CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2014

Prof. Ramon S. Esguerra

JANUARY 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 161106 13 January 2014
Theft

Facts:

Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) was the holder of one private respondent
PLDTs phone line with telephone number 6891115. However, upon ocular inspection of the
declared address, it was found that the occupant of the said address and the user of the phone
number was Planet Internet. PLDT further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had
been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international
calls and bypassed PLDTs international gateway facilities (IGFs), they violated Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone connections.
Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers
and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that
rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and
bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and
infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls.

Inthe application for a warrant to search the office of WWCby PLDT, WWC raised the
defense that toll bypass does not constitute theft, thus there is no probable cause to issue the
warrant.

Issue:

Whether or not the method of toll bypass is punishable under Philippine law.

Held:

Yes, the method of toll bypass is considered theft. In support of their contention that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the
adage nullumcrimen, nullapoena sine lege there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.
Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT.

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 According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and
not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or
bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance
with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it
deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT of the compensation which it is entitled
to had the call been properly routed through its network." As such, toll bypass operations
constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.

On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to
speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future
earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative,
contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and
opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera
and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the
crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDTs international long distance call business
committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1)
the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDTs personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the
consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or the use of force upon things.
The Supreme Court in Laurel v. Abrogar has already held that the use of PLDTs
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and
business:

x xx "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the

instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international
long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances,
decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly
claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone

service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the
Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls,"
and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the
gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this

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 case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the
services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one
of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and
sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.

In Laurel, the Supreme Court reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the
generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of
appropriation." It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal
provisions on theft. The Supreme Court therein upheld the Amended Information charging the
petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former
was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing and completing
of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and
connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined.

RICARDO MEDINA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 161308 15 JANUARY 2014
Defense of relative

Facts:

This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino, which was preceded by a fight during a
basketball game between Ross, Linos son, and Ronald, the younger brother of Ricardo and
Randolf. In that fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone. Hearing about the involvement
of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the scene and sent Ronald home. Ross was brought
to the hospital for treatment. Once Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury
inflicted by one of the Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas
accompanied by his drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He had a bread knife tucked
in the back, but his companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf
whom he confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument. Although
Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between Ross and Ronald, Lino lashed out at
Randolf and gripped the latters hand. Tapan almost simultaneously punched Randolf in the
face. Lino, already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the knife at Randolf who was not
hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two empty bottles of beer, broke the bottles
and attacked Lino with them.

Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and confronted Lino. A
commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their house to get a kitchen knife and came
out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left

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side of his chest, near the region of the heart. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City
charged Randolf with homicide. The RTC convicted Ricardo of homicide, and the CA affirmed
his conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the defense of a relative applies in this case.

Held:

Ricardos attribution of serious error to the CA for not appreciating the justifying
circumstance of defense of a relative in his favor was bereft of any support from the records.

In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the following

requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was
given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the
provocation. Like in self-defense, it is the accused who carries the burden to prove convincingly
the attendance and concurrence of these requisites because his invocation of this defense
amounts to an admission of having inflicted the fatal injury on the victim.

In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon seeing
Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to aid in the
defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial that Linos
fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the
mortal wound. Thus, his defense was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity with human
experience.

Verily, the issue of credibility, when it is decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused,
is determined by the conformity of the conflicting claims and recollections of the witnesses to
common experience and to the observation of mankind as probable under the circumstances. It
has been appropriately emphasized that "[w]e have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to
these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance."

NARI GIDWANIv. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195064 15 JANUARY 2014
B.P. 22

Facts:

The accused is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation GSMC),

which is engaged in the export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery services

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of El Grande Industrial Corporation (El Grande) and issued on various dates from June 1997 to
December 1997 a total of 10 Banco de Oro (BDO) checks as payment for the latters services
worth an aggregate total of 1,626,707.62.

Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been
drawn against a closed account, thus, the instant case filed by El Grande.

The raised the defense that the SEC Order of Suspension of Payment legally prevented
him from honoring the checks. The Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court and the
CA found the petitioner guilty for violating BP 22.

Issue:

Whether or not the order for the suspension of payment issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission is a valid reason to stop payment of a check even if such order was
issued prior to the presentment of the subject checks for payment.

Held:

Yes, the order for the suspension of payment issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission is a valid reason to stop payment of a check.

The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following: 1) making, drawing and issuing
any check to apply on account or for value; 2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3) subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

It is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters
to petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims.
It was incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the
accounts were closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances
might have dictated his liability for those checks.

Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed
suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again
becomes operative when a condition occurs or a situation arises warranting the termination
of the suspension of the contract.

In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is
subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and
when the event that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time private

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respondent presented the September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to
do so, as there was yet no obligation due from petitioner.

PEOPLE v. ROEL VERGARA

G.R. No. 199226 15 JANUARY 2014
Statutory rape

Facts:

The victim was born on 20 October, 1994. Her parents were not married and got
separated when she was five (5) years old. Her mother then lived-in, and begot a child, with the
accused. Unlike her two other siblings by her biological father, the victim lived with her mother
and the accused. The accused began abusing the victim as soon as she had her first
menstruation in May 2003. By the time she was nine (9) years old, the accused had sexually
molested her five (5) times. The last incident of rape, which is the subject of this case, happened
around 12 September 2004, which ordeal the victim confided to her mothers friend who helped
her report the incident to the police authorities. On 16 January 2005, the victim gave birth to a
baby boy.

Accused appealed his conviction and raised the defense that the prosecutions doctor-
witness testified that there were no fresh lacerations to support the claim that the victim was
recently raped.

Issue:

Whether the absence of fresh lacerations is exculpatory evidence in an a charge of rape

Held:

No. Under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

In People v. Teodoro, the Court clearly explained the elements of statutory rape
committed under Article 266-A(1)(d):

Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is

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 the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that
the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the
childs consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from
evil.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim in the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when the
victim was just nine years old. On the issue of the victims age, the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that in this era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age." Hence, the best evidence to prove the victims
age is her Certificate of Live Birth, which indicates that she was born on 20 October 2004 and
was thus nine (9) years of age on 12 September 2004, when she was raped by the accused.

Significantly also, AAAs testimony is supported by the medical evidence on record,

which showed that she had scars in her hymen and was thus in a non-virgin state. That no fresh
lacerations were found in her hymen is no indication that she was not raped on 12 September
2004. Contrary to [accused-appellants] contention, the old lacerations on AAAs hymen confirm
and strengthen her allegation that she had been repeatedly raped by [accused-appellant] not
only on 12 September 2004, but even before. As the victim was no longer a virgin when she was
raped on 12 September 2004, no new injury on her hymen could be expected. It is settled that
healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best
physical evidence of defloration.

In People v. Pruna, the Supreme Court stated that in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, "[t]he best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party."

PEOPLE v. DONALD VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 200304 15 JANUARY 2014
Illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs (R.A. No. 9165)

Facts:

The accused, Donald Vasquez, a laboratory aide of the NBI, was apprehended by the
officers of the same agency after the conduct of an entrapment or buy-bust operations. During
the proceedings, Vasquez raised the defense that the search and arrest were illegal. The RTC
convicted the accused of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecutions
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part
of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court, as affirmed by the CA, held that the
accused did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were
impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him.

Issue:

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 Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict accused for a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act

Held:

Yes, there was sufficient evidence to convict for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. As
held in People v. Chua Tan Lee, in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is
proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that
a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the
accused. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the accused as the one who
sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price
of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the accused. When subjected to
laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested
positive for shabu.

P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the accused of another 12 pieces
of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the accused. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12
more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of
P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the
formers narration of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic
sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the accused.

In People v. Ting Uy, the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of
the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary." In the instant case, the accused failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely
incriminate him. The accused himself even testified that, not only did he not have any
misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not
know them at all. In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.

FEBRUARY 2014

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PEOPLE v. JAVIER MORILLA
G.R. No. 189833 5 FEBRUARY 2014
Conspiracy; transport of illegal drugs (R.A. No. 9165)

Facts:

The accused, former mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, was charged for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act for transporting in his van more than 500 kilograms of shabu in his Starex
van. He was allegedly in conspiracy with one Morilla who was driving an ambulance carrying a
part of the shabu. Mayor MItra was driving ahead of the ambulance. However, upon an
anonymous tip, they were apprehended at a checkpoint en route to Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not there was any conspiracy between the accused Morilla and Mitra, in
transporting the shabu, although they were at different vehicles upon apprehension

Held:

Yes, there was conspiracy and sufficient evidence to convict the accused. A conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the
illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.

However, in conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.In this
case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with
Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with
several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillasturn
to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check.
Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the
sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told
the police officers that he was with the mayor.

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 His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he
just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle
likewise bears no merit. Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the
act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well
established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor
Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malumprohibitum since it is punished as an offense under
a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

MARCH 2014

PEOPLE v.NOEL ENOJAS, et.al.

G.R. No. 204894 10 March 2014
In aid of armed men

Facts:

PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan spotted a taxi suspiciously parked in from of an auto
glass shop. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, Enojas, for his documents.
The latter complied but, having doubts regarding the veracity of the documents, the police
officers asked Enojas to come with them to the police station.

Thereafter, they stopped at a convenience store and PO2 Pangilinan went down to
relieve himself there. As he approached the stores door, however, he came upon two suspected
robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who
still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he
saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man run towards Alabang-Zapote Road
while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a
taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his
mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.

The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was
someone named Reynaldo Mendoza. PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they
monitored the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated
with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the
arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture
accused Enojas and Gomez.

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 The RTC found all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and
use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly applied the aggravating/qualifying

circumstances

Held:

No.The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of
PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder. Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123 10 March 2014
Res ipsa loquitur in criminal cases

Facts:

Gerald was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his
body.

In 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Luceo,
Dr. Valea and Dr. Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Abella, Dr. Razon and petitioner
Dr. Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His
coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no
longer see, hear or move.

Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Luz lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of
Manila against the attending physicians. Dr. Solidum, in particular, was criminally charged for

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"failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald
Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications."

In his affidavit, Dr. Solidum said that, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He
studiedly mentions the concentration of halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record is only
one percent (1%) The numbers indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an
indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his entire
operation. He added that the amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one
percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the
body during the entire operation.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Dr. Solidum is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
(b) Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case

Held:

(a) No.Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science.Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with
special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on
what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not
impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and
malpractice action were attendant.

Although the Prosecution presented Dr. BenignoSulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist

himself who served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the
Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr.
Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the
investigation. Even then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum.Dr.
Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the
results of the physical examination he had conducted on Gerald. In Dr. Vertidos
testimony he said that he cannot ascertain the reason for the bradycardia or slowing of
the heart rate suffered by Gerard stating that an anesthetic agent can only be one of the
possible causes.

From foregoing circumstances, taken together, the prosecution did not prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in

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 administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not
preclude the probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which
could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had
caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido
revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed
the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding
side effects did occur."

The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and
moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries.

(b) In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. The Court
considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements
were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively
within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during
the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element
was undeniably wanting.

Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-
through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and
mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia
during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Such fact
alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him
had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been
triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.
Thus, the fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was
probably caused by someone's negligence.

ENRIQUE ALMERO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188191 12 MARCH 2014
Probation

Facts:

Page 13 of 87
 Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and multiple physical injuries. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer
prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods.On 7 September 2007, he filed an
application for probation. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his application, prompting
petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Issue:

Considering that accused filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the denial
of probation by the MTC, is it proper to grant his application for probation?

Held:

No. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred
by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant
of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified

offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison
an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on
the part of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the
rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that
they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is
deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of
guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This
was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is
probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation
only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question
the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of
the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so

Page 14 of 87
doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

PEOPLE v. ERNESTO VENTURA, SR.

G.R. No. 205230 12 March 2014
Rape

Facts:

In the Information filed before the RTC, Ventura was charged with rape of a personwith
mental capacity below 18 years old. He was charged under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. For his part, Ventura denied the charge against him and invoked the
defense of alibi, but he also admitted having knowledge that AAA has a mental defect.
Issue:

Was the charge of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) proper considering the
mental disability of AAA?

Held:

No. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended, provides for two circumstances
when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit:
paragraph 1(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) when the
offended party is demented.

Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is
a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individuals
former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other
hand, under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include
those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Since AAA is mentally
deficient, she should properly be classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one
who is "demented." Hence, carnal knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under
subparagraph b and not subparagraph d of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as
amended. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Information will not
exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and the particular facts stated
in the Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against
him.

From the foregoing, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between
the rapist and his victim, and the latters mental retardation. This Court has repeatedly held that
"mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the
testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court." The trial judges assessment
of the credibility of witnesses testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of

Page 15 of 87
grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both
real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the appellate court.

In impugning AAAs accusation of rape against him, Ventura interposed the defense of
denial and alibi. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, Venturas argument centered
only on the fact that it was impossible for him to rape AAA on the said date and time of the
incident because he was busy making bread at their bakery, and the only time he left their
house was at 10:00 a.m. Even assuming that he worked inside their bakery the whole day, it was
not impossible for him to commit the crime because the rape took place on the bench located
just in front of their bakery.

PEOPLE v. HENRY T. GO
G.R. No. 168539 25 March 2014
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)

Facts:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the DOTC, PIATCO for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of
R.A. No. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Enrile in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

Issue:

Whether or not a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information.

Held:

Yes.Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no

public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent
may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,

Page 16 of 87
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances,
be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for

conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or
dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not
prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this Court held that:

x xx [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire
alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons.
Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long
as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a
charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

APRIL 2014

PEOPLE v. JOEL DIOQUINO

G.R. No. 191390 2 April 2014
Sweetheart theory as a defense

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged of seven counts of rape against ABC. Claiming to be

ABCs boyfriend, appellant said that the alleged rapes complained against him were the mutual
acts of young lovers. Having made love to said minor two months after she became his
girlfriend, appellant [claimed] that he engaged in a string of consensual sexual encounters with

Page 17 of 87
ABC, with whom he eloped on August 19, 1999, at her suggestion. At the barangay hall, the
barangay chairman prepared a handwritten document whereby ABC, by thereto affixing her
signature, acknowledged the voluntariness of her elopement with appellant. Threatened with
the complaint for abduction which had been, in the meantime, filed by ABCs mother, the lovers
were fetched by appellants parents and brought back to Barangay Gadgaron. Despite ABCs
affirmance of her free will before SPO2 Romeo Gallinera, said minors mother purportedly
concocted the rape charges against him because she disapproved of her daughters relationship
with appellant.

Issue:

Whether the sweetheart defense can be appreciated based on appellants narration

Held:

No. Appellants bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. To be credible,
the sweetheart theory must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.
Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know
the lovers. Appellants defense admittedly lacks these pieces of evidence. In adopting the
sweetheart theory as a defense, however, he necessarily admitted carnal knowledge of ABC, the
first element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it
is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, but also after the prosecution has
successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who
has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. No such evidence was presented to
show that the several episodes of sexual intercourse were consensual. The medical examination
done on ABC debunks any claim of appellant that he did not force himself upon ABC.

PEOPLE v. SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS

G.R. No. 198022 7 April 2014
Abuse of superior strength; robbery with homicide, elements

Facts:

Accused were charged of robbery with homicide for killing the deceased, 54-year old
January Castillo (Castillo). The complaint alleged that, accused-appellant Eduardo (then 40
years old) and his nephew Sonny (at large) stabbed Castillo thrice before fleeing the scene of the
crime. It was also alleged by Castillos wife that she was informed that her husband was missing
Php20,000.00 representing his supposed earnings for the day. The identity of the assailants was
established from Castillos answers propounded to him by the responding police officers when
he was asked who hurt him.

Issue:

Page 18 of 87
 What crime can the accused be held liable for?

Held:

The accused can only be held liable for murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.

BOOK 1: Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission
of the crime.

It is clear from the records of the case that Castillo was then fifty-four (54) years old. Appellant,
on the other hand, was then forty (40) years old. Eduardo committed the crime with his co-
accused, his nephew. Clearly, assailants are younger than the victim. These two accused were
seen by a witness as the persons who mauled Castillo. Moreover, assailants were armed with a
bladed weapon, while Castillo was unarmed. This same bladed weapon was used in repeatedly
stabbing Castillo, who no longer showed any act of defense. Dr. Rasa, the medical doctor who
attended to Castillo when he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to the nature and
extent of the injury sustained by Castillo. He clearly stated that Castillo sustained three fatal
injuries which caused his death.

BOOK 2: The charge of robbery with homicide is unfounded. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.

First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that
the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. In order
for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery has
actually taken place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed.

In this case, the evidence attempting to prove the robbery are only the testimony of Castillos
wife and the responding police officers. However, during examination, it became evident that
Castillos wife had no personal knowledge of the robbery while the police officers did not
clearly ask Castillo as to whether he was robbed, nor did they allege that Castillo volunteered
such information as part of his declarations.

JEAN GAMBOA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188052 21 April 2014
Estafa

Page 19 of 87
Facts:

In 1999, accused was given an amount meant for the payment of new municipal/city
licenses and permits for TFS Pawnshop branches in Manila. Later, it was discovered by private
complainant TFS Pawnshop that their licenses and permits have not been paid. They filed a case
for estafa against the accused. In her defense, accused said that after receiving the amount, she
turned over the monies to a certain Lito Jacinto of the Office of the City Mayor of Manila. The
amounts allegedly misappropriated were (1) P78,208.95 for the renewal of permits and licenses
of the twelve (12) branchesin Manila; (2) P85,187.00 representing the permits and license fees
including surcharges which TFS paid because of Gamboas failure to do so; and (3) P25,213.58
comprising of previous cash advances to Gamboa. Accused also raised specific defenses for the
accounts, alleging that she has either returned a portion of the amount given to her, or remitted
the same as payment of the permits and license fees.

Issue:

Whether accused was properly convicted of estafa

Held:

Yes.The elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code sought to be established by the prosecution are as follows:

1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the

offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to 2. That there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice

of another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

The first and fourth elements were readily admitted by Gamboa while she categorically
disputed the second and third elements by declaring in her letter-explanation to TFS dated 27
February 1999, and at the stage of preliminary investigation, that:

1. her cash advances were distributed to her staff for purposes of

processing the renewal of the required permits and licenses;

2. she had surrendered all the necessary liquidation papers; and

Page 20 of 87
 3. all of TFS branches licenses were already completely paid on 20
January 1999 as per schedule, hence, no additional penalty was incurred therefor.

It was only during trial, specifically at her direct examination, that Gamboa raised the
defense of her handing over the monies to Lito Jacinto, as instructed by her superior, Cuyno.

Notably, Gamboa testified that she herself prepared Exhibit "6," which allegedly
contained the signature of Lito Jacinto as having received the amount of 45,587.65. However,
she lost the original copy thereof in a taxi on May 17, 2001 as evidenced by a Certification of
even date issued by Chief Inspector Vicente Dizon Flores of the PNP Makati Police Station
indicating therein that she left her folder containing documents vital to the instant estafa case.
Such being the case, Gamboa failed to clearly establish as to how she got hold of the photocopy
of the original thereof.

Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court
a quo for marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only
during the direct examination of Gamboa on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time
Exhibit "6" as a defense by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said
defense at the earliest opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances.
Further, she again failed to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati
City during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged,
ordinary human behavior dictates that she should have divulged the said information to her
superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious
doubt on her credibility.

The lack of certainty in the amount demanded by TFS merely puts into question the
actual amount that was misappropriated and the damage on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboas
misappropriation.

LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180016 29 April 2014
Modification of the penalties by the Court; harsh and cruel punishment

Facts:

Accused was charged with estafa. He was convicted by the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of PrisionCorreccional in its
medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private

Page 21 of 87
 complainant DaniloTangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the
costs of suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with modification as to the
penalty, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004
of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to
8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a
total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was originally lodged with the Third Division. As
regards the penalty, while the Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question
of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came
up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in
1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no
unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the
case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.

Issue:

Whether the courts can modify the value of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code,
taking into account the current inflation rate.

Held:

No. There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this
Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in
the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable

Page 22 of 87
 by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said
act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts born out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render
the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise
here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the
court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law
through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein
the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said
penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

Other doctrines: harsh and cruel punishment

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled
that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality
issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein
the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition.

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held

Page 23 of 87
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."

The final penalty imposed by the Supreme Court:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of

petitioner LitoCorpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1),
sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ELEVEN DAYS of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JUNE 2014

PEOPLE v. MATIMANAY WATAMAMA A.K.A AKMAD SALIPADA

G.R. No. 188710 2 June 2014
Treachery, definition

Facts:

The victim (Calim) and several other farmers were ploughing an unplanted parcel of
land. One of the farmers heard gunfire. He turned around and sawCalim fall lifeless from the
shots fired by the accused. As a result of said incident, accused was charged and convicted of
murder qualified by treachery. On appeal, accused alleged that the prosecution failed to
establish treachery, since none of its witnesses testified on how the attack on Calim commenced
and in what mode.

Issue:

Whether treachery was proved by the prosecution as to make accused liable for murder

Held:

Page 24 of 87
 No. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution
without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The
mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. Thus, even
frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.

For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the
inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the
perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be presumed. A case in point is People v.
Rapanut, in which this Court ruled out treachery as the eyewitness saw the accused only after
the initial sound of gunshots, as obtained in this case. Circumstances that qualify criminal
responsibility cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must
be based on facts of unquestionable existence. These circumstances must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself.

We cannot simply assume that at its inception, Calim was unable to parry the attack, as
he was caught unaware. Both witnesses admitted that they did not see how the attack
commenced, and that it was the initial gunfire that caught their attention. Thus, it cannot be said
with certainty that the victim was engrossed in his farm work when he was initially attacked.

PEOPLE v. MILAN ROXAS

G.R. No. 200793 4 June 2014
Mental retardation as a defense; qualified rape

Facts:

An Information was filed charging accused with five counts of rape against AAA, a
minor who was 9 years old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at the time of the
succeeding four rapes. The information alleged that the accused was the uncle of the victim.
Part of the accuseds defense was that he was an 18-year-old mental retardate, retardation with
a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. A doctor who was presented as a witness observed
that the subject was aware that he was being accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the
allegations against him. He was convicted of qualified rape.

Issues:

(a) Whether mental retardation will justify, mitigate, or exempt the accused from criminal
liability for rape
(b) Whether accused was properly convicted for qualified rape based on the information

Page 25 of 87
Held:

(a) No. In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6
clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of ones birth date, and not the
mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when
the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true
intent.

(b) No. While it is alleged that accused was the uncle of the two victims, they did not state
that he is their relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
testimonial evidence that accused-appellant's wife and the victims mother are sisters is
immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victim by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in the
information. In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of
private complainant was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the
third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape on two
counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.

PEOPLE v. LARRY MENDOZA

G.R. No. 192432 23 June 2014
Chain of custody, R.A. No. 9165

Facts:

The arresting officers received reports that an alias Larry was selling shabu. They
organized a buy-bust operation. Larry arrived and asked them how much they were buying,
took out two plastic sachets of shabu and gave it to policeman Diocena who gave him a marked
P500 bill. They arrested Larry, and upon frisking him recovered another sachet of shabu from
him. Larry was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The lower
court convicted him as charged.

Larry appealed, contending that the Prosecution failed to show compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 on the chain of custody.

Issue:

Whether or not the lapses in the chain of custody are sufficient to warrant the acquittal
of the accused.

Held:

Page 26 of 87
 The accused should be acquitted. The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial
lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody. The presentation of the
dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every prosecution for
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous drugs should be
established beyond doubt by showing that the dangerous drugs offered in court were the same
substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known as the
chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.

The manner and timing of the marking of the seized drugs or related items are crucial in
proving the chain of custody. The marking after seizure by the arresting officer, being the
starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the seizure or, if that is
not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining
circumstances. This stricture is essential because the succeeding handlers of the contraband
would use the markings as their reference to the seizure. The markings further serve to
separate the marked seized drugs from all the other evidence from the time of seizure. The
deliberate taking of these identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching,
planting or contamination of evidence.

The buy-bust team did not observe the statutory procedures on preserving the chain of
custody. First, the State did not show the presence during the seizure and confiscation of the
contraband, as well as during the physical inventory and photographing of the contraband, of
the representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of any elected public official.
Such presence was precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. Without the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the DOJ or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, planting or contamination would
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu.

Second, the records nowhere indicated that the buy-bust team, or any member thereof,
had conducted the physical inventory of the confiscated items. Without the inventory having
been made by the seizing lawmen, it became doubtful whether any shabu had been seized from
the accused at all. Third, the arresting officers were not able to justify why the photographs of
the seized shabu were not taken immediately upon the seizure and at the place of seizure. The
State did not explain this lapse. The pictorial evidence would have more firmly established the
identity of the seized shabu for purposes of preserving the chain of custody.

The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the IRR of RA 9165 provides a saving mechanism
to the effect that not every case of non-compliance with the statutory requirements would
prejudice the case of the State against the accused. But in order for that saving mechanism to
apply, the Prosecution must have to recognize first the lapse/s and then credibly explain them.
Here, the Prosecution did not concede that the lawmen had complied with the statutory
requirements. Neither did it tender any justification for the procedural lapses.

Page 27 of 87
 With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserves to be
acquitted of the serious charges. The unexplained failures and lapses committed by the buy-
bust team could not be fairly ignored. At the very least, they raised a reasonable doubt on his
guilt.

PEOPLE v. MA. HARLETA VELASCO

G.R. No. 195668 25 June 2014
Civil liability of conspirator

Facts:

Informations were filed charging Inovero and three others with illegal recruitment
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused
having remained at large. The complainants testified that they went to Harvel International to
apply as caregivers in Japan. At Harvel, they met Inovero and the other accused, who directed
them to submit certain documents and to pay for the placement and processing fees. None of
the complainants were deployed and neither werethe payments returned to them. They later
found out that Harvel was not even licensed to recruit workers. Both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals convictedInovero of illegal recruitment in large scale. In her appeal,
Inovero assails the judgment of conviction, denying her complicity in the illegal recruitment of
the claimants.

Issue

Should Inoveros criminal liability as co-conspirator be proven beyond reasonable

doubt? What is the extent of her civil liability?

Held

Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment charged against her. Strong and
positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-
accused in the recruitment of the complainants. All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her
denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the complainants. But the complainants
credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial.

It is indeed a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime
requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As a co-
conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor. Joint
tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment for the purpose of each paying an

Page 28 of 87
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. Hence, Inoveros
liability towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she
actually received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having
escaped arrest until now, have remained untried.

PEOPLE v. GIL SALVIDAR

G.R. No. 207664 25 June 2014
Chain of custody, R.A. No. 9165

Facts:

Accused was arrested as a result of a buy-bust operation. An information for illegal sale
of marijuana under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and another information for illegal
possession of marijuana under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 were filed against
appellant. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5
and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. In his appeal, accused alleges that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody over the evidence, since there was no explicit testimony that the
specimens were marked in the presence of appellant. There was likewise no proof that the
items were photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media, a DOJ
representative, and an elective government official. Furthermore, it appears that SPO1 Moran
delivered the seized items twice: first to a certain PO1 Bolora and subsequently to PCI Arturo.
Accused argues that while PO1 Boloras custody over the seized items merely lasted for a few
minutes, he still should have testified on the condition of the specimen upon receipt and the
precautions he took to preserve their integrity.

Issue:

Whether the procedural requirements under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 as regards the chain of custody over the seized drugs were
complied with

Held:

The Court finds the chain of custody over the evidence seized from the appellant as
unbroken and that there was sufficient compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not photographed and
inventoried in the presence of a member of the media, a representative from the DOJ, and an
elective government official. While this factual allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that
what Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.

Page 29 of 87
 The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in the chain of
custody over the evidence seized from him by pointing out that SPO1 Moran twice delivered
the items to the crime laboratory at first to a certain PO1 Bolora and later, to PCI Arturo. The
Court notes that despite the foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with the prosecution to
dispense with the testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The parties entered into
stipulations and admissions of facts as regards the participation of the aforementioned two.
This is no less than an admission on the part of the defense that there was nothing irregular in
SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturos performance of their duties relative to preserving the integrity of
the evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accused-appellant sincerely believed that there
was indeed a breach in the chain of custody over the seized items, he would have insisted on
putting SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo on the witness stand for cross-examination.

PEOPLE v. CARLOS ALHAMBRA

G.R. No. 207774 30 June 2014
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) Article III of R.A. No. 7610, elements

Facts:

AAA, the daughter of accused Alhambra, testified that on October 6, 2004, her father
entered her room, removed her undergarments, kissed her on her private parts, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. On October 21, 2004, AAA alleged that after she has taken a bath,
appellant followed her, removed her garments, and started to kiss her on the neck and other
parts of her body. Appellants lascivious design was interrupted when AAAs siblings returned
to their house. AAA was a minor then, being only 17 years old.

An Information for the crime of rape, committed on or about October 6, 2004, was filed
against appellant. In another Information, accused was charged with the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, committed on or about October 21, 2004, under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Likewise, accused was convicted of sexual abuse, defined and penalized under Section 5(b) R.A.
No. 7610, notwithstanding that the designation of the crime in the Information was for acts of
lasciviousness under Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610. The CA affirmed the conviction.

In his appeal, accused argues that he cannot be convicted for the crime of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is neither a child exploited in
prostitution nor a child subjected to other sexual abuse. He claimed that a child may only be
considered as subjected to other sexual abuse if he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult. Considering that it was only accused who sexually
abused AAA, assuming that the allegations against him are true, appellant claims that he cannot
be convicted under Section 5(b) Article III of R.A.No. 7610.

Issue:

Page 30 of 87
 Whether or not the definition of a child exploited in prostitution or a child subjected
to other sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 means that the victim should have been previously
subjected to lascivious conduct or prostitution before the present abuse complained of

Held:

No. Sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1)
the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child is below 18 years old.

The prosecution was able to establish Alhambras criminal liability under Section 5(b),
ArticleIII of R.A. No. 7610. First, AAA testified that on October 21, 2004, whilst clad only in
towel after having taken a bath, her father forcibly removed her towel covering her body, kissed
her on the neck, removed her undergarments, and kissed her on the other parts of her body.
Second, Alhambra used his moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter AAA to
consummate his lascivious design. Third, AAA was only 17 years old when the said incident
happened. Alhambras assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse is plainly without merit. The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for
profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. As established by the
prosecution, Alhambra was only able to consummate his lascivious design towards AAA
through coercion and with the use of his influence over the latter as her father.

As regards the imposable penalty, under Section 5(b) Article III of RA 7610, the penalty
for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18 but over 12 is reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the
penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e. reclusion perpetua. Appellant shall
likewise not be eligible for parole. Besides, Section 31 of RA 7610 expressly provides that the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is, inter alia, the parent of
the victim.

MAY 2014

PEOPLE v. DANILO FELICIANO

G.R. No. 196735 5 May 2014
Allegation of aggravating circumstance in the Information; conspiracy

Facts:

Page 31 of 87
 An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, for conspiring to inflict serious physical injuries upon members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity, including the deceased Dennis Venturina. The version of the prosecution is as
follows: seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were having lunch at the Beach House
Canteen near Main Library of UP Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for
murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity who were identified by
the victims and other bystanders as perpetrators of the crime. It is the argument of appellants
that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not
have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information
since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or
that their masks fell off.

