(ON PEOPLE, PARADIGMS, AND "PROGRESS" IN GEOGRAPHY* Anne Buttimer ‘The notion of ‘paradigm’ exercites a growing appeal among historians and commen tators on geographic thought. (Stoddart, 1967; Whitehand, 1970, 1971; Chorley, 1974; Benry, 1974). As with ‘peneplan” a few generations ag i offers an ils, fof clarity yee semsinssulficiently vague and snalyially elusive to occupy our jmaginatons fora longtime. The theory of scientific revoluions has provoked = Vstual eaaphony of protest and acclim which has exposed several latent confite and uncertainties in the history and philosphy of science. (Kua, 1962; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) What emerges from thie din with resounding clarity, however, is sronger evidence than before that the evolution of scientific ideas cannot be appreciated without a closer serutiny of their social, ideological, and polis! Kuhn's work also shows epeatedly how captivating the influence of established Scientific convention is once they have Become ‘normalized within research inst {utions Indeed disciplinary identity has become increasingly construed in pari matic terms, providing « Kind of passport to our respective Academies of Science. ‘And to join that mery throng geographers everywhere sem to apie, ‘Two obvious challenges for the historian of geographic thought arise from a consideration of paradigms: Cit, the lationship between geography and science’, and secondly, the relationship between geographical thought and milieu, As pene plain in the classical Davsian mythology 0, 0, paradigms could be characttied interme of structure, process, and stage-*” A certain proces called normal scence’ Js associated with each paradigm stricture at any particular ‘tage’ the movement bberween stages isthe function of ‘extraordinary science’. Ione were to take & liberal spproach to time, I ruppose one could compare the evolution of Davisian landforms with the evolution of scientific deat. The sibling vary of goology and fcomorphology might in many ways be compated with geography’ continued ‘loak-and~dagger interaction with systematic sciences, ‘This may be as far a one can take the analogy. The idea of ‘paradigm’ has proven most appropriate for deserbing developments within physical sciences, it fits less comfortably in the story of biological aciences, and Finds itself on rocky + Paper orcpaed fr the Symposinm on ‘Pung andthe Deyeopmen of Gopaghy’ om sored bythe Inernatonal Geogrphival Union Commlaen onthe Hinry af Cergephie ‘Prowhe, Edinburgh 197. To be opened nD Stoddard CEOORAPMY, IDEOLOGY, end ** Commentby Profenar Olt Gran a dicnon abou the Ednburh Symposium, Land,territory when applied to any Geld which aime at comprchensive understanding of Ihumanity and eile. Ks appropriateness for studying the history of geography therefore depends upon how exe views the relationship between geography and selene disciplines. And on this question wear far from universal consensus. The {eters paribus assumption, for example, which science needs in order to wnavel fymematically the structure and dynamics of specie slices’ of reality, has rle- vance only to partiular dimensions of geographic engiry. It hasbeen sugested thatthe ulimate synthesis toward which geography as x whole orients itself i 8 CONTEXTUAL eather than 4 COMPOSITIONAL one. (Téemebohm, 1972; Hager strand, 1974 b), If this be ao then each conceptual sep toward reaching a paraig Inatic understanding of the ‘composton’ of phenomens can spell progress for fseomaphty as a whole, if uhe concept can be woven back into an understanding of Its human and environmental context ‘The purpose ofthis paper sotto deal with the various conespiual and seman- tie nuances ssvociated with the term paradigm (se, however, Masterman, 1970) but rather to ruse some pues surrounding the appropriates ofthis approach to the history of geographic thought, 1 shall abi suggest an altemtive approach hich would foeus onthe life-work of particular individuals whose ideas have been Tigificant in shaping the directions of geographic enquiry throughout history.* ‘The rationale for this proposal stem from a maliee about contemporary academic approaches to ideas and practice in general anda strongly felt ned ro explore the retlectve and personal dimensions of thought at wells its analytical and empirical ‘Ones At face value the Wen of critical reflection upon personal experience may fem very remote from the study of scientific revolutions. [ts premises and pro- fedures stand in marked contrat to the objets, generalizing stance implicit in the search for paradigms. There fs much common ground, however, tobe explored sis these distinctive path, and a focus on individual experience should not detract from the search for general pater, There are surely many routes posible into the history of ideas and if exch is cateflly sgnposed then our collective efforis may produce a more helpful routemap for future explorers Biographical accounts of explores and scientists bear witness co the value of sadying an individuals life—work in the total cotext of his time and miix.