JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (ARTICLE VIII)

1. Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC

FACTS :On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by
HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that
occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the
case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly
covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989,
when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since
Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified
FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid
for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

RULING: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to
the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner
HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, andUNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion
of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative
fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July
5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and
homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves
whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating
that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lismota of the case. Moreover, the
issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The
majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the
issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares
and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75
has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not
transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that
there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers,
and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders
its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number
of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita
per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each
qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have
been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by
the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that
the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for
the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC
approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice
of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the
date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court
to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10,
1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering
that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period
has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey
their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the
day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of
HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders
of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if
all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in
the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to
acquire control over HLI.]
 2. Malaga vs. Penachos

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for
the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December
12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction,
respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner
Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the
bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal
without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the
resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding
had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award
the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing
such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1
of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after
the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared
that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the
coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges,
and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of
the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic
life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the
state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are
irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

3. PACU vs Secretary of Education GR No 5279 31 October 1955

Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as amended by
Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents
of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary
of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to
present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They
have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.

Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court

Decision: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and
to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is
insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the
Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.

4. Mariano vs. COMELEC

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
TeresitaTibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, TeresitaAbang, Valentina Pitalvero, RufinoCaldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of
IbayoUsusan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.

5. Macasiano vs. NHA

Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.He predicates hislocust standi on his being a
consultant of the Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation
for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after
hisretirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As tothe first, he alleges
that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy thatserve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties
regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which heassiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."

1. As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a directinterest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed."
2. On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintainsthat, the instant petition is
devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for theexercise of judicial review in cases
involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that thereis no actual case or controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that thepetitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party toquestion the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted
upon" and that thereis no showing that the question of constitutionality is the verylismotapresented. He argues
thatSections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has
legal standingHeld: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of
thelegislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised andpresented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,i.e the issue of constitutionality must be
verylismotapresented.
To reiterate, the essential requisites for asuccessful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence
of an actualcase or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) theconstitutional
question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question mustbe raised at the opportunity, and (d) the
resolution of the constitutional question must benecessary to the decision of the case.

A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of.It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites areabsent.
There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or bothof the capacities in which he is
filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performinghis duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a
property owner because of the assertionby other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act.
Judicial reviewcannot be exercised

invacuo

. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversiesarising between adverse litigants.

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED

J. Joya vs. PCGG

G.R. No. 96541, Aug. 24, 1993

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be
an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits

REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned
involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.

ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York,
selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA
questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as
scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christies of New York for the sale of
the artworks
RULING:On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial reviewThe rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must
be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most
important are the first two (2) requisites.Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of
judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a
citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of
the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from
acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art.
XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection
Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their
case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people
in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art
pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been
given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends
and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of
due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true
owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and
the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally
infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most
a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the
legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but
the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and
antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Actual Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes
moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11
January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find
however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

7. Valentin Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission

Facts:The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action
for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians
in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibleswho passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's
standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service
eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his
actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issues:

a. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the information regarding the eligibilities of
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City?

b. Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to information?

Ruling: a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However,
as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of
access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it
is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall
and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right,
every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case,
access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
 b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in
bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing
secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or
deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and
to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health
Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

8. Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe vs. The Commission on Elections

The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the constitutionality and legality of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec's) Resolution No. 96881 dated May 7, 2013, entitled "In the Matter of
Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections" (Money Ban Resolution).2 The petitioners included a prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante/temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation.

THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION

Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:

1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from
May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per
day in banks, finance companies, quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions performing similar
functions. However, all other non-cash transactions are not covered.

For this purpose, the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to
implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, and Republic Act No. 6426.

2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency from May 8 to May 13, 2013. For this purpose, all cash being
transported and carried exceeding such amount shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in
violation of the money ban. xxx.

3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of checks in cash involving a
total amount exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the
publication of this resolution until May 13, 2013 shall be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote-
buying and election fraud and shall therefore be treated as a "suspicious transaction" under Republic Act No. 9160 or the
"Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001" as amended by Republic Act No. 9194. For this purpose, the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) is hereby deputized to monitor and initiate investigations, and if necessary, inquire into and
examine the deposit and related accounts involved in the suspected transaction pursuant to procedure and requirements
of Republic Act No. 10167.3

The Comelecs Resolution No. 9688-A,4 issued on May 9, 2013, amended the Money Ban Resolution by:

1. exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of business of the withdrawing client
on the basis of the prevailing "Know-Your-Client/Customer" policy of the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires
banks "not only to establish the identity of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business
transactions,"5 and

2. presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess of P500,000.00 from May 8 to 13, 2013 was for the
purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud when the same was without tenable justification or whenever attended by
genuine reason engendering belief that the money would be used for vote-buying.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the present petition.

On May 10, 2013, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order,6 enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing
before the issuance of the Money Ban Resolution.
THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

The petitioners invoke the Courts power of judicial review to strike down the Money Ban Resolution.

They contend that the Comelecs Money Ban Resolution was issued without jurisdiction since the Comelecs power to
supervise and regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution does not extend to the BSP which is not a holder of any special privilege from the government. The BSPs
power to regulate and supervise banking operations stems from its mandate under the Constitution7and Republic Act
(RA) No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000).8 Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution states

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information,
all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall
aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. [emphasis ours]

They thus conclude that the Comelecs power of supervision and regulation cannot be exercised over the BSP and the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) as they can exercise authority only over public transportation and communication
entities given special privileges by the government. The petitioners also posit that the Comelecs power to deputize
extends only to law enforcement agencies and only if the President concurs. Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the Constitution
states:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxxx

4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. [emphasis ours]

They argue that the BSP and the AMLC are not law enforcement agencies unlike the National Bureau of Investigation and
the Philippine National Police. Assuming they may be considered as such, the Comelec failed to secure the concurrence
of the President to the deputation.

The petitioners note that paragraph 3 of the Money Ban Resolution effectively amended RA No. 9160 (Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001 or AMLA) by treating the withdrawal of cash or encashment of checks exceedingP500,000.00
within one banking day from May 8 to 13, 2013 as a "suspicious transaction," thus authorizing the AMLC to monitor,
initiate investigations, inquire into and examine the deposit. This type of transaction, however, is not among those
enumerated as suspicious under Section 3(b) of the AMLA. As an administrative issuance, the Money Ban Resolution
cannot amend a law enacted by Congress.

The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of constitutional rights.

The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.9 The
Money Ban Resolution violates an individuals due process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and
prohibits the withdrawal, possession, and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a range of legitimate
activities, and hampers and prejudices property rights. Though the intent (i.e., to curb vote-buying and selling) is laudable,
the means employed is not reasonably necessary and is oppressive on an individuals rights. The limitation on withdrawal
also goes against the non-impairment clause because the prohibitions and restrictions impair the banks contractual
obligations with their depositors.

Finally, the petitioners claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence because
it declares that "all cash being transported and carried exceeding [P500,000.00] shall be presumed for the purpose of
vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the money ban."10 There is no logical connection between the proven fact
of possession and transportation of an amount in excess of P500,000.00 and the presumed act of vote-buying because
there are many other legitimate reasons for the proven fact.

The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on the petition, insisting on the validity of the
Money Ban Resolution and its amendment.

The Comelec argues that it has the constitutional authority to supervise and regulate banks and other financial entities,
citing Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It alleges that its power to regulate covers banks and other finance
companies, since these entities operate under an "authority" granted by the BSP under Section 6 of RA No. 8791. This
authority is of the same nature as "grants, special privileges, or concessions" under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution; thus, it may be validly regulated by the Comelec.
The Comelec also claims that it may validly deputize the BSP, since the latter is a government instrumentality covered by
Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Contrary to the petitioners claim, the Comelecs power to deputize is not
limited to law enforcement agencies, but extends to instrumentalities of the government. The constitutional intent is to give
the Comelec unrestricted access to the full machinery of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

The Comelec further contends that Presidential concurrence with the exercise of the Comelecs deputation power is
required only if it involves agencies and instrumentalities within the Executive Department, of which the BSP is not a part.
Even assuming that Presidential concurrence is required, this has been secured through Memorandum Order No. 52,11 s.
2013, where the President gave his blanket concurrence to the deputation of all "law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government."12

That the BSP is constitutionally and statutorily tasked to provide "policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and
credit," and vested with "supervision over the operations of bank," does not preclude the Comelec from exercising its
power to supervise and regulate banks during the election period. Notably, the Comelecs power is limited in terms of
purpose and duration, and should prevail in this specific instance.

If the Comelec deems the supervision and regulation of banks necessary to curb vote-buying, this is a political question
that the Court may not inquire into. The choice of the measures that the Comelec may undertake to ensure the conduct of
a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election is a policy question beyond the scope of judicial review.

The Comelec lastly defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not unduly oppressive on
individuals. It merely limits transactions involving cash (withdrawal, encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect
other non-cash transactions such as those involving checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the
transaction is affected; the transaction may proceed using non-cash medium or instrument. There is, therefore, no
impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the Money Ban Resolution.

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition for being moot and academic.

By its express terms, the Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited time during the May 13, 2013
elections, i.e., from May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban
Resolution was not in force during the most critical period of the elections from May 10, 2013 to actual election day.
With the May 13, 2013 elections over, the Money Ban Resolution no longer finds any application so that the issues raised
have become moot and academic.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.1wphi1 The Court, as a rule, will decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening
events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no longer has any practical value and, from this perspective,
effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy.13 "[W]ithout a justiciable controversy, the [petition would] become a
[plea] for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction."14

While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these exceptions relate only to
situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.15

In the present case, we find it unnecessary to consider the presence of the first, second and third requirements when
nothing in the facts and surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of the fourth requirement, i.e., the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

We note that the Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that
its Money Ban Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October 28, 2013
barangay elections. If the May 13, 2013 elections had come and gone without any need for the measures the assailed
Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in the elections that immediately followed (i.e., the October
28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now premature for the Court to assume that a similar Money Ban
Resolution would be issued in the succeeding elections such that we now have to consider the legality of the Comelec
measure that is presently assailed.

We consider it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address
the Comelecs concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal Comelec
resolution if and when the need arises. Congress, too, at this point, should have taken note of this case and has the
plenary authority, through its lawmaking powers, to address the circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution
sought to address. In other words, Congress can very well act to consider the required measures for future elections, thus
rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for having become moot and academic. The Status Quo AnteOrder
issued by the Court on May 10, 2013, having been rendered functusoficio by the May 13, 2013 elections, is hereby
formally LIFTED.

SO ORDERED

9. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona Jr.

