Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
1. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs.
HON. EMMANUEL G. PEA, as
Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Br. CLII,
Pasig, Metropolitan Manila, and YEUNG
CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUM HO and
ARCHIE CHAN represented by YIM
KAM SHING, respondents.
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, the
Commission issued an order freezing the
assets, effects, documents and records of two
export garment manufacturing firms
denominated as American Inter-fashion
Corporation and De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation.
The Commission appointed Ms. Noemi L.
Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the said
corporations with full authority to manage
and operate the same.
On June 27, 1986, the Commission
designated the OIC, Saludo, and Mr.Yeung
Chun Ho private respondent herein, as
authorized signatories to effect deposits and
withdrawals of the funds of the two
corporations. On September 4, 1986, the
Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing
as co-signatory, in the absence of Mr. Yeung
Chun Ho and Mr. Marcelo de Guzman, in the
absence of Ms. Saludo. However, in a
memorandum dated February 3, 1987, and
addressed to depository banks of the said two
corporations, Ms. Saludo revoked the
authorizations previously issued upon finding
that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hongkong
Chinese national staying in the country on a
mere tourist visa.
On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the
amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from
the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
against the accounts of the said corporations
for payment of the salaries of the employees.
Hence, respondents Yeung Chun Kam Yeung
Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in
Hongkong, instituted through Yim Kam
Shing an action for damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction against the said
bank, the Commission, then Commissioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista and the OIC,
Saludo, and questioning the aforesaid
revocation of the authorization as signatory
previously granted to Mr. Yim Kam Shing as
private respondents' representative.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over
the Philippine Commission on Good
Government
RULING: NO.
On the issue of jurisdiction squarely raised, as
above indicated, the Court sustains
petitioner's stand and holds that regional
trial courts and the Court of Appeals for
that matter have no jurisdiction over the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government in the exercise of its powers
under the applicable Executive Orders and
Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution
and therefore may not interfere with and
restrain or set aside the orders and actions of
the Commission.
Under section 2 of the President's Executive
Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases
of the Commission regarding "the Funds,
Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former
President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies,
Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or
criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
*Important Discussions*
Powers and Authority of PCGG
(a) x x x
(b) to sequester or place or cause to be placed
under its control or possession any building or
office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or
properties may be found, and any records
pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their
destruction, concealment or disappearance
which would frustrate or hamper the
investigation or otherwise prevent the
Commission from accomplishing its task.
(c) to provisionally takeover in the public
interest or to prevent the disposal or
dissipation of business enterprises and
properties taken over by the government of
the Marcos Administration or by entities or
persons close to former President Marcos,
until the transactions leading to such
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acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by
the appropriate authorities.
(d) to enjoin or restrain any actual or
threatened commission of acts by any person
or entity that may render moot and academic,
or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the
efforts of the Commission to carry out its task
under this Order.
PCGG exercises Quasi Judicial Functions
In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the
Commission is a co-equal body with regional
trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no
power to control the other." The Solicitor
General correctly submits that the lack of
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-
judicial agencies is recognized in section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which
otherwise vests exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all
final judgment, decisions, resolutions, orders,
or awards of regional trial courts and quasi
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions. But as already indicated
hereinabove, the Court of Appeals is not
vested with appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the Commission. Executive
Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction
over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda,
members of their immediate family, close
relatives, subordinates, close and/or business
associates, dummies, agents and nominees,
specifically provides in section 2 that "The
Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall
have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who
wish to question or challenge the
Commission's acts or orders in such cases
must seek recourse in the same court, the
Sandiganbayan, which is vested with
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders
are in turn subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by this Court.
Prohibition Against Split Jurisdiction
The law and the courts frown upon split
jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of
actions. To paraphrase the leading case
of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer, et al, 12-
a to draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is to
undermine stability in litigations. A piecemeal
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resort to one court and another gives rise to
multiplicity of suits, To force the parties to
shuttle from one court to another to secure
full determination of their suit is a situation
gravely prejudicial to the administration of
justice. The time lost, the effort wasted, the
anxiety augmented, additional expenses
incurred, the irreparable injury to the public
interest are considerations which weigh
heavily against split jurisdiction.
Civil Case No. 54298 pending before
respondent judge is expressly denominated as
one "for damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction" (Annex "I," petition)
filed by private respondents against the
Commission and then Commissioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista.
The said case is clearly barred by the
aforequoted immunity provision of Executive
Order No. 1, as buttressed by section 4(b)
thereof which further provides that: "No
member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance."
Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively
withholds jurisdiction over cases against the
Commission from all lower courts, including
the Court of Appeals, except the
Sandiganbayan in whom is vested original
and exclusive jurisdiction and this Court.
Primary Admin Jurisdiction and Exhaustion
of Admin Remedies
"(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of
primary administrative jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence. Acts of an
administrative agency must not casually be
overturned by a court, and a court should as a
rule not substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency acting within the
perimeters of its own competence."
Applying these fundamental doctrines to the
case at bar, the questions and disputes raised
by respondents seeking to controvert the
Commission's finding of prima facie basis for
the issuance of its sequestration orders as well
as the interjection of the claims of the
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predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De
Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil.,
headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that
are within the primary administrative
jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be
prematurely brought up to clog the court
dockets without first resorting to the
exhaustion of the prescribed administrative
remedies. The administrative procedure and
remedies for contesting orders of
sequestration issued by the Commission are
provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus,
the person against whom a writ of
sequestration is directed may request the
lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing
or motu proprio for good cause shown, the
Commission may lift the writ unconditionally
or subject to such conditions as it may deem
necessary, taking into consideration the
evidence and the circumstances of the case.
The resolution of the Commission is
appealable to the President of the Philippines.
The Commission conducts a hearing, after
due notice to the parties concerned to
ascertain whether any particular asset,
property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten
wealth. The Commission's order of
sequestration is not final, at the proper time,
the question of ownership of the sequestered
properties shall be exclusively determined in
the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in
turn are subject to review exclusively by the
Supreme Court.
2. DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO.,
INC. and CONVOY MARKETING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS: AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock,
non-profit corporation created in
1974 composed of several national
organizations in the advertising industry,
including: Association of Accredited
Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As),
Philippine Association of National
Advertisers (PANA). Petitioner Destileria
Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was
formerly a member of PANA. In January
2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing
Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising
agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of
the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a
clearance of the airing of a radio
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Case Digest Compilation 4
advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim
ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)."
AdBoard issued a clearance for said
advertisement. Not long after the ad started
airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints
from the public. This prompted AdBoard to
ask SLG for a replacement but there was no
response. With the continued complaints from
the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to
withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus,
AdBoard decided to recall the clearance
previously issued, effective immediately. Said
decision to recall was conveyed to SLG and
AdBoard's members-organizations.
On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present
petition for writ of prohibition and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is
a constitutionally protected right, as well as a
property right. Petitioners believe that
requiring a clearance from AdBoard before
advertisements can be aired amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process
of law. They also argue that AdBoard's
regulation is an exercise of police power
which must be subject to constitutional
proscriptions.
On the other hand, AdBoard seeks the
dismissal of the petition for failure to observe
the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure
to comply with certain requirements for the
filing of the petition, namely: statement of
material dates, attachment of certified true
copy of ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and
defect in the certification of non-forum
shopping.
ISSUE: WON the filing of prohibition
against Adboard is proper
RULING: NO. First of all, the petition filed
in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to
command AdBoard to desist from requiring
petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing
sanctions on any agency that will air,
broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without
such clearance.
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such
recourse, it must establish the following
requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
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tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation,
board or person has acted without or in excess
of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial
function by which he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes
to determine these questions and adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial
function is a term which applies to the action
and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies, which are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Ministerial function is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in the context of a given set
of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard for the exercise of his/its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case
are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. What is at contest here
is the power and authority of a private
organization, composed of several members-
organizations, which power and authority
were vested to it by its own members.
Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this
case. The definition and purpose of a writ of
prohibition excludes the use of the writ
against any person or group of persons acting
in a purely private capacity, and the writ will
not be issued against private individuals or
corporations so acting.
3. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI
G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R.
CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys -in
-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and
VICTORIO
MANGALINDAN, respondents.
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Case Digest Compilation 4
FACTS: On May 14, 1993, private
respondents filed a petition before the trial
court for the determination of just
compensation for their agricultural lands
situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were
acquired by the government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27).
After trial, the court rendered the
assailed Decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of petitioners and against
respondents, ordering respondents,
particularly, respondents Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, to pay these lands owned by
petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform
program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS
(P30.00) per square meter, as the just
compensation due for payment for same lands
of petitioners located at San Vicente (or
Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform
is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions
for reconsideration which were denied by the
trial court. Land Bank then filed a Petition for
Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996.The
trial court, in its Order of November 18,
1996, denied the petition for relief because
Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its
own negligence. Hence, this instant petition
for review.
ISSUE: WON respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies
RULING: Land Bank avers that private
respondents should have sought the
reconsideration of the DARs valuation
instead of filing a petition to fix just
compensation with the trial court.
The records reveal that Land Banks
contention is not entirely true. In fact, private
respondents did write a letter to the DAR
Secretary objecting to the land valuation
summary submitted by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a
conference for the purpose of fixing just
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compensation. The letter, however, was left
unanswered prompting private respondents to
file a petition directly with the trial court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Court of Appeals, we declared that there is
nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional
trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first
refers to administrative proceedings, while
the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for
the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of
just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking
cognizance of the case as the determination of
just compensation is a function addressed to
the courts of justice.
4. JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO and HON.
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. in their
official capacities as Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
respectively, and the Sandiganbayan,
respondents.
FACTS:
(Petitioners Version)
Between 1992 and 1993, DECS-Region XII
ordered several pieces of laboratory
equipment and apparati requested by different
school divisions of the region.
A COA Special Audit Team conducted an
audit of the transactions.
On December 20, 1993, the members of the
COA Special Audit Team submitted to the
COA Regional Director-Region XII, their
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Joint Affidavit claiming alleged deficiencies
in the transactions of DECS Region XII
implicating thereto the petitioner and some
concerned officials and employees of DECS-
Region XII.
Dispensing conducting an exit conference and
inviting the petitioner to clarify the
allegations of the COA Special Audit Team in
their Joint Affidavit-Complaint, in post-haste
the COA Regional Directors indorsed it to the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for
preliminary investigation.
The Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao
docketed the complaint as Case No. 3-93-
27791, entitled "Commission on Audit vs.
Makil Pundaodaya, et al.," for Falsification of
Documents by Public Officers."
More than four (4) years after he submitted
his Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner was
surprised that, without preliminary
investigation and clarificatory question asked,
on July 17, 1998, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the
preliminary investigation recommending that
he, together with the other respondents in
Case No. OMB 3-93-9791, be prosecuted for
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
(Respondents Version)
"Criminal Cases Nos. 25247 to 25276
stemmed from a special audit conducted by
the Commission on Audit (COA), Region XII
relative to the purchase by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
Region XII Office, Cotabato City of school
equipment and laboratory apparati. The report
on the special audit was received by the
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao on
December 22, 1993. Finding the audit report
sufficient to conduct a preliminary
investigation the same was docketed as Case
No. OMB-3-93-2791.
In an Order dated March 1, 1994, Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah
Tolentino directed the concerned public
officials, among whom was herein petitioner,
to submit their Counter-Affidavits and
controverting evidences within ten days from
receipt of the Order and to furnish a copy of
their counter-Affidavits to the complainant.
The latter was given the same period of ten
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(10) days to file their reply to the Counter-
Affidavits.
On May 10, 1994 the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao received the
Counter-Affidavits of the respondents. On
August 2, 1994 the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao was informed
through the letter of COA Director Eugenio
G. Fernandez that the COA was not furnished
by the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-
2791 of their Counter-Affidavits.
Subsequently, GIO Tolentino issued an Order
dropping Alimot Lao Arumpac from the case
in view of his death. The COA on the other
hand was directed to submit its Reply-
Affidavit within ten days from receipt of the
Order.
On January 11, 1995 the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao received a telegram
from COA, Region XII Office requesting that
it be allowed until February 29, 1995 within
which to submit its Reply-Affidavit on the
ground that the audit team leader and
members who conducted the special audit of
DECS, Region XII Office were preparing for
their annual audit report.
On February 29, 1995 the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao received the Reply-
Affidavit of COA.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1998 GIO
Rachelle L. Ladrera recommended the filing
of thirty (30) Informations against petitioner,
Makil U. Pundaodaya, Jose T. Navera,
Rogelio de los Reyes, Daud M. Adiong,
Napoleon O. Cedeno, Laga S. Mangelen and
Mama S. Macoming. The said
recommendation was approved by public
respondents Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Margarito P. Gervacio on February
27, 1999, and by the Honorable Ombudsman
on April 30, 1999.
ISSUE: WON there was undue and
unjustifiable delay on the part of the
Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed
against the petitioner which violated his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
the Complaint against him.
RULING: YES.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
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Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
The constitutional right to a "speedy
disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings."Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
However, the right to a speedy disposition of
a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or even without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used
to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
In this case, the preliminary investigation was
resolved close to four (4) years from the time
all the counter and reply affidavits were
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
After the last reply-affidavit was filed on
February 28, 1995, it was only on July 17,
1998 that a resolution was issued
recommending the filing of the corresponding
criminal informations against the petitioner
and the others. It took eight months or on
February 27, 1999 for Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same
and close to another year or on April 30, 1999
for Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to approve
the recommendation. During this interval, no
incidents presented themselves for resolution
and the delay could only be attributed to the
inaction on the part of the investigating
officials. Indeed, we find that without cause
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or justifiable motive, a long period of time
was allowed to elapse at the preliminary
investigation stage before the informations
were filed.
True, the prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the COA and it must rely on its
own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. However,
we find that the cases are not sufficiently
complex to justify the length of time for their
resolution. Neither can the long delay in
resolving the case under preliminary
investigation be justified on the basis of the
number of informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions
involved. The thirty informations consist of
sixteen (16) counts of violations of Section 3
(g) of RA 3019 relative to the overpricing and
lack of public bidding of laboratory apparatus
and school equipment; while the fourteen (14)
counts are for violations of Section 3 (e) of
the same law relative to the certification in
the inspection reports that the subject items
have already been delivered and received,
when in fact they have not yet been actually
delivered and received, in order to facilitate
payment to the suppliers.
There is no statement that voluminous
documentary and testimonial evidence were
involved. On the contrary, the Office
Ombudsman itself claimed in its
memorandum filed before this Court that "the
Complaint and the Counter-Affidavits
submitted by the complainant and the accused
respectively, as well as the documents on
hand" were sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause for violation of
Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, a
clarificatory hearing was no longer
conducted. Indeed, it appears that the COA
special audit team had already come up and
provided the Office of the Ombudsman with
the facts and figures on the alleged
overpricing, lack of public bidding and
irregular inspection reports, so much so that a
delay of almost four years in terminating the
preliminary investigation is not justified.
Verily, the delay in this case disregarded the
Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to
enforce the criminal liability of government
officers or employees in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service to the people. The failure of
said office to resolve the complaints that have
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been pending for almost four years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the rights of
petitioner as a public official. In such event,
petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the
cases filed against him.
5. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR),
REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY
ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN, Petitioners, vs.
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity
as Assignee of the rights and interest of
FEDERICO SUNTAY, Respondents
FACTS: On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay,
now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and
payment of just compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 27 against the
Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), the
DAR Regional Director for Region IV and
the Land Bank of the Philippines ("Land
Bank"). The case was filed before the Office
of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
("RARAD").
Subject of the case was Suntays landholdings
covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares
situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and
embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title
T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its
value at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One
Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and
68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand
Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and
50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which
valuation according to Suntay, was
unconscionably low and tantamount to taking
of property without due process of law.
After summary administrative proceedings,
the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of
Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former
the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven
Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand
Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100
(P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for
the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of
Suntays properties.
Land Bank filed a petition for just
compensation with the Regional Trial Court.
The same was dismissed. The special agrarian
court also denied Land Banks Motion for
Reconsideration for being pro-
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forma. Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the
order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by
filing a Notice of Appeal with the special
agrarian court.
While the petition for just compensation was
pending with the special agrarian court, upon
motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued
an Order on May 22, 2001, declaring its
January 24, 2001 Decision as final and
executory. It also issued a Writ of
Execution, directing the Regional Sheriff of
DARAB-Region IV to implement its January
24, 2001 Decision.
Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction before the DARAB against Suntay
and RARAD.
ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over
Land Banks petition for certiorari
RULING: NO. Jurisdiction, or the legal
power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of
law. It is settled that the authority to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is
never derived by implication. Indeed, while
the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in
some instance conferred on all courts by
constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have
such power are expressly designated.
Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No.
129-A, the DARAB was created to act as the
quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the
passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory
powers and functions of the DAR were
further delineated.
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of
Procedure, where it delegated to the
RARADs and PARADs the authority "to hear,
determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases
and disputes, and incidents in connection
therewith, arising within their assigned
territorial jurisdiction."
In the absence of a specific statutory grant
of jurisdiction to issue the said
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only
limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise
jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for
certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial
authority of the DARAB nor its rule-
making power justifies such self-
conferment of authority.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-
judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words,
the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if
not wholly, on the provisions of the statute
creating or empowering such agency. The
grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-
judicial agency is not implied.
There is no question that the legislative grant
of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in
all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and
tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and
special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to
hear and determine a class of cases within the
DARs competence and field of expertise. In
conferring adjudicatory powers and functions
on the DAR, the legislature could not have
intended to create a regular court of justice
out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast
powers inherent in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-
judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does
not include authority over petitions
for certiorari, in the absence of an express
grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and
E.O. No. 129-A.
6. RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR,
REGION IV, and SUSAN
ALOA, respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in April 1998 petitioner
Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent
Susan Aloa Metrobank Check No.
005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for
P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite
City Branch. On 20 October 1998 (more than
90 days from due date) private respondent
presented the check for payment. The drawee
bank dishonored the check because it was
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
8

Respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with
the City Prosecutor of Cavite City.Petitioner
then submitted her own counter-affidavit. The
investigating prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of
an Information against petitioner for violation
of BP 22, which was approved by the City
Prosecutor.
Petitioner filed with the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region
IV a petition for review of the resolution. The
ORSP denied the petition. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP
also denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review of the resolution of the
ORSP, as well as the order denying
reconsideration. The appellate court issued
the assailed Resolution denying due course
outright and dismissing the petition. Hence,
this present Petition for Review under Rule
43.
ISSUE: WON decisions of the Office of the
Prosecutor are appealable in the CA
RULING: NO.
First, some ground rules. This case went to
the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals
from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions."3
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor
conducting a preliminary investigation
performs a quasi-judicial function citing
jurisprudence. In those cases, the Court held
that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But
this statement holds true only in the sense
that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor
is an office in the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court.
Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary
investigation is very different from other
quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than
a legislature which affects the rights of
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making."
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon
Development Bank Employees, we held that a
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or
in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency, hence his decisions and
awards are appealable to the Court of
Appeals. This is so because the awards of
voluntary arbitrators become final and
executory upon the lapse of the period to
appeal; and since their awards determine the
rights of parties, their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the
proper remedy from an award of a voluntary
arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals, following Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a
uniform procedure for appellate review of all
adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which
is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does
not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a
quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint
are not appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power
to resolve appeals with finality only where the
penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is
to present her defense in the trial of the case.
9

7. SPOUSES BERNYL BALANGAUAN &
KATHERENE
BALANGAUAN, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, SPECIAL NINETEENTH
(19TH) DIVISION, CEBU CITY & THE
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION,
LTD., respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Katherene was a Premier
Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of
respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she
managed the accounts of HSBC depositors
with Premier Status. One such client and/or
depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne
York (York).
York maintained several accounts with
respondent HSBC. While at the bank, York
inquired about the status of his time deposit in
the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR
representative who attended to him, however,
could not find any record of said placement in
the banks data base.
So as not to ruin its name and goodwill
among its clients, respondent HSBC
reimbursed York the P2,500,000.00.
Respondent HSBC, through its personnel,
filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or
Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cebu City.
Following the requisite preliminary
investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor
(ACP) ACP recommended the dismissal of
respondent HSBCs complaint.
Respondent HSBC appealed the above-
quoted resolution and foregoing comment to
the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review. In a Resolution dated 6
April 2004, the Chief State Prosecutor,
Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the
DOJ, dismissed the petition. Respondent
HSBCs Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality by the DOJ.
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of
Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision granting respondent
HSBCs petition, thereby annulling and
setting aside the twin resolutions of the
DOJ.Petitioners motion for reconsideration
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
proved futile, as it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the Department of Justice is a
quasi judicial agency
RULING: NO. The Court of Appeals found
fault in the DOJs failure to identify and
discuss the issues raised by the respondent
HSBC in its Petition for Review filed
therewith. And, in support thereof, respondent
HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue
that "it was not necessary for the Secretary of
Justice to have his resolution recite the facts
and the law on which it was based," because
courts and quasi-judicial bodies should
faithfully comply with Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution requiring that
decisions rendered by them should state
clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and
the law on which the decision is based.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by
the Office of the Solicitor General, on the
other hand, defends the DOJ and assert that
the questioned resolution was complete in that
it stated the legal basis for denying
respondent HSBCs petition for review "that
(after) an examination (of) the petition and its
attachment [it] found no reversible error that
would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and
evidence on the matter."
It must be remembered that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-
judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals,this Court held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, thus:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been
10

committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public
prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this
is true only to the extent that, like quasi-
judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of
the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is an
organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions such
that its awards, determine the rights of
parties, and their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the
case when a public prosecutor conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause to file an Information against
a person charged with a criminal offense, or
when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the
formers order or resolutions. In this case,
since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body,
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
finds no application. Be that as it may, the
DOJ rectified the shortness of its first
resolution by issuing a lengthier one when
it resolved respondent HSBCs motion for
reconsideration.
8. THE HONORABLE MONETARY
BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, Director,
Supervision and Examination Department
II, and BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
VETERANS BANK, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent established a pension
loan product for bona fide veterans or their
surviving spouses, as well as salary loan
product for teachers and low-salaried
employees pursuant to its mandate under
Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3518 and 7169 to
provide financial assistance to veterans and
teachers.
As its clientele usually do not have real estate
or security to cover their pension or salary
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
loan, other than their continuing good health
and/or employment, respondent devised a
program by charging a premium in the form
of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption
Fund(CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly,
Special Trust Funds were established by
respondent for the pension loans of the
veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers
and low-salaried employees. These trust funds
were, in turn, managed by respondents Trust
and Investment Department, with respondent
as beneficiary. The fees charged against the
borrowers were credited to the respective trust
funds, which would be used to fully pay the
outstanding obligation of the borrowers in
case of death.
On April 30, 2002, an examination was
conducted by the Supervision and
Examination Department (SED) II of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found,
among other things, that respondents
collection of premiums from the proceeds of
various salary and pension loans of borrowers
to guarantee payment of outstanding loans
violated Section 54 of RA No. 8791 which
states that banks shall not directly engage in
insurance business as insurer.
On September 16, 2005, petitioners issued
Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139
directing respondents Trust and Investment
Department to return to the borrowers all the
balances of the CRF in the amount
of P144,713,224.54 as of August31, 2004,
and to preserve the records of borrowers who
were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds
pending resolution or ruling of the Office of
the General Counsel of the BSP. Thus,
respondent requested reconsideration of said
MB Resolution. However, the same was
denied ina letter dated December 5, 2006.
Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati
City. The RTC dismissed respondents
petition for declaratory relief.
Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion
to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration
against said order alleging that it did not
receive a copy thereof until September 3,
2008. Despite the foregoing, the RTC allowed
respondents motion for reconsideration and
required petitioners to file their answer. In a
Decision dated June 15, 2009,the RTC of
Makati City granted respondents petition for
11

declaratory relief. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration against said decision, but
the same was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON the petition for declaratory
relief is proper
RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court governs petitions for
declaratory relief, viz.:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by
any person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order
or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.
Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development
Corporation v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, held that in the same manner that
court decisions cannot be the proper subjects
of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions
of quasijudicial agencies cannot be subjects
of a petition for declaratory relief for the
simple reason that if a party is not agreeable
to a decision either on questions of law or of
fact, it may avail of the various remedies
provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the
BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper
subject matter for a petition for declaratory
relief since it was issued by the BSP
Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers or functions.
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a
quasi-,judicial agency exercising
quasi-,judicial powers or
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
functions.1wphi1 As aptly observed by the
Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is
an independent central monetary authority
and a body corporate with fiscal and
administrative autonomy, mandated to
provide policy directions in the areas of
money, banking, and credit. It has the power
to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those
refusing to obey the subpoena without
justifiable reason, to administer oaths and
compel presentation of books, records and
others, needed in its examination, to impose
fines and other sanctions and to issue cease
and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act
No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides
that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise
its discretion in determining whether
administrative sanctions should be imposed
on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily
implies that the BSP Monetary Board must
conduct some form of investigation or hearing
regarding the same.16
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary
Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-
judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution
No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of declaratory
relief.
9. MAGDALENA HIDALGO et
al., Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, for and in behalf of the
ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES COMMISSARY AND
EXCHANGE SERVICES
(AFPCES), Respondent.
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines has
represented respondent Armed Forces of the
Philippines Commissary and Exchange
Services (AFPCES) in this recourse. AFPCES
is a unit/facility of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) organized pursuant to
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 31, which was
issued on November 20, 1972 by then
President Ferdinand Marcos.
Petitioners, on the other hand, numbering 65
in all, were hired as regular employees of
AFPCES. Some worked as food handlers in
AFPCES catering business and served during
social functions held within its premises.
Others occupied positions as computer
technicians, auditors, record clerks, cashiers,
canvassers, bookkeepers, and
warehousemen. Several of them had worked
with AFPCES for a number of years, ranging
12

from 4 to 31 years. Since the start of their
employment, petitioners were enrolled in the
Social Security System (SSS), with
respondent AFPCES paying its corresponding
employers share in their monthly SSS
contribution.
Between 1999 and 2001, however, AFPCES
advised petitioners to undergo an indefinite
leave of absence without pay, allegedly upon
a conditional promise that they would be
allowed to return to work as soon as
AFPCES tax subsidy is released and upon
resumption of its store operations.
When AFPCES failed to recall petitioners to
their work as allegedly promised, petitioners
filed a complaint for illegal (constructive)
dismissal with damages against AFPCES
before the NLRC.
On August 31, 2006, the appellate court
promulgated the assailed Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 84801 granting AFPCES
petition. The Court of Appeals, after applying
the Supreme Courts pronouncement in Duty
Free Philippines v. Mojica, explained that
since AFPCES is a governmental agency that
has no personality separate and distinct from
the AFP, petitioners are considered civil
service employees, and that complaints for
illegal dismissal should therefore be lodged
not with the Labor Arbiter but with the CSC.
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the said decision, but the
appellate court denied the same for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Which quasi-judicial agency has
jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints for
illegal dismissal against an adjunct
government agency engaged in proprietary
function?
RULING: Civil Service Commission
Petitioners employment to the AFPCES
should have been made in conformity with
pertinent civil service regulations since
AFPCES is a government agency under the
direct control and supervision of the AFP.
However, since this did not happen,
petitioners were placed under an anomalous
situation with AFPCES insisting that they are
government employees under the jurisdiction
of the CSC, but with the CSC itself
disavowing any jurisdiction over them.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
This notwithstanding, since it cannot be
denied that petitioners are government
employees, the proper body that has
jurisdiction to hear the case is the CSC. Such
fact cannot be negated by the failure of
respondents to follow appropriate civil
service rules in the hiring, appointment,
discipline and dismissal of petitioners.
Neither can it be denied by the fact that
respondents chose to enroll petitioners in the
SSS instead of the GSIS. Such considerations
cannot be used against the CSC to deprive it
of its jurisdiction. It is not the absence or
presence of the required appointment from the
CSC, or the membership of an employee in
the SSS or in the GSIS that determine the
status of the position of an employee. We
agree with the opinion of the AFP Judge
Advocate General that it is the regulation or
the law creating the Service that determines
the position of the employee.
Petitioners are government personnel since
they are employed by an agency attached to
the AFP. Consequently, as correctly observed
by the Court of Appeals, the Labor Arbiters
decision on their complaint for illegal
dismissal cannot be made to stand since the
same was issued without jurisdiction. Any
decision issued without jurisdiction is a total
nullity, and may be struck down at any time.
However, given petitioners peculiar situation,
the Court is constrained not to deny the
petition entirely, but instead to refer it to the
CSC pro hac vice.
10) G.R. No. 166365 September 30, 2005
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs.
ROSSANO J. MOJICA, Respondent.
FACTS: Discipline Committee of Duty Free
Philippines (DFP) rendered a decision 4 in DISCOM
Case No. 97-027 finding Stock Clerk Rossano A.
Mojica guilty of Neglect of Duty by causing
considerable damage to or loss of materials, assets
and property of DFP. Thus, Mojica was considered
forcibly resigned from the service with forfeiture of
all benefits except his salary and the monetary
value of the accrued leave credits.
Thereupon, Mojica filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement against DFP
before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
13

Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision
finding that Mojica was illegally dismissed.
However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the
arbiter. It found that the dismissal was valid and
with just cause.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
case.
HELD: No. Respondent Mojica is a civil service
employee; therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with
the NLRC, but with the Civil Service Commission.
DFP was created under Executive Order (EO) No.
468 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment
the service facilities for tourists and to generate
foreign exchange and revenue for the government.
In order for the government to exercise direct and
effective control and regulation over the tax and
duty free shops, their establishment and operation
was vested in the Ministry, now Department of
Tourism (DOT), through its implementing arm, the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). All the net
profits from the merchandising operations of the
shops accrued to the DOT.
As provided under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
564, PTA is a corporate body attached to the DOT.
As an attached agency, the recruitment, transfer,
promotion and dismissal of all its personnel was
governed by a merit system established in
accordance with the civil service rules. In fact, all
PTA officials and employees are subject to the Civil
Service rules and regulations.
Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive
authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and
employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service
rules and regulations. Clearly then, Mojicas
recourse to the Labor Arbiter was not proper. He
should have followed the procedure laid down in
DFPs merit system and the Civil Service rules and
regulations.
EO No. 292 or The Administrative Code of
1987 empowered the Civil Service Commission to
hear and decide administrative cases instituted by
or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to
it.
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest in the Merit
System Protection Board the power inter alia to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases
involving officials and employees of the Civil
Service. Its decision shall be final except those
involving dismissal or separation from the service
which may be appealed to the Commission.
Applying this rule, we have upheld the jurisdiction
of Civil Service Authorities, as against that of the
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
labor authorities, in controversies involving the
terms of employment, and other related issues, of
the Civil Service official and employees
EO No. 292 provided that civil service employees
have the right to present their complaints or
grievances to management and have them
adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the best
interest of the agency, the government as a whole,
and the employee concerned. Such complaint or
grievances shall be resolved at the lowest possible
level in the department or agency, as the case may
be, and the employee shall have the right to appeal
such decision to higher authorities. In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the
available remedies under existing laws and
procedure, the parties may jointly refer the dispute
in the Public Sector Labor Management Council for
appropriate action.
In sum, the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in
taking cognizance of the complaint as jurisdiction
over the complaint for illegal dismissal is lodged
with the Civil Service Commission. The Court of
Appeals likewise erred in sustaining the labor
arbiter.
11) G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE
OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L.
SABIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SENATOR
RICHARD GORDON
FACTS: Former President Cory issued EO No. 1
creating the PCGG. She entrusted upon this body
the task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the deposed President Marcos and
his close associates. To ensure the PCGGs
unhampered performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b)
of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
20 years later, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry
in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006,
Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo
Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
14

on Public Services. However, Chairman Sabio
declined the invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O.
No. 1.
ISSUE: WON Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is
unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes. It can be said that the Congress' power
of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such
power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that "the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch." Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the
operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we
find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG
members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in
the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG
belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
Moreover, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with
Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that:
"Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives." Section 4(b),
being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent
with the principle of public accountability.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the
following constitutional provisions ensuring the
people's access to information as provided under
Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution. These twin provisions of the
Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively
their constitutional rights.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
12) G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports,
DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of
Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, et. Al., respondents.
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a
class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were
members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions
to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latters attention.
Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with
an order of the Secretary of Education to return to
work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding,
the mass actions continued into the week, with
more teachers joining in the days that followed.
The respondent teachers submitted sworn
statements dated to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them.
Through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Secretary Cario filed his motion to dismiss, alleging
as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE: WON the CHR, like a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency, has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type
of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
HELD: No. The Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission
in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
15

findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings. this Court sets out the distinction
between investigative and adjudicative functions.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe
as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am
J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in
the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially,
to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the
Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political
rights," is a matter which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and
in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed
by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the
Supreme Court.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission
on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If
its investigation should result in conclusions
contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it
would have no power anyway to reverse the
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only
by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly
by this Court.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate Government
agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the
Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate unto
itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
13) G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, et.al
FACTS: On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman
issued an Order finding that Interport Sources
Corporation (IRC) violated the Rules on Disclosure
of Material Facts, in connection with the Old
Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely
disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition,
the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and
directors of IRC entered into transactions involving
IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to
Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, alleging that
the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject
matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, jurisdiction was conferred upon the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of
the SEC.
Respondents, however, questioned the authority of
the SEC to investigate on said matter since
according to PD 902-A, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction upon the matter was
conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department) of the SEC however,
this issue is already moot since pending the
disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation
Code was passed thereby effectively repealing PD
902-A and abolishing the PED. They also contended
that their right to due process was violated when
the SEC required them to appear before the SEC to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed
upon them since such requirement shifted the
burden of proof to respondents.
The case reached the CA and said court ruled in
favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined
the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative cases against respondents. In its
resolution, the CA stated that since there are no
rules and regulations implementing the rules
regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDERTRADING OR ANY
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES
ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any
16

suit against respondents. The CA, therefore,
prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or
initiating any action against the respondents for the
alleged violations of the Revised Securities Act.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred when it ruled that there is no
statutory authority whatsoever for SEC to initiate
and file any suit be they civil, criminal or
administrative against respondent corporation and
its directors with respect to section 30 (insider's
duty to discolsed [sic] when trading) and 36
(directors officers and principal stockholders) of the
revised securities act;
2. WON the CA erred when it ruled that rules of
practice and prosecution before the PED and the
SICD rules of procedure on administrative
actions/proceedings are invalid as they fail to
comply with the statutory requirements contained
in the administrative code of 1987.
HELD:
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act do not require the enactment of implementing
rules to make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any
implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or
administrative actions can possibly be had against
the respondents without violating their right to due
process and equal protection. This is untenable.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities
with power to make rules and regulations is based
on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing
general regulations for various and varying details
of management. To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of
Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would
empower the administrative bodies to defeat the
legislative will by delaying the implementing rules.
It is well established that administrative authorities
have the power to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given statute and to effectuate its
policies, provided such rules and regulations
conform to the terms and standards prescribed by
the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its
general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable
that the rules and regulations cannot assert for
themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate
from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where
the statute contains sufficient standards and an
unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should
be no impediment to its implementation.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an
evident mistake when it ruled that no civil, criminal
or administrative actions can possibly be had
against the respondents in connection with Sections
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the
absence of implementing rules. These provisions
are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves.
Their requirements are specifically set out, and the
acts which are enjoined are determinable. The lack
of implementing rules cannot suspend the
effectivity of these provisions. Thus, this Court
cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC
from exercising its authority to investigate
respondents for violation of Section 8 of the Revised
Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute
and cannot be demanded during investigative
proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the
Court of Appeals pronounced that the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure was invalid since Section 8,
Rule V56 thereof failed to provide for the parties'
right to cross-examination, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section
12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is
incorrect.
It must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of
the Administrative Code, entitled "Adjudication,"
does not affect the investigatory functions of the
agencies. The law creating PED empowers it to
investigate violations of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC and to file and prosecute
such cases. It fails to mention any adjudicatory
functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus, the
PED Rules of Practice and Procedure need not
comply with the provisions of the Administrative
Code on adjudication, particularly Section 12(3),
Chapter 3, Book VII.
However, this is not to say that administrative
bodies performing adjudicative functions are
required to strictly comply with the requirements of
Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code,
particularly, the right to cross-examination.
In proceedings before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, created under laws which
authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers or other
documentary evidence only. They are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence. In fact,
the hearings before such agencies do not connote
full adversarial proceedings. Thus, it is not
necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear
and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel
of the adverse party. To require otherwise would
negate the summary nature of the administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings.
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support
an administrative finding of fact, and substantial
17

evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due
process, what is required, among other things, is
that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity
to appear and defend his right and to introduce
relevant evidence in his favor.
III. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate
violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted
in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the
abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code
clearly provides that criminal complaints for
violations of rules and regulations enforced or
administered by the SEC shall be referred to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary
investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains
limited investigatory powers. Additionally, the SEC
may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned
law.
As stated in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did
not result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this
Court ordered the transfer of one case to the
proper regional trial court and the SEC to continue
with the investigation of the other case.
IV. The instant case has not yet prescribed.
Respondents have taken the position that this case
is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint
that may be filed against them resulting from the
SEC's investigation of this case has already
prescribed.
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act,
which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and
Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to
violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding
that a person has violated the Revised Securities
Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution. The
Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal
prosecution be initiated before the SEC, the
administrative agency with the special competence.
In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a
preliminary investigation since the SEC was halted
by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its
investigation. Such a situation leaves the
prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither
the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation
against the respondents, who, in the first place,
sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
All that the SEC could do in order to break the
impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of
Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest
opportunity in this case.
Therefore, the period during which the SEC was
prevented from continuing with its investigation
should not be counted against it. The law on the
prescription period was never intended to put the
prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which
the prosecution of a case would be placed way
beyond their control; for even if they avail
themselves of the proper remedy, they would still
be barred from investigating and prosecuting the
case.
14) G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, et. Al., Respondents.
FACTS: The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a
copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by
the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among
others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as
defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen.
Estrada. Sen. Estrada then filed his counter-affidavit.
Eighteen of Sen. Estradas co-respondents in the
complaints also filed their counter-affidavits.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to
be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses
and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313.
Sen. Estradas request was made "[p]ursuant to the
right of a respondent to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to have access to the evidence
on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)."
On 27 March 2014, the request of Estrada was
denied.The Ombudsman issued the assailed Order
in OMB-C-C-13-0313, which states: This Office finds
however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions
[pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not
entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada]to be furnished all
the filings of the respondents.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-
0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Resolution
which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada
and his co-respondents with one count of plunder
and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019.
18

Sen. Estrada contended that the Ombudsman, in
issuing the challenged order dated 27 march 2014,
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and violated Sen. Estrada's
constitutional right to due process of law. Sen.
Estrada asked for a judgment declaring that (a) he
has been denied due process of law, and as a
consequence thereof, (b) the Order dated 27 March
2014, as well as the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-
0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and
affected by the issuance of the 27 March 2014
Order, are void.
ISSUES:
1. WON Ombudsman acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction.
2. WON Ombudsman denied Estradas right to due
process of law.
HELD: No. We should remember to consider the
differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an
administrative case and a criminal case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of
proof and adjective rules vary depending on
whether the cases to which they are meant to apply
are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In
criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for conviction; in civil actions and
proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as
support for a judgment; and in administrative cases,
substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. In
criminal and civil actions, application of the Rules of
Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In
administrative proceedings, however, the technical
rules of pleading and procedure, and of evidence,
are not strictly adhered to; they generally apply
only suppletorily; indeed, in agrarian disputes
application of the Rules of Court is actually
prohibited.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and "probable
cause merely implies probability of guilt and should
be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in
a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a
preliminary investigation are limited to those
granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry
or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded
belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime
and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence;
it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
We are in accord with the state prosecutors
findings in the case at bar that there exists prima
facie evidence of petitioners involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional
requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay
described as the "fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character."
These requirements are "fundamental and
essential" because without these, there is no due
process as mandated by the Constitution. These
"fundamental and essential requirements" cannot
be taken away by legislation because they are part
of constitutional due process. These "fundamental
and essential requirements" are:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. x x x.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity, x x x."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial."
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. x x x.
19

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. x x x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in sucha manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
However, the Ang Tibay guidelines for
administrative cases do not apply to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases.
The investigating officer, which is the role that the
Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation
and prosecution of government personnel, will
never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the
Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a
preliminary investigation, after conducting its own
fact finding investigation, is to determine probable
cause for filing an information, and not to make a
final adjudication of the rights and obligations of
the parties under the law, which is the purpose of
the guidelines in Ang Tibay. The investigating officer
investigates, determines probable cause, and
prosecutes the criminal case after filing the
corresponding information.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with
finality rights and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang
Tibay,as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidencefor a decision against the respondent in
the administrative case.
In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or
probability of guiltis required. To apply Ang Tibay,as
amplified in GSIS,to preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required to
establish probable cause. The respondent in an
administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS,has the right to an actual hearing
and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no
such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must
be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder,
investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In
preliminary investigations, the same public officer
may be the investigator and hearing officer at the
same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
hearing officer may be under the control and
supervisionof the same public officer, like the
Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice.
This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now
declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential
requirements in preliminary investigations will
render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional
due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all
courts throughout the country.
15) G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ,
et. Al. , respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because
she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any
rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by
the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of
duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting
crime was filed against her and the Provincial
Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was
brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed
under preventive suspension. This is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to
set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with
respect to the two proceedings.
ISSUE: WON Ombudsman acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
HELD: No.
I. Petitioner contends, the Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the case against the mayor because the
crime involved (rape) was not
committed in relation to a public office.
For this reason it is argued that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no
authority to place her and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for refusing to follow his
orders and to cite them for indirect
contempt for such refusal.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of
the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." This power has been held to include the
investigation and prosecution of any crime
20

committed by a public official regardless of whether
the acts or omissions complained of are related to,
or connected with, or arise from, the performance
of his official duty. It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed by a public
official like a municipal mayor, is within the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance, in
accordance with 31 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 (R.A. No. 6770).
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was
for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the
nature of the offense to be charged would still be
subject to the approval of the Office of the
Ombudsman. This is because under 31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized,
he comes under the "supervision and control" of
the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to
the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review,
approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's)
decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own
and refuse to prepare and file the information as
directed by the Ombudsman.
II. The records show that despite
repeated orders of the Ombudsman,
petitioner refused to file an
information for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after
investigating the complaint in the case
she found that he had committed only
acts of lasciviousness.
15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of
the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court
and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the
argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt
because their refusal arose out of an administrative,
rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of
the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in
another context, the preliminary investigation of a
case, of which the filing of an information is a part,
is quasi judicial in character.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the
Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance,
disobedience or resistance of a lawful process,
order or command of the Ombudsman thus making
her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, 3 of
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Case Digest Compilation 4
the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine
after appropriate hearing. At this point it is
important only to note the existence of the
contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of
enforcing his lawful orders.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the
Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be
found that she is guilty of grave misconduct,
insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the
Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime
under preventive suspension.
III. Petitioner contends that her
suspension is invalid because the order
was issued without giving her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the
opportunity to refute the charges
against them and because, at any rate,
the evidence against them is not strong
as required by 24. The contention is
without merit. Prior notice and hearing
is a not required, such suspension not
being a penalty but only a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner
before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was
not a punishment or penalty for the acts of
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a
preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending
his investigation and before the opportunity to
prove his innocence.
16) G.R. No. 172637 April 22, 2015
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS AND EMILY
ROSE KO LIM CHAO, Petitioners, vs.
MARY ANN T. CASTRO, Respondent.
FACTS: Mariven Castro purchased on credit a Fuso
Canter vehicle from KD Surplus. Mariven executed
post-dated checks to KD Surplus. The checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds when
presented for encashment. Mariven inquired from
Emily Rose Ko Lim Chao, the owner-manager of KD
Surplus, if it was still possible to just return the
vehicle in exchange for the issued checks.
Marivens wife, Rosefil Castro, accompanied by his
(Marivens) sister, herein respondent, brought the
Fuso Canter to KD Surplus yard for appraisal and
evaluation. Emily inspected the vehicle and found
out that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty
21

