Professional Documents
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URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/37545
OF
A . J. COOPER
C H A P T E R O N E - INTRODUCTION 6
APPENDIX A
Letter and Questionnaire to Company Secretaries 98
A P P E N D I X B1
Names of Company Secretaries - Individuals 103
A P P E N D I X B2
Names of Company Secretaries - Secretarial Services C o m p a n i e s . 106
APPENDIX C
Questionnaire Results 108
APPENDIX D
dBase Files Used and Listings of Main Files 113
A P P E N D I XE l
Directors with Multiple Directorships in the Same Group 140
A P P E N D I X E2
Directors with Independent or Partly Independent Multiple
Directorships 145
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
Following the October 1987 stock market crash the operation of the securities
market and, to a lesser extent, the governance of companies has come under increasing
scrutiny. The mood is one of less laissez-faire and more regulation, and a study of
the governance of Hong Kong companies is timely.
Chapter 4 describes the process of collecting the relevant data on Hong Kong
companies and describes the difficulties experienced during the performance of this
task. It is an understatement to say that really useful data on boards is difficult to
obtain in Hong Kong, because there is less disclosure legally required than in other
jurisdictions, and because the general business atmosphere is less open, especially
about the internal workings of companies. A postal questionnaire survey which was
carried out in order to supplement the data available from published sources is also
described. The response was less than overwhelming but better perhaps than had been
expected
Chapter 5 describes the analyses of the data and presents the results of those
analyses in detail. Certain relationships, or rather trends, are identified from those
analyses and general discussion of the implications accompanies each analysis.
Chapter 6 summarises the study, following which conclusions are drawn and
some recommendations for further research and future amendment of the legal
framework are given.
CHAPTER TWO - REVIEW OF COMPANY L A W IN HONG
K O N G AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Company law in Hong Kong is derived from English law but, like many other
aspects of Hong Kong, it lags behind the U K by several years. The present
Companies Ordinance is based on the English Companies Act 1948 with amendments,
but has not been amended to bring it into line with the 1985 consolidation of English
company law or later amendments. A review of the requirements of English company
law, as it exists at present, is helpful in understanding Hong Kong company law. The
present chapter therefore gives such a review and discusses the differences between
Hong Kong company law and English company law as they exist at present.
Developments in other jurisdictions which use English company law as their basis are
also included.
2.1
After some debate, true limited liability was introduced in the Limited Liability
Act of 1855partly because British companies were being incorporated in France and
America which had already introduced it (Farrar et al, 1988). Subsequently the Joint
Stock Companies Act 1856 introduced the modern form of constitution consisting of
the Memorandum and Articles of Association whilst the Companies Act of 1862
consolidated earlier laws and enlarged upon themestablishing the law in similar form
to that which exists today.
English company law has thus evolved from the original 1844 legislation
through a series of revisions, additions and consolidations, the last major consolidation
being that of 1985. However, even then the law did not remain unaltered for long.
Numerous amendments and repeals were necessary because of the Insolvency Acts of
1985 and 1986the Financial Services Act 1986 and the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986. A further Companies Act in 1989 brought in revisions
regarding auditors, investigation powers, registration of charges, directors liability,
disclosure of interests in shares and the definition of subsidiaries, as well as amending
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. So the 1985 Act is no longer the
single main Act covering company law that it was intended to be, although it is still
the largest
A company under English Law is a legal entity quite separate from its owners
and its managers, with statutory rights and responsibilities. The legal definition of a
company is "an association of any two or more persons associated for a lawful
purpose"that purpose normally being the economic gain of the personswho are
referred to in the Companies Act as members or subscribers. A company must be
incorporated before it can operate and to do this the members are required to file a
Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association with the registrar of
companies. The basic constitution of a company is set out in these documents which
for a private or public company limited by shares, have become largely standardised
under the influence of the model tables A and B of the Companies (Tables A to F )
Regulations 1985 appended to the Companies Acts, and of specialist company lawyers
and books of precedents. The Memorandum is required to state the company's name,
~ 11 -
objects, domicile, share capital and that the liability of the members is limited.
Everything else is regarded as a matter of administration to be dealt with in the second
document, the Articles of Association. They usually contain regulations on matters
such as the share capital, meetingsdividends, accounts and the like, but the most
important are those relating to the company's organs.
A company has two primary organs, the members in general meeting and the
directorate. This is analogous to a parliamentary democracy where legislative power
rests with the people but the administration is left to executive government, which is
subject to a measure of control through the power of the people to force a change of
government at the general election. With a company, supreme rule-making authority
rests with a general meeting of the members, which must be held at least once i n each
calendar year, but the administration is left to the directors.
A l l registered companies must have directors, minimum age 18and there must
be at least two, but the Act says little about the means of first appointing these
directors, leaving this to the articles of association. They do not have to be members
of the company. Section 10 of the Companies Act 1985 requires a statement naming
the first directors and secretary to be filed with the Memorandum and Articles. The
company must publicise the names of its directors at the Companies Registry and keep
a register of the directors, which must be available for inspection at a reasonable
charge, at its registered office.
Under an article in Table A the directors, and no one elseare responsible for
the management of the company, except in the matters specifically allotted to the
company in general meeting. The modem practice is to give the directors the right
to exercise all the company's powers, except where the general law expressly provides
that they must be exercised in general meeting. Therefore, unless the Articles are
amended from those in Table A, directors may act as they think fit, as decided in a
Board meeting, and the members in general meeting cannot interfere with it. This
applies even as regards matters not specifically delegated to the directors provided
they are not expressly reserved to a general meeting by the Act or the articles*
2AA
This wide delegation of powers is to the directors acting as a board, not to the
individual directors but it is obviously impractical, in the case of large companies, for
day to day administration to take place at formal board meetings which are held, say,
once a month or less frequently. The directors are therefore empowered to appoint
one or more of their number to the office of managing director or to any other
executive office for such period and on such terms as they shall think fit; provisions
enabling this to be done are at article 84 of Table A . In most companies there will
be one or more executive (or working) directors holding office under formal or
informal service agreements whereby they are bound to devote the whole or some part
of their time to the service of the company.
The managing director is usually be appointed on the terms that he shall only
perform such duties as are from time to time assigned to him by the board and that
he shall conform to their orders and instructions. Where these terms are adopted the
board have, in theory, the widest powers of curtailing the range of his activities. But
many, and perhaps most, of the company's powers which have been primarily
delegated to the board will be sub-delegated by them to the managing director or other
executive directors. The management have to ensure that the decisions of the board
are implemented and its policy carried out and, in practice, these officers will do much
more than merely carry out the decisions and policy of the board; they will themselves
make decisions and decide on policy.
Thus the business of the directorate is more and more one of laying down
policy in the most general terms and exercising equally general supervision over the
way in which it is carried out; everything else is left to the managers. The shift of
power from the general meeting to the board has received a considerable measure of
legal recognition, but similar recognition of the further shift from the board to the
management has not occurred. The latter is regarded in law as fully answerable to
and controllable by the board. Even though the board has delegated powers to
executive directors it can still interfere with the exercise by the managers of these
powers.
loopholes.
2.L5 Qualifications of Directors,
A "director1' is not defined in the Companies Act, but section 741 states that
it "includes any person occupying the position of director, by whatever name called".
Shadow directors and alternate directors are, however, defined. There are almost no
qualifications stated for a person to be a director, and although the Cohen Committee
tried to ensure that directors should normally retire when they attained the age of 70
the provision as finally enacted (section 293) is so riddled with exceptions that it has
proved of little value.
As stated above, directors need not be members of the company unless the
Articles so provide. Formerly it was customary for the Articles to require directors
to be possess a minimum number of shares but now the possibility of a complete
separation of owners and managers is recognised and Table A no longer requires a
share qualification.
The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the Insolvency Act 1986
together provide many provisions which concern disqualification of directors.
Undischarged bankrupts are disqualified and commit a criminal offence if they act as
directors without leave of the court. This is the only reason for automatic
disqualification; others are at the discretion of the courts or the Secretary of State.
The court may restrain those convicted of certain offences including fraud, or who
have been persistently in default in delivery of documents to the registrar of
companies, from acting as directors or taking part in the management of companies
for a maximum period of five or fifteen years depending on the case. The court must
report to the Secretary of State persons who have shown themselves to be unfit by
their conduct as directors of insolvent companies, and he may apply for a
disqualification order for a minimum period of two years.
Articles of Association commonly provide for the vacation of office by
directors in certain events, including their resignation, prolonged absence from board
meetings or insanity.
It should perhaps be pointed out that, under section 289, a director need not
be a natural person: another company may be appointed and this device is sometimes
found useful to enable a holding company to maintain complete control of a
subsidiary. (A publicly listed company is, however, effectively barred from such
practice by the Stock Exchange listing rules).
