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E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R.

& LIGHT that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a
CO., defendant-appellant.
sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence,
it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. (Ward vs. Chicago)
MORELAND, J.:
If intoxication is not in itself negligence, what are the facts found by the trial court and
stated in its opinion upon which may be predicated the finding that the plaintiff did not
This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an
use ordinary care and prudence and that the intoxication contributed to the injury
accident which occurred in Caloocan on the night of August 8, 1909.
complained of? After showing clearly and forcibly the negligence of the defendant in
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
leaving its tracks in the condition in which they were on the night of the injury, the
railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of
court has the following to say, and it is all that can be found in its opinion, with
Caloocan.
reference to the negligence of the plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr.
The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which Wright was on returning to his house on the night in question, the testimony of Doctor
defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff Kneedler, who was the physician who attended him an hour after the accident,
is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. demonstrates that he was intoxicated.
On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the
tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, If the defendant or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and
causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel, the
from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. plaintiff was no less negligent, he not having abstained from his custom of taking
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the more wine than he could carry without disturbing his judgment and his self-control, he
night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon knowing that he had to drive a horse and wagon and to cross railroad tracks which
which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out were to a certain extent dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated above the
of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more level of the street.
above the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to
described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided
was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was the damages which he received, although the company, on its part, was negligent in
unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the maintaining its tracks in a bad condition for travel.
primary cause of the accident.
Both parties, therefore, were negligent and both contributed to the damages resulting
TRIAL COURT held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence to the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, in the judgment of the court, contributed in
was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. greater proportion to the damages that did the defendant.
G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, to what extent. If the negligence of conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober
the plaintiff was the primary cause of the accident then, of course, he cannot recover; he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible
if his negligence had nothing to do with the accident but contributed to his injury, then to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
the court was right in apportioning the damages, but if there was no negligence on the described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of
part of the plaintiff, then he should be awarded damages adequate to the injury the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and
sustained." falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition;
In support of the defendant's contention counsel says: "Defendant's negligence was and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen
its failure properly to maintain the track; plaintiff's negligence was his intoxication; the while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's fall from his calesa. It seems clear that plaintiff's speculation and guesswork.
intoxication contributed to the fall; if he had been sober, it can hardly be doubted that
he would have crossed the track safely, as he had done a hundred times before." It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss
the question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of
A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us to the conclusion that there the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., above; and we do not find facts in the opinion of
is nothing in the opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.
was negligent with reference to the accident which is the basis of this action. Mere
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule
BUTARO YAMADA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., is driver's duty to slacken speed, to reduce the noise, if any, of the vehicle, to look
defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO.,Defendant-Appellant. and to listen, if necessary, or do any other act necessary to determine that a train is
not in dangerous proximity to the crossing.
MORELAND, J.:
Plaintiffs claim damages against both the railroad and the garage company In the case at bar, it is undoubted that if the driver had taken the simplest means of
because of injuries suffered by them in a collision between a train owned by permitting his own faculties to exercise themselves fairly, there would have been no
and operated over tracks belonging to the railroad company and an accident, as the presence of the train would have been discovered in an instant; but
automobile the property of the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. he chose to drove on the track at full speed with all the noise which an automobile
On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an produces. Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their presence,
automobile from the defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. generally speaking, is easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
The automobile was secured at a certain price hour and was driven and
controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company. COUNSEL argued that to go upon a railroad crossing without making any effort to
The journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip, ascertain the approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so dangerous to life,
while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad company in the barrio of San that no one may be permitted to excuse himself who does it, provided injury result.
Juan, municipality of Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and One who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs,
the plaintiffs injured. take refuge behind the plea that others have performed the same act safely.

TRIAL COURT dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad APPELLANT contends that the plaintiffs cannot recover for the reason that the
Company and held the defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs negligence of the driver of the automobile, if any, was imputable to them, they having
in various amounts. The taxicab company appealed. permitted the driver to approach and pass over the railroad crossing without the use
of ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of a train or locomotive, and
It appears from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of the having made no effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to take reasonable
automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the care in making the crossing.
precautions which ordinary care and prudence would require, without reducing speed
and without taking any precaution looking to determining whether there was danger With this contention we cannot agree. We think the better rule is that a person who
from a train or locomotive. The trial court accordingly found that the driver was guilty hires a public automobile and gives the driver direction as to the place to which he
of gross negligence and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the wishes to be conveyed, but exercise no other control over the conduct of the driver, is
accident. It also found that the driver had been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for
company to approach and pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the
and observed on the occasion in question, and that, for that reason, the taxicab negligence either of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver. (Little vs.
company was liable for the damages caused. Hackett)
.
APPELLANT contended that the view of the railroad tracks in both directions was We are of the opinion, therefore, that the rule is as we have stated it. Ordinarily where
obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was impossible one rides in public vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the negligence of a
for a person approaching the crossing even though on guard, to detect by sight the third person, to which negligence that of the driver contributes his contributory
approach of a train. negligence is not imputable to the passenger unless said passenger has or is in the
position to have and exercise some control over the driver with reference to the
If that were the case, it was clearly the duty of the driver to reduce the speed of his matter wherein he was negligent. Whether the person injured exercises any control
car and the noise thereof to such an extent that he would be able to determine from over the conduct of the driver further than to indicate the place to which he wishes to
the unrestricted and uninterrupted use of all his faculties whether or not a train was drive is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court on all of the evidence in
near. It is the law that a person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over the case. (Duval vs. Railroad Co.,)
a railroad crossing.
APPELLANT contends "that the defendant Manila Railroad Company was not guilty
The degree of care differs in different cases. Greater care is necessary in crossing a of negligence which contributed to the causing of the accident complained of."
road where the cars are running at a high rate of speed and close together than
where they are running at less speed and remote from one another. But in every case In this connection it appears that, prior to the beginning of the action now before us,
due care should be exercised. It is very possible that where, on approaching a two actions were instituted, both growing out of the accident which forms the basis of
crossing, the view of the tracks in both directions is unobstructed for such a distance the actions before us: (1) A criminal action against the engineer of the train, in which
as to render it perfectly safe to pass over without the use of any other faculty than the engineer was acquitted; and (2) a civil action for damages by the garage and
sight, such use alone is sufficient and it is not necessary to stop or even to slacken taxicab company, the appellant herein, against the defendant railroad company, for
speed or listen. On the other hand, where the view of the tracks is obstructed, them it damages to the automobile which was destroyed as a result of the accident, in which
judgment was for defendant. There is evidence in the record showing that the
locomotive engineer gave due and timely signals on approaching the crossing in The case of Chapman vs. Underwood, the plaintiff, while about to board a street car,
question. The trial court found that the employees of the railroad company fully was struck by an automobile which, at the time, was being driven on the wrong side of
performed their duty as the train approached the crossing on the night in question and the street. The automobile was in charge of the servant of the owner, who was
that, therefore, the railroad company in nowise contributed to the accident. We do not present in the automobile at the time the accident occurred. The automobile was not a
believe that the record will justify us in a reversal of this finding. part of defendant's business nor was it being used at the time as a part or adjunct of
any business or enterprise owned or conducted by him. Although the act of the driver
There is abundant evidence to support it and we have nothing before us by which that was negligent, and was so declared by this court, it was, nevertheless, held that the
evidence may be impeached. That the bell was rung and the whistle was blown on master was not liable for the results of the act. We said: The defendant, however, is
nearing the crossing, giving due and timely warning to all persons approaching, was not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of
testified to not only by servants of the corporation but by passengers on the train. this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall
within the list of person in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant
ART 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when would be responsible.
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the
for personal acts and omissions, but also for the persons for whom they should be owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a
responsible. The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother is liable for the length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
damages caused by the minors who live with them. Guardians are liable for the direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other
damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance
and live with them. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the direct that the driver, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. The automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed
State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the proceeding article shall be results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
applicable. Finally, master or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The liability prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the
referred to in this articles shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed,
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
These are the only cases under the Civil Code in which damages may be recovered acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
from the master for the negligent of his servant. As is seen from a reading of article
1903, a person being driven about by his servant's negligent acts except under In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the
certain circumstances. (Chapman vs. Underwood; Johnson vs. David) On the other automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient
hand, the master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner time intervened to afford the defendant an opportunity correct the act of his driver.
or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner. and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so short as not to be
sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
In the case of Johnson vs. David, supra, we held that the defendant was not liable for
the acts of his servant in negligently driving a horse and carriage against plaintiff, who In the case under discussion we held that, in addition to the requirement to furnish
was at the time riding a bicycle in the streets of Manila, throwing him to the ground and use proper and safe machines, it was the duty of a person or corporation
and injuring him and his bicycle. It appeared in that case that the vehicle was owned operating automobiles for hire to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the selection
by the defendant, that it was being driven by the defendant's coachman on the private of the drivers of his or its automobiles and in supervision over them while in his or its
affairs of the owner, that it was not a public conveyance driven for hire or as a part of employ, including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the
a business or enterprise. Article 1902 provides when a person himself is liable for formulation and due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases
negligence. Articles 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1910 provide when a where such rules, regulations and the formulation and due publication of proper
person shall be liable for injuries caused, not by his own negligence but by the instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules, regulations and instruction
negligence of other persons or things. are necessary. Discussion article 1903 of the Civil Code, which, as we have seen, not
only established liability in case of negligence but also provides when that liability
These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for injuries resulting ceases, the court in that case said:
from acts of negligence such as are complained of in the present cause . . . ."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the of its drivers without disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed to
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that supersede it.
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the selection of the servant or employee or in supervision over him after the selection, We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in fixing the amount of damages which
or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and the plaintiffs suffered. Under the law, each of the plaintiffs, is entitled to recover the
consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the time, doctors' bills and hospital bills and hospital bills and medicines, and any other
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care item of expense which it was found necessary to undergo by reason of the damages
and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is sustained.
relieved from liability.
The plaintiff Butaro Yamada is entitled to be reimbursed for his hospital bill of P49, for
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence the P50 which he paid to Dr. Strahan, and for the loss of time which he suffered at the
and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of rate of P100 a month. We do not believe that we ought to accept the plaintiff's bare
negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in statement as to his physical condition after leaving the Philippine Islands in defiance
relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence of the testimony of Dr. Strahan as to his physical condition 3 months after the injury
of the master. was received and particularly in view of the fact that he returned to work at the end of
2 months. As to the P150 alleged to have been paid to a Japanese doctor in Manila,
In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of we have grave doubts whether he had sufficiently proved that item of expenditure. He
the automobile immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligent in does not give the name of the physician to whom he paid the money and he presents
selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in good condition after no receipt or voucher from the person whom he paid.
selection and the burden of proof was on him to show that he had exercised the care
of a good father of a family. With respect to the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara, We are satisfied from the record that
he is entitled to P600 for 3 months' loss of wages and to P350 for hospital expenses
In that case we further said: "From the commencement of the use of the machine until and medical attendance. As to the claim for P150 paid to a Japanese doctor, we have
the accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to require an examination of the in substance the same circumstances found in connection with the claim of the
machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and supervision. While it plaintiff Yamada, - no name, no date, no memorandum, no receipt; nothing but the
does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for the guidance testimony of the plaintiff himself based upon date prepared from memory. It is worthy
of the drivers and gave them proper instructions, designed for the protection of the of note also that both this plaintiff and plaintiff Yamada claim to have paid exactly the
public and the passengers, the evidence shows, as we have seen, that the death of same amount to Japanese doctors in Manila.
the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara for the sum of
caused by a defect in the machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free P950, and costs.
from responsibility."
With respect to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Kenjiro Karabayashi, we are clear
We, therefore, see that taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it furnished that it must be reduced in amount. He did not go to a hospital or consult a physician
a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to until after the accident. He alleges that he paid to Japanese doctors P310 and to
comply with one of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in this massage doctors P130, and that he paid P365 for medicines. It seem to us incredible
jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper that the plaintiff, who suffered and suffers from no physical injury testified to by any
rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper instructions for physician, should have paid out during that time more than P800 for medicines and
their guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and instructions are doctors.
necessary. To repeat, it was found by the trial court, and that finding is fully sustained
by the record, that it was the custom of the driver who operated the machine on the This plaintiff presents no evidence of such loss of memory except his own statement.
night of the accident, to approach and pass over railroad crossings without adequate We believe that, under this testimony, no damages should be allowed to this plaintiff
precautions, and that such custom was known to and had been sanctioned by the except possibly salary for the short period during which, by reason of shock, he may
officials of the taxicab company, the president of the company testifying that none of have been unable to render active service. He testified that he lost two and one-half
its drivers, especially the one who operated the car on the night of the accident, were months' time, during which he did not work at all, and that his services were worth
accustomed to stop or even reduce speed or take any other precaution in P160 a month.
approaching and passing over railroad crossings, no matter of what nature, unless
they heard "the signal of a car." These facts and circumstances bring the case within
the doctrine enunciated in the Litonjua case to which reference has already been
made, and, at the same time, remove it from that class of cases governed by
Johnson vs. David. Not only has the defendant taxicab company failed to rebut the
presumption of negligence arising from the carelessness of its servant, but it has, in
effect, made those negligent acts its own by having observed and known the custom
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. The nature
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents. of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the
body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice
due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally
FERNAN, C.J.:
construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims.
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious TG-748:
corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, 4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action before the RTC against culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
Subsequently, petitioners filed another action against respondent opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
corporation, this time a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
Respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same
Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after
However, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
Case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case.
Resolving respondent corporation's MTD filed, the trial court issued on the 5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
disputed order dismissing Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes
case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." 6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
APPELLATE COURT promulgated a decision affirming the questioned order of the a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
Appellate Court in its resolution.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always
in danger.
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend
exposed to destruction. ...
that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which
states: Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these omission of the defendant.
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. latter."