and dilapidated body. Emily thus refused to accept
the vehicle.
The respondent then left the premises of KD
Surplus, but returned there a few moments later on
board a Philippine National Police-Special Weapons
and Tactics (PNP-SWAT) vehicle. The respondent
also asked Emily to sign a yellow pad paper
containing a list of the issued checks, and told her
to return these checks. When Emily refused, the
respondent threatened to file cases against Emily;
the respondent also threatened Emilys staff with
lawsuits if they will not testify in her favor. On
September 26, 2002, Emily filed an administrative
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713
(the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees) against the
respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas).
The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and imposed on her the penalty of "three
(3) months suspension from the service without
pay." The Ombudsman held that the respondents
act of summoning the PNP-SWAT to go with her to
KD Surplus, and riding on their vehicle, overstepped
the conventions of good behavior which every
public official ought to project so as to preserve the
integrity of public service. It added that the
respondent had encouraged a wrong perception
that she was a "dispenser of undue patronage."It
argued that the respondent exhibited
irresponsibility and corruption, and showed her lack
of integrity when she took advantage of her
position as Assistant City Prosecutor to summon the
assistance of the elite SWAT Team in order to
pressure and harass Emily.
In her Comment, the respondent countered that
she had been denied due process.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent was denied due process of law.
2. WON respondent is administratively liable.
HELD:
I. No denial of due process
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. Due
process is simply the opportunity given to explain
ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emilys
allegations in her counter-affidavit. The respondent
cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act
of calling for police assistance vis--vis riding on
board the SWAT vehicle, was not among those
included in the charge against her. The Ombudsman
has the power to determine the respondents
administrative liability based on the actual facts
recited in this affidavit complaint.
The Courts ruling in Avenido v. CSC is particularly
instructive:
The charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the
substance of the charge against him; what is
controlling is the allegation of the acts complained
of, not the designation of the offense.
We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard
is sufficient. As long as the respondent was given
the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with; what the law abhors is
an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Notably, when the case was called for a preliminary
conference, the respondent opted to submit the
case for decision on the basis of the evidence on
record.
II. The respondents liability
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that a person is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.
We point out that to constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. The
respondent in the present case summoned the
SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her
brother and sister-in-law. There was no link
between the respondents acts and her official
functions as a city prosecutor.
To our mind, the respondents acts of involving an
elite police team like the SWAT in a matter purely
personal to her and riding on their vehicle in going
to and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled
for. By calling out the SWAT to the premises of KD
Surplus and by riding on their vehicle, she clearly
wanted to project an image of power and influence
meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily.
22

How the respondent managed to convince an elite
police force like the SWAT to accompany her, and to
allow her to use their vehicle in a matter purely
personal to her, does not favorably reflect on her as
well as on the police.
With this, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly
ruled that the respondents acts of seeking the
assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a
SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and not misconduct,
since there is no nexus between these acts and her
official functions. As long as the questioned conduct
tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public
office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on
the erring public officer or employee.
17. G.R. No. 209447 August 11, 2015
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. WINLOVE
M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB), Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 210901]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. WINLOVE
M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION
(COCOLIFE), Respondents.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 12-1251
UCPB (United Coconut Planters Bank) alleged that the
capital or equity used in establishing the CIIF (Coconut
Industry Investment Funds) companies was not
exclusively sourced from the coconut levy funds. It
claimed that while P633 Million was invested by it as
Administrator of the CIIF, as universal bank it also
invested around P112 million in the six oil mill
companies or oil mills group (CIIF OMG).
For the 14 holding companies, UCPB claimed that
while it had the funds in mid-1983 to purchase the
33,133,266 shares in SMC then being sold by the
Soriano Group for the price of P1.656 Billion to Mr.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., it could not, under banking
laws, directly engage in the business of brewery. To
make the equity investment, the 14 holding
companies were established by the CIIF OMG to serve
as corporate vehicles for the investment in SMC shares
(CIIF SMC Block of Shares).
With the foregoing supposed equity in the CIIF
companies and contributions to the acquisition of the
SMC shares, UCPB claims 11.03% indirect ownership.
UCPB thus prayed for a judgment declaring the rights
and duties of UCPB affirming and confirming UCPBs
proportionate right, title and interest in the Oil Mills
Group Companies, its indirect equity of the 14
Coconut Industry Investment Funds (CIIF) Holding
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
Companies and the San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
Shares, the dividends thereon and the proceeds of the
redemption thereof.
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss citing, among others,
the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.
Civil Case No. 12-1252
COCOLIFE raised similar claims of ownership in the
subject companies and shares of stock by virtue of its
being a stockholder, owning UCPB shares
independently of its right as direct shareholder. It
alleged that it purchased from UCPB shares of stock in
four CIIF oil companies. Using funds coming from
COCOLIFE and UCPB, the CIIF OMG was able to raise
the money for the purchase of the 33,133,266
common shares in SMC.
Consequently, COCOLIFEs percentage ownership in
the CIIF SMC Block of Shares being held by the 14
holding companies is 11.01%. According to COCOLIFE,
its investment in the CIIF OMG is evidenced by
certificates of stock issued by San Pablo Manufacturing
Corp., Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills, Granexport
Manufacturing Corp. and Legaspi Oil Co., Inc.
Like UCPB, COCOLIFE asserted that the CIIF OMG and
14 CIIF holding companies are not wholly owned by
the Government.
COCOLIFE argued that it should not be deprived of its
proportionate interest in the said properties
sequestered by PCGG. It thus prayed that judgment be
rendered by the RTC declaring the rights and duties of
COCOLIFE affirming and confirming COCOLIFEs
proportionate interest in the four CIIF oil companies,
its indirect equity in the 14 CIIF holding companies and
the CIIF SMC Block of Shares including the proceeds or
their equivalent, and that any disbursement or
disposition thereof should preserve, respect and take
into account COCOLIFEs right and interest.
Respondents question the authority of Commissioner
Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. in filing the present petitions
before the Court and signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping. They point out
that the PCGG is a collegial body created by virtue of
EO 1, and it may function only as such Commission.
Consequently, the present action should have been
properly authorized by all members of the
Commission.
On the issue of jurisdiction, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue
that since they have properly alleged a case for
declaratory relief, jurisdiction over the subject matter
lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of Makati
City.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was non-compliance with the
rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping which was signed by only one PCGG
Commissioner;
23

2) Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over
Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252;
3) Application of res judicata and/or laches as bar to
the suits for declaratory relief filed by UCPB and
COCOLIFE.
HELD: The petitions are meritorious.
1. Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG Commissioner
Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. to file the present petition
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of the
principal party or the other petitioners has the
authority to do the same. We hold that the signature
of only one Commissioner of petitioner PCGG in the
verification and certification against forum shopping is
not a fatal defect.
It has been consistently held that the verification of a
pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is
to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
As to the certification of non-forum shopping, a rigid
application of the rules should not defeat the PCGGs
mandate to prosecute cases for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, and to conserve sequestered assets
and corporations, which are in custodia legis, under its
administration. Indeed, relaxation of the rules is
warranted in this case involving coconut levy funds
previously declared by this Court as affected with
public interest and judicially determined as public
funds.
We noted the extraordinary circumstances in the filing
of the petition by the said government officials that
justified a liberal interpretation of the rules.
2. The RTC has no jurisdiction over suits involving the
sequestered coco levy assets and coco levy funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or
by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or
some of the claims prayed for therein. Jurisdiction is
not acquired by agreement or consent of the parties,
and neither does it depend upon the defenses raised
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.
Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth and related cases:
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions
shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
In PCGG v. Pea, we made the following clarification
on the extent of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
x x x Under section 2 of the Presidents Executive
Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets,
and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated
by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents,
or Nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall
likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and
original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
3. Applicability of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action.
The following requisites must obtain for the
application of the doctrine:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that
is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
(4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same parties.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first,
known as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by
verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action.
24

The second, known as conclusiveness of judgment,
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent,
ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause
of action.
Conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and there
was judicially passed upon and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned
and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical.
We hold that res judicata under the second aspect
(conclusiveness of judgment) is applicable in this case.
The issue of ownership of the sequestered CIIF
companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares was directly
and actually resolved by the Sandiganbayan and
affirmed by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic.
More important, in the said decision, we categorically
affirmed the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F THAT THERE IS
NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH
RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE
SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CIIF BLOCK OF
SMC SHARES, AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY
HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE
AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
18. G.R. No. 174431 August 6, 2012
The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA. AILEEN
H. BUGARIN, MA. LINDA B. ABIOG and MA. ANNETTE
B. SUMULONG, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC of the
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: The late Bugarin was the Director of the NBI
when the late Ferdinand Marcos was still the president
of the country from 1965-1986. After the latters
downfall in 1986, the new administration, through the
PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture of properties
under R.A. No. 1379 against him with the
Sandiganbayan. The latter dismissed the petition for
insufficiency of evidence.
After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for
reconsideration, the PCGG sought a review of the
dismissal before the Court. Sitting En Banc, the Court
found manifest errors and misapprehension of facts
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
including Bugarins very own summary of his property
acquisitions.
Thereafter, the Court found Bugarin to have amassed
wealth totaling P2,170,163.00 from 1968 to 1980
against his total income for the period 1967 to 1980
totaling only 766,548.00. With this, the Court held
that Bugarins properties, which were visibly out of
proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980,
should be forfeited in favor of the government.
Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his
motion was pending, he passed away in September
2002. His heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have
the case dismissed which the court denied.
With the case back at the Sandiganbayan, hearing was
set for to determine which properties of the late
Bugarin would be forfeited in favor of the government.
Upon motion, the Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 30
days within which to submit "a list of properties more
or less equivalent to the amount of P1,403,615.00 and
still remaining in the name of defendant Bugarin."
Pursuant to this order, the PCGG filed its Partial
Compliance which contained a list of properties and
investments found to have been acquired by Bugarin.
The PCCG, in a manifestation, informed the
Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the
status of Bugarins other business investments not
included in their Amended Partial Compliance but only
one replied to inform them that Bugarin was "not a
stockholder of nor has he any investment in this
company." Thus, in the same manifestation, the PCGG
prayed that its latest compliance be considered
sufficient conformity to the Sandiganbayans Order.
Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan could not
determine the properties to be forfeited on its own,
and further prayed that the parties be allowed to
present evidence to determine what properties of
Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not bugarins heirs should be accorded
their right to due process; and
2. Whether or not the assailed resolutions are in
accordance with the decision of the supreme court in
the republic case.
HELD:
1. Foremost in petitioners arguments is their claim
that they have been deprived of their right to due
process of law when the Sandiganbayan ordered for
the forfeiture of Bugarins properties. They, thus, want
that another round of trial or hearing be conducted for
"further reception of evidence" to determine which
among the properties enumerated in the Republic
case are ill-gotten wealth.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Bugarin was
accorded due process. He was given his day in court to
prove that his acquired properties were lawfully
attained. A review of the full text of the said case will
25