A report by the directors "with respect to the state of the company's affairs,
the amount, i f any, which they recommend should be paid by way of dividend, and
the amount, i f any which they propose to carry to reserves m u s t be attached to the
balance-sheet, and to be circulated and publicised with it. They must state the names
of the directors and the principal activities of the company and its subsidiaries and any
significant changes. In particular they must draw attention to changes in fixed assets
and, i f the balance-sheet value of any land differs substantially from market value,
must indicate the difference ,,with such degree of precision as is practicable." If
shares or debentures have been issued, details must be given with reasons for the
issues.
Unless the number of employees of the company and its subsidiaries is less
than one hundred, the number employed and their aggregate remuneration must be
stated. If the company and its subsidiaries have made donations for charitable or
political purposes exceeding 50 in all, details most be given of the amounts
subscribed for each purpose. And if a company and its subsidiaries have a turnover
exceeding 250,000 and their business includes the supplying of goods, the value of
goods exported must be given. These last two requirements have been strongly
attacked as political gimmicks but can perhaps be justified on the ground that
shareholders have a right to know what charities and political aims are being
supported by their money - as perhaps have the public too - and that publication of
export figures is an ingenious way of encouraging the export drive.
Finally, the report must give particulars of any other matters which are material
for the appreciation of the company's affairs by its members, unless disclosure would
be harmful to the business of the company or its subsidiaries. In addition, the report
must now contain such information as may be prescribed concerning arrangements in
force for securing the health, safety and welfare at work of its employees and for
protecting other persons against risks to health or safety arising out of the activities
at work of its employees.
The case law relating to directors duties was reviewed by Mr. Justice Romer
in the City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. case and reduced to three propositions.
19 -
Sanctions against insider dealing in the U K involve both criminal law and self
regulation. No remedies are as yet available under civil law, and although the 1973
and 1978 Companies Bills promised limited civil redress, they failed to become law.
Criminal sanctions against insider dealing were first introduced in Part V of the
1980 Companies Act, now consolidated in the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act 1985and amended by the Financial Services Act 1986. The Companies Act
1989 made further amendments to the penalties and other matters.
The Act also prohibits the same person from counselling or procuring other
persons to deal in the securities in question and from communicating the information
to other persons. Corporate bodies as such are excluded from these prohibitions,
although a board of directors could counsel and procure a company to enter into an
unlawful dealing and thus be held liable.
Unpublished price-sensitive information is defined as in the Act as
information :-
The Act applies to information about any company and dealing in the U K or
in overseas companies from the U K . Therefore an offence would be committed in the
following circumstances :-
Insiders are defined as individuals who have, at any time within the previous
six months, been knowingly connected with a company by virtue of being either >
The provisions of the Act are also extended to public servants, who may have
obtained price-sensitive information in the course of their job.
Persons to whom information has been passed are known as "tippees" and they
too are banned from dealing in the companies securities or those of any other
company to which the information relates. However the burden of proof necessary
in the case of a tippee is overwhelmingly high. It must be proved that :-
Section 1(5) of the Act also prohibits individuals who are making, or
contemplating making, a takeover offer from dealing in the securities of the target
company in any other capacity. In other words outsiders who create price sensitive
information of their own are banned from using that information (say) to advise others
to purchase shares in the target company. However, most takeover offers are
contemplated and made by companies, not individualsso the application of this
section may be difficult. Instead, the directors would be caught by the provisions of
section 1(2) described in the preceding paragraphs.
Prosecutions under the Act are in the hands of the Director of Public
Prosecutions or the Secretary of State for Trade, which effectively means that only
serious offences will be prosecuted. However, the Companies Act 1989 gives power
to prosecute to the Stock Exchange in certain circumstances. The penalty is a fine and
up to seven years imprisonment, (increased from two years by the 1989 Act). Over
100 suspected cases were referred to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) by
-24 -
the Stock Exchange in 1986 but to mid-1989 only 10 prosecutions had been brought,
and the largest penalty was a one-year suspended jail sentence and 25,000 fine plus
7,000 costs.
Directors are required under the Stock Exchange rules to ensure that every
employee of the company and every director or employee of a subsidiary company,
who is in possession of price-sensitive information, should deal only in accordance
with the Code.
There are two more or less exclusive sets of provisions, one relating to
directors, the other to shareholders. The reason for this distinction is because the
provisions relating to directors, introduced in the 1948 Companies Act, were designed
to prevent dealings by them with insider information, whereas those relating to
shareholders, introduced in 1967 and substantially beefed up in the 1976 Companies
Act following the notorious "dawn raids", were primarily intended to protect
companies against a secret build-up of a substantial shareholding with a view to a
take-over.
(a) Directors
On appointment directors must notify the company, in writing and within five
days, of any holdings of shares or debentures of the company, its subsidiaries, its
holding company or the holding company's subsidiaries. Section 324(6) allows that
interests in shares (but not debentures) in wholly owned subsidiaries do not require to
be disclosed, although how anyone who is being appointed as a director can have an
interest in a
directors have to notify the company, in writing and within five days, of acquisition
or disposal of any beneficial interest in shares or debentures of companies in the
group. The notice must give considerable detail regarding the transaction, including
the price at which the transfer was made. Interests of a spouse or infant child of a
director are treated as interests of a director. The company must maintain a register
of directors' interests and dealings and, within three days of receipt of noticemust
enter the information received in the register. When the company itself grants a
director a right to subscribe for it shares or debentures it must enter on the register
details of the rights and of their exercise. The register is, during business hours, to
be open to inspection by members without charge and by others on payment of a
small fee, and copies may be obtained.
(b) Shareholders
Every person who becomes beneficially interested in more than the notifiable
percentage in nominal value of such shares or any class thereof must give notice to
the company and, generally speaking, the same rules as those relating to directors
apply to the meaning of "interest" and as to the time within which disclosure is to be
made. But the information which has to be given is less extensive. In particular, the
price paid does not have to be disclosed. A separate register of these shareholdings
and dealings must be maintained by the company and this too is open for inspection
and copies may be obtained. The company is not, however, required to notify the
stock exchange on which the shares are listed. Where a director's holding is more
than the notifiable percentage, his relevant shareholdings and dealings will have to
appear both in the register and in the register of director's holdings.
A further innovation was made by the 1976 Act. Any company to which the
foregoing provisions apply (i.e. a company any of whose share capital is listed on a
recognised stock exchange) may require any member to indicate in writing the
capacity in which he holds any shares conferring unrestricted voting rights and, if he
holds them otherwise than as a beneficial owner, the names and addresses of the
persons who have an interest in them so far as that lies within his knowledge. The
company may require similar information from any person so identified. Similarly
information may be requested regarding any voting agreement or arrangement relating
to the shares. When any information is obtained it must be entered on a separate part
of the register, which is subject to the like rights of public inspection.
Despite these provisions, the law was inadequate to deal with secret
acquisitions, such as that of Consolidated Goldfields Ltd. by a foreign buyer who used
nominees, each acquiring shares of less than 5% of the total so that no disclosure was
necessary, and followed with a "dawn raid".
The current disclosure requirements as set out in the Companies Act 1985
apply to all voting shares in public companies. Any change in a holding which causes
the total shareholding to move from below the notifiable percentage to above, or vice
versa, because of acquisition or sale of shares by a shareholder is notifiable.
Notification is also required if the shareholders holding becomes a notifiable
percentage because of change in share capital of the company, or because he has
become aware of having a notifiable interest whether or not such change has
occurred".
provisions also exist concerning "concert parties" but these have proved difficult to
enforce. The difficulty is to prove that parties were actually acting in concert and
although a concert party may appear likely, obtaining proof is quite another matter.
2.2.1 History
The first Companies Ordinance was passed in Hong Kong in 1865 and closely
followed the English Companies Act of 1862. The pattern was set for Hong Kong to
enact a local Ordinance following the most up to date English legislation. Initially the
number of Companies registered was quite small and few Chinese owned companies
existed and it was not until after the Second World War that the advantages of trading
through a limited company began to be appreciated by Chinese merchants here.
In the early part of this century partnerships were the normal form of business
association i n the Chinese community but Chinese merchants in Hong Kong
complained that the English partnership law was unduly harsh because it made every
partner liable for all the debts of the firm however small his interest in the firm. In
1911the Chinese Partnership Ordinance was passed in Hong Kong, "to provide for
the registration of Chinese partnerships and to enable partners therein to register and
thereby to limit their liability". This Ordinance was enacted after the Companies
Ordinance and the Partnership Ordinance but before the Limited Partnership
Ordinance, based on the English model, which was passed one year later. By Section
31 -
Meanwhile the 1908 and 1929 English Companies Acts were followed by the
1911 and 1932 Companies Ordinances respectively, following the previous pattern.
Thereafter the pattern changed and there was no general updating following the 1948
Companies Act but a number of amendments were enacted during the 60's and 70s
introducing some of the changes which had occurred in UK in the 1948 Act and the
later 1967 A c t
Public companies were not common in Hong Kong prior to 1970 and major
areas of private investment were outside the equity market. Even in 1972 when
volume of trading on the stock exchanges of Hong Kong reached half that of the
London market there were only 260 companies listed. As the ease of raising capital
through the equity markets became apparent, many more companies became listed.
