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1. ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondent.
FACTS: Mecano, an NBI Director, was hospitalized for
cholecystitis, for which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he
is claiming from the COA, based on sec. 699 of the
RAC. COA contended that the RAC has been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically sec.
699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of
1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917
RULING: NO. Respondent was ordered to give due
course on petitioners claim for benefits.
The question of whether or not a particular law has
been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter
of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly
repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are
intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute,
usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and
specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied
repeals.
Under sec. 27, Bk. VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the repealing clause
states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the
nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general
repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal under the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws. The latter situation
falls under the category of an implied repeal.
(NOTA BENE: This means that the RAC, despite the
passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, may still
be a source of administrative law)
2. LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA
FACTS: This case involves three contracts of lease:
1) Contract A: executed between Civil Aeronautics
Administration (lessor) and Rosario Leveriza (lessee)
2) Contract B: executed between Leveriza (lessor) and
Mobil Oil (lessee)
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3) Contract C: executed between CAA (lessor) and
Mobil Oil (lessee)
When Leveriza subleased the property to Mobil Oil
(Contract B) without permission from the lessor, CAA
cancelled Contract A and executed Contract C with
Mobil Oil. Leveriza contended that Contract C was
invalid not only because it was entered into by CAA
without approval by the Department Secretary but
also because it was not executed by the President of
the Philippines or officer duly designated. According to
Leveriza, the officer duly designated to cancel the
contract is not the Airport General Manager but the
Secretary of Public Works and Communication or the
Director of the CAA.
ISSUE: WON the CAA administrator has the authority
to enter to Contract of Lease
HELD: YES. Finally, petitioners contend that the
administrator of CAA cannot execute without approval
of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease
over real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code,
which provide that Under 567 of the Revised
Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be
executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or
(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the
CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real
property belonging to the RP under its administration
even without the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, which authority is
expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section
32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads: Sec.
32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject
to the general control and supervision of the
Department Head, the Administrator shall have,
among others, the following powers and duties:
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain
and develop the Manila International Airport and all
government aerodromes except those controlled or
operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including such power and duties as: (b) to enter into,
make and execute contracts of any kind with any
person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity;
(c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or
real property; right of ways, and easements which may
be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real
property thus acquired and any other real property of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold
without the approval of the President of the
Philippines.
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative
Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a
special law nor in the fact that the real property
subject of the lease in Contract C is real property
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
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It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA
has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for
the government under the third category (Art. 567. )
Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the
CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract
involving leases of real properties belonging to the RP,
not because it is an entity duly designated by the
President but because the said authority to execute
the same is, by law expressly vested in it, which in this
case is RA 776.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic
Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by
reason of its creation and existence, administers
properties belonging to the RP and it is on these
properties that the Administrator must exercise his
vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make
and execute contract of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to
acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real
property, right of ways and easements which may be
proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the
sale of properties acquired by CAA or any other real
properties of the same which must have the approval
of the President of the Philippines.) The Court of
appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of
such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in
paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the
Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval
of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications in the execution of Contract C.
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic
principle of statutory construction mandates that
general legislation must give way to special legislation
on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted
as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable; that specific statute
prevails over a general ; and that where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefor specially should
prevail.
3. Ignacia Balicas v. Fact-Finding and lntelligence
Bureau (FFIB)
FACTS: Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior
environmental management specialist, monitored the
implementation of the CHS Project Development to
check compliance with the terms and conditions in the
ECC. She conducted another monitoring on the project
for the same purpose.
In both instances, she noted that the project was still
in the construction stage hence, compliance with the
stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and
therefore, a follow-up monitoring is proper. It
appeared from the records that this August 23, 1995
monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by
the DENR.
Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3,
1999, a fact-finding investigation was conducted by
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the Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department
of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR), and the
local government of Antipolo. The charge against
petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to
monitor and inspect the development of CHS, which
was assumed to be her duty as DENR
senior environmental management specialist assigned
in the province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that
monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she
monitored the development of CHS as evidenced by 3
monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith
and exercise of due diligence, insisting that the tragedy
was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse
did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent
mountain eastern side of the subdivision.
ISSUE: WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty.
RULING: In order to ascertain if there had been gross
neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully
prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR
regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior
environmental management specialist. Internal
regulations merely speak of the functions of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.
The responsibility of monitoring of housing and land
development projects is not lodged with the DENR but
with the HLURB which is the sole regulatory body for
housing and development. Hence there is no legal
basis for a government employee under DENR be held
liable for gross neglect of duty pertaining to another
agency.
Regulatory Agency refers to any agency expressly
vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or
adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and
interests of private persons, the principal powers of
which are exercised by a collective body such as a
commission, board or council
4. MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the
name B.E. CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO,
doing business under the name BEST BUILT
CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEA, doing business
under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEA; and
the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioners, v.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA,
ENRICO TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their
respective capacities as Chairman and Members of
the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his capacity as
President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well
as in their respective personal capacities; and HON.
LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN, Respondents.
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FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF)
through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the
November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction
of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day for the submission of pre-
qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988,
and that the bids would be received and opened on
December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under
the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All
three of them were not allowed to participate in the
bidding as their documents were considered late.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government
instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a
government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized
or operating under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific constitutional
policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority
of the state.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818. There are also indications in its charter that
ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-
economic life of the nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the
state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative.
Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college,
such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the
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services of such employees as can be spared without
serious detriment to public service.
Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury
and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations
Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that
ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree
as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as
regards to the bidding and the award of the project.
5. Preclaro vs Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
FACTS: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the
Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology
Development Institute, Department of Science and
Technology, a component of the Industrial
Development Institute which is an agency of the DOST.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD
building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction
undertook the construction. The structure is jointly
funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been
completed, accused either directly requested and/or
demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00,
claimed as part of the expected profit of the
contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said offense
in relation to the performance of his official duties.
Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not
a public officer because he was neither elected nor
appointed to a public office, but merely a private
individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a
particular project and for a specified period. Hence the
Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to
include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government
ISSUE: WON a private individual hired on a contractual
basis by the government is a public officer
HELD: YES. The word includes used in defining a
public officer indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The terms classified, unclassified or
exemption service were the old categories of position
in the civil service which have been reclassified into
Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807
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providing for the organization of the Civil Service
Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as
Project Manager for a government undertaking falls
under the non-career service category of the Civil
Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec
2(b) of RA 3019.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of
the Administrative Code of 1987, non-career service in
particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than
those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law, or which is coterminous with
that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was
made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career
Service It shall include Contractual personnel or those
employment in the government is in accordance with
a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year,
and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job,
under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
6. LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner vs. THE
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
x------------------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO,
JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but
it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
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cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners raised in Court that E.O 1 which created
the PTC should be declared unconstitutional and to
enjoin PTC from performing its functions.
It is their contention that PTC violates separation of
powers as it encroach the power of congress to create
Public Office and appropriate funds for its operation.
They also asserted the fact that the role of the
President in the 1987 Constitution does not include
the power to create an entirely new public office.
Respondents contested that EO 1 did not arrogate the
powers of the Congress to create Public Office because
the Presidents executive power and control
necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct
investigation to ensure laws are faithfully executed.
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to create the
Philippine Truth Commission
RULING: YES. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed.
Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the
authority of the President to issue Administrative
Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to
look into the administrative charges filed against the
employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said
case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation
to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that
the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is
to be revisited, this was also the objective of the
investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC,
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There
being no changes in the government structure, the
Court is not inclined to declare such executive power
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as non-existent just because the direction of the approval of the Department of Budget and
political winds have changed. Management?

HELD: NO The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the

7. KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY approval of the DBM are disallowed.
REGULATORY BOARD, Petitioner, - versus
-COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY 1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA V. Compensation and Position Classification System in
IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. the Government and For Other Purposes, or the
COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM
COMMISSION, Respondents. that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from

8. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES
the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,
flawed considering that the coverage thereof
MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices,
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
sans qualification.
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
others; to direct or superintend the execution,
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No.
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
public affairs, as to administer the government of the
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
state.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR
The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
additional source of funding for said staffing
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
modification.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
of constitutional commissions.
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the
request.
But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that
only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed
tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs
Distribution of Powers of Government, the
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC,
the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast,
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and
Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR.
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Thus:
Regional Office. The CSC-Central Office denied
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The
CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied
Audit.
the same.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA,
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically
which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
and regularly released.
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading,
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance
retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
justification that such action is within the ambit of
Commission on Human Rights, and independent
CHRs fiscal autonomy.
central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution,
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
Congress may establish an independent economic and
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
planning agency.
positions in the Commission without the prior

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From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative
Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among
the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed
in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act
or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, 23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the
COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership. We note with interest that
the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while
cited under the heading of the CHR, did not
specifically mention CHR as among those offices to
which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely
states its coverage to include Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a
constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all
government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind
with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does
not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is
not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758
more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.
9. DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY
TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL,
BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO
BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and
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MARIA CORAZON
CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE
GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, respondents.
FACTS: President Estrada issued E.O 29 which provides
for the mandating the streamlining of NTA and issued
E.O 36 thereafter amending E.O. 29 providing for the
increasing of the staffing pattern from 400 to not
exceeding 750 positions affected.
NTA prepared and adopted a New Organization
Structure and Staffing Position (OSSP). Petitioners are
from NTA Batac, Ilocos Norte who received individual
notices of termination.
They filed a position for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. RTC ordered NTA to appoint petitioners in
the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to
their respective of former assignments.
ISSUE: WON the President, through the issuance of an
Executive Order can validly carry out the
reorganization of the NTA.
RULING: The President, based on existing laws, had
the authority to carry out a reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department.
The general rule has always been that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to
create includes the power to destroy.
A public office is either created by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the
office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be
abolished by the same legislature that brought it into
existence. The exception, however, is that as far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of
a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. Section 48 of RA 7645 provides that Actual
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities
shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the President.
10. NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA,
respondents.
FACTS: Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first
grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy
Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said
position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of
Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position,
petitioner was also appointed under permanent status
up to September 1984.
She was for two years, more or less, designated as
Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
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Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which
took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the
restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on
October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not
being a member of the
In its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil
Service Commission directed that private respondent
Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register
of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held
that "under the vested right theory the new
requirement of BAR membership to qualify for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds
II or higher as mandated under said Executive Order,
would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but
only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or
after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order
took effect." 3 A fortiori, since private respondent
Garcia had been holding the position of Deputy
Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she
should not be affected by the operation on February 1,
1981 of Executive Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail
the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission.
NALTDRA Contention: It contends that Sections 8 and
10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing
positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to
the appropriate new offices created by said Executive
Order, which newly created offices required the
issuance of new appointments to qualified office
holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to
private respondent Garcia, and not being a member of
the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.
ISSUE: WON Membership of the Bar is a qualification
requirement for appointment of Deputy Register of
Deeds under EO 649?
RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 649 authorized the
reorganization of the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA).
It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC
and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA. The question of whether
or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative
intent about which there can be no controversy
whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law
itself. A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649
which authorized the reorganization of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms,
provided for the abolition of existing positions.
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Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law
mandates that from the moment an implementing
order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration
Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however,
does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does
not involve or mean removal for the reason that
removal implies that the post subsists and that one is
merely separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in
law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to
speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the
abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the
abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2)
was it done in good faith?
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the
Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution. The power to reorganize is, however; not
absolute.
We have held in Dario vs. Mison that reorganizations
in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. This court has
pronounced that if the newly created office has
substantially new, different or additional functions,
duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to
create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old
office it will be considered as an abolition of one office
and the creation of a new or different one. The same is
true if one office is abolished and its duties, for
reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or
office. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to
improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission. A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times.
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have
such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold
any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional
qualification was not intended to remove her from
office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant
with a valid reorganization measure.
11. ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-
REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA
BANAN, respondents.
FACTS: Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister
of Agriculture and Food (the "MAF"), the private
respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal
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Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the aforesaid Minister in
Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon
occupied the position of Fisheries Extension Specialist
(FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) in the same region.
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the
Department of Agriculture (the "DA"), with the
issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January
1987, called for the evaluation of the following
employees for twenty nine position of MAO in Region
II, Cagayan. The list as prepared by the Placement
Committee included the herein petitioner Sinon but
excluded the respondent Banan
Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the
DARAB for re-evaluation of the qualification of all
those included in the aforementioned list made by the
Placement Committee.
On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution
No. 97 in which the ranking for 29 MAO prepared by
the Placement Committee was re-evaluated.
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by
the respondent Banan and this same resolution was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez, who also affixed his
signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an
appointment as MAO for Region II in Cagayan as
approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam
on the basis of the first evaluation made by the
Placement Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service
Case No. 573 on November 22, 1989 to the CSC. This
appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the
respondent DARAB failed to file its Comment within
the period required; and second, the evaluation of the
qualification of the employees is a question of fact
which the appointing authority or the Placement
Committee assisting him is in a better position to
determine. Hence, the Resolution dated 28 February
1989 of the DARAB was set aside.
On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for
Reconsideration in which she pitted her qualifications
against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO
positions. At the same time, she pointed out that to
allow the findings of the Placement Committee to
supersede the DARAB resolution which the Secretary
of Agriculture had approved would be tantamount to
giving precedence to the Placement Committee over
the head of the agency.
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the
Comment filed by the DARAB which had not been
considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573,
the CSC granted respondent Banan's Motion for
Reconsideration and gave due course to her
appointment by the DARAB.
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On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991 Resolution
which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed
Resolution dated July 11, 1991.
ISSUE: WON CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
in reviewing and re-evaluating the rating or
qualification of petitioner
RULING: NO. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with
Executive order No. 116, it became imperative to
"protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers
and employees in the implementation of government
reorganization". Thus, Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6656.
It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the
Placement Committee was created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot
deserving persons shall be appointed in any
reorganization, there shall be created a Placement
Committee in each department or agency to assist the
appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel.
To "assist" mean to lend an aid to, or to contribute
effort in the complete accomplishment of an ultimate
purpose intended to be effected by those engaged. In
contrast, to "recommend" is to present one's advice
or choice as having one's approval or to represent or
urge as advisable or expedient. It involves the Idea
that another has the final decision.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with
the duty of exercising the same discretionary functions
as the appointing authority in the judicious selection
and placement of personnel when the law empowered
it to "assist" the appointment authority.
The same law also allows any officer or employee
aggrieved by the appointments to file an appeal with
the appointing authority who shall made a decision
within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. If the
same employee is still not satisfied with the decision
of the appointing authority, he may further appeal
within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof the CSC.
In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987
of the Office of the President created the agency
Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem
of the employees affected by the reorganizations.
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of
aggrieved parties which make it impossible to give the
8

status of finality to any appointment until all protests
or oppositions are duly heard.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper
received by petitioner Sinon on 30 August 1989 for the
position of MAO had not conferred any permanent
status and was still subject to the following conditions
attached to any appointment in the civil service:
Provided that there is no pending administrative
case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment, nor any decision by
competent authority that will adversely affect the
approval of the appointment .
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the
qualification filed by Banan was pending, the
petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a
"complete" appointment. Neither is there any point in
asserting that his appointment had "cured" whatever
changes was subsequently recommended by the
DARAB.
The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating
the findings of the Placement Committed only to find
that Sinon is not qualified should no be taken as a
grave abuse of discretion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence
that the public respondent CSC had disregarded the
findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is,
these findings were re-evaluated and the report after
such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the
findings of the DARAB. Because of all the foregoing
circumstances, the jurisprudence cited by the
petitioner Sinon appears to be incorrect.
Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February
1991, any statement by the CSC directing the
appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there
was no directive from the CSC that may be
misinterpreted as a usurpation of any appointing
power.
Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as
recommended by the DARAB and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being
consistent with the law. Section 4 or R.A. 6656
mandates that officers and employees holding
permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the approved
staffing pattern comparable to their former positions.
Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges
generally accorded to them would more aptly refer to
Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment
was never confirmed completely. There is no dispute
that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern is
most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing
pattern.
It must be recalled that the whole purpose of
reorganization is that is it is a "process of restructuring
the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-
up, to make it more viable in terms of the economy,
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efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive
to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by
law." For as long as the CSC confines itself within the
limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the
prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this Court
must sustain the Commission.
12. LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior
Training and Career Development Officer on
permanent status from Feb. 1979 to Dec. 1986.
On Dec. 3, 1986 EO 81, the Revised Charter of IBP was
passed authorizing the re-organization of
DBP. Pursuant to the Executive Order, DBP issued
Board Resolution allowing the issuance of Temporary
Appointments to DBP Personnel in order to fully
implement the re-organization. Such Temporary
Appointments issued had max. period of 12 months.
Petitioner was issued a Temporary Appointment on
Jan. 2, 1987 for a period of 1 year which was renewed
for another period up to Nov.30, 1988.
A Memorandum issued by the Final Review
Committee, Petitioner got a performance rating of
Below Average by reason of which his appointment
was made lapse. Petitioner, together with certain
Evangeline Javier filed with CSC a joint verified
complaint against DBP for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Does the validity of the re-organization
implemented by DBP violates petitioners right to
Security of Tenure?
RULING: NO. Petitioner contends that government re-
organization to terminate the services of government
employees cannot be valid ground pursuant to the
ruling of Dario vs. Mison. Petitioner also maintains
that average and below average efficiency ratings are
not valid grounds for his Termination from Service. He
also contends that he should be afforded a day in
court pursuant to the requirements of procedural due
process.
The Court held that this statement of petitioner is
incomplete and inaccurate, if not outright erroneous.
Either petitioner misunderstood or he totally
overlooked what was stated in the aforecited decision
which held that "reorganizations in this jurisdiction
have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued
in good faith."
Clearly, from our pronouncements
in Dario, reorganization is a recognized valid ground
for separation of civil service employees, subject only
to the condition that it be done in good faith. No less
than the Constitution itself in Section 16 of the
Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34
of Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6656, support this conclusion with the
9

