The principal argument of my thesis is that contrary to popular belief and conviction the individual

self does not exist.

The Self or the individual, or the individual self is a misnomer.
Primarily because what is popularly known as the individual self is a premature conclusion drawn
from a hypothetical process of individuation that never really successfully separates from the
collective of social cognition.

The ego, the I, individual self, has no independent existence when social cognition ceases to
exist.

Though the process of individuation has often and exhaustively been understood in Jungian and
Freudian terms, as also by other luminaries in the field of psychology and consciousness, this thesis
tries to focalise the debate in the context of theory of mind.

Theory of mind here is defined as the cognition of other mental states as well as ones own,
commonly known as the Self. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience and most specifically social
cognitive neuroscience has brought up many tests, viewpoints and perspectives in this regard.

Many tests provide empirical means to verify and also refute various postulations on the
computational and representational theory of mind. Most specific here would be the work done by
John Searle, Hilary Putnam and Roger Penrose. Of specific importance is intentionality (Searles
Chinese room), and the role of language in an unimpaired theory of mind.

My point of divergence from these theorists is that their viewpoint arises from the presupposition
that it is an individual mind that is undergoing the hypothetical mental processes. The
presupposition is that of the individual as an invisible existential precondition. This precondition is a
fallacy, an illusory entity that has no scope of existence.

My hypothesis is that all precursors to the theory of mind suffer from this fallacy and it goes back to
Descartess Meditations.

The Self does not precede social cognition.

Social cognition precedes Self.
Social cognition not only precedes Self it is not different from Self. The Self is nothing more than a
complex representation of social cognition. In this way the Self and its social representation are
complex mirror images of each other. The Self is an illusory perception resulting from the
computation of theory of mind into a single viewpoint oriented in space and time. In reality there is
no difference.
Therefore the mirroring of social cognition in a viewpoint oriented in space and time and with a
point of reference is the Self. This Self has no other qualities to call its own, and ceases to exist when
social cognition ceases to exist.

This theory can be corroborated and put to test in empirical ways.

1) Studies in the social model of disability. Tests and studies that show that persons with the
same impairments and disabilities are statistically different in different social environments.
Their impaired sense of Self is a result of the broken mirror syndrome. They reflect back the
impaired perceptions society has of them. The broken mirror syndrome is best understood
in psychiatry as PTSD, post traumatic stress disorder. So in the broken mirror disability is in
reality a distorted reflection of socially induced PTSD.
2) The mirror neuron is fast becoming a disclaimer for all standard and notional understanding
of the Self and theory of mind. Cognitive neuroscientists have found a clear demarcation in
 brain activity responsible for theory of mind and those for imitation. It is evident that
perceptions of the other and the self is more complex than hitherto understood. This
gives vast scope for understanding the self through neuro philosophy.

Especially significant in this regard would be the vast and rich Indian philosophical discourses
on the nature of cognition. A common theme in many of its schools is a recurrent clarity that
the Self is absent in various psychic operant instruments called the mind or manas.

In my hypothesis, the self is the complex mirroring of social cognition in a spatio temporal viewpoint.
Amongst all constants the only variable here is intentionality (Searle). It is the intentional stance that
undergoes various computations in the light of language and through the prism of social cognition it
throws up myriad mirrors of complex representations.

The hypothesis goes on to postulate that it is this intentionality that reaches critical mass and causes
social change witnessed in social revolutions. This happens when reflections of intentionality reach
critical mass, thus changing the mirror representations of social cognition, whereby the
representation of the individual self too changes.

It is this intentionality that is calibrated in myriad philosophical schools as the virtues, and morals
and ethics. The pratibimba in Kashmir Shaivism in this regard is also worth exploring.

Not long ago a computational theory of mind was considered impossible. But with recent
breakthroughs in cognitive neuroscience and psychological testing we are coming close to calibrating
and computing consciousness through understanding the complex mirroring of intentionality in
social cognition. We may be witnessing not only a computational theory of mind, but a
computational theory of consciousness.

Some collaborative empirical tests for the hypothesis.

1)The correlation between the pratityasamutpada (Buddhist Logic) postulation of the Self as
a point of reference in the continuum of space and time, and Grazianos (cognitive
neuroscience) research on the mirror neuron, eye gaze and executive function.
2) Co-relationship between Chomskys Universal grammar and Indian philosophies of
language reveals a cohesive seamlessness in the continuum of social cognition. This and a
close study of pratityasamutpada and pratibimbavada displays the self as an illusory
fragmentation of the social cognition continuum.
3) Empirical tests and surveys to observe similar children with similar theory of mind
impairments (autism) in three different environments.
1) Shelter homes
2) Special schools
3) Mainstream schools.

A disparity in results in this survey can provide conclusive proof on the nature of theory of
mind and how much individuation of the Self is cognitively and philosophically possible.