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Secular Outlook for Global Growth: 20172036

Slower growth is expected to result in a lower-than-historical-average
interest-rate climate and be less of a tailwind to equities.

Irina Tytell, PhD l Senior Research Analyst, Asset Allocation Research

Lisa Emsbo-Mattingly l Director of Asset Allocation Research
Dirk Hofschire, CFA l Senior Vice President, Asset Allocation Research

Key Takeaways GDP forecasts: foundation for long-term

With the economy providing the backdrop
for asset markets, our secular gross domestic
product (GDP) growth forecasts are the foun-
dation for developing long-term capital mar-
ket assumptions.
Our forward-looking, global approach emphasiz-
es the key components of GDP growthpopula-
tion and productivityand calculates the critical
drivers that have been most predictive.
Over the next 20 years, global growth is ex-
capital market assumptions
Economic growth provides the backdrop for asset
markets, influencing corporate earnings, interest rates,
inflation, and many other factors that affect asset returns.
We believe, therefore, that long-term GDP growth
forecasts form the foundation for long-term capital
market assumptions.
Modern financial markets have a relatively short history,
particularly outside the United States and a handful
of other developed countries, limiting the availability
of data for growth and asset assumptions. Most
approaches use a framework that centers on the U.S.

pected to be somewhat slower, primarily due
to deteriorating demographics in most coun-
tries, with developing economies likely to
register the highest growth rates.
Peaking globalization trends and rising
anti-globalization political pressures could
affect the outlook, with potentially negative
and other advanced economies, and many approaches
are backward-looking and rely on mean reversion to
historical averages.
We think that the global economic landscape is likely to
look quite different over the next 20 years compared to
the past 20 years, and that a forward-looking approach
to developing capital market assumptions may provide
a better chance for success in this dynamic environment.

impact on growth via more restricted trade
flows and immigration policies.
Slower world growth would lead to low-
er-than-historical-average interest rates and
provide less of a boost to equity returns than
in recent decades.
Generating long-term global GDP forecasts is the first
step in that process. At a high level, economic growth
can be separated into two components: population
growththe increase in the number of peopleand
productivity growththe increase in output per person
(Exhibit 1). This paper summarizes highlights from the
fifth annual update of our secular GDP forecasts.
Post-Industrial Revolution growth: blip or
new baseline?
During much of the worlds history, productivity growth
was extremely slow. Economies generally expanded in
line with increases in their population. As of 1820, the
largest economies were essentially a ranking of the largest
populations, with China and India topping the list.
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution in Great
Britain more than 200 years ago, bursts of technological
transformation have powered rapid productivity
gains. Throughout the economy, innovation brought
fundamental changefrom steamships, railroads, indoor
plumbing, electricity, and telephones in the 19th century
to automobiles, airlines, antibiotics, radio, and television
in the 20th century. For the first time in history, per
capita incomes rose exponentiallyespecially in the U.S.
and the more advanced European economies (Exhibit2).
By 1900, the U.S. had become the worlds largest
economy, despite having a population only one-fifth the
size of Chinas.
Extrapolating history
Among forecasters who attempt to project global rates
of growth into the 21st century, there are two schools of
1
thought. One group assumes that the U.S. possesses an
inherent dynamism, and that U.S. average productivity
rates over the past 50 or 100 years may continue.
Data limitations prevent large developing economies
from being incorporated into the historical average
productivity rate, but the general presumption is that
their rapid expansion may keep global growth solid for
years to come.
Another perspective is that the two-century burst of

EXHIBIT 1: Labor-force growth and productivity growth are EXHIBIT 2: The technological transformations of the
key determinants of economic growth. 19th and 20th centuries led to major expansion in per
Key Drivers of GDP Growth capita income.
Average World GDP per Capita
LABOR FORCE Real GDP per Capita (U.S. dollars)
Participation 10,000
Rate ANNUALIZED CHANGE IN
POPULATION GROWTH 9,000 WORLD GDP PER CAPITA
Working-Age
Population 11000 10001870 18701960 19602016
8,000
+ 7,000
0.0% 0.1% 1.3% 2.1%

Catch-Up
6,000

5,000
People
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 4,000
Other
3,000

