Arraignment and Plea

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 134288-89. January 15, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose B. Tiongco for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
The penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 43568 and the penalty of death in Criminal Case
No. 43571 were imposed upon accused-appellant after the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found him guilty
of two counts of rape for sexually molesting, through force and intimidation, his 15-year old daughter
Melita Estomaca, sometime in the month of December 1993 and on March 6, 1994. In rendering
judgment against accused-appellant, the trial court found more credible the victim's testimony over
accused-appellant's denial. cIDHSC
Hence, this automatic review. Among others, appellant assailed the credibility of the testimony of the
victim.
The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's decision convicting appellant of the
crimes charged. In a prosecution for rape, the testimony of the offended woman standing alone can be
the basis of conviction if such testimony meets the test of credibility. The Court had carefully read the
testimony of the victim and found the same to be truthful and credible. Melita's candid and
straightforward narration of how she was abused and the tears that accompanied her story were
earmarks of credibility and must be given full faith and credit. Hence, appellant's sheer denial cannot
overthrow the unequivocal and positive testimony of the victim. The Court also did not sustain
appellant's argument that it was impossible for him to commit the rape in the presence of his son who
was sleeping beside him. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. The Court had
time and again held that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks along
the roadside, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the same room where
other members of the family are also sleeping and even in places which to many would appear unlikely
and high risk venues for its commission. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
but modified the award of damages.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; ELEMENTS OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, NEED NOT BE PROVEN
WHERE ACCUSED EXERCISES MORAL ASCENDANCY AND INFLUENCE OVER VICTIM. Melita's failure to
shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of the
accused-appellant. We have, time and again, ruled that in rape committed by the father against the
daughter, violence or intimidation need not be proven because of the former's moral ascendancy and
influence over the latter. Being the father, accused-appellant exercises moral and physical ascendancy
over Melita which could be sufficient to cow her into submission to his bestial desire. Moreover,
evidence shows that Melita resisted the efforts of accused-appellant. In fact, in the March 1994 incident,
Melita kicked accused-appellant. Her resistance, however, proved futile. On the other hand, Nicolas'
failure to hear any commotion during the sexual assaults may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
the rapes, it is possible that Nicolas was in deep slumber and not awakened by the resistance offered by
the latter against her father.
2. ID.; ID.; NEED NOT BE COMMITTED ONLY IN SECLUSION; LUST IS NO RESPECTER OF TIME AND
PLACE. Similarly, we cannot sustain accused-appellant's argument that it was impossible for him to
commit the rape in the presence of his son who was sleeping beside him. There is no rule that rape can
be committed only in seclusion. We have time and again held that rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks along the roadside, in school premises, in a house where there are
other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping and even in
places which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Lust is no respecter
of time and place.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; LONE TESTIMONY OF VICTIM IS

SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT, IF CREDIBLE. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility
becomes the single most important issue and when the testimony meets the test of credibility, an
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Thus, the testimony of the offended woman
standing alone can be the basis of conviction if such testimony meets the test of credibility. We have
carefully read the testimony of Melita and finds the same to be truthful and credible.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RAPE VICTIM'S STRAIGHT FORWARD NARRATION OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE TEARS
THAT ACCOMPANIED HER STORY ARE EARMARKS OF CREDIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. Melita's candid and
straightforward narration of how she was abused and the tears that accompanied her story, are
earmarks of credibility and must be given full faith and credit. In addition, no ill motive can be imputed
against her to concoct a story of defloration were she not motivated by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. Certainly, no barrio lass, still in her teens, innocent and naive to the ways of
the world, would fabricate a story of bestiality against her own father that could sully her reputation and
expose herself, as well as her family to all sorts of public aspersions were she not motivated to seek
justice for a wrong committed against her.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY IN REPORTING SEXUAL VIOLATIONS, UNDERSTANDABLE AND DOES NOT
AFFECT VICTIM'S CREDIBILITY. Melita's failure to immediately report the incident to her mother or to
the police authorities do not negate the crime of rape. We have ruled, in a plethora of cases, that failure
of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of fabricated charge. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's
threat on their lives, more so when the rapist is living with her. Melita's delay in reporting the sexual
violations is thus understandable and does not affect her credibility.
6. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; IF UNSUBSTANTIATED, CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER EVIDENTIARY VALUE THAN
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT. Accused-appellant's sheer denial cannot overthrow the unequivocal
and positive testimony of Melita. Mere denial, just like alibi, constitute a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. Without being substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, his defense
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
complainant, whom the court finds to be a credible witness.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; BIRTH CERTIFICATE, PRESUMED TO BE REGULARLY ISSUED. Accused-

appellant, in an attempt to evade the death penalty, assails Melita's age claiming that her birth date was
altered from 1972 to 1978 to make it appear that at the time of the alleged rape, Melita was a minor. He
also insinuates that Melita is not his daughter claiming that at the time he married Melita's mother, the
latter was already two months pregnant. He denies having carnal knowledge of Melita's mother before
the marriage. The contention has no leg to stand on. The Certificate of Live Birth shows that Melita was
born on July 21, 1978 and that she is the daughter of accused-appellant and Nenita Ruelo. At the time of
rape, Melita was 14 years old. The defense failed to present contrary evidence to dispute Melita's age. It
presented Melita's mother, Nenita, but the latter did not refute the former's age much less her paternity.
It requires more than a party's bare allegation to defeat the face value of the Birth Certificate which
enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance. IAEcCa
8. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; CIVIL INDEMNITY; AWARD THEREOF INCREASED TO P75,000.00 WHERE
DEATH PENALTY IS IMPOSED; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD OF P50,000.00 CONFORMS WITH CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE. [T]his court finds no reversible error in the trial court's decision finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sustains the imposition of the
penalties with a modification that the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 025(97) be increased
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, in view of the attendant qualifying circumstances for which the death
penalty is authorized under RA No. 7659. In addition, we deem it proper to award moral damages for the
shame, as well as mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation Melita has suffered, which, conformably with current jurisprudence, should be placed in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each count.
9. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AWARDED TO DETER OTHER FATHERS FROM SEXUALLY ABUSING
THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS. An award of exemplary damages is also proper to deter other fathers with
similar perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters, in
the amount of P25,000.00 for each count.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Accused-appellant, Melchor Estomaca y Garque, was charged by his daughter, Melita Estomaca, of five
counts of rape, committed on different occasions, before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 38, and
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568, 43569, 43570 and 43571.
During the arraignment on June 15, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases
Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43569 and 43570.
Trial ensued with respect to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571. The criminal complaint subject of
Criminal Case No. 43568 reads:
"That sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage
of his superior strength, abuse of confidence and trust, he, being the father of the undersigned, with
deliberate intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with (sic) the undersigned who, at that time, is 15 years of age.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 1
while Criminal Case No. 43571 reads:
"That on or about March 6, 1994, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of the
undersigned complainant, with deliberate intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse of the undersigned, who, at
that time, is 15 years of age.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
On July 15, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. 43568 and death in Criminal Case No. 43571. He was also ordered to indemnify the private
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 in each case. 3
The cases were brought to this Court for automatic review and docketed as G.R. No. 117485-86. On April
22, 1996, judgment was rendered setting aside accused-appellant's conviction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 convicting
accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are
REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that the same be
given appropriate priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
circumspection.
"SO ORDERED." 4
On August 30, 1996, the records of the case were returned to the trial court. 5 However, with the
inhibition of Judge David A. Alfeche, Jr., Presiding Judge of the trial court, Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and
43571 were referred to Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo and re-docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 024(97) and 025(97), respectively.
Accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned anew on November 26, 1997, where he entered a
plea of not guilty to both criminal complaints. Thereafter, the two cases were tried jointly.
The prosecution's evidence revealed that Melita Estomaca, was born on July 21, 1972 6 to accused-
appellant and Nenita Ruelo. Sometime in December of 1993, at about 11:00 in the evening, Melita was
in their house at Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo, sleeping on the floor with her brother Nicolas and
accused-appellant. Suddenly, she felt somebody touching her breast and forehead. When she woke up,
she saw accused-appellant who told her to go back to sleep. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed her
shorts and panty, laid on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina. Melita struggled but accused-
appellant boxed her on the stomach which rendered her unconscious. She did not report the incident to
her mother because accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother and brother. AHcaDC
The incident was repeated on March 6, 1994. Melita was about to sleep when accused-appellant started
fondling her breast. She pleaded with her father to stop but the latter continued. She kicked him but
accused-appellant punched her on the stomach which rendered her unconscious. Thereafter, accused-
appellant succeeded in satisfying his lust. 7
Unable to take the abuses of her father, Melita finally narrated the incidents to her mother, Nenita who
confronted accused-appellant but the latter maltreated her. Melita left their house and stayed at her
grandmother's house in Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. Accused-appellant followed her and asked her to go
home, but Melita refused. It was at this instance when Melita narrated to her grandmother her ordeal.
Criminal complaints were filed against accused-appellant. 8
Melita was brought to Dr. Shiela D. Gumabong, Rural Health Physician of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras, for
medical examination which revealed the following findings: cSTDIC
"EXTERNAL EXAMINATIONS:
"Breast, fully developed, hemispherical in shape, slightly soft in consistency, areola brownish in color
with nipples prominent and protruding.
"No evidence of contusion, hematoma or abrasion in external body surfaces.
"INTERNAL EXAMINATIONS:
"Pubic hair grown and slightly abundant; labia majora and minor are coaptated.
"Hymenal opening shows an old laceration with scar formation at 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock position
on the face of the watch. Hymenal orifice admits 2 fingers with moderate resistance. Vaginal rugosities
are present and prominent. Vaginal canal is moderately tight.
"Speculum examination: Cervix closed, well formed, pinkish in color. Uterus not enlarged.
"CONCLUSION: 1. No extra-genital injuries noted
2. Physical Virginity Lost." 9
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the charges levelled against him, testifying thus:
"ATTY. TIONGCO:
"Q You are accused by Melita Estomaca on raping her five (5) times on five (5) separate occasions,
are those accusations true?
"A No, Sir.
"Q Melita Estomaca while in the witness stand testified before this Honorable Court that you boxed
her in the stomach in order to rape her, is that true?
"A No, Sir.
"ATTY. TIONGCO:
That would be all, Your Honor, with the witness." 10
His testimony was corroborated by his wife Nenita and son Nicolas, who both testified that they were
never informed by Melita of the rapes and had learned of the incident only through the radio news
broadcast. 11 Nicolas likewise vowed that it was impossible for accused-appellant to rape Melita
because he was sleeping between the two. 12
On April 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MELCHOR ESTOMACA Y GARQUE guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape and hereby sentences him as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 024(97) penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentence him to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the offended party, Melita
Estomaca, the sum of P50,000.00
"2. In Criminal Case No. 025(47) penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as Amended
by Paragraph 7, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes and sentence him to suffer the penalty of DEATH to indemnify the
offended party, Melita Estomaca, the sum of P50,000.00.
"Costs against the accused in both cases.
"SO ORDERED." 13
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court gave weight to Melita's testimony and rejected accused-
appellant's denial, ratiocinating, thus:
"Accused did not care to explain his whereabouts in the hours and dates mentioned in the two criminal
complaints. He did not bother to advance any serious, credible or well-founded motive or reason why his
own daughter charged him of the heinous crime of RAPE. Yes, the records of the proceedings are bereft
of any evil motive why Melita Estomaca should charge his father of rape. There was no effort on the part
of the accused to impute ill or evil motive on the complainant. The record is bare of any evidence to
show any improper motive on the part of the victim to charge her own father of such a very serious
crime that is punishable by death. The legal conclusion therefore, is that the testimonies of the victim,
Melita Estomaca is worthy of full faith and credit." 14
Accused-appellant now comes to this court assailing the above decision, arguing that the trial court
erred in convicting him and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and death. He
contends that the testimonies of Nenita and Nicolas negate the claim of Melita that force or intimidation
was used for him to have carnal access to her.
Such contention deserves no merit.
Melita's failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the
criminal acts of the accused-appellant. 15 We have, time and again, ruled that in rape committed by the
father against the daughter, violence or intimidation need not be proven because of the former's moral
ascendancy and influence over the latter. 16 Being the father, accused-appellant exercises moral and
physical ascendancy over Melita which could be sufficient to cow her into submission to his bestial
desire. 17 Moreover, evidence shows that Melita resisted the efforts of accused-appellant. In fact, in the
March 1994 incident, Melita kicked accused-appellant. Her resistance, however, proved futile. On the
other hand, Nicolas' failure to hear any commotion during the sexual assaults may be attributed to the
fact that at the time of the rapes, it is possible that Nicolas was in deep slumber and not awakened by
the resistance offered by the latter against her father.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the testimony of Melita is incredible, full of improbabilities and
inconsistent with human experience. He specifically points to the following: (a) it was impossible for
accused-appellant to rape Melita in the presence of his son who was sleeping between them; (b) Melita
continued to sleep with accused-appellant and her brother despite the alleged assault on her honor; (c)
Melita did not report the incident to her mother and brother; and (d) Melita did not make any attempt
to escape.
Again, we find the above contentions unmeritorious.
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue and
when the testimony meets the test of credibility, an accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. 18 Thus, the testimony of the offended woman standing alone can be the basis of conviction if
such testimony meets the test of credibility. 19
We have carefully read the testimony of Melita and finds the same to be truthful and credible. Her
narration of the December 1993 incident is convincing:
"Q Miss Witness, on December, 1993 at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, you said that you were
sexually abused by your father, sometime on December, 1993 at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Could you tell the Court what specific date was that on December that you were sexually abused by your
father? TAEcCS
"A I cannot remember the date but it was before Christmas day.
"Q Could you tell us where were you in the evening, say around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of
December, 1993 while you were sexually abused or raped by your father?
"A Yes, I was at our house at Tiolas.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q Was there any unusual incident that happened at that month of December, 1993 at around
11:00 o'clock in the evening?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What was the incident all about?
"A He raped me.
"Q You are referring to whom?
"COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person sitting on a chair who is an accused in these cases.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q And what happened next while you were sleeping together with your brother in the evening of
December, 1993?
"A While we were sleeping at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, I felt somebody is touching me.
"Q Could you tell which part of your body you feel somebody was touching you?
"A My breast and my forehead.
"Q Did you know who is (sic) that person who is (sic) touching your breast and your forehead?
"A Yes, Sir.
"Q Could you tell us the name of that person?
"A Melchor Estomaca.
"Q And then after that, what happened next?
"A And he told me lie down here and go to sleep.
"Q While you are (sic) lying down but you were not sleeping, what did your father do if he did
anything?
"A He removed my shorts and panty.