** ‘Within such case tudies one finds ample evidence for the overchelming impor tance of general intellectual tends nd seological sting. Logically and empirical Jy 2 focus on individuals should thue complement the focus on general develop ‘mental themes, The issues to which I wish to attract attention probe more deeply than this, however I wish to aise questions regurding the nature and quality ofthe KNOWLEDGE whose history we wish to reconstruct, the processes whereby sch historical reenrch isto be done, andthe effectiveness of our results for conten porary thought and practice within geography. T cannot promise « perspective Cee a ema ete Senin Pieter aaa Beimi Unerstys Celunba Cnierty, New Vouk. fv both Physics and Peycholoy an ato emis gers ee ier caer ete earieeaee Ey Gali and Ca Wy esa Th Aerie Caer aKNOWLEDGE ACTION Neen ‘toewtomg TT sees Figure 1. Historiography’ of Geographic Research. (Grand, 1917). which will guarantee cithertheoretial or revolutionary resus, but I do hope to clear the ground for a more objective and personal approach tothe history and Philosophy of geography. "The What and the How inthe History of leas Reconstructing the history of thought inevitably involves assumptions and nferen ‘ees reqrding the goals of enquiry and the direction of ie develapmen. Besides, as {Grano's paper suggested, one's point of view always reflects the circumstances and _eitgest ofthe time at which sich history i witen, (Grams, 1977 b) (igure 1) Th opting the perspective of “cientifc revolution’ tothe history af geo graphic thought, one implies that geography shares some common goals and dice: tions with conventional sciences, Gran has indicated » deqree of parle bbeween the ways in which geography and acience as « whole hve responded to ‘external societal challenger overtime: (Figure 2) ‘To appreciate fly the value of this approach, however, one needs to Became aware of what types of knowledge ae included or excluded, and what types of ‘earch are implied.Figure 2. Emergence of new fostares in the development of science ond georaphy. (Grano, 19778), “The structure of scientific revolutions and paradigmatic normal science ae pre mised upon two complementary scholaly goals! 1) intellectual mastery over complexity via abstract generalization and theory; and 2) increasing analytical acuity in conceptual and methodological frameworks snd procedures Both reveal an attitude toward the relationship between knowledge and experience ‘which Heidegger characterized as RECHNENDES DENKEN (Heidegger, 1954, 1971) a style of thought which separates mind and matter, subject and object, and lms at rational understanding and contol over realty, The alternative attitude ‘which he characteries as BESINNLICHES NACHDENKEN is one which refutes to separate knowing and being and seks to unlock the meaning inherent in reality, as far a8 posible in its own terms. Contrasting scholarly roles and research proce dlres follow from these two atitader: in the former context scholars aime & detached, “objective” stance on praxis and emphasise product rather than the prot ces of enquiry. In the latter context scholars assume an “engaged” (immersed) ance; they ty to become aware of their own a pros! idens and also to elicit self-awareness among the people and ‘objects they study, emphasis esting on the process a well as on the produats of enquiry Thave, of course, gosly oversimplified » complex philosophical iaue but it is ‘one which has been otelooked in the debate over Kuhn's work, Infact the entire {debate could be adumbrated withthe fist of thee two categorie: the Rechuendes Denken s0 characteristic of Western science generally. Could the mime be sid about our disourse on the history’ of geographic thought? If so, how well does the ‘paradigmatic analysis fi the actual record of what geographers have thought dy fnd written, and of how they lived and inspired people asocnted with thei ‘The distinction between these two attitudes toward knowledge and experience should not necesuily imply a separation, and I suppose the ultimate challenge for scholar is to weave these two perspectives ina mutually creative way. It is inthis ‘context that one could angue fr a closer look at the unique personal experiencesof particular geographers: how they were influenced, how they inspired others, ‘wt Freeh insights they brought to the field ata whole To wnmask the distinctions between ‘Subjective’ and ‘objective’ accounts of idea, their genesis and develop is ony part ofthe rationale for thie reorientation. Eventually, ite sim i develop 2 syle of scholarly activity which provokes discovery and self awareness ‘within the whole of DASEIN. Tie style may provoke more questions than answers because it endeavors to promote an attitude of listening to experience exer than striving to represent it interme ofa prior formulations cally, of courte, a eiteal apprail of conventional models and procedures should always precede their application to the analysis of particular preblems. It thould therefore be seen as a complement rather than a subrttute for siete research. Development of the atitude of Besinliches Nachdonten, lke the elt ‘ation of vite, is probably a life tsk, and example is probably more helpful than ‘words It has tobe dicovered and practised by each scholar in hier ova partic lar icumstances, Who bette than the authors of history, then, to reflect upon the ‘volition of their own ideas and share ther insights with posteriey?