Analysis
March 2, 2009
Summary: Could the emer-
gence of a nuclear Iran be
accommodated comfortably in
the Turkish security scene? Or
would it spell a fundamental
and negative transformation
of the strategic environment?
The answer to this question
should inform the Turkish
calculus as the international
community grapples with the
challenge of a near-nuclear
Iran.
With an Iran sanctions vote
looming in the UN Security
Council, Turkey will be faced
with some uncomfortable
decisions, and the need to
take much tougher messages
to Tehran.
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Can Turkey Live with a Nuclear Iran?
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
Turkey has lived for decades with
nuclear arsenals in its neighborhood.
Could the emergence of a nuclear Iran
be accommodated comfortably in
the Turkish security scene? Or would
it spell a fundamental and negative
transformation of the strategic envi-
ronment? The answer to this question
should inform the Turkish calculus as
the international community grapples
with the challenge of a near-nuclear
Iran. The prevailing Turkish tendency
to equate Iranian and Israeli nuclear
capabilities obscures the hard security
consequences of Iranian proliferation
for Turkey and the region. With an
Iran sanctions vote looming in the UN
Security Council, Turkey will be faced
with some uncomfortable decisions,
and the need to take much tougher
messages to Tehran.
Turkey’s nuclear perspective
Throughout the Cold War, Turkey
confronted the reality of Soviet nucle-
ar weapons on its borders and shared
in the doctrinal and operational as-
pects of NATO nuclear planning. Yet,
in contrast to the situation on NATO’s
central front, defense on the flanks,
and especially in NATO’s southern
region, was never as reliant on nuclear
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
forces and strategy. This was a theater
in which Turkey’s large conventional
land forces were a major factor in the
military balance. The arcane dynam-
ics of nuclear deterrence and strategic
“coupling” within the alliance operated
in a more diffuse fashion in NATO’s
south, and especially in Turkey.
Despite the formal solidarity suggested
by NATO’s Article V guarantee, the
defense of Frankfurt and the defense
of Ankara (or Athens, for that matter)
were never entirely equivalent con-
cerns for many alliance members. The
notion that American and European
allies would accept the risk of nuclear
retaliation in defense of Turkish terri-
tory was never quite as straightforward
as in the defense of Western Europe. In
doctrinal terms, of course, the com-
mitment was equal. In political terms,
the guarantee often appeared less clear
cut. The relative remoteness of Turkey
from the core strategic competition
in Europe gave questions of nuclear
forces, nuclear strategy, and the public
debate over nuclear weapons and arms
control a more esoteric quality when
seen from Ankara.
In the years since the end of the
Cold War, Turks have remained less
obsessed with questions of nuclear
Analysis
strategy and nuclear proliferation. Exposure to weapons
of mass destruction and delivery systems of greater range
and accuracy has never been at the forefront of Turkish
perceptions about Iraq, Iran, or Syria. Even in periods when
Turkish relations with these countries have been troubled
or crisis prone, proliferation risks were usually a second-
ary or tertiary concern. Turkish defense planning has been
dominated by the requirements of conventional defense and
irregular warfare. The positive transformation of Ankara’s
relations with Middle Eastern neighbors in recent years
has been driven by political normalization and commercial
activism. Proliferation has not been central to the agenda,
despite Turkey’s pronounced exposure to ballistic missiles
based in the region. Turkish strategists are certainly aware of
this exposure, but as a rule, Turks prefer to focus on inten-
tions rather than capabilities when debating proliferation in
their neighborhood. Improved relations with Teheran and
Damascus have simply lowered the perception of risk. They
have also opened a considerable gap in perception between
Turkey and many of its NATO allies, and above all, with
Israel.
“The prevailing Turkish tendency to
equate Iranian and Israeli nuclear
capabilities obscures the hard
security consequences of Iranian
proliferation for Turkey and the
region.”
Tangible security consequences
The rise of a more cooperative Turkish-Iranian relation-
ship in political and commercial terms does not mean that
Turkey will be insulated from the negative effects of a new
nuclear arsenal on its borders. It is worth thinking through
2
the implications for Turkish security, including the implica-
tions if Iran remains on the nuclear threshold for some time
to come.
First, a nuclear-armed Iran could prove a fundamentally
different regional actor from the Turkish perspective. If
Tehran’s nuclear aspirations, including a full fuel cycle
capability, are aimed at bolstering the country’s regional
weight and prestige, Iran’s emergence as a nuclear power
could make it a much more difficult partner for Ankara.
Even assuming that a more assertive Iran maintains stable
relations with Turkey, Ankara will still be affected by height-
ened competition and a heightened sense of risk elsewhere,
including in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Israel
and the West will not be the only sources of pressure on An-
kara when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed,
this is already visible as Egypt and the Gulf states seek to
shape Turkey’s position on prospective UN Security Coun-
cil action against Tehran. Iranian proxies around the region,
from Iraq to Lebanon to Gaza, would likely be emboldened
by the existence of an Iranian nuclear umbrella. Turkey’s
“zero problems” approach to regional policy may prove
less sustainable under conditions of greater instability and
greater competition across the board.
Second, there is a substantial risk that a nuclear-armed Iran
will not be tolerated by the United States, or by Israel, where
a nuclear Iran is seen as posing an existential threat. To be
sure, there is an active debate in both countries about the