"Q Was your father able to remove your short and your panty completely away from your body?
"A Yes, Sir.
"Q By the way Miss Witness, can you tell us what were you wearing at the time you go (sic) to sleep
in the evening of December, 1993?
"A I am (sic) wearing T-shirt and shorts.
"Q Okey, answer the question. What happened next?
"A He lied (sic) on top of me.
"Q When your father was lying on top of you, what happened next?
"A He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
"Q Miss witness please tell us, while your father is (sic) inserting his penis inside your vagina, what
were you doing then?
"A I kept on struggling.
"Q Aside from struggling, did you do anything?
"A I did nothing because he boxed me in my stomach.
"Q And what happened to you when your father boxed you in your stomach?
"A I fell unconscious
"Q Later on did you gain consciousness?
"A Only early in the morning.
"Q And after regaining your consciousness what did you do if you did anything?
"A I stood up and I examined my panty and I saw that there is (sic) a yellowish substance." 20
Similarly, her account of the March 6, 1994 incident is quite revealing:
"Q Please tell the court what was that unusual incident that occurred in the midnight of March 6,
1994?
"A He again raped me.
"Q Could you tell us how did your father rape you on March 6, 1994 at midnight?
"A He again touched my body and forced to pull down my shorts and panty and I struggled and I
told him that I do not like it because it is painful but he told me that it will not last long.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Miss witness what were you doing then you said your father was touching your breast in the
evening of March 6, 1994?
"A We were lying down about to sleep.
"Q And when your father was touching your breast, did you do anything to say preventing him to do
such thing?
"A Yes, Sir.
"Q Can you tell us what did you do?
"A I asked permission from him to drink water but my father did not permit me.
"Q After your father did not permit you to drink water, what did he do next?
"A He told me that we will go to sleep and he continue (sic) on touching me and I keep (sic) on
struggling then I kicked him to which may be he felt the pain and so he boxed me on my stomach.
"Q Now, where did your father boxed (sic) you?
"A Here.
"COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to her stomach.
"Q What happened to you after your father boxed you?
"A I was then unconscious.
"Q Later on you regain consciousness?
"A Only in the morning.
"Q How did you feel after regaining consciousness?
"A I felt pain over my body and my 'hita' (thigh) is slippery." 21
Melita's candid and straightforward narration of how she was abused and the tears that accompanied
her story, are earmarks of credibility and must be given full faith and credit. In addition, no ill motive can
be imputed against her to concoct a story of defloration were she not motivated by the desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished. Certainly, no barrio lass, still in her teens, innocent and naive to
the ways of the world, would fabricate a story of bestiality against her own father that could sully her
reputation and expose herself, as well as her family to all sorts of public aspersions were she not
motivated to seek justice for wrong committed against her. 22
Similarly, we cannot sustain accused-appellant's argument that it was impossible for him to commit the
rape in the presence of his son who was sleeping beside him. There is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion. We have time and again held that rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks along the roadside, in school premises, in a house where there are
other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping and even in
places which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. 23 Lust is no
respecter of time and place. 24
Also, Melita's failure to immediately report the incident to her mother or to the police authorities do not
negate the crime of rape.
We have ruled, in a plethora of cases, that failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not
necessarily an indication of fabricated charge. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some
time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's threat on their lives, more so when the rapist is
living with her. Melita's delay in reporting the sexual violations is thus understandable and does not
affect her credibility. 25
Accused-appellant's sheer denial cannot overthrow the unequivocal and positive testimony of Melita.
Mere denial, just like alibi, constitute a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 26
Without being substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, his defense deserves no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of complainant, whom the court finds
to be a credible witness. 27
Accused-appellant, in an attempt to evade the death penalty, assails Melita's age claiming that her birth
date was altered from 1972 to 1978 to make it appear that at the time of the alleged rape, Melita was a
minor. He also insinuates that Melita is not his daughter claiming that at the time he married Melita's
mother, the latter was already two months pregnant. He denies having carnal knowledge of Melita's
mother before the marriage.
The contention has no leg to stand on.
The Certificate of Live Birth shows that Melita was born on July 21, 1978 and that she is the daughter of
the accused-appellant and Nenita Ruelo. At the time of rape, Melita was 14 years old. The defense failed
to present contrary evidence to dispute Melita's age. It presented Melita's mother, Nenita, but the latter
did not refute the former's age much less her paternity. It requires more than a party's bare allegation to
defeat the face value of the Birth Certificate which enjoys a legal presumption of the regularity of
issuance. 28
In sum, this court finds no reversible error in the trial court's decision finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sustains the imposition of the penalties with a
modification that the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 025(97) be increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, in view of the attendant qualifying circumstances for which the death penalty
is authorized under RA No. 7659. 29
In addition, we deem it proper to award moral damages for the shame, as well as mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation Melita has suffered, which,
conformably with current jurisprudence, should be placed in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count.
30 An award of exemplary damages is also proper to deter other fathers with similar perverse tendencies
or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters, in the amount of P25,000.00 for
each count. 31
Four Justices of the Court maintain their position that R. A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision sentencing accused-appellant MELCHOR
ESTOMACA y GARQUE to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case No. 024(97) and
Death in Criminal Case No. 025(97) with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall be ordered to
indemnify the victim MELITA ESTOMACA in Criminal Case No. 025(97) the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity instead of P50,000.00, and in addition, to pay Melita Estomaca the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of the offense proved. aCSHDI
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let certified copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forwarded
without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 99287. June 23, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEAS; PLEA-BARGAINING CONSTRUED. Plea

bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p.
1237). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE; RULE. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to
change his plea thereafter. Thus. Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides: "Sec. 2. Plea
of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. "A conviction under this plea, shall
be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL
COURT. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc
Resolution).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AFTER PROSECUTION RESTED CASE; RULE; PURPOSE; CASE AT BAR. In the case at
bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had
already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the
Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a Plea only when
the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then
Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law: ". . . (A)fter the
prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in
allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of
homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for
this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is
allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining." The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it
could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment
whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end
that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE THEREOF, DEEMED IMPROPER AND IRREGULAR IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY FINDING ON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ON HAND. A reading of the disputed rulings in this
case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment
under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent
by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be
recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case
and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high
because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and
irregular.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES CONSENT FROM BOTH FISCAL AND OFFENDED PART; REASON THEREFOR.
The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty
to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991).
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when
the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. It is not correct to state that there is no offended
party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in
themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed
by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale,
G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 14S SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts
themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit,
the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this
case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public
interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the
offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended
party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.
7. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY NOT APPLICABLE WHERE
FISCAL DID NOT CONSENT TO THE CHANGE OF PLEA. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here,
the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision
is that found in Section 7, Rule 117. Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted
under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of
consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial
court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the Order of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in
Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for violation of
Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and
one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information
against him reads:
"That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) wrapped with
an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Rollo)
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November
21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally
manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of 'not guilty' to
that of 'guilty' to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said
section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine
ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician,
dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under
Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent
Judge issued an order (annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January
30, 1991, respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give
private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date,
the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991,
respondent Judge issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of
decision to February 25, 1991 to give private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of
the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its
case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally
charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the
court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private
respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex F,
p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a
specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on
February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's motion, to wit:
"It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing of the 'voluntary plea of
guilt' as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under Article 13, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused simply wants to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando
Fernandez of the PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which requires that the same be availed of
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out by
the prosecution, that such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and of
the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that the rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian considerations,
hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at bar.
"Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission to the law and a moral
disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)
"Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on the change of heart of the
accused in mid-stream.
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby
sentenced to a straight prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, to pay a fine
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
"Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let the 0.08 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be
disposed of according to law.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 24-25)
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated decision but the same
was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which states:
"It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules should not be interpreted to
the letter in 'victimless crimes' such as this case, possession of regulated drugs, which is more of a 'social
disease' case so to speak and in the light of (the) provision itself that 'with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal.' Is the fiscal the offended party?
"Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not been very consistent on this
'lesser offense plea' thing. It would perhaps be in consonance with justice that a guideline be laid down
by the said Office, if only to apprise the public, the Court and the accused on when said consent is to be
given by the fiscal as a matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to leave the same undefined is
in the mind of this Court, not conducive to a 'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues: cdrep
"I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE
CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED.
"II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE
LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE
OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN VIEW OF THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF PLEA." (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent
Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
1979, p. 1237). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus.
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it
is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
"A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy."
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc
Resolution).
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and
the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised.
Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such
a Plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA
373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law: cdrep
". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could
rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the
lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record.
The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a
lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,
much less bargaining."
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the
Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has
submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously
study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of
valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least
persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had
already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime
originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change
of plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
involving violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to speak of and that even
the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to
change his plea.
We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the
offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense (see Manuel v.
Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991).
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when
the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former (see People v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion
of then Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as
amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law
because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and
the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 14S
SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families.
As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the
drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the
people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal
who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to
the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (see United States v.
Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to
be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government. LLpr
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and
his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open
to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the
private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot
claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule
117 which states:
"SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
(a) . . .;
(b) . . .;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the
offended party;
xxx xxx xxx."
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was
irregular and improper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13, 1991 respectively in
Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal
case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this case is
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 167179. January 28, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER CEREDON y PAGARAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J p:
Sa mga karumal-dumal na krimen, walang higit na nagpapasiklab ng galit, pagkarimarim at pagkapoot

kaysa sa panghahalay sa sariling laman. Ito ay kasuklam-suklam at nakapandidiri na marapat lamang na
maramdaman ng nagkasala ang galit at pagtatakwil sa kanya ng lipunan. Sa pagkaka-repeal ng Death
Penalty Law noong June 24, 2006 sa pamamagitan ng Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, ang akusadong
umaapela ay sampung ulit na hinahatulan ng reclusion perpetua. Sa piitan na lilipas ang kanyang mga
araw kasama ang umuusig na gunita ng pagkakasala sa kanyang batang-batang kapatid. cDEICH
AMONG the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage, repulsion and hatred than incestuous
rape. It is so odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel the anger and spurn of
society. 1 With the repeal of the Death Penalty Law 2 on June 24, 2006 through the passage of R.A. No.
9347, 3 accused-appellant is sentenced ten times to reclusion perpetua. He is to live out his days under
incarceration with thoughts of his crimes against his sister of tender age to haunt his conscience.
The Case
Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape, defined and penalized
under Article 266 (A) and (B) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7659,
allegedly committed as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 08-1296:
That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force
or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
herein offended party, AAA, 4 his youngest sister, a minor, ten (10) years of age, all against her will and
consent. dctai
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten (10) years of age, all against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

consent. TIESCA
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
consent. AcEIHC
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and
consent. CAaDTH
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will
and consent. cIEHAC
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, all against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 14
On August 13, 2001, at his arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan,
appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all ten (10) charges. However, on September 3, 2001, during the pre-
trial conference, his counsel manifested before the trial court the desire of appellant to change his plea
to "guilty" on all ten (10) counts. Said manifestation was granted and appellant was re-arraigned. 14-a
CDaSAE
Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. Teresa Andres-Teresa, Grade IV teacher of private
complainant AAA, and AAA herself took the witness stand for the prosecution.
No evidence was presented for the defense.
The Facts
Criminal Case No. 08-1296

