1. ADM. CASE NO. No.
5195 Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true owner of the
NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY
HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. EUGENIA J. MUOZ,
Complainant, - versus - ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG,
Respondent.
April 16, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2001,[1] the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Milagros San
Juan found respondent guilty of the charges and recommended the
penalty of disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors
reduced the penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV-
2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9 December
2002, the Court, however, remanded the case to the IBP in view of its
findings that no formal hearing/investigation was conducted.
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were accordingly held
thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muoz, complainant
alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a resident of the United
States of America together with her husband, Mario Blanco. She also
stated that she owned two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City,
each with an area of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her
name. In a document dated 20 November 1989, she authorized
respondent, who were her husbands first cousin, to sell said lots. [3]
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had
sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00 and therefrom he
deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And, allegedly, per
complainants instructions, he remitted the remaining balance
of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes.[4]
In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot
remained unsold due to the presence of squatters on the property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2)
lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to the spouses Celso and
Consolacion Martinez for the price of P1,120,000.00, and that new
titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted
respondent with these facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the
same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muoz sent a
demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to
her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and
his receipt of its proceeds, but he never tendered or offered to tender
the same to complainant. Despite repeated and continued demands,
respondent has since not remitted the amount equivalent
to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land
and P560,000.00 for the second).[5]
Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney
dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used to sell the lots is
a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not
the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. In addition, they
could not have acknowledged the document before a notary, as they
were not in the Philippines at the time.[6]
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of
deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct. [7]
properties, which had to be titled in complainants name, as Mario
Blanco was a U.S. citizen. Mario Blanco had requested him to look for
a buyer of the properties and, in the course of selling them,
JR., respondent claimed that he had only transacted with the former and
never with complainant. Respondent averred that he had been
authorized in November 1989 to sell the property, through a Special
Power of Attorney, for a price of not less than P250,000.00 net for the
owner.[8]
Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the two (2)
lots had been executed on 19 March 1990 but, only one lot was
initially paid in the amount of P281,980.00, which he immediately
remitted to Mario Blanco. The payment for the other lot was
withheld, pending the relocation of the squatters who had been
occupying the premises. And when respondent had finally collected
the proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years after, he
asked Mario Blanco if the former could use the amount for a real
estate venture whose profit, if successful, he would share with the
latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think twice and consented to
the proposal. The venture, however, did not push through. [9]
Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots had been sold
for only P563,960.00.[10]
Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that
complainant and her spouse, Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the
Special Power of Attorney, but it was only notarized later. [11]
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December 2006, Atty.
Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the following findings:
It appears from the records that the two lots were
sold by Respondent for P560,000.00,
not P1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The
basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11,
1990 which shows that the two lots composing 800
sq. meters being sold for P560,000.00. There appears
to be no documentary basis for the claimed amount
of P1,120,000.00 of Complainant. However,
Respondent in his Comment stated that the two
lots were sold by him for P563,960.00. In any case, we
shall uphold and apply the amount stated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale.
In Respondents letter dated March 20, 1990, he
acknowledged that he already received P320,000.00
as the total value of one lot. Moreover, the
computation shows that the P320,000.00 was only for
400 sq.m. as the computation stated: 400 sq.m.
x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00. Therefore, if the first lot
was sold for P320,000.00, then the second lot must
have been sold for P240,000 x x x
x x x there was clear deception on the part of
Respondent when he wrote the letter dated March
20, 1990 informing the Blanco spouses that he had
sold only one of the two parcels of land
for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact that
on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before he wrote the
letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by him
selling the two lots for P560,000.00. This Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990.
During the hearing, Respondent admitted that the
Deed of Sale covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent
was not forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses.
xxx
x x x Instead of representing that two lots had been
sold for P560,000.00. Respondent only represented
that he sold only one lot for P320,000.00
and pocketing the balance of P240,000.00.
1

xxx
During the course of hearing, Respondent claims that
the Deed of Sale referred to above is a fake, and that
there is a Deed of Sale showing a selling price
of P320,000.00 which is the real Deed of Sale.
However, no such Deed of Sale has been presented by
Respondent and no such Deed of Sale appears in the
records. Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted
his statement claiming he was merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a Special Power of
Attorney dated January 16, 1989, wherein the
signatures of the Blanco spouses appear in the SPA
when they were not in the Philippines on January 16,
1989 but were allegedly in the United States,
their absence in the country has not been
satisfactorily established since mere xerox copies of
their passports, although noted by a notary public,
cannot duly establish their absence in the country on
that date. Other acceptable documents such as a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration would
have been appropriate but which, however, had not
been presented. In any case, Respondent denies the
charge of falsification.[12] (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the
fact that respondent was already 72 years old, he be meted out the
penalty of suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not disbarment as
had been prayed for and not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier
resolved by the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to
Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of
6% per annum computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVII-2007-222 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.[13]
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a
reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, following the
dictum that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[14]
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of
the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity
of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the
confidence reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced
by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however,
taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from
the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed
them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can
be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the parties that
the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to complainant and
her spouse. Respondents contention, though, that he had been
authorized to retain the proceeds of the second is specious, as
complainant and her spouse could not have given the same, having
been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated
demands, to date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount
2
has been paid. Thus, respondents deceitful conduct warrants
disciplinary sanction and a directive for the remittance of the
remaining proceeds is in order.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with the IBP that the
same appears to be unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule that, in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent
committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if
the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he
bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense. [15] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.[16]
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to so do.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds,
however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case,
the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2)
years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced
age. The Court believes that a suspension of six (6) months is
sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Further, respondent is ordered to deliver to complainant the
amount of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum
computed from March 1990.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.