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court,
however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of
attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and
Gaston.

It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no
longer chased by the attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent
to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also pointed out that the
wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with intent to kill."

Issues:

(a) Whether the inclusion of the phase wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise"
violated the accuseds right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them
(b) Whether there was a necessity to prove the actual injuries inflicted by the accused to
their respective victims

Held:

(a) No. In People v. Wilson Lab-ea, this Court has stated that:

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. x xxThe purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his
defense, precluding surprises during the trial.

Page 32 of 87
 Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged

must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if
duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to
be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like

nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries
out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove

that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from
including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being
charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

(b) Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused,
regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy
is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of
one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when
two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil
will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is
liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of
the agreement or conspiracy."

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in
agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able
to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers.
The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared

Page 33 of 87
 by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is,
therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by
the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is
only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are
qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of
slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and
suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and
Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to
kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of
them were liable for that intent to kill.

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

JUNE 2014

PEOPLE v. ANGELITA I. DAUD ET. AL.

G.R. No. 197539 2 June 2014
Illegal recruitment, estafa

Facts:

Sometime in January 2001, complainants De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio were

introduced to accusedDaud. Accused encouraged them to apply for work abroad and
convinced them that she would be able to send them to Korea.

Complainants separately paid Daud different amounts at her office in Paraaque City. In
their presence, Daud counted the money, issued receipts therefor as "processing fees of Nike
applicants", affixed her signature after signing the receipts in the name of "Nimfa Min".
Whenever they gave payment to Daud, it was in the presence of Hanelita and appellant
Gallemit.

Nothing happened to the applications of the complainants and they were not able to
depart. Upon inquiry with the Korean Embassy, they were told that the photocopies of their
passports and visas issued by Daud were fake.

An Information was filed charging Daud, Hanelita, and appellant Roderick Gallemit
with illegal recruitment in large scale. Eight more Informations were filed charging the accused
with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight private complainants. Only
appellant was apprehended.

Page 34 of 87
 Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove that he
gave private complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them
abroad for work such that they were convinced to part with their money. Any encouragement
or promise of employment abroad was solely made by Daud. Appellant points out that it was
only his alleged presence at the time private complainants were making their payments to Daud
that led said private complainants to believe that appellant participated in the recruitment
scheme.

Issues:

(a) Whether accused can be held liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
(b) Whether accused can be held liable for Estafa.

Held:

(a) Yes. It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant himself received
the placement fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the
finding of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among
appellant and his co-accused Hanelita and Daud, appellants wife and mother-in-law,
respectively. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is not essential
that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.

(b) Yes. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. As explained in People v.
Cortez and Yabut:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal

recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malumprohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se
where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable
by other laws.

Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and vice versa.

Page 35 of 87
 The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

While appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the

element of deceit is lacking and insisting on the absence of proof that he made any false
statement or fraudulent representation to private complainants, private complainants
were able to establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that appellant
acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants into believing
that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for
employment. Decena testified that appellant gave her a copy of the purported job order
for Korea, while Poserio avowed that appellant encouraged him to apply for work
abroad. Daud, appellants fellow conspirator, accepted placement fees from private
complainants, even issuing receipts for some; instructed private complainants to
undergo medical examination; and took private complainants passports. The
representations made by appellant and his co-accused to private complainants were
actually false and fraudulent, not only because they were not duly authorized to
undertake recruitment for overseas employment, but also because there were no actual
jobs waiting for private complainants in Korea and private complainants never had a
chance to leave for work abroad.

Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or
pecuniary loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present
any receipt signed by appellant proving that he received money from private
complainants. However, when conspiracy has been established, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. All three private complainants testified that they paid
placement fees to Daud, who issued receipts for some amounts either in her name or in
the name of one "Nimfa Min." Moreover, the payment of placement fees to illegal
recruiters is not evidenced by receipts alone; it can also be established by testimonies of
witnesses.

PEOPLE v. JERIC FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 199211 4 June 2014
Estafa, penalties

Facts:

The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the complainants that the
appellant promised them employment abroad. The trial court ruled that the appellant
represented to the complainants that he had the power and ability to send them in Hongkong,
and that by virtue of this representation and fraud, the complainants were convinced to part
with their money in order to be employed. It also disregarded the appellants defenses of denial
and alibi.

Page 36 of 87
 For the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. MC03-6278, the
RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a P100,000.00
fine. For the crime of estafa, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the following
indeterminate penalties: (a) four (4) years of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case No. MC03-6279; (b) four (4) years of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal
Case No.MC03-6280; (c) four (4) years of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of
prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case No.MC03-6281; (d) four (4) years of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal
Case No. MC03-6282 ; and (e) four (4) years of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case No. MC03-6283.

Issue:

Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law was properly applied by the trial court as
regards the five counts of estafa

Held:

No. As regards the penalties imposed in the crime of estafa, Article 315 of the RPC
provides that an accused found guilty of estafa shall be sentenced to the penalty of
prisioncorreccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is taken from the penalty
next lower or anywhere within prisioncorreccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty of prisioncorreccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its maximum
period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.

Applying these principles to the present case, the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty of prisioncorreccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is not prision mayor
minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty, prisioncorreccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be
divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one
period in accordance with Article65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period
of prisioncorreccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.

Page 37 of 87
 In computing the incremental penalty, jurisprudence tells us that the amount defrauded
should be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any
fraction of a year shall be discarded. Accordingly, the imposable penalty should be as follows:

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6279, where the amount defrauded was P45,800.00, the appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P23,800.00, 2 years shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6280, where the amount defrauded was P29,550.00, the appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6281, where the amount defrauded was P29,550.00, the appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6282, where the amount defrauded was P30,500.00, the appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6283, where the amount defrauded was P35,000.00, the appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months and 21 days or prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P13,000.00, 1 year shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty.

PEOPLE v. MARLON ABETONG

G.R. No. 209785 4 June 2014
Chain of custody, R.A. No. 9165

Facts:

Accused was arrested pursuant to a buy-bust operation. From their arrest until the items
seized were transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, the pieces of
evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perezs custody. In his testimony, PO3 Perez stated that he
kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug Enforcement Unit Office, to which only
Inspector Lorilla has a key. During the trial, Inspector Lorilla was not presented as a witness by
the prosecution. Accused was convicted of sale of dangerous drugs.

Issue:

Page 38 of 87
 Whether the mandatory procedures under Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 regarding the chain
of custody of dangerous drugs was affected by thenon-presentation of Inspector Lorilla as a
witness

Held:

Yes. The failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecutions case. To recall,
only PO3 Perez and Inspector Ompoy testified against accused-appellant. During his testimony,
PO3 Perez admitted that he put the confiscated item in the evidence locker on August 22, 2003
for safekeeping and subsequently brought them to Inspector Ompoy at the crime laboratory on
August 25, 2003.9 During this three-day interval, the items were allegedly kept inside the
evidence locker to which only Inspector Lorilla has the key.

During the interim, Inspector Lorilla constructively acquired custody over the seized
items. As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the chain, Inspector Lorillas
testimony became indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. Only he could have testified that from August 22 to 25, 2003 no one else obtained the key
from him for purposes of removing the items from their receptacle. Only he could have
enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed in order to preserve the
integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker. Absent his testimony, therefore, it
cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain of custody has sufficiently been established.

Requiring the key holders testimony is especially significant in this case in view of the
law enforcers failure to deliver the confiscated items to the crime laboratory within 24 hours, as
required under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. While the delay in itself is not fatal to the prosecutions
case as it may be excused based on a justifiable ground, it exposes the items seized to a higher
probability of being handled by even more personnel and, consequently, to a higher risk of
tampering or alteration.

PEOPLE v. JENNY LIKIRAN

G.R. No. 201858 4 June 2014
Proximate cause

Facts:

Accused-appellants brother punched the face of the victim and later shot him several
times. When the victim fell as a result of the gunshot wounds, accused-appellant stabbed him
on the back. The victim died. Accused-appellant was convicted of murder. In his appeal, he
raised the issue that it was his brother, not him, who shot the victim several times which caused
the latters death.

Issue:

Page 39 of 87
 Whether the accused-appellant is guilty for the death of the victim considering that he
only caused injuries subsequent to the gunshot wounds delivered by his brother

Held:

Yes. The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated
upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued
by Dr. CidricDael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural
Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to
multiple stab wound scapular area. Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the
prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense
failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health
officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the
victim. Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:

CAUSES OF DEATH

Immediate cause : DOA

Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW
Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L)

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sarenos cause of death.

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it
is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latters death.
In Quinto v. Andres the Court stated that:

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life
in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not
alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated
in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of
the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of
the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take
away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x xx[.](Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)

PEOPLE v. ROGER UMAWID

Page 40 of 87
G.R. No. 208719 9 June 2014
Insanity as defense; treachery as qualifying circumstance

Facts:

Accused, without provocation, attacked his son who was then carrying his two-year old
daughter, with a bolo. His son was able to parry the blow; however, his granddaughter was
fatally hit. After seeing his bloodied granddaughter, he went to the neighboring house of his
nieces and nephew and attempted to hack them. His nieces were able to escape, while his 15-
year old nephew was able to survive the attack with two mutilated fingers. Accused was
charged with and convicted of the (a) murder of his two-year old granddaughter, and (b) the
frustrated murder of his 15-year old nephew. For his defense, he said that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime.

Issues:

(a) Whether his defense of insanity should have been appreciated

(b) Whether murder and frustrated murder were the proper charges against the accused

Held:

(a) No. As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and
avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption
in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must relate
to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s
with which he is charged.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while

committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total
deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not
enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is
evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested
in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must
be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr.
Juliana to substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincinas
testimony only showed that he evaluated Umawids mental condition in May 2002,
February 2003, and March 2003. In other words, he only examined Umawid six (6)

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 months before the latter committed the crimes and three (3) months and four (4) months
thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings did not include Umawids mental
disposition immediately before or at the very moment when he committed such
crimes.As such, Dr. Quincinas testimony cannot prove Umawids insanity. Neither
would Dr. Julianas testimony shore up Umawids cause as the former failed to attest to
the latters mental condition and even referred him to another doctor for further
evaluation. Given these circumstances, Umawids defense of insanity remained
unsubstantiated and, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as
criminally liable.