(Maclver, 1960; Heller, 1918) CCharism and Context: Ideas and Micwx ‘The style of research adopted in the history of geographic thought and the attiedes associated with it inevitably influence the content of what is produce, Is it possible to develop syle of research into the history of our discipline which allows us to tap a ricer range of ideas and insight than conventional ones? Build. ing on what Profesor Grand has alesdy presented, let me eve some pessblities for weaving the two contrasting approaches to history under three major headings (1) Geography and ‘normal sciences (2) Geography and “extraordinary science’; and (8) Geographic thought and milieu. Substituting the term ‘experience’ for the term “ation” in Gran'sdigram, let me uae this general framework to iltrate the ‘major points: (Figure 8) 4, Geography end Normal Science ‘Normal scence’ a defined by Kuhn is perhaps best exemplified in the analytical Iy-oriented disciplines where hypothetico-dedvicive procedures are uscd and law-Uke generations are sought. Under specified conditions these procedures ‘may arzve at statements about realty which ean have predictive power (Ruder, 1966; Hempel, 1965, 1956; Ryan, 1970). To achieve the kind of certainty, the scope of enquiry has tobe limited: specific type of phenomena or procetes must bbe iolated from their fll contexts x that their own intrinsic dynamism may be ‘examined more closely. Ceters paribus, an elaborate act of rules and conventions are believed to guarantee a certain type of rientific certainty about caeflly lecumserbed slices of realty. (Popper, 1960, 1962), Normal science execs in ‘yielding insight into the proceses whercby things function and interact. In thia SS “union PR ome Figure 3. Reconstruction of Geographic Thought end Prectce. respect its fundamental gal could be described st TECHNICAL as opposed tothe PRACTICAL concer for weaving theory and prix. (Habermas, 1971, 1973) With increasing levels of specialization and compartmentalization of scientific fore, the problem of integeating the results of such research becomes an enormous ‘allege to logic and language. To relate them buck int their evironmentalcon- text isthe Fundamental problem of contemporary applied scinces ~a problem by ‘ow familia tothe geographer. (Hempel, 1966; Myrdal, 1969; Greer, 1969). Gtitial reflection upon the historical development of the ‘normal scence’ covientation within geography during the past few decades could shed ight om these two sete of isuce especially if we deliberately keep in mind the relationships Ihetween theoretical and practical developments within the eld, (Gran, 1977 a and 1977 b). Plenty of examples could be found in each of our courtis where {rographic models — spatial, ecological, behavioral ~ have been applied to soci snd environmental planning and an evaluation of these experiences could yield a Fich variety of human implications. (Butimer, 1974, 1979). Why not begin such ‘evaluation by inviting some of our senior colleagues who have been influential in steering geography toward a more ‘scientific’ couse on the one hand and toward a more ‘elevat” stance on the other, to reflect autobiographiealy about the vol tion of their ideas and praxis? In an atmosphere freed from the prestres of formal acaemic obligations, perhape they could nov be more fre to undertake such # task than are those of us who are surrounded by the constraints of departmental ie?1 donot intend to suggest that etal evaluation is not posible via other routs. ‘The work of the Frankfurt School, for example, shows how a hermeneutical approach could derive many general insights into relationships between ideology, science and technological and socal lie. (Mareuse, 1972; Sehroyer, 1973), Geners Tzations, however, necessarily subsume individual and wiqve ideas within broader rubrics and cannot reveal the total context and import of an inlviduals thought {Polanyi 1962; Sorokin, 1987). General evtique of tends too, eften har a negative tone! the inappropriatenss of a model for general application may be emphasized to the point that ite appropriates for particular situations maybe ignored. Bach of our geographic ideas which might be considered as candidates for ‘paradigm’ status presumably had 2 moment and place of origin where ts it” with the envionmental context was optimal. Examples could inclu the hierarchical networks of central places in Suddetachland, ecological zones of land use in erty tseentieth century Chicago, adminirative regionalization achemes based om peys in prewar France, or ‘behavioral’ models of shopping choice fh retail sector of “American cites. When applied to other context, the “i les comfortable, sd foften quite gauche. To appreciate the positive value of particular ideas and to understand che complexity of applying descriptive models in ormative way one feeds to understand the multiple contexts in which these ides were fist ati lated and applied. (Geliner, 1965; Louch, 