Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202687 January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ "JERIC" AND JUAN BUENDIA Y DELOS
REYES@ "JUNE", Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For resolution of the Court is the appeal filed by Jeric Pavia and Juan
Buendia (appellants) from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020. The CA affirmed the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, San Pedro,
Laguna which found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Section
13, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. Appellants were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 500,000.00.
The Antecedents
On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant
reported to SPO3 Melchor delaPea (SPO3 Dela Pea) of the San Pedro
Municipal Police Station, San Pedro, Laguna, that a pot session was taking
place at the house of a certain "Obet" located at Barangay Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Pea formed a
team to conduct police operations against the suspect. The team was
composed of the confidential informant, PO2 Rommel Bautista (PO2
Bautista), PO3 Jay Parunggao (PO3 Parunggao), PO1 Jifford Signap and
SPO3 Dela Pea as team leader.3
At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the
target area. When the team arrived, the members saw that Obets house
was closed. Since the house was not surrounded by a fence, PO2 Bautista
approached the house and peeped through a small opening in a window
where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living
room. PO3 Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found
an unlocked door. He entered the house,followed by PO2 Bautista and they
caught the four persons engaged in a pot session by surprise. After they
introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the four suspects
and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene.4 Among those
arrested were herein appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet

Page 1 of 176
containing white crystalline substance were confiscated by PO3 Parunggao
after he conducted a body search on their persons.5 PO3 Parunggao
marked the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with "JP,"
representing the initials of Jeric Pavia while that taken from appellant
Buendia was marked, also by PO3 Parunggao, with "JB," representing the
initials of Juan Buendia.6 These plastic sachets were transmitted tothe
crime laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for
"shabu."7
Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 in two separate but identically worded informations
which read:
That on or about 29 March 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused without authority of the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody [of]
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in the company
of two persons.8 When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the
offense.9
A joint trial of the cases ensued.
In defense, appellants provided a different version of the incident.
According to them, on the questioned date and time, they were roaming the
streets of Baranggay Cuyab, selling star apples. A prospective buyer of the
fruits called them over to his house and requested them to go inside, to
which they acceded. Whenthey were about to leave the house, several
persons who introduced themselves as policemen arrived and invited
appellants to go with them to the precinct. There, they were incarcerated
and falsely charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002.10
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense
charged through the spontaneous, positive and credible testimony of its
witness. The trial court noted that the police officers carried out a lawful
arrest before they proceeded with the bodily search of appellants.
Moreover, there was no clear and convincing evidence that the team of
PO3 Parunggao was inspired by any improper motive whenthey carried out
their operation. Thus, the testimony of PO2 Bautista on the witness stand,
narrating the events leading to the apprehension of appellants, deserves
full faith and credit.11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Page 2 of 176
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the
evidence on record support the trial courts conclusion that a lawful arrest,
search and seizure took place, and that the prosecution fully discharged its
burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements
necessary for the conviction of the offense charged.12
On the contention of appellants that their warrantless arrest was illegal and,
therefore, the items seized from them as a result of that arrest were
inadmissible in evidence against them, the CA held that this argument
totally lacks merit. According to the CA:
We stress at the outset that the [appellants] failed to question the legality of
their warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused [is]
estopped from assailing the legality of [his] arrest if [he] failed to move for
the quashing of the Information against [him] before [his] arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before [he]
enter[s] [his] plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the
warrantless arrests conducted on [appellants] were valid. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the situations when a person
may be arrested without a warrant x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto
arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we hold that the
prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the house
where the pot session was conducted and to their arrest were triggered by
a "tip" from a concerned citizen that a "pot session" was in progress at the
house of a certain "Obet" at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Under
the circumstances, the police did not have enough time to secure a search
warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process (i.e., a pot
session may not bean extended period of time and it was then 9:00 p.m.).
In view of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela Pea immediately dispatched
his men to proceed to the identified place to verify the report. At the place,
the responding police officers verified through a small opening in the

Page 3 of 176
window and saw the accused-appellants and their other two (2)
companions sniffing "shabu" to use the words of PO2 Bautista. There was
therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe that the
accused-appellants were then and there committing a crime. As it turned
out, the accused-appellants indeed possessed and were even using a
prohibited drug, contrary to law. When an accused is caught in flagrante
delicto, the police officers are not only authorized but are duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the
[appellants] were frisked, which search yielded the prohibited drug in their
possession. These circumstances were sufficient to justify the warrantless
search x x x thatyielded two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of "shabu." x x
x
xxxx
All the x x x requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this
case. The police officers had prior justification to be at a certain "Obets"
place as they were dispatched by their desk officer; they arrested the
[appellants] as they had reason to believe that they were illegally using and
possessing a prohibited drug and drug paraphernalia. The search of the
[appellants] incident to their arrest yielded the confiscated crystalline
substance which later proved to be "shabu". In the course of their lawful
intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia scattered
in the living room. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them.
xxxx
As correctly found by the trial court, the [appellants'] story is unworthy of
belief. Their denial mustfail in the light of the positive identification and
declarations made by the prosecution witness. As stated earlier, PO2
Bautista testified in a straightforward and categorical manner regarding the
identities of the malefactors. He did not waver despite the defense
counsel's rigid questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility
with which anaccused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence
that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the
crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory
examination conducted by the PNP crime Laboratory on the drugs
recovered from the [appellants] which revealed that the confiscated plastic
sachets tested positive for the presence of "shabu": two (2) heated

Page 4 of 176
transparent plastic sachet with markings "JB" and "JP" containing 0.02
gram of white crystalline substance each both yielded positive results.13
With respect to appellants claim that the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody because the police operatives failed to strictly comply with
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, the CA has this to say:
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the [appellants] want to portray, the chain of custody of
the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the
seizure of the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from
the [appellants'] possession and of the various drug paraphernalia in the
living room, the police immediately brought the [appellants] to the police
station, together with the seized items. PO3 Parunggao himself brought
these items to the police station and marked them. The plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance was marked "JB" and "JP". These
confiscated items were immediately turned over by PO2 Bautista to the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon, Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba City for examination to determine the presence of dangerous
drugs. After a qualitative examination conducted on the specimens,
Forensic Chemist Lorna Ravelas Tria concluded that the plastic sachets
recovered from the accused-appellants tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug, per Chemistry Report
Nos. D-0381-05 and D-0382-05.
When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2
Baustista positively identified them to be the same items they seized from
the [appellants] and which PO3 Parunggao later marked at the police
station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for
examination based on a duly prepared request.
Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of
the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they were
brought for examination. Besides, as earlier stated, the [appellants] did not
contest the admissibility of the seized items during the tria1. The integrity
and the evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants
were therefore duly proven not to have been compromised.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply,
with Section 2l (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render
an accused's arrestillegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be

Page 5 of 176
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the
present case, we see substantial compliance by the police with the required
procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items, thus
showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not compromised. We
refer particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to
the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test
results obtained, under a situation where no objection to admissibility was
ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, show that
the evidence seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently
identified and testified to in court.14 x x x
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
Appellants are charged under Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
provides:
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings. Any person found possessing any dangerous
drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties
provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and purity
of such dangerous drugs.
The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section
13 of R.A. No. 9165 are the same as those for the violation of Section 11 of
the law: (1) possession bythe accused of an item or object identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
(3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by the accused,15 with the
additional element that (4) the accused possessed the prohibited or
dangerous drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of
at least two persons.
As correctly found by the CA, the evidence for the prosecution showed the
presence of all these elements. The testimony of PO2 Bautista on this point
is determinative:
q. When you said PO3 Parunggao saw that the door of the house was not
locked, what did you do?
a. He entered the house and we followed him, maam [sic].
xxxx
q. In what part of the house where [sic] this [sic] people engaged in a pot
session?
a. At the sala, maam [sic].
q. And what was their reaction when PO3 Parunggao and the rest of the
team barged in?

Page 6 of 176
a. They were surprised, maam [sic].
xxxx
q. And what did you do after that?
a. PO3 Parunggao introduced ourselves as police officers, maam [sic].
q. What happened after that?
a. We confiscated the drug paraphernalias [sic] and then PO3 Parunggao
conducted body search and was able to confiscate shabu from the two of
the people there maam [sic].
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao conducted a search?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
q. Did you see him conducting a search?
a. Yes, maam [sic].
q. What did you see him doing?
a. I saw that he was able to confiscate small plastic sachet containing
shabu, maam [sic].
q. From whom?
a. From Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia, maam [sic].
q. If this Jeric Pavia is in court right now, will you be able to point to him?
a. Yes, maam [sic].
q. Please point to him?
a. That man in the first row wearing yellow shirt, maam [sic] (pointed to a
person inside the courtroom who, when asked answered by the name of
Jeric Pavia).
q. You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia,from what part of his body was he able
to confiscate the same?
a. From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
xxxx
q. You said that PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance from two person [sic], one was identified as Jeric
Pavia, who was the other one?
a. It was Juan Buendia, maam [sic]
q. Please identify him if he is in court?
a. That man also in the first row, at the right portion, wearing yellow shirt
(pointed to a person who, when asked answered by the name of Juan
Buendia).
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao confiscated from Juan Buendia
the plastic sachet of shabu?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
xxxx

Page 7 of 176
q. On [sic] what part of the body of Juan Buendia was the item taken by
Officer Parunggao?
a. Also in [sic] his pocket, maam [sic].16
The same testimony of PO2 Bautista also established the chain of custody
of the prohibited drugs taken from appellants. Thus:
q. You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated [sic] plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he able
to confiscate the same?
a. From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
q. And do you know what PO3 Parunggao do with the item?
a. He placed marking on it, maam [sic].
q. In what place did he put the marking?
a. At the police station maam [sic].
q. What markings did he place?
a. It was marked JP representing the initials of accused Jeric Pavia, maam
[sic].
q. Where were you when Officer Parunggao placed that marking on the
item?
a. I was beside him, maam [sic].
q. Can you describe the plastic sachet?
a. It is a small transparent plastic sachet which contains white crystalline
substance otherwise known as shabu, maam [sic].
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet from the time PO3
Parunggao took it from the possession of Jeric Pavia up to the police
station?
a. It was P03 Parunggao, maam [sic].
q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JP, please identify the same?
a. This is the same item confiscated from Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].
xxxx
q. Did you come to know what Officer Parunggao do with the plastic sachet
confiscated from Juan Buendia?
a. He brought it to the police station, maam [sic].
q. And what did he do with it?
a. He placed the markings JB, maam [sic].
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet with markings JB from
Aplaya [where the pot session took place] to the police station?
a. It was PO3 Parunggao, maam.
q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JB, please identify the same?

Page 8 of 176
a. This is the same item confiscated from Juan Buendia by PO3
Parunggao, maam [sic].17
It is likewise important to note that it was PO2 Bautista himself who brought
the request18 for laboratory examination of the substance taken from
appellants from the San Pedro Police Station to the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Calamba City, thereby ensuring that the integrity of the confiscated items
are preserved. Thus, the fact that the apprehending team did not strictly
comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 does not necessarily render appellants arrest illegal or the items
seized from them inadmissible in evidence.
As held by this Court in the case of People v. Llanita:19
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do
not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x. We have
emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Briefly stated, non-compliance withthe procedural requirements under RA
9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of
the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
xxxx
x x x. We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
Finally, both the trial court and the CA rejected appellants' defense of denial
and frame-up for failure to substantiate the same.
Indeed, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common
and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must
be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the case before us,
appellants failed to present sufficient evidence in support of their claims.
Aside from their self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented
to bolster their allegations.20 Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper
motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial or frame-up and
instead apply the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents.21

Page 9 of 176
In view of the foregoing, we see no reason to deviate from the well
discussed decision of the CA, its findings and conclusions having been
supported by both law and applicable jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 04020 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Page 10 of 176
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the
resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP
No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M.
Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald
Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation,
as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15
in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
Police Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer
SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador
Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the
Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene
of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw
Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him.
This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan
Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police
officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.

Page 11 of 176
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there
stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed
weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said
complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators
of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police
station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular
procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners'
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise
denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule
65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of
their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

Page 12 of 176
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to
clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to
Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the
RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED
WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No
arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a
response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of
Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under
the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived
at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners
were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was
not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The
criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach
this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion
was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65
petition has been abused.

Page 13 of 176
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated
by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless
warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the
guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time,
and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins,
development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19
and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the
people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins
to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties
of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on
the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25
The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and
required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals'
threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta
Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold,
or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis
supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard
to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity
of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law
of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different
from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless
arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of
Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power

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to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was
concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of
any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law
of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in
the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on
warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It further
held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and
3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which
were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules
of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless
arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes
through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in
our jurisprudence.