2. A.C. No. 5955
JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA, Complainant - versus - ATTY. GOERING
G.C. PADERANGA, Respondent.
DECISION
Before this Court is a letter-complaint[1] dated June 3, 2002, filed by
complainant John Christen S. Hegna with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) against respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga for
deliberately falsifying documents, which caused delay in the
execution of the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 8, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R-45146,
entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip.
Herein complainant was the lessee of a portion of Lot No. 5529,
situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, which was owned by the
heirs of Sabina Baclayon. The heirs of Baclayon, through their
representative Gema Sabandija, entered into a contract of lease with
complainant for a period of ten (10) years, commencing from June 26,
1994, with a rental of P3,000.00 per year, or P250.00 per month.
On September 26, 2001, complainant filed a complaint for forcible
entry against therein defendants docketed as Civil Case No. R-45146,
entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip, with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8 of Cebu City. In said
complaint, he alleged that in about the second week of March 1996,
therein defendants entered the vacant portion of the leased premises
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; destroyed
the barbed wire enclosing the leased premises of complainant, then
built a shop on the said premises without complainants consent. He
averred that despite his demands upon therein defendants to vacate
the premises and demolish the structure built thereon, the latter
failed and refused to comply.[2]
When therein defendants failed to file their Answer, complainant filed
a motion that judgment be rendered in default.
On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of
complainant, ordering therein defendants to vacate the leased
premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal
occupation and use of the subject property, as well as attorneys fees
and costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court directs judgment against
Defendants MR. & MRS. ELISEO PANAGUINIP and directs
them to vacate Lot No. 5529 over the portion in an area of
1,596 square meters thereof, as leased to herein Plaintiff,
situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, and to pay
Plaintiff the sum of PESOS: ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) per
month from the second week of March 1996 until the
present date by way of compensatory damages for the
illegal occupation and use of the contested property,
subject to 12% annual legal interest until fully paid, and
thereafter pay the same amount per month until they
vacate the subject property hereof, and to further pay
Plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 by way of Attorneys Fees, and
the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. [3]
On February 8, 2002, the MTCC granted the Motion for Execution of
Judgment filed by complainant, and issued a Writ of Execution
on February 18, 2002.
On February 21, 2002, Sheriff Edilberto Suarin of the MTCC, Branch 8
of Cebu City levied on certain personal properties of therein
defendants.[4]
On March 1, 2002, therein defendants requested the complainant to
move for the dismissal of the complaint against them so as to prevent
the issuance of the writ of execution thereon. While therein
defendants wanted to amicably settle the case, however, they failed to
mention the proposed settlement amount stated in the decision
dated December 21, 2001.
Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim[5] dated March 5, 2002 before Sheriff
Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said civil case. In the
said affidavit, respondent claimed that he was the owner of Lot No.
3653-D-1 and a FUSO (Canter series) vehicle, which he bought from
therein defendants on November 27, 2001,[6] and December 12, 2001,
[7]
respectively, both of which could be erroneously levied by a writ of
execution issued in the civil case.
On April 3, 2002, Sheriff Suarin tried to levy therein defendants
parcel of land and motor vehicle, but failed to do so because of the
third- party claim filed by respondent. [8]Subsequently, on April 24,
3
2002, respondent filed a Complaint[9] for Annulment of Judgment
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO) with damages against complainant before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cebu City, docketed as
Case No. CEB-27614, entitled Mr. Eliseo Panaguinip, Mrs. Ma. Teresa
Panaguinip and Goering G.C. Paderanga v. John Hegna, Mila Hegna,
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales and Edilberto R. Suarin.
In an Order[10] dated May 13, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the MTCC to desist from further
proceeding with the civil case, and the Sheriff to desist from
conducting a public auction of the levied properties of therein
defendants. The RTC subsequently dismissed respondents complaint
for annulment of judgment in its Decision[11] dated June 29, 2006.
In a letter dated June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC, complainant alleged
that he was filing a complaint against respondent for deliberately
falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice to
be served in Civil Case No. R-45146. He alleged that after the decision
in the said civil case was rendered, therein defendants called him on
the telephone, requesting the stay of the execution of judgment, as
the latter would be settling their accounts within ten days, but they
failed to comply.
On March 14, 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint [12] for
falsification of public documents against respondent; false testimony
and perjury against therein defendants; and falsification under
paragraph 6, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against Atty. Elena
Marie Madarang, notary public, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City. Anent the complaint against respondent,
complainant averred that the third-party claim was full of
irregularities, to wit: (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot No.
