Fordham University

Chapter Title: TRANSITION: RILKE

Book Title: Heidegger

Book Subtitle: Through Phenomenology to Thought
Book Author(s): WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON
Published by: Fordham University. (2003)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1g2kmxp.24

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 CHAPTER VIII

TRANSITION: RILKE

We have seen in its essentials how Heidegger considers the

history of metaphysics to be a de-volution of authentic thought
as discernible in the Ae-ytLv-vot'Lv of Parmenides and Heraclitus.
Weare prepared to appreciate the sense of Heidegger's effort to
re-trieve the original sense of these terms under the guise of
foundational thought. By way of transition, let us see briefly
how the author interprets the lyric poet R. M. Rilke. For Hei-
degger, Rilke is the poet par excellence of metaphysics in its
consummation as we saw it in Nietzsche, having experienced
and expressed in words the Being of beings as universal Will,
whose nature is simply to be itself as Will. : ... The [universal]
Will comes to presence as a Will unto Willing." 1 Yet there is
something genuine in his experience of how it was to be over-
come, and this entitles him to be called a "poet for needy
times." 2 We polarize our resume around these two points.

A. RILKE AND NIHILISM

I. Being as Will
Will-unto-Power can be discerned in all the metaphors which
Rilke uses in order to describe the Being of beings. Consider the
1 " . . . Der Wille west als der Wille zum Willen." (HW, p. 258). As with Nietzsche,
we must make an effort to realize that "Will" here is not a psychological pheno-
menon but a manner in which to speak of Being.
1 The phrase "needy times" refers to HlSlderlin's "Brod und Wein": " ... and
whereunto the poet in needy times?" The sense: the times are needy because of the
nihilism which Nietzsche observed; what, then, is the function of a poet as such in
overcoming this nihilism? Heidegger cites the HlSlderlin text and uses it to give a
title to his essay (" ... und wozu Dichter in dilrftiger Zeit?," cited HW, p. 248).

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392 FROM BEING TO THERE-THE DE-VOLUTION OF THOUGHT

most important ones. Being is conceived as "Nature." After the

fashion of Leibniz' Natura, Nature for Rilke is the universal
force that permeates all beings, "lets them loose" from one point
of view, "gathers them into themselves" from another. The
result is that beings are, not simply because they are willed but
because they are-willing, sc. are as willing, by reason of the Will
that makes them be. In the same sense, note Being as "Life,"
"Venture," "Ground," "Center." 3
This last metaphor has a double sense. Being is to be under-
stood as a sort of gravitational force drawing all beings unto
their true selves, giving them "weight" as beings. By the same
token, however, it draws them unto itself, therefore unto one
another, gathering them thus unto a single unit. This drawing
power of Being is a "Traction" (Zug, Bezug), which works its
influence in beings, each in its own way, by "at-traction" (An-
ziehung).4 All of these terms say the same thing: they designate
the ensemble of beings as such, sc. in their Being, interpreted as
universal Will.
Rilke's most significant term for Being, however, is "the
Open." Being is the Open insofar as it admits of no enclosures
within itself. It is the universal drawing power of pure Traction
that encompasses all beings, drawing them into a Whole that
dissolves all barriers between them. Obviously Being as the
Open is another form of Being as universal Will. We must be
careful, however, not to let a similarity in terminology lead us
to think that we are dealing with the same conception of the
Open that we have met in Heidegger. Far from it. Heidegger's
Open is that which renders beings open, hence accessible one to
another, able to encounter each other. But en-counter implies
opposition, therefore enclosures that separate the two beings
that meet. These, however, are just the sort of barriers between
beings that Rilke's Open excludes. Where there is a genuine
meeting of beings or opposition between them, this takes place
outside the Open as such. 5

a HW, pp. 256-257 (Loslassen, Versammlung), 257-258 (Leben, Wagnis, Grund),

259-26o (Mitte).
4 HW, pp. 26o-26r (Zug, Bezug), 26x (Anziehung).
a HW, p. 262 ("das Offene").

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 TRANSITION: RILKE 393
2. Man
This being the case, we see immediately that we must dis-
tinguish beings according to the relation they bear to each other
and to the Open. Beings other than man are found "in" the Open,
propelled by blind drive into the pure Traction of the Whole.s
Man, however, because he is endowed with the power to en-
counter beings, sc. to enter into comportment with them as
opposed to him, is to this extent outside the Open as Rilke con-
ceives it.
What is it that distinguishes man from other beings? It is this
power to deal with that which stands op-posed to him, sc. that
peculiar psychic structure that we call consciousness, by which
man pro-poses to himself the objects with which he deals. What
distinguishes man from other beings is that he enjoys a higher
level of consciousness (another Leibnizian thesis), founded more
ultimately still on the Cartesian principle that what properly
characterizes the ego-cogito is the power to pro-pose objects. 7
This power of consciousness is that special property of man
which characterizes his at-traction as a being. Consciousness is
what most profoundly characterizes man in the depths of his
Being. It is the specifically human "activity," if we may use
this ambiguous term simply in its broadest sense to suggest
man's Being in action. If Being is a Willing, then human
consciousness, too, is a willing, the manner in which man is
(willing) as a being. That is why the pro-posing power of human
consciousness and all the comportment that it implies is a
willing.s
Because of the privileged nature of the Willing that consti-
tutes him as a being, man is not absorbed into the universal
Traction the way other beings are, but is endowed with an inde-
pendence (liberty) by which he can go along spontaneously of
his own accord with Being, pro-posing beings for and to himself.
The power to pro-pose we have seen before. Here the theme re-

HW, p. 263.
6
HW, pp. 265, zBz.
7
8 HW, p. 266. The scholastics distinguish voluntas vt natura and voluntas vt fa-
cultas. To the extent that the language is acceptable, one might say that the present
conception corresponds to voluntas ut natura. The observation, however, has only
illustrative value.

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394 FROM BEING TO THERE-THE DE-VOLUTION OF THOUGHT

turns with an insistence not only upon the pro-posing of indi-

vidual objects but of the whole ensemble of beings, sc. of Nature,
the Open as the World. Because man pro-poses the Open to
himself, he is excluded from it, takes his de-parture (Abschied)
from it, rather stands before it, lets it stand before him as an
object related to him as subject. 9
All that is new here is another word to describe the pro-posing,
sc. "com-posing," or, as we prefer to translate in the present
context, "contra-posing," which is intended to suggest a whole
manifold of nuances, the common denominator of which is that
man not only pro-poses objects but controls (or tries to control)
these objects, so as to suit his own disposition.lO The essential
is that man becomes the center of reference for beings to such an
extent that in objectivizing beings, sc. pro-posing them as objects
and entering into comportment with them accordingly, he im-
poses himself upon them by referring them to his own purposes.
Here we find the command character of Will in the comportment
of man's consciousness:
... In a willing of this sort, modem man presents himself as the one who
in all his relations to everything that is, hence even to himself, rises up
.as the self-imposing com-poser of them all and establishes this ascendancy
.as an unconditioned domination over [all beings] .... 11

The result is that, if beings still have a presence, it is only the

presence of (re)present-ation in and for a consciousness that is
by nature calculating. This pro-posing present-ation does not
have any intuitive contact with beings-to-be-known. The visage
of beings themselves is no longer viewed immediately but is
sacrificed to the projects of pro-posing, present-ing consciousness.
Hence beings owe their present-ness to the activity of man's
pro-posing power and " ... the sphere of the objective-ness of

' HW, pp. 265, 266 (mit), 27I (Ab-schied), 262 (vor die Welt), 265-266 (in den
Stand gebracht).
1 We are trying to render Herstellen, which in itself would be translated better
as "pro-duce," but which we render as "com-pose" ("contra-pose") for reasons that
appear as we proceed.
11 " .. Der neuzeitliche Mensch stel!t sicb in solcbem Wollen als den beraus, der
in allen Beziehungen zu allem, was ist, und damit auch zu ibm selbst, als der sich
durchsetzende Hersteller aufsteht und diesen Aufstand zur unbedingten Herrschaft
einrichtet .... " (HW, p. 266). See pp. 265-266 (vorsatzlichen Sichdurchsetzens der
Vergegenstandlichung. Befehl).