(b) Yes. For the death of his granddaughter, treachery was properly appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance. It has been held that the killing of a child is characterized by
treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the
victim due to her tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

For the injuries of his 15-year old nephew, treachery may be appreciated based on his
minority, not on the factual circumstances that preceded the attack. Treachery may still
be appreciated on account of Jeffreys minority, considering that he was just 15 years of
age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the case of People v. Guzman,
where it was held that treachery attended the killing of a 17-year old victim due to his
minority, viz:

As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of
appellant and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and
without means of escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time
of the attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age then. In such a helpless
situation, it was absolutely impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself
against the assault of appellant and his two companions. Being young and weak,
Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his two
companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was
unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took
advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also
deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by
first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him.
Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach
until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael
proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the latters large intestine.

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people
were walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be
made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This is even more
true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by
reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an
adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. As we earlier found, Michael

Page 42 of 87
 was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to a fight when he was stabbed to
death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the
time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.

JULY 2014

FR. RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182438 2 July 2014
Illegal marriage

Facts:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29,
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day
of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey,
who was then dressed in barong tagalog, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with
their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians,
also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been
informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate. The petitioner prepared his choir
and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the
rest of their invited guests.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac,
Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
The petitioner was convicted of the crime charged.

Issues:

Is Fr. Ronulos act of blessing the couple tantamount to an illegal marriage ceremony
or solemnization of the marriage without a marriage license?

Held:

Yes. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is
the presence of a valid marriage license. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge

Page 43 of 87
that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these
requirements negates his defense of good faith.

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as
follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner
is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage
ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code
are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code
which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife." Pertinently,
Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony
as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule
was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of
not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to
the petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

ALOYSIUS LUMAUIG v. PEOPLE

G.R. No.166680 7 July 2014
Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts

Facts:

Page 44 of 87
 In the course of an audit examination, the auditor came across a disbursement voucher
for P101,736.00 prepared for petitioner Aloysius DaitLumauig (petitioner), former mayor of the
municipality of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other
cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. Based on
the auditors investigation, the petitioner failed to settle or liquidate said cash advance. Thus,
the petitioner was charged with Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 but claimed that it
never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were
already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he
receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was
claiming for separation pay when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash
advance. He also alleged that he paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on
June 4, 2001.

Subsequently, he was charged with violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than for which it was obtained.
After a joint trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a consolidated decision acquitting the accused in
the graft case but convicting him in the criminal case for Failure of Accountable Officer to
Render Accounts under Article 218 of the RPC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this Petition.

Issues:

(a) Would the acquittal of the accused in the graft case exculpate him from his criminal
liability for failure of accountable officer to render accounts?
(b) Is a prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances necessary before an
accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the RPC?
(c) Should the penalty imposed upon the accused be modified considering the restitution he
made?

Held:
(a) No. The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for
failure to render an account in the present case. It is undisputed that the two charges
stemmed from the same incident. "However, [we have] consistently held that the same
act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges." (Suero v. People, 490
Phil. 760, 771 [2005]). Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the
two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will
extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. The glaring
differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply that the
requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would certainly
differ in each case. Hence, petitioners acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge

Page 45 of 87
 for him in the present case given the differences between the elements of the two
offenses.

(b) No. A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua
non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the RPC
which has the following elements:

1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated

therefrom;

2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;

3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the

Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor; and

4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts

should be rendered.

Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where
none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it
engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice
but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only
application.

Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was,
thus, required to liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid
liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within two
months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar,
petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly
found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218 because it
took him over six years before settling his accounts.

(c) Yes. The penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified. In sentencing petitioner to a
straight penalty of six months and one day of prisincorreccional and a fine of P1,000.00,
the Sandiganbayan correctly considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of petitioner. However, it failed to consider the mitigating
circumstance of return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated.

In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement

of the funds misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being
analogous to voluntary surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an

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 account under Article 218 (i.e., the succeeding Article found in the same Chapter), the
same reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution of the funds that were
previously unliquidated in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner.

The prescribed penalty for violation of Article 218 is prisincorreccional in its

minimum period or six months and one day to two years and four months, or by a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both. Considering that there are two mitigating
circumstances and there are no aggravating circumstances, under Article 64 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty which, in this case, is arresto mayor in its maximum period or four months and
one day to six months.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2, is not applicable to cases

where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. In determining
"whether an indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is
considered is the penalty actually imposed by the trial court, after considering the
attendant circumstances, and not the imposable penalty." In the case at bar, since the
maximum of the imposable penalty is six months, then the possible maximum term that
can be actually imposed is surely less than one year. Hence, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to the present case. As a result, and in view of the attendant
circumstances in this case, we deem it proper to impose a straight penalty of four
months and one day of arresto mayor and delete the imposition of fine.

REYNALDO MARIANO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 178145 7 July 2014
Reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

Facts:

Ferdinand de Leon (Ferdinand) went to his mothers house in San Roque, Angat to
pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted
therefrom. However, he was bumped by a red Toyota pick-up driven by petitioner Reynaldo
Mariano (petitioner). Ferdinand was thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness.

On the other hand, petitioner and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of
Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latters mother about five (5) to six (6)
meters away from their pick-up. Petitioner stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle,
which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, petitioner made a signal and overtook the jeep of
Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was
sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Petitioner did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on
his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions. After bringing his

Page 47 of 87
companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, petitioner proceeded to Camp Alejo S.
Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.

Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the
petitioner of frustrated homicide. On appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
modifying the felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. In his appeal before the SC, petitioner alleged
that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that
Ferdinands injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent;
that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck.

Issue:

Was the CA correct in convicting the accused of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries?

Held:

Yes. We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries. Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor
vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Moreover, there
must be a direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of.

The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:

As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the
normal rate of speed and within the control of the drivers hands could have caused
Ferdinands injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a
motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v.
Garcia:

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is
his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be
exposed to all manner of danger and injury."

Page 48 of 87
 Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep
of Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side
of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted
from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least,
minimizing his injuries.

The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both
lower courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully
converged except for the RTCs conclusion that malicious intent had attended the
commission of the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this
appellate review, for it is a well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Court.

MIGUEL CIRERA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 181843 14 July 2014
Treachery

Facts:

Romeo Austria (Austria) testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was
playing a lucky nine game at a wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Petitioner Miguel Cirera
(Miguel) arrived, asking money from Austria so he could buy liquor. In response, Austria
asked Miguel "to keep quiet." Gerardo Naval (Naval) "arrived and asked Austria to go home."
There was an exchange of words between Naval and Miguel. Austria "stood up and felt that he
was stabbed." As he ran home, he noticed Miguel "armed with a knife," this time chasing Naval.
Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . . confined for more than a month." He spent around
P110,000.00 for his hospitalization. On cross-examination, Austria testified that he saw Miguel
attempt to stab him again.

Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After
he and Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back." Naval retaliated.
However, he ran away when he saw Miguel holding a knife. Miguel chased Naval who fell on
the ground. When Naval saw that Miguel was "about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a
bench" and left him lying on the ground, unable to stand. According to Naval, "he did not see
the knife land on his back." Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.

Miguel testified that he saw private complainants at a wake. Naval tapped his back and
asked, "Anongproblemamo?" to which he answered, "Walanaman." Thereafter, Naval punched
Miguel. As he was about to stand up, he was hit by a hard object on his head, causing him to
lose consciousness. He was brought to UERM Memorial Hospital where Naval identified him.
He was then brought to Station 11 in Galas, Quezon City. Miguel also testified that only Naval
identified him at the hospital.

Page 49 of 87
 In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of frustrated murder ruling that treachery was present in the commission of
the crime. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated by the trial court in
convicting petitioner Miguel of two (2) counts of frustrated murder.

Held:

No. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the

safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the attack does
not always equate to treachery.

Treachery, as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction of frustrated murder

rather than frustrated homicide, was not proven by the prosecution. Article 14(16) of the
Revised Penal Code defines treachery as follows:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.

The requisites of treachery are:

(1) The employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the
safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and

(2) Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.

A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing

evidence." Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence "cannot
be presumed." As with the finding of guilt of the accused, "any doubt as to its existence . . .
should be resolved in favor of the accused."

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if
the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victims position was merely accidental.
The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing
the crime.

In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or
reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. The attack

Page 50 of 87
might "have been done on impulse or as a reaction to an actual or imagined provocation offered
by the victim." In this case, petitioner was not only dismissed by Austria when he approached
him for money. There was also an altercation between him and Naval. The provocation might
have been enough to entice petitioner to action and attack private complainants.

Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination to
ensure success in committing the crime. What was more likely the case, based on private
complainants testimonies, was that petitioners action was an impulsive reaction to being
dismissed by Austria, his altercation with Naval, and Navals attempt to summon Austria home.

In this case, treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be convicted of two
counts of frustrated homicide.

PEOPLE v. ROSENDO AMARO

G.R. No. 199100 18 July 2014
Forcible abduction with rape

Facts:

On 26 May 1998, appellant RosendoAmaro was charged with the crime of forcible
abduction with rape in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then proceeded. AAA,
who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her way home from school
when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in court as
the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to
appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became
dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. When she regained
consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips
and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but
appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped
five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellants penis touched the outer portion of her
vagina.

During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant
because the latter promised to bring her home. On the last day of her detention, AAA and
appellant went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA
walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police station. Appellant
noticed AAA being taken away but he did nothing.

Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted
that he brought the latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before
begging him to take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon
reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of FloranteMagays sister. Appellant
then went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back home

Page 51 of 87
when he heard his name on the radio in connection with the disappearance of a girl. He picked
up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked alone
towards her house.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape. The trial court found AAAs testimony as credible and
straightforward and supported by medical findings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether appellant was properly convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

Yes. The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age.

The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a
seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that he knew
her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have easily been
deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their
innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.

PEOPLE v. JOY ALCALA

G.R. No. 201725 18 July 2014
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs, elements

Facts:

Pursuant to a buy-bust operation, the accused Joy Alcala y Novilla (accused) was
charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for knowingly selling and
delivering two (0.02) gram of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

Page 52 of 87
 After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The trial court concluded
that the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for
accuseds conviction. It found the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the buy-
bust operation credible and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped-up charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties. On the other hand, the denial of the accused was found to be unsubstantiated by
any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being considered as negative, weak, and self-
serving evidence, accuseds bare denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said judgment of
conviction.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision convicting the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime.