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We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing
in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional
Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to
be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of
some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their
agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a
penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of
the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a
defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or
agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will
appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph
may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him,
provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or
crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of
Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may,
within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant,
any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace
officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is

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reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is
no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there
was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined
probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these
conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the
arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge
that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the
presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition,
it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase
"reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which,
the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be
held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a
Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the
Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance
which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of
the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest
was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a
crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated
in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the
part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited
this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal
Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940
Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

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(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964
Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the
old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of
the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or
reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been
committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required
that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the
element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission
of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the
person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940
and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in
warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of
Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under

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paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained
the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should
not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed."
This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation
for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was
further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the
basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears
that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes:
first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime;
and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based
on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately
below, starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the

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elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the
determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and
circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a
warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that
the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to
"reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should
make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the
determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable
cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a
pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular
circumstances and the particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information

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as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the
context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts
must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan
v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause
as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of
the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked
to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary

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investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based
on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought
to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances
pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is
invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor,
and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective
functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use
the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of
facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must
determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer
should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge
must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited
facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather
within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not

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expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise
the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity
to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to
prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements
as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the
Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were
made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor
Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of
the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to
be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the
warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly
recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical
harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the
arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police
officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person.
It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the
commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an
offense has just been committed means that there must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of
the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers

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were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence,
they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's
identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the
killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from
unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just
been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had
shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that
the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name
of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal
knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the
same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge
of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation,
indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court
held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the
victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him.
The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the
arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The
Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was
derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to
Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court
upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting
incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime
found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant
only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers
acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of
facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless
arrest was held valid.

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In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the
policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the
victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court
held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a
robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who
proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.
When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated
the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined
them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was
spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just
committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call
from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a
team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez
later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita
III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the
incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go
with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved
in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and
proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was
about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the
driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the
back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities
as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it
appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal

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knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to
the Black's Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying
facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or
actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of
the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police
officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances
at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these
facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts
as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their
probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from
the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances
before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on
the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid
warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2)
the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within
his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable

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cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes
of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable
arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1)
has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe
that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
misapprehended the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however,
that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to
the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought
in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter
stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place
two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises
when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the
petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they
asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.

Page 27 of 176
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal
Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same
date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that
was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following
findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right
hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L
peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr.
Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital
L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon
the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that
they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the
present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim,
he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him;
however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog
did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the

Page 28 of 176
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is
incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied
with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy;
the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and
lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to
render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the
petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed. 1wphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms

of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality
where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties,
and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate
and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate
under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion
of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required.
It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92

Page 29 of 176
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier
could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.
Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical
restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the
police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application
of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime,
including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had
informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against
them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC
Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary
investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is
not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said
motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the
Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound
to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the
case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this
Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the
decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the
reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby

Page 30 of 176
DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21,
2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Page 31 of 176
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 which affirmed in toto the December 11,
2007 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting
appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of 300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de
Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th
Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding
and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon,
a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-
SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the
appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for
illegal drug possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly
apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellants attempts
to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his
motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police
Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU
office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV
12-25-06," representing his and appellants initials and the date of the
arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as
the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2
Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared
a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of the seized substance.

Page 32 of 176
PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were
received by Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic
chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03
gram of white crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information10
which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control,
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram
which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of
METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
not guilty to the offense charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leons allegations and instead
claimed that on the date and time of the incident, he was walking alone
along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from
behind. Appellant approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de
Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which
contained 1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was
detained and mauled by eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de
Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters
where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle"
and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters firing range. There, "Michelle"
and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone,
firing a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer and
eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge about the
cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was
brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment.14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal
Guiyab, who informed him that he was being charged with resisting arrest
and "Section 11."15 The first charge was eventually dismissed.

Page 33 of 176
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a
finding that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs have been established, to wit: (1) the appellant is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3
de Leon to testify falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the
former had previously arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs
under Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and credit
to PO3 de Leons testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view
doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3
de Leon at the place and time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of
denial and frame-up proffered by the appellant, being uncorroborated, and
in the light of the positive assertions of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give
credence to appellants claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of his money,
since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3 de Leons
superiors or to institute any action against the latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of 300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellants conviction, finding "a
clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA
held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would
reasonably arouse suspicion,"18 aggravated by the existence of his past
criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached
him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution
had adequately shown the continuous and unbroken chain of custody of
the seized item, from the time it was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de
Leon, marked at the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and
delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo, the
forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper
identification.
The Issue

Page 34 of 176
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA
erred in affirming in toto the RTCs Decision convicting appellant of the
offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down
the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a
private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.20
In both instances, the officers personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the
officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for
a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellants conviction in this case, the appellate court
ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.

Page 35 of 176
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that
there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de
Leons testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Maam.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking
at the shabu in his hand, Maam.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Maam.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying
something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Maam.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was
holding, Maam.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Maam.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and
holding in his hand was a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu,
Maam.21 (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable
how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able
to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and
minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic
sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected
numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion
that what he purportedly saw in appellants hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no
other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts
per se of walking along the street and examining something in ones hands
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant
had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de
Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5,
Rule 113.

Page 36 of 176
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had
personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the
appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to
believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore
clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on
account of the latters previous charge22 for the same offense. The CA
stressed this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view. 1wphi1

PO3 Renato de Leon saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of

plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance. PO3 Renato de
Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for
the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion. The
third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of
plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained
shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellants person
and past criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just wait
and see and give appellant a chance to scamper away. For his part,
appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from
an equally familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de
Leon caught up with him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellants act
of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leons reasonable suspicion
that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same
offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal
knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been
committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a
persons reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a
persons previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of
appellants arrest based on "personal knowledge of facts regarding

Page 37 of 176
appellants person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not
what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be
strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon
approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.25 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent
reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers,
unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully
apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellants attempt to run away from
PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have
meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something
in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his
previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted.
"Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellants case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the
reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the
moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of
the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be
arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizens
constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained
in the case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty

Page 38 of 176
and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu
purportedly seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted
and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno
Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Page 39 of 176
ECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON
Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ
Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN,
Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 191366

Present:

CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Page 40 of 176
Promulgated:
December 13, 2010

X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------X

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which
affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating
Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties,
Social Gatherings or Meetings.

The Facts

The Information indicting the accused reads:

That on or about the 2 nd day of

September 2006, in the City of Dagupan,

Page 41 of 176
 Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR
DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y
CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and
RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without
authority of law, confederating together, acting
jointly and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff
and possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues)
contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled
aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) person[s].

Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]

Version of the Prosecution

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon),
one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady
Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical
officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45
oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the
Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan
City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and
Page 42 of 176
reported that a pot session was going on in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1
Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the
area, the house of Gonzales was located.

As the police officers entered the gate of the house,

they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the
side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house,
they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez),
Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a
room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police.
In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of
used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police

precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned
over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory
Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory
examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11
pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of
used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and,
except for Doria, they were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Page 43 of 176
Version of the Defense

The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez,

Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of
September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano
Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a
certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez
and who was to give the materials for the painting of said
jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for
Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him
if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria
arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and
apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the
police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were
incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.

The Ruling of the RTC

The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to

evidence.

On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the

dispositve portion of which reads:

Page 44 of 176
 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR
DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y
Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined
and penalized under Section 13 in relation to
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and
each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the
amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of
suit.

The subject items are hereby forfeited in

favor of the government and to be disposed of
in accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of

prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill-
motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and
alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have

Page 45 of 176
been in constructive possession of the subject items. A
conspiracy was also found present as there was a common
purpose to possess the dangerous drug.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to

support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive
possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further
held that although the procedure regarding the custody and
disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless
safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty was not
sufficiently controverted by the accused.

Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this

appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the subject
decision, presenting the following

Assignment of Errors

For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin

Martinez

Page 46 of 176
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-
appellants

to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;

2. The lower court erred in not seeing through

the antics of the police to plant the
shabu paraphernalia to justify the
arrest of the accused-appellants
without warrant;

3. The lower court erred in not finding that

the corpus delicti has not been
sufficiently established;

4. The lower court erred in not finding the

uncorroborated testimony of PO1

Page 47 of 176
 Azardon insufficient to convict the
accused-appellants of the crime
charged;

5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the

accused-appellants.

For accused Rafael Gonzales

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE
ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.

Page 48 of 176
 After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary
records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the
evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that
granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has
not been duly established.

Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure

Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the

legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is limited only to the
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.[6]

Although the admissibility of the evidence was not

raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that this
Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if
such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,[7] especially
when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.[8]
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote
rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must
not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and
again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment
of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never

Page 49 of 176
be used to defeat substantive rights.[9] Thus, despite the
procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the
admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear
infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.

The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its

constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.[10] Sec.
2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket

prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant.
Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed
even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest;[11] (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[12]

Page 50 of 176
 This case would appear to fall under either a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view
search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be
considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is
lawful. Thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when

lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed

and he has probable cause to

Page 51 of 176
 believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has
escaped while being
transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a)

and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7
of Rule 112.

Page 52 of 176
 A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the
accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as
an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1
Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they
proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales
based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot
session was going on in said house, to wit:

Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the

informant, did he not tell you how many
persons were actually conducting the pot
session?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of

course you were not armed with a search
warrant, correct?

A: None, sir.

Page 53 of 176
Q: Before the information was given to you by your
alleged informant, you did not know
personally Rafael Gonzales?

A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.

Q: When this informant told you that he was told that

there was [an] ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales, was this
report to you placed in the police blotter
before you proceeded to the house of
Rafael Gonzales?

A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.

Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the

personal data or identity of the person
who told you that he was allegedly
informed that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a

downtown jeepney but he does not want

Page 54 of 176
 to be identified because he was afraid,
sir.

Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him

that there was an ongoing pot session in
the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: No more, sir.

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney

driver you immediately formed a group
and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of

Rafael Gonzales, you could not see

Page 55 of 176
 what is happening inside the house of
Rafael Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as

well as the plastic sachet of shabu on
the table while you were outside the
premises of the property of Rafael
Gonzales?

xxx

Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see

the paraphernalia?

COURT: Answer.

Page 56 of 176
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how
could we see them, sir.

Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a

certain person who told you that he was
informed by another person that there
was an ongoing pot session going on
inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in

inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and
you arrested the persons you saw?

A: Yes, sir.[14]

Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this

case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be
applicable and both require probable cause to be present in
order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has

Page 57 of 176
been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[15]

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous

drugs cases[16] that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search,[17] such rulings cannot be
applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either
a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically,
circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis
for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers
entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure
based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v.
Bolasa[18] is informative on this matter.

In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the

police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited
drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to
the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house
accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house,
they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man
and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the
house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated
the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court
ruled:

The manner by which accused-

appellants were apprehended does not fall
under any of the above-enumerated categories.
Page 58 of 176
Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that at the time of their arrest, accused-
appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime.
Second, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that a crime was committed nor did
they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it. Third,
accused-appellants were not prisoners who
have escaped from a penal establishment.

Neither can it be said that the objects

were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-
appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to
contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally
peeped first through the window before they
saw and ascertained the activities of accused-
appellants inside the room. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a
moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it
cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is
bereft of any such showing.

On the contrary, it indicates that the

apprehending officers should have conducted
Page 59 of 176
 first a surveillance considering that the
identities and address of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause for arresting accused-
appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal.
Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal
search cannot be used against accused-
appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow
in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
[19]

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in

arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the
suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. [20]

As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the

arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time
Page 60 of 176
of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause
to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to
arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an
offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip
originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no
personal knowledge of the information that was reported to
the police:

Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for

apprehending all the accused was based
on a tip-off by an informant?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?

A: He told us that somebody told him that there was

an ongoing pot session in the house of
one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.

Page 61 of 176
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant
himself to whom the information
originated but from somebody else?

A: That was what he told me, sir.

Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged

pot session was going on? [No Answer]

Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic]

to where the alleged pot session was
going on?

A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.

Q: So you merely relied on what he said that

something or a pot session was going on
somewhere in Arellano but you dont
know the exact place where the pot
session was going on?

