Professional Documents
Culture Documents
modernizing
public
Transportation
2010 World Resources Institute
Report by:
DARIO HIDALGO
Senior Transport Engineer
EMBARQ, The WRI Center for Sustainable Transport
dhidalgo@wri.org
AILEEN CARRIGAN
Transport and Urban Planning Associate
EMBARQ, The WRI Center for Sustainable Transport
acarrigan@wri.org
FOREWORD
EMBARQ, WRI's Center for Sustainable Transport,
promotes the use of bus rapid transit (BRT) around
the world as a sustainable, high-impact and relatively
low-cost transport solution. The data compiled for this
report confirms that BRT can provide high-capacity
With more of the worlds population up to 45,000 passengers an hour in each direction
living in urban areas than ever before, with comparatively low capital investmentless than
and the largest agglomerations now home to more than US$12.5 million per kilometer. Equally impressively, the
10 million people, cities today face urgent and complex modernized or new transit systems we looked at were
development challenges. implemented relatively quicklyin only two to five
years from concept to commissioningand were able
In managing growth and providing services, planners to break even or require small operational subsidies.
and politicians increasingly seek to balance economic
priorities with sustainable development that meets social The report also summarizes common pitfalls and
needs and mitigates environmental impacts. This report shortcomings encountered in these 13 cities in
examines efforts by major cities across Latin America and designing, financing and implementing BRT and
Asia to apply such approaches to public transport. citywide bus systems.
Urban transportation systems significantly affect cities We hope our findings will enable urban transportation
quality of life and, through associated air pollution agencies in cities already pursuing sustainable solutions
and greenhouse gases, the wider regional and global to learn from others experiences, improve their systems,
environments. These impacts can be mitigated by and achieve greater transport, environmental and public
sustainable transport policies which promote cleaner, health impacts. We also hope that cities embarking on
more efficient public transport systems in order to new transportation projects can draw on our analysis
reduce congestion, minimize travel times, reduce GHG to avoid the shortcomings of others approaches in
emissions and local air pollutants, decrease road traffic delivering environmentally and financially sustainable
injuries and deaths and improve public health. transport solutions.
Sustainable urban transport can have measurable As the world searches for low-cost, low-carbon transport
positive impacts and externalities, but in order to solutions, this report underlines that BRT projects should
realize its full potential to transform cities, a transport be championed and prioritized, especially in developing
project must be planned, implemented and operated countries where infrastructure financing options are
effectively. This is far from an easy task, involving a more limited and rapid motorization is exacerbating
myriad political, financial, technical, institutional and urban problems of congestion, pollution and road traffic
communication challenges. injuries and deaths.
In order to shed light on these challenges, Modernizing We thank the city officials, experts and professionals who
Public Transportation: Lessons Learned from Major Bus shared their data and were candid about their transport
Improvements in Latin America and Asia, presents projects challenges and shortcomings, in order that
a comparative analysis of the performance of 13 others may learn from their experiences. We believe
modernized bus systems in cities including Bogot, their willingness to share processes undergone and
So Paulo, and Santiago, Jakarta and Beijing. The result lessons learned will give rise to improved urban transport
is an illuminating snapshot of the state of practice of planning, design, implementation and operation,
bus transport in Latin America and Asia, highlighting ultimately bringing a better quality of life and cleaner
both common hurdles and problems encountered, environments to the cities of the emerging world.
and positive lessons learned, from recent efforts to
make getting around mega-cities more efficient and Jonathan Lash
environmentally-friendly. President
Executive
Summary
The mega-cities of Latin America and Asia in 13 Latin American and Asian cities. In particular,
rely on public transport to keep their citizens it reviews and synthesizes information regarding
moving and economies working while mitigating challenges experienced by transport system decision
the negative environmental impacts of rapid makers in three key areas: planning, implementation
motorization. Increasingly, these cities are upgrading and operations. In order to assist urban transport
or even transforming their public transport systems planners and implementing agencies, the study also
to better serve the needs of their populations and provides recommendations on avoiding or mitigating
the environment. Some of these efforts have been similar difficulties when introducing bus reforms
more successful than others and some more widely in developing world cities.
publicized. To date, however, there has been no
synthesis of benefits and shortcomings of the various The selected cities were chosen for several reasons
approaches taken, in order to inform future urban including: long-term recognition in urban transport
transport projects in emerging nations. There are several practices, multi-functional land usage practices for
studies, for example, about the celebrated successes urban environments, and/or the recent1 completion
of the TransMilenio bus rapid transit system in Bogot, of bus system improvements. The review includes the
Colombia, and its counterpart in Curitiba, Brazil, but following cities: Curitiba, Quito, Bogot, So Paulo,
little literature on the shortcomings of these, and similar Len, Mxico City, Pereira, Guayaquil, Santiago and
systems, creating an informational gap in constructive Guadalajara in Latin America, and Jakarta, Beijing and
advice on lessons to be learned. Ahmedabad in Asia. The cities vary in size and socio-
economic characteristics (see table 1), but in each case
This study seeks to fill that information gap by buses account for a substantial portion of total public
summarizing key findings and lessons learned from transport use and bus rapid transit (BRT) was introduced
a comprehensive review of major bus improvements as a component of reform.
