Defenses | Contibutory Negigance— i a parson was inured in part due to hs own negigance his negligence “contibuted” 10 the accident), the njured party would not be entitled to calect any damages from another paty who supposedly caused the accident PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. ETHEL BRUNTY GR. 169891 | Nov. 2, 2006 FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of Respondent Ethel Brunty and a U.S. citizen, came to the PH for a visit. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Fiipino host Juan Garcia (Garcia), traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz Sedan, driven by Rodolfo Mercelita (Merceitt). By 2am of Jan. 25, 1980, Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelta were already approaching the railroad crossing at Bray. Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Merceita, riving at approximately 70 km/hr, overtook a vehicle, unaware of the railfoad track just 50 yards ahead and that they were about to colide with PNR Train No. T-71, which was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila. When the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train, Mercelita was instant killed: the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. However, Rhonda Brunty was pronounced dead after 10 mins. from arriving at the nearest hospital. Garcia, who had sutfered severe head injuries, was transferred to the Manila Doctor's Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. ‘Amontt later, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter to the PNR demanding payment of damages, as a result of her daughter's death When PNR did notrespond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila alleging that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries sates by Garcia, were the direct and proximate resut of the grass. and reckless Moncada, Tarlac They ported out tat thee was Lore lone o wan moti about to cross the ralroad track, and that the flaaman or switchman m with a he hligh Brunty & Garcia likewise averred that PNR falled to supervise its employees in th mance of their sespeative tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and anerator of the tran. In its Answer, PNR claimed that it exercised the dligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but also in the supervision of its employees, stressing that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in ‘question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. I insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear waming signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mernsita's nagligance and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, The driver disregarded the warming histle blasts of the oncomi r ‘counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded actual and compensatory damages, and Itigation expenses. ‘After trial on the merits, the RTC decided in favor of Plaintifs Brunty and Garcia, directing PNR to pay the former damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC with partial modifications, affirming the RTC’ findings a8 to the negligence of PNR, while ruling that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in transportation. However, the CA did not agree with the RTC’s findings on the contributory negligence of Merceita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Meroelta could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guity of contributory negligence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WN - (1) PNR’s negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision; - YES. (2) The Mercedes Benz driver Mercelita was quity of contributory negligence; and— YES. (8) The doctrine of last clear change applies in Mercelita's case. ~ NO. HELD: (1) YES, PNB was foun ‘ale of motors n crossing the ratoad tack As such, ts lable for damages fo quasi, voting the provisions of Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code. Applying the requisites for a quasi-delict, it was clearly established that (1) Brunty and Garcia sustained damage or injury as a result of the colision; (2) there was negligence on the part of PNR; and (3) the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossingDefenses | Contibutory Negigance— i a parson was inured in part due to hs own negigance his negligence “contibuted” 10 the accident), the njured party would not be entitled to calect any damages from another paty who supposedly caused the accident is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. An examination of the photographs of the raiiroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1) absence of fagbars or safety railroad bars; (2) inadequacy of the installed waming signals; and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the ste as claimed by PNR it would stil be impossible to know or see that there is @ rairoad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one's view would be blocked by a cockpit arena, Moreover, a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2am. Thus, itis imperative on the Part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area. It may broadly be stated that raliroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at rairoad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a raiway shall make and construct at all points where such ralway crosses any public road, good, sulcent, hicles of every kind. a sign with large and distinc aced thereon, nol roximity of he ralway_and wam parsons af the necessly af looking out friars. Ths Court has previously determined the liablity of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, lagman or switchman, or ‘semaphores. Such aus evidence of negligence and clstegad ofthe safety of the nublo-even i het s 1o law or ordinance view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the ch a8 wel as its conclision on pettioner's negligence, (2) YES. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection Toholda personas having conto to his jis, itmust be shown thet the periounedan act fay To prove contributory nealoence, ‘tisstl nocesay ioestablsh acausal ink alhaugh not oroximate Wy. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory conf when ft contributes prowimalaly tothe rr, end nt snp a condion forts occurence, ‘The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; one's view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it \was also established that Mercelita was then diving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the raiioad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate PNRss liabiity. Pursuant to Art. 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence ‘could have is to mitigate liability, which, however, is not applicable in this case, since the record is bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelta (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty, and no damages were awarded for the injuries suttered by Garcia. Hence, the finding of contributory negligence on the part of Merceita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of lability, does not apply. (3) NO. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, orwhere it s impossible to determine whose fault ornegligence ‘caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintif does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Th he neal of PNR. we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant