the head of the victim
into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all the consequences even if
the result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v.
Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the
accused in that case was convicted of murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there
is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted.
Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed upside down
the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench; pounded his chest
with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these acts would surely
cause death to the victim. . . .

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony
with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person
committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by
him. . . .

....

Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise
from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. In the case at bar, there
is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm to the victim
(an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence,
they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result
had not been intended.28

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of murder.29

First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual performed
over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the victim's parents,
accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the boy to a
"treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body. Unfortunately, the strange procedure
resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their
liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not
bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of
murder.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as
homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is
the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.

The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which, because of
their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latter's death. As
already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group,
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.

In United States v. Divino,30 the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the
victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the
victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the
accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted that the accused had no
intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment.

In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,31 the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a non-
medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the necessary
technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was homicide through reckless
imprudence.

The trial court's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful
act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary.32 The facts of
the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the accused-appellants. Indeed, the trial
court's findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are ignored and the Court limits itself
to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized "treatment" of the victim. Obviously,
such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed.

Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery or
the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the accused
from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.33 Viewed in this light, the acts which the
trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrain
Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.

On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants' contention that the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of Honey Fe's credibility.
Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached or contrived. She was only a
few meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their "pray-over" healing session
not to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her
testimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fe's
testimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victim's skull. With regard to Dr.
Mendez's failure to find any stab wound in the victim's body, he himself had explained that such could be
due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state of
decomposition. Randy Luntayao's cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering the
length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very likely
that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determine
whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract the
credibility of Honey Fe's testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.

Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances Claire
Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecution's evidence. We
do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable.34

Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge Renato C.
Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the case after the
prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.35 However, the fact that the judge who wrote the
decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less competent to render a
decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses.36

Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they can.

Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

In Samson v. Court of Appeals,37 the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the accused
liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals court
erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged him with
having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi
offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with
willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in
effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act
with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of
the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which
charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by
the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the
result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would
be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal
intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

In People v. Fernando,38 the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court. On
appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.

Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this
case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellants
should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.

As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.39 In addition, they should pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants' gross negligence in
attempting to "cure" the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an example or correction
for the public good.40

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad
Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her
van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while
the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1
against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed
as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita
Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless,
careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without
taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla
bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to
P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the
"quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and
sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y
Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without
subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs.
D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but
imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses
(P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing
Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file
her brief. 6

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE
THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE
ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH
ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND
EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF
WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9

xxx xxx xxx

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR

LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN
THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE
BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO
BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO
MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO
PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A
CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the
ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the
ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that
there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex
crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of
six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage
to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case
because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to
property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum
period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as
imposed by the lower courts."

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months.
Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the
vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes
in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91,
Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the information charging
him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do
not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light
felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.
13

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor,
pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14
which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex"
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to
penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two
separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction
to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of
this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was
a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15

The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period
here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant
to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in
joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano
v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless
imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations
were filed — one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for
damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that
Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to
property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v.
Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it
would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi
offenses in question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30
days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed
under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article
365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public
censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph
of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this
case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act
committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave
felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have
been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than
that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower
than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the
penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a
maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that
in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without
regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is
deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying
the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in
Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony —
not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised
Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses
may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies
of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not
constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject
to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint
for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to property
[Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage,
the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit:
(1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she
pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for
each of them. 29

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
as to actions pending before its enactment. 30

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,
or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof."

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and
the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had
jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of
the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the
latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer
from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within
the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure,
which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4
months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of
Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the
running of the prescriptive period.

Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any
reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary
examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals
34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office
suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and
Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a
violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not
constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of
the information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and
the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular
mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's
defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed
therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.