0.878
Santiago Chile 5,700,000 2,896
(44)
0.772
Beijing China 10,850,000 14,505
(92)
3,236
Quito 1,550,000
0.806
Ecuador
(80)
Guayaquil 2,460,000 7,130
0.612
Ahmedabad India 5,340,000 11,459
(134)
0.734
Jakarta Indonesia 13,670,000 10,051
(111)
0.854
Mxico City Mxico 19,240,000 9,286
(53)
Sources: Data from City Mayors, Statistics, http://www.citymayors.com/sections/rankings_content.html; United Nations Environment
Programme, Human Development Index (HDI) 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org; Department of Risaralda, Colombia, http://risaralda.com.co/;
City of Guayaquil, http://www.guayaquil.gov.ec/; CST India, EMBARQ Center for Sustainable Transport, Transport in Cities, India Indicators,
2009, http://www.embarq.org/en/india-transport-indicators; Mxico National Institute for Federalism and Municipal Development, E-Local,
http://www.e-local.gob.mx
a HDI rank is out of 182 countries.
2 Not including costs of public space and mixed-traffic road improvements that are sometimes carried out at the same time as BRT construction.
Implementation Phase
OVERVIEW
operation, and minimal vehicle and infrastructure
maintenance. The cities also suffered from high levels
of congestion, accidents, emissions (of local air
pollutants and carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse
gas), as well as noise pollution. A common feature
All 13 cities reviewed in this report of traditional transit services is competition among
embraced bus rapid transit in response to vehicles for passengers known as war of the penny,
dysfunctional and inefficient transport conditions, competition on the street, or competition in-the-
public discontent, and critical environmental and road market3, which often leads to oversupply of buses
safety conditions (Hidalgo and Graftieaux 2008). With and low-quality service.
the exception of Brazil, China and India, prior to the
implementation of the new bus systems, traditional Compared to the other countries, Brazil had developed
bus services were operated by private providers under stronger institutions and regulations to plan and manage
semi-deregulated fares and routes, coupled with weak the bus transit services at the local level under private
planning, enforcement, and control strategies (Orrico provision by large companies (Orrico Filho et al. 2007). In
Filho et al. 2007). While traditional bus transport in the contrast, China and India had mainly kept transit provision
featured cities was notable for its low user fares and under local public agencies. Despite the differences in
extended coverage, it also featured major inefficiencies regulation and ownership, services in So Paulo, Beijing
and negative impacts on the surrounding environment. and Ahmedabad were considered of poor quality before
Weak local government regulation had resulted in changes were made: crowded, slow, and unreliable due
excessive bus fleets, inadequate vehicle sizes, obsolete to lack of integration, inadequate infrastructure, and
equipment, long routes with inefficient and irregular interference from general traffic congestion.
3 Term commonly used by transport economists as opposed to competition for-the-market which is generated through bidding processes
for service or concession contracts. Competition in-the-market often leads to high fares, oversupply of buses and low quality service, while
Bus Rapid
competition for-the-market can result in lower user fares, benefitting the public (Ardila, 2003).
City Supply/
General Description Comments
Project (initial year) Demand
Curitiba Citywide integrated bus system with 2,200 vehicles, including 114 7 private operators under
RIT five BRT corridors (65 km of median bi-articulated diesels as well as agreements with a public authority.
(1973) busways), 139 stations, 26 terminals, articulated, conventional, small
340 km of feeder routes, 185 km of buses, special service buses; New 22 km BRT corridor under
inter-district circular routes, 250 km electronic fare collection system. construction.
of "rapid bus" routes; total of 340 bus
lines and 1,100 km of bus routes. 2.26 million passengers/day.
Quito Three BRT corridors (37 km, mostly 189 articulated buses (113 trolley Public operator/owner (Trolebs and
Metrobs-Q median busways); 68 stations, 9 buses), 185 feeder buses, coin- Ecova corridors), private operator
(1995) terminals; integrated feeder services; based fare collection. (North corridor), no fare integration
centralized control (separately for among corridors. Discussion to
each corridor) 560,000 passengers/day. replace Trolebs with an LRT.
Bogot High-capacity BRT system with 84 1,190 articulated buses, Five private groups, partially formed
TransMilenio km median busways, 104 stations, 10 bi-articulated buses, by some traditional operators, hold
(2000) 10 integration points, integrated 448 feeder buses, electronic concession contracts for 7 trunk and
feeder services and advanced fare collection system. 6 feeder zones. Two new corridors
centralized control. (22 km) under development as well
1.6 million passengers/day. as a citywide reform of traditional bus
services. Metro system under study.
So Paulo Integrated system under single 13,711 buses: 1,073 articulated, Private operators under concession
Integrated System fare with partial BRT treatments in 5,599 padron (90-passenger), contracts with the municipal public
(2002) some corridors (e.g. Passa-Rapido 2,423 conventional, 3,063 microbus agency SPTrans. Integration has
corridor).104 km median busways, (21-passenger), 1,553 minibus been expanded to regional rail and
preferential bus lanes, 327 transfer (42-passenger), integrated several municipal services within the
stations, 24 terminals. electronic fare collection system. metropolitan area.