Page 62 of 176
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to

the veracity of the alleged pot session
because he claimed that he derived that
information from somebody else?

A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that

there was an ongoing pot session, sir.

Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to

where?

A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.

xxx

Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those

included in the alleged pot session?

Page 63 of 176
A: No, sir.

Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know

physically what was really happening
there?

A: He was told by another person that there was an

ongoing pot session there, sir. [21]
[Emphasis supplied]

Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized

in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must
be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search.[22]

The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the

police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior
surveillance or investigation before they discovered the
accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the
police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to
constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless
Page 64 of 176
search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one
under exigent and emergency circumstances.

The apprehending officers should have first conducted

a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one
of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause,
then a search warrant should have been secured prior to
effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the
ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.[23] The subject items
seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The
drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus
precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.

As has been noted previously by this Court, some

lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over illegal
searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to
present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the
methods by which they were obtained. This attitude tramples
on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law
enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law
fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the

Page 65 of 176
eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.[24]

Chain of Custody

Even granting that the seized items are admissible as

evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order
for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the
chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.

The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug

was not established with moral certainty as the chain of
custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having
failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165,
and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series
of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of
1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory
of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no
photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule
requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them
copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled
from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to
the crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti
was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to

Page 66 of 176
their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence
in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.

The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of

dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of the
dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law,
and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this being a case for violation
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the
crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have
occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or
in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of

the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a
condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the
existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently
established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to
ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the
movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[26]
Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of cases
to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous
drugs cases, to wit:

Page 67 of 176
 As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.[27]

Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,

[28] defines chain of custody as follows:

b. Chain of Custody means the duly

recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic

Page 68 of 176
 laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and
used in court as evidence, and the final
disposition;

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,

provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and
integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from

Page 69 of 176
 the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure

for the custody of seized or confiscated items in dangerous
drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as
follows:

Usually, the police officer who seizes the

suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who would then send it by
courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession
of the substance changes hand a number of
times, it is imperative for the officer who seized
the substance from the suspect to place his
marking on its plastic container and seal the
same, preferably with adhesive tape that
cannot be removed without leaving a tear on
the plastic container. At the trial, the officer
can then identify the seized substance and the
procedure he observed to preserve its integrity
until it reaches the crime laboratory.

Page 70 of 176
 If the substance is not in a plastic
container, the officer should put it in one and
seal the same. In this way the substance would
assuredly reach the laboratory in the same
condition it was seized from the accused.
Further, after the laboratory technician tests
and verifies the nature of the substance in the
container, he should put his own mark on the
plastic container and seal it again with a new
seal since the police officers seal has been
broken. At the trial, the technician can then
describe the sealed condition of the plastic
container when it was handed to him and
testify on the procedure he took afterwards to
preserve its integrity.

If the sealing of the seized substance has

not been made, the prosecution would have to
present every police officer, messenger,
laboratory technician, and storage personnel,
the entire chain of custody, no matter how
briefly ones possession has been. Each of them
has to testify that the substance, although
unsealed, has not been tampered with or
substituted while in his care.[29]

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates, and

Page 71 of 176
provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial

custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. [Emphasis supplied]

Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural

requirements will not necessarily render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is
Page 72 of 176
a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable
ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a
failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti
from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A
review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the
documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken
links in the chain of custody.

According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint

Affidavit, the following were confiscated from the accused, to
wit:

a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected

shabu residues.

b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange,
two (2) pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc
colored white ).

c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected

shabu residues.

d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected

shabu residues.

e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]

[Emphases supplied]

Page 73 of 176
 At the police station, the case, the accused, and the
above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty Investigator
Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for
proper disposition. [31] A letter-request for laboratory
examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar
Orduna Basbag for the following items:

a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected

shabu residues marked DC&A-1.

b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected

shabu residues marked DC&A-2.

c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu

residues marked DC&A-3.[32]
[Emphases supplied]

The letter-request and above-mentioned items were

submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan Esteban
(SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L
listed the specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:

A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open

transparent plastic sachet with tag each

Page 74 of 176
 containing suspected shabu residue without
markings.

B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with

tag each containing suspected shabu residue
without markings.

C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with

tag each containing suspected shabu residue
without markings.[33]

[Emphases supplied]

Three days after the subject items were seized, or on

September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1
Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:

DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006

CONFISCATION RECEIPT

Page 75 of 176


TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about

12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together
with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro
Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of
SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2
Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin
apprehended the following names of persons of
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old,
married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this
city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old,
single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao
Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver,
a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND
DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married,
businessman, resident of Cabeldatan,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old,
separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad
Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.

Suspects were duly informed of their

constitutional rights and were brought to
Dagupan City Police Station, Perez Market Site
Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk
Page 76 of 176
 Officer to record the incident and the sachet of
suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought
to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen,
Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

Seizing Officer:

(sgd.) (sgd.)

PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz

Affiant Affiant

Remarks:

Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
[Emphases supplied]

Page 77 of 176

The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used
aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in
the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and
marked as Exhibits H and series, I and series, and J and series,
respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and
P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]

The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the

subject items were properly preserved as there was sufficient
evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were
the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the
letter-request for laboratory examination.

A review of the chain of custody indicates, however,

that the CA is mistaken.

First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21

of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject
items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of
the accused, or their representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and
provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1
Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted that no photographs
were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for

Page 78 of 176
the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that
the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney

driver you immediately formed a group
and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before
you barged in that place of Rafael
Gonzales?

A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.

Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able
to have pictures taken, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.[37]

[Emphasis supplied]

Page 79 of 176
 The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground
to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness of the situation
cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The
police officers were not prevented from preparing an
inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of
warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be
done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of
the situation may have had should have dissipated by the time
they reached the police station, as the suspects had already
been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held
that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the
apprehending officer from immediately conducting the
physical inventory and photography of the items at their place
of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws intent to
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[38]

This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases

for failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People
v. Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People v. Dela Cruz,[41]
People v. Santos, Jr.,[42] People v. Nazareno,[43] People v.
Orteza,[44] Zarraga v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]

Page 80 of 176
 Second, the subject items were not properly marked.
The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the
requirement of marking, to wit:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its

implementing rule do not expressly specify is
the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the
evidence seized upon apprehension is the same
evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at
the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain
of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of
the seized items - to truly ensure that they are
the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence - should
be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This
step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches,
and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on
planting of evidence under Section 29 and on
allegations of robbery or theft.

For greater specificity, "marking" means

the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the

Page 81 of 176
 seized items shall be placed in an envelope or
an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of
the seized items require a different type of
handling and/or container. The evidence bag
or container shall accordingly be signed by the
handling officer and turned over to the next
officer in the chain of custody.[47] [Emphasis in
the original]

Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his

Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that the
subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-
request for laboratory examination that the subject items were
indicated to have been marked with DC&A-1, DC&A-2 and
DC&A-3. There is no showing, however, as to who made
those markings and when they were made. Moreover, those
purported markings were never mentioned when the subject
items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they
took the stand.

The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that

is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and
cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any
individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the
Chemistry Report[48] that the precise number of each type of
item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all
documents prior to said report, the subject items were never
accurately quantified but only described as pieces,[49] several

Page 82 of 176
pcs,[50] and shabu paraphernallas.[51] Strangely, the Chemistry
Report indicates that all the subject items had no markings,
although each item was reported to have been marked by P/
Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject items
during laboratory examination and testing.[52] Doubt,
therefore, arises as to the identity of the subject items. It
cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject
items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected
to the laboratory examination and presented in court.

This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and
irregularity in the marking of seized items in dangerous drugs
cases, such as Zarraga v. People,[53] People v. Kimura,[54] and
People v. Laxa.[55]

Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution

and the courts below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of
being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was
prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did
not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and
their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation
receipt should provide. The only information contained in the
Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and
the general description of the subject items as the sachet of
suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. The receipt is made even more dubious by
PO1 Azardons admission in his testimony[56] that he did not
personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not
know exactly who did so.

Page 83 of 176
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the
Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were indorsed by
PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper
disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to
P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and
when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to
SPO3 Esteban.

Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the

chain of custody. No witness testified on how the subject
items were kept after they were tested prior to their
presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar
shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59]
People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]

More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the

guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardons testimony[62]
that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the
police station, the Letter[63] to the Executive Director of the
DDB states that the apprehending officers were tipped off
while conducting monitoring/surveillance. Said letter also
indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and
seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2,
2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in
the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and
Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube
suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from

Page 84 of 176
the accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for
laboratory examination.

In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain

of custody belie the prosecutions position that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the
CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly
insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The
corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug
itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused
can be found guilty.[64]

Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA

provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta.
Maria,[65] this Court held that said section was silent as to the
consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be
interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the
participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant
to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in
saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore,
other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to
perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs
cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.

Page 85 of 176
 Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the admissibility of the
evidence but only its weight.[66] Thus, had the subject items in
this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and
probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.

It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed

to the police officers, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty should prevail. However, such
presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the
regular performance of duty.[67] Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity
cannot stand.

In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were

clearly shown and proven to be irregular. When challenged by
the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of
regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of
the accused.[68]

This Court once again takes note of the growing

number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to the
failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search
and seizure procedure under the law.[69] Some bona fide
arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the
acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives
compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized

Page 86 of 176
items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement
agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and
procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of
seized drugs.

It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal

prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible.
Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not
necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be
recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of
the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.[70]

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be

instructive on Sec. 11[71] (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and
Sec. 15[72] (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with
regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This
Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges
under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs
as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of
residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the
intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order

Page 87 of 176
to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that
there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under
Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of
Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of
twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for
first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under
Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the
objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide
them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at
life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs

was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and
the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs.
Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers
should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for
use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they
should have been charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under
Sec. 12 [74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact,

Page 88 of 176
under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that
the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to

rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers
and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous
drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance
to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when
another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided
for in Sec. 15.

WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the
accused and ordering their immediate release from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of

the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt
of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be

Page 89 of 176
furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police,
and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement
Agency, for their information and guidance.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is

directed to turn over the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M.

PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Page 90 of 176
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution

and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Page 91 of 176
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ BOBONG and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ BOBOY, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the
name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the
government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding
accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[4] and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them.[6] Trial ensued,
wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca,
SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr.
as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member
of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina,

Page 92 of 176
Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.[7] The first time he came to see
the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July
1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle
passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-
appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the
names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge
of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.[8]
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon
received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA,
Ma-a, Davao City any time that morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00
A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No.
3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1
Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher
to pass by.[10]
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team
were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying
the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team
boarded their vehicle and overtook the trisikad.[11] SPO1 Paguidopon was
left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were
accosted.[12]
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point,
accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same
to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open
the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this.[14] SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana
leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.[15]
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly
seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained
Page 93 of 176
in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the trial court.[17] A motion
for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was
likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence
and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,[18]
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without
any evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own
evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt
of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused
NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under
Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided
for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately
elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the
Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR
HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.

Page 94 of 176
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY
FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.[20]
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and
seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the
strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.[21]
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.[22]
Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words,
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high regard as a freedom
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.[23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following

Page 95 of 176
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures;[24] and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search).[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made --- the process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The
Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another (arrest of escaped prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of
conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants,
and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid
because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue of whether
or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall
within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in cases of in
flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge
of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of
Page 96 of 176
facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,[30] probable cause
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable
information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers,
are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,[31] it was held that
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and
so subject to apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not consider eyes...
darting from side to side ... [while] holding ... [ones] abdomen, in a
crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances
sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause.
According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the
arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v. Encinada,[33] the Court
ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a
motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial court
concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was
standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his
Page 97 of 176
eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come (sic) nearer
(sic) to them.[35] In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the
Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.[36]
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were moving very fast - an observation which leaves us incredulous
since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions
were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion
or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front
waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner
was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.[37]
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[38]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this
to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which
allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers that accused-
appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
Page 98 of 176
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who
did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to
the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer
conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon,
however, admitted that he only learned Mulas name and address after the
arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the
arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him
by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look
at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a
motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With
respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he
had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of
accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and
how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another
person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and
Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon.
He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is
Nazario Molina[39]
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely
baseless. SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-
appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who
allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-
appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting
officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been
certain of accused-appellants identity, and were, from all indications,
merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.