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 TRANSITION: RILKE 395
objects remains inside of consciousness .... "12 Hand in hand
with all this goes the supremacy of man's reason (the power of
calculation par excellence) and, of course, the domination of
logic over man's interpretation of beings.
The consequence of all this is clear: technicity. As we know
.already, the word does not designate simply technology, sc. the
mechanical techniques of contemporary civilization that scien-
tific progress has made possible. Rather it is the fundamental
attitude in man by which all beings, even man himself, become
raw material for his pro-posing, contra-posing, (self)im-posing
comportment with beings. Technology is simply the instru-
mentation of this attitude, the organization of man's de-parture
from the Open.13

B. RILKE's ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME NIHILISM

I. Theory
Now Rilke is aware of this situation, which corresponds to
what Nietzsche called nihilism. He knows that something must
change. What then does he propose? On the one hand, man must
<>vercome the consequence of the subject-object polarity and
the de-parture it implies (in a word: technicity); on the other
hand, he cannot abandon his own nature as a conscious (there-
fore pro-posing) being. Is reconciliation possible? Yes, replies
Heidegger for Rilke, provided that man find in himself a deeper
level of consciousness: the interior world of the heart. There and
-only there can he accomplish his return into that totality which
is the Open. What does this mean?
As long as man remains exclusively on the level of the subject-
<>bject opposition, his de-parture from the Open is irreversible.
Even if he tries to set up some sort of barrier to protect himself
from technicity, the barrier itself would be separative, would
widen the distance between man and the Open. But if man were
to recognize his de-parture as a de-parture, would not the recog-
nition itself, without removing the dichotomy, be nevertheless
12 " . Die Sphare der Gegenstiindlichkeit der Gegenstande bleibt innerbalb des
Bewulltseins .... " (HW, p. 281). See pp. 282, 287 (Logik).
13 HW, pp. 267 (Sichdurchsetzens), 268 (Instrument der Einrichtung), 271 (Orga
(lisation des Abschieds).

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396 FROM BEING TO THERE-THE DE-VOLUTION OF THOUGHT

a type of return? In this case, man would see the danger of tech-
nicity as threatening his own fundamental belonging-ness to the
Open which, after all, constitutes him in his Being. " ... Once
we have seen the danger [of technicity] as a threat to our own
essence, inevitably we have accomplished the reversal of the de-
parture from the Open. . .. " 14
This supposes, however, some contact with the Open that
permits man to see that this subject-object opposition is only
one form of his dealings with it. He must experience the many-
sidedness of Being. For Being is a sphere, like the moon, only
one side of which can be "seen" by calculating present-ation.
For present-ational thought, only what it can (re)present can be
considered positive. But the other side of the sphere is equally
positive. If the sphere of Being were taken as life, for example,
then death would be a side of it that is turned away from man,
whose calculating reason would consider it as something purely
negative. To experience the totality of the Open in this case
would be to experience death as a positive side of Being.l5 The
essential is that these positive sides of Being, that are, however,
"turned away" from man, are inaccessible to present-ational
thought.
But they are not altogether inaccessible. The level of objec-
tivizing present-ation is only one level of man's conscious life,
and, indeed, a superficial one. There is another level, more pro-
found: the interior world of the heart. Did not Pascal, almost
contemporaneously with Descartes, proclaim the "logic of the
heart"? Here in this invisible center, man discovers how and
what to love. This inner world of the heart remains immanent,
to be sure, but within it the barriers of calculating present-ation
dissolve, and beings are free to flow together in union with the
common Traction of the Open. Such is the reversal of man's
de-parture from the Open that Rilke suggests as antidote to
technicity: " ... the reversal of consciousness is a re-collection
of the immanence of objects of present-ation into a presence
within the realm of the heart." HI
14 " Mit dem Gesehenhaben der Gefahr als der Wesensgefahr miissen wir die
Umkehrung der Abkehr gegen das Offene vollzogen haben .... " (HW, p. 277).
11 HW, pp. 279-280 (Tod).
18 " Die Umkehrung weist in das Innere des lnnen. Die Umkehrung des Be-
wuBtseins ist deshalb eine Er-innerung der Immanenz der Gegenstande des Vor-
stellens in die Prasenz innerhalb des Herzraumes." (HW, p. 284). See pp. 282-283,
2ss.

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 TRANSITION: RILKE 397
2. Practice
Even if we grant all this, the essential question remains: how
does Rilke intend to effect the re-collection (Er-innerung) ? The
poet himself does not say, but Heidegger replies in his name: by
poetry. Such is the function of the poet in time of need. The
argument: Rilke speaks of the re-collection being achieved by
the more "venture-some" among men. Recalling that "Venture"
is one name for Being as Will, Heidegger suggests that he is
"more" venture-some who is endowed in an extraordinary way
with access to Being, sc. he who has access to "more" than
Being, if this be considered from the point of view of beings. Now
how does man fundamentally have access to Being? Here Hei-
degger speaks for himself: by language. We have seen in EM
how such a thesis becomes plausible as soon as we re-trieve the
aut'hentic meaning of :Aoyo~. For the present, let us (provision-
ally) accept the thesis without further comment, for the sake of
the present analysis. If language is the privileged means of
access to Being, then how can anyone be called "more" venture-
some except in terms of language? Every man, of course, has
the power of language, but the more venture-some (Being-full,
if one may say so) among men will be those endowed with a
special gift for language. These are the poets.l7
Rilke, the poet, attempts to accomplish the reversal of man's
de-parture from the Open by means of language. Each level of
man's conscious life has a language proper to itself. On the level
of present-ative objectivation and calculating reason, language
is merely the expression of a judgement to be used as an instru-
ment of human intercourse. In the realm of the heart, language
yields (without reflecting upon itself and making itself an object)
to what is to-be-said, simply because it must be said. It is this
latter type that Rilke ambitions- the language of the heart. He
will have nothing to do with the language of pro-posing, contra-
posing, (self)im-posing tho~ght. He will bring the pure Traction
of the Open in its undiminished totality into words, and this
means to belong himself completely to the domain of beings.
Yet there is no "forcing" into words. On the contrary, the poet
must receive what is to be said, must accept it as coming from a
n HW, pp. 274, 287 (wollender, wagender), 291 (Sagenderen).

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398 FROM BEING TO THERE-THE DE-VOL UTI ON OF THOUGHT

Source and, having accepted it, must let it unfold unto its
fullness. The true poet does not com-pose, he fulfills.lS

C. HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF RILKE

I. Debit
What is Heidegger's own judgement of Rilke? As with the
Hegel analysis, there is no explicit critique as such and we must
disengage it from occasional remarks that slip into a more gener-
al expose. We can crystallize it in terms of what we have seen
about the de-volution of Western thought under the guise of
subject-ism in general and of logic in particular.

a. SUBJECT-ISM - Despite his efforts to overcome tech-

nicity, Rilke remains locked in the subject-ism of which tech-
nicity is but a consequence. To be sure, he tries to overcome the
present-ative objectivation of the subject-object polarity. But
how? By a subject-ism still more profound. The inner world of
the heart is simply a deeper level within the conscious subject,
but it remains within it. If Rilke comes to speak of the Being of
beings as "worldly present-ness," or even as "existence" (Dasein),
this presence remains referred to the present-ness proper to
consciousness ([re]present-ation), even if consciousness be under-
stood as the inner world of the heart which has complete access
to the Open. That is why it does not occur to Rilke to interro-
gate further the nature of this inner realm:
... Rilke does not meditate any more closely the spatiality of this inner
world, nor does he, moreover, ask whether or not this inner world, since
after all it gives sojourn to worldly presence, is itself, together with this
presence, grounded in a temporality whose essential time, in conjunction
with essential space, forms the original unity of that time-space domain in
terms of which Being itself comes-to-presence.l9
11 HW, pp. 291 (sich in die Sage einlaBt), 294 (In andere Weise als ... Sicbdurch-
setzen), 292 (in den Bezirk des Seienden selbst), 275 (empfangt).
u A bit of a day's work for a poet. " ... Auch Rilke bedenkt weder die Raum-
lichkeit des Weltinnenraumes naher, nocb fragt er gar, ob nicbt der Weltinnenraum,
da er docb der weltischen Prasenz Aufenthalt gibt, mit dieser Prasenz in einer Zeit-
lichkeit griindet, deren wesenhafte Zeit mit dem wesenhaften Raum die urspriing
Iiebe Einheit desjenigen Zeit-Raumes bildet, als welcher gar das Sein selbst west."
(HW, p. z83). See HW, pp. 283, 288 (innerhalb der Spbare der Subjektitat), 281-282
(Jmmanenz), 286-287 (Sphiire der Priisenz). For an illuminating comparison of the
Heidegger-Rilke conceptions of the Sphere of Beine, see HW, pp. 277-278.

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 TRANSITION: RILKE
399
b. LoGIC - All this becomes clearer when we consider the
matter from the viewpoint of logic. Rilke could inveigh as well
as Heidegger against the excesses of logical thought, if this
thought be considered as a function of an objectivizing, calcu-
lating reason. He, too, could say that logic has not only developed
a set of rules for manifestive predication but that it has become
itself " ... the organization of the domination of purposeful
(self-)imposition over what is objective .... "2o Yet what does
he offer in its stead? Pascal's "logic of the heart"! But is it not
still a logic? If the poet reverses man's de-parture from the Open
by a language of a deeper sort than that of mere expression, with
which the logic of predication has to do, the language of reversal
none the less remains something that man of his nature "has,"
hence a possession, an implement of his comportment. It remains
an llpyvov, then, and still requires organization by a logic. Logic
remains inevitable as long as language is conceived as possessed
by man rather than possessing him, sc. as long as we remain
within the compass of metaphysics that forgets to think Being
as distinct from beings. " ... Only inside of metaphysics is tbere
logic." 21

2. C1edit
The ledger has its credit side, however. It must be said fot
Rilke that he recognizes the menace of technicity, sees it for
what it is, sees it in all its unwholesomeness. But to recognize
the unwholesome as unwholesome, is this not already an orien-
tation toward what is wholesome, whole, the Holy? 22 Thh: i.s
itself a major service.
More than that, however, Rilke discerns that salvation from
the un-holy, thus understood, is somehow or other to be found
in a return to the authentic use of language. True enough, his
reflection upon language is an interrogative one that puts to
question the sense of the poetic vocation. But interrogative
thought, if the question is genuine, is already under way towards
ao " ... die Organisation der Herrschaft des vorsatzlichen Sichdurchsetzens im.
Gegenstiindigen .... " (HW, p. 287).
1 1 " Nur innerhalb der Metaphysik gibt es die Logik." (HW, p. 287).
sa HW, p. 294 (das Heilige). See pp. 253, 291. As we shall see in the Holderlina
interpretations, Heidegger considers the Holy as another term for Being.

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 TRANSITION: RILKE

an answer. That Rilke is at least under way toward a compre-

hension of the Holy entitles him to be called a "poet for needy
times." 23

RESUME

Distilled into its simplest form, Heidegger's thesis is this: the

nihilism (nothing-ness) to which Nietzsche (and Rilke) testify
is but the last consequence of metaphysics itself, for which Being
itself means ... nothing. To overcome nihilism, we must over-
come metaphysics (and with it both logic and humanism) by
thinking Being as the process of ck->.~.&e:Lot out of which the onto-
logical difference arises. The process is somehow correlated with
language. To think Being thus is to ground metaphysics by
foundational thought.

HW, pp. 295, 251 (Dichterberuf), 294 (unterwegs).

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