The Hang Seng Index rose 5.3 times between December 1971 and March 1973a
compound rate of 13% per month, but after the discovery of fake share certificates in
mid 1973and numerous cases of fraud, the market collapsed. Following this, the
provisions of Section 37 relating to the prospectus and information it must contain
were introduced in 1973.
Against this background the Companies Law Revision Committee was spurred
to action. As well as legislation to protect investors and regulate securities, the
Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 1972 expanded greatly the role of the Registrar
of Companies, and required disclosure of certain information. But the effect was
muted by the general non-interventionist attitude of the era and many of the powers
were not exercised. The main provisions of the English 1948 Act were not
transplanted into Hong Kong Company Law until 1984.
Following the 1987 crash and the Securities Review Committee Report, the
legislation on Securities was significantly tightened and the control of the Stock
Exchange has been overhauled but company law still lags significantly behind English
Law in certain areas. Most notable of these is that there is no enacted legislation
covering insider dealing, and Hong Kong remains one of the few markets where this
is not a criminal offence.
The acceptance of English case law as precedent in Hong Kong courts is quite
normal, as indeed it is in other countries whose written law is based on English Law.
There are many detail differences between the company law as it stands at
present in England and in Hong Kong. The major differences which could have an
effect on governance are listed below.
Banks are given the right not to disclose transfers to and from
reserves before profits are stated. Such exemption is not given
to clearing banks under the U K Companies Act (but
interestingly the U K Companies Act does not require banks to
produce accounts which show a true and fair view).
Thus the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance follows the U K Companies Act
in most respects, lagging behind somewhat in most respects but being ahead in others.
-35 -
Prior to the 1987 stock market crash it has to be said that enforcement of the
listing rules was not vigorous and transgressions were not uncommon. A much
tougher line is now being taken by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. on
breaches of its listing rules. This is demonstrated by the recent case of Wai Yick
chairman Mr. Leung Tim and other directors who dealt in shares of the company
within the closed period before issue of the announcement of final results. They failed
to make the dealings, which involved 59% of the company's shares, public by
notifying the Stock Exchange. Mr. Mark Hanson, the Stock Exchange's executive
listing director said:
"The Exchange has taken a hard line because situations whereby people think they can breach
the listing rules could not be tolerated, otherwise there is no point in having the rules."
dealing' meaning that none of the exceptions listed in section 141C of the Ordinance
applied to the relevant dealing in securities. These exceptions are:-
If the Tribunal concludes that there has been culpable insider dealing, it must
go on and identify the persons involved and the extent of their culpability. This
inquiry need not be limited to those who were immediately a party to the insider
dealing but may include any person connected with the dealing, and in the case of a
corporation, the individuals who exercised management control. The powers of the
Tribunal to investigate allegations of insider dealing are far reaching, and include the
ability to authorise the Commissioner for Securities to deal with any document or
article which comes into his possession for the purposes of any inquiry 'in such
manner as the justice of the case requires'. It is not entirely clear what this sentence
means, but it allows the Tribunal great flexibility. In addition, the Commissioner can
inspect the books and records of any person where there are reasonable grounds to
believe or suspect that they contain information relevant to the inquiry.
on the Financial Secretary; thereafter, it is made available to the public, with a copy
given to every person whose conduct was in question before the Tribunal.
There is no doubt that the Tribunal system itself works reasonably well and it
has found several persons "culpable", including Mr. L i Ka-shing, but its sanction is
a rather toothless tiger. Apart from a very public and rather temporary loss of face
those found culpable have been perceived to have "got away with it".
The Report of the Securities Review Committee (May 1988) avoided making
a recommendation as to whether insider dealing should be made a criminal offence
rather than just a matter of public censure. The Report suggested that a strengthening
of insider dealing laws need not go as far as creating a criminal offence, but could
include debarring directorships and freezing voting rights.
However, the legislators seem to have gone further than suggested by the
committee as the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (1990)which was gazetted
on 27th July 1990whilst retaining the Tribunal system gives it power to:-
25 Disclosure of Interests.
Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers relating to the shareholding (35 per cent
of the issued share capital) which must be achieved before there is a duty to make a
general offer.
The provisions relating to the duty to disclose, registers and definitions of who
is an interest are similar to those in U K except that the trigger point is 10%
shareholding in a listed company rather than 2% and the price at which the shares
were transacted is not required to the disclosed. Provisions regarding conceit parties
are also included although, as in UK, proving the offence in a court of law will be
difficult.
where it appears that circumstances exist which suggest that contraventions may have
occurred in relation to a listed company's shares or debentures. This is a very wide
power, requiring no actual knowledge on the part of the Financial Secretary to justify
such an investigation, although the scope of the appointment can be defined.
The body of company law in Singapore consists of the Companies Act (Cap
50) Singapore Statutes, 1985 and the Companies (Amendments) Act 1987. These are
based on partly on English company law but also borrow heavily from Australian
company law. Thus as in other English law based jurisdictions, precedents set by
English case law are accepted where they do not conflict with the provisions of the
Singaporean Acts and gaps in the Singaporean Acts may be filled in by reference to
English Law, although this latter point is disputable. There also exists the Securities
Industry Act which is based largely on the US Securities and Exchange Act.
Three types of company limited by shares are recognised. These are the public
company, the private company and the exempt private company. The latter is one
which has no more than 20 members and in which no beneficial interest is held
directly or indirectly by any corporation. The exempt status gives exemption from
filing financial statements with annual returns, and allows it to make loans to its
directors, or provide guarantees or security for loans to directors, which for other
companies is illegal
Most provisions of the Companies Act are similar in nature to those in Hong
Kong, but section 157(2) specifically prohibits insider dealing by officers or agents of
the company (even after they have ceased to hold office). Section 103 of the
Securities Industry Act also deals with insider dealing whilst Section 102 deals with
fraudulent activity whether by insiders or outsiders.
-41 -
Australian company law is, again, based on English law, but because Australia
is a commonwealth of independent states, each state enacted its own legislationso
that by the late 1950s the Companies Acts although broadly based on the same theme
varied markedly in their detail. Some were more modem than others, and each had
provisions peculiar to itself. This made multi-state operation of companies very
difficult because a company was treated as a foreign company outside of its state of
incorporation.
In 1962 each state enacted the Uniform Companies Act to effectively unify the
Australian companies legislation for the first time, although wording was not exactly
the same in each state. A major review of the Law was undertaken in 1967-70 by the
Company Law Advisory Committee and amending legislation was enacted by all states
in 1971-73. In 1974 the governments of four states signed an agreement to increase
the uniformity and establish reciprocal arrangements. A recognised company then no
longer had to file accounts etc. as if it were a foreign company when it operated
outside its state of incorporation.
Three types of company are defined, the public company the proprietary
company and the private company. A proprietary company requires only two
members and two directors against a public company's three, but it may not seek
funds from the public. If it has exempt status then It need not appoint an auditor (or
if it does, it need not file accounts), it is not prohibited from making loans to
directors, members may effect resolutions without holding a meeting, and other
benefits.
Directors must be over 18and for a public company they must be under 72
when appointed. A person over 72 must retire and can only be re-elected by a 75%
majority. The directors report for a public company must give details of qualifications
experience and special responsibilities of each director.
-43
These are the idealised roles of a board of directors but research shows that the
reality is rather different. For instance Mace found that in most of the American
companies which he looked at, the boards of directors served as a source of advice
and counsel, served as some sort of discipline and acted in crisis situations, for
instance if the president died or if he was asked to resign because of his or the
company's unsatisfactory performance. Drucker called this role a standby in case of
power failure".
Mintzbcrg (1983) reviewed the literature on the subject and concluded that
board approval of management decisions and performance under normal circumstances
tended to be a foregone conclusion, because the board simply lacked sufficient
information to do otherwise. He also concluded that the real power of those boards
which did have a measure of control, was their capacity to dismiss and appoint the
-45 -
Of course many of the top companies in Hong Kong are owned and managed
by 'westerners' and conform to the 'western' model. But there are also a large
number of Chinese owned companies which, although publicly owned, are dominated
by an individual, or more commonly a family group, so the issues of corporate
governance with respect to these Chinese owned companies in Hong Kong may be
rather different to those in the USA or U K . In discussing the overseas Chinese
business", Tricker (1989) said :-
many of the more successful family enterprises in Hong Kong have created
public companies, obtained a Stock Market quotation and attracted funds from
individual and institutional investors; similarly in Singapore.
- Cross holdings with related companies associated with the family group,
One might legitimately wonder why anyone would invest, as a minority outside
shareholder, in such a family firm.
The answer may lie in the attitude of the (largely) Chinese investor. It may be that
appreciation of the nature of a public company is not widespread, nor are there
significant expectations of disclosure, regulation or independent supervision. Rather
the investor equates the public company, in which he can buy a share, with the family
group of which it is part. The investment is not so much in the specific public
company, as in the reputation of the owner-entrepreneur, the network of family
businesses and the future good-fortunes of that family. The exact legal entity, in
which the public invest, is less significant."