Page 99 of 176
 Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said
case knew appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the
latters illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the
Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent
search were illegal, holding that [t]he prosecutions evidence did not
show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the
ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a
felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
circumstances.[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their
right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.[41]
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does
not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search
conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but
to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement
officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free
society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends
even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias
Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 100 of 176
 Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr.,
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 101 of 176

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of
firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at
the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The
Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest
that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the
Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at
the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw
two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his
abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in
the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan
knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters
for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the
accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

Page 102 of 176

That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution
was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the
articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June
13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly
reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him,
including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that
he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed
instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his
arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as
Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As
previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to
reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have
been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized
as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also
contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial
court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

Page 103 of 176

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the
absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is
the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge
Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that
it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and
search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful
under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how
we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.

Page 104 of 176

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed
it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been
apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at
11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows
but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding
his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their
suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that
they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from
the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity
who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did
not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate
on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the
warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist
that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection,
turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the
accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind
the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him.
His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found
to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and

Page 105 of 176

seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause
had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the
arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand
on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the
warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected
while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent
than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be
actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of
the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there
was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm
found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of
Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested

Page 106 of 176

has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case
of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested
and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly
because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on
any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a
criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over
liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-
appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his
exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time
of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and
must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is
based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of
the accused-appellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which
she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional
rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio
with no expectation of material reward makes her representation even
more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant
might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-
zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the

Page 107 of 176

requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the
vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may
be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been
observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately
unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Page 108 of 176

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding
appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y
BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession,
control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves with an
approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to
Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late
evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L.
Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay
Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against
persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on
persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
informations supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening
that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who
was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was

Page 109 of 176

requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling
bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves
(Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or
less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at
the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained
that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana
leaves; that the accused was taken to the police headquarters at San
Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio
Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report
(Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following
morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-
policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who
has had special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little
portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion
examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that
Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana
leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the
remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL
at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982
(Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be
marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the
trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his
wife begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in the
poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is
engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including
chicks, and used to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to
Subic at times in connection with his business and whenever he is in Subic,
he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in
Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2,
1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a balance of
P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able to
meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's
house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's son;
that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but
he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening
that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he

Page 110 of 176

did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga;
that upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando,
Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that
while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he came to know later as Pat.
Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence
certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet
and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat.
Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for
verification as he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building,
he saw a policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo,
sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that Pat. Quevedo took him
upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the
prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him; that inside his pocket
was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him that it
shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he was
thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being
charged with possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out,
somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife,
he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money
but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo,
pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone
assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON
INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the
lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de
oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new
counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk
of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her
appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE
PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES
SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER
AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a
product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a
search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the
time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court,
confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did
not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante
delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in
itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Pao, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin,
163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a
tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound
for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank,
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained

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marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted
in evidence since it was seized illegally. The records show, however, that
there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court
to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at react two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's
decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a
search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the
case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions
of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons
are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves
supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and therefore should
not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the
marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC
Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of
the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that
he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for
examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified
that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said
letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of
proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The
marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily
identified as the one seized from accused.

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Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime
Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we cannot discount the
separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded
positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted
was insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the
informer should have been presented before the lower court. We discard
this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This
Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer,
where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not
fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September
1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v.
Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the
trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the
appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the
province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and
observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution
and the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No.
81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no
reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and
Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show the
commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These
prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a
very serious offense against the accused. The knowledge on what these
witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official
performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are
prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in
the possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated
by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the
PCCL, with station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C
and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that
Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at
the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will

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be "salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the
municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat.
Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And
this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen
really got any money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do
not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court
as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from
the accused and which contained the marijuana in question if the instant
case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by
the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties
and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or
that they have any prejudice against the herein accused. Between the
testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated
and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo,
p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He
could have availed himself through compulsory court processes of several
witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was
presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the
inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot
prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution
witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as
correctly observed by the lower court, is an added circumstance tending to
establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs
one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear from the
testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that
when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he
(accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover,
considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the possession of
the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that
the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established.
(Rollo, pp. 13-14)

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The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other
hand, he categorically denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana
leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be
true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not
appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was
apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court
pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before
Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is
inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tolentino,
145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity
of official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the
Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant
was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less,
and from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana
leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated
the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who
examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only
600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively
confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the
fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place
which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe
penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing
than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to
transport the marijuana leaves but his actual session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.

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SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Page 117 of 176

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-
appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt
(hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No.
89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for
the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country
sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and
stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio
City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to
Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with
body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989),
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set
up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information
was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning,

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that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with
Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding
was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced
that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four
(4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting
the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags
from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer
noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also
contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish
found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought
to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

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During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his
defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He
also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said
bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge
of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for
his passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of the
officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among
others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer
in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus.
When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was
hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken
with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give
credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest
opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's
Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months
after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying
ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his
pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of
violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper
disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4

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Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of
the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects
was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore,
the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are
not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search
warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable

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cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to
flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs
in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by
bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada
to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic
of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers.
Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an
informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was
held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers
therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one
of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of
the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The
failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do
so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was
trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man,
who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure
of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a

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probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on
the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the
NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags
containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to
present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.
To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction
by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion
even by the king, has not only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935
to the present; it has also received unvarying recognition and acceptance in
our case law.1 The present Constitution2 declares that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right,
among others, "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."3
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other
government authority to a search of his body, or his personal effects or
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a legitimate arrest.4

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An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
Even without a warrant, an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace
officer or a private person:5
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."6 And it has
been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate
control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.7
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also
been held to be proper in cases of "search of a moving vehicle,8 and
"seizure of evidence in plain view."9 This was the pronouncement in
Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention
to Moreno v. Ago Chi;10 Alvero v. Dizon,11 Papa v. Mago,12 and an American
precedent, Harris v. U.S.13
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under
circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in
accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in
some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed
committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the
search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree.14
In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial
suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."15 But the
right against an unreasonable search and seizure may be waived by the
person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not
to invoke it.16

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There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing
validity of these established principles. However, the Court is divided as
regards the ultimate conclusions which may properly be derived from the
proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just cited
should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at
odds. What is certain, however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest
when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's person and the things in his
possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a
search warrant everytime they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and)
no judge would issue them one considering that searching questions have
to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in
accordance with the norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed,
nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit a crime, in the
soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had
was a suspicion that Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or
in his bags; all they had was, in the words of the Trial Court, "the hope of
intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of the
Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . .
(from the Cordillera) were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6,
1988 also by the First Division.17 There, Aminnudin was arrested without a
warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking from an inter-island vessel.
The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an
informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's
bag confirmed the informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana.
The Court nevertheless held that since the PC officers had failed to procure
a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do so and
therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless
search, the search of Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the
marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and the marijuana was
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted
against Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in
which apparently different conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote

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a few words to them so that the relevant constitutional and legal
propositions are not misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988),18 the
accused boarded a "Victory Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from
Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was carrying at the back of the
seat then occupied by Obia, an INP member "on Detached Service with
the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obia's suspicion, and at
the first opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously
looked into the plastic bag and noted that it contained camote tops as well
as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of
marijuana with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So
when the bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obia accosted
her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman, and announced
his intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana because
of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea "Please go with
me, let us settle this at home" he brought her to the police
headquarters., where examination of the package in Claudio's bag
confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held
the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search
justified, and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence against
the accused.
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990),19 two police
officers and a barangay tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at
the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
"aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . .
(there) but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers; . . . they
noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after
they identified themselves as peace officers; found in the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one kilogram, more or less;
the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was thereafter
filed against that person, Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon these facts it
was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless arrest
and a proper warrantless search incident thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in
People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In contrast" to Aminnudin where the Court

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perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and obtention of a
search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an
informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . .
Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant . . . To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robber, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to
contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on
hand to enable the PC officers to secure a search warrant, had there been
time. But because there was actually no time to get the warrant, and there
were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing
a crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance
instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al., decided on August 2, 1990,20 and People
v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.21
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two
members of the INP, Davao Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by
the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he suddenly fled. He
was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in
custody. The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a
revolver, for which he could produce no license or authority to possess, four
rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This
Court affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises,
probable cause for a search without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he had with him at the
time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme
Court in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio,22 a 1968 case, which the Solicitor
General had invoked to justify the search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the
First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan,
Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway
going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report
by informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be
transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the
informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at
about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney

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approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger.
The officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic
sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and
cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The
policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and
confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to
be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest,23 and declared
that, as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in
flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest.
Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin24 in
which, as aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of
Aminnudin's identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel on
which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time
and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and
Bagking, the Court found that the officers concerned had no exact
description of the vehicle the former would be using to transport marijuana,
and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed out
that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high
seas whose route and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which
ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise alter its course, or select
another destination.25
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure
appears to be People v. Lo Ho Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on
January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an undercover or "deep
penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a
group of suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim
Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo to Guangzhou, China, where he
saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea and
replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of
substituted "tea," they were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving
the airport in separate vehicles, they were intercepted by officers and
operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been
tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought
in by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed
the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of white crystalline powder
which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim
were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was
discharged as state witness. Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions raised by them in this

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Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986),26 held legal the search of the
appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the dangerous
drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including
clandestine reports by a planted spy actually participating in the activity,
that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; that the
requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity," and "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.27
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing,
facts existed which were found by the Court as justifying warantless
arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly ascertained that the
woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a
package emitting the odor of marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested
and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been positively pointed to
as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take
quick and decisive action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched
was acting suspiciously, too, and when accosted had attempted to flee from
the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite
information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting
prohibited drugs at a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the
case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a warrantless search and
seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable divergence of views
among the members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the
appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There was in this case
no confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no
attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other
reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in
process of perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently
prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and the
bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters
not that the search disclosed that the bags contained prohibited
substances, confirming their initial information and suspicion. The search

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was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful
warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a
reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or
adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was
therefore illegal, since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of
an individual before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be
made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken,
and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the
search. An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search
undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic
Command at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly
admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy bears" in the
luggage found in his possession an admission subsequently confirmed
by laboratory examination does not help the cause of the prosecution
one bit. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Malmstedt was
accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all persons under
custodial investigation.28 He was not informed, prior to being interrogated,
that he had the "right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice," and that if he could not
afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not does it
appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of
counsel." The soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the
investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The admissions elicited from
Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution clearly states,
are "inadmissible in evidence against him.29
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having
been taken in violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him "for any purpose in
any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him
are the admissions supposedly made by him without his first being
accorded the constitutional rights of persons under custodial investigation.
Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing remains of the case
against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence
presented by Malmstedt in his defense is feeble, unworthy of credence.
This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar axiom, the State
must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish

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is an objective physical reality that cannot but be conceded, there is in law
no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion, much less
beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal
activity. This is the paradox created by the disregard of the applicable
constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is that the hashish in
question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn
from private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a
disparagement of the efforts of the police and military authorities to deter
and detect offenses, whether they be possession of and traffic in prohibited
drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But
those efforts must take account of the basic rights granted by the
Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under suspicion of
engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by
the objective of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently
desirable attainment of that objective might be. Disregard of those rights,
as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of the guilty,
and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence
inadmissible even if truthful or otherwise credible.30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989
and to acquit the appellant on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe
represents the correct application to the facts of this case of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and seizures. It is
consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and
also with Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous
decision of the Court en banc, and my dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on
warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on checkpoints),
178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181
SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made
during the deliberation on this case that some members of the Court seem
to be coddling criminals instead of extending its protection to society, which
deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again;
and it is all our fault.

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Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology
that I do not consider a person a criminal, until he is convicted by final
judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial court. Until then, the
Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or
speak crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our
own standards of propriety and decorum. None of these makes him a
criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is
also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to
wink at an illegal search and seizure as long as the suspect has been
actually found in possession of a prohibited article That fact will
retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they
would rationalize, the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact
of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v.
People's Court, 80 Phil. 1, which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by an express provision in
the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the
present Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally
obtained "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system
of criminal justice. In the case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint
1wphi1

established for the preposterous reason that the route was being used by
marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The
ponencia notes that the military had advance information that a Caucasian
was coming from the Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This
is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the
majority should readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced
by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited
drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it
was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable
cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the
poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years
ago:

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. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
available evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the government
1avvphi1

should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means
by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got
evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting
it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the
future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am
"coddling criminals," I welcome the accusation and take pride in it. I would
rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed evidence
than exalt order at the price of liberty.