declaration that all those not so appointed in the
implementation of said reorganization shall be
deemed separated from the service with the
concomitant recognition of their entitlement to
appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement
plans of the reorganized government agency.
The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation
process adopted by DBP, bear out the existence of
good faith in the course of reorganization.
13. G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR.,
respondents.
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO
rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a
Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the
provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring
on the Commission the power and authority to effect
changes in its organization as the need arises. Said
resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for
Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief
as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among
others, said resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC given the authority to
abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: NO. The petition is granted and Resolution of
the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and
set aside.
The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD
No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not
enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts
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from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds
for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17,
Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power
to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by
petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must
be read together with Section 16 of the said Code
which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commissions power to reorganize is
limited to offices under its control as enumerated in
Section 16.
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of
building up executive manpower in the government
with a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not
negated by its attachment to respondent Commission.
By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within
the control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching
one functionally inter-related government agency to
another is to attain policy and program coordination.
This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7,
Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation
for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having
the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the
charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board,
which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency.
14. MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner, vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and
MANILA STOCK EXCHANGE, respondents.
FACTS: This is an issue on resolution of the Securities
and Exchange Commission which would deny the
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a
stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading
on its board, securities already listed in the Manila
Stock Exchange.
10

Petitioner contended that the permission provided by
law amounted to prohibition, and that the commission
has no power to impose it.
ISSUE: Whether the SEC has the authority to
promulgate the rule in question.
RULING: No. It is fundamental that an administrative
officer has only such powers as are expressly granted
to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof.
The commission cites no provision of law expressly
supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests
that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was
approved by the department head before the War and
it is not in conflict with the provisions of securities and
exchange act. The approval of the department, by
itself, adds no weight on judicial litigation. The
commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule which result in discrimination
and violation of constitutional rights.
15. Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda
ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v.
Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of the order of
then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G.
Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the
Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga
Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa,
Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Departments
regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management
Committee which shall assume the management of
KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the
disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the
turn over of all assets, properties and records of the
KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the
alleged petition of the general membership of the
KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in
the removal of the members of the Board of Directors
who were not elected by the general membership of
the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and
management audit of the Department of Agriculture
auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM
is not operating that cooperative in accordance with
P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD
and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also
professed therein that the Order was issued by the
Department in the exercise of its regulatory and
supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as
amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Order issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture is illegal
HELD: Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No.
23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of
cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may
be removed by a vote of majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general
assembly. The person involved shall have an
opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17,
Article III of the KBMBPMs by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee
Members. Any elected director or committee
member may be removed from office for cause by a
majority vote of the members in good standing
present at the annual or special general assembly
called for the purpose after having been given the
opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for
the holding of both the annual general assembly and a
special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for
the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It
is likewise manifest that the right to due process is
respected by the express provision on the opportunity
to be heard. But even without said provision,
petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case.
Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM
who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section
does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied
in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to:
(a) act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
(b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts;
(c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units;
(d) determine priorities in the execution of plans
and programs; and
(e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to:
11

(1) generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and insure that they are managed
effectively, efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-to-day activities;
(2) require the submission of reports and cause
the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department;
(3) take such action as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official functions,
including rectification of violations, abuses and
other forms of mal-administration;
(4) review and pass upon budget proposals of
such agencies but may not increase or add to
them.
The power to summarily disband the board of
directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the
KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which
directors and officers are to be removed. The
Secretary should have known better than to disregard
these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the
general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going
audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in
exercising a power which he does not have, expressly
or impliedly.
We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of
the Solicitor General that the Secretarys power under
paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted
to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of
any cooperative includes the milder authority of
suspending officers and calling for the election of new
officers. Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation
includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent
directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would
have expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that
the law intended such as postulated, there is the
requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.
16. JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and
controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869
issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand
Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors
approved an instrument denominated as Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted Sports
and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting
station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international
bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR,
appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the
games.
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On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its
Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by
its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its
President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-
named document. Pursuant to the authority granted
by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by
conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run
basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of
winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as
member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed
the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority
by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains
that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet.
He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its
legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling
on the internet for the simple reason that the said
decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11,
1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling
activities were confined exclusively to real-space.
Further, he argues that the internet, being an
international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to
operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation
of PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of PD No.
1869 which provides: Place. The Corporation [i.e.,
PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of
chance on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling
does not fall under any of the categories of the
authorized gambling activities enumerated under
Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the
right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could
not have been included within the commonly
accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs or
other recreation or amusement places as these
terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where
people who intend to bet or gamble go and play
games of chance authorized by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract
any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
RULING: No. A legislative franchise is a special
privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a
privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised
at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
control and administration, either by the government
directly, or by public agents, under such conditions
and regulations as the government may impose on
12

them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode
of conducting the business, the charter and the quality
of the service to be rendered and the duty of the
grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are
almost always defined in clear and unequivocal
language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter
into operators and/or management contracts, it is not
allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share
its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate
its power in view of the legal principle of delegata
potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been
expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the
Court clarified that since ADC has no franchise from
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate
even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor
to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the
same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it
were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
17. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr.
Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through
petitioner RCPI's facilities to his sister and brother-in-
law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in
Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. Both telegrams did not reach
their destinations on the expected dates. Private
respondent filed a letter-complaint against the RCPI
with the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) for poor service, with a request for the
imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction
against the company.
Commission finds respondent administratively liable
for deficient and inadequate service defined under
Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and hereby imposes the
penalty of FINE.
ISSUE: Whether the NTC had the jurisdiction and
impose fine against petitioner for failure to deliver the
letters to the addressee.
RULING: No. NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a
fine. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service
Commission says so categorically.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act,
vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all public services and
their franchises, equipment and other properties.
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No substantial change has been brought about by
Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor
General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The
Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities,
including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to
render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it
expanded the coverage of the supervisory and
regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be
no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of
jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent
Commission, are limited to those expressly granted
or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and
ineffective.
18. MATIENZO VS. ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839 - June 1, 1988
FACTS: The petitioners and private respondents are all
authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The
respondents, however, admittedly operate colorum
or kabit taxicab units. On or about the second week
of February, 1977, private respondents filed their
petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation
(BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized
excess taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on
January 17, 1973, to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing
or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible operators. Within a matter of days, the
respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
application for hearing and granting applicants
provisional authority to operate their excess taxicab
units for which legalization was sought.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the
grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the
annulment of permits already granted under PD 101,
the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for
legalization and awarding special permits to the
private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the
petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor
any member thereof had the power, at the time the
petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the
clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power
had been limited to a period of six (6) months from
and after the promulgation of the Decree on January
17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses
and becomes functus officio.
ISSUE: Whether or not BOT can still legalize
clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under
Section 1 of PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months
after the promulgation of the Decree.
RULING: Yes. A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a
grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue
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provisional permits as a step towards the legalization
of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged
time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by
the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such
powers six (6) months after promulgation of the
Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal
of the States waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the
cited section declares when the period of moratorium
suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal
operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to
the Boards exercise of jurisdiction under its broad
powers under the Public Service Act to issue
certificates of public convenience to achieve the
avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service
Act, Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining
whether a board or commission has a certain power,
the authority given should be liberally construed in
the light of the purposes for which it was created, and
that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be
upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where
the end is required, the appropriate means are
deemed given.
19. G.R. No. 137489. May 29, 2002
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE, INC., ESMERALDO A. DUBLIN, ALICIA
SAVAREZ, EDNA URETA, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: Certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative filed several
complaints alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then
incumbent officers and members of the board of
directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein
private respondents. Acting on the complaint, the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) issued an
order freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a
management committee to manage the affairs of the
said cooperative. Private respondents questioned the
jurisdiction of CDA before the RTC of South Cotabato.
RTC then issued a TRO against CDA. Court of Appeals
then declared that the order of the CDA was NULL
AND VOID and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CDA it is vested with quasi-
judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in
view of its powers, functions and responsibilities
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6939.
HELD: No. Section 3(o) of R.A. No. 6939 and Article
35(4) of R.A. 6938, may not be relied upon by the CDA
as authority to resolve internal conflicts of
cooperatives, they being general provisions.
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the CDA from
resolving the instant case. The assumption of
jurisdiction by the CDA on matters which partake of
cooperative disputes is a logical, necessary and direct
consequence of its authority to register cooperatives.
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It can be gleaned from the above-quoted provision of
R.A. No. 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to
discharge purely administrative functions which
consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and
technical assistance to cooperatives and
implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the
said law can it be found any express grant to the CDA
of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes.
At most, Section 8 of the same law provides that
"upon widest of either or both parties the Authority
shall mediate and conciliate disputes with a
cooperative or between cooperatives" however, with
a restriction "that if no mediation or conciliation
succeeds within 3 months from request thereof, a
certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the
commission prior to the filing of appropriate action
before the proper courts". Being an administrative
agency, the MA has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those which are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.
20. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch
127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR.,
City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from the filing of the
letter-complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite with
the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to
stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the possibility of pollution of the water
content of the surrounding area. Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Whether the LLDA have the power and
authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws.
RULING: Yes. The cease and desist order issued by the
LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and
other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped
as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive
powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or
modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a
"cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred
14

by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect
that the rule granting such authority need not
necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases
in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order
by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under
the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of
its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order
issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City
Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance,
no further legal steps would have been necessary.
21. G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant
FACTS: In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No.
1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate
the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides
that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136
provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should
not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile. Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the
Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered
by bamboo poles (sagwan), Such is a violation of
Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only
steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate
the Pasig River. However, in the information against
Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty
against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at
the discretion of the court - this was pursuant to
Circular No. 397 which provides: For the violation of
any pan of the foregoing regulations, the persons
offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5
and not more than P500, in the discretion of the
COWS.
Berries now challenged the validity of such provision
of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal
provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a
penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time
the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the
Circular is valid.
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HELD: No The Commissioner cannot impose a different
range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in
effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon
the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to anybody or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain: only by the constitutional agency
alone the laws must be made until the constitution
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom and patriotism this high prerogative has been
entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by
choosing other agencies upon which the power shall
be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. The Collector
cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in
Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in
accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No.
1136.
Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is
valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is
sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary
that we should pass on the questions discussed in the
briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts.
The reference to them in the complaint is not material,
as we have frequently held that where an offense is
correctly described in the complaint an additional
reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.
22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937
FACTS: Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges
by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all
were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
of United States for review, which was also denied.
The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-
Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution
of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application
for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of
CFI Manila set the petition for hearing.
The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things,
that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
15

protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
powers.
RULING: Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No.
4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is,
for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a
careful examination of the whole context, is to make
the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial
boards through appropriation of the salaries for
probation officers at rates not lower than those
provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on
the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act
in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to
show that if not one of the provinces and this is the
actual situation now appropriate the necessary
fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation
under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation
system.
23. MACEDA V MACARAIG
G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991
FACTS: Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as
a public corporation to undertake the development of
hydraulic power and the production of power from
other sources. RA 358 granted NAPOCOR tax and duty
exemption privileges. RA 6395 revised the charter of
the NAPOCOR, tasking it to carry out the policy of the
national electrification and provided in detail
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NAPOCORs tax exceptions. PD 380 specified that
NAPOCORs exemption includes all taxes, etc. imposed
directly or indirectly. PD 938 dated May 27, 1976
further amended the aforesaid provision by
integrating the tax exemption in general terms under
one paragraph.
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC has ceased to enjoy
indirect tax and duty exemption with the enactment of
PD 938 on May 27, 1976 which amended PD 380
issued on January 11, 1974
RULING: No, it is still exempt. NAPOCOR is a non-profit
public corporation created for the general good and
welfare, and wholly owned by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines. From the very beginning of
the corporations existence, NAPOCOR enjoyed
preferential tax treatment to enable the corporation
to pay the indebtedness and obligation and effective
implementation of the policy enunciated in Section 1
of RA 6395.
From the preamble of PD 938, it is evident that the
provisions of PD 938 were not intended to be
interpreted liberally so as to enhance the tax exempt
status of NAPOCOR.
It is recognized that the rule on strict interpretation
does not apply in the case of exemptions in favor of
government political subdivision or instrumentality. In
the case of property owned by the state or a city or
other public corporations, the express exception
should not be construed with the same degree of
strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the
policy of the state, since as to such property
exception is the rule and taxation the exception.
24. G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and
KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
FACTS: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in
favor of the complainant.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the
principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker.
16

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
powers
HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of
powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum
circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA
was given no authority to promulgate the regulation,
and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference
of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of
the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
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The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more
and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called the
power of subordinate legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement
the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in
the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
25. DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS: Sometime in May 1991,[1] Alma D. Pagatpatan,
an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement,
considering that he had already reached the age of
sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with
thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of
government service. Rabor responded to this advice
by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" [2] issued by
the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS")
and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten
statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to
comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is
followed by a non-legible initial with the following
date "2/28/91."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B.
Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo
R. Duterte as follows:
"Please be informed that the extension of services of
Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of
the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
'Officials and employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be
retained in the service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall
not exceed six (6) months.' IN VIEW WHEREFORE,
please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador
Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extendible."
Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte
furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director
Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for
work effective August 16, 1991."
Decision: We find it very difficult to suppose that the
limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has
no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the
foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law.
17

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by
the Civil Service Commission that extending
the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one
(1) year would: (1) give apremium to late-comers in
the government service and in effect discriminate
against those who enter the service at a younger age;
(2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-
rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for
employment of qualified young civil service
applicants who have already passed the various
government examinations but must wait for jobs to be
vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the
mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension
of their government service to complete 15 years so
they may qualify for old-age pension."
Applying now the results of our reexamination of the
instant case, we believe and so hold
that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April
1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and
affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated
26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while
the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless,
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All
that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes."
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that
administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of
the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970,
33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-
28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). x x x.
The rule on limiting to one year the extension
of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less
than 15 years of service under
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990,
cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relationship or connection with any provision of P.D.
1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was
an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil
Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146."
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26. ALVADOR A. ARANETA vs. THE HON. MAGNO S.
GATMAITAN.
FACTS: The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the
use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the EO 66 and 80
as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the
general clamor among the majority of people living in
the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said
resources of the area are in danger of major depletion
because of the effects of trawl fishing.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to
the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other
relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
ISSUE: Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80
were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
President.
RULING: Yes. As already held by this Court, the true
distinction between delegation of the power to
legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion
as to the execution of law consists in that the former
necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall
be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to
its execution has to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also
held, the power to delegate - the Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No.
2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules
and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of
power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act
within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done
to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation
of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is
unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters
of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary.
The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec.
to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President
did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare
of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of general
concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with law.
18

27. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner, petitioner, vs.
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land
Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law
in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against
respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed
against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for
the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending
suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by
the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the
validity of such enactment as well as such
administrative order.
Such administrative order, which took effect on April
17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No
motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with
reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-
in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape
or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an
intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a
section on dimensions, placement and color.
As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass
reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not
less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At
least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or
taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the
vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to how such
reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or
painted."
There is the further requirement that in addition to
such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or
painted four reflectors on each side of the motor
vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in
front and those in the rear end of the body thereof.
The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in,
commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized
paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle
shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the
sides and in the rear shall all be red.
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be
imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the
requirements contained in this Order shall be
sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor
vehicle affected and if already registered, its
registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the
provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; Provided,
however, that in the case of the violation of Section 1
(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine
of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be
imposed.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is
contrary to the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power
RULING: No. It is thus obvious that the challenged
statute is a legislation enacted under the police power
to promote public safety.
To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression
by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long
after the Constitution came into force and effect that
the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern
governments."
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by
the legislature and toward the approval of the practice
by the courts.
It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
19

that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met
in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that
the regulation should germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards
that the law prescribes.
Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature
must declare a policy and fix a standard in enacting a
statute conferring discretionary power upon an
administrative agency, but the agency may be
authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the
purposes of the legislation and carrying it into effect.
When the legislature laid down the fundamentals of a
law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the
authority to exercise such legislative power as is
necessary to carry into effect the general legislative
purpose. The rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode of proceedings to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute.
28. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary
of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity
as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent
respondents from implementing and enforcing RA
9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the
law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail
the creation of a congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers, for it permits legislative
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participation in the implementation and enforcement
of the law.
ISSUE: WON the joint congressional committee is valid
and constitutional
HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of
Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of
oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it
has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest. The power of oversight
has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on
the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may
in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of
its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such
as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.
In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a
statutory provision requiring the President or an
20

administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by
law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution's
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own
laws.
29.
30. BPI LEASING CORPORATION petitioner,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
APPEAL AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.
FACTS: For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing
Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49
representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then
imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from
equipment leasing for the said year amounting to
P27,783,725.42.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86.
Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing
companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be
subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual
income earned. This means that companies registered
under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable
for "contractors percentage tax" under Section 205
but are, instead, subject to "gross receipts tax" under
Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC
had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractors
percentage tax," it re-computed its tax liabilities under
the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of
P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the
CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the
difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as
"contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it
should have paid for "gross receipts tax."
The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim
of refund and held that RR 19-86, may only be applied
prospectively such that it only covers all leases written
on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since
BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it
follows that this was derived from lease transactions
prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by
the RR.
A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was
filed, but was denied. BLC then appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of
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Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that RR 19-86
may be applied retroactively so as to allow BLCs claim
for a refund of P777,117.05.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
provision on the date of effectivity of RR 19-86 is clear
and unequivocal, leaving no room for interpretation on
its prospective application.
ISSUES:
WON RR 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in
nature.
WON RR 19-86 is prospective or retroactive in nature.
WON BPI failed to meet the quantum of evidence
required in refund cases.
RULE:
1ST ISSUE BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR
19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative in
character and hence, should retroact to the date of
effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret. A legislative
rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on
the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing. The Court finds the questioned RR to be
legislative in nature. Section 1 of RR 19-86 plainly
states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277
of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express grant of
authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. Verily, it
cannot be disputed that RR 19-86 was issued pursuant
to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance,
thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as
alleged by BLC.
BLC further posits that, it is invalid for want of due
process as no prior notice, publication and public
hearing attended the issuance thereof. To support its
view, BLC cited CIR v. Fortune Tobacco, et al., wherein
the Court nullified a revenue memorandum circular
which reclassified certain cigarettes and subjected
them to a higher tax rate, holding it invalid for lack of
notice, publication and public hearing. In this case, RR
19-86 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are
subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is invoking
RR 19-86 as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it
were invalid, then petitioner all the more has no right
to a refund.
2ND ISSUE The Court now resolves whether its
application should be prospective or retroactive.
Statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express
terms or by necessary implication. In the present case,
there is no indication that the RR may operate
retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express
provision stating that it "shall take effect on January 1,
1987," and that it "shall be applicable to all leases
written on or after the said date." Thus, BLC is not in a
21

position to invoke the provisions of RR 19-86 for lease
rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
3RD ISSUE Tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions. As such, these are to be strictly construed
against the person or entity claiming the exemption.
The burden of proof is upon him who claims the
exemption and he must be able to justify his claim by
the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory
law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon vague
implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax
refund.
31. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F.
GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General
Manager, Petitioners, v. ALBERT M. VELASCO and
MARIO I. MOLINA, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners charged respondents
administratively with grave misconduct for their
alleged participation in the demonstration held by
some GSIS employees, and placed them under
preventive suspension for 90 days.
Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of
certain employee privileges but were denied because
of their pending administrative case.
Petitioner promulgated Resolutions 372 and 197
disqualifying employees with pending administrative
case from step increment and other benefits and
privileges. Respondents claimed that the denial of the
employee benefits due them on the ground of their
pending administrative cases violates their right to be
presumed innocent and that they are being punished
without hearing.
In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court
granted respondents petition for prohibition,
restraining petitioners from implementing the above
resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is valid.
HELD: NO. Not all rules and regulations adopted by
every government agency are to be filed with the UP
Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent
character are to be filed. Interpretative regulations
and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the Administrative agency and
not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law
Center. The assailed resolutions pertained only to
internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the
GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of
these resolutions with the UP Law Center.
If an employee who was suspended as a penalty will
be treated like an employee on approved vacation
leave without pay, then it is only fair and reasonable to
apply the same rules to an employee who was
preventively suspended, more so considering that
preventive suspension is not a penalty. An employee
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who was preventively suspended will still be entitled
to step increment after serving the time of his
preventive suspension even if the pending
administrative case against him has not yet been
resolved or dismissed.
Also, the trial court was correct in declaring that
respondents had the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive
suspension and without the administrative case being
finally resolved, respondents should have been
reinstated and, after serving the same number of days
of their suspension, entitled to the grant of step
increment.
32. WILLIAM C. DAGAN, CARLOS H. REYES, NARCISO
MORALES, BONIFACIO MANTILLA, CESAR AZURIN,
WEITONG LIM, MA. TERESA TRINIDAD, MA.
CARMELITA FLORENTINO, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
RACING COMMISSION, MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC.,
and PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., Respondents.
FACTS: Aug. 11, 2004- Philracom issued a directive
directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and
Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately
come up with their respective Clubs House Rule to
address Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and
to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA.
Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 5 dated 28 March 1994 by the Department
of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses
from any locality or place except when accompanied
by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director
of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). In compliance
with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners
of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit
the horses to blood sampling and administration of
the Coggins Test to determine whether they are
afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17
September 2004, Philracom issued copies of the
guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA.
Petitioners refused to comply with the directives.
Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing
proceeded. The horses, whose owners refused to
comply were banned from the races, were removed
from the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing
their licenses or evicted from their stables.
Racehorse owners complained before the Office of the
President (OP) which in turn issued a directive
instructing Philracom to investigate the matter.
Petitioners filed for a TRO with the RTC- granted. RTC
however dismissed their petition for injunction
because: 1. The issue is already moot since almost all
racehorse owners complied with the directives; and 2.
It is a valid exercise of police power. Upon appeal, CA
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
22

ISSUE: WON there is a valid delegation of legislative
power to Philracom
RULING: YES. The validity of an administrative
issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on
compliance with the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with
the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority
given by the legislature;
(4) It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the
questioned issuances. Philracoms authority is drawn
from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the
presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed
its authority. And the issuances are fair and
reasonable.
FIRST REQUISITE:
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be
delegated, or as expressed in the Latin
maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This
rule is based upon the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. This rule
however admits of recognized exceptions such as the
grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies. They have been granted by Congress with
the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. However,
in every case of permissible delegation, there must be
a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinableto which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and
standards sufficiency. Complete: Philracom was
created for the purpose of carrying out the declared
policy in Section 1 which is to promote and direct the
accelerated development and continued growth of
horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports
development program but also in order to insure the
full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue
and employment. Philracom was granted exclusive
jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the
conduct of horse racing, including the framing and
scheduling of races, the construction and safety of
race tracks, and the security of racing.
Sufficient Standards: Section 9 provides for Specific
Powers: To register race horses, horse owners or
associations or federations thereof, and to regulate
the construction of race tracks and to grant permit for
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the holding of races; To issue, suspend or revoke
permits and licenses;order the suspension of any
racing event in case of violation of any law, ordinance
or rules and regulations; To prohibit the use of
improper devices, drugs, stimulants or other means
to enhance or diminish the speed of horse or
materially harm their condition;
No delegation of rule-making power to MJCI and PRCI
The philtracom directive is merely instructive in
character. Compliance with the Philracoms directive is
part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections
1[33] of R.A. No. 7953[34] and Sections 1[35] and
2[36] of 8407.[As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty
is not derived from the delegated authority of
Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to
them by Congress
SECOND REQUISITE:
While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a
month after Philracoms directive, this circumstance
does not render the directive nor the guidelines void.
Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI
and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing,
with or without implementing guidelines.
Lack of publication:As a rule, the issuance of rules
and regulations in the exercise of an administrative
agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require
notice and hearing. InAbella, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that
prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise
of quasi-legislative powers since there is no
determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained.
THIRD REQUISITE:
The administrative body may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute
it is administering or which created it, or which are in
derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.The
assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for
monitoring and eradicating EIA. These guidelines are
in accord with Philracoms mandate under the law to
regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country.
FOURTH REQUISITE:
The assailed guidelines do not appear to be
unreasonable or discriminatory. In fact, all horses
stabled at the MJCI and PRCIs premises underwent
the same procedure. The guidelines implemented
were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a
reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses
infected with EIA.
Horse-owners were also informed beforehand. The
lease contract executed between petitioner and MJC
contains a proviso reserving the right of the lessor,
MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a
particular horse is a qualified horse. In addition,
Philracoms rules and regulations on horse racing
23

provide that horses must be free from any contagious
disease or illness in order to be eligible as race entries.
33. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL)
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory
powers, the National Telecommunications Commission
issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of
telecommunications services and on measures in
minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone unit. Isla Communications Co., Inc.
(IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel)
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the
memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as
stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such
jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer
Acts of the Philippines. Soon thereafter, Globe
Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a
joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit
complaint-in-intervention. This was granted by the
trial court.
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from
implementing the MCs. NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss,
on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The defendant's MD is
denied for lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later
on denied by the trial court. The CA, upon NTC's filing
of a special action for certiorari and prohibition,
reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private
respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?
RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that
is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required
that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law. They must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules
and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what
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fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly
the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an
administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-
making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to
or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action and exercise
of discretion in a judicial nature.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where
the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the
same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question
or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court. It applies where the
claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case,
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction
24

to pass upon the same. The determination of whether
a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
34. CONTE VS COA
FACTS: Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-
Palma were former employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) who retired from government service.
They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 660. In addition, petitioners also
claimed benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56,
series of 1971 that provides financial incentive and
inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to
avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended,
rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as
amended, by giving them financial assistance
equivalent in amount to the difference between what
a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less
what he was entitled to under RA 660.
Thereafter, COA issued a ruling disallowing in audit all
such claims for financial assistance under SSS
Resolution No. 56 for the reason that it results in the
increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under
existing retirement laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not public respondent abused its
discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners
claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56; and
2. Whether or not SSS Resolution No. 56 is valid.
HELD:
1. No. The Commission bears stress that the financial
assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56
is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under
R.A. No. 660. It is clear that petitioners applied for
benefits under RA 660 only because of the incentives
offered by Res. 56, and that absent such incentives,
they would have without fail availed of RA 1616
instead. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit,
there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission.
2. No. The said financial assistance partakes of the
nature of a retirement benefit that has the effect of
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modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A.
No. 660. It is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had
no authority to maintain and implement such
retirement plan and in the guise of rule-making,
legislate or amend laws or worse, render them
nugatory. Hence, SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby
illegal, void and no effect.
35. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellant, vs.
AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, defendant-appellee.
fACTS: Augusto Santos is an owner of fishing boat
Malabon II and III, who ordered his fishermen to fish,
loiter and anchor with the 3km U.S. Military
jurisdiction near the island of Corregidor without
permission from Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce.
The fiscal filed against Augusto Santos a violation of
sec. 28 Admin. Order 2; provides that boat licensed
under Act 4003 are prohibited to gather, collect and
catch fish and other sea products, to anchor or loiter
within the 3km jurisdiction of US military authorities.
Sec 28 Admin Order 2was issued by the Sec. Of
Agriculture & commerce by virtue of an authority
vested in him by Sec 4 Act. 4003: that he shall issue
instructions, orders, rules and regulations to carry into
effect provisions in Act 4003 and conduct proceedings
under such provisions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sec. of Agri & Commerce exercise
an excess of regulatory power as vested by Sec. 4 Act
4003.
2. Whether or not Sec. Of Agri & Commerce can
exercise legislative power in issuing an Admin Order 2.
3. Whether or not Sec. 28 of Admin Order 2 is null and
void.
HELD: Act 4003 does not contain any conditional
clause quoted in sec 28 AO 2 such clause supplies a
defect if the law. In Sec 4 Act 4003 he shall issue from
time to time instructions, orders, rules and regulations
consistent with this the Act as may be necessary to
carry into effect the provisions thereof and conduct of
proceedings arising from such provisions. Therefore
such act constitutes excess regulatory power conferred
to him because it is beyond the scope provisions of Act
4003.
The Secretary has no power to legislate on the matter
because such power cannot be delegated to him which
is exclusive for Phil. Legislature. Therefore sec 28 is
null and void. Santos charges does not constitute a
crime or a violation of some criminal law within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, information DISMISSED.
36. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign
exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
25

money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to
sell the same to the Central Bank as required under
Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was
published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951
after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower
court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay
fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the
Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective
and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc
decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the
Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming
effective. This is based on the theory that before the
public is bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published for the people to be officially and
specifically informed of such contents including its
penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
37. G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO
REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and
CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967
regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo
Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged for having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused
in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped
with motor; with a generator colored green with
attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white;
and electrocuting device locally known as sensored
with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo
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direct and with the use of these devices or
equipments catches fish thru electric current, which
destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach,
to the detriment and prejudice of the populace"
(Criminal Case No. 5429).
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding
the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation
of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G.
1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine
waters.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of
the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2
of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the
ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries
(63 O.G. 9963).
ISSUE: WON the Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1 are valid.
RULING: NO. We are of the opinion that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself.
An examination of the rule-making power of
executive officials and administrative agencies and,
in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the
view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro
fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making
powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All
that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. The lawmaking body cannot possibly
provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute.
The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
26

principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the non-delegation of legislative,
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity
of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law" .
Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.
The rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.
There is no question that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that
the Secretary "shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent"
with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into
effect the provisions thereof." That power is now
vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7
of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December
No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the
Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose" of that enactment
"and for the development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that "the Department Head shall have the
power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do
so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and
other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate
the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and
dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws
relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall
prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except
as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department
Head in conformity with law have the force of law.
As he exercises the rule-making power by
delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite
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that he should not transcend the bound
demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that
power; otherwise, he would be improperly
exercising legislative power in his own right and not
as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic
principle that administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of
the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in
the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the
policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left
to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that
rules and regulations are the product of a delegated
power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation
should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation
prescribed by an executive officer of the
government in conformity with and based upon a
statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an
offense and renders the offender liable to
punishment in accordance with the provisions of
the law.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro
fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was
issued, because the law itself does not expressly
punish electro fishing.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned
in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power
which has not been and cannot be delegated to
him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking
body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of
the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary
but also an exercise of a legislative power which he
does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is
27