He also states :-
"Board structures and processes in Overseas Chinese enterprises are quite different.
Power and prestige in the Chinese business lies with the owner-manager.
Responsibility for day to day activities of production and operations may be delegated
to managers, but even then with frequent rearrangements and what would be
considered, by Western executives^ interference in delegated responsibilities.
Responsibility for financial and personnel matters typically remains with the owner
(Silin 1976Deyo 1983, Redding & Wong 1986).
In the Chinese culture there is a ready acceptance of authority and the essential
tightness of hierarchy. The father of the family is respected and his sons will follow
his directions. It is quite normal, for example, for a son who has been highly
successful in business abroad, to return at his father's bidding to contribute to the
family enterprise. Such an occurrence would be much less likely in a Western
setting, where, individuals expect independence once they leave h o m e ?
autocracy which exists within families and may be considered just an extension of the
family. They do not expect challenge from the shareholders any more than they
expect disrespect from their family members.
A review of media coverage of the Hong Kong business world in recent years
will reveal many cases of wrong doing on the part of directors. Cases of insider
dealing by directors such as L i Ka-shing of Cheung Kong and Clifford Pang of Lafe
Holdings have been reported at length. There is no doubt that minority shareholders
suffer as a result of such activity but it is still not a crime under current Hong Kong
company law.
Governance issues include all of the issues suggested in section 3.2 above and
in addition:-
In theory, eventual control of the company rests with shareholders, since they
have the power to appoint or remove directors and to make a number of other
decisions in general meeting. Since the majority of the decisions are made by passing
an ordinary resolution, the company can effectively be controlled by anyone who has
a beneficial interest in more than 50% of the share capital. In practice control can be
gained with fewer shares since many shareholders do not bother to attend the
meetings. This is one reason for the 35% threshold of share ownership beyond which
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange requires a general offer to be made to shareholders.
(The corresponding level on the London Stock Exchange is 29.9%). For complete
control (to pass special resolutions when these are required), a 75% stake is necessary.
Most companies are run fairly and if the company is a listed one, the Stock
Exchange and the media will help ensure that any minority shareholders are not
unfairly treated. There are situations as described above where the minority runs the
risk of being oppressed by the majority shareholders, notably where the majority
shareholders are also the company's directors. Because of this, the Companies
Ordinance makes some provisions to help minorities. The areas where oppression is
most likely to occur are :-
the rights of certain classes of shares (notably those held by
directors) may be substantially better than those of other
classes, particularly with respect to the payment of dividends or
voting rights,
- Members who hold 5 per cent of the total voting rightsor 100
members holding shares on which there has been paid up an
average of at least $2,000 per member, may requisition for a
resolution to be considered at the company's next annual
general meeting.
Any member of the company can apply the court for an order under section
168A on the grounds that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner
which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part of the members (including
himself). The conduct may be past, present or future and may be an act or a series
of acts but otherwise the Ordinance does not define what would constitute 'unfairly
prejudicial' conduct. The right to apply to the court is extended to the personal
representative or the trustee of any person beneficially interested in the shares by
virtue of a will or intestacy of any member. The Financial Secretary may also make
any application i f it appears from any report made under section 146or from any
document obtained from a search of premises, that the business of the company is
being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial. The company must be liable to be
wound up for this provision to apply.
Two or more members holding 10 per cent or more of the issued share capital
of the company may call a meeting, but this provision is only effective if the
company's articles do not provide otherwise.
Members who hold 5 per cent of the total voting rights or 100 members
holding shares on which there has been paid up an average of at least $2,000 per
member may requisition for a resolution to be considered at the company's next
annual general meeting.
If the requisition does not require the company to give members notice of a
resolution, it may be deposited at the company's registered office not less than one
week before the annual general meeting. Unless the company resolves otherwise the
expense of sending members notice of the proposed resolution and any statement is
borne by the requisitionists.
director was appointed for life to the board of a private company before 31st August
1984 is this provision ineffective.
Courts generally have been reluctant to intervene in company disputes where there is
an alternative remedy so the use of Section 168A is rare.
-56-
C H A P T E R F O U R -O B T A I N I N G D A T A O N H O N G K O N G C O M P A N I E S
Data on Hong Kong companies was obtained from annual reports available
from the Mong Kwok Ping Management Data Bank of the Department of Management
Studies, University of Hong Kongsupplemented by data from other sources, and from
a postal questionnaire survey conducted in June and July 1990.
Data files in dBase III+ format already existed in the Data Bank for
companies' data in 1986 and these were provided by Mr. Gilbert Wong. However it
was felt that this data should be brought up to date as far as possible. The updating
exercise proved to be more complicated than at first envisaged, and took a
considerable amount of time. Two new dBase IV datafiles were used to store the
data, one for company data and one for director data, the common field being the
Stock Exchange company code. Several additional fields were included to enable
extra data to be stored over and above that available in the Data Bank files.
Unfortunately, the company reports for the required year could not all be
located in the data bank, and information on a total of 114 companies was collected.
The six overseas companies with listings in Hong Kong were later excluded because
their governance is not undertaken in Hong Kong and so they are not relevant to the
present study. They were:-
-57
A s company reporting year end dates vary, the data used for each company is
that obtained from the report for the financial year ending on a date between April
1988 and March 1989. Thus the data are not strictly comparable, although it was
found that 53 of the remaining 108 companies for which data was obtained used 31st
December as the reporting year end. The full breakdown was as follows:-
April 0 October 0
May 0 November 0
June 15 December 53
July 1 January 1
August 1 February 1
September 4 March 32
Total 108
Company profit for the reporting year and also for the preceding five year
period were collected. Since the object of collecting this data was to attempt to
-58 -
The product of share price and number of shares for the beginning and end of
the year were initially intended as an alternative measure of assessment of the success
or failure of the company. The object was to use these figures and the share price at
start and end of the year to gauge increase in market capitalization as a measure of
performance. However, it soon became clear that there are many pitfalls in using such
a measure. Number of shares required two figures, one at the start of the reporting
year and one at the end since these often differed because of share placements, bonus
and rights issues, employee share scheme issues, warrant conversion etc.
The first problem is which year to take. Since companies reports cover
different periods, the share price should perhaps be taken at the beginning and end of
the reporting year. But the information about the performance of a company is
historical and is seldom available until some time after the end of a reporting year,
although often it is available before the publication of the annual report. So the share
price reflects performance only after a lag period and the share price change in the
year
companies with different reporting years it would then be necessary to adjust the share
prices to eliminate market trends due to political influences etc.. This might
conceivably be done by factoring the prices using the Hang Seng or Hong Kong
indices, but whether this would give a valid measure of success or failure is debatable.
-59 -
It was decided instead to take a common time base for share prices. The dates
selected were
trading days of 1989 and also dates when trading was not particularly volatile or
suffering from political influences (in contrast to the politically influenced situation
in June 1989). Prices on these dates were also easily available, (Anon, 1990) and
being for the year following most reporting dates for other data collected, the share
price increase should reflect the reported results for all companies, except perhaps
those which report in the early part of the 1988/89 financial year.
The second problem involves changes of capital during the year, which in
theory should affect the share price. Dividends are included as they represent a
payout of potential capital and so the share price for companies paying low dividends
should improve more than those paying higher dividends. The only really satisfactory
way to establish return to investors is to carry out an internal rate of return calculation
for each company, treating market capitalization at the start of the period and capital
injections from placements, rights issues etc as capital inflows and dividends and the
market capitalization at the end of the period as capital outflows. However, such
calculations would take an inordinate amount of time and, as the purpose of this
dissertation is to establish if there is any linkage between governance and success of
a company, broad measures should suffice. The percentage increase in share price in
1989 (Anon, 1989) was therefore taken as the measure. This figure includes
adjustments for bonus issues etc.
Finance Industrials
Utilities Hotels
Properties Others
Consolidated Enterprises
Whilst some companies can be easily slotted into one of these categories, there
are many instances of diversified companies whose activities include several of the
categories, such as a company in the industrial sector which has undertaken property
development of its own land and has subsequently continued to indulge in property
development because it found it profitable, as well as continuing with the core
business. Also certain activities which are lumped together in the above categories
are quite dissimilar and have different profitability (eg finance includes banks, deposit
taking companies, investment houses and other financially related companies).
1. banking
2. finance/investment
3. trading
4. manufacturing
5. shipping
6. hotel
7. entertainment
8. utilities
9. property development
10. construction
11. retailing
Names and shareholdings of directors were obtained from the company reports
and presented little difficulty other than occasionally not knowing whether the
director's surname was the first or last stated name. Alternate directors names were
included, as were the few "honorary" chairmen. Shareholdings in the "other
shareholding" listing are either non-beneficial holdings stated in the director's report
or holdings effectively controlled via a trust or another company, apportioned equally
between those controlling the trust.
A variable indicating the type of control of the company was allocated based
on the shareholdings of directors augmented by information from other published
sources, such as Wardleycards. The variable ranged from 1 to 6 as follows :-
2 - dominant minority
49% of shares or voting rights.
It was not normally possible to find out which directors were executive
directors from annual reports as only a few companies give this information. It is not
a legal requirement to do so in Hong Kong.
The questionnaire was in three parts. The first part requested the company
secretary to indicate the company's main business or businesses, to give or confirm
the names of its directors and to indicate which were executives and which were
non-executive. The second part requested information on the frequency and length of
board meetings, existence of board sub-committees and gave fifteen statements about
the style of board meetings. Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or
disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likert Scale. The third part asked
for information on the functions of the board. Firstly the respondents were asked to
rate certain functions, grouped under five headings, in terms of importance from not
applicable to very important. They were then asked to say what percentage of time
the board spent on each of the function groups.
The returns from the questionnaire survey were somewhat disappointing. Three
secretaries representing six companies sent letters of regret, stating that the
questionnaire could not be filled in because it was not company policy to do soor
similar reasons. Two company secretaries also telephoned the author to advise that
the questionnaire would not be returned for similar reasons. A further four gave
partial replies, two declining to fill in section B4 which asked to indicate agreement
or disagreement with the fifteen statements about the style of board meetings, the
other two declining to fill in most of section C as well. Twenty replied giving full or
nearly full replies although eight of these neglected to fill in section C2 on percentage
of the board's time spent on various functions. The other 76 representing 111
companies did not reply. The success rate was therefore about 14%.
Of the 36 companies whose company reports were not in the Data Bank, seven
supplied their report for the relevant year even though most of these did not return the
questionnaire. The total number of companies for which data was available was thus
boosted to 115.
-65 -
The data from the questionnaire survey were tabulated using Lotus 1-2-3 and
correlations with various parameters such as the type of industry (refer to page 56) and
the type of control of the company (refer to page 57) were examined. Various graphs
were produced in order to identify useful trends. Because of the small sample this
proved difficult. There appeared to be little difference between the range of response
whatever the type of control. Responses to the questionnaire are tabulated in
Appendix C.
5.1.1
The frequency of board meetings varied more than expected. Seventeen of the
twenty respondents said that their board held meetings at least quarterly. O f these,
two held meetings every two months, seven held meetings every month and four held
meetings more frequently than once a month. These results are shown in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 - Frequency of Board Meetings
One major property company, which is a subsidiary of a large hong, stated that
its board met less than once every six months, (and only for one to two hours). It also
has no sub-committees or working parties. It might be inferred that the board is
powerless and that control is in the hands of the managing director or, more likely,
in the hands of the parent company.
The duration of board meetings was within the range of less than one hour to
2 - 3 hours, with the average as 1 - 2 hours. Obviously boards do not like long
Figure 5.2 - Duration of Board Meetings
Ten of the 20 respondents said that they have subcommittees, one of whom
failed to elaborate. The most common subcommittee is the Executive Committee, of
which there were six. Other committees were Finance (1)Audit (1), Compensation
(2)Conditions of Service (1) and General Purposes (1). One respondent had four
subcommittees, but others had only one. There was no relation between the control
type or industry and existence of subcommittees.
-69-
The statements in this section were included in order to get a broad feel for the
style of board meetings. The statements were not very scientific in nature but
statements were included to state basically the same idea in different ways, both
negative and positive. No respondents disagreed (ie responses ranged from 'neither
agree nor disagree' to 'strongly agreewith the statements:-
Control Type 1 2 3 4 6
(No. of Go's) (8) (2) (4) (2) (2)
Statement No.
1 3-5 5 3-4 3-4 4-5
2 1-3 2 2-4 2-4 3-4
3 2-5 3-4 1-5 4-5 4-5
4 2-4 1-2 3-4 4 1-3
5 4 3-4 3-5 3-4 4
6 3-4 4 3-5 4 4-5
7 1-4 3-4 3-5 4-5 2-3
8 2-5 4 4-5 4-5 4-5
9 1-3 1-2 1-3 2-3 1-2
10 2-5 4 3-4 4 4-5
14 4 4 3-4 4-5 4
Some agreement was found also between other pairs such as Key decisions
are made by a few directors' and 'Meetings are dominated by a few directors' as
might be expected, but in general the results were inconclusive.
The results were also examined using a 6 style profilegraph of the type shown
in figure 5.4. These were produced for variables such as type of industry and type of
control but the results were inconclusive, which may not be surprising given the small
sample. The range of answers for each type of industry or control was wide. The
ranges of responses are shown in table 5.1 and the averages for control types 1 and
2 combined and for control type 4 are plotted in figure 5.4. As can be seen there was
little indication that the type of control in the company had any effect on the
agreement or disagreement, except in response to the statements:-
This suggests that companies with control type 4 have more autocratic boards than
companies with control types 1 and 2, which is slightly surprising.
55 Board Functions.
FUNCTIONS
budgetary c o n t r o l 16 3 1 1
monitor f i n a n c i a l r e s u l t s 16 5
m o n i t o r mgmt a c t ' s g e n e r a l l y 11 8 1 1
'ACCOy^TABXLITX
report t o shareholders 17 4
CORPORATE P O L I C Y :
set corporate p o l i c y 16 3 2
compare w i t h c o m p e t i t o r s 10 9 1 1
formulate strategy 15 4 2
set corporate d i r e c t i o n 14 5 1 1
N/A - N o t a p p l i c a b l e N/R - No r e s p o n s e g i v e n
The results were interesting for their occasional exceptions more than the
averages. For instance, whilst most companies thought that budgetary control was
very important as a board function and three thought it fairly important, one company
thought it not important and another thought it not applicable. Reviewing of audit
reports was a function which one company considered to be not important and two
companies considered to be not applicable. Fewer than half the companies considered
comparison with competitors to be important, and one company, a major textile
manufacturer, considered it not applicable. This may of course be because the board
of directors does not perform this function, but let us hope someone in the company
does!
-73 -
Only one respondent took the trouble to specify other functions. These were
major acquisitions and investments", which could be considered as part of the
implementation of strategy, "provision of working capital", which is really part and
parcel of monitoring financial results under the supervision function, and "appointment
of senior executives", which is certainly a function separate from the four given in
table 5.2.
Data collected on the 115 companies was organised into two main dBase IV
files, one containing data relating to the company as a whole, and the other containing
data relating to the directors of the companies, as mentioned in section 4.1 above.
From these two main files, data was extracted, manipulated and copied to other files
for specific analysis. The data was analysed according to two variables; the type of
control and the type of industry. The results are presented below. A full list of files
and their usage is at Appendix D, together with a copy of the data contained in the
two main files.
The number of directors was established for all 115 companies on which data
was collected. The range of board size is very wide, from 3 to 24(figure 5.5) with
a median of 9 and an average of 10. Bearing in mind research on the effects of group
size on group performance (Thomas and Fink, 1963)one wonders how a board of 24
people ever reaches a decision.
Analysis by industry (figure 5.6) shows that banks and utility companies tend
to have bigger boards than the other industries, and analysis by type of control (figure
5.7) shows a discernible trend towards larger boards with the change from type 1
(dominant major shareholder), average size 8.75, to type 5 control (widely held
shares), average size 12.43. This is consistent with governance notions that more
widely held companies have more board representation for minority interests.
20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20
xdcutlvs NO. OF DIRECTORS Non-excutivs
The highest return in 1988 was shown by Wah Kwong Shipping but this was
a little exceptional because of the very depressed share price at the beginning of the
year. The gains and losses from the property sector are, perhaps surprisingly, within
the -25% to +30% range with one exception. Howeveran explanation may lie in the
fact that many of these companies also undertake construction, which traditionally
shows low returns. The only true construction company in the sample, Kumagai Gumi
(HK) Ltd., showed a loss for the period.
- 79 -
In order to see whether the type of control had any influence on the return to
shareholders the graph shown in figure 5.13 was plotted. There is no strong indication
that one form of control gives a better return to investors than another. Each shows
a range of returns, both losses and profits, and although the companies which are
widely held (type 5 control) show mostly profits, the sample size is too small to draw
any firm conclusion. The subsidiary companies (6) show a very similar range of
returns to those of the dominant shareholder companies (1) which is perhaps not
surprising as most subsidiaries are 50% or more owned by the parent company.
5.2.4 Remuneration
Assuming that the non-executive directors only receive a small fee for their
intermittent attendance, the executive directors of Evergo and Winsor are extremely
well paid!
-81 -
- The larger the board and particularly the greater the number of
executives on the board, the higher will be the remuneration
percentage, all other things being equal
It is worth taking a closer look at the figures for Sincere Co. Ltd, whose
remuneration of directors was the highest percentage of profits in 1988-89 (although
as mentioned in Chapter 3 the Evergo Holdings Ltd. directors took a higher percentage
of profit before extraordinary items). They are also one of the few companies which
gives a breakdown of its directors' remuneration, reporting directors' fees, salaries,
bonuses and other emoluments separately for executive and non-executive directors.