NARVASA, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130632. September 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NATY CHUA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a decision[1] rendered in Criminal Case No. C-34417 for estafa
under Article 315(2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code[2] and Criminal Cases
Nos. C-34418 to C-34421 for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,[3]
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, Branch 130, found accused-
appellant Naty Chua (hereafter NATY) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in all cases.
The Information in Criminal Case No. C-34417 charged NATY with
estafa allegedly committed as follows:
That on, about and sometime during the month of October 1988 in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and deceived one
Robert Loo Tian in the following manner to wit: the said accused
received from said complainant cash money amounting to P232,650.00
and in exchange thereof issued in favor of said complainant the
following checks to wit:
Name of Bank Check No. Date Amount
Far East Bank & Trust Co. 909202 3/24/89 P 7,500.00
Equitable Bank 12276355 4/20/89 5,150.00
Urban Bank 088899 4/05/89 20,000.00
Equitable Bank 12276356 5/23/89 100,000.00
Equitable Bank 12276357 6/06/89 50,000.00
Equitable Bank 12276358 6/23/89 50,000.00
when said accused knew fully well at the time that she ha[d] no
sufficient funds in the bank and would not have such funds even on the
date stated on the face thereof and upon presentment of such checks to
the drawee bank for payment, the same were all dishonored for the
reasons Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and Account Closed; that

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despite due notice as required by Republic Act No. 4885 and
notwithstanding repeated demands, the herein accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to make good
her checks in the total amount of P232,650.00 and still refuses and fails
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the
aforementioned amount.
Contrary to Law.[4]
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No.
C-34418 reads as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of October 1988 in
Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No 12276355 drawn
against the Equitable Banking Corp., in the amount of P5,150.00 dated
April 20, 1989 to apply for value in favor of ROBERT LOO TIAN well
knowing at the time of issue that she had no sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check was subsequently dishonored for the reason
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and with the intent to defraud, failed
and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of P5,150.00
despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check had been
dishonored and had not been paid.
Contrary to law.[5]
The Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-34419 to C-34421[6] are
similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. C-34418 except as to the dates
of issue, and the numbers and amounts of the checks. Involved therein
are Check No. 12276356 dated 23 May 1989 in the amount of P100,000;
Check No. 12276357 dated 6 June 1989 in the amount of P50,000; and
Check No. 12276358 dated 23 June 1989 in the amount of P50,000. The
ground for the dishonor of the checks was Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment,
NATY pleaded not guilty in each case.[7]

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 The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the challenged
decision of the trial court as follows:
Complainant Robert Loo Tian testified that sometime in October 1988,
his sister-in-law Teresita Lim brought to his house in Kalookan City the
herein accused Naty Chua and introduced her to him. The accused
wanted to borrow money in the amount of P200,000.00. He was at first
reluctant and told them to come back after two or three days. When the
accused Naty Chua and Teresita Lim returned to his house two or three
days later, he agreed to Naty Chuas request and gave her the amount of
P232,650.00 in cash in consideration of which the accused issued and
delivered him six (6) personal postdated checks, drawn against the
Equitable Banking Corporation. When the six (6) checks became due in
March 1989, he wanted to deposit them but the accused told him not to
deposit them because they were not funded and promised to replace
them. Sometime within that month of March 1989, the accused replaced
the six (6) personal checks with another six (6) postdated checks, four of
which were her personal checks (Exhibits B, D, E, F) drawn against the
Equitable Banking Corporation, while the other two (Exhibits A, C)
were checks endorsed to her by Gracita del Rosario and Susana de
Guzman (TSN, June 11, 1990, pp. 16-17).
When the two endorsed checks (Exhibits A, C) became due, he made an
arrangement with Teresita Lim to deposit them in her personal account
because Teresita Lim had money and immediately paid him in cash,
whereas if he had to deposit them in his personal account, he would have
to wait for another three days before the checks could be cleared.
However, the two checks when presented for payment were dishonored
for the reason that they were drawn against insufficient funds (Exhibits
A-2, C-4, on Exhibits A and C), as a result of which he had to return to
Teresita Lim the amount he had received from her. He looked for the
accused in order to request her to make good the checks but she was
nowhere to be found.
The four personal checks made and issued by the accused Naty Chua
(Exhibits B, D, E, F) were deposited by him in his personal account, but
they were all dishonored upon presentment and returned unpaid for

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reasons of insufficient fund (IF) in the case of the Check Exhibit B, and
Account Closed with regard to the Checks Exhibits D, E and F. Since he
could not find the accused personally, he sent her by registered mail two
letters of demand, both dated July 7, 1989, one addressed to her
residence at No. 229-F Kanlaon Street, Quezon City, and other to her
place of business at No. 147 Carlos Palanca Street, Quiapo, Manila
(Exhibits G, H). Both letters were returned by the Post Office for the
reason that they were unclaimed by the accused. He noticed, however,
that the envelope of one of the letters (Exhibit G) was already opened
when returned to him.
Complainant filed with the Kalookan City Police Station a case against
the accused (Exhibit I) which case was subsequently forwarded to the
Office of the Fiscal (Exhibit J). During the confrontation, at the Fiscals
Office, the accused appeared personally and offered to settle the case by
paying to him the amount of P1,000.00 a month, an offer which he
rejected for it would take her 17 years to complete the payment.
Teresita Lim corroborated his testimony in all material points.
Alfredo de la Cruz, signature verifier of the Equitable Banking
Corporation, who appeared pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum,
produced before the Court the statement of account of accused Naty
Chua with the Bank (Exhibit L). He testified that Check No. 12276355
(Exhibit B) was deposited on April 20, 1989 but was returned the
following day for the reason Insufficient Fund (TSN, June 25, 1990, p. 7.
See also Exhibit L-2 on Exhibit L); that the account of Naty Chua was
closed on June 21, 1989; that the three other checks (Exhibits D, E, F)
were no longer reflected in the statement of account since her account
had been closed, so that said checks were dishonored and returned for
the reason Account Closed. (TSN, June 25, 1990, pp. 8, 9).[8]
On the other hand, NATY interposed the defense of denial. She
denied knowing Robert Loo Tian (hereafter ROBERT) and issuing
checks to him. She testified that she received a subpoena from the City
Prosecutors Office of Kalookan City sometime in July 1989. Since she
did not know the complainant, she deemed it proper not to attend the
hearing. She sent her mother to the prosecutors office to find out who

Page 137 of 176

filed the case against her. Her mother reported that the complainant was
one Robert Loo Tian and that the latter was interested in just settling the
case. Her mother and ROBERT agreed at the prosecutors office to meet
at Aldys Restaurant at 2:00 p.m., and her mother advised her to meet
with ROBERT.
Accompanied by her mother, her uncle Benjamin Manalo, and her
friend Precy, NATY went to Aldys Restaurant at the appointed hour.
Mrs. Loo Tian was there waiting outside the restaurant. Since the
restaurant was still closed, her uncle suggested that they go instead to
Silver City Restaurant across the street and just wait for ROBERT there.
When they were already inside the restaurant Mrs. Loo Tian made a
phone call to ROBERT. NATYs companions all sat on one table. NATY
sat on the table next to them, as their table was already fully occupied;
besides, she wanted to show then that she and ROBERT did not know
each other. After waiting for one-anda half hours, ROBERT arrived and
approached the table where his wife and NATYs companions were
sitting. He faced Precy and asked her, Naty, why [didnt] you want to
appear at the fiscals office? NATYS mother answered, That is not Naty
and pointed at her and said, That is Naty. When Ben Manalo asked her
whether she knew ROBERT, she shook her head to indicate that she did
not know him. ROBERT just stared at her and sat down at the table of
her companions. ROBERT then said that they should just settle the case
and that she should help him by letting Susan appear before the
prosecutors office in order for Susan to pay the P20,000 check issued to
Teresita Lim. ROBERT also told her that she could pay to him in
installment the amounts of the checks. She refused and told ROBERT
that she did not know him, nor did she have an obligation to him. As for
Susans whereabouts, she had no knowledge thereof.
NATY further declared that the four checks issued by her were for
Teresita Lim as collateral for her loan and that she already paid these
checks in cash and in kind out of the goods taken by Teresita from her
store. The goods taken by Teresita worth P65,000 and charged against
her loan were covered by delivery receipts. She further claimed that the
cash payments she made were listed on a piece of paper and signed by
Teresita after each payment. However, she was unable to take back the
checks from Teresita. When she requested an accounting Teresita wanted
Page 138 of 176
her to produce the list of payments made, but she did not give her list to
Teresita. Unfortunately, the list is now missing; although at the time
Teresita demanded its production, it was still existing.
Finally, NATY asserted that she merely stood as guarantor to the
checks she indorsed, which represented the loans obtained from teresita
Lim by Susana de Guzman in the amount of P20,000 and by Gracita del
Rosario in the amount of P7,500.[9]
Benjamin Manalo corroborated NATYs testimony as to what
transpired during the meeting at Silver City Restaurant. He testified that
NATY did not sit at their table but sat on the third table away from them
and they all pretended that they did not know each other. ROBERT came
in after a while and proceeded to their table. ROBERT mistook Precy for
Naty, and he was corrected by NATYs mother.[10]
The trial court did not believe NATY. It found unworthy her claim
that her four personal postdated checks and the two indorsed checks
were issued and indorsed not to ROBERT but to Teresita, since
ROBERT was in possession thereof. It did not give credence to her
claim that she had already paid the amounts evidenced by the checks. It
held:
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the six (6) checks
(Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F) are replacement checks (TSN, May 2, 1990,
pp. 44, 46. See also Affidavit of Robert Loo Tian, Exhibit I) made,
issued and delivered by the accused to the complainant to replace the six
(6) personal checks all postdated previously issued by her which she
admitted were unfunded on their due date. Not only did the accused fail
to deposit the amount necessary to cover the payment of the original six
postdated checks but she also failed to deposit the amount to cover the
payment of the four of the six replacement checks. Thus, there was fraud
or deceit, constituting false pretense and fraudulent acts. The Court is
convinced that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused.[11]
The trial court likewise found NATY guilty of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 for having issued four worthless checks. The law
punishes the mere issuance, regardless of the intent of the parties, of any
kind of check which is subsequently dishonored.

Page 139 of 176

 Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment against NATY. In the
estafa case it sentenced her to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) years of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party ROBERT in the
amount of P232,650, plus 12% interest per annum from date of demand;
and in each of the four cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it
imposed upon her the penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year.
NATY interposed an appeal from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which was, however, referred to us in view of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed in the estafa case.
We accepted the appeal.
In her Appellants Brief, NATY contends that the trial court erred in
(A) CONVICTING [HER] DESPITE THE EVIDENCE BY THE
PROSECUTION ITSELF THAT THE CHECKS IN QUESTION [WERE]
NOT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE FOR THE SUBJECT LOAN
TRANSACTION;
(B) CONVICTING [HER] OF ESTAFA DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE SIMULTANEITY IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CHECKS AND RECEIPT OF BENEFITS;
(C) FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE UNQUESTIONABLE FACT THAT
THE CHECKS IN THESE CASES WERE ISSUED WHEN THE
OBLIGATIONS WERE ALREADY EXISTING;
(D) MISINTERPRETING THE LAW ON ESTAFA BY ITS SCATTERED
ATTRIBUTION OF ITS ELEMENTS TO DIFFERENT SETS OF CHECKS;
(E) CONVICTING [HER] DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT PRIOR
SETTLEMENT OR RECONCILIATION OF THE ACCOUNT IS REQUIRED
TO DETERMINE THE BALANCE OF THE LOAN TRANSACTION
INVOLVED IN THESE CASES;
(F) CONVICTING [HER] IN THIS CASE DESPITE THE CLEAR AND
INDUBITABLE ABSENCE OF DECEIT ON HER PART IN ENTERING
INTO THE SUBJECT LOAN TRANSACTION;
(G) CONVICTING [HER] OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 DESPITE THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
HIMSELF, IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS SISTER-IN-LAW, ARE THE
WRONGDOERS IN THIS CASE;
(H) VIOLAT[ING] [HER] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE IN CONVICTING HER ON EVIDENCE WAY BELOW
THE REASONABLE-DOUBT STANDARD IN CRIMINAL CASES AND

Page 140 of 176

THROUGH ITS TOTAL AND CONVENIENT DISREGARD OF THE
DEFENSE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.
NATY argues that one of the elements of estafa under Article 315
(2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code is a finding beyond reasonable doubt
that the issuance of the check was the efficient cause and the means used
to obtain a valuable consideration. This element was absent in her case
because the issuance of the checks was not the inducement for the loan
to her. The inducements were the intercession made by Teresita Lim,
ROBERTs sister-in-law, and the interest to be earned on the money lent.
NATY further stresses that the checks for which she was convicted were
not the same checks originally issued, but replacement checks issued
sometime in March 1989 when her loan obligation was already four
months old. Hence, there was already a pre-existing obligation for which
the replacement checks were made to answer. She did not, therefore,
commit the crime of estafa.
In addition, NATY faults the trial court for refusing to consider her
claim that she had already paid her loan as shown by the fifteen receipts
totalling P65,000.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that NATY cannot be convicted of estafa under Article 315 (2)
(d) of the Revised Penal Code, since the subject checks were
replacement checks issued and delivered in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. Hence, the checks could no longer be considered as the
means employed by NATY to obtain a loan from complainant. The
element of deceit was thus lacking.
However, the OSG agrees with the trial court that NATY violated
B.P. Blg. 22 in the issuance of the four replacement checks. She issued
the checks as payment for the money she borrowed from complainant,
but all the checks bounced. Despite demand, she failed to make good the
checks.
The OSG then recommends that NATYs conviction for estafa be
reversed and she be acquitted thereof, while her conviction for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 be affirmed with the modification that she be required to
indemnify the offended party of the amount equivalent to the value of
the checks she personally issued.