6 million passengers/day.
Len 3 BRT trunk corridors with 55 articulated buses; 500 auxiliary Thirteen existing private
SIT-Optibs 25km median busways and feeder buses; electronic fare concessionaries formed 4 new
(2003) (60% segregated), 3 terminals, collection system. operators for trunk-ways and continue
51 stations, integrated feeder feeder services operation. System
services, centralized control. 220,000 passengers/day. under expansion (Phase II) including
reorganization of citywide services.
Jakarta Three BRT trunk corridors with 37 162 conventional buses (12 m), Two private operators, physical
Transjakarta km median busway, 4 terminals, electronic fare collection system. integration with commuter train and
(2004) 63 stations, poor integrated feeder, local buses.
centralized control 260,000 passengers/day.
Mxico City Two BRT corridors, 50 km median 209 articulated buses, Eight bus operators, (one public),
Metrobs busway, 77 stations, four terminals, 12 bi-articulated buses, electronic two fare collection contractors,
Insurgentes centralized control using ITS fare collection system. physical integration with regional
(2005) buses, regional rail and Metro.
450,000 passengers/day.
Table 2 (continuted)
City Supply/
General Description Comments
Project (initial year) Demand
Beijing One BRT trunk corridor with 16 km 60 articulated low-floor buses, One private operator, and
Beijing BRT median busway, one terminal, 19 manual fare collection system. physical integration with Metro.
(2005) stations, centralized control.
120,000 passengers/day.
Pereira 16 km exclusive busways (50% in 52 articulated buses, 82 small feeder Two private operators of buses,
Megabs median, 50% on left side on one-way buses, electronic fare collection and one fare collection concessionaire.
(2006) streets in downtown), plus 800m control system.
in mixed traffic on a major bridge,
37 stations, two terminals, 115,000 passengers/day.
centralized control.
Guayaquil 35 km exclusive bus lanes on the 92 articulated buses, 80 feeder One private concessionaire for
Metrova median or left side on one way buses, electronic fare collection bus operations, one fare collection
(2006) streets, 60 stations, 3 terminals, system. and technology provider. System
centralized control. expansion in 2007.
300,000 passengers/day.
Santiago 18.8 km of segregated corridors, 1,200 new low-floor articulated Buses privately operated through 14
Transantiago 4.6 km of new road connections, buses, 1,500 conventional trunk concession contracts: one private
(2007) 62.7 km of improvements in road buses (to be gradually replaced by operator for financial management,
geometry and pavements (in seven new low-floor buses), and 2,300 one private operator for systems
corridors), 70 large bus shelters feeder buses. Integrated electronic integration (control and user
along the main corridors, and three fare collection system. information), and one public operator
intermodal stations. (Metro).
5.7 million passengers/day.
45 km expansion of Metro network.
Guadalajara 16km of median busways, 27 41 articulated buses, 103 feeder Good integration with light rail system
Macrobs stations, integrated feeders, buses, electronic fare collection. and feeder routes, one private
(2009) centralized control. concessionaire for bus operations.
127,000 passengers/day.
Ahmedabad 18km of exclusive median busways, 25 conventional trunk buses, One public bus operator, one private
Janmarg 26 stations, centralized control. manual fare collection. fare collection contract and one ITS
(2009) contract.
35,000 passengers/day.
Sources: Data from Curitiba http://www.curitiba.pr.gov.br; Quito http://www.quito.gov.ec; Bogot http://www.transmilenio.gov.co; Prefeitura
do Municipio de So Paulo, O Plano do Transporte Pblico em Implantacao na Gestao de 2001-04, 2004; Direcin General de Transporte,
Municipalidad de Len, Sistema Integrado de Transporte Optibs; Movilidad Amable, Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable, Mxico D.F.,
Metrobs: Bienvenidos a Bordo, Septiembre de 2005; Institute for Transportation & Development Policy, Making Transjakarta a World Class
BRT System: Final Recommendations, June 2005; Beijing Transportation Research Center, BRT Demonstration Project BRT in South-Middle
Corridor in Beijing, Brief Report on Feasibility Study, September, 2003; Pereira http://www.megabus.gov.co; Guayaquil http://www.metrovia-
gye.com/start.htm; Santiago http://www.transantiago.cl; Santiago interviews, 2006 and 2007; Dario Hidalgo et al, El Sistema Macrobs
de Guadalajara: Un Concepto Avanzado de Planeacin e Implantacin de Transporte Masivo BRT, March 2010, http://tris.trb.org/view.
aspx?id=910301; Centre of Excellence in Urban Transport, Janmarg: BRTS Ahmedabad, After Five Months of Commercial Operations, April
2010, http://www.ahmedabadbrts.com/Reports/5th_month_report.pdf
So Paulo 6,060
Janmarg, Ahmedabad 35
Notes: Scope of the systems varies with respect to inclusion of BRT components and level of integration. For example, the data for Santiago,
So Paulo and Curitiba cover the entire citywide integrated bus systems, of which only a small portion is on BRT corridors. For all other
cities, passenger data primarily refers to BRT passengers. For Santiago and So Paulo passenger demand data is daily boardings not daily
passengers, so each transfer counts as a separate boarding. Bogot data is from 2010. Colors differentiate each city.