Issue:

Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was
sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

Held:

No. It has been consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of drugs under Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that what she had sold and delivered to the
latter was a prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

Certainly, based on the evidence in record, the prosecution had indeed established that
there was a buy-bust operation conducted, showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for P100.00 to PO2 Bautista, the poseur-buyer. PO2 Bautista himself testified that
there was an actual exchange of the marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused
was fully aware that what she was selling was illegal and prohibited when she asked PO2
Bautista "iiskor kayo, magkano?" Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized,
marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug. Taken collectively, the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs by accused-appellant was indeed established beyond reasonable doubt.

Page 53 of 87
 It cannot be overemphasized that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, as amended, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. In this
regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police
operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an
innocent person, such as in the case of accused. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up
charges against her, there remains a question of why no administrative charges were brought
against the police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses
vis--vis that of the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.

GIL ZAFRA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176317 23 July 2014
Malversation of public funds through falsification of public document; complex crime,
penalty

Facts:

Appellant Manolito Gil Z. Zafra was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among
his duties was to receive tax payments for which the revenue official receipts (ROR) were
issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was
retained by the collection officer. Every month, appellant submitted Monthly Report of
Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of
taxpayer, the amount collected and the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the
attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the
Commission on Audit (COA). The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise,
kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating
to the real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued
ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax
paid.

On 06 July 1995, an audit team was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash
accountabilities of the appellant. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser
amounts of taxes reported in appellants MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount
reflected in the CARs and PNBs RORs.

The 18 RORs under review of the audit team were the accountability of appellant as
shown in his Monthly Reports of Accountability (MRA).The MRA contains, among others, the
serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as well as those
issued by him for a certain month.

Page 54 of 87
 Although the subject RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in
the CARs and PNBs 12 copies of RORs is PhP615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported
as tax collections in the RORs triplicate copies submittedby appellant to COA and in his MRCs,
or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter
requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus,
prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds through falsification
of public document against him."

The RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the appellant of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. On appeal, the CA
promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction of the petitioner and the penalties
imposed by the RTC. The CA having denied his motion for reconsideration, the appellant
sought recourse to the SC. Accused raised the defense that it was his subordinates who had
dealt with the taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts.

Issues:

(a) Whether the appellant was properly convicted of the complex crime of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public document.
(b) Whether the RTC and CA imposed the proper penalties upon the appellant.

Held:

(a) Yes. The Court adopts the findings of the CA to wit: that appellant committed
falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had tampered
revenue receipts to the BIR and COA; that he was presumed to be the forger by virtue of
his being in the possession of such public documents; and that he had certified to the
MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts.

Anent the malversation, all the elements of malversation obtain in the present case.
Appellant was the Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated
collection clerks, he collected taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax
payments made by taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and authorized use
and application of the blank RORs issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the
tax payments received in the performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his
remittances of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNBs receipts, even in
the absence of direct proof of misappropriation, made him liable for malversation. The
audit teams demand letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie
presumption that he put to his personal use the missing funds.

The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioners insistence that it
had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the RORs, he
was nonetheless liable, because his duty as an accountable officer had been to strictly

Page 55 of 87
 supervise his assistants; and that by failing to strictly supervise them he was responsible
for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the actual amounts collected.

(b) No. While the Court affirms the judgment of conviction rendered by the courts below,
such is subject to the modification of the penalties imposed. The courts below failed to
consider a number of factors in the imposition of the proper penalties.

In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund through

falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver
felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus
fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled.
In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds
malversed, or the value of the property embezzled. The courts below failed to consider
some of these factors.

PEOPLE v.RENATO DIONALDO

G.R. No. 207949 23 July 2014
Special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide

Facts:

On May 16, 2003 at around 8 a.m., Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother
Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes
later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been
kidnapped. Three (3) men, later identified as accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo
(Armando), Renato Dionaldo (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr.(Mariano), forcibly dragged
a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a car. Upon receiving
the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. The kidnappers called
Roderick and threatened to kill the victim should Roderick report the matter to the police.

The next day, the kidnappers called Roderick and demanded the payment of ransom
money. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release
Edwin in exchange for the amount of P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the
money to Batangas and wait for their next call. When Roderick reached Batangas to deliver the
ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to proceed to the Centennial Village.
He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mgaBayani. After several hours, an orange car
pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take
a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove
away.
The accused were arrested on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or
on June 13, 2003, the police found the dead body of Edwin at Batangas. The accused were
charged with and convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Page 56 of 87
Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention.

Held:

No. The crime committed by the accused-appellants was not merely Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, but the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. This is in view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged
in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this
matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case,
throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors,
though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.

Article 267 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases
supplied)

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex
crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn
by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to
but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is

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killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

PEOPLE v. ALEX DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 207818 23 July 2014
Self-defense; treachery; parole

Facts:

In an Information, accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos was indicted for killing one
Fernando A. Catriz (Catriz). Catriz and the accused-appellant were brothers-in-law. At about
4:00 p.m. of April 6, 2004, Catriz and Bayudan were at Barangay Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan,
unloading culled cob chickens from a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were
transferring the chickens into a cage beside the vehicle, the accused-appellant suddenly
appeared behind Catriz and hacked him on his right shoulder with a tabas (long-bladed bolo).
The impact from the blow caused the handle of the tabas to dislodge thus enabling Catriz to run
towards the nearest house. The accused-appellant, however, drew a "Rambo-type" knife,
pursued Catriz and repeatedly stabbed him until he fell. Pleading for his life, Catriz kneeled in
front of the accused-appellant and asked him to stop. His pleas were not heeded though and the
accused-appellant continued stabbing him until he fell again on the ground. Upon seeing the
lifeless Catriz, the accused-appellant jumped and exclaimed: "Happy New Year,
natayenniFerdie!" (Happy New Year, Ferdie is dead!). The accused-appellant thereafter went to
a nearby pump well and nonchalantly washed his hands. Meanwhile, Bayudan ran towards a
nearby house for fear of his life.

Dr. Yuaga testified that based on his post-mortem examination of the cadaver, Catriz
sustained 11 stab wounds, four (4) of which were in the mid extremity of the heart area that
could cause instantaneous death while two (2) were located at the back portion ofhis body.
Catriz also sustained one (1) incised wound on the left scapula. His cause of death was
"hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab wounds."

For his part, accused-appellant testified that he killed Catriz in self-defense.

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and
rejected accused-appellants allegation of self-defense because: (1) he failed to claim it at the
earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the police station; (2) the number and seriousness
of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz showed a determined effort on his part to kill the victim;
and (3) he failed to surrender the weapon to the police and he instead threw it away. Treachery
was also found to have attended the killing because while Catriz was on a kneeling position
begging for his life, the accused-appellant continued to stab him. At that moment, Catriz was
totally helpless while the accused-appellant was in no danger from any retaliation. Accordingly,

Page 58 of 87
the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. The CA affirmed
the judgment of conviction ruling that unlawful aggression was not present to justify the act of
killing. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

(a) Whether the courts below correctly rejected the accuseds claim of self-defense.
(b) Whether treachery attended the killing which qualifies the crime to Murder as defined
and punished under Art. 248 of the RPC.

Held:

(a) Yes. To escape criminal liability, the accused must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of
Article 11 of the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the
primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can
be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. There is
an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent
danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual
physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to ones life.

Here, the accused-appellant failed to prove that unlawful aggression was initiated by
Catriz. The physical evidence of Catrizs incised wound on the left scapula belies the
version of events adduced by the defense and is more consistent with the narration of
the prosecutions eyewitness Bayudan that the initial blow came from the accused-
appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and hacked him. The testimony of
expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such incised wound could have been
inflicted from behind. Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on Catriz indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. Based
on Dr. Yuagas post-mortem examination, 4 of the 11 stab wounds inflicted on Catriz
were in the mid extremity of the heart area sufficient to cause instantaneous death. It has
been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by
the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.

In fine, the courts a quo were correct in finding that the accused-appellant failed to
discharge his burden of proving the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

(b) Yes. The Court also upholds the findings of the courts a quo that the killing of Catriz by
the accused-appellant was attended with treachery. There is treachery when the offender

Page 59 of 87
 commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the
crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means of attack employed.

It is evident in this case that, as testified by eyewitness Bayudan, the accused-appellant

attacked Catriz whenthe latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. The accused-
appellant commenced his attack from behind Catriz and when the latter eventually fell
down to his knees begging for his life, the accused-appellant continued stabbing him.
Clearly, the accused-appellant took advantage of the vulnerable position of Catriz to
ensure the successful execution of the offense without risk, and deny the victim the
opportunity to defend himself. As treachery qualifies the killing to murder, the courts a
quo were correct in convicting the accused-appellant of murder.

JAIME DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200748 23 July 2014
Drug testing of person allegedly arrested for extortion

Facts:

At 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received
a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and CharitoEscobido (Charito). The complainants
claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon
and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police
officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who
demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and
narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito
even received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as
possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants.A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which
took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu
City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz (herein petitioner) by using a pre-marked
500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by
"James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the
NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan.

Page 60 of 87
Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result.

Accused (herein petitioner) was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, for illegal drug use after a positive confirmatory test was
conducted on him.

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified
that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI
agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination,
but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be
allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail. This
notwithstanding, the RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged which decision was
subsequently affirmed by the CA on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

Held:

No. We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence. Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation
of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15.Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who

is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be
imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center
for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended
using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested
is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided
for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
(Emphasis supplied)

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "a person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended
or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance
with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of the law.

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 Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the "importation," "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings" ; being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance
of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential
chemicals" ; "manufacture or delivery" or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus,
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings" ;
"unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants classified as
dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; and "maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals." To
make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that petitioner here was
arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

Second, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable
to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all
other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested
for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, to wit:

Mandatory drug testing can never be random and suspicion less. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness
a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

PEOPLE v. JOJO SUMILHIG et al.

G.R. No. 178115 28 July 2014
Conspiracy; treachery; complex crime

Facts:

On October 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with Eugenio
Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenios house in Sitio

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Overland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and saw six
persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family were having dinner. Jerry
and Mario recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused. The strafing of
the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I
have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the children of Eugenios other son Remegio Santander
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy, 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained
gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly
was pronounced dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds at the right breast area
and left wrist, while Micel was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.

Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time
of the incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, Barangay
Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound
he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was only in January 1999
that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will
against the Santander clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the
massacre of his family in February 1998.

Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended
that at the time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which
is four-hours walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was
with his wife at the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao at the time the
crime was committed. Both claimed total ignorance of the incident.

The RTC convicted the appellants of the complex crime of double murder and double
frustrated murder.On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC.
However, it found merit in appellants argument that the crime committed could not have been
a complex crime since the death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but
from several and distinct acts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended
Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be convicted instead of two
counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder.

