Araneta v Dinglasan
This
G.R. No. L-2044
FACTS: The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by
virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state
of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix
the duration of its effectivity.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks
a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and
the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials
refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation
of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during
the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was
assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of
this EO.
Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection
with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a
citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents
from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of
it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
HELD: Yes. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it
became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular
session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the
Act and not the first special session after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot
rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225
and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation
of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed
and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects.
is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the
life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes
brought on by the war.
Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266
FACTS: Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546
issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2)
authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out
the national policy declared in section 1."
House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was
vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent
resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative
HELD: No. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage.
The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and
many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the
Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding
power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed
that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be
contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President,
the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed
by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto.
If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations;
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it
is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to
that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to
exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its
authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven
years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act,
would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful
in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period
"in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the
good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national
emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because
emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the
hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all
officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Southern Cross Cement Corp. v Cement Manufacturers
465 SCRA 532
FACTS: The case centers on the interpretation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the
laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The SMA provides for the structure and mechanics for
the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic
industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict
serious injury on them.
Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a petition
seeking for the imposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland cement,
in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard
measure, the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal
investigation in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive
safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public hearings
and conducting its own investigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a
negative finding. Notwithstanding such finding, the DTI sought the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard
measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under
the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he
expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff
Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors
application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to
do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff
Commissions Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as
he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the
recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it
is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous
methodology. The CA held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the
factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely
recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys
discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the
DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions
recommendation.
Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the factual findings of
the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions
warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon
the DTI Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the
existence or nonexistence of conditions warranting the imposition of
safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary
HELD: Petition is granted.
The DTI Secretary is barred from imposing a general safeguard measure
absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a
properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the
legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section
28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The provision states: The Congress
may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the
power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature.
But this provision is also an exceptional grant of legislative power to the
President which is why the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this
presidential authority attains primordial consideration. First, there must be a
law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which
would be filled in by the law. And Third, Congress is further empowered to
impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority.
The authority delegated to the President may be exercised by his/her alter
egos, such as department secretaries. For purposes of the Presidents
exercise of power to impose tariffs under the above provision, it is generally
the Secretary of Finance who acts as the alter ego of the President. The
SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture
Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the
President, to impose such measures.
Both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as
agents of Congress in the implementation of the said law. Indeed, even the
President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of
imposing safeguard measures since it is Congress, not the President, which
possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts.
The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President,
through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard
measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most
relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned
Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures, and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into
the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the
domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat
thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural
products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such
safeguard measures will be in the public interest.
Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress
on the presidential authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts.
The positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is plainly required
by the law and so it must be strictly complied with.
Philcemcor raised a question as to whether such requirement run counter to
our legal order since under the said provision, a body of relative junior
competence as a Tariff Commission can bind an administrative superior and
cabinet officer such as the DTI Secretary. No provision in the SMA expressly
authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite
the absence of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On
the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary shall apply
a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the Tariff
Commission.
Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as
to whether the conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard
measures. These conditions are enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a
product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether
absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause
of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the
investigation of the Tariff Commission, it submits a report to the DTI
Secretary, which states whether the above-stated conditions for the
imposition of the general safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive final
determination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then
is mandated to recommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be
undertaken by the DTI Secretary. Section 13 of the SMA gives five specific
options on the type of safeguard measures the Tariff Commission
recommends to the DTI Secretary.
At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the
recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires
that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard
measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions
recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive
final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive
final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general
safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other
than that recommended by the Tariff Commission.
It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into
the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic
production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the
domestic industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of
wishful thinking.
The Tariff Commissions finding is not merely recommendatory. Section 5
bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission
before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure. This is
a duty imposed on a public officer by the law itself which must be given a
controlling effect. In fact, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary himself
rendered an Opinion with the same conclusion.

Another issue was raised as to whether the DTI Secretary, acting either as
alter ego of the President or in his capacity as head of an executive
department, may review, modify or otherwise alter the final determination of
the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The Court answered in the negative.
Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein
by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the
President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the
Tariff Commission. If Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego
principle to be established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now
played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA). The Tariff Commission is an attached
agency of the NEDA, which in turn is the independent planning agency of the
government.
The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of
the DTI. On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the
NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the
Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code.
At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or
influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact,
the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to
proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very
recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the
Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act
No. 8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No.
8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the
promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff
Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the DTI, to determine
whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a
countervailing duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure,
respectively. In all three laws, the determination by the Tariff Commission
that these required factual conditions exist is necessary before the DTI
Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in
all three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to
reverse the factual determination of the Tariff Commission.
The SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere
flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final
recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latters imposition of a
general safeguard measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship
of interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the
Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI
Secretary to disregard the Tariff Commissions recommendations as to the
particular safeguard measures to be imposed evinces the independence
from each other of these two bodies. This is properly so for two reasons the
DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the
Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI
itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures,
pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA.
Considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in
the President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the
congressional prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such
powers which do not normally belong to the executive in the first place.
Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general
safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the
factual determination made by the Tariff Commission.
Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff
Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the
imposition of general safeguard measures under the SMA. In doing so, the
same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff
Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its
functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the
bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative
prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may
be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch
of government.
Assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may
conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the
NEDAs decision in turn is reviewable by the Office of the President. The
decision of the Office of the President then effectively substitutes as the
determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI
Secretarys decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA
under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review
of the Tariff Commissions determination may be sustained without violating
the SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as
administrative law.
In any event, even if we concede the possibility of administrative review of
the Tariff Commissions final determination by the NEDA, such would not
deny merit to the present petition. It does not change the fact that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the
negative final determination of the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI
Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard
measures despite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of
the Commission.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board
270 SCRA 538
FACTS: Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer
issued a notice of hearing directing Grand Air to serve a copy of the application
and notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. Grand Air filed its
compliance and requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL filed
an opposition to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction
to hear the application until Grand Air first obtains a franchise to operate from
Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the opposition and the CAB
approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months. The opposition for
the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its assumption of jurisdiction
over Grand Airs application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the
specific power to issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity.
Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity or TOP even though the prospective operator does not have a
legislative franchise?
Held: Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under
Republic Act 776 and a legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do
so, since Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of
domestic air transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The
delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress had set
specific standard and limitations on how such authority should be exercised.
Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet
a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities
do not adequately afford.
Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since
it has jurisdiction over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements
of the law.
Philippines Interisland Shipping Association vs CA
270 SCRA 538
FACTS: It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for
an increase in pilotage rates was given by then President Marcos through the
issuance of an E.O No. 1088 PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED
RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND
COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The
executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees
previously fixed by the PPA. During that time the President was exercising
legislative power and was authorized.
However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued
hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power
to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed
lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for
pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract.
Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is just an
intervener in the factual milieu that lead the Court to this issue. For Purposes
of Admin Law, SC should not care about it.
Issue: Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA
has the power to modify the same
Held: EO 1088 is a law. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an
exercise of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to
revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O.
No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the
PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees,
and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the
parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the
nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of
delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law,
as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a
statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA.
What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not
its form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the
rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been
regarded as legislative in character.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
15 SCRA 569
FACTS: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive
orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed
a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor
General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his
behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this
power has been vested in the legislative department.
RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power
than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, Sr
239 SCRA 11
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to
the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the
same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and
coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of
San Narciso, Quezon. By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965,
issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San
Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth
class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that (t)he conversion of
this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864
was approved by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with
RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking
the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the
creation of the new municipality and that the case had become moot and
academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites
for Creation. . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity
of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality
of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities
and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto
municipal corporation.
HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres
was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years,
or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the
result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be
otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years
when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated.
The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case.
On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the States
recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres.
Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No.
174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality
after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No.
1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality
must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)
apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the
1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be
one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
(the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the
province of Quezon must now be conceded.
Sultan Osop Camid vs. The Office of the President
G.R. No. 161414
FACTS: The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not
supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and thriving. The
creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by the
Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that
Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial
affirmation.
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor
General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several
Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his
powers underSec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel
Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs
were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said
orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and
void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of
Andong.
Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged
that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the
municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no person has been
appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of
Andong since 1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not
classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including
said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by
supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence,
particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the
court affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a de
facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned
municipality.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong
continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a
full-blown municipality
HELD: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown
that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly
essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the
municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence
thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have
undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should
have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had
the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Petitioners
seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present
petition, cannot be countenanced.
The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the
Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any
curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of
Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong
warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in
1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
(1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the
beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly
affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent
ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation
has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given
these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not
exist as a duly constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to
create municipalities yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the
promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled
Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title
these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as
San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO
creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions
cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially
dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential
issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those
municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the
other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless
recreated through specific legislative enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert
the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.
If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality
nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial
confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for
the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177597
FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a
plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao
into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
07-0407 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA
Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the
exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema
contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in
Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
ISSUES: (1) Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays is constitutional. (2) Whether a province created under Sec.
19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district
for such province.
HELD:
(1) Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for
being contrary to Sec. 5 ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as
well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the
creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the Congress.
power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the
criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
X of the Constitution is complied. national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides
that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution
x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, or authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for
municipalities. According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution: Congress.)
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over
at least 1 representative in the House of Representatives.
the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative
power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. At
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the
immediately following election to at least 1 Member.
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a
Binamira vs. Garrucho
power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of
188 SCRA 154
the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
FACTS: In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks
(2) Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of
reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable
Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in
membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative
violation of his security of tenure.
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism,
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase
the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986. On April 10, 1986, Minister
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5
Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the
(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
his capacity as General Manager, approved by the President on the same
legislative districts out of existing ones.Congress exercises these powers
date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties
through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by
of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho
regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus
as the new Secretary of Tourism.
vested exclusively in it.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior
memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager, effective
legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any
immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office
changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must
in a permanent capacity.
be embodied in national law.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated
with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question
by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM
his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a
Regional Assembly recognizes this. The ARMM cannot create a province
supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the
without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the
province shall have a legislative district. But this can never be legally
Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional
respondent.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his
designation. (2) Whether or not petitioner should be reinstatement to the office
of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
HELD: Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism
Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. The General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve
for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That
upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall
have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The
reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of
the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking,
it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President.
as also happened in the case at bar.
With these rulings, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must perforce fall
to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a
presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position
in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the
designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be
legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In
either case, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good
faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of
Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at
the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when
President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors
where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as
General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the
categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not
the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title
to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the

presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part
of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that
he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that
judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place
has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, which was true of the designation made by Minister
Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be
considered valid only if not disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,