FACTS:In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish
a national network system that will in turn expand PCSOs source of income. A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC. Kilosbayan opposed the
said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that: PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it
is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA
1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity; The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications
network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be
allowed to set up such; PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not
allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems. PGMC and PCSO, through
TeofistoGuingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that
PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a
mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.

HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4. On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was
reduced to 40% though. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not
merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they
used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate,
and manage the network system including its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears
no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by
PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.

10. Tatad vs. Garcia Jr.

Facts: In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA.No bidding was made but certain
corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was
obviously formed for this particular undertaking.An agreement was then made between the government, through the
DOTC, and EDSA LRT Consortium.The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law
(RA 6957, amended by RA 7718).Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and
shall supply the train cabs.Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for
the same for 25 years.By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT
Consortium.Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.However, Senators
Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation of said agreement as they averred that
EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a
public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities..

Issue: Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public utility?

Ruling: What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the
power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by
themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public.The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does
not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate
them to serve the public.Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another.The
exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated a used to serve
the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise.While private respondent is the owner of the facilities
necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility. In view of this
incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver
possession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a
common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC.

Private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings with the
public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. Even the mere formation of a public utility
corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining
the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for
that purpose

11. Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

FACTS:A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against FulgencioFactoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parenspatriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests?

HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

12. Kilosbayan vs. Manuel L. Morato

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel
and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb.
21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease..It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned
because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no
bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO
does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE
CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from
the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination
of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of
the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

13. Atty. Oliver Lozano vs. Speaker Prospero Nograles

Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers,
prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to
Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All
the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the
Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to
amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments
to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.

Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held: No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for
proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and
adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent
Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure
have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion
has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that
would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.

14. League of Cities of the Phils. Vs. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas
assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the
effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought
to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No.
29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following
the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held: We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not
a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years
later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the
11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

15. VenancioInonog vs. Judge Francisco Ibay

FACTS: The administrative case stemmed from the SinumpaangSalaysay of Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati
City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for
which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his superior's vehicle at the
parking space reserved for respondent judge. Respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the
delay in the promulgation of the decision in 4 criminal cases scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter
had a hard time looking for another parking space. That same day, respondent judge issued another order, finding
complainant guilty of contempt.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross abuse of authority.

RULING: YES.The Supreme Court held that power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order
in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt
for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions
they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly,
with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the
court, not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a
clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law. Besides possessing the requisite learning in
the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. Respondent judge himself has characterized this incident as a "petty disturbance"
and he should not have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste valuable court time and
resources on a trivial matter.

Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found guilty of grave abuse of authority. He was ordered to pay a FINE of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)

16. Biraogo vs. Phil. Truth Commission

FACTS:For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)
is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office
of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUES:Whether or not EO No. 1 is Unconstitutional

HELD:Yes.The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to
the courts.Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy
or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power
to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of
the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functusoficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits
of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its
investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter
1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class."Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power
that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof,
it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also
includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict
between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the
Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government isdone in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.

GRANTED.

17. AttyRumulo B. Macalintal vs. Pres. Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal from a decision dismissing his
petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.

Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET that Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. Thus, PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution,
petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the
concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by
the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President,
as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the
absence of an act of legislature.

ISSUE: Whether the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is constitutional.

HELD: The decision of the Court still stands on its constitutionality We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.The explicit reference by the framers of our
Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word,
mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose
as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of
the PET.Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect. Thus:

Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the
Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the
process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate
Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of
independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task,
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant
experience, is not unwarranted.A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to
the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through
the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.It is also beyond
cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what
is essentially a judicial power.With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution
draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from
the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the
means to use it, is a nullity."The decision therein held that the PTC "finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution." A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of
Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the
Executive and the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the
PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of
the present Constitution.

The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

Section 3

18. Bengzon vs. Drilon, supra

FACTS:Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions
under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was
eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men
was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her
advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier
veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It
follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were
never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.
HELD:The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should
be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and
subsisting.

Section 4

18. Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. vs. CA et al

FACTS:Phil.Remnants Co. constituted BPI to manage, administer and sell its real property located in Pasig, Metro
Manila.BPI gave authority to real estate broker Pedro Revilla Jr. to sell the lot for P1000 per square meter.Revilla
contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land and thereafter was allowed to view the land.Lim
and Alfonso LImketkai went to BPI to confirm the sale and both finally agreed that the land would be sold for P1000 per
square meter. Notwithstanding the agreement, Alfonso asked BPI if it was possible to pay in terms provided that in case
the term is disapproved, the price shall be paid in cash.

Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July
18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated
that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit

An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the
course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS

ISSUE:WON there was a perfected contract of sale between Limketkai Co. and BPI.

HELD:There was already a perfected contract of sale because both parties already agreed to the sale of P1000/sq.m.
Even if Lim tried to negotiate for a payment in terms, it is clear that if it be disapproved, the payment will be made in cash.

The perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to sell and Alfonso Lim with
Albino Limketkai, acting for petitioner Limketkai, agreed to buy the disputed lot at P1,000.00 per square meter. Aside from
this there was the earlier agreement between petitioner and the authorized broker. There was a concurrence of offer and
acceptance, on the object, and on the cause thereof.

The phases that a contract goes through may be summarized as follows:

a. preparation, conception or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining, ending at the moment of
agreement of the parties;

b. perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on the terms of the contract;
and

c. consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon in the contract

Section 5

19. Drilon vs. Lim

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further,
That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance
No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution
and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. 2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor
General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for reconsideration
with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the
issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over
all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the
proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation
of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be
prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before
declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional
insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the
familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not
of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not
only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the
policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that
in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As
we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the
act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the
Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the
Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise:
Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within
one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or
imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and
when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a
whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet
the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or
parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not
reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had
been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before
this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to
do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the
Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another
matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila
Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had
been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with
Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog
and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary
only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25
exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it
of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as
evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and
C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the
July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering
that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not
been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in
issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar
as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

20. Larranaga vs. CA

FACTS;On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP
CIG)went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the
arrest andimmediately phoned his sister and brother-in-law. Petitioners sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A.
Armovit. Atty.Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the police officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed
to meet with themat the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police officers yielded and returned to the
CIG headquarters.Petitioner, together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG headquarters aboard their
own vehicle. Atty. Armovitquestioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben Zacarias. After
consulting with his superiors,Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty.
Armovit made an undertaking inwriting that he and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on
September 17, 1997 for preliminaryinvestigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC ofCebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the
necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioneralleged that he must be released and be subject to a
preliminary investigation. However p e n d i n g t h er e s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u r t f o r t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r
a r i , p r o h i b i t i o n and mandamus with writs ofpreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner,
RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to thepetitioner.

ISSUE:WON the arrest of Petitioner Larraga without a warrant was legal?

RULING:No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a private person. To be
sure,even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence
of a warrant.It does not appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting
to commit anoffense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was attending
classes at the Centerfor Culinary Arts at that time.

21. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. Vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the
Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as
the Board of Investments (BOI). BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles." OppositorMariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics,
Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed
a petition for review with CA. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since
the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be
filed directly with the Supreme Court.While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been
between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular
1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of
enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute
was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Facts: Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., was registered as a non-pioneer enterprise with public respondent BOI
having been so issued a Certificate of Registration under Executive Order NO. 226, also known as the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of glazed floor tiles. Among the specific terms and conditions imposed on
First Lepantos registration were that: (1) The enterprise shall export at least 50% of its production; and (2) The enterprise
shall produce only glazed floor tile. In a letter addressed to the BOI, First Lepanto requested for an amendment of its
registered product to ceramic tiles in order to likewise enable it to manufacture ceramic wall tiles; however, before the
BOI could act on First Lepantos request for amendment, Mariwasa and Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc., already had on file
their separate complaints with the BOI against First Lepanto for violating the terms and conditions of its registration by the
use of its tax and duty-free equipment in the production of ceramic wall tiles. The BOI rendered a decision finding First
Lepanto guilty and imposing on the latter a fine of P797,950.40 without prejudice, however, 1) to an imposition of
additional penalty should First Lepanto continue to commit the same violation; and 2) to the Boards authority to consider/
evaluate First Lepantos request for an amendment of its certificate of registration, including, among other things, a
change in its registered product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. After paying the imposed fine, First Lepanto
formally filed its application with the BOI to amend its registered product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. On 06
August 1992, another verified complaint was filed by Mariwasa with the BOI which asseverated that, despite BOIs finding
that First Lepanto had violated the terms and conditions of its registration, the latter still continued with its unauthorized
production and sale of ceramic wall tiles. Respondent BOI dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Mariwasa appealed the case to the Office of the President. In the meantime, First
Lepanto caused the publicationin the Manila Bulletin of a notice on the official filing with the BOI of the aforementioned
application for amendment of Certificate of Registration No. EP 89-452. Mariwasa opposed the application. On 10
December 1992, respondent BOI handed down its decision approving First Lepantos application.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision of the Board of Investments

Held:The BOI is the agency tasked with evaluating the feasibility of an investment project and to decide which investment
might be compatible with its development plans. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter
that can best be discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts. BOI has allowed the amendment
of First Lepantos product line because that agency believes that allowing First Lepanto to manufacture wall tiles as well
will give it the needed technical and market flexibility, a key factor, to enable the firm to eventually penetrate the world
market and meet its export requirements. It is basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.

22. Aruelo v. CA

Facts: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five
days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day
period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said
pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

Issue: whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular
courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I
provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the
Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquowarranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular
courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

23. Javellana v. DILG

Facts: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989,
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and (2) for oppression, misconduct and
abuse of authority. Divinagracias complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or
SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that
on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages putting him in public ridicule;
that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG
Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38. On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the
complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor
Javellana, presented their respective evidence. Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a
permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis
T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective
officials. In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellanas motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991. Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, Thatsanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedingsinvolving the local government unit of which he is
an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

Issue: whether or not DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme
Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law

Held: No. Petitioners contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Courts power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where
the law allows it.

24. Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees

FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal
Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states:

SEC. 22.Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx

The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates
necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the
GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the
GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws,
ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx

Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Courts order,
the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the
comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees
has no legal basis.

ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government
units?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed
under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED . NO

Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Sec
5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x xxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
x xxxxxxx

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this
Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.

NOTES:

-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of its petition. It is a
corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members
are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members.

-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees
under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of
these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy. Legal
fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence.

-Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making
power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:

Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter
or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in
the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946
up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that x xx the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question. The venerable jurist further ruled: It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license. By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated
the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x xx which,
however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the BatasangPambansa x xx. More completely, Section 5(2)5 of
its Article X provided:

x xxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
x xxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the BatasangPambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

x xxxxxxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x xxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive.