null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge
against Santos was dismiss.
38. G.R. No. 95832August 10, 1992
MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS: Peralta was appointed Trade-Specialist II on
25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified as
"Reinstatement/Permanent".
On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial
salary, covering the period from 25 September to 31
October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave
credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount
corresponding to his absences during the covered
period.
Petitioner then sent a latter to Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
raising the following question:
Is an employee who was on leave of absence
without pay on a day before or on a day time
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday, also considered on leave of absence
without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday?
Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman
argued that a reading of the General Leave Law as
contained in the Revised Administrative Code, as
well as the old Civil Service Law (Republic Act No.
2260), the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree
No. 807), and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation
fails to disclose a specific provision which supports
the CSC rule at issue. That being the case, the
petitioner contented that he cannot be deprived of
his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual
situation posed), and that the withholding (or
deduction) of the same is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission
promulgated Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the
action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of
petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6)
days (September 29, 30, October 1, 20, 21, 22,
1989) is in order.
ISSUE: WON the CSC Resolution is valid.
RULING: NO
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260)
conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service
the following powers and duties:
Sec. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to
prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
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this Civil Service Law, and the rules prescribed
pursuant to the provisions of this law shall become
effective thirty days after publication in the Official
Gazette;
xxx xxx xxx
(k) To perform other functions that properly belong
to a central personnel agency.
When an administrative or executive agency
renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means. 8 It has also been held that
interpretative regulations need not be published.
The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned
Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as
referring only to government employees who have
earned leave credits against which their absences
may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of
leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent
Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does
not show that a government employee who is on
leave of absence without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said
days.
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not
necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside
by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
The construction by the respondent Commission of
R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative
intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that
government employees are entitled to fifteen (15)
days vacation leave of absence with full pay and
fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases.
Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and
the law does not provide for a distinction between
those who have accumulated leave credits and
those who have exhausted their leave credits in
order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that
government employees, whether or not they have
accumulated leave credits, are not required by law
to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and
thus they can not be declared absent on such non-
working days. They cannot be or are not considered
absent on non-working days; they cannot and
should not be deprived of their salary
corresponding to said non-working days just
because they were absent without pay on the day
immediately prior to, or after said non-working
28

days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation
of property without due process.
Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A.
2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised
Administrative Code applied to all government
employee without any distinction. It follows that
the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all
employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A,
whether or not they have accumulated leave
credits.
As the questioned CSC policy is here declared
invalid, we are next confronted with the question of
what effect such invalidity will have. Will all
government employees on a monthly salary basis,
deprived of their salaries corresponding to
Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays (as herein
petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February 1965,
be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding
to such non-working days?
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.
WHEREFORE, SC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797
are declared NULL and VOID. The respondent
Commission is directed to take the appropriate
action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts
previously but unlawfully deducted from his
monthly salary as above indicated.
39. G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS
T. SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari involves
the right of a public official to engage in the practice
of his profession while employed in the
Government.
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana
for: violation of Department of Local Government
(DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June
10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 74-58.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an
incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer
by profession, has continuously engaged in the
practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
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Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as
counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang,
filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public
ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in
several criminal and civil cases in the city, without
prior authority of the DLG Regional Director.
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos
issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting
forth guidelines for the practice of professions by
local elective officials.
On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to
Dismiss the administrative case against him on the
ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars
Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because
the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.
ISSUE: WON DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 are
valid.
RULING: YES. As a matter of policy, this Court
accords great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only
because of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed knowledgeability and
expertise in the enforcement of laws and
regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. With
respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the respondent,
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos.
80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers
and employees relating or incidental to the
performance of their duties are necessarily
impressed with public interest for by express
constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of
which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence,
judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would
actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the
complaining employees and assisting them to
prosecute their claims against City Engineer
Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from
engaging in the private practice of his profession, if
such practice would represent interests adverse to
the government.
29

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of
the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither
the statute nor the circular trenches upon the
Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe
rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials
to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge
of their public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.
40. G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune
Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of
different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent
Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. In a
letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A.
Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government,
"the initial position of the Commission was to
classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign
brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco
Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No.
7654, was enacted, on 10 June 1993, by the
legislature and signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by
the President of the Philippines. The new law
became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended
Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code ("NIRC").
About a month after the enactment and two (2)
days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"),
was issued by the BIR, with regard to reclassifying
the brands of cigarettes.
It states that "HOPE," "MORE" and "CHAMPION"
cigarettes, being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco
Corporation are hereby considered locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes.
Upon filing by Fortune Tobacco of a Petiton for
Review to the Court of Tax Appeals, it ruled that the
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 is found
to be defective, invalid and unenforceable, such
that when R.A. No. 7654 took effect on July 3, 1993,
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the brands in question were not CURRENTLY
CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section
1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7654 and were therefore still classified as other
locally manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 45% or
20% as the case may be.
In fine, petitioner opines that RMC 37-93 is merely
an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus
become effective without any prior need for notice
and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is
not discriminatory since it would apply under
similar circumstances to all locally manufactured
cigarettes.
ISSUE: WON the RMC 37-93 is valid.
RULING: NO. Petitioner stresses on the wide and
ample authority of the BIR in the issuance of rulings
for the effective implementation of the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Let it be made
clear that such authority of the Commissioner is not
here doubted. Like any other government agency,
however, the CIR may not disregard legal
requirements or applicable principles in the exercise
of its quasi-legislative powers.
Let us first distinguish between two kinds of
administrative issuances a legislative rule and an
interpretative rule.
In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders,
Inc., vs. Department of Finance Secretary, the Court
expressed:
. . . a legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details
thereof . In the same way that laws must have
the benefit of public hearing, it is generally
required that before a legislative rule is adopted
there must be hearing. In this connection, the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Public Participation. If not otherwise required
by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order
shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested
cases shall be observed.
In addition such rule must be published. On the
other hand, interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
30

It should be understandable that when an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in
nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.
A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering
the circumstances under which it has been issued,
convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed
simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the
process the previous holdings of past
Commissioners) or merely as construing Section
142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact
and most importantly, been made in order to place
"Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
within the classification of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the
new law would have its amendatory provisions
applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at
the time of its effectivity were not so classified as
bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the
questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium
More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the
category of locally manufactured cigarettes not
bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem
tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of
RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate
consequence on private respondent's products.
Evidently, in order to place "Hope Luxury,"
"Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within
the scope of the amendatory law and subject them
to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-
93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply
intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its
quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of
the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication should not have been then ignored.
Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise
infringed on uniformity of taxation.
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987
Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and
equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike or put on equal footing both in
privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class must be taxed at
the same rate and the tax must operate with the
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same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope
Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
cigarettes. In its decision, the CTA has keenly noted
that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands have
not been similarly included within the scope of the
circular.
All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily
promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid
and effective administrative issuance.
41. G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner
appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,
respondent-appellee.
FACTS: Circular No. 22 was issued by the Social
Security Commission, in view of the amendment of
the provisions of the Social Security Law defining
the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f)
of Republic Act No. 1161. Republic Act No. 1792
changed the definition of "compensation".
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the
amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime
pay given in addition to the regular or base pay
were expressly excluded, or exempted from the
definition of the term "compensation", such
exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the
Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of
such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was,
therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the
interpretation or understanding of the Commission,
of the law as amended, which it was its duty to
enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was
not already in the law as amended. It merely stated
and circularized the opinion of the Commission as
to how the law should be construed.
Victorias Milling Company questioned the validity of
the circular for lack of authority on the part of the
Social Security Commission to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack
of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: WON Circular No. 22 is valid.
RULING: YES. There can be no doubt that there is a
distinction between an administrative rule or
regulation and an administrative interpretation of a
law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative
agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives
31

a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of
the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in
the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the
policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left
to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that
rules and regulations are the product of a delegated
power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and
its scope is within the statutory authority granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its
innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law
is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports
merely to advise employers-members of the System
of what, in the light of the amendment of the law,
they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the
social security contributions should be based, and
that such circular did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official Gazette for
its effectivity.
42. G.R. No. 163448 March 08, 2005
NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (NFA), and JUANITO
M. DAVID, in his capacity as Regional Director, NFA
Regional Office No. 1, San Juan, La Union,
Petitioners, vs. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
represented by its Acting President & General
Manager, COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO (RET.),
Respondents.
FACTS: MASADA Security Agency, Inc., entered into
a one year contract to provide security services to
the various offices, warehouses and installations of
NFA Region I.
Meanwhile, the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board issued several wage orders
mandating increases in the daily wage rate.
Accordingly, MASADA Security Agency requested
NFA for a corresponding upward adjustment in the
monthly contract rate consisting of the increases in
the daily minimum wage of the security guards as
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well as the corresponding raise in their overtime
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, holiday and rest
day pay. It also claimed increases in Social Security
System (SSS) and Pag-ibig premiums.
NFA, however, granted the request only with
respect to the increase in the daily wage by
multiplying the amount of the mandated increase
by 30 days and denied the same with respect to the
adjustments in the other benefits and
remunerations computed on the basis of the daily
wage.
MASADA sought the intervention of the Office of
the Regional Director, Regional Office No. I, La
Union, as Chairman of the Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Board and the DOLE Secretary.
Despite the advisory5 of said offices sustaining the
claim of respondent that the increase mandated by
Republic Act No. 6727 (RA 6727) and the wage
orders issued by the RTWPB is not limited to the
daily pay, NFA maintained its stance that it is not
liable to pay the corresponding adjustments in the
wage related benefits of respondents security
guards.
ISSUE: WON the interpretation given by the labor
agencies that the wage orders issued by RTWPB is
not limited to the daily pay is binding to the Court.
RULING: NO. The term "wage" as used in Section 6
of RA 6727 pertains to no other than the "statutory
minimum wage" which is defined under the Rules
Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate
fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker. 26
The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules
is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed
eight hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increases
or the additional liability to be borne by the
principal under Section 6 of RA 6727 is the
increment or amount added to the remuneration of
an employee for an 8-hour work.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others.27 Since the
increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to
the "statutory minimum wage" as defined herein,
principals in service contracts cannot be made to
pay the corresponding wage increase in the
overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and
rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits
granted to workers. While basis of said
remuneration and benefits is the statutory
minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly
expanded as to include those not stated in the
subject provision.
The general rule is that construction of a statute by
an administrative agency charged with the task of
32

interpreting or applying the same is entitled to
great weight and respect. The Court, however, is
not bound to apply said rule where such executive
interpretation, is clearly erroneous, or when there is
no ambiguity in the law interpreted, or when the
language of the words used is clear and plain, as in
the case at bar. Besides, administrative
interpretations are at best advisory for it is the
Court that finally determines what the law means.
Hence, the interpretation given by the labor
agencies in the instant case which went as far as
supplementing what is otherwise not stated in the
law cannot bind this Court.
43. G.R. No. 159694 January 27, 2006
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, vs. AZUCENA T. REYES, Respondent.
FACTS: On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco
(decedent) died, leaving a 1,292 square-meter
residential lot and an old house thereon (subject
property).
On February 12, 1998, the Chief, Assessment
Division, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), issued a
preliminary assessment notice against the estate in
the amount of P14,580,618.67. On May 10, 1998,
the heirs of the decedent (heirs) received a final
estate tax assessment notice and a demand letter,
both dated April 22, 1998, for the amount of
P14,912,205.47, inclusive of surcharge and interest.
As the estate failed to pay its tax liability within the
April 15, 2000 deadline, the Chief, Collection
Enforcement Division, BIR, notified [Reyes] on June
6, 2000 that the subject property would be sold at
public auction on August 8, 2000.
During the appeal to the CA, it said that Section 228
of the Tax Code and RR 12-99 were mandatory and
unequivocal in their requirement. The assessment
notice and the demand letter should have stated
the facts and the law on which they were based;
otherwise, they were deemed void. The appellate
court held that while administrative agencies, like
the BIR, were not bound by procedural
requirements, they were still required by law and
equity to observe substantive due process. The
reason behind this requirement, said the CA, was to
ensure that taxpayers would be duly apprised of --
and could effectively protest -- the basis of tax
assessments against them. Since the assessment
and the demand were void, the proceedings
emanating from them were likewise void, and any
order emanating from them could never attain
finality.
Reyes argued that she, as well as the other heirs,
was not aware of the facts and the law on which
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the assessment in question is based, after she had
opted to propose several compromises on the
estate tax due, and even prematurely acting on such
proposal by paying 20% of the basic estate tax due.
ISSUE: WON CIRs assessment against the estate is
valid.
RULING: NO. Section 228 of the Tax Code provides
that, "The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of
the law and the facts on which the assessment is
made: otherwise, the assessment shall be void."
In the present case, Reyes was not informed in
writing of the law and the facts on which the
assessment of estate taxes had been made. She was
merely notified of the findings by the CIR, who had
simply relied upon the provisions of former Section
229 prior to its amendment by Republic Act (RA)
No. 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act
of 1997.
First, RA 8424 has already amended the provision of
Section 229 on protesting an assessment. The old
requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the
CIRs findings was changed in 1998 to informing the
taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on
which an assessment would be made; otherwise,
the assessment itself would be invalid.
Second, the non-retroactive application of Revenue
Regulation (RR) No. 12-99 is of no moment,
considering that it merely implements the law.
A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance
secretary to implement the provisions of the Tax
Code.15 While it is desirable for the government
authority or administrative agency to have one
immediately issued after a law is passed, the
absence of the regulation does not automatically
mean that the law itself would become inoperative.
At the time the pre-assessment notice was issued to
Reyes, RA 8424 already stated that the taxpayer
must be informed of both the law and facts on
which the assessment was based. Thus, the CIR
should have required the assessment officers of the
BIR to follow the clear mandate of the new law. The
old regulation governing the issuance of estate tax
assessment notices ran afoul of the rule that tax
regulations -- old as they were -- should be in
harmony with, and not supplant or modify, the law.
It may be argued that the Tax Code provisions are
not self-executory. It would be too wide a stretch of
the imagination, though, to still issue a regulation
that would simply require tax officials to inform the
taxpayer, in any manner, of the law and the facts on
which an assessment was based. That requirement
is neither difficult to make nor its desired results
hard to achieve.
33

Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a
statute, and not declarative of certain rights and
corresponding obligations, is given retroactive
effect as of the date of the effectivity of the
statute.17 RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being
interpretive of the provisions of the Tax Code, even
if it was issued only on September 6, 1999, this
regulation was to retroact to January 1, 1998 -- a
date prior to the issuance of the preliminary
assessment notice and demand letter.
Third, neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail
over Section 228 of the Tax Code.
No doubt, Section 228 has replaced Section 229.
The provision on protesting an assessment has
been amended. Furthermore, in case of discrepancy
between the law as amended and its implementing
but old regulation, the former necessarily prevails.
Thus, between Section 228 of the Tax Code and the
pertinent provisions of RR 12-85, the latter cannot
stand because it cannot go beyond the provision of
the law. The law must still be followed, even though
the existing tax regulation at that time provided for
a different procedure. The regulation then simply
provided that notice be sent to the respondent in
the form prescribed, and that no consequence
would ensue for failure to comply with that form.
Fourth, petitioner violated the cardinal rule in
administrative law that the taxpayer be accorded
due process. Not only was the law here
disregarded, but no valid notice was sent, either. A
void assessment bears no valid fruit.
The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal,
requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax
collection without first establishing a valid
assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal
principle in administrative investigations: that
taxpayers should be able to present their case and
adduce supporting evidence. In the instant case,
respondent has not been informed of the basis of
the estate tax liability. Without complying with the
unequivocal mandate of first informing the taxpayer
of the governments claim, there can be no
deprivation of property, because no effective
protest can be made.
Fifth, the rule against estoppel does not apply.
Although the government cannot be estopped by
the negligence or omission of its agents, the
obligatory provision on protesting a tax assessment
cannot be rendered nugatory by a mere act of the
CIR .
44. G.R. No. 175451 April 13, 2007
ROSARIO L. DADULO, Petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
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OMBUDSMAN, HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., in
his capacity as City Mayor of Quezon City and
GLORIA PATANGUI, Respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Gloria Patangui
(Patangui) filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint against
petitioner Rosario Dadulo, Barangay Chairperson of
Barangay Payatas A, Quezon City; and against
Barangay Security Development Officers (BSDOs)
Edgar Saraga and Rogelio Dumadigo; and Deputy
BSDO Efren Pagabao.
Patangui declared in her Salaysay ng Pagrereklamo
that, while she was out of their house, petitioner
and the said BSDOs stole several galvanized iron
sheets, lumber, and rolled plain iron sheets from
her backyard. The incident was purportedly
witnessed by Patanguis two daughters who saw
two men cart away the items upon the orders of a
woman who was standing nearby. A BSDO on duty
told Patangui that it was petitioner who ordered the
seizure of the subject construction materials. The
same information was relayed to her by a certain
Elsie Castillejos. The following day, Patangui found
out that some of the galvanized iron sheets taken
from her backyard were utilized in building the new
barangay outpost. She recognized said items
because she is familiar with the campaign stickers
still posted on the galvanized iron sheets.
Based on the affidavit of the parties, the Office of
the Ombudsman rendered the assailed Decision
finding petitioner and BSDO Edgar Saraga guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and imposed upon them the penalty of six
months suspension.
ISSUE: WON there is substantial evidence to show
that petitioner ordered the seizure of Patanguis
construction materials.
RULING: YES. Administrative proceedings are
governed by the "substantial evidence rule."
Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an
administrative case would have to be sustained for
as long as it is supported by substantial evidence
that the respondent has committed acts stated in
the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.
A review of the records of the case shows that the
factual findings of the Ombudsman upon which its
decision on petitioners administrative liability was
based are supported by the evidence on record.
Petitioner and BSDO Edgar Saraga were identified as
the persons who took the construction materials.
34