reveal that the summary of properties acquired by
Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was based
on his very own exhibits.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard.
Based on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were
certainly not denied that right. Petitioners cannot now
claim a different right over the reduced list of
properties in order to prevent forfeiture, or at the
least, justify another round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking
due process was in fact given several opportunities to
be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or
choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for
due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan
for execution, petitioners were likewise accorded due
process. Records of this case reveal that every motion
by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was
granted, and every motion filed, either for
reconsideration or leave of court, was heard.
2. Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well
as in the the Republic decision, that the properties
listed by this Court were all candidates for forfeiture.
At that point, no additional proof or evidence was
required. All that was needed was for the
Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make sure
that the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs of the
properties chosen remained within the amount which
was disproportionate to the income of Bugarin during
his tenure as NBI Director. The case was only
remanded to the Sandiganbayan to implement the
Courts ruling in the Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan to
receive evidence once again would be tantamount to
resurrecting the long-settled disposition in the
Republic case. This cannot be permitted.
It is equally clear that this Court had already made a
determination that the properties of the late Bugarin
acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were
disproportionate to his lawful income were ordered
forfeited in favor of the State. This means that the late
Bugarin failed to convince the Court that the delimited
list of properties were lawfully acquired.
The immutability of judgment that has long become
final and executory is the core, the very essence of an
effective and efficient administration of justice. Thus,
in Labao v. Flores, this Court reiterated the importance
of the doctrine:
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
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Case Digest Compilation 4
the land. All the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment
becomes final and executory; execution of the decision
proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party
has the right to appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of
a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a
decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will be no
end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main
role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of
the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
19. G.R. No. 172101 November 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioners, - versus - ASIAPRO
COOPERATIVE, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is
composed of owners-members. Its primary objectives
are to provide savings and credit facilities and to
develop other livelihood services for its owners-
members. Respondent cooperative entered into
several Service Contracts with Stanfilco. In order to
enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of
1997, the owners-members of the respondent
cooperative, who were assigned to Stanfilco requested
the services of the latter to register them with
petitioner SSS as self-employed and to remit their
contributions as such.
However, petitioner SSS sent a letter to the
respondent cooperative informing the latter that
respondent cooperative is actually a manpower
contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for
that reason, it is an employer of its owners-members
working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative
should register itself with petitioner SSS as an
employer and make the corresponding report and
remittance of premium contributions in accordance
with the Social Security Law of 1997.
Respondent cooperative asserted that it is not an
employer because its owners-members are the
cooperative itself; hence, it cannot be its own
employer.
Again, SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative
ordering the latter to register as an employer and
report its owners-members as employees for
compulsory coverage with the petitioner SSS.
Respondent cooperative continuously ignored the
demand of SSS.
Accordingly, SSS filed a Petition before petitioner SSC
against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco
praying that the respondent cooperative or, in the
alternative, Stanfilco be directed to register as an
employer and to report respondent cooperatives
owners-members as covered employees under the
26

compulsory coverage of SSS and to remit the
necessary contributions in accordance with the Social
Security Law of 1997.
Petitioners claim that SSC has jurisdiction over the
petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS as it
involved an issue of whether or not a worker is
entitled to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the
petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS
against the respondent cooperative; and
2. Whether or not SSC can determine the existence of
ee-er relationship.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner SSCs jurisdiction is clearly stated in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as in
Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of
Procedure.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising
under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any other
matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission, x x x.
Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised
Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under the
Social Security Act with respect to coverage,
entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of
contributions and penalties thereon, or any other
matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission after the SSS through its President,
Manager or Officer-in-charge of the Department /
Branch / Representative Office concerned had first
taken action thereon in writing.
It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that any
issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS is
well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC.
It is important to note, though, that the mandatory
coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship
except in cases of compulsory coverage of the self-
employed.
It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint,
not the defenses set up in the Answer or in the
Motion to Dismiss, determine which court has
jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant. Moreover, it is well-settled that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it
until the full termination of the case. The said principle
may be applied even to quasi-judicial bodies.
In this case, the petition-complaint filed by the
petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against the
respondent cooperative and Stanfilco alleges that the
owners-members of the respondent cooperative are
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
subject to the compulsory coverage of the SSS because
they are employees of the respondent cooperative.
Consequently, the respondent cooperative being the
employer of its owners-members must register as
employer and report its owners-members as covered
members of the SSS and remit the necessary premium
contributions in accordance with the Social Security
Law of 1997. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid
allegations in the petition-complaint filed before the
petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its
jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Since the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the respondent cooperative and
its owners-members was put in issue and considering
that the compulsory coverage of the SSS Law is
predicated on the existence of such relationship, it
behooves the petitioner SSC to determine if there is
really an employer-employee relationship that exists
between the respondent cooperative and its owners-
members.
The question on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC
provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE
COMMISSION. - (a) x x x.
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims, arising from employer-employee relations, .
Although the aforesaid provision speaks merely of
claims for Social Security, it would necessarily include
issues on the coverage thereof, because claims are
undeniably rooted in the coverage by the system.
Hence, the question on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship for the purpose of
determining the coverage of the Social Security
System is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of
the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the SSC
which is primarily charged with the duty of settling
disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997.
It may inquire into the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship without need of
waiting for a prior pronouncement or submitting the
issue to the NLRC for prior determination.
Since both the petitioner SSC and the NLRC are
independent bodies and their jurisdiction are well-
defined by the separate statutes creating them,
petitioner SSC has the authority to inquire into the
relationship existing between the worker and the
person or entity to whom he renders service to
determine if the employment, indeed, is one that is
excepted by the Social Security Law of 1997 from
compulsory coverage.
_________________________________________
27

20. G.R. No. 137869 June 12, 2008
SPOUSES MARCIAL VARGAS and ELIZABETH VARGAS,
Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES VISITACION and JOSE
CAMINAS, SPOUSES JESUS and LORELEI GARCIA, and
SPOUSES RODOLFO and ROSARIO ANGELES DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 137940 June 12, 2008
SPOUSES RODOLFO and ROSARIO ANGELES DE
GUZMAN, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES VISITACION
and AZCUNA, and JOSE CAMINAS, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ. and SPOUSES MARCIAL and ELIZABETH
VARGAS
FACTS: Spouses Caminas bought a 54-square meter lot
with a two-storey townhouse (townhouse No. 8) from
Trans-American Sales and Exposition represented by
its developer Jesus Garcia (Garcia). Townhouse No. 8 is
on a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 195187.
Spouses Caminas paid Garcia P850,000 as evidenced
by a contract of sale and provisional receipt, and took
possession of townhouse No. 8 upon completion of its
construction.
Garcia bought from Spouses Vargas various
construction materials. As payment to spouses Vargas,
Garcia executed an absolute Deed of Sale over
townhouse No. 12. However, spouses Vargas and
Garcia executed a Deed of Exchange with Addendum
whereby spouses Vargas transferred to Garcia
townhouse No. 12, and in exchange Garcia transferred
to spouses Vargas townhouse No. 8. The contracts
executed by Garcia with spouses Caminas and spouses
Vargas were not registered with the Register of Deeds.
This was because TCT No. 195187 was still being
reconstituted and it was only on 17 August 1989 that
TCT No. 7285 was issued in its stead.
Subsequently, Garcia and his wife Lorelei (spouses
Garcia) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
townhouse No. 8 in favor of Spouses De Guzman as
security for a loan. As spouses Garcia failed to pay
their indebtedness, spouses De Guzman foreclosed
the mortgage.
Spouses Caminas filed a complaint against spouses
Garcia, spouses De Guzman, and spouses Vargas
before the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of deed of mortgage and deed of sale, for the
declaration of absolute ownership, for the delivery of
title or in the alternative for refund of purchase price
and damages.
Spouses Vargas filed a case against spouses Garcia and
spouses De Guzman for specific performance,
declaration of nullity of the mortgage contract,
damages or in the alternative for sum of money and
damages.
In their Rejoinder, spouses Vargas raised the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Spouses Vargas further stated that the HLURB had
already rendered a decision awarding the property in
their favor.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not setting aside the decision and
order of the Regional Trial Court since the case is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
HELD: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 1344 dated 2 April
1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), the precursor of the HLURB,
to include adjudication of the following cases:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
broker or salesman.
The HLURB has jurisdiction over cases arising from (1)
unsound real estate business practices; (2) claims for
refund or other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (3)
demands for specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots
or condominium units against the owner, developer,
broker, or salesman.
The controversies in this case revolve around the
following transactions:
1. The sale of townhouse No. 8 by spouses Garcia to
spouses Caminas;
2. The sale of townhouse No. 8 by spouses Garcia to
spouses Vargas; and
3. The mortgage of townhouse No. 8 by spouses
Garcia to spouses De Guzman.
There is no dispute that spouses Garcia are in the real
estate business under the name Trans-American Sales
and Exposition. Clearly, the validity of the questioned
transactions entered into by spouses Garcia, as the
owner and developer of Trans-American Sales and
Exposition, falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
On spouses De Guzmans claim that Section 18 of PD
957 does not grant the HLURB the authority to
invalidate the mortgage contract if the requisite
authority from the NHA is not obtained, this Court has
previously ruled that the HLURB has jurisdiction over
cases involving the annulment of a real estate
28

mortgage constituted by the project owner without
the consent of the buyer and without the prior written
approval of the NHA.
On the contention that spouses Vargas are estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction, the well-settled
rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. An
examination of the records of the trial court will reveal
that in its Rejoinder, spouses Vargas raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court since the case
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
However, the trial court failed to address the issue of
jurisdiction in its decision as well as in its order
granting the motion for reconsideration of spouses De
Guzman.
Clearly, the trial court erred in not dismissing the case
before it. Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the
court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In De Rossi v. NLRC, citing La Naval Drug Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
action shall be dismissed. This defense may be
interposed at any time, during appeal or even after
final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine
or conveniently set aside.
21. G.R. No. 179695 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 182369 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN,
respondents.
FACTS: Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases,
was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan.
On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6
months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the
transfer of his registration record to the said barangay.
In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan
was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006,
formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of
Northern Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC
approved petitioner's application for the transfer of
his voting record and registration as a voter
of Barangay Indatuan, NorthernKabuntalan. On March
29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May
14, 2007 National and Local Elections. Private
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
respondent filed a disqualification case against
petitioner. The petition alleged that the petitioner did
not possess the period of residency required for
candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and
in his application for transfer of voting record.
Elections were held without any decision being
rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the
counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged
as the victor. Fermin subsequently filed an election
protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13
of Cotabato City.
On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2 nd Division,
disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his
declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as
of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.
Petitioner argues that he has been a resident
of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of
Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence
prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters
registration record from Barangay Payan to
Barangay Indatuan.
Moreover, the one year residency requirement under
the law is not applicable to candidates for elective
office in a newly created municipality, because the
length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned
from the effective date of its creation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its
discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident
of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14,
2007 elections; and
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its
discretion when it ordered the dismissal of Election
Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no
legal standing to file the protest.
HELD:
1. Yes. As the law stands, the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy." Accordingly, it is
necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC in
order to ascertain whether the Dilangalen petition
filed on April 20, 2007 was well within the restrictive
25-day period. If it was not, then the COMELEC should
have, as discussed above, dismissed the petition
outright.
The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his
CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections on March 29,
2007.58 It is clear therefore that the petition to deny
due course to or cancel Fermins CoC was filed by
Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary
period. The COMELEC therefore did not abuse its
discretion, much more gravely, when it did not dismiss
the petition outright.
29

2. YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely
abused its discretion when it precipitately declared
that Fermin was not a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said
elections.
The COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to
support its finding that petitioner was not a resident
of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the
oath of office subscribed and sworn to before
Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner
indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single
piece of evidence does not necessarily support a
finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner merely
admitted that he was a resident of another locality as
of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before
the elections. It is not inconsistent with his
subsequent claim that he complied with the residency
requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could
have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27,
2006, on or before May 14, 2006.
Neither does this evidence support the allegation that
petitioner failed to comply with the residency
requirement for the transfer of his voting record from
Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a
voter is required to reside in the place wherein he
proposes to vote only for six months immediately
preceding the election, petitioners application for
transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his
earlier admission that he was a resident of Barangay
Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be that as it may, the issue
involved in the Dilangalen petition is whether or not
petitioner made a material representation that is false
in his CoC, and not in his application for the transfer of
his registration and voting record.
The Court finds that the Dilangalen petition does not
make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is therefore
warranted. We emphasize that the mere filing of a
petition and the convenient allegation therein that a
candidate does not reside in the locality where he
seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the
cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must
substantiate every allegation.
22. G.R. No. 142261 June 29, 2000
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
FACTS: Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government
officials were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for allegedly having conspired
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
among themselves in demanding & collecting from
various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee,
control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of
sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly
enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the
collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such
collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out the
penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to
Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman
decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued
that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued
against the DILG for prematurely implementing the
assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsmans Decision
finding petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr
suspension without pay is immediately executory
pending appeal.
HELD: Sec. 27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman
likewise contains a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III
of the said Rules provides: where the respondent is
absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the
expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770.
The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not
among those listed as final and unappealable. The
legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus finds
application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The
clear import of these statements taken together is that
all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
which impose penalties not enumerated in the said
section are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed
in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision.
A judgment becomes final and executory by
operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act
gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions
should generally carry with it the stay of these
30

decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable would
be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or
tribunals become executory only after it has become
final and executory, execution pending appeal being
an exception to this general rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that
all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately
executory.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the
decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately
final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly
so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as
mandating that the appeal will not stay the award,
judgment,final order or resolution unless the law
directs otherwise.final order or resolution unless the
law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the
Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.
It is a principle in statutory construction that where
there are two statutes that apply to a particular case,
that which was specially designed for the said case
must prevail over the other. Considering however, that
petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it
is this law alone which should govern his case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of
procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month
salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory.
23. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a
parcel of land located in Sorsogon. He voluntarily
offered to sell the said land to the government,
through the Department of Agrarian Reform under
Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which
was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary
administrative proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the land.
The DARAB rendered a Decision and valued the
property at P10,956,963.25 for the acquired area of
240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is
hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
the manner provided for by law. Thereafter, a Writ of
Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the
manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the
aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner
provided by law.
Respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the
PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to
comply with the Writ of Execution. He argued that
such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ
of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for
Contempt.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order.
PARAD Capellan ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ
of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount
of just compensation to respondent and directed the
issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A.
Lorayes.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction
before the RTC which was granted. Thus, Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts
order, which was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not quasi-judicial agencies have the
power to cite persons for indirect contempt.
HELD: No. Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have
the power to cite persons for indirect contempt
pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do
so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial
Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases.
These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts.
In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was
filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the
PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes
with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an
unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the
following reasons:
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which
was not complied with in this case. The charge was not
initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by
a motion filed by respondent.
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was
beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.
Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from
respondents Motion for Contempt and for the arrest
of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
31

24. SIMON VS. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
GR 100150, 5 JANUARY 1994
FACTS: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July
1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the
City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and
members of the North Edsa Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice,
Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3
days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to
vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to
their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo,
et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon,
Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and
Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a
letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo,
et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to
appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements
submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990,
as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al.
carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990,
ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light
housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed
Simon, et. al. to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of
said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September
1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During
the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al.
moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990
had yet to be resolved, and likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to
the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September
1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March
1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying
Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order,
dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion
for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al.
filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer
for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction, questioning the extent of the
authority and power of the CHR, and praying
that the CHR be prohibited from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case 90
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et
al."
ISSUE: Whether the CHR has the power to
issue the order to desist against the
demolition of Fermo, et. al.s stalls, and to
cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for
proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the
CHR order.
RULING: Section 18, Article XIII, of the
1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering
the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights."
Recalling the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations; such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed
against the religious."
While the enumeration has not likely been
meant to have any preclusive effect, more
32

than just expressing a statement of priority, it
is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation."
Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought
to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's
Park." More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It
is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if
its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not
prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended
by the Constitution. On its contempt powers,
the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
"adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or
who unduly withhold relevant information, or
who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for
a restraining order) herein, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from
an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
As held in Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The
constitutional provision directing the CHR to
'provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection'
may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law'.
It is never derived by implication. Evidently,
the 'preventive measures and legal aid
services' mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ
of preliminary injunction may only be issued
`by the judge of any court in which the action
is pending [within his district], or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose."
25. GARCIA VS. J. DRILON AND GARCIA, G. R. NO.
179267, 25 JUNE 2013
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner.
33

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed
to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would
be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being an unwanted
product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of
the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law;
2. WON the CA committed serious error in
failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause;
3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in
not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution;
4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the
law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution;
and
5. WON the CA seriously erredin declaring
RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
RULING:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate
to tackle the complex issue of
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and
if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of ones defense. The grant of the
TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a
mediator is justified. Petitioners contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
any part of any branch of the Government
34

while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
26. NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY,
INC., petitioner vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER ILDEFONSO G. AGBUYA and
JUANITO COLLADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 54424 August 31, 1989
FACTS: Private respondent Juanita Collado
was employed by petitioner Nasipit Lumber
Company, Inc. (NALCO) as a security guard.
He was assigned as lst Sergeant of the
NALCO Security Force at Nasipit. In the
course of Collado's employment or on, four
(4) crates of lawanit boards containing 1,000
panels were stolen from petitioner's premises.
Collado was implicated in the theft and was
thereafter placed under preventive
suspension. NALCO filed a petition
(application) for clearance to dismiss Collado
with the Regional Office No. X of the
Department of Labor in Cagayan de Oro City.
The application for clearance to dismiss was
approved in an order issued by Regional
Office No. X Officer-in-Charge Roy V.
Seneres. Collado filed a motion for the
reconsideration of said order on the ground
that he was not given an opportunity to rebut
the false findings or adduce evidence in his
favor. The said Officer-in-Charge, through a
subordinate, certified the case to the
Executive Labor Arbiter for compulsory
arbitration. Notice and summons were issued.
NALCO and Collado were then required to
submit their respective position papers under
pain of a default judgment. After a perusal of
the records, Executive Labor Arbiter
Ildefonso G. Agbuya returned the case to the
Regional Director of Regional Office No. X
in Cagayan de Oro City for whatever
appropriate action he may deem fit.
Consequently, the case was elevated to the
Secretary of Labor.
Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued
an order affirming the order of Officer-in-
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
Charge Roy V. Seneres thereby granting
petitioner's application for clearance to
dismiss Collado.Instead of resorting to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, on October
9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the
Butuan District Labor Office, Butuan City, for
unjust dismiss and reinstatement with
backwages and benefits. NALCO flied a
motion to dismiss the complaint. It alleged
that in view of Acting Secretary Inciong's
aforesaid order, Collado did not have any
sufficient cause of action and therefore his
complaint was a nuisance. In its position
paper, NALCO added that because Acting
Secretary Inciong's order had become final
and executory, the issue of illegal dismissal
had also become res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable in the present case
RULING: NO. This is one of the cases
wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru
Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Razon vs.
Inciong 19 applies. The Court stated therein
that the principle of res judicata may not be
invoked in labor relations proceedings
considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are "non-litigious and summary
in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law." Said
pronouncement is in consonance with the
jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
The requirement of a clearance to terminate
employment was a creation of the Department
of Labor to carry out the Labor Code
provisions on security of tenure and
termination of employment. The proceeding
subsequent to the filing of an application for
clearance to terminate employment was
outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. The fact that said rule allowed a
procedure for the approval of the clearance
with or without the opposition of the
employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8),
demonstrates the non-litigious and summary
nature of the proceeding. The clearance
requirement was therefore necessary only as
an expeditious shield against arbitrary
dismissals without the knowledge and
35

supervision of the Department of Labor.
Hence, a duly approved clearance implied
that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec.
2).
But even while said clearance was a
requirement, employees who faced dismissal
still contested said applications not only
through oppositions thereto but by filing
separate complaints for illegal dismissal.
Usually, the investigation on the application
and the hearing on the complaint for illegal
dismissal were conducted simultaneously.
What makes the present case unusual is that
the employee filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal only after the Acting Secretary of
Labor had affirmed the approval of the
application to terminate his employment.
Nonetheless, we are unprepared to rule that
such action of the Acting Secretary of Labor
barred Collado from filing the complaint for
illegal dismissal. If ever, the most that can be
attributed against Collado is laches for his
failure to question seasonably the Acting
Secretary of Labor's affirmance of the
approval of the clearance to terminate.
However, to count such laches against
Collado would be prejudicial to his rights as a
laborer.
Be that as it may, the possibility that there
would be two conflicting decisions on the
issue of Collado's dismissal may now be
considered academic. The requirement of a
written clearance from the Department prior
to termination was abolished by the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in
1981. Dismissal proceedings are now
confined within the establishments. The
NLRC or the labor arbiter steps in only if the
said decision is contested by the employee.
27. EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS
BUNDALIAN
G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003
FACTS: An unverified letter-complaint was
addressed by private respondent LUIS
BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate
General accusing petitioner, then OIC-
Regional Director of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
3019. Private respondent charged among
others that petitioner and his wife purchased a
house and lot in Los Angeles, California and
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
that petitioners in-laws who were living in
California had a poor credit standing due to a
number of debts they could not have
purchased such an expensive property for
petitioner and his wife. Private respondent
also accused petitioner of amassing wealth
from lahar funds and other public works
projects.
The PCAGC conducted its own investigation
of the complaint. Petitioner fully participated
in the proceedings. After the investigation, the
PCAGC found that petitioner purchased a
house and lot in California, for
US$195,000.00 evidenced by a Grant Deed.
The body concluded that the petitioner could
not have been able to afford to buy the
property on his annual income of P168,648.00
as appearing on his Service Record. The
PCAGC concluded that as petitioners
acquisition of the subject property was
manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it
has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioners dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No.
3019.
The Office of the President, concurring with
the findings and adopting the
recommendation of the PCAGC, issued
Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering
petitioners dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all government benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied
due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC
RULING: NO. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity
to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. As long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.
In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts
to notify the complainant of the proceedings
but his Philippine residence could not be
located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot
argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and cross-
examine the complainant. Petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
PCAGC by participating in the proceedings
before it. He was duly represented by counsel.
He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted
36