Page 141 of 176

 After deliberating on the assigned errors and the briefs submitted by
the parties, we find NATYs appeal partially impressed with merit.
NATY should be acquitted in the case for estafa. She is charged
under Article 315(2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 4885, which penalizes any person who shall defraud another by
postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The elements therefor
are (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.[12]
Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction,[13] while the
false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or
simultaneously with, the issuance of the bad check.[14]
What is obvious to us is that NATY borrowed money from
ROBERT through the intercession of the latters sister-in-law, Teresita
Lim. In payment therefor she issued postdated checks. When such
checks became due she notified ROBERT not to deposit them, since
these were not yet funded. ROBERT agreed that NATY replace the
checks with another set of six postdated checks, four of which were her
personal checks and the other two were issued by another which NATY
indorsed to ROBERT. Ineluctably, the replacement checks were issued
in payment of an obligation long contracted and incurred. It cannot
therefore be said that NATY committed fraudulent acts in the issuance
and the indorsement of the replacement checks. In short, the replacement
checks were by no means the device used by NATY to induce ROBERT
to lend her money without which the transaction would not have been
consummated.
Even assuming arguendo that the checks subject of this case were
the original postdated checks issued by NATY at the time of the
transaction, still no estafa was committed. The trial court had overlooked
portions of the testimony of ROBERT obviously indicating that what
transpired between ROBERT and NATY was a simple loan transaction,
the principal of which was payable at a future date with interest.[15] This
was amply corroborated by prosecution witness Teresita Lim, who
Page 142 of 176
declared that it was she who introduced NATY to ROBERT and asked
the latter whether he could lend money to NATY.[16] ROBERT himself
admitted that what motivated him to lend the amount to NATY was not
her issuing the original postdated checks[17] but the expectation that he
would receive an interest equivalent to 1% a month of the total amount
borrowed from him.
However, NATY is liable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing
four replacement checks. The law makes the mere act of issuing a
worthless check punishable as a special offense.[18] The gravamen of the
offense under this law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.[19] The law has
made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act
proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare.[20] It is undisputed that the four replacement checks in
question were issued by NATY and that these were all dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 130, insofar as Criminal Case No. C-34417 is
concerned and ACQUITTING accused-appellant NATY CHUA of the
crime of estafa charged therein; and AFFIRMING it insofar as the
conviction of NATY CHUA in Criminal Cases Nos. C-34418 to
C-34421 for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the imposition of
the penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year in each case are concerned,
with the modification that she is further ordered to pay the offended
party Robert Loo Tian the face value of the checks involved therein, to
wit: P5,150; P100,000; P50,000; and P50,000, or a total of P205,150,
with legal interest from the filing of the informations until the finality of
this decision and at the rate of 12% per annum thereafter until the
amounts are fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Page 143 of 176

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his
acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66,
finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority,
the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of
Section 15,[1] Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,
[2] and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, the

judgment was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to

Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7659.
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around
12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE)
of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the
vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of
the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of
his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter
BADUA), proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried
a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in
strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men
to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By
Page 144 of 176
this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in
their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he
suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from
fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in
English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not
to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to
no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed sign language; he
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag
yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag,
which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he
signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence,
CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the
latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial
features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited
and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to
have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man,
CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to
act as an interpreter. In the meantime, BADUA opened the bag and
counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr.
Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of
his constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied that the
man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their
uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen
asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence
and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan
Police Station.

Page 145 of 176

 Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region I,
received a letter request[3] from CID incidentally her husband to conduct
a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed
inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,
[4] she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of

the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the
case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an
indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was
subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine
[h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to
transport the same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not
guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended
information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter,
Thelma Sales Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a
Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were
assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to
establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the
testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was
substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her
chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing
28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated

Page 146 of 176

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that they
were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through
interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was
employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995,
he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to
board the latters 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port,
Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their
destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with
two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG
then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority
to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and
reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m.,
they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG
brought with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several phone
calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the person on
the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding.
Apparently, the person on shore could not see them so they cruised over
the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on fuel and
telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while
RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to
look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2)
meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one
bag was missing much to RONGs dismay when he learned of it. When a
crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then
realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police immediately
approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures and
hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who
CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of
the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it,
inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecutions story as a distortion of the truth.
He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his
"constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently,
Page 147 of 176
his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine
hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible
as evidence. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of
his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. BADUA
certainly never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed
to make an impression in his mind. Most significantly, he denied
ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that
RONG alone exercised dominion over the same.
Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member,
recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the
police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also
remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that
CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had
chased the latters car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd
became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police
headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation -- he opened
CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic
chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and
he ordered his officials to find an interpreter. Throughout the
proceedings, photographers were busy taking pictures to document the
event.
Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of
Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the
beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag
situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local police.
They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and
PARONG at the beach but not CID.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that
the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that
CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without legal authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben[5] as
authority, the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted
the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
Page 148 of 176
own choice, considering the language barrier and the observation that
such irregularity was rectified when accused was duly arraigned and
(afterwards) participated in the trial of this case. The RTC then
disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did
not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence
conferred on the testimonies thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his
alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the
illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several
other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit
traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and
established by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had
conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention
Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to
the Country from China and Taiwan, this Court finds the accused Chua
Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 as charged in the Information, and considering the provisions of
Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if
the quantity sold/possessed/transported is 200 grams or more in the case
of Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity involved in this case
is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said
Act, coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member
of an organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no other
recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused, this Court
hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die
by lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00);
and to pay the costs.
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the
Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating
Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity,

Page 149 of 176

who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to
determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of
Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached the
accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and
attempted to take the remaining bag from accused, as well as the
whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a copy of the
report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance
herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated
in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine
National Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat
operations against all illegal seaborne activities.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting
as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2)
granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
despite glaring inconsistencies on material points; and in (3)
appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate in the
illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the
information.
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting
that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search
and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and
contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police
action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's
right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to
the search.
We reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of
home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

Page 150 of 176

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[7]
Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and
equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[8]
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.[9] Verily, the rule is, the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued
in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search and seizure
become unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision.[10] This interdiction against warrantless searches
and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence[11] in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search),[12] and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.[13]
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless
arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly
and quite understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this Court is certain
that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a
warrant.
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the
Page 151 of 176
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such fact[14] or as recent case law[15] adverts
to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive of probable cause. The term probable cause had been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.[16] Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.[17] In People v. Montilla,[18] the Court acknowledged that the
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and
correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized. Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential
evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been
dubiously equated with probable cause, the Court explained:
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima
facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright, at least
on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of
Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence
required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
engender as well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of the
crime and the respondents probable guilt thereof. It has the same
meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule,
that is, that the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial, or where a probable cause exists. It should, therefore, be in that
sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be
considered as legally authorized. (emphasis supplied)[19]
Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts
on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred
police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never
took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its
decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying

Page 152 of 176

the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended. In short, there is no probable
cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower
court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting
suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was
transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation)
constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers from effecting an
in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General
proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause --
persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUAs
illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel
documents or visa), CHUAs suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to
flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which
CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute probable
cause. None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the
pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,[20] confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/
deliver the same,[21] suspicious demeanor or behavior[22] and suspicious
bulge in the waist[23]-- accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information
that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area
did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted
to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and
oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached
him. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim, thus:
Q How far were you when the accused put the bag on his shoulder?
A We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person
carrying the bag.

Page 153 of 176

Q To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder?
A To the east direction.
Q In relation to you, where were you.
A With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached the accused
and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in Tagalog, English and Ilocano
which accused did not understand because he did not respond.
Q When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that time?
A He was walking.
Q To what direction he was walking?
A He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
Q He was walking away from you or going near you?
A He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the right arm of
the accused.
Q Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
A Yes sir and he stopped.[24]
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was
not obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers sense perception
and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking
casually towards the road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag.
These acts did not convey any impression that he illegally entered
Philippine shores. Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing
felonious activity nor of CHUAs criminal behavior as clearly established
in CIDs testimony, thus:
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves:
A No, sir.
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he was
not doing anything wrong?
A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or whatever
assistance that we can give we will give.[25]
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an
arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be
effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in
the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area
within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a
weapon or evidence he can destroy,[26] a valid arrest must precede the
search. The process cannot be reversed.

Page 154 of 176

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made - the process cannot be reversed.[27]
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court[28] as already shown. From all
indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is worth
mentioning here that after introducing themselves, the police officers
immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What else could
have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the
bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been
committed by CHUA -- in effect to "retroactively establish probable
cause and validate an illegal search and seizure."
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a
consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute
a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.[29] CHUA never exhibited that he knew, actually or
constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he
intentionally conceded the same. This can be inferred from the manner
by which the search was performed, thus:
Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that you did
when you approached him (CHUA)?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?
A That is normal practice in our part, sir.
***
Q If it is possible . Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what did you
do?
A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?

Page 155 of 176

A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.
Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his
bag?
A No, sir, there is no answer.
Q No answer?
A Yes, sir, no answer.
Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?
A I used sign language sir.
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that
sign language of opening the bag mr. (sic) witness?
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir.
***
SHERIFF:
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then
manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand
from left to right or from the opening to the end of the zipper.
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the
zipper.
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)
COURT: Did you open that personally?
WITNESS:
A No, your honor.
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open the bag?
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.
Q Why, why was it - no, I reform my question your honor. Is it normal
procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag?
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect the baggage,
it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.
Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his
bag?
A yes, sir.
Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open his bag?
A No, sir.
Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?
A Yes, sir.[30]

Page 156 of 176

 CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and
overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced themselves to
CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The
police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three
languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the polices request to
open the bag, they resorted to what they called sign language. They
claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures.
This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he understand the polices sign language.
More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged
cognizance of the sign language that he deliberately, intelligently, and
consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. This Court
is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented
warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers'
request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused
and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused even
verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the
nature and consequences of such request.[31]
It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated
substance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an
illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial
information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit
of a poisonous tree[32] how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did
not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case -
because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial
suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to
sustain CHUAs conviction.
Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported
methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are
sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it
guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
Page 157 of 176
intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered.
"There are those who say that 'the criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered.' In some cases this will undoubtedly be the
result. But 'there is another consideration -- the imperative of judicial
integrity.' The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets
him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of
its own existence."[33]
As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to
insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a
passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its
erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is
without question unsupported by the records. Conspiracy was not
included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of
the trial court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just
like any other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond
reasonable doubt.[34]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO
SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged,
the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, J., no part. On official leave.
Panganiban, J., on leave.