2,000
Structure

= 1,000

0
GDP GROWTH
1
200
500
800
1000
1500
1600
1700
1820
1870
1913
1940
1960
1980
2000
2010
2016

Source: Angus Maddison (Groningen Growth and Development Centre), Fidelity

Source: Fidelity Investments (AART), as of Aug. 1, 2017. Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

2

productivity growth may be ending.2 As evidence, per
capita incomes in the U.S. and many other developed
economies have stagnated, and technological
breakthroughs seem to be less transformative than
before. For instance, recent advancessuch as mobile
connectivityhave resulted disproportionately in
consumer luxuriessuch as new smartphone apps
rather than revolutionary innovations. Implicit in this view
is the decline of the U.S. and other Western economies,
including a subset of research asserting that high
government debt burdens will weigh on future growth.3
Our view is that both analytical frameworks fall short.
Extrapolating productivity trends based on only a brief
period of world history may optimistically assume that
such rapid expansion can continue, even though the
global economy is now growing from a much higher
base. Conversely, extrapolating slowing productivity
growth by comparing inventions from different eras may
pessimistically assume a trend from a small sample of
technological revolutions, which are by nature largely
unpredictable. Both perspectives suffer from a narrow
focus on the U.S., whose current outlook may not fully
reflect a global economy in which emerging countries
account for more than one-third of output. 4
Our forward-looking, global approach to
growth forecasts
The objective of our forecasting framework is to address
these shortcomings by emphasizing a forward-looking
approach that is not dependent on historical averages.
Our methodology also has a global focus that is more
reflective of the worldwide opportunity set for growth,
enabling us to model long-run potential based on
fundamental drivers.
We use historical data not as static assumptions but,
rather, to understand the underlying determinants of
growth and to find measurable factors that have been
predictive of economic growth in the past. We employ
SECULAR OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL GROWTH: 20172036
We think that the global economic
landscape is likely to look quite different
over the next 20 years than the past 20
years, and that a forward-looking approach
to developing capital market assumptions
may provide a better chance for success in
this dynamic environment.
a multidimensional panel data model that compares
common data sets across economies within a common
framework.5 This approach helps us to make direct
comparisons, while capturing the different characteristics
that make economies unique.
Together, these traits root our analysis in historical
realities and measurable drivers of economic growth,
while providing a dynamic framework that is determined
by model-driven predictions of growth, rather than
by historical averages or overly qualitative hypotheses
about the nature of technological progress.
Population growth: less positive than in the past
Of the two primary determinants of GDP growth,
population growth is easier to forecast, as demographic
trends tend to vary less over time than other economic
data. The growth in a countrys labor force has the most
direct impact on GDP growth. A countrys labor force is
determined by a combination of the overall size of the
working-age population and the percentage of people
within that cohort who are either working or seeking
employment (the labor-force-participation rates). In
advanced economies, aging populations will generally
lead to lower labor-force-participation rates, adding
to the demographic challenge of weaker growth in
working-age populations.
3
Labor-force growth has risen rapidly for several decades,
but almost all countries will experience slower growth
and receive less of a direct demographic benefit over
the next 20 years (Exhibit 3). Several mature countries
such as Japan and parts of Europewith the U.S. as a
notable exceptionwill experience outright labor-force
declines. Its important to note that any changes to
immigration policies could have an important impact on
these forecasts, particularly in Europe, where inflows of
working-age migrants have been higher than expected
in recent years due to turmoil in the Middle East and
Africa. This migration could help mollify the regions
demographic challenges, although the opposite effect
would occur if more restrictive policies were enacted
in response to migration pressures (see Rising anti-
globalization political pressures could affect growth
outlook, page 10).
EXHIBIT 3: The contribution of labor-force growth to
economic growth will be much lower over the next 20 years.
Labor-Force Growth
In general, growth will be faster in the developing
worldLatin America, parts of emerging Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa. However, labor-force growth
is flattening or declining in several emerging Asian
economies, including China, South Korea, and Thailand.
Productivity growth: still positive
Productivity growth is often more difficult to predict,
with multiple drivers whose relative importance varies
according to the characteristics of different economies.
While many factors influence productivity growth
rates, we focus our analysis on three main categories of
economic conditions that we have found empirically to
be key drivers of productivity:
1. People. The characteristics of a countrys inhabitants
affect productivity in several waysthe greater the
human capital, the more productive the economy.
According to our human capital index, which
incorporates measures of educational and scientific
achievement as key drivers of future innovation
and adoption of new technologies, human capital
accumulation over the past two decades should boost