In terms of peak usage on a single BRT corridor, Average commercial speeds vary from Transjakartas
TransMilenios Avenida Caracas in Bogot, is the best low speed of 15 km/hour to 28 km/hour in Bogots
performing, with 43,000 passengers per hour in each TransMilenio (figure 3). Higher speeds are achieved as
direction. Passa-Rapido in So Paulo and the Alameda more BRT components are integrated. For example, the
in Santiago, with around 20,000 passengers per hour introduction of segregated busways, platform boarding,
in each direction, also carry very high volumes. High- prepayment, larger buses, express services, centralized
capacity corridors such as these have additional bus- control, and reduced numbers of intersections all
only lanes at stations to allow buses to overtake each contribute to increased average speed and effectiveness.
other. Many of the remaining corridors have single lanes
and only carry 1,800 to 13,000 passengers per hour in
each direction (figure 2).
So Paulo 20,000
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000
Passengers per hour per direction
Notes: So Paulo and Quito data from 2006. Data unavailable for Santiago.
Highest operational productivity5 was achieved in In terms of capital productivity (average number of daily
Guayaquil where Metrova reported 13 passenger passengers per bus), Guadalajaras Macrobs reported
boardings per bus-km (figure 4). The lowest levels 3,100 passengers per bus per weekday and Guayaquils
of productivity were reported in Jakarta, Beijing and Metrova nearly 3,000 (figure 5). Lowest capital
Bogot (around five passenger boardings per productivity was reported in Len with 396 passengers
bus-km). Even these relatively low levels of operational per bus per weekday6.
productivity are still five times greater than those
observed in traditional systems operating in
mixed traffic.
5 Operational productivity is defined as passenger boardings per day (output) per daily bus kilometers (input). There are external factors affecting
operational productivity such as corridor density, trip length, and availability and characteristics of transport alternatives. Conversely, there are
also internal factors such as the way routes are programmed (radial/diametric, short/long, local/express), minimum headways, and occupancy
levels, among others.
6 This figure combines segregated and mixed traffic operations.
RIT, Curitiba 19
TransMilenio, Bogot 28
So Paulo 18
SIT-Optibs, Len 18
Transjakarta, Jakarta 15
BRT 1, Beijing 21
Megabs, Pereira 20
Metrova, Guayaquil 22
Transantiago, Santiago 18
Macrobs, Guadalajara 21
Janmarg, Ahmedabad 24
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Kilometers per hour
RIT, Curitiba
So Paulo
Macrobs, Guadalajara 10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Daily passenger boardings per bus-km
Notes: Santiago, Beijing, Jakarta and Quito data from 2006. Data unavailable for Curitiba and So Paulo.
So Paulo 625
Transjakarta, Jakarta
Transantiago, Santiago
Notes: So Paulo and Quito data from 2006. Data unavailable for Jakarta and Santiago.
Total capital costs of bus system improvements varied local and external (state or national government) funds.
from US$1.4 million per kilometer (Jakarta) to US$12.5 Len and Mxico City also attracted private capital
million per kilometer (Bogot) as shown in figure 6. through concession contracts for the construction or
New transit systems requiring only minor physical improvement of stations and bus stops. Quito (Trolebs
improvements to the roadway cost in the range of and Ecova), Jakarta and Beijing purchased their buses
US$1.43.50 million per kilometer to implement. Major with public funds and the Mxico City municipality
reconstruction of corridor roadways, two bus lanes directly acquired 20% of the bus fleet7. Quito and
per direction, or new trolleybus systems required Mxico City also procured fare collection equipment
more capital investment: US$3.812.5 million per with public funds. Other systems have equipment
kilometer. In each city, the infrastructure to support provided by the private sector, which is paid back with
system operations was built by local agencies with user fares.
7 There are two operators in Mxico Citys Metrobs: a private operator CISA and a public operator RTP; the buses acquired by RTP are funded
by the municipality.
So Paulo $3.5
Transantiago, Santiago
Notes: Includes only transit infrastructure and equipment costs. Data from different years adjusted. Data unavailable for Santiago.
So Paulo and Quito data from 2006. Guayaquil reports capital costs of $0.986 million/km for the 63 lane-km, which equates
to $1.97m/km for the 31.5 system kilometers.
Total capital
Paulo whose fares are US$1.27 and 1.33 respectively
(figure 7). Most systems with fares below US$0.40
(Beijing, Ahmedabad, Jakarta, Quito, Mxico City)
either received subsidies or were financially strained.
costs of
However, Guayaquil has been able to operate the bus system
Metrova system with US$0.25 fares without subsidies,
due to its very high productivity (13.2 passenger
improvements
boardings per bus-km, and 2,975 passenger boardings were less than
per bus per day). Supervision and planning agencies
are typically funded from the general municipal
US$12.5million/km
budget and not from transit user fares.
So Paulo $1.33
OF FINDINGS:
scarce, most cities needed to rely on grants, budget
allocations from their national governments and loans.