documentary evidence, attended the hearings,
moved for a reconsideration of
Administrative Order No. issued by the
President and eventually filed his appeal
before the Court of Appeals. His active
participation in every step of the investigation
effectively removed any badge of procedural
deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the
due process requirement. He cannot now be
allowed to challenge the procedure adopted
by the PCAGC in the investigation.
It is well to remember that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense for it is enough that the party is given
the chance to be heard before the case against
him is decided. This was
afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
28. ROQUE C. FACURA AND EDUARDO
F. TUASON, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, RODOLFO S. DE JESUS
AND EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 184129]
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, PETITIONER,
VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
EDUARDO F. TUASON, LOCAL WATER
UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
(LWUA), REPRESENTED BY ITS NEW
ADMINISTRATOR ORLANDO C.
HONDRADE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 184263]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. EDELWINA DG.
PARUNGAO, AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 7TH
DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 166495, February 16 : 2011]
FACTS: Facura and Tuason filed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint before the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the
Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao
charging them with: 1) violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct,
falsification of official documents, being
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
notoriously undesirable, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments
of nine (9) coterminous employees of LWUA.
Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive
appointment papers were fabricated and
fraudulent as they were made to appear to
have been signed/approved on the dates
stated, and not on the date of their actual
issuance. They further alleged that with
malice and bad faith, De Jesus and Parungao
willfully and feloniously conspired not to
submit the fraudulent appointment papers to
the CSC, and to submit instead the valid set of
appointment papers bearing the December 12,
2001 issuance date.
They questioned the issuance of the
fraudulent appointments in favor of the nine
(9) confidential staff, to the prejudice of the
government in the amount of P692,657.31, as
these were used as basis for the payment of
their back salaries. They also alleged that De
Jesus' reinstatement was illegal and that he
had lost authority to sign any Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) documents
effective upon the issuance of LWUA Board
Resolution Nos. 061 and 069. Thus, the
actions undertaken by him in signing the
fraudulent appointments were all
misrepresented and, therefore, unlawful. They
further alleged that contrary to law, De Jesus
continued to receive his salary and benefits as
Deputy Administrator of LWUA despite
having already been dismissed. They cited the
string of criminal and administrative cases
against De Jesus before the trial courts and
the Ombudsman.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, De Jesus and
Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-
and-file employees who had no knowledge of
or participation in personnel matters; that
their actions in issuing the two sets of
appointments were all documented and
above-board; that as subordinate employees,
they had no discretion on the matter of the
retroactive appointments of the nine
confidential staff specifically requested by the
Board members; and that the re-issuance of
the second set of appointments effective
December 12, 2001 was duly approved by
Administrator Jamora. They denied any
financial damage on the part of LWUA since
the retroactive payment of salaries was
justified under the DBM letter approving the
37

hiring of personnel retroactive to the date of
actual services rendered by them.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
The complaint was originally referred to the
Ombudsman's Preliminary Investigation and
Administrative Adjudication Bureau - B, and
assigned to Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer I Vivian Magsino-
Gonzales (Pros. Magsino-Gonzales). After
evaluating the documents on file, Pros.
Magsino-Gonzales dispensed with the
preliminary conference and preliminary
investigation of the case. In her Decision
dated September 30, 2003, she recommended
the outright dismissal of the case,
ratiocinating that the Ombudsman did not
have the jurisdiction to resolve the issues of
fraudulent appointments of the nine
confidential staff and their alleged
overpayment to the damage of LWUA and the
government and to decide on the status of De
Jesus as a dismissed employee which, in her
view, belonged to the primary jurisdiction and
technical expertise of the CSC.
Said recommendation was disapproved by the
Ombudsman and the case was referred for
review to Special Prosecution Officer Roberto
Agagon (Special Pros. Agagon) of the
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau - A. Without conducting
a preliminary conference or investigation,
Special Pros. Agagon came up with the
assailed Review and Recommendation
finding De Jesus and Parungao guilty of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross neglect
of duty, and falsification.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal of the
Ombudsman's decision in administrative
cases carries with it the suspension of the
imposed penalty.
RULING: The issue of whether or not an
appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an
administrative case carries with it the
immediate suspension of the imposed penalty
has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of
the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where
this Court held that the decision of the
Ombudsman is immediately executory
pending appeal and may not be stayed by the
filing of an appeal or the issuance of an
injunctive writ, to wit:
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman,[34] as
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
amended by Administrative Order No. 17
dated September 15, 2003, provides:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. -
Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision
shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against such officer.
The Ombudsman's decision imposing the
penalty of suspension for one year
is immediately executory pending appeal.
[35] It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of
an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to
that provided under Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
In the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of the DPWH, we
held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no
vested right of the petitioner is violated as he
is considered preventively suspended while
his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event
38

he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office.
Following the ruling in the above cited case,
this Court, in Buencamino v. Court of
Appeals,[37] upheld the resolution of the CA
denying Buencamino's application for
preliminary injunction against the immediate
implementation of the suspension order
against him. The Court stated therein that the
CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's application for
injunctive relief because Section 7, Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003.
Respondent cannot successfully rely on
Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall
not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon
such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may
apply to cases in the Office of the
Ombudsman suppletorily only when the
procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman.[38] Here,
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended,
is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the
Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989[39] also
provide that the Office of the Ombudsman
has the power to "promulgate its rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions and
duties" and to amend or modify its rules as
the interest of justice may require. For the CA
to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on
the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA
6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in
Section 12,[40] Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is appealed to the CA.
The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executory is a special rule that
prevails over the provisions of the Rules of
Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two
rules apply to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other.
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as amended by Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in
providing that an appeal shall not stop an
Ombudsman decision from being executory.
This rule applies to the appealable decisions
of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure
or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
more than one month's salary. Hence, the
dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the
government service is immediately executory
pending appeal.
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in
providing that in case the penalty is removal
and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall
be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did
not receive by reason of the removal. As
explained above, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or an absolute
right to hold office, except constitutional
offices with special provisions on salary and
tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right
of De Jesus and Parungao would be violated
as they would be considered under preventive
suspension, and entitled to the salary and
emoluments they did not receive in the event
39

that they would win their appeal.
The ratiocination above also clarifies the
application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
in relation to Section 7 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has
no discretion to stay a decision of the
Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is
governed specifically by the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this
administrative case, is thus an encroachment
on the rule-making powers of the
Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI
of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of
R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the
Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. The issuance of an
injunctive writ renders nugatory the
provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The CA, however, cannot be blamed for so
ruling because at that time the Court's rulings
were not definite and, thus, nebulous. There
were no clear-cut guidelines yet. Even the
initial ruling in Samaniego on September 11,
2008, stated in effect that the mere filing by a
respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the
execution of the joint decision against him.
The Samaniego initial ruling merely followed
that in the case of Office of the Ombudsman
v. Laja, where it was stated:
Only orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary shall be final and unappealable
hence, immediately executory.In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed
is other than public censure, reprimand, or
suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
law gives the respondent the right to appeal.
In these cases, the order, directive or decision
becomes final and executory only after the
lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal
from the said order, directive or decision. It is
only then that execution shall perforce issue
as a matter of right.The fact that the
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to
appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory. .
Having ruled that the decisions of the
Ombudsman are immediately executory
pending appeal, The Court finds it unncessary
to determine whether or not Facura and
Tuason were heard before the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
29. EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs.OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave
Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion
and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against
Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.)
Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private
complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC)
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales
III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged
against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city
Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not
been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant
the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the
PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal
without prejudice of the administrative case against
the same police officers, for failure of the complainant
to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite
due notice. However, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty
of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman
Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it
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remained pending for final review and action when
P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the
police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which
ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of
public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is
gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort
to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from
service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons
Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark
Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent
petition for bail holding that strong prosecution
evidence militated against the grant of bail. However,
the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the
accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA
compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow
Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing
but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the
prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his
culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of
these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,
recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing
of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
Assistants before the appropriate government office
for having committed acts and/or omissions
tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds
for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
Hence the petition.
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created
Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a DeputyOmbudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the
Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively
is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment
such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly
subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand,
grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently
conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the
Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in
enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21
- in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing
the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure
of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one
another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to
removea Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial
Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe
law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is
also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which
is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same
Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress
simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of
any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes.
In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all
other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
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The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy
Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied from
his Power toAppoint. In giving the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express
terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog
looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the
general morale and professionalism in the military is
certainly of primordial importance in relation to the
President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for
the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy
Ombudsmandoes not Diminish the Independence of
the Office of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous.
The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it
from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the Office
of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that
"the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and
discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office
where thequestioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of
public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to
endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman
without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the
case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the
request of concerned agencies or private parties is
part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the
Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the
people."
The factual circumstances that the case was turned
over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon
petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without
the private complainant verifying the truth of his
statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration
thereof remained pending for more than nine months
cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's
undue interest in the case considering the lack of
evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the case
Administrative Law
Case Digest Compilation 4
that could have impelled him to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery
that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of
administrative accountability against petitioner and
the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty
of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the
findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do
not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority,
cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing
of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal
of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory
authority to proceedadministratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any of the
grounds forher removal from office as providedfor
under the Constitution and theOmbudsman Act.
__________________________________________
30. EFREN L. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192591 June 29, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner Efren L. Alvarez, at the time of the
subject transaction, was the Mayor of the Municipality
(now Science City) of Muoz, Nueva Ecija. In July 1995,
the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Muoz under
Resolution No. 136, S-95 invited Mr. Jess Garcia,
President of the Australian-Professional, Inc. (API) in
connection with the municipal governments plan to
construct a four-storey shopping mall ("Wag-wag
Shopping Mall"), a project included in its Multi-
Development Plan. Subsequently, it approved the
adoption of the project under the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) arrangement in the amount of P240
million, to be constructed on a 4,000-square-meter
property of the municipal government which is located
at the back of the Municipal Hall. API submitted its
proposal on November 7, 1995.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for giving the
Australian-Professional Incorporated (API)
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, by
awarding to the latter the contract for the construction
of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall in the amount of Two
Hundred Forty Million Pesos (Php 240,000,000.00)
under a Build - Operate - Transfer Agreement,
notwithstanding the fact that API was and is not a
duly-licensed construction company as per records of
the Philippine Construction Accreditation Board
(PCAB), which construction license is a pre-requisite
for API to engage in construction of works for the said
municipal government and that API does not have the
experience and financial qualifications to undertake
such costly project among others, to the damage and
prejudice of the public service.The Sandiganbayan
thereafter rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner.
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Case Digest Compilation 4

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan

failed to observe the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in convicting the Accused-Petitioner;

RULING: No. Petitioner was charged with violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be convicted under
the said provision, the following elements must be
established:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.

In this case, the information alleged that while being a

public official and in the discharge of his official
functions and taking advantage of such position,
petitioner "acting with evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality"
unlawfully gave API "unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference" by awarding to it the contract for the
construction of the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall under the
BOT scheme despite the fact that it was not a licensed
contractor and "does not have the experience and
financial qualifications to undertake such costly
project, among others, to the damage and prejudice of
the public service.

43