%change -8 -18 4 66 19 30
%change -8 -19 6 56 14 28
g
| : 27514061 22388920 12901563 8756080 34705371 23216402 37559455
mmrnmm 37 42 60 93 37 62 49
A l l f i g u r e s In HK$
Table 5.3 shows the reported profit including extraordinary items and directors
remuneration for 1984-90 and figure 5.14 shows the same information graphically.
It can be seen that the directors remuneration has varied considerably. During the
period of falling profits up till 1986, both executive and non-executive remuneration
fell in percentage terms but not as much as profits. In 1987 they increased by 6%,
even though profits dropped a further 32%, to become a staggering 93% of profits.
Since then executive directors' remuneration has increased substantially every year,
including 1989 when despite a profit decline of 32%, the executive directors'
remuneration increased by 19%. Non-executive directorsremuneration was reduced
by 12% in that year.
Whilst there are fixed costs involved in employing executive directors, such
as housing and other accepted benefits, the variable element appears to not be varied
enough. It seems that the performance related element of their remuneration is related
much more to positive performance than negative performance.
HK$ (Millions)
40
30
20
10
Year
Table 5.4 shows the range and average for each industry. In both the hotel and
retailing sectors, one exceptionally high value distorts the average.
5.2S
The first category is self explanatory and requires no analysis. It is right and
proper that executives of subsidiaries should sit on the main board as non-executives
since the decisions of the main board must necessarily affect subsidiaries, and
conversely executive directors of the parent sit on the boards of subsidiaries in order
to exercise a degree of control over them or at least advise and monitor them.
The second group are rather more difficult to explain since the companies
concerned appear to be in competition on the face of it. But it must be remembered
that Hong Kong is a small place and competition is not always what it seems. The
directors of the companies have many chances for social interactionmay have similar
educational backgrounds, be it from attending the same schools or universities, may
belong to the same clubs, and may belong to the same professional organisations.
The third group are again self explanatory. Banks and other lenders often
require borrowers to appoint a representative to their board in order to monitor the
company and protect their loans. Bankers may also be invited to join boards as a
source of expertise and connections in the financial world.
The fourth group are directors who have non-executive posts on a number of
seemingly unrelated companies. These are generally professionals such as bankers or
solicitors or persons who have achieved significant standing in the community. They
may be chairmen, chief executives or executive directors of a company in their own
right but their other directorships are not achieved by virtue of this fact but because
they provide informational exchange. The prime example of this category is Mr.
Charles Y.K. Lee who is a director of 12 companies of the top companies on which
data was collected for this study as well as several others. He is a chartered company
secretary by profession, and in the 1970sas a member of the Company Law Review
Board, and one of the few Chinese well versed in company law, he was invited to join
the boards of several property companies. Cheng et al argued that it was possible that
many of the joint ventures, mergers, diversification and conglomeration of these
companies were assisted by Mr. Lee's interlocking directorships, and contributed to
the success of the companies.
The review of company law has shown how Hong Kong company law is based
almost entirely on the English company law, but has lagged significantly in several
areas, particularly those relating to disclosure and insider dealing. In a few isolated
areas the Hong Kong law incorporates amendments, made as a result of various U K
reform committees' recommendations, which have failed to get onto the U K statute
books. Hong Kong company law looks set to diverge from the English model and
follow Australian company law more closely just as Singaporean company law has
done. The laws regarding disclosure of information and insider dealing are about to
be considerably strengthened and these changes could have profound significance for
the conduct of public companies in Hong Kong.
6.2 Conclusions.
6.2A
Despite the poor response resulting in a small sample size and some
deficiencies in the questionnaire itself, it can be concluded that:-
- Board meetings are held at intervals between less than once every
half year to more than once a month, with no relationship to
parameters such as industry or type of control being obvious.
The results of the attempts to obtain some feel for board style were not very
rewarding. A number of companies refused to respond to this section of the
questionnaire either in its entirety or to particular statements. The range of responses
_ 91 _
was wide and did not correlate with other variables such as industry and type of
control. Some ambiguity in the statements exacerbated the situation and further
refinement prior to sending out the questionnaires would have helped. A pilot study
would have been very useful but insufficient time was available.
The available data yielded several insights into the parameters of companies
boards. The following conclusions may be drawn for the sample of companies for
which data was collected during this study:
- Board size varied widely and some boards are too big for efficient
decision making.
- Banks and the utility companies tend to have bigger boards than
other industries, but the type of control does not seem to be an
influencing variable.
some of them being slightly surprising in that top directors are
frequently on the boards of apparent competitors.
Perhaps as interesting as what can be gleaned from the available data, is what
cannot be established for lack of data. Most company reports do not declare the status
of directors, and data on the ownership of the company is simply not available in
some cases, because of the practice of using nominees for shareholding.
6.23 Recommendations.
Anon, (1988): The Stock Exchange Year Book. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
Ltd.
Berle, A. & Means, G. C , (1968): The Modern Corporation and Society (revised
edition).
Cheng, M., Fong, G.,Gordon, A., Leung C & Wong, A. (1988): Interlocking
Directorates and Their Impact on the Performance in the Property Sector in
Hong Kong. MBA Project Report, University of Hong Kong (unpublished).
FranksI A., (1986): The Company Director and the Law. Longman.
Mace, M. L. (1986): Directors: Myth and Reality, Harvard Business School Classics
Edition. HBS Press, Boston
Mintzbcrg, H(1983):
management policy series). Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, N J .
Mitchell, R L R. (1989):
Butterworth, London
-96-
PillaiP. N(1987):
Butterworth (Asia), Singapore.
Spencer, A. (1983): On the Edge of the Organization - The Role of the Outside
Director. John Wiley.
StottV (1987):
Taylor, R(1985):
Tricker, R. I (1978):
UjejskiT (1990): Securities Regulation - in The Law in Hong Kong 1969 - 1989
(Wacks, R. (ed)). Hong Kong Oxford University Press
APPENDIX A
Dear Sir,
The information required relates to the years stated because this is the latest year for
which I can access reports for all of the top 150 listed companies.
If you are not in a position to provide the information, perhaps you could ask
the Chairman or Managing Director if he would kindly answer the questionnaire. A
stamped addressed envelope is enclosed for its return. It would assist me greatly if
you could reply within 3 weeks.
Yours faithfully,
A. J* Cooper.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
GENERAL
banking
finance/investment
trading
manufacturing
shipping
hotel
entertainment
utilities
property development
construction
retailing
2. The directors according to the company report for 1988/9 listed the directors as shown below.
Please indicate which of these were non-executive (ie those who hold no executive post or
responsibility within the company).
Exec non-exec
BLUCK D R Y
BONG S Y DANIEL
CHENG K S HENRY
LEUNG H M
MORRISON A G
SELWAY-SWIFT P E
[Questionnaires to companies where the directors were not known included the following request :-
2. Please list below the directors for the reporting year which ended between April 1988 and
March 1989 and indicate which of these were non-executive (ie those who hold no executive post or
responsibility within the company).
(It would be helpful if you could provide a copy of the company report for that year to the Mong
Kwok Ping Data Bank of the Department of Management Studies, as no copy is available at present.)]
BOARD MEETINGS
more than 6
yes
no
Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements by circling the appropriate
number:-
1 - strongly disagree
2 - disagree
3 - neither agree nor disagree
4 - agree
5 - strongly agree
Please indicate how important the following functions are to the company. Please circle
appropriate number:-
0 - not applicable
1 - not important
2 - fairly important
3 - very important
budgetary control 0
monitor financial results 0
monitor management activities generally 0
Accountability functions
report to shareholders 0
deal with regulatory issues 0
review audit reports 0
Strategic functions
012 3
012 3
012 3
Supervisory function
accountability function
Corporate policy function
Strategic function
Other function
Thank you for your co-operation. Please return this questionnaire in the envelope provided.
APPENDIX B 1
LARS LYKKE IVERSEN EAST ASIATIC CO. (HONG KONG) LTD., THE
-105
WHEELOCK MARDEN & CO. LTD. HONGKONG REALTY AND TRUST CO., LTD.
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD,
CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE
W1NEUR SECRETARIES LTD. SUN HUNG KAI & CO. LTD.
WORLD-WIDE SECRETARIES LTD. HARBOUR CENTRE DEVELOPMENT LTD.
LANE CRAWFORD HOLDINGS LTD.
WHARF HOLDINGS LTD., THE
WORLD INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD.