Annualized Change (%)

global growth in the next 20 years.
3.0 Human capital tends to be higher in the worlds
20172036 19972016
2.5 wealthiest regions, such as the U.S., Japan, and
2.0 northern Europe. South Korea also has a high human-
capital ranking, and several emerging economies
1.5
including China, Indonesia, and Malaysiahave made
1.0
great strides over the past 20 years.
0.5
As discussed above, slower growth in the labor force
0.0
has a direct negative impact on GDP growth. In order
-0.5 to capture the mixed indirect effects of aging on
-1.0 productivity growth rates, we also built a demographic
Philippines
Australia
South Korea
Russia
Germany

Italy

Thailand

France

Brazil

South Africa
Indonesia

India
U.K.
Canada
Japan

China

Mexico
Spain

Peru
Colombia
U.S.

index that incorporates more detailed measures. Very

young societies may be dominated by dependent
children and less productive young-adult workers,
Source: World Bank, OECD, Country Statistical Organizations, Haver Analytics, while older and aging societies tend to experience
Fidelity Investment (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

4
 SECULAR OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL GROWTH: 20172036

higher elderly dependency ratios. The sweet spot for
productivity-enhancing demographics is somewhere
near the middlewhen younger societies become
more mature but not yet elderly (Exhibit 4). Maturing
younger societies typically benefit from the greater
aptitude for innovation and risk-taking that is likely
more prevalent in youth, as well as from greater
investments in physical and human capital.
have better business climates and more nurturing
institutions.6 As a result, higher complexity typically
means higher productivity. Greater variety and more
sophisticated products in a countrys output signal a
more complex economic structure. For example, Japan
has the highest complexity ranking, while a number
of African countries rank very low. Complexity should
contribute slightly to higher global growth over the next

For example, the Philippines, Mexico, and India will 20 years, primarily due to complexity gains registered

benefit from a maturing phase. Formerly maturing by emerging economies such as South Korea, Malaysia,

countriessuch as Colombia and Brazilwill reach and China.

the demographic sweet spot. Already aging societies 3. Catch-up potential. In theory, less advanced
such as Russia, Germany, and Japanwill feel economies should grow faster than more mature
negative effects on productivity as their demographics economies, thanks to their ability to grow off a lower
deteriorate further. base, adopt existing technologies, and catch up or

2. Structure. Complex economies tend to be more converge to the higher income levels of developed

competitive, use technology more effectively, and countries. In practice, however, this convergence does

EXHIBIT 4: Fewer younger societies stand to benefit from the positive effect of maturing populations.
Median Age of Various Countries

50
Older
1997 2017

Aging
40

30

Headwind
Maturing

20
Peaking

Tailwind
Younger
10
Philippines

India

Mexico

Indonesia

Colombia

Brazil

China

U.S.

Russia

Canada

South Korea

Germany

Japan

Source: United Nations, Haver Analytics, Fidelity Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

5
 not occur automatically but is conditional on other Shifting sources of productivity growth
factors, such as the people and structure of an economy. The fast pace in some developing economies during the
Once we account for the other growth determinants, past 20 years has changed the mix of sources of future
catch-up potential has beenand will continue to productivity growth. On the negative side, the fast pace
bea positive contributor to global GDP growth on of industrialization and growth in per capita incomes in
an absolute basis. Many poorer economies in Asia, recent decades has left less catch-up potential for the
Latin America, and Africa will still benefit from sizable years ahead, a maturing process that tends to reduce the
potential development gains. However, catch-up rate of productivity growth. However, the silver lining is
potential generally will contribute much less to global that the dramatic improvement in structural complexity
growth going forward than it did over the past two and human capital over the past 20 years provides some
decades. After the rapid growth in recent decades of counterbalance by boosting potential productivity.
many larger developing economies, such as China, India, There remains significant differentiation among countries,
and South Korea, higher per capita incomes now leave with Emerging Asia serving as a vivid illustration. South
less catch-up potential for the next 20 years. Korea has advanced to developed-country standards
of living, implying its future productivity will come
EXHIBIT 5: Emerging markets have a more favorable
productivity backdrop from catch-up potential. almost exclusively via its high levels of human capital
Productivity Growth Forecasts (20172036) and complexity (Exhibit 5). Poorer areas, such as
India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have made fewer
India
China
advances in terms of development gains and retain
Indonesia considerable catch-up potential. In between, China
Philippines and Malaysia will confront the challenges of middle-
Malaysia income countries but will do so with much improved
Colombia
sophistication in terms of human capital and structural
Brazil
complexity.
South Africa
Mexico
Poland
Other factors
South Korea Financial crises. Although economies sometimes regain
Germany or even surpass their trend growth rates after a financial
U.K. crisis, the magnitude and duration of the crisis-induced
Spain
downturn often leaves a lasting dent in long-term
U.S.
economic performance.7 Predicting the exact timing
Japan
Canada of a financial crisis is exceptionally difficult, but the
France conditions that have preceded these events throughout
Portion from Catch-Up Potential
Italy history are typically spurred by a protracted buildup of
Other Productivity
Australia
financial imbalances in credit and housing-price bubbles.
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 Our model is designed as an early-warning system to
Annualized Rate (%)