Section 6

25. Maceda v. Vasquez

Facts: Petitioner BonifacioSanzMaceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the
review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-
parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon
A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6,
1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that
no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an
extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges
certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the
Supreme Court
Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of
this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the Supreme Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same
to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

26. Raquiza vs. Judge Castaeda Jr.

Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate
of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castaeda to another branch and
administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it
to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery.

After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved on August
3, 1976 to refer the a administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation. Under date of September 1, 1977 and after duly hearing the parties, Justice Bautista submitted the
following report:

Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza charges the dent Hon. Mariano Castaeda Jr., under four counts, namely:

I. Violation of the Anti-Graft Law;

II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal;
III. Extortion by means of oppression; and
IV. Bribery.
I Under Count I. complainant charges respondent of giving Mrs. NatividadCastellviRaquiza and Mrs. Nieves Toledo-
Gozun unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in violation of paragraph (e), Section 3, Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law. which reads:

Sec. 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxxxxxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of hisofficial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
respondent bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from the second release of P1,000,000.00 for
the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. Complainant further
claims that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the Castellvi Estate and in the case of Mrs. Gozun she has
no right to be given a share of the second release as it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.

Complainant also charges respondent under paragraph (f), section 3 of Republic Act 3019 which provides:

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
any matter Pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of discriminating against any other interested party.

in having allegedly neglected or refused after several motions and oral demands, the release of the amount of
P1,000,000.00 (Treasury Warrant No. D-04,231,948) to the Raquiza children thereby giving undue advantage to both Mrs.
Raquiza and Mrs. Gozun discriminating against the Raquiza children.
II Under Count II, complainant charges respondent with a violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code for
knowingly and deliverately issuing his illegal orders of February 25, and 26, 1976 allowing Mrs. Raquiza to obtain a loan
of P200,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using the equivalent amount in the second release of P1,000,000.00
deposited in the bank in the name of the Castellvi Estate as collateral. Complainant contends that respondent Judge
knows that Mrs. Raquiza has no more participation or interest in or any rights to the Castellvi Estate since according to the
records in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled "Pobre vs. NatividadCastellviRaquiza," both parties agreed to give all the
properties subject matter of the suit to the Raquiza children.

III Under Count III, complainant alleges that respondent committed attempted extortion by oppression in that after Mrs.
Raquiza got the total of P330,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank in connection with the first release of
P1,000,000.00, he visited the respondent Judge in his house asking that he would also release the balance of
P300,000.00 to the Raquiza children because part of the money would be used by complainant in going to the United
States for his eye treatment; and that respondent promised to give the necessary order the following day. Complainant
went to Pampanga the following morning per advice of respondent and saw the judge in his private chamber; that the
judge invited complainant to a corner of the room and told him that he needed money, that taken aback by such alleged
act of graft and corruption, complainant shouted in a very loud voice, "You are corrupt." There is graft and corruption in
this office and then left the room; but that following the saying, "a man in need is a beggar", complainant called the judge
a few days later and assistant. that they were reconciled but nonetheless. the respondent despite several requests from
Atty. Yuzon, counsel for the complainant, consistently failed to comply with his promise that he would release money for
the Raquiza children; that after the reconciliation, complainant visited the respondent Judge in his house and the latter
promised to give the order the following day; that it was only after repeated trips of Atty. Yuzon or his assistant. Mr.
GracioDacutan, to Pampanga that the respondent Judge released the total amount of P350,000.00 to the Raquiza
children; that as the Raquiza children urgently needed some of the money for themselves, the balance was not enough
anymore to finance the trip of the complainant to the United States; hence, he asked again the President to release
another P1,000,000.00; that the complainant brands the imposition of this hardships by respondent Judge, which is
supposedly a case of extortion by means of oppression where respondent subjected complainant, his counsel Atty. Yuzon
and his assistant GracioDacutan, had to shuttle everyday for a period of about one month between Manila to Pampanga
to get the promised order of release which never came up to the present.

IV As to the fourth count, the complainant charges the respondent of bribery, in that "he (respondent) gets bribe money
from Mrs. Raquiza and surely from all other parties;" that on the first release of P1,000,000.00, respondent Judge extorted
P70,000.00 from Mrs. Raquiza out of the release of about P330,000.00.

In his comment or answer to the charges, respondent alleged that those indictments are devoid of factual and/or legal
basis because:

As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust and illegal judgment), respondent Mrs.
Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi Estate because by testamentary provision approved by final judgment,
NatividadCastellviRaquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of the estate although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had
been transferred to her children by virtue of a compromise agreement submitted by Urbane Pobre in Civil Case No. 2761
entitled UrbanoPobre vs. NatividadCastellvi-Raquiza (Exhs. 2 & 3, Orders of Judge Honorio Romero dated March 29,
1971 and May 26, 1971 in Sp. Proc. No. 6824). Note that a case for reconveyance was filed by NatividadCastellviRaquiza
(Civil Case No. 3509 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against her children. Said case is still pending hearing
and decision according to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after careful study of the records (16 big
volumes) of Special Proceeding No. 6824 that he granted on June 19, 1975 the motion of Mrs. Raquiza filed on January
23, 1975 for authority to obtain loan believing that Mrs. Raquiza still has a share, interest and participation in the subject
estate.

Respondent also explained that the testate estate of Alfonso Castellvi is still on liquidation when the first release of 1
million was made by the government in partial payment of the expropriated property of the estate; that as several claim of
creditors have not been paid, respondent was not inclined at the outset to allow any Cash release; and that the second
release of 1 million could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children, much less for the use of the complainant
in his trip to the United States for his eye treatment as claimed; that the reason given in complainant's request to the
President dated December 29, 1975 for the release of the P1 million out of the P2,600,000.00 was that the money would
be used "in patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world" (Exh. 5); that complainant's
representative capacity as attorney-in-fact of his children as well as the purpose for seeking the withdrawal of the entire
second release of P1 million is questionable because Lily Raquiza, one of the complainant's children, denied having
signed or granted any power of attorney (p. 32, Rollo); that in view of the foregoing, respondent judge could not properly
be charged with having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment or interlocutory order.

As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):

Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant is highly improbable; that complainant
did not describe the' shouting spree' incident faithfully because:

Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with his official functions and without
promising complainant anything, advised the latter to see respondent in his office; that the following morning when
complainant went to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and other lawyers and two or three of the court's personnel
were inside the chamber; that complainant then pleaded for help that he would be able to go to the United States for his
eye treatment, saying that after all the first release was authorized by the President precisely for that purpose; that
complainant wanted in the corresponding order to be issued by respondent that so much amount of his children's shares
in the second release should be specifically ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way, respondent
explained to complainant of the unsettled claims of creditors of the late that even more complainant was not the movant
but his children and what his children would want to lend him is a matter between him and his children; that complainant
then replied, "Judge, if you would not give me the small amount I need, I will be your number one enemy ... you chut"; that
respondent stood up to reach for his crutches (respondent then had swollen foot due to his arthritis) and ordered 'Arrest
that man' but complainant had already left; that complainant's accusation is the height of absurdity since respondent
would not be that stupid and careless to choose his court chamber (barely 2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) and in the presence of
many listeners and viewers to attempt an extortion against complainant, a man of known stature, an ex-Governor.
Congressman, Cabinet member and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.

As to Charge IV - (Bribery):

Respondent explains this is unthinkable because

Petitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converse with. To talk to her, one has to speak loud or
shout. She could much less be whispered to. This considering, one could not ask something from her without being heard.
Write her a note, for evidence in order to be caught This is absurd.

that authority was given Mrs. Raquiza only on June 19, 1975 almost 5 months of study of her motion filed on January 23,
1975; that the authority was for P500,000.00, which was even reduced to only P333,000.00 or 1/3 of P1,000,000.00 when
such release was known.

As the letter complaint and the answer or comment of respondent are both verified, they were adopted as part of the
respective evidence of the parties. They also introduced additional oral and documentary proofs. Besides complainant, his
counsel Atty. Manuel Yuson and the latter's assistant. GracioDacutan, testified. For the respondent, Atty. Celia
Macapagal, Atty. Vicente Sicat and respondent Judge offered testimonial and documentary evidence.

After a careful study of all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated. There is factual and legal basis for
respondent's conclusion that Mrs. Raquiza has still a share or participation in the Castellvi estate and that Mrs. Gozun has
likewise a right to be given a share of the second release. As to the first (Mrs. Raquiza,' her right as instituted heir of 2/3 of
the estate is recognized by final judgment although by compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children
(Exh. 2). The Raquiza children sought a reconsideration of the order of Judge Romero (Exh. 2), but the motion was
denied by the same Judge (Exh. 3). There appears no appeal from said order.

Moreover, the Raquiza children subsequently respected the remaining share of their mother by expressly agreeing to her
request to the Philippine Veterans Bank president for additional loan (Exh. 4).

It is not also rebutted that several claims chargeable against the estate has not been completely settled for which reason
respondent at the outset refused to grant any release. However, for humanitarian considerations and

... mainly on the basis of the President's handwritten note on complainant's letter, dated July 16, 1975 (Exh. 8),
respondent authorized the withdrawal from the funds of the Castellvi Estate in the Philippines Veterans Bank derived from
the first release of P1 million, for the delivery to the Raquiza children Daisy, Antonio. Jr.. Levy and Douglas, in the amount
of P248,000.00, and an additional amount of P20,000.00, under his orders, dated August 20, 1975 and November 24,
1975 respectively; and a separate amount of P60,000.00 to complainant's daughter Lily Raquiza (Exh. 9 and 19); and
after the said Raquiza children were granted their aforementioned shares, respondent ordered the immediate payment of
Mrs. Raquiza's loan by the said bank, in the amount of P330,000.00;

19 That under his letter, dated December 29, 1975, (Exh. 5), complainant requested again the President to release P1
million from the funds of the Castellvi Estate to the Raquiza children to be used by them in patenting the Super-Gas
Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world', and after the President authorized the release of PI million by the
Government subject to the availability of funds, the Treasurer of the Philippines, following the recommendation of the
TJAG of the AFP, issued Treasury Warrant No. D-281-948 for payment to the Castellvi Estate, which was actually
released to the Phil. Veterans Bank, by the Army, on February 11, 1976;

As regards the payment to Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun it appears that of the three expropriated properties, one parcel
belongs to the Castellvi Estate while two parcels are owned by Maria Nieves Toledo, who at the time when payment was
ordered, had not yet received any partial payment and had filed a motion for execution (Civil Case No. 1623 or G.R. No.
L-20620) praying for partial payment. As respondent correctly argues, '... for reasons of justice and equity (he) just
followed the mandate of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974, for payment of the corresponding just
compensation to both owners of the properties condemned.' Thus, in sharing landowner Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun in
the second release, respondent had factual and legal basis and can hardly be branded as giving "unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference" under paragraph (e), section 3 of the Anti-Graft Law.
Similarly, considering that Mr. Raquiza has a sham in the Castellvi estate which is still on liquidation; that the second
release could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children nor for complainant's trip to the United States for his
alleged eye treatment; and that complainant's authority to represent all his children had been questioned by no less than
one of his children, I find it hard to respondent Judge knowing that they unjust and illegal.

