CASE NO.

33: LAGMAN vs EXECCUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 (PN 216), effective May 23, 2017 for a period not exceeding 60 days,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. A
written report on the factual basis od PN 216 was submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017,
The report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only
escalated and worsened with the passing of time. On May 23, 2017,a government operation to capture the high-
0ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. However, the government was
confronted by the ASG and Mautes intensified efforts at sowing violence aimed at both the government and the
civilians and their properties. These groups were able to take control of major social, economic, and political
foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the
groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
From the reports received by the President, he concluded that such activities constitute not simply a display of force,
but a clear attempt to establish the groups seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH
wilayat. No doubt, the lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the president of his power, authority, and
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao.
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute, and other criminals brought about undue constraints
and difficulties to the military and government personnel in the performance of their duties and function, and untold
hardships to the civilians. The report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole.
The petitions (Lagman, Cullamat, and Mohamad petitions) were anchored on Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Philippine
Constitution on the constitutionality of PN 2016 for lack of sufficient factual basis. The Mohamad Petition, in
particular, invoking the Courts power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, insists that the Court may look into the wisdom of the
presidents actions and not just the presence of arbitrariness. The Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its
power to review, compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao and declare PN 216 as unconstitutional.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of
such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through
which the appropriate proceeding mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the appropriate
proceeding referred to in Section 18, Art. VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of certiorari
petition, either under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.

Section 18, Article VII. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Section 1, Article VIII. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Section 5, Article VIII. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

The OSG further maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court.
OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of PN 216 should be reviewed by the Court under the lens of
grave abuse of discretion and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts. Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be
the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase in an appropriate proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
refers to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.

Ruling: NO.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
The phrase in an appropriate proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII. It could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution that the phrase in an appropriate proceeding would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Sec. 1 or 5 of Art. VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her
functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension. It must be emphasized that under Sec. 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the Presidents exercise of emergency power. Put differently, if this court applies the standard of review
used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Sec. 18, Art. VII.
As to the purpose or significance of sec. 18, Art. VII allowing judicial review of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution reverted to the Lansang
doctrine, which viewed the same not being a political question and within ambit of judicial review. The 3 rd par. of Sec.
18, Art. Vii should be treated as sui generis as it follows a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it, it limits
the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive his emergency powers. And the
usual period for filing pleadings in petition for certiorari is likewise not applicable under the 3 rd paragraph of
section18, Art. VII.
In fine, phrase in an appropriate proceeding appearing on the 3rd par. of Sec. 18, Art. VII refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
executives emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, petition, or a matter to be
resolved by Court.
To conclude that the phrase in an appropriate proceeding refers to a petition for certiorari filed under the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place
additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the 3 rd paragraph of Sec. 18, Art. VII would be
subsumed under Section 1, Art. VII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the 3 rd
paragraph of Sec. 18, Art. VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.