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus: Article 2176. Whoever by Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No.
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of
the provisions of this chapter. Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not corporation.
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and
COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO, Petitioners, only when a case was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and
vs. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents. that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: TRIAL COURT dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to present
sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents
respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the should have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the
Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the test result issued by CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical
Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a expert to refute the testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the medical
medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida.
who is a medical technologist, conducted the Hepatitis B Surface Antigen
test and later CDC issued the test resultindicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: COURT OF APPEALS reversed the trial courts findings. It found Garcia liable for
Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it
and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist. exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results.
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company
physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.
suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report
submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas employment ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial court,
for failing the physical examination. correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter incorrect HBsAG test result.
suffered a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital.
During Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he
said hospital and the result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his
Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by training and experience; and that he did everything within his professional
CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method. competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and impersonal result.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the
Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
using the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indicated that she was non- demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test
reactive. of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that
the Executive Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo another he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not
similar test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus, CDC have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is
conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative" guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2)
result. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are present in the case
Certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining at bar.
medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or
reactive. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes,
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida. as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Garcia health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed
and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with
her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them.
while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop
respondents amended their complaint by naming Castro as the "unknown
liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his
pathologist."
establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and
construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the very
reiterated the scientific explanation for the "false positive" result of the first
injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-
HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the respondents.
compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the
proximate cause of the death.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical but only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory.
Laboratory Law, provides: No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary Defendant pathologist does not appoint or select the employees of the laboratory nor
of Health for the operation and maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such does he arrange or approve their schedules of duty.
laboratory is under the administration, direction and supervision of an authorized
physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph. Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective
administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory.
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory: 9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: "Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specific
The head is that person who assumes technical and administrative supervision and function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of
control of the activities in the laboratory. duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units.
Sec. 11. Reporting: No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally or in
writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the
authorized associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized supervision of defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that: [He] does not know, and
representative except in emergencies when the results may be released as has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor has he
authorized by the pathologist. personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-
patient otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result
Sec. 25. Violations: 25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be and not merely stamped as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.
suspended or revoked by the Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation
upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules and regulations issued in pursuance thereto Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the
or the commission of the following acts by the persons owning or operating a clinical authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.
laboratory and the persons under their authority.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the
And Section 29(b) of RA5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and
Technology Act of 1969, reads: Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure
of 1959, the following shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand pesos to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe.
nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six months nor Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: (b) Any medical
technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in the Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to
Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from
authorized by the Department of Health. the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the
diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards. been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting
the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as
required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. In the Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards same.
and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head of
CDC. However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated: 3. By way of affirmative We find the Court of Appeals award of moral damages reasonable under the
and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as follows: circumstances bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of
employee of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist employment." Having established her right to moral damages, we see no reason to
comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Exemplary damages
him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical Technology Law (Republic Act No. are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
5527) and are certified by, and registered with, the Professional Regulation temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and attorneys fees may be
Commission after having passed their Board Examinations. They are competent recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.
within the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting laboratory
examinations and are allowed to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated
defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in general, are hired by laboratories for February 27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence
purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and orders issued by the and liable to pay to respondents 50,000.00 as moral damages, 50,000.00 as
Department of Health through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories. Defendant exemplary damages, and 25,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED.
pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center
NOEL CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA AND SAN JUAN DE DIOS Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he
HOSPITAL, Petitioners, v.NELSON CORTEJO, Respondent. was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she
inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach with
BRION, J.: ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out the
tube, or give the patient any oral medication.
On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo Dr. Miranda thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be
brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo to the Emergency Room of the negative. She likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood pressure
San Juan de Dios Hospital because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, and some blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later found to be normal.
stomach pain, and fever. Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo initially attended to and examined Edmer. Edmer's condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several
In her testimony, Mrs. Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April 20, 1988, procedures done.
Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted for one day; a few hours Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that
upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor; and two hours Edmer was suffering from Dengue. One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived
after administering medications, Edmer's fever had subsided. and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Since the
After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they
temperature, and blood pressure. hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his
Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, son to MakatiMed Center.
Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia." Edmer's blood was Dr. Casumpang checked Edmer's condition found that his blood pressure
also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics. was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The respondent requested
Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be
fever and to loosen his phlegm. found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him P600.00.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first time Edmer was transferred to MakatiMed Center
examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage
initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia." IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.
At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's Edmer died. His Death Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Dengue
diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous
her son's bloodpressure is just being active and remarked that "that's the diagnosis of his doctors, respondent instituted an action for damages against
usual bronchopneumonia SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda before
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer the following day. Still the RTC.
suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr.
Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded actual and moral damages. In
about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of ruling that the petitioning doctors were negligent, RTC found untenable the petitioning
information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has doctors' contention that Edmer's initial symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It
an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is faulted them for heavily relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the
bronchopneumonia. other manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed. It held that in diagnosing and
Edmer vomited prompting the respondent (Edmer's father) to request for a treating an illness, the physician's conduct should be judged not only by what he/she
doctor at the nurses' station. saw and knew, but also by what he/she could have reasonably seen and known; yet,
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Miranda, one of the resident physicians of the petitioning doctors failed to take a second look, much less, consider these
SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited, indicators of dengue.
she failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it
away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for The RTC also held SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors for damages
examination. based on the following findings of facts: first, Dr. Casumpang, as consultant, is
Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's an ostensible agent of SJDH because before the hospital engaged his medical
head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer services, it scrutinized and determined his fitness, qualifications, and competence as
had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of a medical practitioner; and second, Dr. Miranda, as resident physician, is
dengue fever. an employee of SJDH because like Dr. Casumpang, the hospital, through its
Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr. Miranda, the respondent screening committee, scrutinized and determined her qualifications, fitness, and
reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and difficulty in competence before engaging her services; the hospital also exercised control over
moving his right leg. her work.
the consultants use in the treatment of their patients. It merely provides them with
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals adequate space in exchange for rental payment.