Source: Fidelity Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

6
 SECULAR OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL GROWTH: 20172036

identify mounting financial imbalances as a rising risk
of future crises. The greatest risk remains centered in
China, where we expect the rapid expansion of credit
and housing prices in recent years will exert downward
pressure on long-term growth.
Peaking globalization. Two decades of rapid
integrationspurred by technological advances and
more countries joining the rules-based multilateral
systemhelped foster a global boom through the mid-
2000s. Globalization has engendered greater mobility of
goods, services, capital, and workers around the world.
Over the last several years, globalization trends started
to taper offa result of less potential for incremental
improvement from global integration along with the
recent rise in more nationalistic political pressures.
Export-oriented, manufacturing-based countries have
proportionally benefited from these secular trends, but
going forward, there is less upside from globalization.
In China and Mexico, manufacturing growth has
significantly outpaced overall GDP growth, a trend
unlikely to continue. Furthermore, countries with a
large concentration in manufacturing exports, such as
Germany and South Korea, are highly exposed to any
potential reduction in globalization (Exhibit 6). We expect
peaking globalization to have a modest negative impact
on trade-intensive economiesan impact that may also
be exacerbated by potential changes to immigration
policies (see Rising anti-globalization political pressures
could affect growth outlook, page 10).
Commodity booms. Commodity booms can greatly
affect the long-term growth trajectory of resource-
dependent economies. In general, we do not foresee a
continuation of the commodity-price boom that boosted
growth in many commodity producers during the first

EXHIBIT 6: Globally exposed countries have less to gain from global integration relative to previous decades.
Country Exposure to Globalization

Manufacturing Export Growth less GDP Growth (ppts)

China Mexico
5

4
India Less growth potential
from globalization
3
Brazil Germany
Spain South Korea
2
Italy
Indonesia
1 Most exposed
U.S. U.K. to deglobalization
Japan France
0
Australia Canada
-1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Manufacturing Exports Share of GDP (ppts)

Ppts: percentage points. Source: IMF, Haver Analytics, Fidelity Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

7
decade of the 2000s. We include long-term estimates Conclusion: GDP forecasts
of commodity exports in those economies, although the Using projections for 40 countries within the MSCI
results do not have material effects on most countries. All Country World Index (ACWI), we forecast global
Model results. The methodology detailed above has GDP growth of 2.1% annually over the next 20 years,
been successful at explaining more than 70% of GDP compared with the 2.7% averaged during the past two
growth in our sample of 80 countries during the past decades. About four-fifths of these countries could
40years. As with any attempt to make projections, experience slower growth, including all the developed
there is uncertainty in our forecasts. We acknowledge economies (Exhibit 7). In general, worsening global
the possibility that government debt levels could have demographics are expected to take the largest toll on
an impact on financial stability and economic growth, the global forecast relative to past history, as almost all
but we were not able to identify them as statistically economies confront an inferior demographic outlook
significant drivers of future growth for economies in from the one they faced two decades ago. In addition,
general. We continue to search for additional factors to rapid gains in emerging Asia in recent decades may
further refine our forecasts and improve the robustness leave less room for industrialization and catch-up
of the results. potential from low income levels than before, as
discussed above.

