IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.

141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Gonzales vs narvasa

GR No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed

a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing
the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in
order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner
disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any
injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has
sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger
of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as
a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily
apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as
amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3
million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the
funds of the Office of the President. Being that case, petitioner must show
that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere
in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.