Relative to the charge of extortion by means of oppression, the undersigned believes as more probable the version
testified to by the respondent at the investigation as well as in his verified comment. Indeed, it would be stretching
credibility to its b point to believe that in a small room (2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) the respondent would have thrown all
precautions to the winds and demand bribe money in the presence of Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Sicat, Atty. Yuzon,
Fiscal Macalino, Messrs. Yalong and Dacutan- Complainant's version cannot stand the test of common experience and
the ordinary instincts of human nature and therefore should be disbelieved. There is no evidence presented by
complainant that when he visited that respondent in the latter's residence in Quezon City, the respondent asked for
money. There is more privacy in respondent's home rather than in his small office and yet respondent in a place of
absolute privacy never asked or demanded for bribe money.

One salient fact also denies the veracity of the version of the complainant relative to the "shouting incident." It is not
denied that at the time the respondent could hardly stand and walk without crutches. He could not have stood therefore on
a corner of the court chamber during the incident. What is more, as he was seated on a chair at the end of his desk to the
right and that since complainant was only one meter away from him, the conversation naturally would have been audible
and the witnesses inside the court chamber never testified that the respondent was asking money from the complainant.
The evidence also remains unrebutted that a few days after the said incident, the complainant apologized to the
respondent for what he had done. On top of it all, it is difficult to believe that the respondent would have committed
extortion or attempted extortion against the complainant, who is reputedly of high stature, not counting that he was a
former provincial governor, congressman, cabinet member and delegate to the Constitutional Convention and it could
have taken so much nerve and daring to do such an act.

As regards the fourth charge of bribery, complainant claims that Mrs. Raquiza had told him that out of the P300,000.00
she obtained as loan from the first release of P1 million, she gave P70,000.00 to the respondent, the undersigned also
finds that this charge was not substantiated. In the first place, the testimony is purely hearsay. As the complainant testified
on cross-examination:

Q Your other charge is bribery. You mentioned that the Judge extorted P70,000 from Mrs. Raquiza, what is your basis ?
A It was told to me by Mrs. Raquiza.
Q I thought you are a widower?
A I am separated from her, but she comes to the house very often.
INVESTIGATOR:
May the Investigator inquire, is that separation legal
A I filed a divorce in the States.
xxxxxxxxx
Q So you are not a widower?
A I am a widower.
Q I cannot understand that?
A Yes, I am married to another woman.
Q You said you were told by Mrs. Raquiza?
A She told me she practically spent 1/2 of what was given to her.
xxxxxxxxx
Q So, your basis is what you got from Mrs. Raquiza
A Yes.
Q Of your own personal knowledge, you don't know that?
A I have not seen Mrs. Raquiza giving the money to him. (pp. 16 17,18, tsn., Feb. 2, 1977)
Mrs. Raquiza was not presented to testify on the matter. The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the
respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him
should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands
that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less.
This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general
rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National Intelligence and
Security Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs. Bullecer 64 SCRA 289; MelquiadesUdani Jr. vs.
Pagharion 65 SCRA 549)

Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment'
(Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if respondent were not collect in his legal
conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And
undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.
We have reviewed the record, including the pt of the testimonies of the witnesses and the other evidence submitted by the
parties. After careful consideration thereof, We find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in
the above report to be well taken and fully sup. ported by the evidence on record.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is exonerated and the
administrative case against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge is
denied.

Section 10

27. Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS: Petitioners Nitafan, Polo and Savellano are judges presiding over branches in the RTC of the NCJR Manila who
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
According to them, said tax deductions constitute a diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not salaries of the members of the Judiciary are subject to income tax.

RULING: YES. The salaries of the members of the Judiciary is subject to general income tax applicable to all taxpayers.
The clear intent of the ConComm was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax, so
as to give substance to equality among the three branches of Government. Though this intent was not clearly set forth in
the final text of the Constitution, the Court since then has authorised the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries
of said members.

FACTS: Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek
to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD: No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose
income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.

Section 11

28. De La Llana vs. Alba

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of
the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP
129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.

RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services.
What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

29. People v. Gacott

Facts: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City
Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the
criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic
Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an
opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series
of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City
Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.

Issue: whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorar

Held: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI
No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed
more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in
his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the
respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National
Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).

General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers
have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs.
Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers
to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or
repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly
ordains:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Section 12

In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as
the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that
his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?

Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency
performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules
and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining
any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems
involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the
expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by
those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

Section 14

31. Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. CA

FACTS: (1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned
constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their
testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the
sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or
legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.

(2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United
Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at
Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held
on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.

(3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired,
substantially complies with the rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts decision is unconstitutional

HELD:WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of theCourt of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the
Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the
appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law.

RATIO:

(1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII,
Section 14, of the Constitution.

(2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with a
n explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

(3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this
second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was
fatal to the order.

(4) Kilometric decisions without much substance must be

avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual
findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its ruling and having done so ends.

32. Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. CA

Before the Court is a pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file
Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in the
least depart from or enervate the specific prohibition against second motions for reconsideration 1 which are applicable
thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for
their debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once again express its
displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious
pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity.

Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and irregularities in the disposition of this case to
both the Court of Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct on the part of counsel for
respondent private corporation and with specific imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection
therewith. These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for
said private respondent.

Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision
of respondent Court of Appeals 2 was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. 3 This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second
Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the extended resolution of respondent court denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition for review on certiorari,
the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective
annexes of said pleadings. Indeed, the parties had all the opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case,
and in some instances even the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such pleadings.

Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required respondents to comment thereon, after
which petitioner's reply filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave sought and granted,
respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings, just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so
extensive, to the point of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all possible aspects of the case to
subserve the partisan views of the parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant the
reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January 26, 1998.4

It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should further have been allowed to file
memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition, while simultaneously insinuating that
its pleadings were not read. Indeed, petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its petition, with
the improbable theory that because the case had progressed to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course
and a decision be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably erroneous submission that since
respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved. Firstly,
this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option
review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly, and worse for petitioner,
there is no conflict in the factual findings of the two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of
fact of the trial court.

In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing this Court on its theory that the
"minute resolutions" it assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present Constitution. In
characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can
be subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court
may likewise be minded to take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all and sundry to now
imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.

As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 5 it has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' decision.

This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., 6 and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on Audit, et al. 7 that the
constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor
stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to
deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the
respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 8

For, as expounded more in detail in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: 9

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and
decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always
gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: WenceslaoLaureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987]), "[T]he Court is not "duty
bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" (Emphasis supplied). This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly discharge its constitutional functions. . . .

x xx x xx x xx

In G.R. No. 76355, MacarioTayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the
constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as
referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No
petition for review . . . shall be refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII,
Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments,
or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible
error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.

The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through its two resolutions, after a thorough review of
the issues and arguments of the parties in the plethora of pleadings they have filed, is not only in accord with but is
justified by this firm and realistic doctrinal rule:

. . . The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall be framed. It has
long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-
blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review
on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been
stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Review is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion." A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court
of Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. 10

That this Court was fully justified in handing down its minute resolutions because it "agrees with or adopts the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals" since "the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct," is best
demonstrated and appreciated by reproducing the salient pronouncements of respondent court on the real issues actually
involved in this case. The material holdings in its decision 11 of June 28, 1996 are as follows:

The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:

Sometime in 1975, NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) and a Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure PNB. (Exh."M" of petitioner and Exh."22" of respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC,
T.S.N. October 14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated April 24, 1975 was
executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of NIDC, covering, among others, a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced
in and covered by TCT No. 469737 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal (now Makati, Metro Manila). At the
instance of Respondent PNB and with the conformity of its subsidiary, NIDC, in order to secure the obligation of Petitioner
KIPI under Respondent PNB's deferred letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan,
Petitioner KIPI executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 covering the same parcel of land and its
improvements under TCT No. 469737 on a paripassu basis in favor of Respondent PNB and NIDC. (Exhibit "H", "H-1" to
"H-9"). Upon full payment of Petitioner KIPI's account with NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC
executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage 12 dated January 7, 1981 releasing the mortgage on TCT No.
469737 (Exhibit "1" to "1-4" of Petitioner and Exhibits "7" to "7-D" of Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC). In this Deed
of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, it is provided among the whereas that "Whereas, the credit accommodations
had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC". (Exh. "1-5"). By virtue of this full
payment and the execution of the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owner's copy of the
TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage was registered with
the Registry of Deed on January 28, 1981. (Exhibits "E" to "E-5") (sic) that there were some accounts chargeable to
Petitioner KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened and established in 1974 and 1975 settled by Respondent PNB with the
foreign suppliers in 1978 and 1979 but came to the knowledge of Respondent PNB only in 1981 and 1982 (Exhibits "21-1"
to "21-L". T.S.N. May 20, 1992 pp. 16-30).

In a letter to Petitioner KIPI dated March 31, 1992, Respondent PNB requested for the return of the owner's copy of TCT
No. 469737 (Exh. "22"). On July 7, 1982 in a letter addressed to Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, then President of Petitioner KIPI,
Respondent PNB reiterated for the return of the aforesaid TCT No. 469737 (Exh. "22-A") and the said title was returned to
Respondent PNB.

On May 7, 1982, Respondent PNB filed a "Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse Claim" with the office of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila and was able to have the same annotated at the back of TCT No. 469737
(Exh. "9" joint exhibit of Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC).

On November 2, 1983, Respondent PNB filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati, Metro Manila a Petition of Sale under
ACT 1508, as amended by P.D. 385 to extra-judicially foreclose various properties belonging to Petitioner by virtue of a
Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated June 21, 1978 (Exhibits "J" to "J-4").

On November 25, 1983, Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriff's Sale to the effect that the land covered by
TCT No. 469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19, 1983 at 9:00 a.m. (Exhs. "K" to "K-2")."

x xx x xx x xx
Simplifying and summing up all the assigned errors of both appellants Philippine National Bank and Santiago Land
Development Corporation, there are actually three main issues to be resolved in this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the "Deed
of Release" dated January 7, 1981 executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of
appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. [Exhibit "I", p. 76 Record Vol. I; Exhibit "7", p. 1494 Record Vol. IV], had the
effect of releasing the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the "Amendment
of Mortgage Deed" dated June 21, 1978 [Exhibit "H", p. 64 Record Vol. I; Exhibit "6", p. 1482 Record Vol. IV]; (2)
Whether the foreclosure of appellee's property conducted on May 17, 1984 is valid; (3) Whether there is legal and/or
factual basis for the awards of damages in favor of the appellee.

