Analysis
March 3, 2010
Summary: Don’t jump to simple
conclusions about Turkish-Israeli
relations. The periodic crises be-
tween Turkey and Israel are more a
function of structural causes and the
changing strategic environment in
the region than the proclivities of the
principal actors.
In the end, all valiant efforts for
managing relations may prove insuf-
ficient to prevent future crises from
erupting.
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Turkey-Israel Relations: Where to Next?
by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — During the February
2010 Munich Security Conference,
the complicated nature of relations
between Turkey and Israel was on full
display. Speaking on a Middle East
panel, Israel’s Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Danny Ayalon,
directed a snide comment at Saudi
Arabia’s representative Turki al-Faysal
for refusing to share the same platform
with him. Al-Faysal, sitting in the
audience, responded during the ques-
tion and answer period that it was due
to “your boorish conduct towards the
Turkish ambassador.”
Israel had reprimanded the Turkish
ambassador, some weeks earlier, over a
Turkish television show, “Valley of the
Wolves,” that depicted Israeli intel-
ligence agents as baby killers. This was
the second time in four months that
Israel had complained about a Turk-
ish show it deemed offensive, causing
a major row to erupt between Turkey
and Israel. And this came on the heels
of an earlier dispute when Turkey
disinvited Israel to participate in a
military exercise.
In the end, Ayalon formally apologized
in a written statement—but only after
Ankara threatened to recall its ambas-
sador. Remarkably, throughout the
episode, the usually mercurial Turkish
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Haberturk. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan kept
his cool and let the diplomats handle
the matter.
I asked a senior Turkish diplomat
attending the Munich conference
about the state of relations with Israel.
His reply: “Which Israel?” Indeed,
only three days after that crisis finally
ended, Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud
Barak came to Turkey for an official
visit and was greeted warmly. Barak
made the point of showing his affec-
tion and closeness to Oğuz Çelikkol,
Turkey’s ambassador to Israel, when
he met the Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Despite this cordial visit, the Turkish
government, no less than the Turkish
public, still seethes over the Gaza war.
Erdoğan’s persistent and merciless at-
tacks on Israel relate to either the war
or the abysmal conditions of Gaza’s
population. Considering the fact that
Barak was one of the architects of that
war as defense minister, it is note-
worthy that he was shown such warm
hospitality.
Barak is a staunch supporter of good
relations with Turkey. Unlike his
flamboyant colleague Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman, he prefers not to
provoke public fights with Turkey and
Analysis
considers the relationship too precious for Israel to risk.
Similarly, one could argue that Erdoğan’s uncharacteristical-
ly guarded reaction throughout this latest episode suggests
an understanding for a line that should not be crossed.
However, one must be careful not to jump to simple conclu-
sions about Turkish-Israeli relations. The periodic erup-
tion of crises is more a function of structural causes and
the changing strategic environment in the region than the
proclivities of the principal actors. Turkey’s relations with
Israel have always been ambivalent, particularly because of
the Palestine question. This started to change dramatically
in the mid 1990s, when the Oslo process was still alive and
provided the necessary legitimacy for the shifting of the
relationship to one of strategic alignment.
Turkey at the time had troubled relations with six out of its
nine neighbors. It was fighting a counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism war against the Kurdish Workers’ Party
(PKK) without getting much sympathy or support from
its allies. Ankara also had the hard task of countering the
machinations of anti-Turkish lobbies in the United States
to get a fair hearing for its case, most notably on the Ar-
menian question. Ankara received precious support from
the Israeli lobby to stave off “genocide” resolutions in the
U.S. Congress and developed a close relationship with some
Jewish organizations. Israel in turn got what it wanted since
its foundation: to publicly establish close links with Turkey
and particularly with the Turkish military. As a result, Israel
broke its isolation in the Middle East and benefited eco-
nomically from these relations. Israeli citizens felt welcome
in Istanbul or Antalya. Militarily the chance for the Israeli
Air Force to train in the skies over the vast Konya valley was
greatly appreciated.1
The strategic environment that shaped Turkish-Israeli
alignment in the mid 1990s changed drastically in the wake
of the 2003 Iraq war, the disastrous consequences of which
inevitably drew Turkey further into regional politics and
deepened Ankara’s engagement with its neighborhood.
Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a vision
began to take shape: Turkey must be engaged with all par-
ties in the region without privileging any one of them.
1
One of the underreported problems in Turkish-Israeli relations concerns precisely this point. Too
many Israeli officials, including President Shimon Peres who should know better expressed their
longing for a Turkey where the generals called the shots. At a time when a profound movement for
“civilianization” was taking place in the country with serious public support, this stance was surely
wrong-footed.
The main tenet of the new foreign policy approach was to
bolster Turkey’s economic prospects and create a zone of
interests. Turkey wanted to generate regional stability and
economic integration around itself and worked hard to
create enough space for diplomacy in all troubling develop-
ments.
Ankara’s arguably amoral but pragmatic engagement with
Syria in the wake of the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a consequence of this
vision. Ultimately Turkey managed to bring Israel and
Syria together for proxy negotiations despite American
objections. In short, Turkey wanted a neighborhood that
was devoid of conflict, sought economic integration, and
expected peace and stability to emerge through engagement
and dialogue.
In this perspective, reaching a closure in the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict had the pride of place. Without it, Ankara
believed no sustainable stability or peace could be achieved
in the region and Iran’s rising influence could not be cur-
tailed. The Palestinian issue was not just a strategic com-
ponent in Turkey’s thinking either. It was an emotionally
burning matter for the general public and certainly for the
prime minister and the core constituencies of his party.
This was the context of the Gaza war and the Turkish
response to it. Having hosted then-Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert three days prior to the assault on Gaza in
Ankara and having spent five and a half hours with him
(and calling the Syrians on the phone to broker a final deal
between the two parties), Erdoğan believed that he was
taken for a ride by his guest.
The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza led to a furious
outburst of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic public sentiment,
helped by the Turkish prime minister’s careless discourse.
This reached frenzied heights in the wake of the prime
minister’s walk-out from a panel in Davos, Switzerland,
where he had a bitter exchange with Israeli President Shi-
mon Peres.
As things stand, Turkey and Israel appear to have two
alternative visions of engagement with the Middle East. The
2
Analysis
strategic framework that allowed Israel to pursue its foreign
policy as it saw fit (since 1967 and particularly since 1979)
is no longer extant: Tel Aviv’s usual approach does not gain
full support even from a timid American administration.
Ankara on the other hand, because of its new found em-
phasis on stability, peace and economic integration in the
region, is adamantly against the use of force and letting the
Palestinian problem fester.
Whereas Ankara privileges peaceful engagement and
stability for the entire region, Tel Aviv appears incapable of
changing its ways and seriously try for a political resolution
of its conflict with the Palestinians, however disoriented the
latter might be.
Tel Aviv sees Iran as a threat to its survival and wishes to
isolate the Islamic Republic and even threaten to bomb it
to preempt its becoming a nuclear power. Ankara has no
desire to have a nuclear-armed Iran either but opposes
vehemently any military action against its neighbor.
The Lebanon and Gaza operations therefore brought forth
the inherent tensions in the alignment. The AKP’s reac-
tion was more a reflection of a structural conflict than an
ideological predisposition, however passionate and at times
offensive the Turkish prime minister’s rhetoric may have
been during the Gaza operation and in its aftermath.
On the Israeli side, Barak and others appreciate the impor-
tance of the Turkish connection. Despite his harsh rhetoric
that reflects both his emotional attachments and the domes-
tic calculations of a savvy politician, Erdoğan never went so
far as to break or even downgrade relations with Israel.
As Dr. Gökhan Bacık2 observes though, Turkey cannot
afford to alienate Israel totally either. The ambitions of its
foreign policy necessitate that it maintain good and credible
relations with all the parties in the region. Neither should
it lose its way in intra-Arab squabbles or render its foreign
policy hostage to the, at times, delirious reactions of an
excitable public. Just as Israel should not allow its current
foreign minister’s world view and personality get in the way
of safeguarding a critical strategic relation.
2
Dr. Gökhan Bacık,“Turkey and Israel where is the Balance ?,” Zaman Daily, January 14, 2010.
In the end, all valiant efforts for managing the relations
may prove insufficient to prevent crises from erupting.
The structural conflict inherent in two radically different
ways of envisioning the Middle East, treating Iran, and of
resolving the long festering Palestinian problem are likely to
engender new flare-ups.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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