CA affirmed RTC's ruling, finding that SJDH and its attending physicians The Case for the Respondent
failed to exercise the minimum medical care, attention, and treatment
expected of an ordinary doctor under like circumstances. In any case, he contends that the petitioning doctors were negligent in conducting
The CA found the petitioning doctors' failure to read even the most basic their medical examination and diagnosis based on the following: (1) the petitioning
signs of "dengue fever" expected of an ordinary doctor as medical doctors failed to timely diagnose Edmer's correct illness due to their non-observance
negligence. of the proper and acceptable standard of medical examination; (2) the petitioning
On SJDH's solidary liability, the CA ruled that the hospital's liability is based doctors' medical examination was not comprehensive, as they were always in a rush;
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. CA opined that the control which the and (3) the petitioning doctors employed a guessing game in diagnosing
hospital exercises over its consultants, the hospital's power to hire and bronchopneumonia. The respondent, too, asserted that SJDH is also negligent
terminate their services, all fulfill the employer-employee relationship because it was not equipped with proper paging system, has no bronchoscope, and
requirement under Article 2180. its doctors are not proportionate to the number of its patients. He also pointed out that
Lastly, CA held that SJDH failed to adduce evidence showing that it out of the seven resident physicians in the hospital, only two resident physicians were
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and the doing rounds at the time of his son's confinement.
supervision of its physicians.
The Issues
I. Dr. Casumpang's Position (G.R. No. 171127)
1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of
Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and care to the precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient;
best of his abilities, and within the proper standard of care required from physicians 2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarity liable with the petitioning
under similar circumstances. He claims that his initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia doctors;
was supported by the chest x-ray result. Dr. Casumpang also contends that dengue 3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners'
fever occurs only after several days of confinement. He alleged that when he had negligent act/omission and the patient's resulting death; and
suspected that Edmer might be suffering from dengue fever, he immediately attended 4. Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora
and treated him. Jaudian as an expert witness.

II. Dr. Miranda's Position (G.R. No. 171217) Our Ruling

In her petition, Dr. Miranda faults the CA for holding her responsible for Edmer's We find the petition partly meritorious.
wrong diagnosis, stressing that the function of making the diagnosis and undertaking
the medical treatment devolved upon Dr. Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer, Medical Malpractice Suit as a Specialized Area of Tort Law
and who confirmed "bronchopneumonia." Dr. Miranda also alleged that she exercised
prudence in performing her duties as a physician, underscoring that it was her The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' negligence in diagnosing
professional intervention that led to the correct diagnosis of "Dengue Hemorrhagic and treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical
Fever." malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by
medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient.33 As the
III. SJDH's Position (G.R. No. 171228) term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care
provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this
SJDH disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda are mere standard, and causes injury to the patient. To successfully pursue a medical
independent contractors and "consultants" (not employees) of the hospital. SJDH malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient's heir) must prove that
alleges that since it did not exercise control or supervision over the consultants' the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or
exercise of medical profession, there is no employer-employee relationship between did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act or omission
them, and consequently, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply. SJDH likewise had caused injury to the patient.34 The patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving
anchored the absence of, employer-employee relationship on the following his/her cause of action.
circumstances: (1) SJDH does not hire consultants; it only grants them privileges to
admit patients in the hospital through accreditation; (2) SJDH does not pay the The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
consultants wages similar to an ordinary employee; (3) the consultants earn their own
professional fees directly from their patients; SJDH does not fire or terminate their The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
services; and (4) SJDH does not control or interfere with the manner and the means proximate causation. Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions
on one's conduct. It requires proof of professional relationship between the physician
and the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the Her affirmative acts amounted to her acceptance of the physician-patient relationship,
patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability. and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.

A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a Standard of Care and Breach of Duty
physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient. The
establishment of this relationship is consensual,and the acceptance by the physician A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of
essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks care involves a question of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence
diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician cases are highly technical in nature, requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to
agrees. provide guidance to the court on matters clearly falling within the domain of medical
science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert testimonies, and
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. guided by medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common knowledge,
The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of ultimately determines whether breach of duty took place.
care that a reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical condition under
similar circumstances. Whether or not Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda committed a breach of duty is to be
measured by the yardstick of professional standards observed by the other members
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his of the medical profession in good standing under similar circumstances.49 It is in this
duties under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only
is specific to each individual case. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is the professional standards observed in the medical community, but also that the
injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient physician's conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard.
to damages.
In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation medical examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should
between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and have undertaken in the diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and second, the
should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the dengue fever signs and symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. The injury or damage is and considered.
proximately caused by the physician's negligence when it appears, based on the
evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer's attending physician, did not act according to
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We do not find Dr. Miranda
or a reasonably probable consequence of the physician's negligence. liable for the reasons discussed below.

a. The Relationship Between Dr. Casumpang and Edmer Dr. Casumpang's Negligence

In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Casumpang and We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer's
Edmer was created when the latter's parents sought the medical services of Dr. throat despite knowing that as early as 9:00 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer
Casumpang, and the latter knowingly accepted Edmer as a patient. Dr. Casumpang's had blood streaks in his sputum.
acceptance is implied from his affirmative examination, diagnosis and treatment of
Edmer. On the other hand, Edmer's parents, on their son's behalf, manifested their In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis
consent by availing of the benefits of their health care plan, and by accepting the of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the
hospital's assigned doctor without objections. symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm
his findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which
b. The Relationship Between Dr. Miranda and Edmer failure, especially when reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of
dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
With respect to Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she
assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter. As second year Dr. Miranda is Not Liable for Negligence
resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other physicians, Dr. Miranda is
deemed to have agreed to the creation of physician-patient relationship with the A decade later, Centman v. Cobb, affirmed the Jenkins ruling and held that interns
hospital's patients when she participated in the diagnosis and prescribed a course of and first-year residents are "practitioners of medicine required to exercise the same
treatment for Edmer. standard of care applicable to physicians with unlimited licenses to practice."

The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Miranda examined Edmer twice (at around We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent. Although she had greater
12:00 and 3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988), and in both instances, she patient exposure, and was' subject to the same standard of care applicable to
prescribed treatment and participated in the diagnosis of Edmer's medical condition. attending physicians, we believe that a finding of negligence should also depend on
several competing factors, among them, her authority to make her own diagnosis, the the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end. Control,
degree of supervision of the attending physician over her, and the shared which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present in this case.
responsibility between her and the attending physicians.
Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree of
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely control over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning
faultless. Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of Edmer's second bleeding doctors conducted and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their
does not necessarily amount to negligence as the respondent himself admitted that diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, no evidence was presented to show that SJDH
Dr. Miranda failed to examine the blood specimen because he washed it away. In monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning doctors in the treatment and
addition, considering the diagnosis previously made by two doctors, and the management of Edmer's case. In these lights, the petitioning doctors were not
uncontroverted fact that the burden of final diagnosis pertains to the attending employees of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.
physician (in this case, Dr. Casumpang), we believe that Dr. Miranda's error was
merely an honest mistake of judgment influenced in no small measure by her status in SJDH is Solidarity Liable Based on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine of
the hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held liable for medical negligence. Apparent Authority

We agree with the lower courts. Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the
petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from liability.
In Brown v. Sims, a neurosurgeon was found competent to give expert testimony
regarding a gynecologist's standard of pre-surgical care. In that case, the court held As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors.
that since negligence was not predicated on the gynecologist's negligent performance However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as an
of the operation, but primarily on the claim that the pre-operative histories and ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of
physicals were inadequate, the neurosurgeon was competent to testify as an expert. apparent authority."