The corruption of AAA's childhood innocence commenced sometime in 1995 when she was merely ten
(10) years of age. It occurred at mid-day in her own home at Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan. 15 She was
playing with her brothers BBB and CCC when appellant beckoned to her. She ignored him for fear of
getting whipped. His calls unheeded, appellant came out of the house and ordered their two brothers to
go down to the river. BBB and CCC did as they were told. 16
Holding AAA by the arms, appellant then brought her into the house. She cried but appellant told her in
Ilocano "Uki ni nam, ta bedbedak ta ngiwat mo" which roughly translates to "Vulva of your mother, I will
gag your mouth." Appellant proceeded to search for a handkerchief. 17 ICTacD
AAA ran towards her youngest brother's cradle but appellant pulled her away to another room where he
gagged her and whipped her with a belt. 18 After that, appellant tied her hands together behind her
back with a rope, pulled her dress down, laid her on a bed and, with more rope, tied each of her legs to
separate corners of the bed. 19 Appellant then left the room. 20
When he returned, he was wielding a pair of scissors. He snipped off AAA's shorts and underwear then
shed his own clothes. Appellant then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The
penetration caused her great pain. 21 Afterwards, appellant wiped her genital region with a
handkerchief and showed it to her. It was covered with blood. 22
Moments later, appellant heard their sister DDD's voice prompting him to procure a towel with which to
cover AAA. Having concealed her nudity in this manner, appellant hastily donned his garments and left
laughing. 23
When DDD and their brothers BBB and CCC entered the room, they found AAA still tied to the bed. One
of her brothers pulled off the towel and untied her. 24 AAA did not tell them that appellant had raped
her because of her fear of appellant and his threats that he would kill them all. 25 IcDCaT
Criminal Case No. 1297
The second incident of rape also occurred in 1995. 26 AAA was tending to their youngest brother when
appellant summoned her to extract his armpit hairs. She turned a deaf ear. Appellant then instructed
their brother BBB to take their youngest sibling to the river to bathe him. BBB complied. 27 Left alone
now with AAA, appellant dragged her inside a room and ordered her to remove her clothes. 28 When
she refused, he forcibly undressed her at knife-point. 29
Stripped naked, AAA was then brought to the bed the same bed on which appellant had previously
committed the dastardly deed. While lying on the bed, appellant disrobed and, while poking her with his
knife, mounted her. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis. After satisfying himself, he again
threatened to kill all of them should she report the matter to anyone. 30
Later that same year, appellant raped AAA for the third time. 31 At the time of the incident, their parents
were out of the house. 32 While sleeping on top of their trunk, AAA was awakened when appellant
started undressing her. She cried and begged him to stop, but he disregarded her pleas and proceeded to
sexually abuse her. 33 Despite her protestations, appellant proceeded to insert his penis into the young
girl's vagina. 34 After his lust had been sated, he reiterated his threat to kill them all should she reveal
the incident to anyone. 35 SIAEHC
A few days after the third rape, AAA was again sexually abused by appellant inside their house, in the
same room and upon the same bed. As in the previous incidents, appellant poked a knife at her to
compel her to submit to his bestial urges. 36 Out of fear, she did not struggle or resist. Thereafter,
appellant, had carnal knowledge of her. 37
The fifth rape happened in the same year. 38 By this time, appellant was already married. 39 His bestial
acts towards his own sister nonetheless continued. It was noontime and AAA had just come home from
visiting their grandfather. 40 When she entered the bedroom, appellant quickly followed her in, closed
the door behind him and locked it. 41
Poking his knife at her, he told her to strip. When she refused, appellant forcibly undressed her. He then
removed his own clothes and laid her on the bed. 42 While pointing a knife at her, he mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. 43 HSTCcD
She pleaded with appellant to stop doing it to her by saying, "Manong kaasiandak kadin, husto na kadin,"
which means "Brother, have pity on me, please stop it." Appellant, however, just slapped her mouth and
proceeded to rape her. Afterwards, he issued his threat not to divulge the matter to anyone lest he
would kill them all. 44
In 1996, appellant, for the sixth time, raped AAA 45 who had turned eleven (11) years old. She was
playing alone in front of their house when she saw appellant approaching her. As she was afraid of him,
she tried to run away. She stumbled, however, and he was able to catch up with her. Appellant then
dragged her inside where he laid her on the living room floor. They were alone at home as the rest of the
family had gone to harvest rice at their kaingin. 46
Appellant proceeded to remove AAA's dress and underwear. Then, he removed his own clothes.
Subsequently, he mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina against her will. 47 Afterwards, he
uttered the same threats to kill everyone should she expose her defloration to anyone. 48 SCcHIE
The seventh occurrence of rape was also in 1996. The family had just transferred to a new house
situated at the foot of a mountain in Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan. They were forced to relocate to a
new house after their old home was swept away in a flood. 49
When probed by the prosecutor as to the details of the seventh incident of rape, AAA disclosed that she
could no longer remember the exact manner how appellant perpetrated the rape. She was, however,
certain that she was twice raped in 1996 by the same. 50
The eighth incident of rape took place in 1998 51 when AAA was thirteen (13) years of age. She was then
lying alone inside their house. Her parents, along with her other siblings, were out working in their
kaingin. 52 DCcTHa
Suddenly, appellant appeared and moved closer to her. She tried to rise but he pushed her back down.
Appellant then forcibly removed the young girl's clothes, her shorts and panty. He then proceeded to
unbutton his pants. 53
According to her, she could not have escaped while appellant was undressing because she feared what
he might do to her. After removing his own clothes, appellant went on top of her and commenced raping
her. 54
Just as she did countless times before, AAA pleaded with appellant "Manong, kuston kaasiannak kadin"
("Brother, enough, have pity on me"). Instead of desisting, appellant slapped her in the mouth. After the
sexual abuse, he issued the same threatening statements to her. 55
Also in 1998, the ninth rape happened. It occurred under similar circumstances. The rest of their family
had gone to their kaingin and private complainant AAA was left alone in their house at the foot of the
mountain. 56 IDSETA
Seeing that she was left alone to tend the house, appellant again pounced on the opportunity to impose
his bestial urges on his young sister. At that time, AAA was still thirteen (13) years old.
As in the previous offenses, appellant forced AAA to undress. After ridding himself of his clothing,
appellant mounted her fragile frame and penetrated the young girl's vagina. 57
The tenth and last incident of rape transpired on May 8, 2000 58 during the wake of their father who had
passed away. AAA was then fifteen (15) years old. It was committed in a new house, also in Baraoidan,
Gattaran, Cagayan, where they transferred. 59 Appellant had his own house by then situated about five
hundred (500) meters away. 60 Their father was lying in state at appellant's house. 61
On said date at noontime, their mother sent AAA home to feed the chickens. 62 She obeyed and went
inside their house to fetch rice with which to feed them when appellant followed and grabbed her. She
resisted and kicked him in the abdomen. He fell down and she tried to run but he was able to grab her
foot causing her to stumble and fall. 63 cITAaD
Thereafter, appellant removed all her clothes. He kissed her lips and breasts several times, mounted her,
then sexually violated her. 64 All the while, he was flaunting his perversion by telling his sister, "Nagimas
gayam ti kabagis ko" ("I derived so much satisfaction from my sister"). Afterwards, he issued the same
previous threats to her. 65
Subsequent Events
However, on September 18, 2000, AAA reached the end of her rope. Notwithstanding appellant's
threats, she revealed to her sister DDD, friend Giselle and teacher Teresa that she was raped by
appellant, her brother. 66 Teresa, upon hearing AAA's revelation, accompanied her to their head teacher
Felix Salvador. Then, together, they went to the barangay captain who told them to report the matter to
the police. This they did. 67
On September 20, 2000, policemen were dispatched to bring appellant to the police station. There, a
confrontation arose between AAA and appellant. Upon seeing appellant, AAA punched him and said
"Hayop ka, baboy, nirape mo ako" ("You animal, pig, you raped me"). 68 ICcaST
On September 21, 2000, there was a second confrontation. 69 Present were their mother, their sister
DDD, their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant's wife Josephine, and AAA's teachers Charito
Elesterio, Jerry Roque and Elpidio Salvatierra. In said confrontation, AAA accused her brother, appellant,
of raping her ten (10) times, while he admitted to having raped her thrice only. Josephine, appellant's
wife, told him to admit so that AAA could forgive him. 70 He then admitted that he had raped her ten
(10) times and asked for forgiveness, beseeching her to take pity on his family. AAA replied that she
could no longer forgive him because her heart had "already hardened like stone." Appellant cried. 71
RTC and CA Dispositions
On January 8, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision 72 convicting appellant on all ten counts of rape,
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt in all
the ten (10) Criminal Informations for "RAPE" and is hereby sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty
of "DEATH" in each of the ten (10) criminal informations. DCATHS
SO ORDERED. 73 (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. However, on the strength of People v. Mateo, 74 the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review.
In its Decision 75 dated January 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court but with
modification providing for damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that for each count of
rape the accused should pay private complainant the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-
5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which
took effect on October 15, 2004. HSaIDc
SO ORDERED. 76 (Underscoring supplied)
Issues
Since the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, and the Public Attorney's Office, as
defense counsel to appellant, had both submitted Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, the
Court is now faced in this review with the same assignment of errors appellant presented before the CA,
to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON AN IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 08-1296; 08-1297; 08-1298; 08-1299;
08-1300; 08-1301; 08-1302; 08-1303 AND 08-1304; CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID INFORMATIONS
FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH WITH PARTICULARITY THE DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE. HDTSIE
III
ASSUMING AGAIN THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 08-
1305.
IV
ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH (SIC) WITH PARTICULARITY
THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE
BROTHER OF THE VICTIM AND, HENCE, A RELATIVE WITHIN THE SECOND DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY
WAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED. 77 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
No Improvident Plea of Guilt
Appellant claims that the trial court based its ruling of conviction on his "improvident plea of guilt,"
relying on Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, to wit: ACIEaH
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. 78
He argues that when he was re-arraigned and he pleaded "guilty" to all ten charges of rape levelled
against him, he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his change of plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty." According to him, the trial court did not inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea and that it
failed to explain fully to him that once convicted, he would be meted the death penalty under R.A. No.
7659. Hence, he contends, his conviction should be set aside.
We cannot agree.
The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to observe
the following: TIEHSA
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires. 79
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and
be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended
by the accused. 80
Records reveal that appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and re-
arraignment. In fact, it was his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant desired to
change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" on all ten charges of rape filed against him by his younger
sister. DCASIT
Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned, the
charges were read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue. 81 He cannot now claim that he
was unaware of the consequences of his change of plea.
More than that, appellant admitted raping private complainant AAA. When confronted by AAA, their
mother, sister DDD, and their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant readily admitted to violating his
sister AAA on at least three occasions. Sensing that AAA was only angered by his fractional admission,
and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him to admit the whole truth, appellant confessed to
the ten counts of rape.
At any rate, contrary to appellant's assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of his
plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As consistently held by
the Court, 82 while convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have been set aside because of
the improvidence of the plea, the same holds true only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
ASETHC
When, as in this case, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the same must be sustained for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the guilty plea of accused but on the convincing evidence proving his commission of
the offenses charged.
Indeed, there were instances, such as in People v. Lakindanum, 83 where even when the court found
that the judge was remiss in his duty to conduct a searching inquiry, the conviction was sustained in the
interest of justice:
The Court observes that, indeed, the manner by which the trial court judge conducted the inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused-appellant's plea of guilty leaves much to be
desired.
xxx xxx xxx
From the records of the proceedings in the court below, it can be gleaned that the trial judge's manner
of apprising Lakindanum of the consequences of his plea was at best, cursory, to wit: STaHIC
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that the judge can hardly be said to have satisfied the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of entering
a guilty plea. Worse, the judge erroneously informed Lakindanum that by pleading guilty, the latter
forfeited his right to testify and to adduce evidence in his defense. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing positive identification by the child victim of her rapist and her candid narration of the
circumstances surrounding the rape, it is clear that accused-appellant was properly convicted for robbing
Catherine of her innocence and childhood. This Court cannot, on mere procedural grounds, allow the
revolting perversion of the accused-appellant to go unpunished. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant's conviction must be upheld as there was no such error of accepting an improvident plea
committed by the trial court. TAaHIE
There can only be an improvident plea of guilt under Section 3, Rule 116 where there is a possibility of
an accused being meted out the supreme penalty of death. In the words of said section, "When accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry . . ., etc." The obvious
rationale for this is to ascertain that accused truly understands the dire consequences of his plea.
Considering that R.A. No. 9346 has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the raison d'etre
behind said rule is absent in the case at bar.
Exact dates of commission
need not be alleged.
Appellant next contends that the Informations filed against him do not sufficiently charge the offenses
committed because the exact dates of commission are not alleged. Hence, his conviction is not
warranted.
The contention is without merit.
The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be alleged with precision. It is enough for the
information or complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a time as near as possible to the
date of its actual commission. Failure to allege the exact date when the crime happened does not render
the information defective, much less void. 85 SETaHC
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive acts
or omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. 86 Thus, in a
prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape,
not the time of its commission. 87 The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed
does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. 88
The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise
time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time
need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that
the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. 89
Besides, as succinctly explained by the trial court:
[Private-complainant] was only ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11) years old in 1996 she
being born on February 18, 1985. It is but natural for her not to remember the dates. More so when it
has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her life. 90 EIDTAa
Further, it is already too late in the day for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He
had all the time to raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his arraignment. He
could have filed for a bill of particulars in order to be properly informed of the dates of the alleged rapes.
However, appellant chose to be silent and never lifted a finger to question the information. As a result,
he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had; he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative
relief. Furthermore, objections as to matters of form in the information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. 91
Relationship as qualifying circumstance