LESSONS
The process of applying for such funds, as well as
approval of project activities by sponsoring institutions,
took several months. As a result, valuable time was lost
8 Despite the fact that Transantiago was a commitment of Ricardo Lagos as a presidential candidate, the project did not have full support
of other top government officials and many key decisions were delayed or changed through the planning and implementation process.
For instance, the leadership of the project planning and implementation team changed 4 times in 6 years.
already in place, there was an effort to make them part backing them came to the end of their elected term.
of the new operation. In general, the approach taken This was the case, for example, in Mxico City, Bogot,
by authorities was to encourage small enterprises and Len and Guayaquil. Cities where launches were rushed
owners to transform themselves into formal companies. generally suffered from problematic initial operations,
This was done either through a limited bidding process which improved within the first few months.
or direct negotiation. In Bogot and Santiago, politically
powerful transport authorities were able to open up Problems were generally encountered in the following
project operations to general bidding. This resulted in areas. Infrastructure and fare collection systems were
protests by existing bus operators but made it possible delayed due to implementation obstacles or contractual
to take advantage of competitive bidding. Other city problems, such as delays in approvals by various
authorities negotiated terms and conditions directly authorities. Another common problem was limited
with the existing operators. This resulted in easier time between bus delivery and the start of operations,
implementation (no stand-offs), but with the trade- resulting in incomplete drivers training, as was the case
off of higher costs and softer contractual conditions, in Len and Mxico City. Delays were often the result
as observed, for example, in Mxico City and Quitos of over-optimistic timetables for the delivery of
Central Norte corridor. different components.
The projects feature a diversity of scope and level In cities with new BRT projects, user education was
of integration11, even in their understanding of BRT neglected prior to system implementation causing
concepts. There are single-corridor projects without many issues during the first weeks of operation,
fare integration with feeders or other transport particularly in Mxico City and Len. In cities
modes (Mxico City, Beijing); projects with sequential launching extensive bus service changes, including
implementation of non-integrated corridors (Quito, the TransMilenio Phase II expansion in 2006 and the
Jakarta); some that gradually implement physically Transantiago launch, insufficient public information and
integrated corridors (Bogot, Guayaquil); and others education led to chaotic conditions, and, in some cases,
that deployed extended route reorganizations (So public protests requiring law enforcement.
Paulo, Santiago, Len). Judging from the outcomes
observed across the cities, sequential implementation In Quito and Bogot and during an early phase in
with clear integration of bus and other public transport Santiago12, transport operators also protested, largely
services is preferable to developing isolated corridors. due to a lack of communication and engagement by
Large-scale route reorganizations (Santiago; So city authorities. Involving existing operators through
Paulo) seem to be the best conceptual approach, as direct negotiations (Mxico City, Len, Jakarta), or
this enables optimum use of all system components. limiting external actors from the bidding processes
However, this approach can provoke significant (Bogot, Pereira, Guayaquil, So Paulo) helped to ease or
opposition from incumbent operators and carries the avoid protests and discontent. Santiago chose to have
risk of institutional or financial overreaching, as was the an open bidding process so that transport users would
case in Santiago. reap the benefits of competition for-the-market, but this
approach also generated some implementation barriers.
In particular, it necessitated the slow and costly removal
Implementation Hurdles of the obsolete bus fleet from the hands of traditional
Most of the transport systems reviewed were rushed operators who were not the new concessionaires.
and started operations without all the planned elements
in place (table 3). This was generally caused by the
need to inaugurate projects before the elected officials
11 Integration can be defined at three levels; physical, operational and fare integration. Physical integration refers to infrastructure that allows
passengers to transfer between bus routes and other modes of transport; operational integration involves coordination of schedules; fare
integration involves payment of a single fare or reduced fares for combined services.
12 A pilot implementation of feeder buses for the Metro System in Santiago in 2002 resulted in very extensive protests by existing operators;
the government used the existing laws to prosecute the operators leaders.