Issues:

Whether the accused-appellants were in conspiracy in committing the crime/s.

Held:

Yes. There was conspiracy among the accused. "Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. "Conspiracy

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may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest."

Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series
of events that clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with
firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were
within close range of the intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms.
Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their acts before,
during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design,
intent and execution.

PEOPLE v. MASTOR SARIP

G.R. No. 188707 30 July 2014
Non-presentation of marked money in prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs

Facts:

Pursuant to a buy-bust operation, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried and
convicted of illegal sale of shabu, illegal possession of shabu and shabu paraphernalia,
punishable under Sections 5, 11 (3), and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The accused-appellants question the judgment of conviction arguing that (1) the marked
money was absent during the transaction and (2) the PDEA operatives instigated the accused-
appellants to commit the crime.

Issue:

Whether the absence of marked money during the buy-bust operation belies the finding
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Held:

No. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and payment therefor. The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, must present in evidence the corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized
illegal drugs.

The duty of the prosecution is not merely to present in evidence the seized illegal drugs.
It is essential that the illegal drugs seized from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
evidence in court as the identity of the drug must be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.

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 This Court is convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to
establish the elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the (1)
identity of accused-appellants as the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the
transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the
sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.

The absence of marked money does not run counter to the presented proof of illegal sale
of shabu. Lack of marked money is not an element to the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The
marked money used in the buy-bust operation, although having evidentiary value, is not vital
to the prosecution of the case. It is merely corroborative in nature. What is material to the
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the illegal sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the case at bar,
the prosecution duly established both.

DR. ANTONIO CABUGAO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 163879 30 July 2014
Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; conspiracy

Facts:

On June 14, 2000, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal
pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. JR's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR
to the clinic of accused (herein petitioner) Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner,
specializing in family medicine gave medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call him
up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, they returned to Dr.
Cabugao in the early morning of June 15, 2000, who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth
General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30
in the morning.

After blood samples were taken from JR, Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination with the
initial finding of Acute Appendicitis. Dr. Cabugao opined that JR must undergo surgery
(appendectomy operation). As he was a general practitioner without expertise in surgery, Dr.
Cabugao referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon. In the later part of the
morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and read the CBC and ultrasound
results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JR were ordered.
Thereafter, JR was placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours with Dr. Ynzon and Dr.
Cabugao as attending physicians. However, the required appendectomy was not performed on
JR.

Despite medical treatment and observation, JR's condition worsened where he had
running fever of 38C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was
given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that by

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2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42C, had convulsions and finally died. No
post-mortem examination was conducted on JR.

Thereafter, an Information was filed against Dr. Ynzon and Dr. Cabugao for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide under Art. 365, paragraph 1 of the RPC. At their arraignment,
both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. In convicting both the
accused, the RTC found them negligent in the performance of their duties. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTCs decision.

Issues:

(a) Whether Dr. Ynzon is criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
(b) Whether Dr. Cabugao is criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Held:

(a) Yes. Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice,
an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. The
elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2)
that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4)
that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established
by the evidence on record. The court a quo and the appellate court were one in
concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care expected from
doctors. In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it
was necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately. The prosecution established that if
JRs condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what
actually happened in the present case.

Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central
to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his
voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that which supplies
the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the
standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused. Quasi-offenses penalize the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, and the lack of care or
foresight, the "imprudenciapunible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional

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 criminal act. This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his
seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence,
failed to exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death. However, in view
of Dr. Ynzons death prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is
extinguished.

(b) No. Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform
appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the source of infection which caused
the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr.
Cabugao is in any position to perform the required appendectomy.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr.
Cabugao is not a surgeon, but a general practitioner specializing in family medicine;
thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy on
JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected
appendicitis.

Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the
necessary precaution in his performance of his duty as a family doctor. On the contrary,
a perusal of the medical records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR,
it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the administration of antibiotics and
pain relievers. There was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr.
Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a
surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that appendicitis is not within
his scope of expertise. This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be
sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to a surgeon who has
sufficient training and experience to handle JRs case belies the finding that he displayed
inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.

We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to
deteriorate. Even so, before he left, he made endorsement and notified the resident-
doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.

PEOPLE v. TRINIDAD CAHILIG

G.R. No. 199208 30 July 2014
Qualified theft

Facts:

Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan

Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. It was discovered

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that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI
and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement
vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to
withdraw funds from one of WPESLAIs bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other
bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity
as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another
was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the
funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said
amount from her capital contribution.

The RTC found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of
qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAIS funds a total of
P6,268,300.00. All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard.The RTC found Cahilig guilty of
the crimes charged, that is, thirty (30) counts of qualified theft. The RTC held that Cahilig, as
cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers ofthe association. The
RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of the association, a
circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted
to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed upon her by her employer."

Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA
denied her appeal and affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, Cahilig appealed to the SC.

Issue:

Whether the courts below were correct in convicting Cahilig of thirty (30) counts of
Qualified Theft.

Held:

Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as
follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these cases.

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 Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her
position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed
scheme to commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the
offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant
abused."

Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it
involves "handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAIs depositors
and other funds of the association. Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required
prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors
into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a
fact that Cahilig did not deny.

AUGUST 2014

PEOPLE v. PETRUS YAU a.k.a. John and SUSANA YAU a.k.a. Susan
G.R. No. 208170 20 August 2014
Accomplice; kidnapping for ransom

Facts:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair
Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of
Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate
number PVD 115. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, private complainant noticed
the driver, appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus), whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache
and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn and talk to him. Thereafter, private
complainant felt groggy and no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up
lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and
chained. When private complainant complained of the tight handcuffs, a man who was wearing
a red mask and introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag from
his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for
ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. A day after,
he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as
well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

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 On February 10, 2004, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force
(PACER) received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was
victimizing passengers. Thus, members of the PACER were ordered to proceed to Bacoor,
Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004,
at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and thereafter
moved to Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they
followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll
down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals.
The driver turned out to be appellant Petrus. Appellant Petrus led the team to his house and the
PACER team found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified
himself as Alastair Onglingswam. Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping For Ransom.

During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his
captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainants captor matched that of
appellant Petrus Yau. In its judgment, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the
commission thereof. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. Hence,
this appeal.

Issues:

(a) Whether the courts a quo were correct as to the degree of responsibility of each accused-
appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
(b) Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the commission of kidnapping for ransom
and the identity of the culprits thereof.

Held:

(a) Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is
liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is
liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. In order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following elements must be present:
(i) that there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (ii) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
(iii) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed
to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she
kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed

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 with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband
when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus illegal act,
but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present
and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible
as an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of
giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the
perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of
sympathy or feeling of support to her husband. Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. De Vera, where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation
of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

(b) The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim
of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the
accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary
evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual.
Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the
latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third,
Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in
Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of
his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands
for the delivery of a ransom in the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.

SEPTEMBER 2014

PEOPLE v. REYNALDO TORRES, et al.

G.R. No. 189850 22 September 2014
Abuse of superior strength; robbery with homicide

Facts:

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto
Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his
vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled
with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latters brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and
an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons,
appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the
unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the
ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelry and immediately fled. Espino was rushed to
the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

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Issues:

(a) Whether the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength
(b) Whether the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide.

Held:

(a) "There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense." Here, appellant and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also
armed with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While
Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously
assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of
Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While
Espino was lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables.
Thereafter, they immediately fled the scene of the crime. It is clear that they executed the
criminal act by employing physical superiority over Espino.

(b) "Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellants brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked
Espinos car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted
from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined
the fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victims wallet, beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would
have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled
with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to

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 commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accuseds taking of
Espinos belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.

OCTOBER 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 166441 8 October 2014
Attempted rape vis--vis acts of lasciviousness

Facts:

Accused Norberto Cruz (Cruz) was charged with attempted rape against AAA when
he allegedly divested the latter of her clothes and mashed her breast and touched her private
part. Cruz was also charged with acts of lasciviousness against BBB for allegedly touching the
private parts of the latter. After trial, the trial court convicted accused as charged. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA upheld the conviction of accused as to attempted rape but
acquitted him of acts of lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this appeal with
the accused interpellating that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
on the charge of attempted rape against him.

Issue:

Whether accused is guilty of attempted rape.

Held:

BOOK 1: No. The Court found the accused guilty of acts of lasciviousness only, as the overt acts
of the accused are equivocal so as to constitute the attempted stage of rape. As the Court so
explained in People v. Lizada, viz:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating

the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
detrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of
the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal;
and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being
equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of
the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.

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 It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in
a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In
the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does
not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage
requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt
actswithout the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown
to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his
intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the
sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected
with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted
rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete
termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as
succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime
of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual
intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

Here, the petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no
other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for
and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
"susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such
that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the
particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if
he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.

Thus it was clarified that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced
attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to
his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or
internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His
preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of
AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for
Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct
connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code

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for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.

BOOK 2: The fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but
this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore,
when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The
intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated whenthe following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits
any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended
party is under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent,
lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which
is carried on a wanton manner.

In the present case, the information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty
and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast."
With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His
embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie
with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her
when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his
acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

PEOPLE v. CHARLIE FIELDAD, ET AL.

G.R. No. 196005 1 October 2014
Carnapping; uncontrollable fear as a defense

Facts:

Fieldad was among the detention prisoners who escaped the BJMP Compound, in
Anonas, Urdaneta. To facilitate their escape, he, along with co-accused Leal, Cornista and
Pimentel, took a Tamarraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Banzon.They
werecharged carnapping, among other charges. To avoid liability for the crime of carnapping,
Fieldad claims that Leal, who was then armed with a gun, forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep
to facilitate their flight from jail.

Issue:

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 (a) Whether accused are guilt of carnapping;
(b) Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is available to the appellants

Held:

SPECIAL LAW

(a) Yes. Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is
an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the
taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that
they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle,
Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by
appellants.

As for intent to gain, the Court so held in People v. Bustinera:

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the

unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.

BOOK 1

(b) No. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is necessary
that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-
defense in equal combat.

In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was
already armed when Fieldad voluntarily followed him to the place where the Tamaraw

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 jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and
when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants testimonies,
only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court of Appeals is quoted with
approval:

x xx. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded
the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone,
had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent
danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape individually.
Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or
duress becomes untenable.

To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstance. The circumstances under which
appellants participated in the commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any
way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their
fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their
flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw
jeep without the consent of its owner.