may be alleged in layman's terms.
Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest
sister of appellant. We do not agree with the defense that in order for relationship to qualify in this case,
it must be mentioned that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of consanguinity." ATCaDE
This is not a novel question. The same issue was addressed by the Court in People v. Sanchez. 92 In the
said case, appellant argued that he could not be meted the death penalty for raping his sister for failure
of the information to allege that said private complainant was a "relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity."
The Court struck down appellant's argument in the following tenor:
We have held in People v. Ferolino, that:
"If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common law
spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity
or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to
further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree."
The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino case, the
victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister of the offender. It was
deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information
that the offender is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil
degree" because we acknowledge the fact that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the
third civil degree, in which case, death penalty cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape.
However, a sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother
relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in
this case that the Information should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the
Ferolino case. 93 HcACTE
Further, what is required by the Rules is that "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment." 94 Perusing the ten (10)
Informations for rape, private complainant AAA was categorically identified as appellant's younger sister.
Verily, the requirement of allegation as to relationship was more than satisfied.
Testimony of AAA as to her own
age is sufficient evidence.

Appellant argues that in Criminal Case No. 08-1305, no evidence was presented as to the age of the
victim, AAA. This is false. On the issue of age of the victim, it is enough that the victim testified on her
age vis-a-vis the time she was raped by appellant.
In People v. Pruna, 95 the Court set out guidelines as to the appreciation of age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. In that case, the rule was laid out, once and for all, that
although the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party, its presentation into evidence is not a sine qua non requirement
to prove her age for the appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance. The decision goes on to state that in the absence of (a) certificate of live birth, (b)
authentic document, or (c) testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age,
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
EcTIDA
In the case at bar, private complainant categorically disclosed that she was only ten (10) years old at the
time of the first rape in 1995 96 and fifteen (15) years of age when she was last raped by appellant. 97
Appellant Ceredon admitted these in a confrontation between him and private complainant, witnessed
by their mother and other relatives. 98
More than that, not only did the defense fail to object to complainant's claim to minority when it was
consistently bared during the trial; the accused, through his plea of guilt, admitted to the victim's age as
alleged in the informations against him. 99 Furthermore, appellant cannot claim ignorance of the age of
the victim as she is his own sister. 100
Anent the Pruna requirement that the court make a categorical finding as to age, the RTC had this to say:
101
True, AAA was not able to tell the exact month and date of the first nine incidents but this is not fatal to
her credibility. She is only about ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11) years old in 1996, she
being born on February 18, 1985 and therefore it is but natural for her not to remember the dates more
so when it has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her life. (Underscoring
supplied) SECcIH
Death penalty repeal and damages
In order that the rape be qualified, there need only be one qualifying circumstance present. Here, We
have two relationship and age. Even assuming that the circumstance of age had not been duly proven,
it makes no difference as to the final outcome of this case as the circumstance of relationship of
appellant to the victim cannot be denied.
As the death penalty has been repealed through R.A. No. 9346, 102 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," appellant's sentence should be downgraded from death
to reclusion perpetua. Section 2 of the said law pertinently provides:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. CIcTAE
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of the law, which reads:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Anent the CA award of damages, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is correct as each count of
rape is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty. 103 With respect
to moral damages, the awarded amount of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00, without need
of pleading or proof of basis. 104 The additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to AAA is
likewise justified due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. 105
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed in each case is hereby changed from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole. Further, the award of moral damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to
P75,000.00. DTIACH
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141782. December 14, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO FLORES a.k.a. "ATONG," and PATERNO PARENO a.k.a.
"PATTER," accused, vs. RENATO FLORES a.k.a. "ATONG," appellant.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Renato Flores, also known as "Atong," was convicted of rape by the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. His co-accused
Paterno Pareno is still at large. In his appeal before the Court, appellant alleged that the court a quo
gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime despite the insufficiency of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. aSECAD
The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction for rape. A careful review of the evidence adduced by
both the prosecution and the defense led the Court to the conclusion that the RTC did not err in finding
appellant guilty of rape. In affirming his conviction, the Court reiterated the settled rule that the lone
testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. In the case at bar, the Court found
the testimony of the rape victim credible despite the alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant
which the Court considered as minor and inconsequential. The Court also ruled that the fact that
complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person is of no moment because
the absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape.
Furthermore, proof of injury is not an essential element of the crime. What is important is that because
of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN PROSECUTING THE CRIME. In reviewing rape
cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove
the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Corollary to the foregoing
legal yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of rape says that she has been defiled, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed against her. So long as her testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. aSEHDA
2. ID.; ID.; LONE TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM, IF CREDIBLE, IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN

CONVICTION. A careful review of the evidence adduced by both parties leads us to the conclusion
that the RTC did not err in finding appellant guilty of rape. The lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. This is so because, from the nature of the offense, her sole testimony is
oftentimes the only evidence that can be offered to establish the guilt of the accused.
3. ID.; ID.; FORCE AND INTIMIDATION; NEED NOT BE NECESSARILY SHOWN TO BE OBJECTIVELY
IRRESISTIBLE; MUST BE VIEWED FROM THE VICTIM'S PERCEPTION. Well-established is the rule that for
the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed be so great or be of such character
that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient
to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need
not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more
or less irresistible are beside the point. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the
victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough
that it produced fear fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil
would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. The fact that complainant bore no physical
evidence of any force used against her person is of no moment. The absence of any external sign of
injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element
of the crime. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit
to the will of appellant. As stated in People v. Maglente, the test is whether the threat or intimidation
produces fear in the mind of a reasonable person that if one resists or does not yield to the desires of
the accused, the threat would be carried out. SHacCD
4. ID.; ID.; LACK OF RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN
CONSENT TO THE SEXUAL ASSAULT. In a long line of cases, we have held that different people react
differently to different situations. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a frightful experience. While the reaction of some women who are faced with the
possibility of rape is struggling or shouting for help, still others become virtually catatonic because of the
mental shock they experienced. To the depraved mind of appellant, complainant's failure to resist or to
shout may have been a sign of consent. But in the crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration
is the state of mind of the victim, not of the perpetrator.
5. ID.; ID.; "SWEETHEARTS THEORY"; NOT ESTABLISHED; BELIED BY THE ACTUATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINANT; CASE AT BAR. A "sweethearts defense" should be substantiated by some
documentary or other evidence of the relationship like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and
the like. Appellant presented only a bag of clothes allegedly belonging to complainant. We believe that
the bag of clothes and the presence of complainant in the house of appellant do not establish their
alleged amorous relationship. Appellant's claim of love relationship is belied by the concurrence of the
following actuations of complainant: (1) disclosing the rape incident to her uncle, (2) seeking help from
police authorities, (3) subjecting herself to medical examination, (4) filing a Complaint for rape and
recounting in court the details of her horrible experience. Further, the sweethearts defense does not
necessarily preclude rape. Even if it were true, such relationship would not, by itself, establish consent,
for love is not a license for lust. A love affair could not have justified what appellant did subjecting
complainant to his carnal desires against her will. TEAICc
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR

INCONSISTENCIES. Alleged inconsistencies, even if true, are minor in character and do not impugn the
credibility of complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, slight contradictions even serve to
strengthen credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of
the sexual assault. A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise
testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF VICTIM NOT DIMINISHED BY DELAY IN REPORTING RAPE INCIDENT.
There is no standard form of behavior when a person is confronted by a shocking, harrowing and
unexpected incident. The workings of the human mind, when placed under emotional stress, are
unpredictable. Rape is a traumatic experience, and the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while.
Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private, rather than reveal her
shame to the world or risk the rapist's carrying out his threat to harm her. In sum, the credibility of the
complainant's testimony is not diminished by the delay in reporting the incident or by the lack of strong
resistance. One cannot expect a 13-year old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman
who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat to her life and complain immediately
that she had been sexually assaulted. SaHIEA
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
In a rape case, the force or intimidation employed need not necessarily be shown to be objectively
irresistible. Rather, it must be viewed from the victim's perception that unless she yielded to the
ravisher's demand, some injury or evil would befall on her during the commission of the offense or even
thereafter. cdasia
The Case
On appeal before this Court is the Decision, 1 dated November 16, 1999, issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City (Branch 171) 2 in Criminal Case No. 6367-V-97, in which Renato Flores,
also known as "Atong," was convicted of rape.
The Information 3 filed against appellant and his co-accused, Paterno Pareno, also known as "Patter," 4
reads as follows:
"That on or about February 2, 1997 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another and
by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of REMEDIOS RENORIA y BANDOJO, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with her, against her will and
without her consent." 5
During the arraignment, Appellant Renato Flores pleaded not guilty. 6 His co-accused; Paterno Pareno,
was at large. 7 After trial in due course, the lower court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, accused RENATO FLORES alias Atong, [having been found g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. . . . is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs.
"He is ordered to indemnify the minor complainant [in] the amount of P50,000.00." 8
The Facts
Prosecution's Version
In its Brief, 9 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"On February 2, 1997, around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Paterno (Pater) Pareno arrived at the house of
Remedios Renoria in Ulingan St., Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela. Immediately upon his arrival, Paterno Pareno
asked Remedios Renoria to accompany him to the nipa hut located about fifty (50) meters away from
their (Remedios Renoria's) house. Remedios Renoria acceded because she [knew] Paterno.
"When Paterno Pareno and Remedios Renoria reached the place, appellant was already inside the nipa
hut obviously waiting for them. Paterno Pareno suddenly dragged Remedios Renoria inside the nipa hut.
Then, appellant and Paterno Pareno immediately covered her mouth and removed her clothing.
However, it was appellant who removed her underwear. This was quickly followed by appellant
discarding his own underwear.
"Remedios Renora was then made to lie down on a wooden bed. Thereafter, appellant positioned
himself on top of her and immediately inserted his penis inside her vagina. She felt pain. Afterwards,
appellant grasped her breasts. She could not cry for help because appellant and Paterno Pareno were
covering her mouth.
"Having satisfied his lust, appellant left immediately. Remedios Renoria, thereafter, stood up, got dressed
and went home.
"On April 24, 1997, Remedios Renoria went to see her uncle, Larry Frias, to report the ordeal she
suffered in the hands of appellant. In turn, Larry Frias told Remedios Renoria's mother [about] the
incident. Thereafter, Remedios Renoria's mother asked Larry Frias to do what [was] best for her
daughter.
"Out of genuine concern for his niece who was only thirteen (13) years old at the time she was ravished,
and because Remedios Renoria and her [were] both unlettered Larry Frias took the initiative to go to the
Office of the Bantay Bata in Quezon City to ask for help.
"At the Office of the Bantay-Bata, Larry Frias narrated what happened to Remedios Renoria. He was then
given referral letters to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). SCaDAE
"Larry Frias and Remedios Renoria went to the Valenzuela Police Station on April 28, 1997. PO2 Virginia
Viacrusis took the statement of Remedios Renoria.
"The following day, or on April 29, 1997, they went to the NBI for medico-legal examination. Dr. Armie
Soreta-Umil, an NBI Medico-Legal Officer, conducted a physical examination on the victim and submitted
a medical report which reads:
Living Case No. MG-97-626
Findings
Conclusions:
1. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries noted on the body at the time of examination.
Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration
by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury." 10
(Citations omitted)
Defense's Version
Appellant, on the other hand, argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. His
statement of facts is as follows: 11
"Evidence for the defense shows that on February 2, 1997, at about 7:00 in the evening, accused-
appellant Renato Flores was ordered by his father to get the latter's salary in Ulingan, Valenzuela City. His
father worked for Rudy Frias, private complainant's grandfather. He testified that private complainant
[was] his girlfriend and that their marriage was being arranged by her mother and her uncle. On the
night the crime charged allegedly occurred, accused-appellant recalled that it was private complainant's
mother, Rowena Frias, who invited him to sleep in their house. He slept in the sofa together with private
complainant. The following morning, accused-appellant's parents were summoned by Rowena Frias and
Larry Frias. Private complainant's mother asked accused-appellant if he love[d] her daughter to which he
an[s]wered in the affirmative. Thereafter, they talked about their plan of getting married and Rowena
even allowed her daughter to go with accused-appellant the following day, bringing with her a bag of
clothes. Since then, the couple lived together as husband and wife for more or less three months until
May 28, 1997 when private complainant was fetched by her mother. She never returned since then. The
next time they saw each other was when private complainant visited him in jail. She informed him that
she was in fact merely forced by Larry Frias to file a complaint."
Ruling of the Trial Court
After a careful study and a judicious assessment of the evidence submitted by both parties, the RTC
ruled that the guilt of appellant was proven with moral certainty. It added that his denial could not
prevail over the victim's positive assertions, which were convincing and credible. 12 It brushed aside his
defense that he and the victim were sweethearts, and that they lived together as husband and wife.
CTAIDE
Hence, this appeal. 13
The Issue
Appellant assigns a sole alleged error for our consideration:
"The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the
prosecution." 14
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is
easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as
only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Corollary to the foregoing legal yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of rape says that she has been
defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed against her. So long
as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 15
Based on the foregoing principles, we have carefully scrutinized the testimony of Remedios Renoria, who
was 13 years old at the time the rape was committed, as follows:
"Q: Now, Madam Witness, when Renato Flores removed his brief and after he removed your panty,
what did he do?
A: He inserted, sir.
Q: What did he insert?
A: His penis, sir.
Q: Where did he insert that?
A: [Into] my vagina.
Q: Now, madam witness, what was your position when the accused Flores inserted his penis into
your vagina?
A: I was lying, sir.
Q: On what part [were] you lying?
A: [O]n a wooden bed.
Q: What about the accused Flores, what was his position when he inserted his penis into your
vagina while you were lying?
A: He was standing.
Q: While you were lying? CDESIA
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What do you mean standing, was he on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was he able to have his penis penetrated into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the movement of the accused when he was inserting his penis into your vagina,
particularly his buttocks, was he pumping it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was your feeling when he inserted his penis into your vagina, did you feel pain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to your vagina, did it bleed?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, how long did he do that to you?
A: It was quite a long time, sir.
Q: Now will you kindly tell this court the reason why you were able to go to that nipa hut?
A: I was dragged by Pater.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now when Pater dragged you inside the nipa hut, was Renato Flores already inside?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was he doing, was he waiting for you?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx" 16
A careful review of the evidence adduced by both parties leads us to the conclusion that the RTC did not
err in finding appellant guilty of rape. The lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain
a conviction. This is so because, from the nature of the offense, her sole testimony is oftentimes the only
evidence that can be offered to establish the guilt of the accused. 17 As correctly observed by the lower
court:
". . . . Minor complainant was forthright. She narrated how she was sexually abused by accused Renato
Flores. She was straight forward in pin pointing to the accused as her abuser. There [are] no facts and/or
circumstances from which it could be reasonably inferred that the minor complainant falsely testified or
she was actuated by improper motive. The absence of clear and convincing evidence of the existence of
improper motive sustain[s] the conclusion that no improper motive exist[s] and her testimony should be
given full faith and credit. The Court is persuaded by the sincerity and c[a]ndor of minor Remedios
Renoria. She showed no sign of hostility but interest to bring the malefactor to justice." 18
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect, owing to its direct opportunity to observe their demeanor during trial. 19
Force and Intimidation