EXHIBIT 7: The world economy will grow more slowly, with the highest growth rates found in developing economies.
Real GDP Growth Forecast (20172036)

Annualized Rate (%)

9.0
Next 20 Years Last 20 Years
8.0
GLOBAL REAL GDP GROWTH
7.0
Last 20 years 20-year forecast
6.0 2.7% 2.1%

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0
Italy

Japan

Germany

Spain

Netherlands

France

Australia

U.K.

Canada

Sweden

U.S.

South Korea

Russia

Turkey

Thailand

Brazil

Colombia

China

South Africa

Mexico

Peru

Malaysia

Indonesia

Philippines

India

Source: Fidelity Investments (AART), as of May 31, 2017.

8

Nevertheless, our forecasts indicate that global growth
will still be positive. The U.S. will average roughly
1.6% annualized growth and narrowly remain the
worlds largest economy. Improved human capital and
increased economic structural complexity could benefit
productivity growth in many developing economies.
Emerging economies with higher growth rates will
account for a greater component of global growth
moving forwarddeveloping countries are projected to
comprise about half of global GDP by 2036, compared
with about one-third in 2016 and one-quarter in 1996.8
This should help to offset the weaker outlooks for Japan
and many European countries.
By 2036, we estimate that three of the worlds top
five economies are likely to be emerging countries,
compared with just one today (Exhibit 8). Our forecasts
indicate that India will grow from the eighth-largest
economy today to the third-largest.
EXHIBIT 8: We estimate several emerging markets will be
among the largest global economies by 2036.
Worlds Largest Economies by 2036
U.S.
China
India
Japan
Germany
Brazil
U.K.
France
Russia
South Korea
Indonesia Current GDP
Projected GDP in 2036
Canada
0 5 10 15
Trillions USD
Source: GDP is in constant dollars. Source: Haver Analytics, Fidelity
Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.
SECULAR OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL GROWTH: 20172036
Within our multi-time-horizon asset allocation framework,
our 20-year secular forecasts serve as the foundation
for developing long-term asset return assumptions. The
long-term expectations on which these forecasts are
based may deviate substantially in the short term. For
more near-term observations, please see our Business
Cycle Update series, which focuses primarily on cyclical
fluctuations in the intermediate term.
GDP forecasts are merely the starting point for asset
return assumptions. Economic growth has a positive
relationship with corporate earnings growth, but equity
return assumptions must be adjusted for differences
relative to the broader economy in stock market
leverage, industry composition, and productivity rates,
among other factors, and valuation dynamics also need
to be taken into account. For fixed-income assets, GDP
growth has a tight, positive relationship with interest
rates, yet bond returns must be modified for starting
yields and other considerations.
At a high level, our long-term GDP forecasts suggest a
few overarching conclusions. First, all else being equal,
slower global growth should provide less of a tailwind
to equity returns over the next 20 years than during
the post-World War II period. Second, the geographic
opportunities for growth tend to favor emerging
economies, though there is significant dispersion of
expected growth around the world. Third, we expect
interest rates to rise over time from their current levels
but remain lower than their historical averages. In
general, asset allocation strategies that can be selective
across a broad, global opportunity set may have the best
potential to take advantage of future growth prospects.
20 25
9
Rising anti-globalization political pressures demographic backdrop, immigrants account for a relatively
large share of the total population and labor force. Without
could affect growth outlook
immigration, U.S. labor-force growth would fall from 0.5% to
With free trade and cross-border flows of capital and labor
0.1% per year. The majority of the effect comes from slower
coming under political fire in many advanced economies, anti-
growth in the population of 16 and older, with the remainder
globalization pressures present a potential challenge to future
accounted for by lower participation rates, as immigrants tend
growth. Because the foundational tenets of globalization could
to be younger than the general population and participate
remain under political pressure for the foreseeable future, we
at higher rates. The 0.4% drop in labor-force growth could
highlight the potential ramifications from more restrictive
overestimate the negative impact if native workers increase their
immigration policies.
participation to help counteract the fewer number of workers
To illustrate the importance of immigration for secular growth, but is unlikely to offset the entire decline. On the other hand,
we illustrate the extreme scenario of zero immigration over this estimate could underestimate the impact, because no
the next two decades. Although such a dire situation is not immigration could lower productivity. Immigrants could raise
likely, it is not without historical precedent, as the net flows productivity directly in the case of high-skilled immigrants in
of immigrants into the U.S. were zero or even negative in the computer, mathematical, and scientific occupations, or indirectly
1930s and 1940s. Developed countries would suffer the most, in the case of low-skilled immigrants in cleaning, construction,
with the global impact of this scenario shaving as much as $4.5 maintenance, and transportation, which helps free up natives for
trillion from global GDP, and with the U.S. accounting for nearly more productive jobs.9
half of this total.
Since we cannot predict the timing and efficacy of policy
The role of immigration has become increasingly important changes over the next two decades, we are not lowering
to help offset aging demographics for many developed our GDP projections based on the possibility of slower
economies in recent years, and it is projected to become even immigration going forward. However, because immigration is
more critical as organic population growth turns negative in a such an important driver of labor-force growth for developed
decade or so (Exhibit 9). Although the U.S. has a more favorable economies, we highlight that more restrictive immigration
policies represent a material downside risk to our current
EXHIBIT 9: Without immigration, population growth in
forecasts for the developed world.
the developed world is expected to decline.
Population Growth in Developed Markets