Curitiba, Gradually improved Operators reluctant Coin based for Manual not Gradual Negotiated
RIT over several years to buy new three decades dynamic control on implementation agreements
busesinitially electronic ticketing platformsbased made it part of between traditional
bought by the in 2006 on schedules the citys life and operators and the
municipality prepared by the development municipality
municipal urban
development
agency (URBS)
Quito, Pavements were Insufficient for Coin basedfare Manual on Scarce Large protests by
Trolebus not rehabilitated initial demand cards abandoned platforms and existing operators
and deteriorated required special selected points
rapidly programming
Quito, Ready long before Delayed due to lack Coin based without Manual on Scarcebut users Difficult to get
Ecova buses were of financebought problems platforms and knew Trolebus existing operators
available by the municipality selected points on board
Bogot, Incomplete Insufficient due to Electronic Started with Abundantsystem Protests by existing
TransMilenio gradually financial difficulties system not manual control was well received operators
Phase I introduced of operators readygradually systems gradually early pavement
introduced introduced deterioration
unreliable
Bogot, Incomplete Gradually Not prepared for Vehicles not Scarcelarge Changes in route
TransMilenio gradually introduced as expansionran out equipped with changes in route structure caused
Phase II introduced infrastructure was of fare cards automatic vehicle structure problems, user
completed locators (AVL), protests
manually controlled
So Paulo Passa-Rapido Gradually replaced Problems with No centralized Large promotion Operations did
corridors gradually over a three-year distribution of the controlAVL and of the changes not improve
introduced time span farecards telematics used in and the use of dramatically
too many terminals for user the farecards only Passa-Rapdio
transactions information, not difficulties in corridors with
to process operational actions reaching users median lanes
Len, SIT Incomplete stations Delivered Implemented Manual on Abundantinitial Lengthy feeder
Optibs and access to one shortly prior to long before platforms and quality fell short of bus tripssome
terminal implementation high-capacity selected points expectations traditional routes
no trained drivers corridors reintroduced
successful
Jakarta, Small stations and Initial fleet not Delayed No communication Scarce, there is not Performance below
Transjakarta inefficient terminal sufficient; 12m- implementation, with the buses a focus on the user expectations
buses too small technical problems
with only one door
Table 3 (continued)
Mxico City, Incomplete stations Delivered few Started with paper AVL introduced Scarce Expected speeds
Metrobs days prior to ticketsgradually three months late widespread not achieved
Insurgentes implementation replaced by confusion during problems at
no trained drivers electronic farecards the initial days of intersections and
operation with driver training
Beijing, Small and Initial fleet too Implemented Good control Scarce, there is not Very low fares
BRT 1 uncomfortable small, low-floor months after initial but still deficient a focus on the user (no subsidies
stations buses lose capacity operation operation allowed), peak
to wheel wells and period crowding
steps, poor internal due to reduced
circulation bus capacity
Pereira, Incomplete Feeder bus fleet Insufficient number Not ready for initial Large campaign, Delays in
Megabs corridors insufficient due to of fare cards operation, gradually but scarce focus on infrastructure due
provisional route extensions manual control introduced system operation to lengthy decision
terminals initial confusion process for the
relocation of utilities
Guayaquil, Most elements in Insufficient fleet Started Not ready for initial Scarce, difficulties Did not achieved
Metrova place for corridor 1 use of small buses manuallygradual operation, gradually in the initial days of the expected
for trunk operations implementation of introduced operation speeds
farecards
Santiago, Long delays Only a fraction of The fare collection Buses were not Extensive campaign Very large-scale
Transantiago in busway the contracted fleet system was not fully equipped was not enough for implementation had
construction was available fully operational and centralized particular needs of several problems
and planned bus operational resulted in a full oversight was not most users transition phase
shelters were not difficulties made week of free-of- operational using new buses
completed on it necessary to charge services on the old route
timeinsufficient increase bus and system proved
infrastructure metro fleet chaotic
Guadalajara, Second access to Insufficient driver Electronic fare Control center Extensive effort Initial commercial
Macrobs stations was not training prior to collection using (buses and traffic) but many speed was very low
available. Sidewalks implementation smart cards was completed four users were not due to lack of driver
were still being (buses were was not fully months after initial well informed, training. A fraction
upgraded. delivered operational; operation began particularly about of feeder bus users
days before was gradually the use of was dissatisfied
commissioning) introduced during smart cards due to long transfer
first four months times.
Ahmedabad, Some roadway and Bus fleet was Started manually Centralized control Extensive effort to Gradual
Janmarg station elements underestimated electronic fare was not fully educate users and implementation as
were still being (actual passenger collection using operational after provide adequate system elements
completed during demand exceeded smart cards was five monthstraffic information became available
trial operations forecasts) not fully operational lights were turned
period. One section after five months off at critical
was temporary intersections
the pavements and
stations were to be
replaced after the
monsoon season.
Sources: Interviews with stakeholders, information provided by managing agencies and news reviews
13 The only system in the review with poor ratings from the users is Transantiago. Nevertheless, ratings have improved steadily in the first
year of operation, and with the changes introduced in service and supervision, user ratings are expected to continue improving in 2008.
14 Furthermore, the cost of operation of RTP was not covered by the farebox revenue of the Metrobs corridor during the first year,
In Santiago, after a chaotic transit system launch operation, despite constant route upgrades and bus
featuring user protests, the government took action to fleet expansions. There are proposals underway to
introduce enclosed interchange facilities and exclusive integrate fares between TransMilenio and traditional
bus lanes, to expand the bus fleet, and to provide services citywide, to build an integrated Metro system,
stronger control mechanisms. Improvements during the and to explore a light rail alternative. These discussions
first three years of operation were significant, and by the have slowed action for short-term improvements in the
end of 2009 Transantiago was perceived as providing existing TransMilenio system, such as new connections
a higher-quality service than previous operations. The among corridors, construction of intermediate return
outlook in Santiago is positive, with structural changes points, introduction of bi-articulated buses and
completed citywide and a clear improvement plan in reduction of competition from traditional bus services
place, including the implementation of high-capacity on parallel routes.
infrastructure in the trunk corridors.