1967). Lally one needs to hear the story fom the lip of the authors themreives, ‘Swictly speaking I suppose that wherever geographers have practiced ‘normal science’ enquiry they have worked in conjunction with rcholan from other disci Tines and shared common models and perspectives with them. Ina broader context could we not regard geography at whole at offering the PRACTICAL challenge to varieties of TECHNICAL experts, vz, to ask how the els of normal science could be woven back into concrete life circumstances, eg. in the context of New ‘Towns oF regional development policies? (Hagestrnd, 1976; White, 1972). Colle: tively, to, geographers ~ to the extent that they remained sensitive to environ ‘mental changes ~ could challenge normal scence beyond its extiblised routinized patterns of enquiry. More interesting than the plateaux of normal science activity then tha ridge ‘and—ralley zone of search for new puredigms which Kuba libles “extraordinary science’. It iy here that the geographer's unique conceen for the environmental ppropratenes of ideas could have expressed itll 2, Geography end Extraordinary Science” ‘Temporalty and change are univensal features of life, To avoid the creeping pars lysis of routinization and obsolescence normal scence must sespnd to intllecutal innovation as well as remain sensitive to changes inthe pracical and technical challenges of its external milieu. ( Kuhn, 1962, 1963; Feyerabend in Lakatos and ‘Musgrave, 1970), In the Kuhnian scheme there is a talvand—cror phase of ‘exploration for new paradigms when the dilecic between conventional scientific ideas and mateil conditions of life revels itself. Normal wience, with all Rsarsenal of established “know how’, i confronted with questions of ‘what’ whete- fore’, and “or whom’. This perspective on the evolution of ideas i certainly a pro vocative one and dovetails nicely witha Marxist conception of history. The mystery ‘of howknowledge actually develops, however, ie ail puzele to mos philosophers fof science: not all significant “breakthrough” ideas can be ascribed exclusively to ‘external chlleges. (Koestler, 1964, 1971; Utah Greatvty Research Conference, ‘Taylor, 1964; Ferkiss, 1969) Even inthe Kubnian achema, key insights are almort, inarably traceable to the work of extraordinary” individual, (Kuhn, 1969; Rank, 1952, 1959; Koester, 1964). In addition to questions relating to the dialect of ‘material and ideologial forces within any ectting therefore, one should perhaps explore what types of contest, what typer of interaction, ate most conducive toward allowing individuale to express their creativity. (Sovokin, 1957; Roger, 1962, McMurray, 1972) An openness of ideological milew may indeed be among the preconditons for allowing certain types of scholaly interaction to take place (Perkins, 1974; Murphy, 1958), ‘Toulmin's account of Witgenstein’s Vienna provides an illaminating example of the context (late 19) within which several distinctively new paradigins were bor. (Foulmin and Janik, 1973). A beter ustration of extraordinary scence? ‘could scarey be found anywhere since loan times, (Barnes, 1965). What this ‘sud suggest is that frequent faeto~face contacts among scholars and Between Scholars and people frm other walks in life may be the vital failtators of entrar ‘ordinary science. A common soda challenge and opportunity for informal com nication over a considerable period of time may also be necestary. (Could it not be thatthe genesis and maturation of great Hess owes a much if ‘not more to informal VERBAL exchanges Between individuals than formal aca demic structures oF to explct societal demands? If Koestler ie rght many of the reat scientists were “sleepwalking” when their most crestve ideas began to ceystllze ~ they di not even recognize the profundity of thie ‘dicoveree’ unit ‘there was an opportunity to share them witha few fiends or asocates who helped them to articulate them. (Koestler, 1964; Rank, 1959) ‘To tace the sory of normal science one may look tothe vcords of research Ihboratory, profesional congress, academic curriculum, or disciplinary journal. If fone wishes to loeate the seede of extraordinary scence perhaps the selon, the fel excursion, journals or lecture nots might be a more appropriate source. And for those innovators who are still alive, what beter approach than simply to ask them? In piecing together the ‘objective’ history of ideas we have relied mostly on documentary evidence. Working from such sources, one can make only guests ot inferences about the nature or sources of influence om a scholars ideas and work ‘Yer E suspect that there have been many ploncers of geographic thought whose Inspiration flowed throwgh their teaching and field experiences, through their counseling and listening, and in some eases atleast, they did not commit their ‘leas to print. Should we not try to elicit some ofthis story from older eoleagues ‘who may all remember their mentors, some of whom may never have bequeathed a printed account of thei ideas? ‘An autobiographic acount could never do complet justice to the enie story and for many erically important issues, thie may now be impossible. However,