We disagree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove the force and intimidation
inflicted upon the offended party. CaHcET
Well-established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed
be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force
employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other
words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result,
all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. 20
Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of
the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear fear that if she
did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or
even thereafter.
The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person is of no
moment. The absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape,
proof of injury not being an essential element of the crime. 21 What is important is that because of force
and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of appellant. 22 As stated in People v.
Maglente, 23 the test is whether the threat or intimidation produces fear in the mind of a reasonable
person that if one resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried
out.
In the present case, the victim narrated how, with the use of threat, she had been coerced by appellant
into submitting to his carnal desires. Pertinent portions of her affidavit are reproduced as follows:
"08.T. Paano ang [nangyaring] pang-aabuso sa iyo o pang re Rape?
S. Ganito po iyon noong Feb. 2, 1997, sa ganap na ika 9:00 ng gabi ay pinatawag ako ni Atong alias
Renato Flores at may sasabihin daw po siya sa akin, noon pong pumunta ako ay nasa loob daw po siya ng
kubo, sabi ni Patter punta daw sa kubo at doon daw ko usap ni Atong, punta ako kubo hila ako sa kamay
ni Atong tulak ako Patter, at takip bibig ko ng kamay ni Atong at sama panyo kamay at tali panyo sa bibig,
higa ako sa papag ni Atong (referring to Renato Flores) at tanggal lahat ng damit ko, pagkatapos ay kiss
niya ako sa labi at dede ko at pagkatapos ay pasok niya ang titi niya sa pek-pek ko taas baba siya at
pagkatapos ay parang pagod na pagod siya at dagan siya sa dibdib ko at tanggal niya ang tali sa bibig ko
at sabi niya ay [sinabihang] "H]uwag kang magsusumbong at papatayin kita naiintindihan mo ba[?"]
aHSCcE
"09.T. Ano po ang mga sumunod na pangyayari?
S. Kinabukasan ay pinatawag ako uli kay Patter at punta daw ako sa kubo February 3, Lunes sa
ganap na ika 9:00 ng gabi at punta daw ako [kay] Atong (Renato Flores) at iwan ako uli ni Patter at sabi ni
Atong pag hindi ako payag patay ako, kaya . . . higa na lang ako papag at hubad ni Atong ang damit ko at
pasok uli niya ang titi niya sa pekpek ko, at pagkatapos sabi ni Atong (Renato Flores) o baka
magsusumbong ka kahit kanino, at sabi niya ay kung magsusumbong daw ako ay papatayin daw niya ako
kaya hindi ako [nagsusumbong] kahit kanino, pinauwi niya ako." 24
Undisputably, the sexual act was committed with force and intimidation as shown by prosecution
evidence. Moreover, the victim could not have shouted for help, as her mouth was covered by the
accused. She testified thus:
"Q: Now after the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, what happened next?
A: He h[e]ld my breast, sir.
Q: Did you shout or [ask] for help?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: They were covering my mouth, sir." 25
Indeed, it is inconceivable how a 13-year-old girl could muster enough strength to resist two men in their
prime. It would be incongruous to assume that she could overcome the superior strength of appellant
and his cohort, Paterno Pareno. TcaAID
Lack of Resistance
Appellant likewise contends that complainant's lack of physical struggle shows that she consented to the
sexual assault. We are not persuaded.
In a long line of cases, we have held that different people react differently to different situations. There is
no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a frightful experience.
While the reaction of some women who are faced with the possibility of rape is struggling or shouting
for help, still others become virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they experienced. 26
To the depraved mind of appellant, complainant's failure to resist or to shout may have been a sign of
consent. But in the crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration is the state of mind of the
victim, not of the perpetrator. 27
"Sweethearts Theory"
While appellant interposed the defense of denial, he additionally alleged that he and Remedios were
sweethearts, and that they had lived as husband and wife from February 3, 1997 until May 28, 1997. To
support this contention, he presented several witnesses who testified that they had seen the victim in
his house. These are unavailing, however, because they did not have personal knowledge of the fact.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence on record that would support this defense. A "sweethearts
defense" should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of the relationship like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. 28 Appellant presented only a bag of clothes
allegedly belonging to complainant.
We believe that the bag of clothes and the presence of complainant in the house of appellant do not
establish their alleged amorous relationship. As correctly observed by the trial court:
"Defense['s] claim that the minor complainant is his sweetheart and they lived together as husband and
wife cannot be given serious consideration. There was not even a letter or photograph of the minor-
victim to show that the accused and she (Remedios Renoria) [were] sweethearts. The bag of clothes is
not concrete proof that the clothes [belong] to minor complainant.
". . . [I]f it is really true that Remedios Renoria and the accused lived as husband and wife in the house of
the accused and left only on May 28, 1997 when fetched by the sister, why was she able to give her
written statement to the police on April 28, 1997 charging the accused [with] rape and [to submit]
herself [to] physical and genital examination before the NBI on April 29, 1997." 29
Appellant's claim of love relationship is belied by the concurrence of the following actuations of
complainant: (1) disclosing the rape incident to her uncle, (2) seeking help from police authorities, (3)
subjecting herself to medical examination, (4) filing a Complaint for rape and recounting in court the
details of her horrible experience. TSADaI
Further, the sweethearts defense does not necessarily preclude rape. Even if it were true, such
relationship would not, by itself, establish consent, for love is not a license for lust. 30 A love affair could
not have justified what appellant did subjecting complainant to his carnal desires against her will. 31
Inconsistencies
In his vain attempt to discredit the testimony of complainant, appellant cites two inconsistencies. First,
he concedes that she was forcibly brought by Pareno to the nipa hut. Prosecution Witness Larry Frias'
testimony, however, allegedly showed that Pareno merely instructed her to go to the nipa hut with him.
This circumstance allegedly raises the possibility that she consented to the sexual intercourse. Second,
appellant submits that, while the victim avers that her mother went to the police station with her, Larry
Frias testified that only he had accompanied private complainant to the NBI, the DSWD and the
Municipal Hall to file a Complaint. 32
The solicitor general correctly debunks appellant's contentions in this wise:
"A careful review of Remedios Renoria's testimony reveals that on February 2, 1997, Paterno Pareno
arrived at their (Remedios Renoria['s]) house and asked her to accompany him to the nipa hut located at
Ulingan, Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela; that when they reached the place, Paterno Pareno dragged her inside
the nipa hut where appellant was obviously waiting; and that appellant and Paterno Pareno covered her
mouth and undressed her.
"In other words, Paterno Pareno used force on Remedios Renoria only when they finally reached the
nipa hut, the place where the crime was committed.
"Anent the issue of who really was with Remedios Renoria at the time she went to the police station to
report the incident, Remedios Renoria clarified during her cross examination that it was Larry Frias who
accompanied her to the police station.
"Demonstrably, the alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant do not actually exist. Assuming that
they do exist, the same are very trivial in nature [and] cannot impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole." 33 (Citation omitted)
Further, the aforecited inconsistencies, even if true, are minor in character and do not impugn the
credibility of complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, slight contradictions even serve to
strengthen credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of
the sexual assault. 34 A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise
testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. 35
The Delay in Reporting the Incident
Complainant's failure to report the incident immediately, according to appellant, belies her claim of rape.
This contention is untenable. dctai
There is no standard form of behavior when a person is confronted by a shocking, harrowing and
unexpected incident. The workings of the human mind, when placed under emotional stress, are
unpredictable. Rape is a traumatic experience, and the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while.
Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private, rather than reveal her
shame to the world or risk the rapist's carrying out his threat to harm her. 36
In sum, the credibility of the complainant's testimony is not diminished by the delay in reporting the
incident or by the lack of strong resistance. One cannot expect a 13-year old girl to act like an adult or a
mature and experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat to
her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. 37
Indemnity and Moral Damages
It has been the policy of the Court to award outrightly to a victim of rape an amount not exceeding
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, upon an indubitable showing of the commission of the crime. 38
When the rape is committed in its qualified form and the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity given
is P75,000.
Moreover, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, appellant should be ordered to pay the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages. It may be awarded without need of independently showing that the
victim suffered mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and the like. 39 In the crime of rape, these are
assumed by the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that an additional award of
P50,000 as moral damages be given to the victim. Costs against appellant. HcTIDC
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-30527-28. March 29, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIO RICOHERMOSO, SEVERO PADERNAL, JUAN
PADERNAL, ROSENDO PERPEAN, MACARIO MONTEREY and RITO MONTEREY, defendants, JUAN
PADERNAL and SEVERO PADERNAL, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Trial Attorney Lolita
C . Dumlao for plaintiff-appellee.
Rogerio S. T . Cadag for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
Severo Padernal and Juan Padernal appealed from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Lucena
City, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to
pay solidarily the sum of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of Geminiano de Leon and to pay the costs
(Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-37-Quezon or 1922-CFI-Gumaca).
In the same decision they were convicted of lesiones leves. Each one was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of fifteen (15 days of arresto menor and to pay the costs. Rosendo Perpean, Rito Monterey and Macario
Monterey were acquitted (Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-38-Quezon or 1923-CFI-Gumaca).
The facts disclosed in the prosecution's evidence, on which the judgment of conviction was based, are as
follows:
At about nine o'clock in the morning of January 30, 1965 Geminiano de Leon, together with his thirty-
three-year old common-law wife Fabiana Rosales, his twenty-four-year old son Marianito de Leon and
one Rizal Rosales, encountered Pio Ricohermoso in Barrio Tagbacan Silagan, Catanauan, Quezon.
Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that barrio which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin. Geminiano
asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he should at least be allowed to
taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to his house
anytime and he would give the latter palay. Geminiano rejoined that he could not get the palay that
morning because he was on his way to Barrio Bagobasin but, on his return, he would stop at
Ricohermoso's house and get the palay.
When Geminiano returned to Barrio Tagbacan Silagan, he stopped at Ricohermoso's place. It was about
two o'clock in the afternoon. I Geminiano sat on a sack beside Fabiana Rosales in front of the house
while Marianito stood about three meters behind his father. A .22 caliber rifle was slung on Marianito's
right shoulder. Ricohermoso stood near the door of his house while Severo Padernal was stationed near
the eaves of the house.
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about the palay. The latter, no longer conciliatory and evidently hostile,
answered in a defiant tone: "Whatever happens, I will not give you palay." Geminiano remonstrated:
"Why did you tell us to pass by your house, if you were not willing to give the palay?"
At that juncture, as if by pre-arrangement, Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached

Geminiano from the left, while Severo Padernal (Ricohermoso's father-in-law) got an axe and
approached Geminiano from the right. The latter looked up to the sexagenarian Severo Padernal, with
both hands raised and pleaded: "Mamay (Grandpa), why will you do this to us. We will not fight you."
While Geminiano was still looking up to Severo Padernal on his right, Ricohermoso walked to
Geminiano's left, and, when about one meter from him, stabbed him on the neck with his bolo.
Geminiano fell face downward on the ground. While in that helpless position, he was hacked on the back
with an axe by Severo Padernal.
At that same place and time, while Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de
Leon, another episode was taking place. Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso's brother-in-law and the son of
Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around
Marianito's neck and his left hand pressing Marianito's left forearm. They grappled and rolled downhill
towards a camote patch. Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, his rifle was gone. He
walked uphill, saw his mortally wounded father Geminiano in his death throes, and embraced him. He
carried Geminiano for a short distance. The fifty-one year old Geminiano died at two o'clock on that
same day.
Doctor Isabela A. Matundan certified that Geminiano de Leon sustained the following wounds:
"1. Wound, incised, neck, lateral aspect, left, cutting the carotid artery and jugular vein, 4 inches in
length crosswise with fracture of the cervical vertebra.
2. Wound, incised, back, lumbar region, left, 4 1/2 inches, directed anteriorly, 3 inches deep.
3. Wound, incised, waist, dorsal, 1 1/2 inches, skin only.
4. Hematoma, forearm, upper third, left." (Exh. B)
Doctor Matundan said that the first wound was fatal. It could have caused instantaneous death because
it was a deep wound which pierced the carotid artery and jugular vein (Exh. C). The second wound on
the back could likewise have caused the victim's death if it had penetrated the kidney.
Doctor Matundan found that Marianito de Leon sustained multiple abrasions on the neck and abdomen
and a lacerated wound on the left foot which would heal from one to nine days even without medical
treatment.
Appellants' version is that in the afternoon of January 30, 1965, when Ricohermoso refused to give any
palay to Geminiano de Leon, because the land tilled by the former was allegedly a public land,
Geminiano approached Ricohermoso. When Geminiano unsheathed his bolo, Ricohermoso met him,
drew his bolo and struck Geminiano on the left side of the neck. The latter tried to parry the blow. He
was wounded in the wrist. As Geminiano turned right to flee, Ricohermoso struck him again on the left
side of his body, causing him to fall on the ground. Geminiano died on the spot due to the bleeding from
the wound on his neck.
While Geminiano was being assaulted, his son Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle but Juan Padernal
disabled him and wrested the gun. Marianito suffered abrasions on the neck and other parts of the body
(Pages 1 to 3, appellants' brief).
It is manifest that the defendants fashioned their version in such a way as to shift the responsibility for
the killing to Ricohermoso, a fugitive from justice who has not been tried. They also tried to exculpate
Severo Padernal and to prove that Ricohermoso acted in self-defense.
The appellants filed their brief on February 6, 1970. Later, Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal. The
withdrawal was granted in the resolution dated November 3, 1970 (Page 206, Rollo). That withdrawal
strengthened the case for the prosecution or the appellee and rendered inoperative appellants' version
of the case. Severo Padernal in effect accepted as correct the prosecution's version of the tragic incident
and the trial court's finding that he conspired with Ricohermoso and his son, Juan, to kill Geminiano de
Leon.
The only issue in this appeal, which concerns Juan Padernal, is whether he conspired with Ricohermoso
and Severo Padernal to kill Geminiano de Leon.
The trial court rationalized its conclusion that there was conspiracy by stating that their conduct revealed
unity of purpose and a concerted effort to encompass Geminiano's death.
Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury (par.
4, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal. His reliance on that justifying circumstance is erroneous. The act of
Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who
were the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his
assailants.
Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious
intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law
on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 11.
Juan Padernal contends that he was not a co-principal because he did not take any direct part in the
killing of Geminiano, that he did not force or induce Ricohermoso to stab Geminiano and that he
allegedly did not cooperate in its commission. That contention is not well-taken.
It should be recalled that, in the morning, Geminiano had an understanding with Ricohermoso that he
(Geminiano) would return in the afternoon to get his share of the palay harvest. Ricohermoso gave
Geminiano the impression that he (Ricohermoso) was amenable to giving Geminiano his share of the
harvest. However, during the interval, Ricohermoso changed his mind. Instead of remaining steadfast to
his original intention to give Geminiano palay, Ricohermoso planned with his father-in-law, Severo
Padernal, and his brother-in-law, appellant Juan Padernal, the manner of liquidating Geminiano so as to
stop him from pestering Ricohermoso with demands for a share in the harvest.
So, when Geminiano reappeared at Ricohermoso's place in the afternoon, Severo Padernal, Ricohermoso
Juan Padernal, like actors in a well-rehearsed play, performed their assigned roles with dramatic
precision. Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso, one armed with an axe and the other with a bolo, in a
pincer movement, confronted Geminiano de Leon. Simultaneously with that maneuver, the thirty-five-
year old Juan Padernal embraced Marianito de Leon and prevented him from firing at Severo Padernal
and Ricohermoso or from helping his father.
Considering the trio's behavior and appellant Juan Padernal's close relationship to Ricohermoso and
Severo Padernal, the ineluctable conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them. He coordinated and
timed his seizure of Marianito with the assault of Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal on Geminiano. It is
doubtful if the assailants could have consummated the killing of Geminiano, without their suffering any
injury, if Marianito had not been rendered helpless by appellant Juan Padernal.
The circumstances surrounding the killing of Geminiano de Leon alevosia or treachery. His hands were
raised and he was pleading for mercy with Severo Padernal, when Ricohermoso struck him on the neck
with a bolo. The fact that an exchange of words preceded the assault would not negate the treacherous
character of the attack. Geminiano did not expect that Ricohermoso would renege on his promise to give
him palay and that he would adopt a bellicose attitude. Juan Padernal's role of weakening the defense,
by disabling Marianito de Leon, was part and parcel of the means of execution deliberately resorted to
by the assailants to insure the assassination of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to themselves (Par.
16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code).
Treachery was appreciated in a case where the accused fired at the victim who, with hands upraised,
pleaded in a loud voice: "Do not shoot me; investigate first what was my fault" (People vs. Barba, 97 Phil.
991. See People vs. Dagundong, 108 Phil. 682, 684, 693).
As to the other case, L-30528, the charge against the appellants was attempted murder with respect to
Marianito de Leon. The trial court convicted them lesiones leves. The case was included in this appeal
apparently pursuant to the provision in section 17(1) of the Judiciary Law that a case arising out of the
same occurrence, as that in which reclusion perpetua was imposed, is appealable to this Court.
Inasmuch as Juan Padernal did not touch upon the lesiones leves case in his brief, he, like his father
Severo, seems to have acquiesced in the correctness of the trial court's decision.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court as to appellant Juan Padernal is affirmed with costs
against him.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-47462. February 28, 1980.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON PAROHINOG, accused-appellant.
Tomas Dulay, Jr. for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Concepcion
T. Agapinan for appellee.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
Convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay the
costs, Wilson Parohinog appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified this case to us on October 27,
1977, on the ground that only questions of law are involved in the appeal.
The procedural background of the case is as follows.
Wilson Parohinog, together with Soterania Parohinog, Robinson Parohinog, Loreto Parohinog and
Rodulfo Teodoro were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Criminal Case
No. 121. Upon arraignment they pleaded not guilty to the information.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Tomas Navarro who was counsel for all the accused,
announced in open court that Wilson Parohinog wanted to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide. The prosecuting fiscal gave his conformity, so Wilson Parohinog was re-
arraigned and thereupon pleaded accordingly. He was not sentenced immediately and the trial was
continued. On March 16, 1973, after the defense had presented its first witness, Wilson Parohinog,
through counsel, filed a written MOTION TO CHANGE PLEA OF GUILTY TO THAT OF NOT GUILTY on the
grounds that he did not comprehend the consequences of his plea of guilty and he had a valid and
meritorious defense. prLL
Acting on the motion, the trial court on the same day issued the following Order: "As prayed for by the
accused that the motion to his plea of guilty to that of not guilty be withdrawn, and finding it to be
justified, the same is granted."
During our deliberations on this case the question arose as to what the trial court granted in the above-
quoted order which is obviously vague. An opinion was advanced that what the trial court granted was
the withdrawal of the motion of the accused to change his plea of guilty to that of not guilty. Under this
construction, the accused reverted to his plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. Another
opinion which is shared by this writer is that the trial court granted the withdrawal of the plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide so as to substitute it with that of not guilty to crime charged which is
murder. Howsoever the order might be construed, the legal question is the effect of the plea of guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide after the prosecution had rested its case.
In this case Wilson Parohinog was accused of murder. After the prosecution had rested its case he was
allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The change of plea at that stage would have
been highly improper and irregular if the evidence for the prosecution had made out a case of murder
against him for then both the trial court and the prosecuting fiscal would be helping the accused to avoid
receiving a more severe penalty. Attributing good faith to both the trial court and the prosecuting fiscal,
the plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide must have been allowed only because the evidence
for the prosecution had proved that homicide, not murder, had been committed. In fact, a reading of the
trial court's decision shows this to be the case.
The information alleged evident premeditation and abuse of superiority but the trial court said that the
latter was not present and made no finding as to the former. It found that Wilson Parohinog was entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Additionally, he is also
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender for at the back of the warrant for his
arrest is the notation: "The accused Wilson Parohinog voluntarily surrender in this department,"
meaning the Police Department of Sapian, Capiz.
In the light of the foregoing, even assuming that Wilson Parohinog did withdraw his plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide and reverted to his former plea of not guilty, he cannot be convicted of
murder because the evidence for the prosecution made out a case of homicide only with no aggravating
circumstance but with two mitigating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by finding Wilson Parohinog guilty of the
crime of homicide penalized by reclusion temporal but with the presence of two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance has to be reduced to prision mayor (Art. 64, par. 5, Rev.
Penal Code). Accordingly, Wilson Parohinog is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. The decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio.
In closing we have to point to the fact that the trial court in convicting the accused of murder imposed a
straight penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. It found no aggravating circumstance but
appreciated on mitigating circumstance. The minimum period of the penalty is, therefore, applicable,
i.e., 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. However, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
should have been applied. Accordingly, we urge the trial judge, Tomas R. Leonidas to re-read the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. LLphil
SO ORDERED.

Arraignment and Plea

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Arraignment and Plea

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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 134288-89. January 15, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose B. Tiongco for accused-appellant.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; LONE TESTIMONY OF VICTIM IS

7. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; BIRTH CERTIFICATE, PRESUMED TO BE REGULARLY ISSUED. Accused-

while Criminal Case No. 43571 reads:

"No evidence of contusion, hematoma or abrasion in external body surfaces.

"CONCLUSION: 1. No extra-genital injuries noted

2. Physical Virginity Lost." 9

"A No, Sir.

"A No, Sir.

That would be all, Your Honor, with the witness." 10

"Costs against the accused in both cases.

Such contention deserves no merit.

Again, we find the above contentions unmeritorious.

"A Yes, I was at our house at Tiolas.

xxx xxx xxx

"A Yes, sir.

"Q What was the incident all about?

"A He raped me.

"Q You are referring to whom?

Witness pointing to a person sitting on a chair who is an accused in these cases.

"xxx xxx xxx

"A My breast and my forehead.

"A Yes, Sir.

"Q Could you tell us the name of that person?

"A Melchor Estomaca.

"Q And then after that, what happened next?

"A And he told me lie down here and go to sleep.

"A He removed my shorts and panty.

"A Yes, Sir.

"A I am (sic) wearing T-shirt and shorts.

"Q Okey, answer the question. What happened next?

"A He lied (sic) on top of me.

"A He inserted his penis inside my vagina.

"A I kept on struggling.

"Q Aside from struggling, did you do anything?

"A I did nothing because he boxed me in my stomach.

"A I fell unconscious

"Q Later on did you gain consciousness?

"A Only early in the morning.

Similarly, her account of the March 6, 1994 incident is quite revealing:

"A He again raped me.

"A We were lying down about to sleep.

"A Yes, Sir.

"Q Can you tell us what did you do?

"Q Now, where did your father boxed (sic) you?

Witness pointing to her stomach.

"Q What happened to you after your father boxed you?

"A I was then unconscious.

"Q Later on you regain consciousness?

"A Only in the morning.

"Q How did you feel after regaining consciousness?

"A I felt pain over my body and my 'hita' (thigh) is slippery." 21

The contention has no leg to stand on.

[G.R. No. 99287. June 23, 1992.]

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEAS; PLEA-BARGAINING CONSTRUED. Plea

Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

"CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Rollo)

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 24-25)

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues: cdrep