Anent the first issue, We rule that the "Deed of Release" dated January 7, 1981 executed solely by the National
Investment and Development Corporation in favor of the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc., did not operate to
release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the "Amendment
of Mortgage Deed" dated June 21, 1978. Said "Deed of Release" is not binding upon the appellant Philippine National
Bank which was not a signatory to it and has not ratified the same.

It is axiomatic under Our law on obligations and contracts that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs (Art. 1311, New Civil Code). The characteristic of "relativity of contracts" renders it binding only upon the parties
and their successors. [Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Paras, Vol. IV 1994 ed., pp. 550-552]. A contract cannot
be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol.
IV 1995 ed., p. 428 citing Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336, Ibaez vs. Rodriguez, 47 Phil. 554, etc.] even if he is aware of
such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995, p. 428 citing
Manila Port Service et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 20 SCRA 1214]. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the
act, declaration, or omission of another, and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except as expressly provided
by law or the Rules of Court [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 / Rule 123 sec. 10 Rules of
Court].

We accordingly find no legal basis for the court's ruling that the "Deed of Release" dated January 7, 1981, had the effect
of releasing the mortgage in favor of appellant bank despite the fact that it was executed solely by the National Investment
and Development Corporation without any conformity or authority whatsoever of its joint mortgagee, the appellant
Philippine National Bank. It is not disputed that PNB is a corporation with a separate and distinct personality from that of
NIDC. The court a quo erred in holding that PNB recognized the release of the mortgage as shown by its Exhibit "22"
wherein Vice President Ramirez stated in his memo to the Litigation and Collection Division of the PNB that upon
discovery of the aforecited release of the mortgage, "we immediately wrote NIDC informing them that KIPI effected the
release of PNB's mortgage using NIDC's Deed of Release". The same memo stated that PNB requested KIPI to return the
title for the reannotation of PNB's mortgage "which was erroneously cancelled" (p. 1712, Record). Accordingly, the same
exhibit indubitably showed that PNB promptly objected to the erroneous cancellation of the mortgage in its favor.
Moreover, as above pointed out, an agreement cannot bind one who is not a party even if he had knowledge of the
agreement and had acted on the basis thereof.

Moreover, a reading of the Amendment of Mortgage Deeds executed by Komatsu, PNB and NIDC, will show that it
covered not only the credit accommodations obtained by Komatsu with NIDC as described in the first whereas clause, but
also another obligation arising from the establishment of a deferred letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00, and other credit
accommodations. We quote from the said Amendment:

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Deed of Mortgage in favor of NIDC referred to
in the first "Whereas" clause hereof shall be as it is hereby amended in the sense that the mortgage shall be in favor of
PNB and NIDC, their successors and assigns on a pari-passu basis to secure the respective obligations of the
MORTGAGOR to PNB and NIDC as follows:

NIDC : a) Direct loan of P8,000,000.00.

: b) Guarantee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 issued in favor of PNB to secure the Credit Line of MORTGAGOR with
PNB

PNB : US $1,564,826.00 or equivalent in Philippine Currency by way of deferred Letter of Credit issued by PNB in favor of
Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, thru Republic National Bank of New York, N.Y.

plus interest and charges as well as all other obligations, whether direct or indirect, primary or secondary, as appearing in
the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB and other reasonable expenses and charges arising thereunder,
whether such obligations have been contracted before, during or after date hereof. Subject to condition No. 4
hereinbelow, in case the MORTGAGOR execute subsequent promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former
note, an extension thereof, as new loan, or is given any kind of accommodations such as overdraft, letters of credit,
acceptance and bills of exchange, release of import shipments, on trust receipts etc., this mortgage shall also stand as
security for the payment of said promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations without necessity of executing new
contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory note or notes and/or
accommodations were existing on the date hereof. However, if the MORTGAGOR shall pay to the MORTGAGEES, their
successors or assigns the obligations secured by this mortgage, together with interest, costs and other expenses on or
before the date they are due and shall keep and perform all the covenants and agreements herein contained for the
MORTGAGOR then this mortgage shall be null and void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect. (pp. 65-66,
Record).

It is clear that the reference to the credit accommodations consisting of P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00
guarantee mentioned in the third "whereas" clause of the Deed of Release "as having been fully paid by the borrower"
was to these two obligations obtained from NIDC, and not to the other obligation described in the Amended Mortgage as
pertaining to PNB directly, arising from the issuance of the deferred letter of credit in the amount of US $1,564,826.00, the
express inclusion of which obligation in the Amended Mortgage cannot be ignored. It is equally clear that NIDC was in no
position to state that Komatsu's direct obligation to PNB has been fully paid. And on the basic proposition above-stated
that the deed of release executed by NIDC cannot bind its joint mortgagee, which is an entirely different entity, We find
that the courta quo erroneously invoked the 3rd whereas clause stating that "the credit accommodations had been fully
paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC".

We are thus unable to accept the trial court's reasoning that the release executed by NIDC will "necessarily include" the
mortgage to PNB. The hypothesis that NIDC being a wholly owned subsidiary of its joint mortgagee could not have
executed the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage without the knowledge and consent of respondent PNB, "its
mother company", has no support in law and jurisprudence. Neither does the evidence of record show that any
confirmation or ratification of the release of mortgage was made by the PNB. Nothing short of an actual payment of the
debt or an express release will operate to discharge a mortgage (55 Am. Jur. 394).

Defendants-appellants also question the trial court's ruling that even granting that PNB's claim is correct that insofar as it
is concerned, the mortgage was not released it being a separate entity and the mortgage being on a pari-passu basis, the
extrajudicial foreclosure should be to the extent only of its proportionate credit.

We do not agree that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is null and void. A
mortgage is indivisible in nature, so that payment of a part of the secured debt does not extinguish the entire mortgage
(See Paras, Civil Code Anno., 1995 ed., Vol. V, p. 1044; Art. 2089, Civil Code). There is also no language in the mortgage
instrument to indicate otherwise, i.e. that the mortgage of the Pasong Tamo property is divisible, so that in case of the
payment of the obligation to one mortgagee the mortgage would subsist only to the extent of the remaining lien of the
other mortgagee. The mortgage instrument contemplated not only obligations existing on the date thereof, but also future
obligations or accommodations appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB, thus rendering it unlikely
and impractical for the parties to have intended a division of the mortgaged property in accordance with the proportionate
credits of the two joint mortgagors.

The case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 46) cited by the court a quo is not in point. It
refers to a mortgage of one parcel of land in favor of one mortgagee, where there was a failure of consideration, i.e. the
entire amount of the loan was not released to the mortgagor and the mortgage was thus held to be enforceable only to the
extent of the amount of the loan that was released. The factual situation in this case is obviously different. The mortgage
here is not being enforced for more than the actual sum due.

With respect to the court's pronouncement that the "Petition for Correction of Entry or Adverse Claim" cannot be made as
basis of any foreclosure proceeding, suffice it to point out that the records bear out defendants-appellants' claim that the
PNB filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135 pursuant to the provisions of the Amendment
of Mortgage Deed (Records, pp. 1482 to 1493). The Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, dated October 8,
1983, was made the basis for the issuance of the Notice of Sheriff's sale (Exhs. "9" to "9-d", "9-e" to "9-bbb", "9-ccc
Komatsu; Exhs. "10", "14" to "14-b", "15", "17" PNB,/SLDC). The plaintiff-appellee has not controverted the veracity of
these documents either in the court below or in its Appellee's brief. Accordingly, We rule that since the mortgage in favor
of PNB is still subsisting, the sheriff's sale on the basis of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is valid.

Finally, consistently with Our above ruling relative to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the non-binding effect
of the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation in so far as the mortgage in
favor of the appellant Philippine National Bank is concerned, We rule that the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. is
not entitled to any award of damages pursuant to the principle ofdamnumabsque injuria, i.e. there might have been a loss
(on the part of the appellee-mortgagor) arising from the foreclosure but said loss does not create a ground of legal
redress. A loss or damage which does not constitute the violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is damnum
absque injuria [HuyongHian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA 114, 134; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 548]. (Emphasis
supplied)

Consequently, respondent court reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 5957 and
declared legal and valid the First Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated November 12, 1983, the Second Notice of Sheriff's Sale
dated April 6, 1984, the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings held and conducted thereunder, the Certificate of Sale
dated May 17, 1984 and the registration thereof, the Final Deed of Sale, its registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued to respondent Philippine National Bank as the highest and lone bidder, the Deed of Sale in favor of and the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago Land Development Corporation.
Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its resolution 13 of January 14,
1997, from which we quote the following pertinent excerpts:

The motion for reconsideration has no merit.

We reiterate our ruling that the "Deed of Release" executed solely by National Investment and Development Corporation
did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in
the "Amendment of Mortgage Deed". This issue was fully discussed in our decision and We find no substantial argument
in the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner-appellee's memorandum or at the hearing, that would warrant a reversal of
our previous findings.

It is evident that the "Deed of Release" pertains only to the mortgage executed in favor of the National Investment and
Development Corporation whose credit has been fully paid. Insofar as the mortgage executed in favor of PNB is
concerned, the same subsists as the credit in the amount of $1,564,826.00 remained unpaid. Contrary to appellee's
submission, the "Deed of Release" executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation is not an exercise
in futility for said document actually released the indebtedness due to the National Investment and Development
Corporation consisting of an P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee loan.

Petitioner-appellee submits that in the light of Article 2089 of the Civil Code, the "Amendment of Mortgage Deed" is null
and void, and there was no valid mortgage in favor of PNB. Hence when the "Deed of Release" cancelled the only valid
mortgage in favor of National Investment Development Corporation, there was no more mortgage left to be foreclosed by
Philippine National Bank.

We do not agree.

At the outset, We note that the legality and validity of the "Amendment of Mortgage Deed" was never put in issue before
the trial court nor was it raised in the appeal proper. "If well recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for
the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only
in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court" [Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
249 SCRA 303].

At any rate, We are not inclined to uphold appellee's contention that the "Amendment of Mortgage Deed" (which is the
basis of the mortgage in favor of the PNB) is null and void on the argument that Article 2089 of the Civil Code "prohibits a
situation where two or more creditors, with separate and distinct credits secured a mortgage over a single property".

There is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits the mortgagor from mortgaging the same property for a
separate and distinct debt in favor of another creditor. In this jurisdiction, the mortgagor is allowed to obtain subsequent
loans by means of subsequent and successive mortgages on the same property. We further agree with appellant that "if
an owner-mortgagor can enter into second and further mortgages, there is no law that prohibits the mortgagor and the
mortgagee from agreeing that the mortgages would be pari-passu." What is proscribed by Article 2089 is for a debtor who
has mortgaged his property to secure a debt, to demand that the mortgage be released in proportion to the amount of the
debt he has paid. Under said article, the mortgagor has to pay the debt in full before he can ask for the release of the
mortgage. This is compatible with the principle that a mortgage is indivisible.