Page 158 of 176

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100920. June 17, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NOLI SALCEDO @ "KA TONY," GEMO IBAEZ @ "KA
TITING," BOLODOY CALDERON, JUANITO SUAL,
JR., EDISON BANCULO, NONOY ESQUILONA, GIL
RAPSING, JOSE FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CORTEZ,
NOE ALBAO, ELY RAPSING, PACO MANLAPAZ,
DANILO LAURIO and NORIE HUELVA, accused,
NOLI SALCEDO, EDISON BANCULO, JUAN SUAL,
JR., and DANILO LAURIO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The rights of a person under custodial investigation, particularly
the right to remain silent and to counsel, have been explained,
echoed and stressed no end by this Court. They are no less
constitutionally enshrined.[1] Innumerable court decisions[2] have
been rendered, evincing the great importance with which the state
regards them. A law[3] was recently enacted defining the rights of
persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation as
well as the duties of the arresting, detaining and investigating
officers; and penalizing violations thereof. In spite of these clear
constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory guidelines, one still
finds persistent infractions by public investigators and police
authorities that have resulted in acquittals which oftentimes are
not understood or appreciated by the public at large.
In the present case, the issue confronts us once more. As we
have held in similar cases, a voluntary extrajudicial confession of
an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without the
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.[4]
Of course, where the statements in the uncounselled confession
are reiterated in open court, or where other conclusive evidence

Page 159 of 176

proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
court should not hesitate to convict and mete the proper penalty.[5]
In an Information[6] dated October 28, 1988, First Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. charged Accused-
appellants Noli Salcedo, Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and
Danilo Laurio, together with Nonoy (Teodulo, Jr.) Esquilona,
Reynaldo Cortes, Paco (Romarico) Manlapaz, Gemo Ibaez,
Bolodoy Calderon, Gil Rapsing, Jose Fernandez, Noe Albao, Ely
Rapsing and Norie Huelva, with the crime of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about June 20, 1988, in the evening thereof, at Barangay
Gabi, Municipality of Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation(,) treachery and superiority of strenght (sic) and taking
advantage of nighttime, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot with a gun(,) hack with a bolo one
Honorio Aparejado y Fideles, hitting the latter on the different parts of
the body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death.
On September 12, 1989, Accused Noli Salcedo, Juanito Sual, Jr.,
Edison Banculo, Danilo Laurio, Reynaldo Cortes and Nonoy
Esquilona, assisted by Attys. Ricardo Merdegia and Jose Medina,
pleaded not guilty to the above charge, while Accused Romarico
Manlapaz, assisted by Atty. Ruben Songco, entered the same
plea on January 23, 1990.[7] The rest of the accused remained at
large. Trial ensued insofar as those apprehended and arraigned
were concerned. On May 6, 1991, the trial judge rendered
judgment convicting Salcedo as principal; and Banculo, Sual, Jr.
and Laurio as accomplices in the crime of murder. Esquilona, Jr.,
Cortes and Manlapaz were acquitted.[8]
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The principal witness for the prosecution, Edwin Cortes, a 30-year
old farmer, resident of Gabi, Baleno, Masbate, and brother-in-law

Page 160 of 176

of the victim, Honorio Aparejado, identified and affirmed his
statement[9] given on June 30, 1988 relative to the incident which
he had subscribed to before Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Vicente
Lim Yu on July 11, 1988. The gist of Cortes testimony[10] is as
follows:
About 8:00 oclock in the evening of June 20, 1988, he was in his house
together with his wife, their four children and the victim when several
armed men led by Accused Noli Salcedo arrived. Salcedo shouted for
him and the victim to come out of the house. Once outside, Cortes and
Aparejado were ordered to lie on the ground; then they were hogtied.
Thereafter, they were told to get up and were led to the other side of a
creek, about twenty (20) meters from the house, where they were
ordered to lie down again. While the witness and the victim were in such
position about two or three meters apart, Salcedo shot Aparejado twice,
then hacked him. Salcedos companions likewise hacked the victim.
Afterwards, they turned Aparejados body around, opened his stomach
and took out his liver. His kneecap was also removed. Then all the
accused left, bringing with them the victims liver and kneecap. Cortes
claimed to have witnessed all these since the accused had a flashlight
and the moon was just rising.
After the accused had left, Cortes ran towards a grassy area where
he was able to untie his hands. The following morning, he informed the
relatives of the victim about the incident and likewise reported the same
to police authorities at Baleno, Masbate. Cortes further stated that he
had known Salcedo for about a year prior to the incident and that he
had no knowledge of any reason why the accused had killed Aparejado.
Although he admitted not knowing the identities of Salcedos
companions at the time of the murder, he identified each of the accused
before the trial court and said that they were the ones who killed
Aparejado.
Municipal Health Officer Conchita Ulanday conducted the
postmortem examination on the body of the victim. Her findings
included:
Signs of violence:

Page 161 of 176

(1) Incised wound with a zigzag appearance 11 penetrating exposing the
stomach and a portion of the intestines, located at the epigastric area
(Rt.) up to the level of the navel.
(2) Incised wound slightly curving in appearance(,) 7 penetrating
exposing a portion of the intestines crossing the wound #1 at the level of
the navel.
(3) Gunshot wound point of entry #2, 1 cm. circular each 1 apart pre-
axillary line at the level of the 4th and 5th (illegible) with the presence
of tattoing (sic) (powder burns) around the wound(,) back, left, with a
downward-inward in (sic) direction.
(4) Gunshot wound point of entry 1 cm. circular, scapular line, (with)
tattoing (sic) around the wound, lower back, left.
(5) Hack wound at the level of the nape of the neck, almost completely
detaching the head from the body.
(6) A emulsion (sic) knee cartilage, Rt.
Due to the above-mentioned post mortem findings (sic) was made that
death was caused by hack, gunshot and incised wounds.[11]
Dr. Ulanday described the first, second and last wounds as
serious but not fatal, although they might have been secondary to
infection. However, the three other wounds were fatal since they
injured vital organs such as the lungs, heart and liver.[12]
Witness Lydia Aparejado, widow of the victim, testified on how
she learned of the killing of her husband. At that time, she was in
Baleno attending to the needs of their children who were studying
there. She further testified to the actual expenses incurred as a
consequence of the death of her husband, amounting to
P5,000.00. She also demanded indemnification for the physical
and mental anguish she felt due to the killing of her husband, in
an amount she left to the discretion of the court.[13]
P/Sgt. Jose Bajar of the Aroroy Police Station testified that he had
conducted the investigation of Accused Danilo Laurio, Juan[14]
Sual, Jr. and Edison Banculo on August 22, 1988. The
investigation was in the form of questions and answers in the
vernacular which were reduced into writing.[15] During cross-
examination, he admitted that the three were not assisted by
Page 162 of 176
counsel when they signed their respective waivers--neither during
the investigation nor at the time they affixed their signatures to
their respective statements.[16]
Pfc. Wencell[17] Esquilona, member of the INP (now PNP) Baleno
Police Station, was presented as a rebuttal witness for the
prosecution. He stated that he had effected the arrest of six of the
accused, namely: Manlapaz, Cortes, Esquilona, Jr., Laurio,
Banculo and Sual. As to the latter three, Esquilona admitted that
he was not armed with a warrant for their arrest but that he had
only received a wire from the headquarters that the three were
suspects in the murder of Aparejado. At the time of the arrest, he
likewise recovered one lantaka, an armalite revolver and fatigue
uniforms at the house where the three were arrested. He stated
further that he did not maltreat any of them and was not present
during their investigation conducted by Sgt. Jose Bajar.[18]
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Edison Banculo testified that he had been in Balite,
Aroroy, Masbate, sleeping in the house of his adoptive parents,
Celia[19] Laydo and Angel Entines,[20] on the night the incident
occurred. His adoptive parents and co-accused Danilo Laurio
were also in the same house at that time. He declared that he had
signed Exhibit G, purportedly his confession of his participation in
the killing of Aparejado, only because he could not bear the
physical maltreatment by the police who had further threatened to
kill him. He confirmed that he was not assisted by counsel or
apprised of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel of his own choice during his investigation.[21]
Another accused, Teodulo Esquilona, Jr., testified that he had
been in Masbate, Masbate, learning the art of wood lamination
from a certain Eduardo Marabe, on the day the incident took
place. Among his co-accused, he knew only Reynaldo Cortes
while he met the others for the first time in court. He testified
further that, contrary to the assertion of Prosecution Witness
Edwin Cortes, he personally knew the latter who had been his
neighbor in the poblacion of Baleno, Masbate from 1978 to 1986.
Besides, his wife was the cousin of Edwin.[22]
Page 163 of 176
Accused Reynaldo Cortes corroborated the alibi of Teodulo, Jr.,
stating that he slept in the latters house on the night of June 20,
1988 at Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. The latter had left early morning
of that day and came back only the following day. He denied
having known the other accused previous to the filing of the case
except for Romarico Manlapaz who was a neighbor of Teodulo, Jr.
He claimed to be a cousin of the victims father but knew no
enmity or ill feeling between them. He likewise claimed to have
been physically maltreated by the police during his investigation.[23]
The principal suspect, Noli Salcedo, likewise denied complicity in
the murder of Aparejado. He claimed to have been in Manila
working as a construction laborer from 1987 until August 1988.
When asked the name of his employer and of the firm where he
worked, he could not, however, name either. At the latter date, he
went back to Bantigue (in Masbate) to attend the fiesta. He was
later arrested in his hometown of Kinamaligan. At the time of his
arrest, he had tried to escape, as a result of which he was shot by
one of the police officers. He denied knowing the Aparejados and
his other co-accused.[24]
Another accused, Romarico Manlapaz, also claimed that he had
been in Manila from May 10, 1988 until February 1989 when he
returned to Lagta, Baleno. He admitted knowing, among his co-
accused, Teodulo Esquilona, Jr. and Reynaldo Cortes who were
his neighbors in Lagta. As to the rest, he only met them in jail. He
also denied knowing the victim or his widow.[25]
Juanito Sual, Jr. stated that he was in his house in Gabi, Baleno,
Masbate during the night of the incident. He admitted affixing his
signature to the statement marked Exhibit F for the prosecution,
but only because he could no longer bear the maltreatment of
Policeman Wencell Esquilona. He confirmed that he had not been
assisted by counsel during his investigation, and denied that he
had been informed of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted
by counsel of his own choice. He also claimed that at the time he
was apprehended, there was no warrant for his arrest. He denied
having been in the company of Noli Salcedo, whom he allegedly
met in jail only in the evening of June 20, 1988. He said that,
Page 164 of 176
among the other accused, he knew only Edison Banculo, Danilo
Laurio and Reynaldo Cortes prior to this case.[26]
Danilo Laurio stated that he was sleeping at the house of his
adoptive parents in Balite, Aroroy, Masbate, on the night that
Honorio Aparejado was killed. At that time, his co-accused Edison
Banculo was in the same house. He controverted the statement of
Prosecution Witness Edwin Cortes that he was one of those who
had killed Aparejado. He further denied having known the victim
or the latters wife prior to his murder. He also stated that at the
time of his arrest, the arresting officer was not armed with a
warrant. Although he admitted having signed his alleged sworn
statement presented by the prosecution, he claimed that he was
forced to do so after having been physically abused by Policeman
Wencell Esquilona.[27]
The adoptive mother of Accused Banculo and Laurio, Celia Laydo
Entines, testified that she and the two went gold-panning in her
land at Baliti (or Balite), Aroroy, Masbate on June 20, 1988 at
daytime. About 7:00 oclock in the evening, they all went to sleep
and woke up about 5:00 oclock the following morning. To her
knowledge, her two adopted sons did not leave the house that
night.[28]
Two other witnesses were presented, corroborating the alibi of
Cortes and Esquilona, Jr., and also attesting to their good
character.
Ruling of the Trial Court
In discrediting Accused-appellant Noli Salcedos sole defense of
alibi, the court a quo reasoned thus:
Accused Noli Salcedo has been clearly and positively identified by lone
witness Edwin Cortes. His alibi therefore, that he was in Manila at the
time the heinous crime was perpetrated, cannot be sustained. Moreover,
after examining the evidence in support of his defense, the Court finds
that his alibi has the aspect of fabrication.
xxx xxx xxx
When asked by the prosecution the firm or the name of his employer
where he was working in Manila, he could not remember the

Page 165 of 176

construction firm neither the name of his employer. This is highly
impossible, considering the fact that he reports to work daily. While he
may in the remote probability forget one, he could not forget both."[29]
With respect to the other accused, the trial court explained their
complicity this wise:
It is to be remembered that Edwin Cortes, witness for the prosecution
knew only Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon of the eight (8) who
came to his house. x x x
The other accused were merely referred to by the witness as companions
of Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon. That he was able to pinpoint the
other accused in Court is understandable considering that when the
above-named accused were under custodial interrogation, he was
present. Under such circumstances, he could well remember the faces of
the six (6) accused for purposes of implicating them.
Their participation in the criminal act appears to be limited to being
present in the premises where the acts of co-defendants who, other than
being present, giving moral support to the principal accused, cannot be
said to constitute direct participation in the acts of execution and their
presence and company were not necessary and essential to the
perpetration of the murder in question. Such co-defendants may only be
considered guilty as accomplices x x x.[30]
However, the trial court noted that the inclusion of Accused
Romarico (Paco) Manlapaz, Reynaldo Cortes and Teodulo
Esquilona, Jr. in the charge was based solely on the extrajudicial
confessions of Edison Banculo, Juan Sual, Jr. and Danilo Laurio
which, absent independent proof of conspiracy, were not
admissible evidence against alleged co-conspirators[31] under
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a judgment of
acquittal was rendered in favor of Manlapaz, Cortes and
Esquilona, Jr.
The full dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NOLI SALCEDO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the

Page 166 of 176

penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the victim
in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused Edison Banculo, Juan Sual Jr. and Danilo Laurio as
Accomplice (sic) in the crime of Murder, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer Indeterminate Penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, in the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.
All instruments seized from the accused are hereby confiscated in favor
of the government, to wit:
Exh. I - lantaka (homemade gun) long barrel;
Exh. L - armalite revolver, Smith and Wesson, US made;
Exh. L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4 - live ammos; and
Exh. L-5 and L-6 - empty shells.
In the service of their sentence, accused Edison Banculo, Juan Sual Jr.
and Danilo Laurio shall be given the full credit of their detention.
Accused Teodulo Esquilona, Jr., Reynaldo Cortes and Paco Manlapaz
are hereby ACQUITTED.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the apprehension of the other
accused who remain at large up to the present, namely: Gemo Ibaez,
Bolodoy Calderon, Gil Rapsing, Jose Fernandez, Noe Albao, Ely
Rapsing and Norie Huelva.[32]
Issues
In their appeal before us, accused-appellants aver that the trial
court erred in not acquitting them on the ground of reasonable
doubt and in not giving due credit to their defense of denial and
alibi.[33] They claim that the prosecution failed to present clear and
conclusive proof of conspiracy and of the presence of all elements
of the crime (without, however, specifying which element was not
proved). Thus, although alibi is an inherently weak defense, faced
with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecutions
evidence, it suffices to raise reasonable doubt as to the accuseds
responsibility.