Respondents claim was corroborated by the
testimony of her daughter who saw the actual
taking of the construction materials. Moreover,
respondent testified that the materials taken from
her premises were used in the construction of the
new barangay outpost.
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence
and are accorded due respect and weight especially
when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It
is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by
the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings
may aptly be made. In reviewing administrative
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the
function of this Court to analyze and weigh the
parties evidence all over again except when there
is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task
in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals.
Wherefore, the Decision of the CA in affirming the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in which
found petitioner Rosario Dadulo guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
imposed upon her the penalty of suspension for six
months is AFFIRMED.
45. G.R. No. 147096 January 15, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
petitioner, vs. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO.,
INC. and BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.,
respondents.
FACTS: On December 29, 1992, Bayantel filed an
application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public
Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate
and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional
Authority (PA).
On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting
in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to
operate CMTS service. Extelcom filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the
application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel
a provisional authority to construct, install, operate
and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and
Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 allocating
frequency bands to new public telecommunication
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entities which are authorized to install, operate and
maintain CMTS.
ISSUE: WON the provisional authority given by NTC
to Bayantel is valid.
RULING: YES. The NTC was created pursuant to
Executive Order No. 546, promulgated on July 23,
1979. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to
the Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau, which were
both abolished under the said Executive Order.
Under Executive Order No. 125-A, issued in April
1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the
Department of Transportation and
Communications.
In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the
NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the
installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio
communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems. Such power includes the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services.
the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the Order of
the NTC dated May 3, 2000, granting Bayantel a
provisional authority to install, operate and
maintain CMTS. The general rule is that purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts.
The established exception to the rule is where the
issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion. None of
these obtains in the case at bar.
This Court has consistently held that the courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of the government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency. It has also been held
that the exercise of administrative discretion is a
policy decision and a matter that can best be
discharged by the government agency concerned,
and not by the courts.48 In Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals, it was held that findings of fact which are
supported by evidence and the conclusion of
experts should not be disturbed. This was reiterated
in Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, wherein it was ruled that
factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality and are binding
35

even upon the Supreme Court if they are supported
by substantial evidence.
Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in
the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its
adjudicative functions. This latitude includes the
authority to take judicial notice of facts within its
special competence.
In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the NTC which formed the basis
for awarding the provisional authority to Bayantel.
As found by the NTC, Bayantel has been granted
several provisional and permanent authorities
before to operate various telecommunications
services. Indeed, it was established that Bayantel
was the first company to comply with its obligation
to install local exchange lines pursuant to E.O. 109
and R.A. 7925. In recognition of the same, the
provisional authority awarded in favor of Bayantel
to operate Local Exchange Services in Quezon City,
Malabon, Valenzuela and the entire Bicol region
was made permanent and a CPCN for the said
service was granted in its favor. Prima facie
evidence was likewise found showing Bayantel's
legal, financial and technical capacity to undertake
the proposed cellular mobile telephone service.
46. G.R. No. L-49774 February 24, 1981
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (CAGAYAN COCA-
COLA PLANT), petitioner, vs. Hon. AMADO G.
INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor and CAGAYAN
COCA-COLA FREE WORKERS UNION, respondents.
FACTS: On January 3, 1977, Cagayan Coca-Cola Free
Workers Union, private respondent herein, filed a
complaint against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan
Coca-Cola Plant), petitioner herein, alleging failure
or refusal of the latter to include in the computation
of 13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or
maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest
days and special holidays, including pay for regular
holidays and night differentials.
An Order was issued by Regional Office No. X where
the complaint was filed requiring herein petitioner
San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant)
"to pay the difference of whatever earnings and the
amount actually received as 13th month pay
excluding overtime premium and emergency cost of
living allowance. "
Herein petitioner appealed from that Order to the
Minister of Labor in whose behalf the Deputy
Minister of Labor Amado Inciong issued an Order,
affirming the Order of Regional Office No. X.
Petitioner, contends that Presidential Decree 851
speaks only of basic salary as basis for the
determination of the 13th-month pay; submits that
payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
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night differential pay, as well as premium paid for
work performed on rest days, special and regular
holidays do not form part of the basic salary.
ISSUE: WON in the computation of the 13th-month
pay under Presidential Decree 851, payments for
sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for
work done on rest days and special holidays,
including pay for regular holidays and night
differentials should be considered.
RULING: NO. Under Presidential Decree 851 and its
implementing rules, the basic salary of an employee
is used as the basis in the determination of his 13th-
month pay. Any compensations or remunerations
which are deemed not part of the basic pay is
excluded as basis in the computation of the
mandatory bonus.
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851, the following
compensations are deemed not part of the basic
salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to
Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions
No. 174;
b) Profit sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which
are not considered or integrated as part of the
regular basic salary of tile employee at the time
of the promulgation of the Decree on December
16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851
issued by the then Labor Secretary Blas Ople,
overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations are
excluded as part of the basic salary and in the
computation of the 13th-month pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior
Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all
remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to
an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later
and more controlling Supplementary Rules and
Regulations which categorically, exclude from the
definition of basic salary earnings and other
remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A
cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates
that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad
inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary rules and Regulations cure the
seeming tendency of the former rules to include all
remunerations and earnings within the definition of
basic salary.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the Deputy Labor
Minister are hereby set aside
47. G.R. No. L-19337 September 30, 1969
36

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the
production and milling of centrifugal sugar for exert,
the sugar so produced being placed in containers
known as jute bags. In 1957 it made two
importations of jute bags.
Of the 44,800 jute bags declared under entry 48,
only 8,647 were exported within one year from the
date of importation as containers of centrifugal
sugar. Of the 75,200 jute bags declared under entry
243, only 25,000 were exported within the said
period of one year. In other words, of the total
number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags
were exported within one year after their
importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period
but within three years from their importation.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the
exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags
within one year from their importation, the
Collector of Customs of Iloilo, required it to pay the
amount of P28,629.42 representing the customs
duties and special import tax due thereon, which
amount the petitioner paid under protest.
ISSUE: WON the Commissioner of Customs is
vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the
then applicable law, with discretion to extend the
period of one year provided for in section 23 of the
Act.
RULING: NO. To implement the said section 23,
Customs Administrative Order 389 dated December
6, 1940 was promulgated, paragraph XXVIII of which
provides that "bonds for the re-exportation of
cylinders and other containers are good for 12
months without extension," and paragraph XXXI,
that "bonds for customs brokers, commercial
samples, repairs and those filed to guarantee the
re-exportation of cylinders and other containers are
not extendible."
And insofar as jute bags as containers are
concerned, Customs Administrative Order 66 dated
August 25, 1948 was issued, prescribing rules and
regulations governing the importation, exportation
and identification thereof under section 23 of the
Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.
It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of
the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one
year the period within which the containers therein
mentioned must be exported, are silent as to
whether the said period may be extended. It was
surely by reason of this silence that the Bureau of
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Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66,
already adverted to, to eliminate confusion and
provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
more specifically, to make officially known its policy
to consider the one-year period mentioned in the
law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisions in
question have not been the subject of previous
judicial interpretation, then the application of the
doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative
construction," would, initially, be in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not
previously interpreted the statute is the rule
applicable that courts will give consideration to
construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical
construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute
or law by the executive department or other agency
charged with its administration or enforcement is
entitled to consideration and the highest respect
from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate
weight in determining the meaning of the law,
especially when the construction or interpretation is
long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous
with the first workings of the statute, or when the
enactment of the statute was suggested by such
agency.
The administrative orders in question appear to be
in consonance with the intention of the legislature
to limit the period within which to export imported
containers to one year, without extension, from the
date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the
Tariff and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have amended
section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the
long-standing view of the Commissioner of Customs
that the one-year period therein mentioned is not
extendible.
Implied legislative approval by failure to change a
long-standing administrative construction is not
essential to judicial respect for the construction but
is an element which greatly increases the weight
given such construction.
The correctness of the interpretation given a statute
by the agency charged with administering its
provision is indicated where it appears that
Congress, with full knowledge of the agency's
interpretation, has made significant additions to the
statute without amending it to depart from the
agency's view.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the
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construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts
often refer to several factors which may be
regarded as bases of the principle, as factors
leading the courts to give the principle controlling
weight in particular instances, or as independent
rules in themselves. These factors are the respect
due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact
that they frequently are the drafters of the law they
interpret; that the agency is the one on which the
legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application
of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering
deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute;
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered
view that the one-year period prescribed in section
23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 is non-
extendible and compliance therewith is mandatory.
1. PCGG vs. Pea
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over
the Philippine Commission on Good
Government
RULING: NO. RTC and CA have no
jurisdiction over PCGG in the exercise of its
powers and therefore may not interfere with
and restrain or set aside the orders and actions
of the Commission.
Under section 2 of EO 14, all cases of the
Commission regarding the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies,
Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or
criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
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PCGG exercises Quasi Judicial Functions
In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the
Commission is a co-equal body with regional
trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no
power to control the other."
The Solicitor General correctly submits that
the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts
over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in
section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980), which otherwise vests exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals
over all final judgment, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of regional trial courts and
quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions.
EO 14 specifically provides in section 2 that:
"The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall
have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof."
Necessarily, those who wish to question or
challenge the Commission's acts or orders in
such cases must seek recourse in the same
court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested
with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders
are in turn subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by this Court.
Prohibition Against Split Jurisdiction
The law and the courts frown upon split
jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of
actions - To draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is
to undermine stability in litigations. A
piecemeal resort to one court and another
gives rise to multiplicity of suits, To force the
parties to shuttle from one court to another to
secure full determination of their suit is a
situation gravely prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Primary Admin Jurisdiction and Exhaustion
of Admin Remedies
Courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence. Acts of an
administrative agency must not casually be
overturned by a court, and a court should as a
rule not substitute its judgment for that of the
38

administrative agency acting within the
perimeters of its own competence.
Applying these fundamental doctrines to the
case at bar, the questions and disputes raised
by respondents are within the primary
administrative jurisdiction of the Commission
that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog
the court dockets without first resorting to the
exhaustion of the prescribed administrative
remedies.
2. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs.
Advertising Board of the Philippines
Destileria applied with the AdBoard for a
clearance of the airing of a radio
advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim
ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)."
AdBoard was swept with complaints from the
public, thus recalled the clearance previously
issued.
ISSUE: WON the filing of prohibition
against Adboard is proper
RULING: NO. First of all, the petition filed
in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to
command AdBoard to desist from requiring
petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing
sanctions on any agency that will air,
broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without
such clearance.
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such
recourse, it must establish the following
requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation,
board or person has acted without or in excess
of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial
function by which he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes
to determine these questions and adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial
function is a term which applies to the action
and discretion of public administrative
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officers or bodies, which are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Ministerial function is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in the context of a given set
of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard for the exercise of his/its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case
are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. What is at contest here
is the power and authority of a private
organization, composed of several members-
organizations, which power and authority
were vested to it by its own members.
Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this
case. The definition and purpose of a writ of
prohibition excludes the use of the writ
against any person or group of persons acting
in a purely private capacity, and the writ will
not be issued against private individuals or
corporations so acting.
3. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Natividad
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition
before the trial court for the determination of
just compensation for their agricultural lands
situated in Pampanga, which were acquired
by the government pursuant to PD 27.
Land Bank avers that private respondents
should have sought the reconsideration of the
DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to
fix just compensation with the trial court.
ISSUE: WON respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
RULING: No. Private respondents did write
a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the
land valuation summary and requested a
conference for the purpose of fixing just
compensation. The letter, however, was left
unanswered prompting them to file a petition
directly with the trial court.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals, we declared that there is nothing
39

contradictory between the DARs primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, which
includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all
petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to
administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for
the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of
just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function. Thus, the trial
did not err in taking cognizance of the case as
the determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice.
4. Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman
DECS-Region XII ordered several pieces of
laboratory equipment and apparatus. A COA
Special Audit Team conducted an audit of the
transactions and submitted to the COA
Regional Director their Joint Affidavit
claiming alleged deficiencies in the
transactions.
In post-haste the COA Regional Directors
indorsed it to the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao for preliminary investigation.
Without preliminary investigation and
clarificatory question asked, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the
preliminary investigation recommending that
respondents be prosecuted for violation the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: WON there was undue and
unjustifiable delay on the part of the
Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed
against the petitioner which violated his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
the Complaint against him.
RULING: YES. The constitutional right to a
"speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to
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the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-
judicial hearings."Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.
However, the right to a speedy disposition of
a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or even without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used
to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay.
In this case, the preliminary investigation was
resolved close to four (4) years from the time
all the counter and reply affidavits were
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
We find that without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time was allowed to
elapse at the preliminary investigation stage
before the informations were filed.
True, the prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the COA and it must rely on its
own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. However,
we find that the cases are not sufficiently
complex to justify the length of time for their
resolution. Neither can the long delay in
resolving the case under preliminary
investigation be justified on the basis of the
number of informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions
involved.
There is no statement that voluminous
documentary and testimonial evidence were
involved. On the contrary, the Office
Ombudsman itself claimed in its
memorandum filed before this Court that "the
40

Complaint and the Counter-Affidavits
submitted by the complainant and the accused
respectively, as well as the documents on
hand" were sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause for violation RA
3019. Hence, a clarificatory hearing was no
longer conducted. Indeed, it appears that the
COA special audit team had already come up
and provided the Office of the Ombudsman
with the facts and figures on the alleged
overpricing, lack of public bidding and
irregular inspection reports, so much so that a
delay of almost four years in terminating the
preliminary investigation is not justified.
Verily, the delay in this case disregarded the
Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to
enforce the criminal liability of government
officers or employees in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service to the people. The failure of
said office to resolve the complaints that have
been pending for almost four years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the rights of
petitioner as a public official. In such event,
petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the
cases filed against him.
5. DARAB vs. Lubrica
ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over
Land Banks petition for certiorari.
RULING: NO. Jurisdiction, or the legal
power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of
law. It is settled that the authority to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is
never derived by implication.
DARAB was created to act as the quasi-
judicial arm of the DAR. To this end, the
DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure,
where it delegated to the RARADs and
PARADs the authority "to hear, determine
and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes,
and incidents in connection therewith, arising
within their assigned territorial jurisdiction."
In the absence of a specific statutory grant
of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
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DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only
limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise
jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for
certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial
authority of the DARAB nor its rule-
making power justifies such self-
conferment of authority.
The extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if
not wholly, on the provisions of the statute
creating or empowering such agency. The
grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-
judicial agency is not implied.
The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body,
whose limited jurisdiction does not include
authority over petitions for certiorari, in the
absence of an express grant.
6. Bautista vs. CA
ISSUE: WON decisions of the Office of the
Prosecutor are appealable in the CA.
RULING: NO. Petitioner submits that a
prosecutor conducting a preliminary
investigation performs a quasi-judicial
function citing jurisprudence. In those cases,
the Court held that the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in
nature. But this statement holds true only in
the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the
prosecutor is an office in the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of
a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary
investigation is very different from other
quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than
a legislature which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-
making."
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does
not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information.
41

It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a
quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint
are not appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power
to resolve appeals with finality only where
the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is
to present her defense in the trial of the case.
7. Spouses Balangauan vs. CA
ISSUE: WON the Department of Justice is a
quasi judicial agency
RULING: NO. It must be remembered that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence
of probable cause.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,this Court
held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
The prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
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ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public
prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this
is true only to the extent that, like quasi-
judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of
the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point.
A quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court and other than
a legislature which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-
making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards,
determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments
of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to
file an Information against a person charged
with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary
of Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions.
In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-
judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution finds no application. Be
that as it may, the DOJ rectified the
shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
lengthier one when it resolved respondent
HSBCs motion for reconsideration.
8. Monetary Board vs. Philippine Veterans
Bank
Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the RTC of Makati City. The RTC
dismissed respondents petition for
declaratory relief.
Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion
to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration
against said order alleging that it did not
receive a copy thereof until September 3,
2008. Despite the foregoing, the RTC allowed
respondents motion for reconsideration and
required petitioners to file their answer.
ISSUE: WON quasi-judicial agencies can be
subjects of a petition for declaratory relief.
42

RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court governs petitions for
declaratory relief, viz.:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by
any person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order
or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.
In the same manner that court decisions
cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief for the simple reason
that if a party is not agreeable to a decision
either on questions of law or of fact, it may
avail of the various remedies provided by
the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the
BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper
subject matter for a petition for declaratory
relief since it was issued by the BSP
Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers or functions.
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a
quasi-judicial agency exercising
quasi-,judicial powers or functions. As aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP
Monetary Board is an independent central
monetary authority and a body corporate with
fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated
to provide policy directions in the areas of
money, banking, and credit. It has the power
to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those
refusing to obey the subpoena without
justifiable reason, to administer oaths and
compel presentation of books, records and
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others, needed in its examination, to impose
fines and other sanctions and to issue cease
and desist order.
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary
Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, then its decision cannot be
the proper subject of declaratory relief.
9. Hidalgo vs. Republic of the Philippines
AFPCES is a unit/facility of the AFP
organized pursuant to LOI No. 31. When
AFPCES failed to recall petitioners to their
work as allegedly promised, petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal
with damages against AFPCES before the
NLRC.
ISSUE: Which quasi-judicial agency has
jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints for
illegal dismissal against an adjunct
government agency engaged in proprietary
function?
RULING: Civil Service Commission
Petitioners employment to the AFPCES
should have been made in conformity with
pertinent civil service regulations since
AFPCES is a government agency under the
direct control and supervision of the AFP.
Since it cannot be denied that petitioners are
government employees, the proper body that
has jurisdiction to hear the case is the CSC.
Such fact cannot be negated by the failure of
respondents to follow appropriate civil
service rules in the hiring, appointment,
discipline and dismissal of petitioners.
Neither can it be denied by the fact that
respondents chose to enroll petitioners in the
SSS instead of the GSIS. Such considerations
cannot be used against the CSC to deprive it
of its jurisdiction. It is not the absence or
presence of the required appointment from the
CSC, or the membership of an employee in
the SSS or in the GSIS that determine the
status of the position of an employee. It is the
regulation or the law creating the Service that
determines the position of the employee.
Petitioners are government personnel since
they are employed by an agency attached to
the AFP. Consequently, as correctly observed
by the Court of Appeals, the Labor Arbiters
43

decision on their complaint for illegal
dismissal cannot be made to stand since the
same was issued without jurisdiction. Any
decision issued without jurisdiction is a total
nullity, and may be struck down at any time.
10. Duty Free Philippines vs. Mojica
Discipline Committee of Duty Free Philippines (DFP)
rendered a decision finding Stock Clerk Mojica guilty
of Neglect of Duty. Mojica filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement against DFP
before the NLRC.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. Respondent Mojica is a civil service
employee; therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with
the NLRC, but with the Civil Service Commission.
DFP was created under EO No. 46 primarily to
augment the service facilities for tourists and to
generate foreign exchange and revenue for the
government. In order for the government to exercise
direct and effective control and regulation over the tax
and duty free shops, their establishment and
operation was vested in the Ministry, now Department
of Tourism (DOT), through its implementing arm, the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
PTA is a corporate body attached to the DOT. As an
attached agency, the recruitment, transfer, promotion
and dismissal of all its personnel was governed by a
merit system established in accordance with the civil
service rules. In fact, all PTA officials and employees
are subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations.
Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive authority
of the PTA, it follows that its officials and employees
are likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and
regulations. Clearly then, Mojicas recourse to the
Labor Arbiter was not proper. He should have followed
the procedure laid down in DFPs merit system and the
Civil Service rules and regulations.
EO No. 292 or The Administrative Code of
1987 empowered the Civil Service Commission to hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest in the Merit System
Protection Board the power inter alia to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases
involving officials and employees of the Civil Service.
Its decision shall be final except those involving
dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission.
Applying this rule, we have upheld the jurisdiction of
Civil Service Authorities, as against that of the labor
authorities, in controversies involving the terms of
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employment, and other related issues, of the Civil
Service official and employees.
In sum, the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in taking
cognizance of the complaint as jurisdiction over the
complaint for illegal dismissal is lodged with the Civil
Service Commission.
11. Sabio vs. Gordon
Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the
PCGG. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
Senator Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No.
455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT,
and PHC due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Senator Gordon wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource
persons. However, Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1.
ISSUE: WON Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is
unconstitutional.
HELD: In Senate v. Ermita, that "the power of inquiry
is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in
Arnault that "the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject
for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate."
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff
from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress'
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes. It even extends "to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis. Section 4(b), being
in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the
principle of public accountability (public office is of
public trust).
It also runs counter to the people's access to
information as provided under the Constitution. These
twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of
the government, as well as provide the people
44

sufficient information to enable them to exercise
effectively their constitutional rights.
12. Cario vs. CHR
The teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements. The mass
actions continued.
The respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently
for reasons completely unknown to them.
ISSUE: WON the CHR has jurisdiction.
HELD: No. CHR is not a quasi-judicial agency. The
Commission may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. This
Court sets out the distinction between investigative
and adjudicative functions:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or observation; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry. In the legal sense,
"adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority; To determine finally.
If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary
to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes
that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the
matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
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13. SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation
HELD:
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act
do not require the enactment of implementing rules
to make them binding and effective.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities
with power to make rules and regulations is based on
the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general
regulations for various and varying details of
management. To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of
Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would
empower the administrative bodies to defeat the
legislative will by delaying the implementing rules.
It is well established that administrative authorities
have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and to effectuate its
policies, provided such rules and regulations conform
to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute
as well as purport to carry into effect its general
policies. Where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent there should be
no impediment to its implementation.
The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the
effectivity of these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from
exercising its authority to investigate respondents for
violation of Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and
cannot be demanded during investigative
proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed that the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure was invalid since it failed to provide for the
parties' right to cross-examination.
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate
violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by
the SEC and to file and prosecute such cases. It fails to
mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED
is concerned. Thus, the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure need not comply with the provisions of the
Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly
Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, such as the NLRC and POEA, created under
laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions
may be reached on the basis of position papers or
other documentary evidence only. They are not bound
by technical rules of procedure and evidence. Thus, it
is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to
appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the
counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise
would negate the summary nature of the
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.
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Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence
is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due
process, what is required, among other things, is that
every litigant be given reasonable opportunity to
appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant
evidence in his favor.
III. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate
violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted in
the Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition
of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly
provides that criminal complaints for violations of
rules and regulations enforced or administered by the
SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC
nevertheless retains limited investigatory
powers. Additionally, the SEC may still impose the
appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54
of the aforementioned law.
As stated in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not
result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this Court
ordered the transfer of one case to the proper
regional trial court and the SEC to continue with the
investigation of the other case.
14. Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of
the complaint which prayed, among others, that
criminal proceedings for Plunder be conducted against
him. Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, which was denied.
HELD: No. We should remember to consider the
differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an
administrative case and a criminal case:
(On quanta of proof) In criminal actions, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil
actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence,
as support for a judgment; and in administrative
cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication.
(On application of rules) In criminal and civil actions,
application of the Rules of Court is called for, with
more or less strictness. In administrative proceedings,
the technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of
evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they generally
apply only suppletorily.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is only for the determination
of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a
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summary manner. It is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."
Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by
procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient
to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of
the commission of a crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
(On counter-affidavits) The Ombudsman, in furnishing
Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents, fully complied
with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
Rules of Procedure. Both the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to
furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of
the complainant and affidavits of his supporting
witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The
right of the respondent is only to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant.
This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that
respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal
sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. Moreover, the
Ombudsmans Rule of Procedure, only require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his
supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even
furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically
named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of
other co-respondents.
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15. Lastimosa vs. Vasquez
Lastimosa and the Provincial Prosecutor failed to file a
criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an
administrative complaint was filed and a charge for
indirect contempt was brought against them. They
were placed under preventive suspension.
Petitioner contends that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor
because the crime involved (rape) was not committed
in relation to a public office.
ISSUE: WON Ombudsman acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction.
HELD: No. The office of the Ombudsman has the
power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient."
This power has been held to include the investigation
and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions
complained of are related to the performance of his
official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of
rape, when committed by a public official like a
municipal mayor, is within the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
There is no merit in the argument that they cannot be
held liable for contempt because their refusal arose
out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As
petitioner herself says, the preliminary investigation of
a case is quasi judicial in character.
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid
because the order was issued without giving her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to
refute the charges against them and because, at any
rate, the evidence against them is not strong.
The contention is without merit. Prior notice and
hearing is not required, such suspension not being a
penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The suspension was not a
punishment or penalty, but only as a preventive
measure. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the opportunity to prove his
innocence.
16. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castro
Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of
RA 6713 (the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
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for Public Officials and Employees) against the
respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Ombudsman held that the respondents act of
summoning the PNP-SWAT to go with her to KD
Surplus overstepped the conventions of good
behavior.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent was denied due process of law.
2. WON respondent is administratively liable.
HELD:
1. No denial of due process
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. Due process is
simply the opportunity given to explain ones side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
The Ombudsman has the power to determine the
respondents administrative liability based on the
actual facts recited in this affidavit complaint.
The Courts ruling in Avenido v. CSC is particularly
instructive:
The charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution.
It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of
the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the
designation of the offense.
We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is
sufficient. As long as the respondent was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with; what the law abhors is an absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard.
2. The respondents liability
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if
such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.
We point out that to constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. The respondent in the
present case summoned the SWAT for a purely
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personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-
law. There was no link between the respondents acts
and her official functions as a city prosecutor.
To our mind, the respondents acts of involving an elite
police team like the SWAT in a matter purely personal
to her and riding on their vehicle in going to and from
the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for. By calling
out the SWAT to the premises of KD Surplus and by
riding on their vehicle, she clearly wanted to project
an image of power and influence meant to intimidate,
bully, and/or browbeat Emily.
With this, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly
ruled that the respondents acts of seeking the
assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT
vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and not misconduct, since
there is no nexus between these acts and her official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes
the image and integrity of his/her public office, the
corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring
public officer or employee.
17. PCGG vs. Dumayas
(On Coconut Industry Investment Funds) On the
issue of jurisdiction, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that
since they have properly alleged a case for
declaratory relief, jurisdiction over the subject
matter lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of
Makati City.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was non-compliance with
the rule on Verification and Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping which was signed by only one
PCGG Commissioner;
2) Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over
Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252;
3) Application of res judicata and/or laches as bar to
the suits for declaratory relief filed by UCPB and
COCOLIFE.
HELD: The petitions are meritorious.
1. Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG Commissioner
Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. to file the present petition
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification
and certification against forum shopping on behalf
of the principal party or the other petitioners has
the authority to do the same. We hold that the
signature of only one Commissioner of petitioner
PCGG in the verification and certification against
forum shopping is not a fatal defect.
It has been consistently held that the verification of
a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification
is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
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petition are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective.
As to the certification of non-forum shopping, a
rigid application of the rules should not defeat the
PCGGs mandate to prosecute cases for the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth, and to conserve sequestered
assets and corporations, which are in custodia legis,
under its administration. Indeed, relaxation of the
rules is warranted in this case involving coconut levy
funds previously declared by this Court as affected
with public interest and judicially determined as
public funds.
We noted the extraordinary circumstances in the
filing of the petition by the said government officials
that justified a liberal interpretation of the rules.
2. The RTC has no jurisdiction over suits involving
the sequestered coco levy assets and coco levy
funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed
for, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed for
therein. Jurisdiction is not acquired by agreement
or consent of the parties, and neither does it
depend upon the defenses raised in the answer or
in a motion to dismiss.
Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth and related cases:
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may
be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction
over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
In PCGG v. Pea, we made the following clarification
on the extent of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
48

x x x Under section 2 of the Presidents Executive
Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets,
and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents, or Nominees whether civil or
criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to,
such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction,
subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the
Supreme Court.
3. Applicability of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and their privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the
same claim, demand, or cause of action.
The following requisites must obtain for the
application of the doctrine:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits,
that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
(4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same parties.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The
first, known as bar by prior judgment, or
estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as
a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action.
The second, known as conclusiveness of
judgment, otherwise known as the rule of auter
action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.
Conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and
there was judicially passed upon and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties
to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies,
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in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular
matter in another action between the same parties
or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical.
We hold that res judicata under the second aspect
(conclusiveness of judgment) is applicable in this
case. The issue of ownership of the sequestered CIIF
companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares was
directly and actually resolved by the Sandiganbayan
and affirmed by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic.
More important, in the said decision, we
categorically affirmed the resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F
THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER
TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE
CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES, AND (3) THE CIIF
COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN
ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND
MAY 7, 2004.
18. G.R. No. 174431 August 6, 2012
The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA.
AILEEN H. BUGARIN, MA. LINDA B. ABIOG and MA.
ANNETTE B. SUMULONG, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: The late Bugarin was the Director of the NBI
when the late Ferdinand Marcos was still the
president of the country from 1965-1986. After the
latters downfall in 1986, the new administration,
through the PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture of
properties under R.A. No. 1379 against him with the
Sandiganbayan. The latter dismissed the petition for
insufficiency of evidence.
After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for
reconsideration, the PCGG sought a review of the
dismissal before the Court. Sitting En Banc, the
Court found manifest errors and misapprehension
of facts including Bugarins very own summary of his
property acquisitions.
Thereafter, the Court found Bugarin to have
amassed wealth totaling P2,170,163.00 from 1968
to 1980 against his total income for the period 1967
to 1980 totaling only 766,548.00. With this, the
Court held that Bugarins properties, which were
visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from
1968 to 1980, should be forfeited in favor of the
government.
49

Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his
motion was pending, he passed away in September
2002. His heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to
have the case dismissed which the court denied.
With the case back at the Sandiganbayan, hearing
was set for to determine which properties of the
late Bugarin would be forfeited in favor of the
government. Upon motion, the Sandiganbayan gave
the PCGG 30 days within which to submit "a list of
properties more or less equivalent to the amount of
P1,403,615.00 and still remaining in the name of
defendant Bugarin."
Pursuant to this order, the PCGG filed its Partial
Compliance which contained a list of properties and
investments found to have been acquired by
Bugarin. The PCCG, in a manifestation, informed the
Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the
status of Bugarins other business investments not
included in their Amended Partial Compliance but
only one replied to inform them that Bugarin was
"not a stockholder of nor has he any investment in
this company." Thus, in the same manifestation, the
PCGG prayed that its latest compliance be
considered sufficient conformity to the
Sandiganbayans Order.
Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan could
not determine the properties to be forfeited on its
own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed
to present evidence to determine what properties
of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not bugarins heirs should be
accorded their right to due process; and
2. Whether or not the assailed resolutions are in
accordance with the decision of the supreme court
in the republic case.
HELD:
1. Foremost in petitioners arguments is their claim
that they have been deprived of their right to due
process of law when the Sandiganbayan ordered for
the forfeiture of Bugarins properties. They, thus,
want that another round of trial or hearing be
conducted for "further reception of evidence" to
determine which among the properties enumerated
in the Republic case are ill-gotten wealth.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Bugarin
was accorded due process. He was given his day in
court to prove that his acquired properties were
lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the
said case will reveal that the summary of properties
acquired by Bugarin during his tenure as NBI
Director was based on his very own exhibits.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard.
Based on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were
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certainly not denied that right. Petitioners cannot
now claim a different right over the reduced list of
properties in order to prevent forfeiture, or at the
least, justify another round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party
seeking due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is
by his own fault or choice he squanders these
chances, then his cry for due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for execution, petitioners were
likewise accorded due process. Records of this case
reveal that every motion by petitioners for resetting
of hearing dates was granted, and every motion
filed, either for reconsideration or leave of court,
was heard.
2. Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as
well as in the the Republic decision, that the
properties listed by this Court were all candidates
for forfeiture. At that point, no additional proof or
evidence was required. All that was needed was for
the Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make
sure that the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs
of the properties chosen remained within the
amount which was disproportionate to the income
of Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director. The
case was only remanded to the Sandiganbayan to
implement the Courts ruling in the Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan
to receive evidence once again would be
tantamount to resurrecting the long-settled
disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be
permitted.
It is equally clear that this Court had already made a
determination that the properties of the late
Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were
disproportionate to his lawful income were ordered
forfeited in favor of the State. This means that the
late Bugarin failed to convince the Court that the
delimited list of properties were lawfully acquired.
The immutability of judgment that has long become
final and executory is the core, the very essence of
an effective and efficient administration of justice.
Thus, in Labao v. Flores, this Court reiterated the
importance of the doctrine:
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land. All the issues between the parties
50