In Jakarta, both facilities and buses need expanding and
In the case of Quito, the Central Norte Corridor upgrading. Given that the systems corridors are handled
infrastructure has not yet been completed, and the by different operators using dissimilar fare collection
capacity of the Trolleybus has been exceeded, sparking technologies, Jakarta has been unable to reach fare
interest in a Light Rail Transit (LRT) alternative. Moreover, integration and passengers are required to pay twice
there is a lack of physical and fare integration among to complete their journeys.
the three BRT corridors. The LRT debate has resulted in
slow action on short-term improvements and system
integration of the BRT.
17 Private operators were required to expand the bus fleet and assume higher risks than initially established, in order to be able to improve service
quality and keep the system in operation. The government increased the oversight mechanisms and committed to create a permanent subsidy.
Curitiba, - Operating close to capacity in some sections and stations of the busway (structural corridor)
RIT - Large number of transfers required
- Insufficient service during peak hours and excessive service off-peak
- Inflexible operationsno clear balance between supply and demand
Quito, - On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods (Trolebs and Ecova)
Metrobs-Q - Long waiting and travel times in feeder buses (Central Norte)
- Non-integrated corridors
- Buses were subsidizedno funding for vehicle replacement (Trolebs)
- Demand below expectations may cause financial problems to private operators (Central Norte)
- Protracted and unsuccessful contract negotiations with historic private operators (Ecova)
- Feeder buses remain under traditional operation (Central Norte)
- No clear system vision (proposed replacement by LRT) (Trolebs)
Bogot, TransMilenio - On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods; delays in accessing feeder buses
- Rest of the city has very poor transport service
- Funding for system expansion is lacking
Len, - Some feeder routes with reverse commuting (from city to suburbs) result in long travel times
Optibs - Invasion of the bus lanes by general traffic (sometimes encouraged by the traffic authorities)
- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods
Mxico City, - On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods
Metrobs Insurgentes - Isolated corridor
- Financially stressedneeded fare increase
- Permanent negotiation of conditions with private operators
Pereira, - Insufficient capacity in temporary terminal facilitiesresolved with the opening of the Cuba terminal in August 2008
Megabs - Poor reorganization of the remaining bus routes
- Flexibility of buses not fully used in operations
Santiago, - Insufficient infrastructure to support operations (lack of integration points, segregated bus lanes)
Transantigo - Expected commercial speeds not achieved; hence, an increase in bus fleet is required
- Lack of adequate oversight of required minimum levels of service led to the non-compliance of some contractors
- The system is operating with an initially unexpected permanent subsidy requiring national congressional approval
Ahmedabad, - Highly uncertain passenger demand, since BRT is in a rapidly developing area
Janmarg - Demand exceeded expectation and initial fleet was insufficient
- Lack of centralized control and dependable traffic control system resulted in unreliable operations (large variance in
service frequency)
Quito, Not clear: fares are politically defined; depends on the Trolebs corridor currently operating beyond capacity
Metrobs-Q ability of public administrators to subsidize buses; needs overhaul and expansion (of station length, operation
no earmarked funds for maintenance; ambiguous contract of bus platoons); LRT is being proposed as one solution.
conditions for private sector operations (Ecova); actual user Corridor Central Norte operating with temporary facilities
demand is probably below expectations (Corredor Central (terminals) and incomplete implementation of route
Norte). reorganization.
Bogot, TransMilenio Clear: fares established in contracts; however, expansion Decline in level of service requires construction of special
Phases I and II limited by pressure from existing operators and lack of infrastructure, revision of routes, and fleet expansion (which
funds; also no earmarked funds for maintenance (existing will be limited due to impact on user fares).TransMilenio
funds dedicated to system expansion). also lacks integrated fares with other bus services.
So Paulo Not clear: growing pressure for free or reduced-fare On-board ticket validation generates long dwell times at
services provided from the public budget; high existing stations; some stations are also too short; requires faster
fares inconsistent with service provision for the poor. replacement of curb lanes with median lanes.
Len, Clear: fares negotiated with all operators; however, no Bus lanes easily invadedgeometric improvements
SIT Optibs earmarked funds for maintenance. required.
Jakarta, Transjakarta Not clear: fare defined as social policy and currently Limited capacity: can be addressed with larger buses (i.e.
subsidized. 18m with four doors), larger stations and shorter traffic
signal cycle times.
Mxico City, Not clear: fares politically defined; permanent negotiation Limited capacitysystem could be easily extended by
Metrobs Insurgentes with private operators; fares currently subsidized; no expanding stations and bus convoys; intersections easily
earmarked funds for maintenance. blockedrequires geometric improvements.
Beijing, Not clear: fares set below system costs; operator may face Limited capacity: can be easily expanded with a larger fleet
BRT 1 bankruptcy. and operational improvements; could modify stations and
fleet to accommodate high-platform/high-floor buses.
Pereira, Not clear: fares established in contracts but traditional Requires completion of Dosquebradas Terminal and better
Megabs services are not integrated and the system faces connection to Cuba Terminal; excessive transfers, probably
competition; no earmarked funds for maintenance. mitigated with hybrid operation where feeder buses are
able to continue in the trunk corridor.
Guayaquil, Not clear: fares defined by a national authority (US$ 0.25) Limited capacity in first corridor; second corridor designed
Metrova with reduced fares for special groups. for higher capacity with passing lanes at stations.
