.R. No. 185891, June 26, 2013CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, Petitioner, v.

JUANITA REYES,
WILFI EDO REYES, MICHAEL ROY REYES, SIXTA LAPUZ, AND SAMPAGUITA TRAVEL
CORP., Respondents.

TOPIC: Diligence of a good father of a family

FACTS
Wilfredo made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for his family s trip to Adelaide,
Australia. Upon confirmation of their flight schedule, Wilfredo paid for the airfare and was issued
4 Cathay Pacific roundtrip airplane tickets for Manila-Hong Kong-Adelaide-Hong Kong-
Manila.One week before they were scheduled to fly back home, Wilfredo re-confirmed his
familys return flight with the Cathay Pacific office in Adelaide. They were advised that the
reservation was still okay as scheduled
.
On the day of their scheduled departure from Adelaide, Wilfredo and his family arrived at the
airport on time. When the airport check-in opened, Wilfredo was informed by a staff from Cathay
Pacific that Wilfredo s family did not have confirmed reservations, and only Sixta
s flight booking was confirmed.Although, they were allowed to board the flight to Hong Kong, not
all of them were allowed to board the flight to Manila as it was fully booked. Only Wilfredo
s mother-in-law, Sixta, was allowed to proceed to Manila from Hong Kong.On the following day,
the Reyeses were finally allowed to board the next flightbound for Manila.Upon arriving in the
Philippines, Wilfredo went Sampaguita Travel to report theincident. He was informed by
Sampaguita Travel that it was actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled their bookings.

ISSUE:Whether Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Wilfredo
s family? YesWhether Sampaguita breached its contract of services with Wilfredo
s family? Yes

HELD:
Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Reyeses when it disallowed them to
board the plane in Hong Kong going to Manila on the date reflectedon their tickets. Thus,
Cathay Pacific opened itself to claims for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney
s fees and costs of suit. In contrast, the contractual relation between Sampaguita Travel and
respondents is a contract for services. The object of the contract is arranging and facilitating the
latters booking and ticketing. It was even Sampaguita Travel which issued the tickets.
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.
This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would
have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether
negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. There was indeed failure
on the part of Sampaguita Travel to exercise due diligence in performing its obligations under
the contract of services. It was established by Cathay Pacific, through the generation of the
PNRs, that Sampaguita Travel failed to input the correct ticket number for Wilfredos ticket.
Cathay Pacific even asserted that Sampaguita Travel made two fictitious bookings for Juanita
and Michael.
The negligence of Sampaguita Travel renders it also liable for damages
Spouses Mamaril vs. The BSP
G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013

SPOUSES BEN.JAMIN . MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL, Petitioners, v. THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB
SECURITY AGENCY, INC., CESARIO PENA,'' AND VICENTE GADDI, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE. J.:
FACTS:

Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Spouses Mamaril) are jeepney operators. They park their passenger jeepneys
every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) for a fee per month for each unit.

As usual, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound one evening. However, the following morning, one of the
vehicles was missing and was never recovered. According to the security guards CesarioPe (Pe) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB
Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted (Guard Service Contract) for its security and protection, a male person
who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound.

ISSUE: Whether or not BSP is liable based on the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: Principle of Relativity of Contracts; Lease

With respect to Guard Service Contract, it is undisputed that Spouses Mamaril are not parties therein. Neither did the subject
agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Spouses Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof.
Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.

With respect to the parking ticket, it has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a
lease. A lessor-lessee relationship existed between Spouses Mamaril and BSP. Article 1664 of the same Code states that [t]he
lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the
lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder. Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Spouses Mamaril a
suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable
for the loss suffered by Spouses Mamaril.
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinsons Department Store in Cebu City and decided to purchase the black
jeans worth P2098. While she was walking, she was confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item
she got to which respondent replied that she did and showed the receipt. Respondent then suggested they talk about it in the Cebu
Pacific office in the mall. While in there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess employees in front of their
clients. The next day, Guess employees event sent a demand letter to respondents employers. While the RTC ruled for them, CA
reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good faith. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the
decision of CA.

ISSUE:
Did the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines?

HELD:
The Court affirmed CAs decision and held that the employees abused their rights and did not have good faith in their actions
against respondent where there was no clear evidence that she was evading to pay for the merchandise. The petition is thus denied
for lack of merit.

Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa

Pastorfide, Cagayan De Oro Water District and Gaspar
Gonzales, Jr. GR. NO. 161921, July 17, 2013
"Principle of Abuse of Rights" - Article 19 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed, and transferred all their
rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has been agreed by the parties that the water
bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without
notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account has
become delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain
why her water supply was cut without notice.

The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the
disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma.
Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights.
The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this
petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It provides
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of illegality
(Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus
liable for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water
supply of the respondent without giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for
damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the
water supply even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account.

CIVIL LAW; LEASE; Essentially not personal in character; No novation in sublease; Lessee
can sublease as long as it is not expressly prohibited; When Lessor should pay 1/2 value of
improvements introduced
Analita P. Inocencio vs. Hospicio De San Jose
G.R. No. 201787, 25 September 2013

In this case, the Supreme Court held the clause "contract is non-transferable unless prior consent of the lessor
is obtained in writing" to refer to transfers inter vivos and not transmissions mortis causa.

Since lease contracts are not personal in character, the SC explained that the rights of a lessee may be
transferred to an heir via intestate succession and unless prohibited, the heir can exercise the same rights as
the lessee-predecessor-in-interest.

A lessee is also not prohibited from sub-leasing the leased property or premises provided no express
prohibition exists in the contract of lease. When there is a sub-lease, there is likewise no novation of the
contract of lease, since the original juridical relation between the lessor-lessee remains (as opposed to an
Assignment of the Lease when the lessee is replaced by the assignee).

Another notable point made in this case is the fact the simultaneous lease of the building likewise includes with
it, the lease of the land on which the property is located. Thus, rental payment for the building includes rental
for the lot.

With respect to improvements introduced by the lessor in good faith on the property, the SC held that the lessor
is entitled to be paid 1/2 value of the improvements introduced at the time the lease is terminated, provided that
the following requirements are present: (1) the improvements were introduced in good faith; (2) the
improvements are useful; and (3) suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form
and substances.

Should the lessee refuse to reimburse the lessor, the latter may then cause the demolition of the improvements
introduced.

ALLIED BANKING CORP vs BPI

G.R. No. 188363 February 27, 2013
A collecting bank is guilty of contributory negligence when it accepted for deposit a post-dated
check notwithstanding that said check had been cleared by the drawee bank which failed to
return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period.
FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt.
Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner's (Allied
Bank) Kawit Branch. The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of
Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the
check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).3
The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of MMGI with
P1,000,000.00. On October 22, 2002, MMGIs account was closed and all the funds therein were
withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account. In
response to Silvas complaint, respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum.4
Petitioner filed a complaint6 before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent should
solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence in failing to return the check to
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as provided in Section 20.17 of the Clearing
House Rules and Regulations8 (CHRR) 2000. In its Answer with Counterclaims,9 respondent
charged petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the first place. It
contended that petitioners admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
1. What does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance enunciate?
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.22 The doctrine necessarily assumes
negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
and does not apply except upon that assumption.23 Stated differently, the antecedent negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.24 Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was
defendants failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or
injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.25
2. Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance apply in this case?
YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the unwarranted
encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated
check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure.
As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary
care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date
written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly returned
the check and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount
thereof to the payees account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner
in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the
amount credited to the payees account covering the check.