It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a specialist in The elements of the action have been set out as follows: For a hospital to be liable
neurosurgery to express the opinions permitted to be expressed by plaintiffs' under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or
doctors, e.g., the immediate need for a decompression in the light of certain its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
neurological deficits in a post-laminectomy patient. As stated above, there was no individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
issue as to the proper execution of the neurosurgery. The medical testimony (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
supported plaintiffs' theory of negligence and causation. (Citations omitted) also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with
The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice actions is that "a ordinary care and prudence. (Emphasis supplied)
specialist in a particular branch within a profession will not be required." Most courts
allow a doctor to testify if they are satisfied of his familiarity with the standards of a WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS the consolidated
specialty, though he may not practice the specialty himself. One court explained that petitions. The Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de Dios Hospital
"it is the scope of the witness' knowledge and not the artificial classification by title solidarity liable for negligent medical practice. We SET ASIDE the finding of liability as
that should govern the threshold question of admissibility. (Citations omitted) to Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda. The amounts of P45,000.00 as actual damages and
Application to the Present Case P500,000.00 as moral damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court.
In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on The Court AFFIRMS the rest of the Decision dated October 29, 2004 and the
the standard of care in dengue fever cases. Although he specializes in pathology, it Resolution dated January 12, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56400.
was established during trial that he had attended not less than 30 seminars held by
the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16
years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases. The Causation
Between Dr. Casumpang's Negligent Act/Omission, and the Patient's Resulting Death
was Adequately Proven

Liability of SJDH

We affirm the hospital's liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but
on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. In
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties,
the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2)
payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only
CARLOS BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, INC. AND the blood. However, Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests
because the immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian.
RAMON S. INSO, M.D., Respondents.
Dr. Inso and the nurses performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on
Lilian. Dr. Inso also informed her family that there may be a need to re-
Petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian Borromeo. operate on her, but she would have to be put in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
Lilian was a patient of the respondent Family Care Hospital, Inc. under the Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU because it was only a
care of respondent Dr. Ramon Inso. secondary hospital and was not required by the Department of Health to
Petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had have one.
been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two Dr. Inso informed the petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to
days. She was admitted at the hospital and placed under the care of Dr. another hospital.
Inso. Dr. Inso personally called the Perpetual Help Medical Center to arrange
Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute appendicitis. Lilian's transfer, but the latter had no available bed in its ICU.
However, there was insufficient data to rule out other possible causes and to Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the Muntinlupa Medical Center
proceed with an appendectomy. Thus, he ordered Lilian's confinement for (MMC) which had an available bed.
testing and evaluation. Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance accompanied by the resident
Over the next 48 hours, Lilian underwent multiple tests. However, the tests doctor on duty and a nurse. Dr. Inso followed closely behind in his own
were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had appendicitis. vehicle.
Meanwhile, Lilian's condition did not improve. Lilian abruptly developed Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian.
an acute surgical abdomen. Dr. Inso asked for a plasma expander. Unfortunately, at around 10:00 A.M.,
Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian because of Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her.
the findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured At the request of the petitioner, Lilian's body was autopsied at the PNP
appendix. Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr. Reyes, the medico-legal assigned to the
After explaining the situation, Dr. Inso obtained the patient's consent to the laboratory, conducted the autopsy.
laparotomy. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to
At around 3:45 P.M., Lilian was brought to the operating room where Dr. bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. He further concluded
Inso conducted the surgery. that the internal bleeding was caused by the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening in the
During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute repair site. He opined that the bleeding could have been avoided if the site
appendicitis. He proceeded to remove her appendix which was already was repaired with double suturing instead of the single continuous suture
infected and congested with pus. repair that he found.
The operation was successful. Lilian's appearance and vital signs improved. Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
At around 7:30 P.M., Lilian was brought back to her private room from the Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
recovery room. During the trial, the petitioner presented Dr. Reyes as his expert witness.
After 6 hours, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low. However, Dr. Reyes admitted that he had very little experience in the field of
After assessing her condition, he ordered the infusion of more intravenous pathology and his only experience was an on-the-job training at the V. Luna
(IV) fluids which somehow raised her blood pressure. Hospital where he was only on observer status. He further admitted that he
Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor Lilian's had no experience in appendicitis or appendectomy and that Lilian's case
condition. was his first autopsy involving a death from appendectomy.
Subsequently, a nurse informed him that Lilian was becoming restless. Dr. Moreover, Dr. Reyes admitted that he was not intelligently guided during the
Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that she was quite pale. He autopsy because he was not furnished with clinical, physical, gross,
immediately requested a blood transfusion. histopath, and laboratory information that were important for an accurate
Lilian did not respond to the blood transfusion even after receiving two 500 conclusion.
cc-units of blood. Various drugs were administered. In their defense, Dr. Inso and Family Care presented Dr. Inso, and expert
Eventually, an endotracheal tube connected to an oxygen tank was inserted witnesses Dr. Celso Ramos and Dr. Herminio Hernandez.
into Lilian to ensure her airway was clear. Nevertheless, her condition Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening at the
continued to deteriorate. repair site caused Lilian's internal bleeding. If the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening had
Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing petechiae in various parts of caused Lilian's hemorrhage, she would not have survived for over 16 hours;
her body. she would have died immediately, within 20 to 30 minutes, after surgery.
At this point, Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian had Disseminated Intravascular Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to
Coagulation (DIC), a blood disorder characterized by bleeding in many parts DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood to coagulate; Dr.
of her body caused by the consumption or the loss of the clotting factors in Ramos considered the abundant petechial hemorrhage in the myocardic
sections and the hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple bleeding points indicate observed under similar circumstances by other members of the profession in good
that Lilian was afflicted with DIC. standing; (4) that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable because direct evidence as to the
Meanwhile, Dr. Hernandez is a general surgeon and a hospital administrator cause of Lilian's death and the presence/absence of negligence is available; and (5)
who had been practicing surgery for twenty years as of the date of his that doctors are not guarantors of care and cannot be held liable for the death of their
testimony. patients when they exercised diligence and did everything to save the patient.
Dr. Hernandez testified that Lilian's death could not be attributed to the
alleged wrong suturing. He submitted that the presence of blood in the lungs, OUR RULING
in the stomach, and in the entire length of the bowels cannot be reconciled
with Dr. Reyes' theory that the hemorrhage resulted from a single-sutured The requisites of establishing medical malpractice
appendix.
Dr., Hernandez testified that Lilian had uncontrollable bleeding in the Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic legal principle that
microcirculation as a result of DIC. The microcirculation is too small to be equally applies to civil and criminal cases. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff
seen by the naked eye; the red cell is even smaller than the tip of a needle. has the duty of proving its elements, namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient;
Therefore, the alleged wrong suturing could not have caused the amount of (2) the defendant's breach of this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and (4) proximate
hemorrhaging that caused Lilian's death. causation between the breach and the injury suffered.17 In civil cases, the plaintiff
Dr. Avila, also a lawyer, was presented as an expert in medical must prove these elements by a preponderance of evidence.
jurisprudence. Dr. Avila testified that between Dr. Reyes who autopsied the
patient and Dr. Ramos whose findings were based on medical records, A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise the
greater weight should be given to Dr. Reyes' testimony. degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained
medical professionals acting under the same circumstances.18 A breach of the
RTC rendered its decision awarding the petitioner P88,077.50 as compensatory accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the
damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P3,607,910.30 as loss of earnings; defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient.19
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. The RTC relied on Dr. Avila's opinion and The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent
gave more weight to Dr. Reyes' findings regarding the cause of Lilian's death. It held members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine.20 Because medical
that Dr. Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site causing Lilian's malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually essential to
death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, holding that establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the
a patient's death does not ordinarily occur during an appendectomy. circumstances; (2) that the defendant's conduct fell below the acceptable standard;
and (3) that the defendant's failure to observe the industry standard caused injury to
CA reversed the RTC's decision and dismissed the complaint. CA gave greater his patient.
weight to the testimonies of Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos over the findings of Dr.
Reyes because the latter was not an expert in pathology, appendectomy, nor in The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus, a
surgery. It disregarded Dr. Avila's opinion because the basic premise of his testimony pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an
was that the doctor who conducted the autopsy is a pathologist of equal or of greater anesthesiologist22 and an autopsy expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in
expertise than Dr. Ramos or Dr. Hernandez. CA held that there was no causal infectious diseases.23
connection between the alleged omission of Dr. Inso to use a double suture and the
cause of Lilian's death. It also found that Dr. Inso did, in fact, use a double suture The petitioner failed to present an expert witness.
ligation with a third silk reinforcement ligation on the repair site which, as Dr. Reyes
admitted on cross-examination, loosened up after the initial swelling of the stump In ruling against the respondents, the RTC relied on the findings of Dr. Reyes in the
subsided. CA denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the light of Dr. Avila's opinion that the former's testimony should be given greater weight
element of causation between the instrumentality under the control and management than the findings of Dr. Ramos and Dr. Hernandez. On the other hand, the CA did not
of Dr. Inso and the injury that caused Lilian's death was absent; the respondents consider Dr. Reyes or Dr. Avila as expert witnesses and disregarded their testimonies
sufficiently established that the cause of Lilian's death was DIC. in favor of Dr. Ramos and Dr. Hernandez. The basic issue, therefore, is whose
testimonies should carry greater weight?
The petitioner argues: (1) that Dr. Inso and Family Care were negligent in caring for
Lilian before, during, and after her appendectomy and were responsible for her death; We join and affirm the ruling of the CA.
and (2) that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case.
Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso's alleged negligence. His
In their Comment, the respondents counter: (1) that the issues raised by the petitioner testimony could not have established the standard of care that Dr. Inso was expected
are not pure questions of law; (2) that they exercised utmost care and diligence in the to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso's failure to observe this standard. His testimony
treatment of Lilian; (3) that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the standard of care cannot be relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed errors during the operation,
the severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian's probability of survival, and the
existence of other diseases/conditions that might or might not have caused or preponderance of evidence clearly tilts in favor of the respondents.
contributed to Lilian's death.
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not
The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining whether Dr. immediately apparent to the layman.
Inso was at fault. Dr. Avila testified in his capacity as an expert in medical
jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine, surgery, or pathology. His testimony fails The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of
to shed any light on the actual cause of Lilian's death. evidence onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for itself;"
is a rule of evidence that presumes negligence from the very nature of the accident
On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr. Inso himself and itself using common human knowledge or experience.
from two expert witnesses in pathology and surgery.
The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not
Dr. Ramos graduated from the Far Eastern University, Nicanor Reyes Medical ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency
Foundation, in 1975. He took up his post-graduate internship at the Quezon Memorial which caused the injury was under the exclusive: control of the person charged with
Hospital in Lucena City, before taking the board exams. After obtaining his negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
professional license, he underwent residency training in pathology at the Jose R. action or contribution from the injured person.38 The concurrence of these elements
Reyes Memorial Center from 1977 to 1980. He passed the examination in Anatomic, creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiffs
Clinical, and Physical Pathology in 1980 and was inducted in 1981. He also took the burden of proof.
examination in anatomic pathology in 1981 and was inducted in 1982.31
This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. We have
At the time of his testimony, Dr. Ramos was an associate professor in pathology at applied this doctrine in the following cases involving medical practitioners:
the Perpetual Help Medical School in Bian, Laguna, and at the De La Salle Where a patient who was scheduled for a cholecystectomy (removal of gall stones)
University in Dasmarias, Cavite. He was the head of the Batangas General Hospital but was otherwise healthy suffered irreparable brain damage after being administered
Teaching and Training Hospital where he also headed the Pathology Department. He anesthesia prior to the operation.39
also headed the Perpetual Help General Hospital Pathology department.32 Where after giving birth, a woman woke up with a gaping burn wound close to her left
armpit;40
Meanwhile, Dr. Hernandez at that time was a General Surgeon with 27 years of The removal of the wrong body part during the operation; and
experience as a General Practitioner and 20 years of experience as a General Where an operating surgeon left a foreign object (i.e., rubber gloves) inside the body
Surgeon. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas before of the patient.
undergoing five years of residency training as a surgeon at the Veterans Memorial The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's
Center hospital. He was certified as a surgeon in 1985. He also holds a master's alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman.42 These
degree in Hospital Administration from the Ateneo de Manila University.33 instances require expert opinion to establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It
is also not applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been identified
He was a practicing surgeon at the: St. Luke's Medical Center, Fatima Medical or established.
Center, Unciano Medical Center in Antipolo, Manila East Medical Center of Taytay,
and Perpetual Help Medical Center in Bian.34 He was also an associate professor at While this Court sympathizes with the petitioner's loss, the petitioner failed to present
the Department of Surgery at the Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central sufficient convincing evidence to establish: (1) the standard of care expected of the
University, and the Perpetual Help Medical Center. He also chaired the Department of respondent and (2) the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected standard.
Surgery at the Fatima Medical Center.35 Considering further that the respondents established that the cause of Lilian's
uncontrollable bleeding (and, ultimately, her death) was a medical disorder -
Dr. Hernandez is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons, the Philippine Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation we find no reversible errors in the CA's
College of Surgeons, and the Philippine Society of General Surgeons. He is a dismissal of the complaint on appeal.
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Surgery and a member of the Philippine Medical
Association and the Antipolo City Medical Society.36 WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual surgical
procedure.37 Both experts agreed that Lilian could not have died from bleeding of the
appendical vessel. They identified Lilian's cause of death as massive blood loss
resulting from DIC.