Our ruling that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is valid since the
mortgage is indivisible in nature is not inconsistent with our statement that "the Deed of Released executed solely by
National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor
of appellant Philippine National Bank". The fact that the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and
Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National
Bank, does not render the mortgage divisible. Indeed, foreclosure of the property in its entirety by Philippine National
Bank is necessary because of the indivisible nature of a mortgage. The fact that there are two obligations secured by the
same mortgaged property does not render the mortgage divisible. "The indivisibility of the mortgage or pledge does not
affect the divisibility of the principal obligation. When the same thing is pledged or mortgaged to several creditors, the
indivisibility of the pledge or mortgage entitled each and every creditor to the same action against the thing which is liable
in its entirety for the individual share of each creditor." [Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Vol. V, pp. 538-539,
1992 Ed.].

The rest of the arguments of the appellee in its motion for reconsideration are mere rehash of what have been raised in its
brief and were already fully considered and discussed in our decision. (Emphases ours)

In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthy and repetitious submissions of petitioner in its pleadings
filed with this Court as earlier enumerated, all the arguments therein are also mere rehashed versions of what it posited
before respondent court. We have patiently given petitioner's postulates the corresponding thorough and objective review
but, on the real and proper issues so completely and competently discussed and resolved by respondent court,
petitioner's obvious convolutions of the same arguments are evidently unavailing. It must be noted that its recourse to
respondent court was by appeal on writ of error, hence the preceding quotationinextenso of said court's decision readily
shows how the real issues were correctly particularized and summarized to meet petitioner's assignment of errors, and
then ably adjudicated on both evidential and legal grounds.
Petitioner has come to this Court this time on appeal by certiorari and it must be aware of the elementary rule that, as
emphasized in the decisions previously cited, a review thereunder is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. 14 Here, there is no novel question of
substance nor has respondent court decided the case contrary to law or our applicable decisions. On the contrary, it acted
with commendable fealty to the same, and that is the other reason why we extensively reproduced the pertinent
discussions in its challenged decision.

All these notwithstanding, petitioner still comes up with another supposed issue, this time faulting respondent court for
allegedly not resolving the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to redeem its foreclosed property from
respondent Philippine National Bank in the event the foreclosure thereof is held to be valid. We agree with respondents'
observation that this matter is not proper at this stage of the case since it was never raised in the complaint or admitted as
an issue at the pre-trial, but was raised only in petitioner's memorandum before the trial court. 15 Also, respondents point
out that the period of redemption had long lapsed since the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on May 17, 1984
and, citing applicable authorities, the one-year redemption period is not suspended by an action for nullification of the
auction sale.

What is more telling against petitioner's new proposition, however, is the documented fact that as early as April 17, 1985,
it executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption over the property in question in favor of Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing. 16 In fact, the exercise of such right of redemption by the assignee is involved in Civil Case No. 105 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, and the side issue of the right of respondent Santiago Land Development Corporation to
intervene therein was decided by this Court in G.R. No. 106194. On both substantive and procedural considerations,
therefore, petitioner's presentation of that so-called issue in the present appellate stage is an undue imposition on the time
of this Court.

We have stated, at the outset, that petitioner's second motion for reconsideration could have been correctly rejected
outright. But, as further noted, petitioner has distressingly adopted the lamentable technique contrived by losing litigants of
resorting to ascriptions of supposed irregularities in the courts of justice as the cause for their defeat. Here, petitioner
speaks of pressure having been employed by respondents against the trial court. It then proceeds to insinuate anomalous
haste on the part of respondent court in reversing the trial court, pointing to the supposed short period of time it took the
former to come out with its decision. It never even bothered to mention that the issues are actually very simple, that the
evidence is basically documentary, and that the questions raised are easily answered by applying settled doctrines of this
Court.

On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the yarn that retired Justice Teodoro Padilla first approached
the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and asked for a disposition in favor of respondents as a "birthday and
parting gift"; that said ponente declined and unloaded the case such that it was again raffled to a good friend of Justice
Padilla. The records, however, show that this case was directly raffled to the Second Division on January 28, 1997 and
there was no prior ponente to whom it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under the internal rules of this
Court, when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a second raffle.

Petitioner could have rendered a signal service to the judiciary if it had only verified and proved the facts it purveyed but
which are now belied even just by the internal rules of this Court, of which petitioner appears to be ignorant hence the
valor of his denunciation. The members of the Second Division of this Court vehemently deny and denounce the
animadversion on their allegedly having been approached by Justice Padilla regarding this case. The Padilla Law Office,
counsel for respondent private corporation, has submitted its response to the imputations against it, thus calling for
petitioner to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner for the aspersions it has cast upon
respondent Court of Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid law firm, Justice Teodoro Padilla and the Court of
Appeals, on the one hand, and to herein petitioner, on the other, to decide for themselves whether to further pursue this
incident in the proper proceedings.

On such contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce with a stern admonition that petitioner refrain from conduct
tending to create mistrust in our judicial system through innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be
proffered. Responsible litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual honesty on facts duly
ascertained can subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the pleader.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and EXPUNGED as an
unauthorized pleading. This resolution is immediately final and executory, and no further pleadings or motions will be
entertained.

SO ORDERED.

Issue: whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

Held: Resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained. And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision. The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the
Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the res

33. Prudential Bank vs. Castro

Facts:The case at bar relates to the disbarment of Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia.Prudential Bank instituted an administrative
case and ask the court for theinitiation of proceedings for hisdisbarment or suspension in connection with his actuations in
a civil case ("Macro Textile Millsdel Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants"), where he represented the
plaintiff.Issue:Whether or not the Courts decision violates the Constitution since it lacks certification by theChief Justice
that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assignedto a member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court.Whether or not aconstitutional provision has been disregarded in the Court's Minute
Resolutiondated January 12, 1988.

Held:The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the verybeginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by anyformal certification. Such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases. But even if such acertification were required, it is beyond doubt
that the conclusions of the Court in its decision werearrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the
members who actually took part in thedeliberations and voted attest to that.No constitutional provision has been
disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution, datedJanuary 12,1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for
lack of merit, the issues raised thereinhaving been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that
this is an administrativecase so that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
courtshallbe ... denied without stating the legal basis therefore" is inapplicable. And even if it were, saidResolution stated
the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutionalrequirement. "Lack of merit," which was
one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis

34. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor
of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED.

The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The present conflict between the
petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26,
1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300)
metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by
opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on
board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India.
However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did
not reach its point destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and
despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter,
negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric
tons of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port. However, upon inspection, the
Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent
that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates:

Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items
ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply
order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the
execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof
shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It
will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had
to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's
employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference.

The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for
any reason the Member of the Commission shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms
of the contract/supply order. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with reference from the stage at which it was left by
his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, or any Statutory modification or re-
enactment there of and the rules made there under and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration
proceedings under this clause.

The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from time to time, to make and publish the award.

The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. 1*

On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor setting forth the
arbitral award as follows:

NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the evidence, oral and documentarys adduced by the claimant
and carefully examining the various written statements, submissions, letters, telexes, etc. sent by the respondent, and the
oral arguments addressed by the counsel for the claimants, I, N.N. Malhotra, Sole Arbitrator, appointed under clause 16 of
the supply order dated 26.2.1983, according to which the parties, i.e. M/S Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the
Pacific Cement Co., Inc. can refer the dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the Arbitration Act. 1940, do
hereby award and direct as follows:

The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant:

1. Amount received by the Respondent
against the letter of credit No. 11/19
dated 28.2.1983 US $ 477,300.00
2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred
by the claimant on the inspection team's
visit to Philippines in August 1985 US $ 3,881.00
3. L.C. Establishment charges incurred
by the claimant US $ 1,252.82
4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant
from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 US $ 417,169.95
Total amount of award US $ 899,603.77
In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay to the claimant the interest at the rate of 6% on the
above amount, with effect from 24.7.1988 up to the actual date of payment by the Respondent in full settlement of the
claim as awarded or the date of the decree, whichever is earlier.

I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards the expenses on Arbitration, legal expenses, stamps
duly incurred by the claimant. The cost will be shared by the parties in equal proportion.

Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988. 2

To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in
Dehra Dun. India (hereinafter referred to as the foreign court for brevity), praying that the decision of the arbitrator be
made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court issued notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the
petition. The private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January 16, 1989. Subsequently, the said court
directed the private respondent to pay the filing fees in order that the latter's objections could be given consideration.
Instead of paying the required filing fees, the private respondent sent the following communication addressed to the Civil
judge of Dehra Dun:

The Civil Judge

Dehra Dun (U.P.) India
Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989
M/S Pacific Cement Co.,
Inc. vs. ONGC Case
Sir:
1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May 1989.
2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your letter did not mention the amount to be paid.
3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us how much to pay to comply with the same.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
Pacific Cement Co., Inc.
By:
Jose Cortes, Jr.

President 3

Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for
failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on February 7, 1990, to wit:

ORDER

Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit No. 5 on 7.2.90, therefore, award should be
made Rule of the Court.

ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of award decree is passed.
Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$
899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9%
interest per annum till the last date of realisation.4

Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or
demand has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The petitioner filed its opposition to the said motion to
dismiss, and the private respondent, its rejoinder thereto. On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order upholding the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue, albeit dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The RTC held that the
rule prohibiting foreign corporations transacting business in the Philippines without a license from maintaining a suit in
Philippine courts admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign corporation is suing on an isolated transaction as in this
case. 5 Anent the issue of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the RTC found the referral of the
dispute between the parties to the arbitrator under Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,

[a] perusal of the shove-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows that the matter covered by its terms is limited to "ALL
QUESTIONS AND DISPUTES, RELATING TO THE MEANING OF THE SPECIFICATION, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND
INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY OF WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS
ORDERED or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified to "IN ANY WAY ARISING OR
RELATING TO THE SUPPLY ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN, DRAWING, SPECIFICATION, etc.," repeating the
enumeration in the opening sentence of the clause.