APPENDIX C
Questionnaire Results
-109-
Asia Securities 3 2 N
Cheung Kong 2 2 N
Chevalier 5 Y Executive
Dickson Concepts 1 2 N
East Asiatic 1 1 N
HAECO 2 2 Y Executive
H K Ferry 4 2 N
H K Land 6 2 N
Johnson Electric 1 N
Novel Enterprises 4 2 Y
Shaw Brothers 4 1 N
S H K Properties 2 2 N
S H K & Co 5 2 Y Executive
TVB 4 1 Y Executive
Yaohan H K 2 2 Y
110 -
i cn
rt
ro
1
en C
M cn 04 CO <
S cn S en <N CS C< S CS <s
rri
I cn m *n *n m
I <
>
s CO CS en C
O - cn <s <
N tn cn
1
UOPOQS
a\ oi
i <S cn <s cn CS cn - C4 - cs CS - C4
Tt
vn <s <
S ro n w
n <s O
C O
P cn to
*rj cn rt cn
i IO cn rt cn tn
I c*> cn cn tn <s cs C4 cn
<?
z cn *n *n : *0 CO xf
C4 r4 <s CA C4 <
S <
>
r C4 C4 ci C4 ci c4
iTi
i en cn *o
*ri cn
Company Name
I I m
3
I .a
e
SHK Properties
|
i
HK & S Hotels
1 1 M 1 1 SI o i
1 1 oS
m 1
M j I
C
O
1 SHK
I I I I 1 1 1 l i >*
|
I
-Ill -
C
O cn cn cn n tn r4 <s cn cn m m
m tn cn m 0 en cn <N
en C4 tn <s
ci C
O 0 cn cn cn C
O - <r\ eA cn n n 0 cn en tn
ClC-2
cn cn cn ri cn m o <S C
O CS 04 0 - cn <N <N N
ClC-1
m <n <
n C
O o 0 CJ cn 0 m
o <s cn cn N m rn O C4 r^t C
O Cv4 r4 CS irt C
O m C
O cn
ClA-2
cn cn cn tn cn m tn r^i C
O cn tn M
C C
O m tn
CI S 3
o r4 ci m m m - C4 C
O C4 *s C4 0 tn cn cn cn
ClS-2
cs cn n ro m cn oi n cn ra cn C
*
1 tn r4 cn n
I trs cn C^l m cn tn cn C4 cn en cn o O cn c* cn to
Company Name
I 1 1 11
I1 1 I 1
0 C
ja
SHK Properties
I I 11 i i>-
| Shaw Brolhcn
i
SHK& Co
1 J 11
a
| Firat Pacific
_5 C
/
3
-a 8 4 -S Q
Q
i i i 3 z
1
1
|
|
Table C4 - Answers to Questions in Section C2
A s k Securities 30 20 20 30
Cheung Kong 20 20 20 40
Chevalier
Dickscn Concepts
East Asiatic 20 20 35 25
First Pacific 50 10 10 30
Fountain Set 30 30 20 20
HAECO 70 10 10 10
H K Vcxry 30 30 10 10 10
HKLand 25 25 25 25
H K & S Hotels 50 20 10 10 10
Johnson Electric
L a i Sun Gamumt 10 30 60 0
Novel Enterprises 40 20 40 0
Shaw Brothers 15 20 30 35
S H K Properties
SHK & Co
TVB
Yaohan H K 30 10 20 20 20
-113 -
APPENDIX D
1
Conipany i Rcpcrt Dircacffs shares No. shaics Profit E P S Sh pricc Sh price
date rcmuncr.n t of yr end of yr
24 B U R W I L L I N T E R N A T I O N A L L T D . 8903 3543000
33 E L E C A E L T E K C O M P A N Y L T D . 8806 7896000
10 H A N G L U N G D E V E L O P M E N T C O . L T D . 8806 16783000
97 H E N D E R S O N I N V E S T M E N T L T D . 8806 491000
12 H E N D E R S O N L A N D D E V E L O P M E N T C O . L T O . 8806 6856000
480 H K R PROPERTIES L T D .
9 HK-TVB LTD.
160 H O N K W O K L A N D I N V E S T M E N T C O . L T D . 379000
A C OA
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 660400000
CO. (LIBERIA)
15 JARDINE M A T H E S O N HOLDINGS LTD. 55000000
7183 K A W A H B A N K LTD., T H E
cmc
180 K A D E R INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD.
BORDER SHIPPING
LTD (LIBERIA)
280 KING F O O K HOLDINGS L T D .
66 11.20 20
66 L A N E C R A W F O R D HOLDINGS LTD. "B" 8903 465850000 20
67 L A P H E N G CO., L T D . S6303310 110281196
68 L E E HING D E V E L O P M E N T L T D . 2.35
(PHILIPPINES)
448 SEMr-TECH MICROELECTRONICS (FE) LTD. 8901 138000000 0.140 0,72 0.87 0 INT. SEMI-TECH
MICROELEC.(CAN)
80 SHAW BROTHERS (HONG KONG) L T D . 8903 1610000 398390400 398390400 167215000 0.410 4.88 3.68
82 SHUI O N G ROU P L T D . 8803 6153742 64262500 705855000 57237623 0.084 0.00 0.00
263 SHUN H O INVESTMENTS (HOLDINGS) L T D . 8903 847500 246540000 295848000 109153971 0.370 1.29 2.55
242 S H U N T A K ENTERPRISES CORPORATION L T D . 8812 28000 95893252 161520992 2051200203 0.405 2.58 3.15
249 SIME D A R B Y H O N G K O N G LTD. 8806 5000000 233100000 233100000 160500000 0.317 2.35 2.93 SIME D A R B Y B H D
(MALAYSIA)
256 T I A N T E C K L A N D L T D . 9314900C
4 W H A R F HOLDINGS LTD., T H E
7096 WING L U N G B A N K L T D .
100 Z U N G F U C O . L T D . 174.75000C
-119 -
Directors N a n x Post Excc/ Indu.
held ncai-cx shaiehidg sfaarehldg shareUdg sharehldg
271 ASIA SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL LTD. CHENG LUNG DON HORACE 0.02
ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. CHONG HOO HONG C 9 741192 17581219 5.09
ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. SIN CHO CHIU CHARLES 9 360000 0.10
New Company Name Dircaors Name Excc/ Ordinary Prcicicncc Indir. ord. %agc
code
shaieMdg sharehldg sh*iMdg
YEE E L Y 0.00
C A V E N D I S H INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD.
C I T Y HOLDINGS L T D . N G K K KENNETH
C I T Y HOLDINGS L T D . L O Y U K SUI 245973675 4650
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. LEUNG S H 622720 0.03
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. CHOW N M A L B E R T DMD 0.00
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. CHOW C W DMD 231800 0.01
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTO. HUNG S L KATHERINE
0.00
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. FOK K N CANNING DMD 0.00
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. L E EY K CHARLES
00
.0
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. LI ICS 743157062 33.82
MAGNUS G C
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. 0.00
C H E U N G K O N G (HOLDINGS) LTD. LI CHONG Y M 23796344 1.08
CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. CHENG SIU YIN SHIRLEY 23249225 124999875 29.65
L A IY C 0.00
32 CROSS-HARBOUR T U N N E L CO., L E EP T C 0.00
32 CROSS-HARBOUR T U N N E L C O , . L T D HIGGINSON G A
0.00
32 CROSS-HARBOUR T U N N E L CO. , L T D CHEEY C 16396000 IZ96
32 CROSS-HARBOUR TUTWEL C O , L T D CANDLER R W 0.00
32 CROSS-HARBOUR T U N N E L C O , , L T D THE HU F K 0.00
32 CROSS-HARBOUR T U N N E L CO., , L T D SO J Y C 0.00
440 D A H SING F I N A N Q A L HOLDINGS L T D . WONG S Y DAVED 47222210 51.41
440 D A H SING F T N A N Q A L HOLDINGS L T D . YAM A D A SHOHEI 0.00
440 D A H SING fTNANCIAL HOLDINGS LTD. CHOW C K 0.39
440 D A H SING F T N A N Q A L HOLDINGS 5 LTD. HINDE D A V I D R 0.00
440 D A H SING FINANCIAL HOLDINGS S LTD. SIMPSON JOHN W 0.12
440 D A H SING F T N A N Q A L HOLDINGS WONG S S W I L U A M 338
440 D A H SING FTNANCIAL HOLDINGS5 LTD. IKARI KAZUHIRO 0.00
440 D A H SING F T N A N Q A L HOLDINGSS LTD. HASEGAWA YASUSHI ALD 0.00
440 D A H SING F T N A N Q A L HOLDINGS5 LTD. CHOW W W SOllS ALD 225600 0.22
440 D A H SING F I N A N Q A L HOLDINGS 5 LTD. TSUailYA TSUNBO ALD 0,00
440 D A H SING F I N A N Q A L HOLDINGS LTD. CHEUNG T Y EDWARD ALD 0.00
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. LEUNG W M RAYMOND 0.04
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. CHAU T OY L YVONNE 0.00
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. SCHEUFELE KARL F 39600 0.01
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. W A N S C JOSEPH 0.04
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. POON DICKSON GEC 1 159867836 50.80
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. WUEST WALTER JOSRF 1 19171920 6.09
DICKSON CONCEPTS LTD. SCHEUFELE KARL 0.01
EIE DEVELOPMENT (INTERNATIONAL) TAK AH ASH I HARUNORI 49.76
EIE DEVELOPMENT (INTCRNATIONAL) E L A2AR NAGY 134225156 8.83
EIE DEVELOPMENT (INTERNATIONAL) ISHIZAKI ROBERT BUNCO 0.03
E E DEVELOPMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD FAIRBURN MARTIN D 0.00
E E DEVELOPMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD KANEDA SHOICHr 0.60
EIE DEVELOPMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD KANAZAWA MAMORU 0,00