To our mind, the testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos carry
far greater weight than that of Dr. Reyes. The petitioner's failure to present expert
witnesses resulted in his failure to prove the respondents' negligence. The
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant. them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian,
less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
CARSON, J.:
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into
an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by
David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to
eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the
Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck.
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained
extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average
his wounds.
boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about
the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found
12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of
them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident, during the
visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them
construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as
a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place
quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in
caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of
wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday
defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the
to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from
power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some
prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use
may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the
of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some
effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's
discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys
premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so. justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in
question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on
evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly
one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning
thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the
mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he
expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was
obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment
engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and,
for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more
however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than
finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an
most boys of fifteen.
oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public,

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the

established by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in
pastime or in play.
only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the
caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts
property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and
on which these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the
that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the
blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by
point where they were found.
contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in

The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors,

apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and control
of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record
allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff
failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors.

finding in accord with his allegations in this regard. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that
a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge,
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the
extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been
of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work done by
before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company
company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished
operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in
the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company as a these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the
sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted
discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should
use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those
evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to
prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of
the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as to form and
reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property, and were the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
left where they were found by the company or some of its employees. and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a decision
affirming the judgment of the court below.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's
favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code. accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit
competent evidence:
acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
should be responsible.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed
caused by the minors who live with them. in the case under consideration.

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised
employed or on account of their duties. due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff
would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the
damage.
property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience,
his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place. between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of
that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted
occasioned the injuries sustained by him. and sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the
case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in
doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs.
many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the
Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in

liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to

or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of
another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children
would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults

by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to
enter upon another's premises.
exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous
machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were
children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where
indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co.,
the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin,

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.

owner of the premises liable.


On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States,
citing and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal
question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that

while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case
injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the
principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in

to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of
many of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that it
premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from
responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."

tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as
the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an
follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure,
adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule
permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a
in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give warning
by the circumstances of the case."
of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the interest or
curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he can not
regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in reason we may
premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this village
no obligation to make provision. to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied
license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles
warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case
involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in
of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence,
the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the
volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would
plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty,
make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so
and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for
that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed,
the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.
and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child
attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might
the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot thereby be killed or maimed for life."

building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the
merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all,
case of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the
usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would often impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them
assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to
playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they
regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or
from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.
snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied
accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad
invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity
to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions. might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting
thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps,
purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if
baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of
one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to
another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises,
children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of
such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the
case would lie. "What difference," said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except
the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a
McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are
wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the
boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to
congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the deprive it a right to recover in such cases a point which we neither discuss nor
attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as decide.
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from
children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam
such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by
because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is
the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises
action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under
incurred.
such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child
against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which
express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept
or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to
the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to
enter. discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case
of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention
to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
as in the United States all private property is acquired and held under the tacit
circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on
condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the
which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to
attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else
is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a circumstances.
match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the particular
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts,
circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo
so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in
cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
"Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence
discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own
such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the
acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such
nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done
been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in
thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our
was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain
no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these
explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for
little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an
can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may,
might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil
within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec.
frightened and ran away. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and
females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O.,
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
No. 68, sec. 1).
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury
the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be
and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while injured party himself.
it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause,
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
gave rise to the damage."
inflicted the injury.

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.


The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.) To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and
own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. effect; but if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third
5, Partida 3.) person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even though such acts or
omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown that the
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the
immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
himself.