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The Solicitor General views Appellant Salcedos alibi as futile
because he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Further, the prosecution eyewitness positive
identification of him as one of the culprits pulverizes his already
weak defense. The state counsel recommends, however, the
acquittal of Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio on the ground
that their extrajudicial confessions were executed without the
assistance of counsel and are, hence, inadmissible in evidence.
He further states that since the only evidence implicating them in
the crime are these uncounselled confessions, the constitutional
presumption of innocence must be resolved in their favor.[34]
The Courts Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the
recommendation of the Solicitor General justified. Thus, we
partially grant this appeal insofar as the conviction of Appellants
Juanito Sual, Jr., Edison Banculo and Danilo Laurio is concerned.
However, with regard to Appellant Noli Salcedo, in the face of the
clear and categorical testimony of Prosecution Witness Edwin
Cortes who related in minutiae the extent of Salcedos
participation in the vicious slaughtering of the hapless victim, his
conviction must stand.
First Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Against Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio
Appellants Banculo, Sual, Jr. and Laurio deny complicity in the
murder of Aparejado and refute the voluntariness of the execution
of their purported confessions. The three claim to have been
physically maltreated by the apprehending officer and forced to
sign the statements prepared by the police investigator. The trial
judge, however, gave no credit to their allegations of
maltreatment, and further ruled against the objections of the
defense counsel to the admissibility of appellants statements on
the ground that they had been taken without the assistance of
counsel.

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Significantly, the absence of counsel at the time of the
investigation of the three above-named appellants was confirmed
by the police investigator himself, thus:
Q (When) Danilo Laurio signed the waiver, was he assisted by counsel?
A No, sir.
Q How about Juanito Sual, when he signed Exhibit F, his waiver, when
he signed the waiver on Exhibit F, was he assisted by his counsel?
A No, sir.
Q When he signed the entire body of your investigation was he also
assisted by counsel?
A No, sir.
Q How about Edison Banculo when he signed the waiver, was he
assisted by counsel?
A He was not assisted.
Q When he signed the entire investigation that you made?
A Yes, sir.[35]
Under these circumstances, this Court is left with no choice but to
exclude the sworn statements of Laurio, Sual, Jr., and Banculo
from the evidence against them. We recently had occasion to
discourse on the inviolability of the constitutional rights of a
person under custodial investigation and we find our
pronouncement in People vs. Parel once more worth repeating:
Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. The right to be informed carries with it the correlative
obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates
effective communication which results in the subject understanding what
is being conveyed. Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension,
the degree of explanation required will vary and depend on education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
being investigated. In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person
being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be informed of that

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right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the
same and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if
he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he
decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be
provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such
waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of
counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made
by appellant spoke the truth and was not extracted through violence or
intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to inform
appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his
right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective
legal assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the
confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)
In People vs. Januario,[37] we reemphasized our unwavering
commitment to safeguard our peoples rights, particularly the right
to counsel of persons under custodial investigation, as follows:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when
our nation was reeling from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and
outright violations of our peoples rights to life, liberty and property.
Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human
liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial
investigations from ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace
officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness
that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense not only the services of
counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) competent but also (b)
independent and (c) preferably of his own choice as well.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement
agencies in apprehending violators of the law x x x. It sympathizes with
the public clamor for the bringing of criminals before the altar of justice.
However, quick solution of crimes and the consequent apprehension of

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malefactors are not the end-all and be-all of law enforcement. Enforcers
of the law must follow the procedure mandated by the Constitution and
the law. Otherwise, their efforts would be meaningless. And their
expenses in trying to solve crimes would constitute needless
expenditures of taxpayers money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of
basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the
awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.
The constitutionally infirm confessions of appellants, therefore,
cannot be given any iota of consideration. And without such
statements, the remaining prosecution evidence is sorely
inadequate to prove the participation of Banculo, Sual, Jr. and
Laurio in the crime. The lone prosecution eyewitness, Edwin
Cortes, tried to implicate all the accused by describing the kind of
weapon each had been armed with during the night of the
incident.[38] His statements relative thereto are, however, suspect.
In the rest of his testimony, he referred to the accused, other than
Salcedo, merely as Salcedos companions. On a specific question
proffered by the public prosecutor, Cortes admitted not knowing
the identities of the other accused, thus:
Q Do you want to impress to this Honorable Court that you do not know
the rest of the accused at the time when this victim was killed?
A Yes, sir.[39]
Even during his earlier investigation by the police, he had already
claimed not to have recognized the other assailants. The relevant
part of his sworn statement is as follows:
Q How many persons all in all did you see?
A Eight.
Q Of these eight persons were you able to recognize any one of them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they?
A Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon.
Q How about the six, do you know them?
A I do not know them.[40]
Without knowing the other accused at the time of the incident, it is
quite unbelievable that the witness could recall exactly what kind

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of weapon each carried that night. No sufficient and credible
evidence is in the records to overturn another constitutional right
of the accused: the right to be presumed innocent of any offense
until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Every
circumstance favoring their innocence must be taken into account
and proof against them must survive the test of reason.[41] Under
the above circumstances, the prosecution failed to adduce that
quantum of evidence required to warrant a conviction. Hence, the
three appellants deserve an acquittal.[42]
Against Appellant Salcedo
We cannot hold the same for Appellant Salcedo. He was
positively and consistently identified by Witness Edwin Cortes as
the principal culprit. Upon the groups arrival at the witness house,
it was Salcedo who shouted for Cortes and Aparejado to get down
from the house. He was the one who gave orders for them to lie
down on the ground, to be hogtied and to proceed to the other
side of the creek.[43] The witness was categorical in declaring that it
was Salcedo who shot Aparejado twice and hacked him after that.
He testified:
Q When you were already lying flat on the ground near that creek what
happened?
A Noli Salcedo shot Honorio Aparejado.
Q Was Honorio Aparejado hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you when you saw Honorio Aparejado ... Noli Salcedo
when he shot Honorio Aparejado?
A Just near, about two meters.
Q How were you able to see that it was Noli Salcedo who shot Honorio
Aparejado when it was nighttime?
A I could recognize his voice and his physical built.
Q Was there a light at that time?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How many times did Noli Salcedo shoot Honorio Aparejado?
A Two times.
Q Then after shooting Honorio Aparejado, what else transpired?
A He was hacked.
Q Do you want to tell us that Honorio Aparejado was again hacked?

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A Yes, sir.
Q By whom?
A The companions of Noli Salcedo.
Q How about Noli Salcedo, did he hack Honorio Aparejado?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times?
A Only once.[44]
His testimony essentially affirmed his statements during the police
investigation, thus:
QUESTION Last June 20, 1988 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening
where were you?
ANSWER I was in my house at Gabi, Baleno, Masbate.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were in your house on that date and time, do you
remember of (sic) any unusual incident that happened?
A Yes sir.
Q Tell us what happened.
A During that date and time several persons arrived and told us to go
down.
Q How many persons all in all did you see?
A Eight.
Q Of these eight persons were you able to recognize any one of them?
A Yes sir.
Q Who are they?
A Noli Salcedo and Bolodoy Calderon.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after you were told to lay flat faced down?
A While we were lying down, Noli Salcedo shot Norie Aparejado.
Q Was Norie Aparejado hit?
A Yes sir.[45]
Appellant Salcedo, instead of introducing evidence to show that
the witness had evil motive in imputing the crime to him, even
admitted that he knew of no reason why Edwin Cortes would
testify falsely against him.[46] Consequently, Cortes positive and
clear identification of Salcedo is sufficient to convict him. It has
been repeatedly held that the testimony of a single witness, if
credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.[47]

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Second Issue: Alibi
In the light of the prior discussion exculpating Appellants Banculo,
Sual, Jr. and Laurio from the murder of Aparejado, we shall no
longer discuss the sufficiency and worthiness of their alibi.
With respect to Appellant Salcedo, his defense of alibi, juxtaposed
with the positive identification made by Witness Cortes, pales in
probative value and is totally inadequate to justify an exoneration.
Salcedo tried to establish that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime since he was supposedly
working in Manila at that time. But when asked by the public
prosecutor the name of his employer in Manila, he simply replied
that he could not remember anymore.[48] As aptly observed by the
trial court, it is highly impossible for one not to remember either
the name of his employer or the firm where he had worked.[49]
Salcedo did not even attempt to try to recall either name. This
lends grave doubt as to the truthfulness of his defense. The
inherent weakness of alibi as a defense was not overcome.
Indubitably, it cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the prosecution witness.[50]
Treachery
Although the trial court stated that the killing was qualified by
treachery, it did not explain what circumstances of treachery were
present. Nonetheless, the facts established during trial
unmistakably point to the presence of means, method or form
employed by the accused which tended directly and specially to
ensure the execution of the offense without risk to himself arising
from the defense that the offended party might make. The Court is
satisfied that these essential requirements of treachery were
proven by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the
killing itself.[51]
In the case before us, there were eight assailants, at least one of
whom was armed with a gun and a bolo. It was sufficiently
established by the prosecution that the victim had first been
hogtied and then made to lie down facing the ground. And it was
in such position that Salcedo fatally shot and hacked him.
Obviously, the killing was attended by alevosia. Aparejado was
Page 174 of 176
rendered defenseless and absolutely with no means to repel or
evade the attack.[52] This qualifies the killing to murder.
Damages
This Court observes that the trial court did not rule on the
damages sought to be recovered by the widow of the victim. Lydia
Aparejado testified that she incurred expenses for the
embalmment, the coffin and funeral lot in the estimated amount of
P5,000.00. Of such expenses, the Court can only give credence
to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial
of the victim.[53] We scoured the records for any receipt in support
of her claim but found none. Actual damages cannot, therefore,
be granted to the victims heirs. However, we affirm the civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 given by the trial court.
This is automatically awarded without need of further evidence
other than the fact of the victims death.
Anent moral damages, the victims widow did state that she
suffered headaches due to the death of her husband; with him
gone, she worried about how to support her children. Moral
damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish,
may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical
injuries[54] or the victims death, as in this case. The amount of
moral damages is left to the discretion of the court. Since the
court a quo did not exercise such discretion, this Court may do so
because an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review. This Court now deems justified the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to Lydia, the wife of
Honorio Aparejado.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially
GRANTED. Appellants Edison Banculo, Juanito Sual, Jr. and
Danilo Laurio are hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and
are ordered RELEASED immediately unless they are being
detained for some other legal cause. The assailed Decision
finding Noli Salcedo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as
the payment of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of
Page 175 of 176
the victim, Honorio Aparejado y Fideles, is AFFIRMED.
Furthermore, accused-appellant is also ordered to pay moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to the victims wife, Lydia
Aparejado. The other parts of the said Decision, insofar as they
are not inconsistent with the foregoing, are hereby also
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and Melo, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., on leave.

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