are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a
judgment becomes final and executory; execution
of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just
as a losing party has the right to appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision
on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being
time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the
merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation,
and this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
19. G.R. No. 172101 November 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioners, - versus - ASIAPRO
COOPERATIVE, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is
composed of owners-members. Its primary
objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities
and to develop other livelihood services for its
owners-members. Respondent cooperative entered
into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco. In
order to enjoy the benefits under the Social
Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of the
respondent cooperative, who were assigned to
Stanfilco requested the services of the latter to
register them with petitioner SSS as self-employed
and to remit their contributions as such.
However, petitioner SSS sent a letter to the
respondent cooperative informing the latter that
respondent cooperative is actually a manpower
contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for
that reason, it is an employer of its owners-
members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent
cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS
as an employer and make the corresponding report
and remittance of premium contributions in
accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.
Respondent cooperative asserted that it is not an
employer because its owners-members are the
cooperative itself; hence, it cannot be its own
employer.
Again, SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative
ordering the latter to register as an employer and
report its owners-members as employees for
compulsory coverage with the petitioner SSS.
Respondent cooperative continuously ignored the
demand of SSS.
Accordingly, SSS filed a Petition before petitioner
SSC against the respondent cooperative and
Stanfilco praying that the respondent cooperative
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or, in the alternative, Stanfilco be directed to
register as an employer and to report respondent
cooperatives owners-members as covered
employees under the compulsory coverage of SSS
and to remit the necessary contributions in
accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.
Petitioners claim that SSC has jurisdiction over the
petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS
as it involved an issue of whether or not a worker is
entitled to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over
the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner
SSS against the respondent cooperative; and
2. Whether or not SSC can determine the existence
of ee-er relationship.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner SSCs jurisdiction is clearly stated in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as in
Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of
Procedure.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute
arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any
other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by
the Commission, x x x.
Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised
Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under the
Social Security Act with respect to coverage,
entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of
contributions and penalties thereon, or any other
matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission after the SSS through its President,
Manager or Officer-in-charge of the Department /
Branch / Representative Office concerned had first
taken action thereon in writing.
It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that
any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the
SSS is well within the exclusive domain of the
petitioner SSC. It is important to note, though, that
the mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is
premised on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship except in cases of
compulsory coverage of the self-employed.
It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint,
not the defenses set up in the Answer or in the
Motion to Dismiss, determine which court has
jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant. Moreover, it is well-settled that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with
it until the full termination of the case. The said
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principle may be applied even to quasi-judicial
bodies.
In this case, the petition-complaint filed by the
petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against the
respondent cooperative and Stanfilco alleges that
the owners-members of the respondent
cooperative are subject to the compulsory coverage
of the SSS because they are employees of the
respondent cooperative. Consequently, the
respondent cooperative being the employer of its
owners-members must register as employer and
report its owners-members as covered members of
the SSS and remit the necessary premium
contributions in accordance with the Social Security
Law of 1997. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid
allegations in the petition-complaint filed before
the petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its
jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Since the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members was put in
issue and considering that the compulsory coverage
of the SSS Law is predicated on the existence of
such relationship, it behooves the petitioner SSC to
determine if there is really an employer-employee
relationship that exists between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members.
The question on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC
provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND
THE COMMISSION. - (a) x x x.
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, .
Although the aforesaid provision speaks merely of
claims for Social Security, it would necessarily
include issues on the coverage thereof, because
claims are undeniably rooted in the coverage by the
system. Hence, the question on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship for the purpose
of determining the coverage of the Social Security
System is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction
of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the
SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of
settling disputes arising under the Social Security
Law of 1997.
It may inquire into the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship without need of
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waiting for a prior pronouncement or submitting
the issue to the NLRC for prior determination.
Since both the petitioner SSC and the NLRC are
independent bodies and their jurisdiction are well-
defined by the separate statutes creating them,
petitioner SSC has the authority to inquire into the
relationship existing between the worker and the
person or entity to whom he renders service to
determine if the employment, indeed, is one that is
excepted by the Social Security Law of 1997 from
compulsory coverage.
_________________________________________
20. G.R. No. 137869 June 12, 2008
SPOUSES MARCIAL VARGAS and ELIZABETH
VARGAS, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES
VISITACION and JOSE CAMINAS, SPOUSES JESUS
and LORELEI GARCIA, and SPOUSES RODOLFO and
ROSARIO ANGELES DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 137940 June 12, 2008
SPOUSES RODOLFO and ROSARIO ANGELES DE
GUZMAN, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES
VISITACION and AZCUNA, and JOSE CAMINAS,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. and SPOUSES MARCIAL
and ELIZABETH VARGAS
FACTS: Spouses Caminas bought a 54-square meter
lot with a two-storey townhouse (townhouse No. 8)
from Trans-American Sales and Exposition
represented by its developer Jesus Garcia (Garcia).
Townhouse No. 8 is on a portion of the land covered
by TCT No. 195187. Spouses Caminas paid Garcia
P850,000 as evidenced by a contract of sale and
provisional receipt, and took possession of
townhouse No. 8 upon completion of its
construction.
Garcia bought from Spouses Vargas various
construction materials. As payment to spouses
Vargas, Garcia executed an absolute Deed of Sale
over townhouse No. 12. However, spouses Vargas
and Garcia executed a Deed of Exchange with
Addendum whereby spouses Vargas transferred to
Garcia townhouse No. 12, and in exchange Garcia
transferred to spouses Vargas townhouse No. 8. The
contracts executed by Garcia with spouses Caminas
and spouses Vargas were not registered with the
Register of Deeds. This was because TCT No. 195187
was still being reconstituted and it was only on 17
August 1989 that TCT No. 7285 was issued in its
stead.
Subsequently, Garcia and his wife Lorelei (spouses
Garcia) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over townhouse No. 8 in favor of Spouses De
Guzman as security for a loan. As spouses Garcia
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failed to pay their indebtedness, spouses De
Guzman foreclosed the mortgage.
Spouses Caminas filed a complaint against spouses
Garcia, spouses De Guzman, and spouses Vargas
before the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of deed of mortgage and deed of sale, for
the declaration of absolute ownership, for the
delivery of title or in the alternative for refund of
purchase price and damages.
Spouses Vargas filed a case against spouses Garcia
and spouses De Guzman for specific performance,
declaration of nullity of the mortgage contract,
damages or in the alternative for sum of money and
damages.
In their Rejoinder, spouses Vargas raised the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Spouses Vargas further stated that the
HLURB had already rendered a decision awarding
the property in their favor.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not setting aside the decision and
order of the Regional Trial Court since the case is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
HELD: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 1344 dated 2
April 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), the precursor of the
HLURB, to include adjudication of the following
cases:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, broker or salesman.
The HLURB has jurisdiction over cases arising from
(1) unsound real estate business practices; (2)
claims for refund or other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and (3) demands for specific
performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
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condominium units against the owner, developer,
broker, or salesman.
The controversies in this case revolve around the
following transactions:
1. The sale of townhouse No. 8 by spouses Garcia to
spouses Caminas;
2. The sale of townhouse No. 8 by spouses Garcia to
spouses Vargas; and
3. The mortgage of townhouse No. 8 by spouses
Garcia to spouses De Guzman.
There is no dispute that spouses Garcia are in the
real estate business under the name Trans-
American Sales and Exposition. Clearly, the validity
of the questioned transactions entered into by
spouses Garcia, as the owner and developer of
Trans-American Sales and Exposition, falls within
the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
On spouses De Guzmans claim that Section 18 of PD
957 does not grant the HLURB the authority to
invalidate the mortgage contract if the requisite
authority from the NHA is not obtained, this Court
has previously ruled that the HLURB has jurisdiction
over cases involving the annulment of a real estate
mortgage constituted by the project owner without
the consent of the buyer and without the prior
written approval of the NHA.
On the contention that spouses Vargas are estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction, the well-
settled rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. An
examination of the records of the trial court will
reveal that in its Rejoinder, spouses Vargas raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
since the case properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the HLURB.
However, the trial court failed to address the issue
of jurisdiction in its decision as well as in its order
granting the motion for reconsideration of spouses
De Guzman.
Clearly, the trial court erred in not dismissing the
case before it. Under the Rules of Court, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
In De Rossi v. NLRC, citing La Naval Drug Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense
may be interposed at any time, during appeal or
even after final judgment. Such is understandable,
as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and
53

not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
21. G.R. No. 179695 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM
DILANGALEN, respondents.
G.R. No. 182369 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM
DILANGALEN, respondents.
FACTS: Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases,
was a registered voter of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that
he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1
year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the
COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record
to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation
of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on
December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay
Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC
approved petitioner's application for the transfer of
his voting record and registration as a voter
of Barangay Indatuan, NorthernKabuntalan. On
March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan
in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
Private respondent filed a disqualification case
against petitioner. The petition alleged that the
petitioner did not possess the period of residency
required for candidacy and that he perjured himself
in his CoC and in his application for transfer of
voting record. Elections were held without any
decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the
said case. After the counting and canvassing of
votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor. Fermin
subsequently filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato
City.
On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division,
disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his
declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan
as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.
Petitioner argues that he has been a resident
of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of
Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence
prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters
registration record from Barangay Payan to
Barangay Indatuan.
Moreover, the one year residency requirement
under the law is not applicable to candidates for
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elective office in a newly created municipality,
because the length of residency of all its inhabitants
is reckoned from the effective date of its creation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its
discretion when it declared petitioner as not a
resident of the locality for at least one year prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections; and
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its
discretion when it ordered the dismissal of Election
Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no
legal standing to file the protest.
HELD:
1. Yes. As the law stands, the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy." Accordingly, it
is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC
in order to ascertain whether the Dilangalen
petition filed on April 20, 2007 was well within the
restrictive 25-day period. If it was not, then the
COMELEC should have, as discussed above,
dismissed the petition outright.
The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed
his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections on
March 29, 2007.58 It is clear therefore that the
petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermins
CoC was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day
reglementary period. The COMELEC therefore did
not abuse its discretion, much more gravely, when it
did not dismiss the petition outright.
2. YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely
abused its discretion when it precipitately declared
that Fermin was not a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said
elections.
The COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to
support its finding that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and
sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in
which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of
Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006.
However, this single piece of evidence does not
necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not
a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14,
2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007
elections. Petitioner merely admitted that he was a
resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006,
which was more than a year before the elections. It
is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that
he complied with the residency requirement for the
elective office, as petitioner could have transferred
to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or
before May 14, 2006.
54

Neither does this evidence support the allegation
that petitioner failed to comply with the residency
requirement for the transfer of his voting record
from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given
that a voter is required to reside in the place
wherein he proposes to vote only for six months
immediately preceding the election, petitioners
application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does
not contradict his earlier admission that he was a
resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be
that as it may, the issue involved in the Dilangalen
petition is whether or not petitioner made a
material representation that is false in his CoC, and
not in his application for the transfer of his
registration and voting record.
The Court finds that the Dilangalen petition does
not make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is
therefore warranted. We emphasize that the mere
filing of a petition and the convenient allegation
therein that a candidate does not reside in the
locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient
to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing
evidence must substantiate every allegation.
22. G.R. No. 142261 June 29, 2000
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
FACTS: Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government
officials were charged with alleged dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for allegedly having
conspired among themselves in demanding &
collecting from various quarrying operators in
Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring
fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other
quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial
ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and
without issuing receipts for such collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out
the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant
to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman
decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman
decision had not yet become final, petitioner
argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may
be issued against the DILG for prematurely
implementing the assailed decision.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsmans Decision
finding petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr
suspension without pay is immediately executory
pending appeal.
HELD: Sec. 27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
The Rules of Produce of the Office of the
Ombudsman likewise contains a similar provision.
Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where
the respondent is absolved of the charge and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of
10 days from receipt thereof by the respondent,
unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed
in Section 27of R.A. 6770.
The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not
among those listed as final and unappealable. The
legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus
finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The
clear import of these statements taken together is
that all other decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties not
enumerated in the said section are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An
appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the
instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision.
A judgment becomes final and executory by
operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act
gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions
should generally carry with it the stay of these
decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts
or tribunals become executory only after it has
become final and executory, execution pending
appeal being an exception to this general rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates
that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are
immediately executory.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that
the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is
55

immediately final and executory pending appeal,
the law expressly so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted
as mandating that the appeal will not stay the
award, judgment,final order or resolution unless
the law directs otherwise.final order or resolution
unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the
Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.
It is a principle in statutory construction that where
there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said
case must prevail over the other. Considering
however, that petitioner was charged under the
Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should
govern his case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of
procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate
that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
where the penalty imposed is other than public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month salary or fine equivalent to one month
salary are still appealable and hence, not final and
executory.
23. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of
a parcel of land located in Sorsogon. He voluntarily
offered to sell the said land to the government,
through the Department of Agrarian Reform under
Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03,
which was however rejected by the respondent.
Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon
commenced summary administrative proceedings
to determine the just compensation of the land.
The DARAB rendered a Decision and valued the
property at P10,956,963.25 for the acquired area of
240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the
Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to
the landowner in the manner provided for by law.
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the
PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay
the respondent the aforesaid amount as just
compensation in the manner provided by law.
Respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the
PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to
comply with the Writ of Execution. He argued that
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such failure of the petitioner to comply with the
writ of execution constitutes contempt of the
DARAB. PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion
for Contempt.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order.
PARAD Capellan ordered the issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged
amount of just compensation to respondent and
directed the issuance of an arrest order against
Manager Alex A. Lorayes.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction
before the RTC which was granted. Thus,
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the trial courts order, which was denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not quasi-judicial agencies have
the power to cite persons for indirect contempt.
HELD: No. Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that
have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
can only do so by initiating them in the proper
Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect
contempt cases. These matters are still within the
province of the Regional Trial Courts.
In the present case, the indirect contempt charge
was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with
the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through
an unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the
following reasons:
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which
was not complied with in this case. The charge was
not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it
was by a motion filed by respondent.
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by
the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest
was beyond the power of the PARAD and the
DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt
and for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and
void.
24. SIMON VS. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
GR 100150, 5 JANUARY 1994
56