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the
And again
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays
the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish
down the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the
their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September
interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this
27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the
court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly
necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the
deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages from the
person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by
defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
said act or omission.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between
(93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
the act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the
first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages
result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
"necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
1887.) injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.) We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of
the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."

definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking
Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases
up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and
(personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the
carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the
plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January,
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon
the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that
the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo
year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to
cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect
be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to
in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact
seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases
admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a
we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of
youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up
proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when
the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor
the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
decide.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:


Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the
judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where the

made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and
the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of
the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at
CO., defendant-appellant. the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries
and burns." 2
FERNANDO, J.:
Then came a summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for plaintiff-
Youth, the threshold of life, is invariably accompanied by that euphoric sense of well-
appellant. Thus: "Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in
being, and with reason. The future, bright with promise, looms ahead. One's powers
his deposition, ..., that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at
are still to be tested, but one feels ready for whatever challenge may come his way.
the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and
There is that heady atmosphere of self-confidence, at times carried to excess. The
that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep
temptation to take risks is there, ever so often, difficult, if not impossible, to resist.
slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not
There could be then a lessening of prudence and foresight, qualities usually
stop dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr.
associated with age. For death seems so remote and contingent an event. Such is not
shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that
always the case though, and a slip may be attended with consequences at times
he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a
unfortunate, even fatal.
warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident." 3 Also: "Virgilio de

Some such thought apparently was in the mind of the lower court when it dismissed la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957,
he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep
the complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss
whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the going towards the direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the

victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward.

defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the

Feb 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him." 4

Clark Air Force Base. In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after
After which reference was made to the testimony of the main witness for defendant-
summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so
appellee, Teodorico Capili, "who was at the engine at the time of the mishap," and
to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other
who "testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and
side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation." 1
found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters

The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the lower court, away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he
saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between
satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct
to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was

P282,065.40. An examination of the evidence of record fails to yield a basis for a caught in the middle of the tracks." 5

reversal of the decision appealed from. We affirm.


1. The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to defendant-

According to the decision appealed from, there is no dispute as to the following: "In appellee Manila Railroad Company comes to us encased in the armor of what

December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of admittedly appears to be a careful judicial appraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of

age, ...; that Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time record. It is thus proof against any attack unless sustained and overwhelming. Not
that it is invulnerable, but it is likely to stand firm in the face of even the most
of the accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep,
formidable barrage.
In the more traditional terminology, the lower court judgment has in its favor the therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held
presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After all, the lower court had liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not
The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code
neglect it. There is no affront to justice then if its finding be accorded acceptance
of Spain, formerly applicable in this jurisdiction, 10 had been interpreted in earlier
subject of course the contingency of reversal if error or errors, substantial in
decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 11Manresa was cited
character, be shown in the conclusion thus arrived at. It is a fair statement of the
to the following effect "'Among the questions most frequently raised and upon which
governing, principle to say that the appellate function is exhausted when there is
the majority of cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability,
found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court.
are those referring to the determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or
As was held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled, that when the credibility of negligence of the person responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable
witnesses is the one at issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence factors in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can
deserves serious consideration by this Court." 6 An earlier expression of the same be no liability, and although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded
view is found in Jai-Alai Corporation v. Ching Kiat: "After going over the record, we unless arising from some person's fault or negligence'."
find no reason for rejecting the findings of the court below. The questions raised hinge
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v.
on credibility and it is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its
Juanillo 12 and United States v. Barias. 13Cooley' formulation was quoted with
determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the
approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: "Judge Cooley in his work
parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand." 7
on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the
In a 1964 opinion, we adhered to such an approach. Thus: "'Nothing in the record protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and
suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct on the part of the trial judge in the vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers
formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the injury." There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. 14 Thus:
evidence presented. We are denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
consonant to the time honored tradition of the Tribunal to hold trial judges better comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of
situated to make conclusions on questions of fact'." 8 On this ground alone we can the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
rest the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.lwphi1.et require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure
to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
2. Nor is the result different even if no such presumption were indulged in and the
matter examined as if we were exercising original and not appellate jurisdiction. The To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee,
sad and deplorable situation in which plaintiff-appellant now finds herself, to the and the action of plaintiff-appellee must necessary fail. The facts being what they are,
contrary notwithstanding we find no reason for reversing the judgment of the lower compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee
court. had not arisen.

This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by 3. Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment
act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under appealed from on the ground that there was a failure to appreciate the true situation.
obligation to pay for the damage done. 9 Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, Thus the first three assigned errors are factual in character. The third assigned error
could be summarily disposed of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view
that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the
meters before reaching the crossing. accident had taken place." 15

The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above excerpt from the
hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the decision appealed from but what to her is the apparent reliance of the lower court
gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a on Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. 16 and United States v. Manlabat &
collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at Pasibi. 17 In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court follows: "A
the time of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road
confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance. Considered separately, crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be
neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment different in able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of
character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the
suffice to alter the result. The quantum of proof required still not been met. The purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and
alleged errors fail of their said effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it had railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to
not been improved. There is no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing
court. cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a
reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track." The
It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too
Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between an automobile and a street
dependent in the lid analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it
car is substantially similar. Thus: "It may be said, however, that, where a person is
presented itself to the parties for us to be able to say that this or that element having
nearing a street crossing toward which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party
been isolated, negligence is shown. The factors that enter the judgment are too many
to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the exigencies of
and diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of itself to yield the correct
the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has a right to
answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses. Every case
presume that such duty will be performed."
must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must
be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now allege that there has been a drift away
objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out. from the apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above cases
evidenced by Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 18 the controlling facts of which, however,
In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to
are easily distinguishable from what had been correctly ascertained in the present
impute negligence to defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do
case. Such a deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this
not call for that conclusion.
jurisdiction but also of the United States.

4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment. Plaintiff-


This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice Holmes, he
appellant apparently had in mind this portion of the opinion of the lower court: "The
had the following to say: "Especially noteworthy in this respect is the attempt Mr.
weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a
Justice Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Goodman, to 'lay down a standard
signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own,
once for all,' which would require an automobile driver approaching a railroad
ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss Jr., who
crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure
undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that
otherwise that no train is coming to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is
sound enough: it is by no means proper care to cross a railroad track without taking PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
reasonable precautions against a train, and normally such precautions will require GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY
looking, hearing, and a stop, or at least slow speed, where the view is obstructed." 19 CORPORATION, respondents.

Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pakora v. Wabash Railway, 20 where, SARMIENTO, J.:
according to Prosser, it being shown that "the only effective stop must be made upon
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are 1) the decision 1 of the then
the railway tracks themselves, in a position of obligation danger, the court disregarded
Intermediate Appellate Court 2 in AC-G.R. CV No. 01055, entitled "Pedro T. Layugan,
any such uniform rule, rejecting the 'get out of the car' requirement as 'an uncommon
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Godofredo Isidro, Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party
precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous,' and saying that the
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation, Third Party
driver need not always stop. 'Illustrations such as these,' said Mr. Justice Cardozo
Defendant- Appellant, "which reversed and set aside the decision 3 of the Regional
'bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Cabanatuan City, and also dismissed
rules of law.... Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or
the complaint, third party complaint, and the counter claims of the parties and 2) the
regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal." 21
resolution 4 denying the plaintiff-appellee's (herein petitioner) motion for
What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth reconsideration, for lack of merit.
earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in
The findings of fact by the trial court which were adopted by the appellate court are as
accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be
follows: 5
no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee
xxx xxx xxx
acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that
mm What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
court: "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with Plate No. SU-730 which
the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the
was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck
tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff,
was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia
advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible
Research and Medical Center and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent
accident and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will incur more expenses as he
allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have recuperates from said injuries; that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a
acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do." 22
lifetime income in the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00); and that
he agreed to pay his lawyer the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the
complaint, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. As prayed for by the plaintiffs counsel, the Court declared the defendant in default on
October 12, 1979, and plaintiff's evidence was received ex-parte on January 11, 1978
and February 19, 1980. The decision on behalf of the plaintiff was set aside to give a
chance to the defendant to file his answer and later on, a third-party complaint.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly, at the rate of ONE HUNDRED
Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a PESOS (Pl00.00) per trip. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had
truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck to use crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he supported his family sufficiently, but
allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards after getting injured, his family is now being supported by his parents and brother.
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident
GODOFREDO ISIDRO, defendant/third-party plaintiff, testified that his truck involved
was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device,
in this vehicular accident is insured with the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation
hence the driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by the truck
covering own damage and third-party liability, under vehicle policy No. 11723 (Exh.
of the herein defendant in the amount of more than P20,000.00; that plaintiff being a
"1") dated May 30, 1978; that after he filed the insurance claim the insurance
mere bystander and hitchhiker must suffer all the damages he incurred. By way of
company paid him the sum of P18,000.00 for the damages sustained by this truck but
counterclaim defendant alleged that due to plaintiffs baseless complaint he was
not the third party liability.
constrained to engage the services of counsel for P5,000.00 and P200.00 per court
appearance; that he suffered sleepless nights, humiliation, wounded feelings which DANIEL SERRANO, defendant driver, declared that he gave a statement before the
may be estimated at P30.000.00.
municipal police of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya on May 16, 1979; that he knew the
responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner
On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his
used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by
insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff, without
Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence
admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant is liable to
presented, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff
the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their contract under
was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police report confirmed the
Insurance Policy No. 11723 which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising
allegation of the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-examination. The
from death, bodily injuries and damage to property.
collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the
Third-party defendant answered that, even assuming that the subject matter of the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
complaint is covered by a valid and existing insurance policy, its liability shall in no The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated (Exh. "C")
case exceed the limit defined under the terms and conditions stated therein; that the when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work depriving him
complaint is premature as no claim has been submitted to the third party defendant as of his income. (pp. 118 to 120, Record on Appeal.)
prescribed under the Insurance Code; that the accident in question was
Upon such findings, amply supported by the evidence on record, the trial court
approximately caused by the carelessness and gross negligence of the plaintiff-, that
rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: 6
by reason of the third-party complaint, third-party defendant was constrained to
engage the services of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendant is hereby ordered: a) To pay the
plaintiff SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS actual and compensatory
Pedro Layugan declared that he is a married man with one (1) child. He was
damages; b) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for attorney's fees; c) FIVE
employed as security guard in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, with a salary of SIX
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for moral damages; and d) To pay the costs of this
HUNDRED PESOS (600.00) a month. When he is off-duty, he worked as a truck
suit. On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant is ordered to indemnify the
helper and while working as such, he sustained injuries as a result of the bumping of
defendant/third party plaintiff-. a) The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
the cargo truck they were repairing at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya by the
PESOS for actual and compensatory damages; and b) The costs of this suit.
driver of the defendant. He used to earn TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) to
The Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated reversed the decision of the trial Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact are
court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party complaint, and the counter- claims conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 8) the facts
of both appellants. 7 set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and 9) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
Hence, this petition.
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.