feasibility, merits and disadvantages of military action to
prevent the emergence of a nuclear armed Iran, or at least
to set back the clock on the Iranian nuclear program. It is
almost impossible to imagine the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) government cooperating in a military strike
against Iran’s nuclear program, short of an explicit Iranian
threat to Turkish territory. In a narrow sense, Turkey might
benefit from the elimination of a new nuclear arsenal on its
borders. But Turkish policymakers rightly worry about the
“open account” that such an operation would create across
the region.
Even if the most concerned states opt to defer military
action, Turkey will confront an ongoing risk of conflict in
its neighborhood and steady diplomatic pressure from all
Analysis
sides. In the event that Iran itself decides not to cross the
threshold to a deployable weapons capability but retains
an active, covert nuclear program, Ankara could find itself
embroiled in a new and extended strategy of containment
aimed at Tehran from both sides of the Atlantic. Under
these conditions, Ankara’s closer relations with Iran will be
increasingly at odds with Western policy, further complicat-
ing Turkey’s relations with the European Union, NATO, and
Washington.
Third, the emergence of a nuclear or near-nuclear Iran
will have a range of specific and potentially costly conse-
quences for Turkish defense. A nuclear-armed Iran will put
nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy back at the center of
NATO planning in ways that Turkey may find uncomfort-
able. As enhanced missile defenses are put in place across
the region, Turkey may find it hard to reconcile its political
stake in relations with Iran (and Syria) with the growing
problem of missile defense for Turkish population centers.
Will Turkey wish to play a more active role in multilateral
missile defense architecture, or will it prefer to opt out and
concentrate on (very expensive) national programs? It is
fashionable to talk about the potential for cascading nuclear
proliferation affecting multiple neighborhoods on Turkey’s
borders. This would surely be transforming for a country
grown skeptical of NATO security guarantees, and with no
nuclear weapons ambitions of its own. But this may be the
least likely case. More likely, indeed virtually certain, is the
effect of a nuclear-ready Iran on conventional military bal-
ances and doctrines, from the Mediterranean to the Black
Sea and the Gulf. Even short of a nuclear arms race, Ankara
could face a strategic environment characterized by rapid
technical change, revived conventional arms competitions,
and new risks to confidence even where political relation-
ships have grown more stable (e.g., in the Aegean).
What will Turkey do?
Within the next few weeks, and in the absence of visible
progress on the diplomatic front, the UN Security Council
is likely to take up the question of new economic sanctions
against Iran. This will pose serious dilemmas for Turkey’s
leadership. Ankara has understandably opposed the idea
4
of economic sanctions that would harm Turkish economic
interests and, it argues, are unlikely to change Iranian
behavior (they may well be right about this). A negotiated
solution, perhaps with a Turkish role in nuclear storage
and enrichment arrangements, would certainly be the best
outcome for Ankara. But the prospects for a solution of this
kind are not good, and Ankara may now confront some
very uncomfortable decisions. The government’s choices
can have far reaching implications.
“If Turkey votes “no” or opts to ab-
stain in a Security Council vote . . .it
may actually hasten the use of force
to deal with the problem—the worst
development from the perspective
of Turkish interests.”
If Turkey votes “no” or opts to abstain in a Security Coun-
cil vote, it will bolster unnecessarily the view of those who
argue that Ankara is drifting toward closer alignment with
Middle Eastern and Eurasian partners. It will fuel the sterile
debate about “losing Turkey” and complicate Turkish-West-
ern relations across the board. Far more importantly, the
absence of consensus with Turkey may actually hasten the
use of force to deal with the problem—the worst develop-
ment from the perspective of Turkish interests. In Wash-
ington, the looming Iran sanctions question is emerging as
the leading test for U.S.-Turkish relations under the Obama
administration. The challenge of a nuclear Iran is one of
the inescapable foreign policy issues facing an administra-
tion hard pressed on several fronts. Iran policy can reinforce
or seriously erode the bilateral goodwill established over the
past year. If Turkey cannot support a sanctions package in
the Security Council—and this may turn critically on what
the package contains—then at least it should be seen to take
much tougher messages to Tehran on the nuclear question.
Analysis

Western observers are increasingly concerned that Turkish-

Iranian discussions do not have this quality. Turkish public, Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
and even elite opinion may encourage Turkey’s leaders to
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
talk about the desirability of a nuclear free Middle East,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
and to favor arguments about the equivalence of Israeli and
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the
Iranian nuclear weapons. In terms of Turkey’s own strategic
Pacific Council on International Policy and spent over a decade at the
interests, there is no equivalence at all. A nuclear Iran will
RAND Corporation. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of
spell trouble for Turkish security and undermine Turkey’s
the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.
political objectives across multiple regions.
About GMF

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan

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moting greater cooperation and understanding between North America
and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, as a per-
manent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in
Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

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