33 ELEC & ELTEK C OMP A N Y LTO. SO C S DAVID 3638145 414919810
53.02
33 ELEC & ELTEK COMPANY LTD. TSANG M P MARCUS DCMD 4468923
0.57
33 ELEC & ELTEK C OMP A N Y LTD. LEE Y K CHARLES 500000
0.06
33 ELEC & ELTEK COMPANY LTD. YAU Y C GEORGE 1761000 0.22
33 ELEC & ELTEK COMPANY LTD. T A M K H WILSON 0 0.00
195 G R A N D HOTEL HOLDINGS LTD. HA" ARCULLI RONALD J 154583 16520647 192
195 G R A N D HOTEL HOLDINGS LTD. "B" ARCULLI RONALD J 199985 21372865 3.60
97 HENDERSON INVE
VESTMENT I W A NM Y 00
,0
97 H E N D E R S O N INVESTMENT LTD. WOO P S 0J6
97 HENDERSON INVESTMENT LTD, LEUNG H M 0.00
HK-TVB L T D PAIN 00
.0
HK-TVB L T D 0.03
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
GALEM G
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
MILLER T J
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
TONROEJG
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.03
L I K P DAVID
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 58200 0.00
CHUNGSY
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
CREWGL
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
FUNG H M
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0,00
TURNBULL W
8 H O N G K O N G TELECOMMUNICATIONS L T D 0.00
WALKER F L
0.01
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, L T D 107680
RODRIGUES ALBERT
3.46
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, L T D 34108540
MCAULAY R
0.01
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, MOCATTAWE
13.81
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, L T D KADOORIE D MICHAEL
0.00
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS. L T D M A R D E NJ L
0.01
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, N G C S ROBERT
0.00
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, L T D KADOORIE HORACE
0.03
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, U K P DAVID
0.00
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTELS, L T D WEBB-PEPLOE H G
0.00
45 H O N G K O N G A N D SHANGHAI HOTCLS, LTt GORDON SIDNEY
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. TSO K S
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS L T D . YEEE L Y
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. CHANN K GMD
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. BOTTOMLEY F D R
0.00
6 SHURNIAK W H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD.
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. RIGG N A 2497
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. SELWAY-SWIFT P E
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. WELSH E H
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTO. M U R R A Y SIMON
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD, WONG C H
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTO. SHEA R R A L P H
0.01
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. L E O N G S W SYDNEY 179909
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. L E E Y K CHARLES
0.01
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. HOTUNG E JOSEPH 111000
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. MAGNUS G C
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. SANDBERG M
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTO. CHOW
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. CHEUNG OSWALD
0.00
6 H O N G K O N G ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. FOK K N CANNING
0.03
50 H O N G K O N G F E R R Y (HOLDINGS) CO. L T D . L A U T C EDMOND
0.00
50 H O N G K O N G F E R R Y (HOLDINGS) CO. LTO. FXJNGPFKEKNETH
0.01
50 H O N G K O N G F E R R Y (HOLDINGS) CO, L T D . K A N Y L MICHAEL 19138
0.00
49 HONGKONG REALTY A N D T R U S T CO., LTD. "A" PANC L
0.00
49 HONGKONG REALTY A N D T R U S T CO., LTD. "A" WOO K 1276
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION PURVES W 83489
0.02
7005 HONGKONG St. SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIKS 1684716
0.00
7005 HONGKONG St SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION F R A M EF R 54110
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION ASHERB H 0
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION BOND J R H 50116
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION BROOKS J A
0.01
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION CONNOLLY D E
0.00
7005 HONGKONG Sc SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION D U N N LYDIA
0.00
7005 HONGKONG A SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION FREDERICK R R
0.00
7005 HONGKONG Sc SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION GLEDHILL D A
0.00
7005 H O N G K O N G & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION G R A YJ M
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION JAQUBSD G 53659
0.00
7005 HONGKONG Sc SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION KNOX N R
0.00
7005 HONGKONG &. SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LEEH C
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION MACKAYCD
0.00
7005 H O N G K O N G St SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION MCMAHON K
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION NEWTON C W 5907
0.00
7005 HONGKONG A SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION RICHN M S 0
0.01
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION SOHMEN H 989100
0.00
7005 HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION STRICKLAND J E 39616 0.00
H O P E W E L L HOLDINGS L T D Y E U N G K Y KEVIN
-128 -
17
17
N E W WORUD D E V E L O P M E N T CO.. CHENG Y P
00
.0
17
N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO., CHENG Y T
00
.0
N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO., YOUNG B C ALBE R T 960
0.19
17 N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO., HO TIM 2159866 0 0.02
17 177280
N E W WORJLD D E V E L O P M E N T CO., YIU Y
0.00
17 CHENG K S HENRY
N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO.,
0,31
17 3501984
N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO., SIN W K
1.62
00
.0
17 18465600
N E W W O R L D D E V E L O P M E N T CO.. LIANG C H D A V r o
78 N O V E L ENTCRPRISES L T D L A MW W 8326000
CHOI C I 0,80
78 N O V E L ENTERPRISES L T D
-133 -
New Conpany Name Directors Name Ordinary Prcfcrcnoe
shapcMdg sharehldg
N O V E L ENTHRPRI
[SES LTD MA M Y LESTER 0.32
N O V E L ENTERPRI
SES SHUTW
0.00
N O V E L ENTERPRI
SES SHIH P C
0.08
N O V E L ENTERPRI
SES SELWAY-SWIFT P E
0.00
N O V E L ENTERPRISES LTD. KITAMURA YOSHIHIRO
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD.
1932 219337621 75.68
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD. TUNGCC
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD KING ROGER
00.0
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD CHO MORLEY L
00.0
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD HOBSON H F G
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD SHAW B P
00.0
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD LUS D
00.0
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD THOMPSON N S
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD LIANG M H
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOUDINGS) LTD HS1A JOHN
0.00
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD CHASE R H A 00.0
332 ORIENT OVERSEAS (HOLDINGS) LTD. HARRINGTON D J 00.0
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. MAC K 0.00
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. CHAM S L 0.01
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. MAH C 00.0
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. FAO P W 0.00
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD, CHAN CHEUK aDRISTOPHER 00.0
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. MATK 0.04
ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. LAM PUI (LAM M T) 0.02
73 PALIBURG INVESTMENTS LTD. BONG S Y DANIEL 0,00
73 PALIBURG INVESTMENTS LTD. GALLIE R T 175000 0.03
73 PALIBURG INVESTMENTS LTD. NG K K KENNETH 00.0
73 PALIBURG INVESTMENTS LTD. Y U T K PETER 0.00
73 PALIBURG INVESTMENTS LTD. LO YUK SUI 76.95
S A N M I G U E L BREWERY L T D . KARR R D 00
.0
S A N M I G U E L BREWERY L T D . B E L M O N T E F JR 0.00
S A N M I G U E L BREWERY L T D . FERIA J Y 00
.0
S A N MIGUEL BREWERY LTO. L E E DOMINGO 0.00
SEMI-TECH MICROELECTRONICS (FAR EAST) LTD. HO S N STANLEY 14924000 1.39
SEMI-TECH MICROELECTRONICS (FAR EAST) LTD. TING JAMES H PCEO 188140000 17.01
SEMI-TECH MICRO
LOELECTRONICS (FAR EAST) LTD. M AF Y 00
.0
LOELECTRONICS (FAR EAST) LTD.
SEMI-TECH MICRO WELLS M W 00
.0
80 SHAW BROTHERS (HONG KONG) L T D . TURNBULL WILLIAM 0.00
80 S H A W BROTHERS (HONG KONG) L T D . SFffiN H J 0.00
63.94
82 SHUI O K G RO UP L T D . L O H S VINCENT 451341215
SHUI O N G RO UP L T D , LOCKJEAN 00
.0
SHUI O N G RO UP L T D . D E NYS G J 0.04
C H A N P D AVID 63806125 16 JO
88 T A I C H E U N G PROPERTIES L T D .
H E U N GL S 532812 0.15
90 T A I SHING D E V E L O P M E N T HOLDINGS L T D .
Company Name
Post Excc/ Ordinary Preference Indir. ord. %agc
held ncsi-cx sharehldg sharehldg sharehldg shaiehldg
00.0
r
096 WING L U N G B A N K LTD. HO T T STEPHEN 2586
8472
00.0
Z U N GF U CO. L T O