MARTIN, CHRISTIAN PAOLO G.

1- H

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

Carpio, J

FACTS:

After a vehicular accident lastAugust 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (Ivler) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first crime and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second
crime for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

The MeTC refused to quash the information, not finding any identity of offenses between
the two cases.

Unable to seek a favorable decision, petitioner elevated the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803) while Ivler sought from
the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the
MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of the petitioners absence; the court
cancelled his bail and ordered his immediate arrest. Seven days after the arraignment, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Hence this petition.

MARTIN, CHRISTIAN PAOLO G.

1- H

PETITIONERS DEFENSE: (On Absconding) His petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 and wished to distinguish
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief,
not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. And also assailing the failure of the RTC to
reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803; arguing that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366 arising from the same facts.

RESPONDENT: The respondent calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses such as slight physical injuries cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies i.e. homicide. Therefore, the prosecution was
obliged to file separate charges in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

Yes. Double Jeopardy; The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded the Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365

The charges against the Petitioner arose from the same act and facts, but was prosecuted
with two separate charges under the same provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Art 365),
penalizing quasi-offenses. The same is incorrect, for reckless imprudence as defined under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. Hence, the said cases in question
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
MARTIN, CHRISTIAN PAOLO G.

1- H

DOCTRINE: The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.