The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the defendant that the breach, consisting of the non-delivery of
the purchased materials, should have been properly litigated before a court of law, pursuant to Clause No. 15 of the
Contract/Supply Order, herein quoted, to wit:

"JURISDICTION

All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this
supply order is situated." 6

The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to
want of jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had
therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an enforceable right. 7

The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its
decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute
between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the appellate court
observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no
findings of fact and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it
would violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 8 The appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the private
respondent's objections for non-payment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first replying to the private
respondent's query as to the amount of legal fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation of due process. Lastly,
it pointed out that the arbitration proceeding was defective because the arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner,
and the fact that the arbitrator was a former employee of the latter gives rise to a presumed bias on his part in favor of the
petitioner. 9

A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the appellate court's decision was denied, thus, this petition
for review on certiorari citing the following as grounds in support thereof:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF
DISMISSAL SINCE:

A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY THE PROVISIONS OF
CLAUSE 16 OF THE CONTRACT;

B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA WAS AN AFFIRMATION OF THE FACTUAL AND
LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITRATOR AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS JURISDICTION;

C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT UNDER A FOREIGN
JUDGMENT. 10
The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. To reiterate, Clause 16 provides as follows:

Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items
ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply
order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the
execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof
shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It
will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had
to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's
employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference. 11

The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the
petitioner. The primary question that may be posed, therefore, is whether or not the non-delivery of the said cargo is a
proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16. The petitioner contends that the same was a matter
within the purview of Clause 16, particularly the phrase, ". . . or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever,
in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract, design, drawing, specification, instruction . . .". 12 It is argued
that the foregoing phrase allows considerable latitude so as to include non-delivery of the cargo which was a "claim, right
or thing relating to the supply order/contract". The contention is bereft of merit. First of all, the petitioner has misquoted the
said phrase, shrewdly inserting a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" where none actually
exists. An accurate reproduction of the phrase reads, ". . . or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in
any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions . . .". The absence of a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" indicates that the
former cannot be taken separately but should be viewed in conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification,
instruction or these conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the purview of this phrase, the "claim, right or thing
whatsoever" must arise out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or instruction of the supply order/contract.
The petitioner also insists that the non-delivery of the cargo is not only covered by the foregoing phrase but also by the
phrase, ". . . or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during the
stipulated/extended period or after completion/abandonment thereof . . .".

The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is equally applicable in the ascertainment
of the meaning and scope of vague contractual stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase. According to the
maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words in which it is
found or with which it is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to
associated words. 13 A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers three matters which may be submitted to
arbitration namely,

(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein
before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered; or

(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract
design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions; or

(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period
or after the completion/abandonment thereof.

The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply/order contract. In the third category, the clause, "execution or failure
to execute the same", may be read as "execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract". But in accordance with
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding
words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications
or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature
of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract is but
a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be
deliberated upon by a person possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the
regular courts.

This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly
cognizable by the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract:

All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply
order is situated. 14
The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts and other instruments served as our guide in
arriving at the foregoing conclusion:

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual. 15

Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly. 16

Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument, where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. 17

Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be read in isolation from the rest of the
instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions. 18 The whole and every part of a
contract must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the canon of
construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. 19

The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to contemplate even the non-delivery of the oil well
cement would in effect render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16 shows that the parties did not intend
arbitration to be the sole means of settling disputes. This is manifest from Clause 16 itself which is prefixed with the
proviso, "Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract . . .", thus indicating that the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator is not all encompassing, and admits of exceptions as may be provided elsewhere in the supply order/contract.
We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined
to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.

The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of argument, that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a
proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of the contract is a
matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16. In this contention, we find merit. When the 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement were not delivered to the petitioner, an agreement was forged between the latter and the private respondent that
Class "G" cement would be delivered to the petitioner as replacement. Upon inspection, however, the replacement
cement was rejected as it did not conform to the specifications of the contract. Only after this latter circumstance was the
matter brought before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly, what was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of
the cargo at the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the specifications of the contract,
a matter clearly within the coverage of Clause 16.

The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to make replacement and that it undertook the latter
only "in the spirit of liberality and to foster good business relationship". 20 Hence, the undertaking to deliver the
replacement cement and its subsequent failure to conform to specifications are not anymore subject of the supply
order/contract or any of the provisions thereof. We disagree.

As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent undertook to deliver the 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement at "BOMBAY (INDIA) 2181 MT and CALCUTTA 2119 MT". 21 The failure of the private respondent to deliver the
cargo to the designated places remains undisputed. Likewise, the fact that the petitioner had already paid for the cost of
the cement is not contested by the private respondent. The private respondent claims, however, that it never benefited
from the transaction as it was not able to recover the cargo that was unloaded at the port of Bangkok. 22 First of all,
whether or not the private respondent was able to recover the cargo is immaterial to its subsisting duty to make good its
promise to deliver the cargo at the stipulated place of delivery. Secondly, we find it difficult to believe this representation.
In its Memorandum filed before this Court, the private respondent asserted that the Civil Court of Bangkok had already
ruled that the non-delivery of the cargo was due solely to the fault of the carrier. 23 It is, therefore, but logical to assume
that the necessary consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by the private respondent of the cargo or the
value thereof. What inspires credulity is not that the replacement was done in the spirit of liberality but that it was
undertaken precisely because of the private respondent's recognition of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract,
Clause 16 of which remains in force and effect until the full execution thereof.

We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the
private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based. The pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreign court reads:

ORDER

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of award decree is passed.
Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$
899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9%
interest per annum till the last date of realisation.24
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a
categorical declaration that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained in the
latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of
the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated
into the foreign court's judgment the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision
containing literally, only the dispositive portion". 25

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v.
Permskul, 26 this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not
transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings
of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch
63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, 28 where
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in
this wise:

We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay
compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial
convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of
the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision. 29 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. 30This is particularly true when the
decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this
case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure
in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. 31 This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lexfori or the
internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment
may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because
our rules provide otherwise.

The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated, first by reason of the fact that the
foreign court never answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees to be paid then refused to admit its objections for
failure to pay the same, and second, because of the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former
employee of the petitioner.

Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense 33 or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to
due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard. 34 Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was
conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so. 35

In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by the foreign court to file its
objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its objections to be given consideration. Instead
of paying the legal fees, however, the private respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring about the
correct amount of fees to be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting the foreign court's reply, almost a year passed
without the private respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign court rejected the objections
of the private respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner's claims. We cannot subscribe to the private
respondent's claim that the foreign court violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the
latter rejected its objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity to
be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply to the private respondent's written communication. On the
contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should have prompted the private respondent to ascertain with all due diligence
the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act with prudence and diligence thus its plea
that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this
Court. 36
The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee of the
petitioner. This point deserves scant consideration in view of the following stipulation in the contract:

. . . . It will be no objection any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he
had to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's
employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 38 that:

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It
is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-
in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of
the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty. 39

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private respondent herein, had the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.

The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that
the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the
validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception
of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial
court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint in Civil Case No. 4006 before Branch 30 of
the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent
PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC. to pay to petitioner the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said
case.

SO ORDERED.

Issue: whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

Held: No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Even in this
jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be
incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at

35. Atty Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio AKA Henry Tan

Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods
Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed
to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the
refund of the purchase price.1

Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent,2 filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials
including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other employees.3

In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner alleged that, inter alia,

x xxx

5. I had no participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. As a Corporate Secretary, I
have never been involved in the management and day-to-day operations of [Fil-Estate]. x xx

x xxx.

7. xxx. [Herein respondent] alleges:

"The letter showed that the request was approved by [herein petitioner], provided that the transfer fee was paid, and that
there be payment of full downpayment, with the balance payable in two years."

8) The handwritten approval and endorsement, however, are not mine. I have never transacted, either directly or
indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or [herein respondent]. x x x4 (emphasis partly in the original, partly supplied; underscoring
supplied)

On the basis of petitioners above-quoted allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury
against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. PSG 03-07-11855 before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office, which dismissed it by
Resolution of June 17, 20045 for insufficiency of evidence, and denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration.6

On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by Resolution of July 20, 2005 signed by the Chief State
Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice,7 motuproprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any
reversible error, following Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service
[NPS] Rule on Appeal).

Respondents motion for reconsideration having been denied8 by Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008,9 set aside the DOJ Secretarys
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition
for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.10

The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated, not under
Section 12 but, under Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal which categorically directs the Secretary to dismiss outright
an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment; and that under Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition
outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit, or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised are
too unsubstantial to require consideration.11

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.

Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of
justice"12; that, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,13 the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings
of executive departments such as the DOJ; and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a
petition for review motuproprio, and the use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply means "altogether,"
"entirely" or "openly."14

In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,15 as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well
as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Further, respondent, citing Adasa v. Abalos,16 argues that the DOJ "muddled" the distinction between Sections 7 and 12
of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an "outright" dismissal is not allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds
no reversible error17 in an assailed resolution.

The petition is impressed with merit.

A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."18

x xx [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to
enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].19 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining
information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.20

Balangauan v. Court of Appeals21 in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a
prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since
the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body."22 Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions
issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the present case for, as the Supreme Court stated,
the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein]
respondent[s] . . . motion for reconsideration."23 Respondents position fails.
Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution in resolving the therein respondents motion for
reconsideration is immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body.

Respondents citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman
dismissed the therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman merely evaluated the
complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which reads:

SEC. 2. Evaluation.Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (emphasis supplied)
Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on respondents petition for review under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on
Appeal, respondent posits that "outright" dismissal is not sanctioned thereunder but under Section 7. Respondents
position similarly fails.
That the DOJ Secretary used the word "outright" in dismissing respondents petition for review under Section 12 of the
Rule which reads:
SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He
may, motuproprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
x xxx
(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
x xxx (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not dent his action. To be sure, the word "outright" was merely used in conjunction with the motuproprio action.

Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for review.1awphil These are (a)
when the petition is patently without merit; (b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay; (c) when the issues
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been arraigned in
court.24

When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in
Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably
with Section 12. In other words, Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the DOJ Secretarys review power.

As for respondents reliance on Adasa, it too fails for, unlike in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner has not been arraigned
as in fact no Information has been filed against her.

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information,25 courts will not interfere with his findings;
otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal
complaint is dismissed or given due course.26

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Section 16

36. Valdez vs. CA

This is a case of double sale of real property where both vendees registered the sales with the Register of Deeds and
each produced their respective owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title to the property.

Spouses Francisco Ante and Manuela Ante were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 20th Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City, with an area of approximately 625.70 square meters as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 141582 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Said spouses executed a special power of attorney in
favor of their son, Antonio Ante, a lawyer, authorizing him to execute any document conveying by way of mortgage or sale
a portion or the whole of said property, to receive payment and dispose of the same as he may deem fit and proper under
the premises. 1

Antonio Ante offered to sell the lot to Eliseo Viernes, who was occupying the same with the permission of Ante. Viernes,
however, turned down the offer as he did not have money. Antonio Ante then told Viernes that he will instead sell the
property to Pastor Valdez and Virginia Valdez. 2
Antonio Ante had the said lot subdivided into Lot A with an area of 280 square meters and Lot B with an area or 345.70
square meters, each lot having its corresponding technical description.