Annualized Change (%)

6%
BirthsDeaths
5%
Migration
4%
Population Growth
3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%
196165

196670

197175

197680

198185

198690

200610
199195

199600

200105

201115

201620

202125
202630

203135

Shaded area represents estimates from United Nations. Source: United

Nations, Haver Analytics, Fidelity Investments (AART), as of Dec. 31, 2016.

10
 SECULAR OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL GROWTH: 20172036

Authors
Irina Tytell, PhD l Senior Research Analyst, Asset Allocation Research

Lisa Emsbo-Mattingly l Director of Asset Allocation Research

Dirk Hofschire, CFA l Senior Vice President, Asset Allocation Research

The Asset Allocation Research Team (AART) conducts economic, fundamental, and quantitative research to develop asset allocation
recommendations for Fidelitys portfolio managers and investment teams. AART is responsible for analyzing and synthesizing invest-
ment perspectives across Fidelitys asset management unit to generate insights on macroeconomic and financial market trends and
their implications for asset allocation.

Senior Asset Allocation Analyst Jacob Weinstein, CFA also contributed to this article. Fidelity Thought Leadership Vice President Kevin
Lavelle provided editorial direction.

11
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In general the bond market is volatile, and fixed-income securities carry interest rate risk. (As interest rates rise, bond prices usually fall, and vice versa. This effect is
usually more pronounced for longer-term securities.)
Fixed-income securities carry inflation, credit, and default risks for both issuers and counterparties.
Investing involves risk, including risk of loss.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Diversification and asset allocation do not ensure a profit or guarantee against loss.
All indices are unmanaged. You cannot invest directly in an index.
Index definitions
The Human Capital Index is a proprietary indicator incorporating measures of educational and scientific achievement as key drivers of future innovation and adoption
of new technologies.
The Demographic Index is a proprietary indicator incorporating detailed demographic measures that capture the mixed indirect effects of aging on productivity rates.
References
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Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 2 (April 1992): 223251.
Cowen, T. The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better. Dutton (2010).
Gordon, R. Is U.S. economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 63 (September
2012).
Hausmann, R., C. Hidalgo, et al. The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity. Harvard Center for International Development, Harvard Kennedy
School, MIT Media Lab (2011).
Jones, C. The Upcoming Slowdown in U.S. Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper, No. 6284 (November 1997).
Kannan, P. Credit Conditions and Recoveries from Recessions Associated with Financial Crises. International Monetary Fund (March 2010).
Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff. Growth in a Time of Debt. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 100, No. 2 (May 2010): 573578.
Endnotes
1
Source: Angus Maddison (Groningen Growth and Development Centre). 2 See especially Gordon, also Cowen and Jones. 3 See Reinhart and Rogoff. 4 Based on
real GDP (adjusted for inflation) in constant 2010 dollars. 5 See Barro, and Barro and Sala-i-Martin. 6 See Hausmann, Hidalgo, et al. 7 For example, see Kannan.
8 In 2010 dollars. Source: World Bank, Fidelity Investments (AART), through Mar. 31, 2015. 9 Source: International Monetary Fund study Impact of Migration on
Income Levels in Advanced Economies, Jaumotte, F., and K. Koloskova, and S. Chaman Saxena. (Oct. 24, 2016).
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