The petitioner alleges the following errors. 8


Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case to warrant a deviation from

1. WHETHER UPON THE GIVEN FACTS, THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE the general rule.

COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE AND


From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round logs 13 the
DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT.
Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck could not have been

2. WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that the same was parked on a
portion of the road 14 at the time of the accident. Consequently, the respondent court
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH PROPER JURIS-
PRUDENTIAL (sic) BASIS. inferred that the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked
truck.15 The inference or conclusion is manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is
The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error of the decision of the grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court could
respondent court finding the petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa have reversed the finding of the trial court that a warning device was
loquitur (The thing speaks for itself).<re||an1w> Corollary thereto, is the question installed 16 escapes us because it is evident from the record that really such a
as to who is negligent, if the doctrine is inapplicable. device, in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the
parked truck three to four meters from the rear of his parked truck.17 We see this
The respondent corporation stresses that the issues raised in the petition being
negative finding of the respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts and the
factual, the same is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review by certiorari. 9
evidence on record and directly contravening the positive finding of the trial court that

Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that an early warning device was in proper place when the accident happened and that

its findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by the driver of the private respondent was the one negligent. On the other hand, the

this Court. 10 For if we have to review every question of fact elevated to us, we would respondent court, in refusing to give its "imprimatur to the trial court's finding and

hardly have any more time left for the weightier issues compelling and deserving our conclusion that Daniel Serrano (private respondent Isidro's driver) was negligent in

preferential attention.11 Be that as it may, this rule is not inflexible. Surely there are driving the truck that bumped the parked truck", did not cite specific evidence to

established exceptions 12 when the Court should review and rectify the findings of support its conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and nebulously adverted to

fact of the lower court, such as: unspecified "scanty evidence on record." 18

1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent corporation would want us to

conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is grave abuse of dismiss this petition on the ground that it was filed out of time. It must be noted that

discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the Court of there was a motion for extension, 19 albeit filed erroneously with the respondent

Appeals went beyond the issues of the case if the findings are contrary to the court, dated March 19, 1986, requesting for 30 days from March 20, 1986, to file the

admission of both the appellant and the appellee; 6) the findings of the Court of necessary petition or pleading before the Supreme Court". Also, on April 1, 1986, an
appearance of a new lawyer for the petitioner before the Supreme Court" with
motion 20 was filed, again erroneously, with the Court of Appeals, requesting for 20 highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life
days extension "to file the Petition for Review on Certiorari." Likewise a similar and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who
motion 21 was filed with this Court also on April 1, 1986. On the other hand, the claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist
instant petition for review was filed on April 17, 1986 22 but it was only after three negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle.
months, on August 1, 1986, in its comment 23 that the respondent corporation raised Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is
the issue of tardiness. The respondent corporation should not have waited in ambush shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right
before the comment was required and before due course was given. In any event, to to be on the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be
exact its "a pound of flesh", so to speak, at this very late stage, would cause a grave there. Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a
miscarriage of justice. Parenthetically, it must be noted that private respondent Isidro reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning
did not raise this issue of late filing. device, like that required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed
We now come to the merits of this petition.
considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent
such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine
The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of

regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the
flat tire of the said truck. 27
prudent and reasonable man would not do24 or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.25 The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked
truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed.28 Moreover, there is the admission of
In Picart vs. Smith, 26 decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we
respondent Isidro's driver, Daniel Serrano, to Wit: 29
held:
Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)Will you narrate to me in brief how
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
the accident happens (sic) if you can still remember?
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
That on or about 10:40 p.m., 15 May 1979 while driving Isuzu truck at Baretbet,
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
his (sic) lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded with intense glare of the light that's
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
why I did not notice a parked truck who (sic) was repairing a front flat tire. When I was
him. The Law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I step (sic) on
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the (Emphasis supplied).
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue
side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
the truck. 30 But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still bumped the
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. His left leg was later
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 33 Or as Black's Law
amputated from below the knee when gangrene had set in. 31
Dictionary 34 puts it:
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that
Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that in
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence
respondent court committed reversible error.
whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that
The respondent court ruled: 32 accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it
lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
xxx xxx xxx
that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control
of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 133,
In addition to this, we agree with the following arguments of appellant Godofredo
Isidro which would show that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the 155. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an
inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was
driver of the cargo truck:
caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
xxx xxx xxx defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
... In the case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence was (sic) observed
is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as adverted to, the motorists have the right to In this jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a number of cases, notably in
be on the road, while the immobile truck has no business, so to speak, to be there. It Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., 35 and the latest is in the case of F.F. Cruz and
is thus for the plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver Co., Inc. vs. CA.36
and he himself did employ early warning device such as that required by law or by
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
some other adequate means or device that would properly forewarn vehicles of the
impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place and other negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without

peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 37 The doctrine

bar, will evoke the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is not a rule of substantive law 38 but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural

on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing convenience. 39 The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof
the flat tire of said truck. (pp. 14-17, Appellant's Brief). (Emphasis supplied).
of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. 40 It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.41 The doctrine can be invoked respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the
when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial 47 The private respondent
not readily available. 42 Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough
inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the
plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. 43 Finally, once the actual cause of injury concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any,
circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's)
liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, 44 as in this truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of
case. a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the
selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5,
thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer
of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the respondent
or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris court as well as its Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are
tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated January 20, 1983, is
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the hereby REINSTATED in toto. With costs against the private respondents. SO
selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good ORDERED.
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. 45 In
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS
disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the
SANTOS, accused-appellant.
negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
to instruct him to be careful in driving. 46
One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is
City, reported over print and broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several
clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were undergoing an endurance
check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered
run as part of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much
earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and effort was spared for the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-
thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the appellant Glenn de los Santos (hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to local
private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver
authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the 3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as follows:
4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within
5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking 6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito
advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from behind in a While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident,
sudden and unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle members of the while the following eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the
Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an Endurance Run of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some
35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to cause other than said accuseds spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and
Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a able medical assistance rendered on the following victims which prevented their
column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, death, to wit:
thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st
1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo
man to the last man, unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or
moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of 2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan
Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil 3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala
Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo
echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands at the
accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a 5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza
distance of 100 meters away from the joggers rear portion, but which accused failed
and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu 6. Arman Neri Hernaiz

Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw
While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:
themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping, or ramming
the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of 1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera
said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that bodies of the
victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, 2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano

continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the
3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang
succeeding joggers on said 1st line, as a result thereof the following were killed on the
spot: 4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion

1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco 5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro

2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas


after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel,
behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless. conducted an ocular inspection of the place where the incident happened. They then
proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City Prosecutor
Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
manifested, thus:

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle
Operation Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on
which [was] involved in the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light
1 September 1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of the training
blue with strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well as in front.
was the endurance run from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The
We further manifest that the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the
run on 5 October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three
front just below the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the
columns: the first and second of which had 22 trainees each, and the third had
impact. The lower portion was likewise damaged more particularly in the radiator
21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black
guard. The bumper of said vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut
combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging
of the plastic used as a bumper; that the right side of the headlight was likewise totally
trainees. When they reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was instructed to
damaged. The front signal light, right side was likewise damaged. The side mirror was
dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging
likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from the ground to the lower portion
trainees were occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were
of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front level is 5 ft.[4]
assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming
vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles to take the left lane.[1] PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at
Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several
Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were
members of the PNP came to their station and reported that they had been bumped
assigned as rear guards of the first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum
by a certain vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other
Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which
policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only
slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.[2]
bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle remained on the
highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to
While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at
high speed towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of conclude that the brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen

100 meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. long.[5]

the other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their
GLENNs version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:
signals and coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit
them, the rear guards told their co-trainees to retract. The guards forthwith jumped in At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez
different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by the said and the latters fellow band members to provide them with transportation, if possible
vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were an Isuzu Forward, that would bring their band instruments, band utilities and band
overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first members from Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From
and second columns. The guards then stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their there, they were supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the
comrades from being hit again.[3] San Miguel-sponsored Sabado Nights of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October
1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from him.[6] Since
the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, thuds, he was not able to pump the brake, nor did he notice that his foot was pushing
GLENN immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions woke up and
truck. After which, he proceeded back to his house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, said to him: Gard, it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all
and told his wife that he would go to Bukidnon to get his aunts Isuzu Forward truck die. Due to its momentum, the Elf continued on its track and was able to stop only
because the twenty band members and nine utilities and band instruments could not when it was already very near the next curve.[10]
be accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked to go along,
GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the
namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Pea, and a certain Akut.[7]
right headlights of the truck had been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his
After leaving GLENNs house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza confusion and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did not report the
Restaurant. GLENN saw his kumpare Danilo Cosin and the latters wife, and joined incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he
them at the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer. When the Cosin had hit. It was only when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the
spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at truck was broken; the side mirror and round mirror, missing; and the windshield,
12:00 midnight for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred,
rains. It took them sometime looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the and he realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that
truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had mechanical same day to Governor Emano.[11]
problems. Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting
The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the
that they would use the Isuzu Elf truck instead.[8]
PAG-ASA Office, Cagayan de Oro City. The former testified that when he went to
GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was GLENNs house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy rain; and at
no moon or star; neither were there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate. He corroborated GLENNs testimony that he
companions used the national highway, traversing the right lane going to Cagayan de (Crescente) went to GLENNs house that evening in order to hire a truck that would
Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left bring the band instruments, band utilities and band members from Cagayan de Oro to
curve going slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.[12] Almazan, on the other hand, testified that
from the opposite direction of the national highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there
a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to dim. GLENN was rain from 8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was
switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she
kilometers per hour. It was only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meant by overcast is that there was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and
meters from each other that the other cars headlights were switched from bright to stars could not be seen.[13]
dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to
The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100
sudden darkness.[9]
meters away from the place where the incident occurred. He testified that he was
It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter, a man came to
passing the oncoming vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping his house and asked for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a
thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot on the brake vehicle. Danilo further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil
pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was was dry and not muddy.[14]
trembling and could not see what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping
In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal
crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, intent, should be indulged.[18]
with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic
suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in
GLENNs part.
the amount of P30,000; and each of the victims of attempted murder in the amount of
P10,000. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the
incident was very dark, as there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASAs observed
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a)
weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50
in finding that he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the
kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was
rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence,
truck to run even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could
there was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts
still have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and
that illuminated the highway.
glaring light from the oncoming vehicle.

Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts,
In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that the accused out of mischief and dare-
black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to
devilness [sic], in the exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three
make out on that dark and cloudy night.The rear guards had neither reflectorized
bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the rear guard[s] and see them
vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.
scamper away as they saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them
down.[15] Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENNs
Likewise, the OSG posits that the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging
vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENNs truck
trainees was probably brought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3)
such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
bottles of beer earlier before the incident.[16]

Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENNs testimony that he


Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., the possibility
had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming
that [GLENN] could have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30
vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been
in the early morning, and thus was not able to stop his Isuzu Elf truck when the
still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he
bumping thuds were occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up
plowed into the group of police trainees.
upon hearing the shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping
thuds had already occurred.[17] Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place
the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more
killing the same; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be
scrupulous in weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial courts finding
inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and
that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was
three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have
wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional
deliberately hit the group with his truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of
hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It
bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to
as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene. grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them
with intent to kill.
For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENNs vehicle to
the confluence of the following factors: Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the
assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining
1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were
which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true.[20] Thus,
applied the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum,
in People v. Godinez,[21] this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of
albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
the accused becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his

2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine version that the shooting was purely accidental.

and smooth asphalt, free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or
Neither is there any showing of a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of
excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little bit downward, more particularly
police elements disguised in a vehicular accident.[22] Even if there be such
from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and faster to traverse
evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion
a distance of 20 to 25 meters which was the approximate aggregate distance from the
movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the case, the proper
first elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.
charge would be rebellion, and not murder.[23]

3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms
GLENNs offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or
only) could hardly make an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at
to a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done
a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour.
so, many trainees would have been spared.

4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and
We have once said:
the under chassis was elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat
on the ground without its rubber tires running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires. duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and
5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was
for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable
proceeding, the forward movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum of
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-
the forward-moving truck such that there was even much lesser force resisting the
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.[24]
said ongoing momentum.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man,
explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the Court
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so,
should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused.[19]
the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions
to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,[28] the accused was
born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.[25] convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex
crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal
reckless imprudence, and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead
Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
Appeals,[29] the accused was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
with damage to property through reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place. The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through
reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have
felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be
known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the
treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have,
first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it
therefore, been filed.
was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse,
the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated
accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing
speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a
the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such
opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the defect.[30] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time. object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
injuries and less serious physical injuries. intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the
applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3
victim, therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof
as acts or omissions punishable by law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or
raises the penalty by one degree.[31] Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides
fault (culpa).[26] In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[27] we ruled that if a reckless,
that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise its sound discretion
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of
through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who
in the imposition of the penalty.[32] suffered minor physical injuries.

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro
that GLENN escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims. It City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-
being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the
for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an
injuries, the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said penalty, which years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless imprudence
is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty
of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced of two (2) months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for
to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period. each group of heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in
favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel
Pangca[33] and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis SO ORDERED.
Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SEBASTIAN M.
aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.
BAKING, Respondent.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr.
indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in
Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG,
degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could
blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondents
properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the
blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
two medical prescriptions Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render
triglyceride.
assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch)
period, as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for
crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum
Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was
term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law will not Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
apply.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one
As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the pill of Dormicum on three consecutive days November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m.,
same. Conformably with current jurisprudence,[34] we reduce the trial courts award of
November 7 at 6:00 a.m., and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition lacks merit and, therefore,
vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. should be denied.
Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the
The issues for our resolution are:
collision nor felt its impact.

1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental
proximate cause of respondents accident; and
state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Upon being
shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent 2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. of the suit is justified.

Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
80 of Quezon City a complaint for damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-94-20193. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 18, 1997 in favor of no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
respondent, thus:
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant;
the latter to pay mitigated damages as follows: and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.3
1. 250,000.00 as moral damages;

There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.


2. 20,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses;

It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
3. plus % of the cost of the suit.
The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees
SO ORDERED. will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.
the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
November 5, 2002. Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake
Hence, this petition.
could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should

Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with law have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether
the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician.
or prevailing jurisprudence.
The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
demands.41awphi1.nt caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents
part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over
negligence in driving his car.
him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear

We disagree. showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.6 Here,
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the damages caused by the latter.
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy,
and precedent.5 As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendants wrongful act or omission is the
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
resulting in a collision. of the Civil Code.7

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states: Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral
damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
the accident caused by the negligence of petitioners employee.
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable
xxx
amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible facts. However, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.8 Taking into

for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the consideration the attending circumstances here, we are convinced that the amount

latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. awarded by the trial court is exorbitant. Thus, we reduce the amount of moral
damages from 250,000.00 to 50,000.00 only.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229

not engaged in any business or industry. allows the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public
good. As mentioned earlier, the drugstore business is affected with public interest.
xxx Petitioner should have exerted utmost diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. On the part of the employee concerned, she should have been extremely
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the sensitive nature of its
mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
business, petitioner must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness.
prevent damage.
Therefore, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of 25,000.00 is in
order.1awphi1.nt

On the matter of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the
reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the
court.9 Since the trial courts decision did not give the basis of the award, the same
must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric
Company,10 we held:

Likewise, the award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses should be deleted.
Well-enshrined is that "an award for attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the
courts decision and not in the dispositive portion only" (Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Hua
Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also true
with the litigation expenses where the body of the decision discussed nothing for its
basis.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435 are AFFIRMED with modification in the
sense that (a) the award of moral damages to respondent is reduced from
250,000.00 to 50,000.00; (b) petitioner is likewise ordered to pay said respondent
exemplary damages in the amount of 25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorneys
fees and litigation expenses is deleted.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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