FACTS: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July
1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the
City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and
members of the North Edsa Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice,
Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3
days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to
vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to
their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo,
et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon,
Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and
Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a
letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo,
et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to
appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements
submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990,
as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al.
carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990,
ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light
housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed
Simon, et. al. to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of
said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."
A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September
1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During
the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al.
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moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990
had yet to be resolved, and likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to
the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September
1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March
1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying
Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order,
dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion
for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al.
filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer
for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction, questioning the extent of the
authority and power of the CHR, and praying
that the CHR be prohibited from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case 90
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et
al."
ISSUE: Whether the CHR has the power to
issue the order to desist against the
demolition of Fermo, et. al.s stalls, and to
cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for
proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the
CHR order.
RULING: Section 18, Article XIII, of the
1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering
the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights."
Recalling the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations; such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed
against the religious."
While the enumeration has not likely been
meant to have any preclusive effect, more
than just expressing a statement of priority, it
is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily
57

making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation."
Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought
to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's
Park." More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It
is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if
its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not
prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended
by the Constitution. On its contempt powers,
the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
"adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or
who unduly withhold relevant information, or
who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for
a restraining order) herein, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from
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an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
As held in Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The
constitutional provision directing the CHR to
'provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection'
may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law'.
It is never derived by implication. Evidently,
the 'preventive measures and legal aid
services' mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ
of preliminary injunction may only be issued
`by the judge of any court in which the action
is pending [within his district], or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose."
25. GARCIA VS. J. DRILON AND GARCIA, G. R. NO.
179267, 25 JUNE 2013
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed
to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
58

filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would
be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being an unwanted
product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of
the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law;
2. WON the CA committed serious error in
failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause;
3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in
not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution;
4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the
law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution;
and
5. WON the CA seriously erredin declaring
RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
RULING:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate
to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
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possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and
if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of ones defense. The grant of the
TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a
mediator is justified. Petitioners contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
any part of any branch of the Government
while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The
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same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
26. NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY,
INC., petitioner vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER ILDEFONSO G. AGBUYA and
JUANITO COLLADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 54424 August 31, 1989
FACTS: Private respondent Juanita Collado
was employed by petitioner Nasipit Lumber
Company, Inc. (NALCO) as a security guard.
He was assigned as lst Sergeant of the
NALCO Security Force at Nasipit. In the
course of Collado's employment or on, four
(4) crates of lawanit boards containing 1,000
panels were stolen from petitioner's premises.
Collado was implicated in the theft and was
thereafter placed under preventive
suspension. NALCO filed a petition
(application) for clearance to dismiss Collado
with the Regional Office No. X of the
Department of Labor in Cagayan de Oro City.
The application for clearance to dismiss was
approved in an order issued by Regional
Office No. X Officer-in-Charge Roy V.
Seneres. Collado filed a motion for the
reconsideration of said order on the ground
that he was not given an opportunity to rebut
the false findings or adduce evidence in his
favor. The said Officer-in-Charge, through a
subordinate, certified the case to the
Executive Labor Arbiter for compulsory
arbitration. Notice and summons were issued.
NALCO and Collado were then required to
submit their respective position papers under
pain of a default judgment. After a perusal of
the records, Executive Labor Arbiter
Ildefonso G. Agbuya returned the case to the
Regional Director of Regional Office No. X
in Cagayan de Oro City for whatever
appropriate action he may deem fit.
Consequently, the case was elevated to the
Secretary of Labor.
Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued
an order affirming the order of Officer-in-
Charge Roy V. Seneres thereby granting
petitioner's application for clearance to
dismiss Collado.Instead of resorting to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, on October
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9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the
Butuan District Labor Office, Butuan City, for
unjust dismiss and reinstatement with
backwages and benefits. NALCO flied a
motion to dismiss the complaint. It alleged
that in view of Acting Secretary Inciong's
aforesaid order, Collado did not have any
sufficient cause of action and therefore his
complaint was a nuisance. In its position
paper, NALCO added that because Acting
Secretary Inciong's order had become final
and executory, the issue of illegal dismissal
had also become res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable in the present case
RULING: NO. This is one of the cases
wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru
Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Razon vs.
Inciong 19 applies. The Court stated therein
that the principle of res judicata may not be
invoked in labor relations proceedings
considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are "non-litigious and summary
in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law." Said
pronouncement is in consonance with the
jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
The requirement of a clearance to terminate
employment was a creation of the Department
of Labor to carry out the Labor Code
provisions on security of tenure and
termination of employment. The proceeding
subsequent to the filing of an application for
clearance to terminate employment was
outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. The fact that said rule allowed a
procedure for the approval of the clearance
with or without the opposition of the
employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8),
demonstrates the non-litigious and summary
nature of the proceeding. The clearance
requirement was therefore necessary only as
an expeditious shield against arbitrary
dismissals without the knowledge and
supervision of the Department of Labor.
Hence, a duly approved clearance implied
that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec.
2).
60

But even while said clearance was a
requirement, employees who faced dismissal
still contested said applications not only
through oppositions thereto but by filing
separate complaints for illegal dismissal.
Usually, the investigation on the application
and the hearing on the complaint for illegal
dismissal were conducted simultaneously.
What makes the present case unusual is that
the employee filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal only after the Acting Secretary of
Labor had affirmed the approval of the
application to terminate his employment.
Nonetheless, we are unprepared to rule that
such action of the Acting Secretary of Labor
barred Collado from filing the complaint for
illegal dismissal. If ever, the most that can be
attributed against Collado is laches for his
failure to question seasonably the Acting
Secretary of Labor's affirmance of the
approval of the clearance to terminate.
However, to count such laches against
Collado would be prejudicial to his rights as a
laborer.
Be that as it may, the possibility that there
would be two conflicting decisions on the
issue of Collado's dismissal may now be
considered academic. The requirement of a
written clearance from the Department prior
to termination was abolished by the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in
1981. Dismissal proceedings are now
confined within the establishments. The
NLRC or the labor arbiter steps in only if the
said decision is contested by the employee.
27. EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS
BUNDALIAN
G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003
FACTS: An unverified letter-complaint was
addressed by private respondent LUIS
BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate
General accusing petitioner, then OIC-
Regional Director of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
3019. Private respondent charged among
others that petitioner and his wife purchased a
house and lot in Los Angeles, California and
that petitioners in-laws who were living in
California had a poor credit standing due to a
number of debts they could not have
purchased such an expensive property for
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petitioner and his wife. Private respondent
also accused petitioner of amassing wealth
from lahar funds and other public works
projects.
The PCAGC conducted its own investigation
of the complaint. Petitioner fully participated
in the proceedings. After the investigation, the
PCAGC found that petitioner purchased a
house and lot in California, for
US$195,000.00 evidenced by a Grant Deed.
The body concluded that the petitioner could
not have been able to afford to buy the
property on his annual income of P168,648.00
as appearing on his Service Record. The
PCAGC concluded that as petitioners
acquisition of the subject property was
manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it
has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioners dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No.
3019.
The Office of the President, concurring with
the findings and adopting the
recommendation of the PCAGC, issued
Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering
petitioners dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all government benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied
due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC
RULING: NO. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity
to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. As long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.
In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts
to notify the complainant of the proceedings
but his Philippine residence could not be
located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot
argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and cross-
examine the complainant. Petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
PCAGC by participating in the proceedings
before it. He was duly represented by counsel.
He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted
documentary evidence, attended the hearings,
moved for a reconsideration of Administrative
Order No. issued by the President and
eventually filed his appeal before the Court of
61

Appeals. His active participation in every step
of the investigation effectively removed any
badge of procedural deficiency, if there was
any, and satisfied the due process
requirement. He cannot now be allowed to
challenge the procedure adopted by the
PCAGC in the investigation.
It is well to remember that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense for it is enough that the party is given
the chance to be heard before the case against
him is decided. This was
afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
28. ROQUE C. FACURA AND EDUARDO
F. TUASON, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, RODOLFO S. DE JESUS
AND EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 184129]
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, PETITIONER,
VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
EDUARDO F. TUASON, LOCAL WATER
UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
(LWUA), REPRESENTED BY ITS NEW
ADMINISTRATOR ORLANDO C.
HONDRADE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 184263]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. EDELWINA DG.
PARUNGAO, AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 7TH
DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 166495, February 16 : 2011]
FACTS: Facura and Tuason filed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint before the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the
Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao
charging them with: 1) violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct,
falsification of official documents, being
notoriously undesirable, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments
of nine (9) coterminous employees of LWUA.
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Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive
appointment papers were fabricated and
fraudulent as they were made to appear to
have been signed/approved on the dates
stated, and not on the date of their actual
issuance. They further alleged that with
malice and bad faith, De Jesus and Parungao
willfully and feloniously conspired not to
submit the fraudulent appointment papers to
the CSC, and to submit instead the valid set of
appointment papers bearing the December 12,
2001 issuance date.
They questioned the issuance of the
fraudulent appointments in favor of the nine
(9) confidential staff, to the prejudice of the
government in the amount of P692,657.31, as
these were used as basis for the payment of
their back salaries. They also alleged that De
Jesus' reinstatement was illegal and that he
had lost authority to sign any Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) documents
effective upon the issuance of LWUA Board
Resolution Nos. 061 and 069. Thus, the
actions undertaken by him in signing the
fraudulent appointments were all
misrepresented and, therefore, unlawful. They
further alleged that contrary to law, De Jesus
continued to receive his salary and benefits as
Deputy Administrator of LWUA despite
having already been dismissed. They cited the
string of criminal and administrative cases
against De Jesus before the trial courts and
the Ombudsman.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, De Jesus and
Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-
and-file employees who had no knowledge of
or participation in personnel matters; that
their actions in issuing the two sets of
appointments were all documented and
above-board; that as subordinate employees,
they had no discretion on the matter of the
retroactive appointments of the nine
confidential staff specifically requested by the
Board members; and that the re-issuance of
the second set of appointments effective
December 12, 2001 was duly approved by
Administrator Jamora. They denied any
financial damage on the part of LWUA since
the retroactive payment of salaries was
justified under the DBM letter approving the
hiring of personnel retroactive to the date of
actual services rendered by them.
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The Ruling of the Ombudsman
The complaint was originally referred to the
Ombudsman's Preliminary Investigation and
Administrative Adjudication Bureau - B, and
assigned to Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer I Vivian Magsino-
Gonzales (Pros. Magsino-Gonzales). After
evaluating the documents on file, Pros.
Magsino-Gonzales dispensed with the
preliminary conference and preliminary
investigation of the case. In her Decision
dated September 30, 2003, she recommended
the outright dismissal of the case,
ratiocinating that the Ombudsman did not
have the jurisdiction to resolve the issues of
fraudulent appointments of the nine
confidential staff and their alleged
overpayment to the damage of LWUA and the
government and to decide on the status of De
Jesus as a dismissed employee which, in her
view, belonged to the primary jurisdiction and
technical expertise of the CSC.
Said recommendation was disapproved by the
Ombudsman and the case was referred for
review to Special Prosecution Officer Roberto
Agagon (Special Pros. Agagon) of the
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau - A. Without conducting
a preliminary conference or investigation,
Special Pros. Agagon came up with the
assailed Review and Recommendation
finding De Jesus and Parungao guilty of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross neglect
of duty, and falsification.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal of the
Ombudsman's decision in administrative
cases carries with it the suspension of the
imposed penalty.
RULING: The issue of whether or not an
appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an
administrative case carries with it the
immediate suspension of the imposed penalty
has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of
the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where
this Court held that the decision of the
Ombudsman is immediately executory
pending appeal and may not be stayed by the
filing of an appeal or the issuance of an
injunctive writ, to wit:
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman,[34] as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17
dated September 15, 2003, provides:
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SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. -
Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision
shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against such officer.
The Ombudsman's decision imposing the
penalty of suspension for one year
is immediately executory pending appeal.
[35] It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of
an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to
that provided under Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
In the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of the DPWH, we
held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no
vested right of the petitioner is violated as he
is considered preventively suspended while
his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event
he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not
63

receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office.
Following the ruling in the above cited case,
this Court, in Buencamino v. Court of
Appeals,[37] upheld the resolution of the CA
denying Buencamino's application for
preliminary injunction against the immediate
implementation of the suspension order
against him. The Court stated therein that the
CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's application for
injunctive relief because Section 7, Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003.
Respondent cannot successfully rely on
Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall
not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon
such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may
apply to cases in the Office of the
Ombudsman suppletorily only when the
procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman.[38] Here,
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended,
is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the
Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989[39] also
provide that the Office of the Ombudsman
has the power to "promulgate its rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions and
duties" and to amend or modify its rules as
the interest of justice may require. For the CA
to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay
the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on
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the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA
6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in
Section 12,[40] Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is appealed to the CA.
The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executory is a special rule that
prevails over the provisions of the Rules of
Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two
rules apply to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other.
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as amended by Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in
providing that an appeal shall not stop an
Ombudsman decision from being executory.
This rule applies to the appealable decisions
of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure
or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
more than one month's salary. Hence, the
dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the
government service is immediately executory
pending appeal.
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in
providing that in case the penalty is removal
and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall
be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did
not receive by reason of the removal. As
explained above, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or an absolute
right to hold office, except constitutional
offices with special provisions on salary and
tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right
of De Jesus and Parungao would be violated
as they would be considered under preventive
suspension, and entitled to the salary and
emoluments they did not receive in the event
that they would win their appeal.
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The ratiocination above also clarifies the
application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
in relation to Section 7 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has
no discretion to stay a decision of the
Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is
governed specifically by the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this
administrative case, is thus an encroachment
on the rule-making powers of the
Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI
of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of
R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the
Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. The issuance of an
injunctive writ renders nugatory the
provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The CA, however, cannot be blamed for so
ruling because at that time the Court's rulings
were not definite and, thus, nebulous. There
were no clear-cut guidelines yet. Even the
initial ruling in Samaniego on September 11,
2008, stated in effect that the mere filing by a
respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the
execution of the joint decision against him.
The Samaniego initial ruling merely followed
that in the case of Office of the Ombudsman
v. Laja, where it was stated:
Only orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary shall be final and unappealable
hence, immediately executory.In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed
is other than public censure, reprimand, or
suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
law gives the respondent the right to appeal.
In these cases, the order, directive or decision
becomes final and executory only after the
lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal
from the said order, directive or decision. It is
only then that execution shall perforce issue
as a matter of right.The fact that the
Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to
appeal from its decisions should generally
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carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory. .
Having ruled that the decisions of the
Ombudsman are immediately executory
pending appeal, The Court finds it unncessary
to determine whether or not Facura and
Tuason were heard before the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
29. EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs.OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave
Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before
PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four
others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending,
the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the
Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the
same police officers, for failure of the complainant
to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite
due notice. However, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose
office it remained pending for final review and
action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load
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of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23,
2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident,
which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven
others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza,
a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
It was tasked to determine accountability for the
incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to
resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days
from submission. The inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged
inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from
service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor
of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia,
their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder and Money Laundering before the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major
General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that
strong prosecution evidence militated against the
grant of bail. However, the government,
represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor
Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's
approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the
change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA
compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow
Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his
culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion
of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,
recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the
filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies
and Assistants before the appropriate government
office for having committed acts and/or omissions
tantamount to culpable violations of the
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Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office
under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally
created Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a DeputyOmbudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the
Ombudsman's authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other
hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in
enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section
21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern
that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President
to removea Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial
Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious gap in
the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman
himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under
Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the
removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
66

Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of
all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy
Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied
from his Power toAppoint. In giving the President
the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in
express terms an authority that is already implied
from the President's constitutional authority to
appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that
affect the general morale and professionalism in the
military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the
Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a
Deputy Ombudsmandoes not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of theOmbudsman. he
claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not
resultantly negates the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman is tenuous.
The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it
from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that
"the terms of office, the salary, the appointments
and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office
where thequestioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal
of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-
IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor
cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of
his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned
agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
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constitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people."
The factual circumstances that the case was turned
over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon
petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the truth
of his statements; that the decision was
immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more
than nine months cannot be simply taken as
evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of
the parties to the case that could have impelled him
to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery
that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement
of administrative accountability against petitioner
and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside,
as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust.
Hence, the President, while he may be vested with
authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory
authority to proceedadministratively against
petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine theexistence
of any of the grounds forher removal from office as
providedfor under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.
__________________________________________
30. EFREN L. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192591 June 29, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner Efren L. Alvarez, at the time of the
subject transaction, was the Mayor of the
Municipality (now Science City) of Muoz, Nueva
Ecija. In July 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
Muoz under Resolution No. 136, S-95 invited Mr.
Jess Garcia, President of the Australian-Professional,
Inc. (API) in connection with the municipal
governments plan to construct a four-storey
shopping mall ("Wag-wag Shopping Mall"), a project
included in its Multi-Development Plan.
Subsequently, it approved the adoption of the
project under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
arrangement in the amount of P240 million, to be
constructed on a 4,000-square-meter property of
the municipal government which is located at the
back of the Municipal Hall. API submitted its
proposal on November 7, 1995.
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Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan

for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for
giving the Australian-Professional Incorporated
(API) unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference, by awarding to the latter the contract
for the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall in
the amount of Two Hundred Forty Million Pesos
(Php 240,000,000.00) under a Build - Operate -
Transfer Agreement, notwithstanding the fact that
API was and is not a duly-licensed construction
company as per records of the Philippine
Construction Accreditation Board (PCAB), which
construction license is a pre-requisite for API to
engage in construction of works for the said
municipal government and that API does not have
the experience and financial qualifications to
undertake such costly project among others, to the
damage and prejudice of the public service.The
Sandiganbayan thereafter rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable

Sandiganbayan failed to observe the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt in convicting the
Accused-Petitioner;

RULING: No. Petitioner was charged with violation

of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be convicted
under the said provision, the following elements
must be established:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.

In this case, the information alleged that while

being a public official and in the discharge of his
official functions and taking advantage of such
position, petitioner "acting with evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality"
unlawfully gave API "unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference" by awarding to it the
contract for the construction of the Wag-Wag
Shopping Mall under the BOT scheme despite the
fact that it was not a licensed contractor and "does
not have the experience and financial qualifications
to undertake such costly project, among others, to
the damage and prejudice of the public service.

68