NOVEMBER 2014

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 178512 26 November 2014
Frustrated homicide

Facts:

On December 24, 1997, at about ten oclock in the evening, Alexander Flojo(Alexander)
was fetching water below his rented house when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (Alfredo), the
brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (Lucila), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed
Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying,
PasensyakanaMang Alex and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went
upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M.,
Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container,
Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.In
his defense, Alfredo alleged that he accidentally hit Alexanders back, causing the latter to
throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them.

Petitioner Alfredo de Guzman, Jr. was charged with and convicted of frustrated
homicide by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal with the
petitioner interposing the defense, among others, that intent to kill, the critical element of the
crime charged, was not established.

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Issue:

Whether petitioner is criminally liable for frustrated homicide.

Held:

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code , as amended, is present.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight
between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held
liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to
characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to
kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to
kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill
is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct
or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time
of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, the Court considered the
following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We
have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he
uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.

Here, the Court concurred with the trial court and the CA that the wounds sustained by
[the victim] Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of
a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander.
The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically,
one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was
unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission,
and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound

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on Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.

ROSAL HUBILLA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176102 26 November 2014
Indeterminate Sentence Law; Probation Law; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (R.A. No. 9344)

Facts:

Petitioner RosalHubilla (Hubilla), a minor at the time of the commission of the crime,
was charged with and convicted of homicide by the trial court and the Court of Appeals after a
finding that he inflicted a mortal stab wound against one Jayson Espinola, causing the death of
the latter. The trial court sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
four years and one day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but
modified the penalty, reducing the sentence to six months and one day to six years of
prisioncorreccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum. Hence, this appeal wherein petitioner questions the propriety of his penalty, and his
eligibility to probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Code
and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law);
(b) Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence
under Republic Act No. 9344; and
(c) Whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.

Held:

BOOK 1:

(a) Yes. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal
for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he
committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate

sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which,
herein, was prisioncorreccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the

Page 79 of 87
 maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium periodeight
years and one day to 10 yearswas proper because there were no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence
of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of
prisioncorreccional to enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No.
968.

The Court ruled that the petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the
Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules
support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the
Court to deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides
certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict
with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5
(k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the
ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate
courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling
the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

BOOK 1

(b) No. Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, which disqualifies from
probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. Anent petitioners claim for
suspension of sentence, the Court so ruled that although Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as
guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years
of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40.Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the
law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.

Page 80 of 87
 If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.

Here, petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no
longer legally feasible or permissible.

SPECIAL PENAL LAW

(c) No. A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of
Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition
of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of
imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort,
and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of
time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of
Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner
simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action

taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of
Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and
for the minimum necessary period.

MARIA LINA VELAYO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 204025 26 November 2014
Estafa

Facts:

The complaint arose from the sale to WJA Holdings, Inc., owner of the Asian Institute of
Maritime Studies (AIMS) of two properties owned by Alorasan Realty Development
Corporation. As one of the lots was on mortgage with a bank, AIMS agreed to pay a
downpayment of P40Million for the two lots to enable ARDC to secure the release of said title.

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Velayo claimed to know someone at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) who could help
reduce the taxes, and so on behalf of WJA she volunteered to remit the pertinent capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes and transfer fees due on the sale. She thus asked WJA not to
deduct the said taxes from the gross amount of the checks. Of the initial P40 Million paid, P20
Million was applied to one-half of the gross price of mortgaged property, while the other P20
Million would represent the full payment for the second lot. On April 5, 2001, AIMS paid
another P10 Million, and the next day it paid the final P10 Million, thereby completing the full
gross price for the transaction. Eventually, Velayo was able to turn over the Deed of Sale and
pertinent BIR forms for the second property, but not for the first property. She alleged that she
was waiting for a Department of Finance ruling which would lower the applicable taxes on the
mortgaged property. The sales agent for ARDC noticed that despite the amount given to Velayo
supposedly for payment of the taxes due on the sale and properties, only the taxes for the
second property have been fully paid.

WJA thus filed a criminal action for estafa against Velayo for allegedly misappropriating
the supposed purchase price and payment for withholding taxes for two parcels subject of a sale
between the company she was working for as director and corporate secretary thereof, and WJA
Holdings. The trial court found her guilty of estafa with abuse of confidence, under paragraph
1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as charged, which finding the Court of
Appeals affirmed on appeal. Hence, this petition with Velayo interposing the defense, among
others, that she did not have juridical possession over the subject funds and thus could not be
liable for estafa.

Issue:

Whether Velayo had juridical possession over the subject funds so as to make her
criminally liable for estafa.

Held:

Yes. Velayo is an agent of WJA who received money on its behalf with the agreed task to
remit the same to the BIR and thus facilitate the transfer of the titles to WJA. That Velayohad
juridical possession of the said amount will become readily apparent as this Court comes to
understand that it was her offer of help in remitting the taxes to BIR which induced WJA to not
withhold the now-missing amounts but instead to entrust the same to her, upon the
understanding that she has to pay the same to BIR in its behalf. It was an obligation which
Velayo assumed personally and not on behalf of ARDC; ARDC itself did not have such a duty,
notwithstanding that the checks were deposited in ARDCs account. Indeed, Velayo did not
require a prior authority from ARDC to volunteer for the aforesaid task, and WJA fully relied
on Velayos assurance that she could withdraw and remit the funds to the BIR, because all
throughout the transaction she acted with full freedom and discretion as regards the funds in
the account of ARDC. Without a doubt, a trust relationship was established between WJA and

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Velayo in her personal capacity, not in behalf of or representing ARDC, over the funds she
offered to remit to BIR.

Stated otherwise, Velayo did not receive the same in behalf of ARDC, but received it for
herself, through her own representations. WJA had no obligation to pay to ARDC the
withholding tax; its obligation was to pay the same to the BIR itself. It was only due to Velayos
own representations that she was able to get hold of the money. Thus, while in Chua-Burce, as
in People v. Locson, money was received by the bank teller in the ordinary course of duty in
behalf of the bank, in the instant case ARDC had nothing to do with the arrangement between
Abuid and Velayo as to the remittance of the withholding taxes to BIR. Through her own
representation, Velayo was able to get hold of the funds, then she absconded with it. She acted
on her own without sanction from ARDC, and she cannot now be allowed to escape criminal
liability for her breach of trust. True, she was ARDCs representative in the principal
transaction, but this does not shield her from criminal liability because it was her voluntary
unilateral act which caused injury to WJA.

Thus it was so ruled that when the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party in trust or on commission or for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received.

EDMUND SYDECO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 202692 12 November 2014
Resistance and serious disobedience

Facts:

Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) was flagged down by police officers manning a checkpoint
when he allegedly swerved his car, in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
The policemen then asked the Sydeco to open the vehicle's door and alight for a body and
vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead,
he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously
irked by this remark, one of the policemen, then told the Sydeco that he was drunk, pointing to
three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner's explanation about being
sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored the
policeman and suddenly, the latter boxed him on the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at the
same time blurting, "P...g inamo gusto motapusinnakitaditomaramikapangsinasabi." The
policemen then told Sydeco to ride with the to the hospital, to verify his alleged state of
drunkenness. He refused to comply. The policemen chargedSydeco with drunk driving and
resisting arrest under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Aggrieved, petitioner
appealed, contesting that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties by police officers.

Page 83 of 87
Issue:

Whether accused Sydeco is criminally liable for resisting arrest under Article 151 of the
RPC.

Held:

No. Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational
stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter's
refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a
plain view search only. Petitioner's twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting
lawful orders. Petitioner's twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting lawful
orders. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would
make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down,
committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal
activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under
Art. 151 of the RPC are: (i) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance
of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (ii) That the offender resists or
seriously disobeys such person or his agent.

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in
authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner's
act of exercising one's right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the
night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in
contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and
under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but
in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse
infringed. Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in R.A. No. 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-
manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a
vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of
the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk"
action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of
the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention to invite
him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation,
the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the
petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched
him on the face.

DECEMBER 2014

PEOPLE v. SHIRLEY A. CASIO

G.R. No. 211465 3 December 2014

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Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act

Facts:

In an entrapment operation involving persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu

City, with PO1 Albert Luardo (PO1 Luardo) and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso (PO1 Veloso) acting
as decoys, accused Shirley Casio (Casio) called their attention by saying Chicks mo dong?
(Do you like girls, guys?)

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused
went as follows:

Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo: Unyamga bag-o? Kanangbatan-on kay naa mi guests naghulatsa

motel. (Are they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at
the motel.)

Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuhako. (Yes, just wait and Ill get them.)

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA, 17 years of age, and BBB,
private complainants in this case.
Accused: Kiningduhakauyonmoani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)

PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kahanasilamodalaugkayat? (Well, are they good in

sex?)

Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how
much their services would cost. Accused replied, Tag kinientos (P500.00).

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland
Motel, to which the latter acceded. Upon proceeding to the room rented by the police officers
especially for the entrapment, they handed the marked money to the accused. Upon signal of
PO1 Veloso, the rest of the police team proceeded to the room and arrested the accused,
informed her of her constitutional rights, and confiscated the marked money from the accused.

The RTC of Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
trafficking of persons, which the CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Page 85 of 87
 Whether AAAs admission of her engagement in prostitution constitutes consent on her
part and thus exempts accused from liability.

Held:

BOOK 2/SPECIAL PENAL LAW

No. The elements of trafficking in persons under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012, are:

(i) The act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,

transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;
(ii) The means used include by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person;
(iii) The purpose of trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
or the removal or sale of organs.

The victims consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minors consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled
AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for
money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209386 8 December 2014
Qualified theft

Facts:

Petitioner Mel CarpizoCandelaria (Candelaria) was a truck driver employed by

Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao), owner of United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil).Candelaria was
charged with qualified theft when he failed to deliver 14,000 liters of diesel fuel, allegedly worth
P497,000.00, to Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) and to return the lorry truck which boarded
the diesel fuel. Both the trial court and the CA convicted Candelaria of the crime of qualified

Page 86 of 87
theft. Hence, this appeal with the accused interposing that he must be acquitted considering
that his conviction was merely based on circumstantial evidence.

Issue:

Whether accused Candelaria was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft
notwithstanding that there was no direct evidence against him.

Held:

BOOK 2

Yes, Candelaria is guilty of qualified theft. The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable
under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking
be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it
be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence.

In the present case, the Court found that there was a confluence of all the foregoing
elements. Through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently established
that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven
by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on 23 August 2006 was taken by him, without the authority
and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the confidence
reposed upon him by Lao, as his employer.

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