Santiago, Clear: fares established in contracts, with funding for Trunk-feeder scheme increased transfers and route design
Transantiago system operations provided by law; additional investments resulted in longer walking times; requires infrastructure to
financed with government funds. enhance bus operations and integration.
Guadalajara, Not clear: financial equilibrium was very tight during the Challenging busway geometry in some sections.
Macrobs first year, fare increase is not based on inputs. Buses are not air conditioned.
Ahmedabad, Not clear: the public-private partnership agreement has Initial operation is (mainly) within exclusive busways
Janmarg clear financial clauses; nevertheless the system is gradually (mainly) without integration with BRT feeders or the
replacing the state-owned provider which receives public conventional transport system. This is expected to be
funds for operations. solved in further phases as the system grows.
18 The expanded case studies address some of the recommendations in more detail and are tailored to the context of each city.
Create a special-purpose agency to plan, oversee Have contingency plans ready if system
and control system development, and provide components are not complete.
adequate coordination mechanisms. Dedicate funds to plan and implement user
Be creative in funding project development, using education programs.
new taxes, loans and non-traditional sources such Involve the community in implementation through
as privatizations, special purpose bonds, real estate adequate information and various participation/
development, etc. engagement programs
Involve existing operators to mitigate conflicts, but
use bidding processes to reduce user costs through
increased competition for-the-market. Operational Phase
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Initial funding for this study was provided by TRISP, a partnership between the UK
Department for International Development and the World Bank for learning and sharing
of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services. Original idea and
project guidance were provided by Pierre Graftieaux. Additional funding was provided
by EMBARQs strategic partners: the Shell Foundation and the Caterpillar Foundation.
The authors also acknowledge valuable comments by Gerhard Menckhoff, Ramn
Muoz, Jules Flynn, Mauricio Cullar, Sam Zimmerman, Catalina Ochoa, Luis Gutierrez,
Alex Perera, Davida Wood, Paulo Custodio and Janet Ranganathan. Assistance in initial
research was provided by Adriana Ortegn, and editorial help by Laura Root, Polly Ghazi
and Charles Kent. Input from the BRT-ALC Centre of Excellence is appreciated. Thanks also
to the officials, project operators and consultants that contributed their valuable time
and information throughout the interviews. The views expressed in this report are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, the World
Resources Institute, the funders or the people interviewed.
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WEB REFERENCES
Curitiba: http://www.curitiba.pr.gov.br
Quito: http://www.quito.gov.ec
Bogot: http://www.transmilenio.gov.co
So Paulo: http://www.sptrans.com.br
Len: http://www.leon.gob.mx/ciudadanos/transporte.php
Jakarta: http://transjakarta.co.id
Mxico City: http://www.metrobus.df.gob.mx
Beijing: http://www.chinabrt.org/en/cities/beijing.aspx
Pereira: http://www.megabus.gov.co
Guayaquil: http://www.metrovia-gye.com
Santiago: http://www.transantiago.cl
Guadalajara: http://www.macrobus.gob.mx
Ahmedabad: http://www.ahmedabadbrts.com
INTERVIEWS
Calos Poveda, Gerente Tcnico Corredor Central Norte (Fideicomiso Ing. Alejandro Villegas, Program Officer, Mxico, The William and
Operadores) Flora Hewlett Foundation, NGO (Abril 17, 2006)
Luis Vaca, Luis Barrejo, Miembros del Comit de Administracin Lic. Luz Helena Gonzlez Chaves, Directora General Red de
Corredor Central Norte (Operadores Privados) Transporte Pblico del Distrito Federal, RTP, Gobierno del Distrito
Federal, Empresa Operadora Pblica (Abril 18, 2006)
Csar Arias, Consultor, Ex-director General de Transporte de Quito
Lic. Edmundo Valencia, Director Desarrollo Tecnolgico y
Mantenimiento RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora
Pblica (Abril 18, 2006)
Claudia Lorena Galindo RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa
Operadora Pblica (Abril 18, 2006)
Bogot
Lic. Carlos Oropeza Bailey, Gerente de Mantenimiento RTP,
Anglica Castro, Gerente General; Ral Roa, Director de Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pblica (Abril 18,
Operaciones; Sandra ngel, Directora de Planeacin, TRANSMILENIO 2006)
S.A. (2006)
Ing. Adriana Lobo, Directora Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS,
Gustavo Gmez, Gerente General SITM-Ciudad Mvil, Operador del Organizacin No Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)
Sistema (2006)
Ing. Diana V. Noriega Navarrete, Coordinadora de Tecnologa
Mauricio Arciniegas, Director de Operaciones SI99-SI02, Operador Ambiental Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, Organizacin No
del Sistema (2006) Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)
Gustavo Gallegos, Asesor, Direccin de Infraestructura, Andres Ocampo, Manager of Subus S.A., System Operator
Departamento Nacional de Planeacin (September 28 2006)
Fabio Zorro, Director of Operations Subus S.A., System Operator
Lina Mara Sierra, Alejandro Baquero, Asesores Transporte Masivo,
Juan Enrique Coymmans, Professor Transportation Planning,
Ministerio de Transporte (December, 2006)
Pontificia Universidad Catlica de Chile
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