On June 15, 1980, Antonio Ante, as attorney in fact, executed a deed of sale of Lot A in favor of spouses Pastor Valdez
and Virginia Valdez, for and in consideration of the amount of P112,000.00 3

On February 12, 1987, in the same capacity, Antonio Ante sold to said Valdez spouses, Lot B for the amount of
P138,000.00. 4

The Valdez spouses demanded from Antonio Ante the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 covering
said two (2) lots. Ante promised them that he will deliver the title to them in a few days.

In the meanwhile petitioners started fencing the whole lot with cement hollow blocks in the presence of spouses Eliseo
and Felicidad Viernes. Except for the gate, it took them two weeks to finish fencing the whole lot. On said occasion the
Viernes spouses were informed by the Valdez spouses that they were fencing the same as they purchased the land from
Antonio Ante.

As Ante failed to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title demanded by the Valdez spouses, the latter filed their
affidavit of adverse claim over the subject lot with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on September 6, 1982 as the
vendees of the property. 5

Upon inquiries made, the Valdez spouses learned that Antonio Ante had delivered the owner's duplicate certificate of title
as a collateral to one Dr. Camilo Garma of Purdue Street., Cubao Quezon City to secure his rentals in arrears in the
amount of P9,000.00. On September 13, 1983, upon the prodding of the Valdez spouses, Antonio Ante wrote to Dr. &
Mrs. Garma to request them to entrust the owner's duplicate copy of the title of the questioned lot to the Valdez spouses
with the assurance that Ante will pay his indebtedness to them. 6 The Garma spouses turned over to the Valdez spouses
the said owner's duplicate certificate of title after said Valdez spouses paid for the obligation of Antonio Ante to the Garma
spouses.

The Valdez spouses then proceeded to register the two deeds of sale dated June 15, 1980 and February 12, 1981 7 with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title. They were, however, informed
that the said owner's duplicate certificate of title had been declared null and void per order of Judge Tutaan dated
November 10, 1982. They also found out that spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante earlier filed a petition for the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title and to declare null and void the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title.

The Valdez spouses also discovered that the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 141582 and in lieu thereof issued TCT
No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes on the basis of a deed of assignment of the same property dated February
17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in her favor.

When Virginia Valdez inquired from Antonio Ante why he executed the said deed of assignment when he had previously
sold the same lot to them, Ante replied that they could sue him in court.

Thus, the Valdezes filed their adverse claim over the lot covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes.
They filed the complaint in Barangay office of San Roque, Quezon City against Felicidad Viernes but as no amicable
settlement was reached, the Valdezes filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking among others,
that the order dated November 10, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City authorizing the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of Francisca Ante be declared null any void; that the deed of assignment
dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in favor of Felicidad Viernes be cancelled and revoked; that TCT No.
293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be cancelled and declared null and void;
that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to reinstate, revalidate and give full force and effect to the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 in the name of spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante and declare petitioners as the
true and lawful owners of the property; ordering respondents Viernes and all persons claiming right under them to vacate
the property, and to pay damages and costs to petitioners.

After trial on the merits before which the Antes were declared in default, a decision was rendered by the trial court on April
9, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed as against defendants Vierneses, and defendants Antes are hereby ordered to
pay to plaintiff, as prayed for in their complaint, as follows:

Defendant Antes are hereby ordered to pay actual damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to plaintiffs.

Defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00.

Defendants Antes, are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 8
Not satisfied therewith the Valdezes interposed an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on September 12, 1988, affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs against the appellants.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Valdezes wherein the following issues are raised:

1. Whether the Order dated November 10, 1983 declaring as null and void the Owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 141582 and ordering the issuance of a new Owner's copy of said title should be set aside having been secured
fraudulently and in bad faith by Francisco Ante and Antonio Ante who had already sold the property to the spouses Pastor
and Virginia Valdez and who knew fully well that the said Owner's copy of said title has never been lost.

2. As between plaintiff-spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez, petitioners in this case and defendant Felicidad Viernes, one
of the private respondents, who is entitled to the subject lot?

3. Who is entitled to damages? 9

The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person
who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in
the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

From the aforesaid provision of the law, it is clear that if movable property is sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith. However, should the subject of the
sale be immovable property, the ownership shall vest in the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
registry of property. Should none of the vendees inscribe the sale in the Registry of Property, then the ownership of the
subject real property shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

In this case, Lot A of the subject property was sold to the petitioners by Antonio Ante, as attorney-in-fact, on June 15,
1980, while Lot B was sold by the same attorney-in-fact to petitioners on February 12, 1981.10 Since the owner's copy of
TCT No. 141582 was not delivered in due time to the petitioners by Antonio Ante despite his promise to deliver the same
in a few days, petitioners registered their notice of adverse claim over the said property on September 6, 1982 with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City wherein it was duly annotated as follows:

PE-3004/T-141582 Affidavit of Adverse Claim

Filed under sworn statement of Pastor Valdez & Virginia C. Valdez claiming that they are the vendees of the property
described herein, but the title was not delivered (Doc. 253, Page 51, Bk. I of the Not.Pub.of Q. City, Prudencio W. Valido)

Date of Instrument August 19, 1982

Date of Inscription Sept. 6, 1982 11

However, earlier, that is on February 17, 1982, a Deed of Assignment of the same property was executed by Antonio Ante
in favor of respondent Felicidad Viernes. 12 Ante filed a petition for the issuance of another owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 141582 with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground that the owner's duplicate copy had been
lost. The petition was granted in an order dated November 10, 1983 declaring null and void the lost owner's duplicate
copy of the title and ordering the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the title in favor of the Antes. Said owner's
duplicate copy was delivered by Ante to respondent Viernes who thereafter together with the Deed of Assignment
presented the same to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for registration on November 11, 1982. Thus, on the basis
thereof, TCT No. 141582 was cancelled and TCT No. 293889 was issued in the name of respondent Felicidad Viernes.

Petitioners again filed an adverse claim this time on the property covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of respondent
Viernes.

From the foregoing set of facts there can be no question that the sale of the subject lot to petitioners was made long
before the execution of the Deed of Assignment of said lot to respondent Viernes and that petitioners annotated their
adverse claim as vendees of the property as early as September 6, 1982 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On
the other hand the deed of Assignment in favor of Viernes of the said lot was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City only on November 11, 1982 whereby a new title was issued in the name of Viernes as above stated.

The rule is clear that a prior right is accorded to the vendee who first recorded his right in good faith over an immovable
property. 13 In this case, the petitioners acquired subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Antes
and as such owners petitioners fenced the property taking possession thereof. Thus, when petitioners annotated their
adverse claim in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City they thereby established a superior right to the property in question
as against respondent Viernes. 14

On the other hand, respondent Viernes cannot claim good faith in the purchase of the subject lot and the subsequent
registration of the Deed of Assignment in her favor. Even before the petitioners purchased the lot from the Antes
respondent Viernes' husband was first given the option to purchase the same by Antonio Ante but he declined because
he had no money and so he was informed that it would be sold to petitioners. After petitioners purchased the lot they
immediately fenced the same with the knowledge and without objection of respondent Viernes and her husband and they
were informed by the petitioners about their purchase of the same. Moreover, when petitioners annotated their adverse
claim as vendees of the property with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was effectively a notice to the whole world
including respondent Viernes.

Respondent Ante obviously in collusion with respondent Viernes sold the same property to Viernes which was earlier sold
to petitioners, by virtue of a subsequent Deed of Assignment. It was fraudulently made to appear that the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 was lost through a petition filed with the trial court to nullify the said owner's duplicate
copy and for the issuance of another owner's duplicate copy.

Unfortunately, such fraud was unmasked as early as July 14, 1981 when respondent Francisco Ante, in Civil Case No.
29617, filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a subpoena and subpoena ducestecum to require Paz Garma of 8
Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City to produce before the court on July 16, 1981 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at the scheduled
pre-trial of the case, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of the
Antes as the same was entrusted to Paz Garma as a realtor for the proposed sale of the property which did not
materialize. 15 Respondent Viernes admitted in her answer dated January 7, 1984 that she knew of the filing in court of
said urgent motion and that the branch clerk of court issued the correspondingsubpoena. 16 Thus, respondent Ante, as
well as respondent Viernes, knew that the owner's duplicate copy of certificate of title No. 141582 was never lost,
consequently the filing of the petition in court for the issuance of a new one was attended with fraud and gross
misrepresentation.

As a matter of fact, as hereinabove discussed, upon the urging of petitioners, respondent Antonio Ante wrote to the
Garma spouses to entrust the TCT to petitioners on September 30, 1983 17 and when petitioners paid the standing
account of Ante to the Garmas said owner's duplicate copy was delivered by the Garmas to the petitioners. The bad faith
of respondents Viernes and Ante is obvious.

Further, even while the notice of adverse claim of September 6, 1982 filed by the petitioners on TCT No. 141582 in the
Register of Deeds was still existing and had not been cancelled, on November 11, 1982 the Register of Deeds
nevertheless cancelled said TCT and issued a new title in favor of respondent Viernes. The annotation was not even
carried over nor was it ordered cancelled under the new title issued to respondent Viernes. The Register of Deeds and/or
his subordinates apparently yielded to the fraudulent design of respondents Viernes and Ante.

An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9, 1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as
basis for its conclusions. 18 Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates as follows:

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also provides clearly as follows:

Sec. 1.Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed
with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all judges "to
make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced."

Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due course, or is
otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis
thereof.

In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court contained in the first two pages a statement of the
allegations of the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses presented and the exhibits marked during the
trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion:
After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to prove their case as against defendant
Felicidad Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is no sufficient
proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of defendant Vierneses, and on the basis of existing jurisprudence, a third
person who in good faith purchases and registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff who had
previously purchased same property but failed to register the same. 19

This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct statement of the facts on the
basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one paragraph statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and
of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact
therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by the records which show on the contrary,
petitioners earlier registered the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while
the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly
stated.

Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision.1wphi1 It merely adopted the
alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of
respondent Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the mandate
aforestated.

As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is
predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the
lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the Court has to wade through the
records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records
for further proceedings.

Hence, the appealed decision should be struck down.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the appellate court dated September 12, 1988 is
hereby SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring the order of the trial court dated November 10,
1982 null and void and reinstating the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 in the possession of the petitioners;
declaring the petitioners to have the superior right to the property in question and to be the true and lawful owners of the
same; directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 293889 in the name of respondent Felicidad
Viernes and to issue a new title in favor of petitioners spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez upon the presentation of the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582; directing respondent Felicidad Viernes and other persons claiming rights
under her residing in the premises of the land in question to vacate the same immediately and to remove whatever
improvement she has placed in the premises; and ordering private respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioners
the amounts of P15,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
docket fees for the amount of damages and attorney's fees awarded to the petitioners, if not yet duly paid, shall constitute
a prior lien in favor of the government, before the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the petitioners. Costs against
private respondents.

SO ORDERED.