Having charged that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Pineda and Coderes,

it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that all the accused had come to an
agreement concerning the transport of shabu and had decided to execute the
agreement.[36]

In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v. People[37] is instructive:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together,
however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of
criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be
a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of
intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime
committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the
mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even
approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough
for purposes of conviction.[38]

In this case, the prosecution, other than its bare assertions that petitioner and
accused conspired in transporting the shabu, failed to establish that there was
indeed a conscious criminal design existing between and among petitioner and
accused to commit the said offense. True, petitioner was in the drivers seat of the
parked car on that fateful day of December 15, 2003, but it could not be deduced
that he was even aware that Pineda had with him two plastic containers containing
shabu, nor did he accord any form of assistance to Pineda. According to PO2
Jovenir, these plastic containers were placed inside a bag and Pineda tried to
conceal these under his seat.[39] These facts, standing alone, cannot give rise to a
presumption of conspiracy. Certainly, conspiracy must be proven through clear
and convincing evidence. Indeed, it is possible that petitioner was telling the truth
when he said that he merely met with accused in order to offer the car for sale, as
that was his part-time business.[40]

It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required
to establish the crime proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere presence at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy.[41] In fine, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove and
establish conspiracy. Necessarily, petitioner should be held accountable only for
his alleged respective participation in the commission of the offense.[42]
(MICHAEL SAN JUAN y CRUZ, vs. People G.R. No. 177191 May 30, 2011)

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the

offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance
tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accuseds
liberty. We apply these principles in this case.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[14] The essence of conspiracy is the
unity of action and purpose.[15] Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime
itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests.[16] However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not
sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of
the responsibility of the assailants.[17] What is determinative is proof establishing that the
accused were animated by one and the same purpose.[18]

ROSIE QUIDET, VS. PEOPLE G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010