3653-D-1, covered by TCT No. T-11127, dated November 27, 2001,
had no record of transfer in the Register of Deeds of Cebu City; (b) the
registration of the motor vehicle allegedly owned by respondent by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 21, 2001 did not
reflect any change of ownership from May 4, 2001; (c) the two Deeds
of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 2001 and December 21, 2001
showed that both were notarized under Series of 2000 of the notary
public; (d) Notarial Register No. 177 on page 37, Book II showed
erasures and tampering done by substituting the intended entry of
Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Person to a Deed of Absolute Sale
under the names of the spouses Eliseo and Ma. Teresa Panaguinip,
therein defendants, representing the sale of Lot No. 3653-D-1 under
TCT No. 11127; and Notarial Register No. 188 on Page 39, Book II of
Atty. Madarang also had tampering and erasures, as the entry of
Affidavit of Loss was substituted with a Deed of Absolute Sale under
the name of Ma. Teresa Panaguinip representing the sale of the FUSO
(Canter series); and (e) the Community Tax Certificate number
appearing in both Deeds of Absolute Sale was actually issued to
another person, not to therein defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip.
On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against respondent for lack of prima facie evidence of
guilt, as the allegations therein were similar to the instant
administrative complaint.[13]
In his Comment[14] dated April 29, 2003 on the administrative
complaint filed against him, respondent argued that he did not falsify
any document and maintained that he had already satisfactorily
explained the irregularities before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
He added that the genuineness and due execution of the deeds of sale
had not been affected by the fact that he failed to register the same.
Also, he alleged that the MTCC Decision dated December 21,
2001 was unjust and void due to lack of jurisdiction, and for being
based on spurious claims.
In a Resolution[15] dated July 9, 2003, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.

On November 21, 2003, the parties appeared in a mandatory
preliminary conference and, upon termination thereof, were ordered
to submit their respective verified position papers within ten (10)
days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
[16]
Complainant and respondent submitted their position papers
on December 11, 2003,[17] and December 2, 2003,[18] respectively.
On June 1, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP submitted
his Report and Recommendation, which contained the following
observations:
III. FINDINGS:
Based on the resolution of the City Prosecutors office
in Cebu City, the complaint against the Panaguinip spouses
and Attys. Paderanga and Madarang (the notary public)
was dismissed for lack of prima facie of guilt. Such
resolution is accorded great weight but certainly not
conclusive considering the administrative nature of this
instant complaint. In criminal prosecutions, a prima facie
evidence is necessary but in this instant case, substantial
evidence is all that [is] necessary to support a guilty
verdict.
According to the Respondent, it was perfectly normal for
him to obtain properties without registering the same
under his own name. In his Position Paper, he even cited
several other transactions where he merely possessed
Deeds of Sale but not Certification of Registration or
Transfer Certificates of Title. He alleged that for ESTATE
PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties
in the name of the previous owner. The alleged
discrepancies in the notarization were fully explained as
well. The notary public explained that the erasures in her
Notarial Register were made to correct mistakes so that
entries will speak the truth. These corrections include the
entries under entry number 177 to indicate the correct
entry which was the Deed of Saleexecuted [by] the spouses
Panaguinip. The original entry, Affidavit of Two
Disinterested Persons, was actually notarized but was later
cancelled at the request of the same affiants. The full
explanation of these affiants, very doubtful and highly
suspect, was nevertheless taken into consideration by the
Prosecutor for reasons known only to him. The
Respondents also managed to convince the Cebu
Prosecutor that the discrepancy in the Residence
Certificates was due to human error!
Not necessarily disagreeing with the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City, the Resolution dismissing the case
for falsification is not entirely convincing. There were
certainly evidentiary matters which could have been better
addressed by a judge, namely, the affidavit of the secretary
of the notary public, the explanation in the incorrect entries
in notarial register, the affidavit of the two (2) witnesses
who sought the cancellation of their original affidavit, and
the explanation of Paderanga himself regarding the
difference in the dates.
Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper
unaided by counsel while Respondent is a lawyer.
Nevertheless, Complainant managed to present one (1)
piece of evidence not squarely addressed by Respondent
Paderanga: the letter handwritten by Respondents clients,
written in Cebuano, asking the Complainant for mercy and
forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter
was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE
transfer of ownership of properties owned by the
Panaguinip spouses to their lawyer, Respondent Paderanga.
This letter, attached to the Complaint, was never refuted in
any way by Respondent Paderanga who may have skirted
4
the issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter
dated March 1, 2002indicates that the Panaguinip spouses
still believe and assert ownership over these properties
despite the existence of a Deed of Sale allegedly
dated March 5, 2002. Complainant also went further by
attaching an Affidavit by a Third Person who stated that the
Panaguinip spouses still assert ownership over the parcel
of land and vehicle.
Moreover, Complainant alleged that Respondent invited
him consecutive times after the issuance of the writ of
execution in the lower court; the first was at the Majestic
Restaurant, the second was at Club Cebu at Waterfront
Hotel. There was an offer to settle the judgment award
of P100,000. During the first meeting, the offer was P3,000,
on the second meeting, this time with the Panaguinip
spouses, the offer was P10,000. When Complainant refused
to settle with Respondent, he received a copy of the
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim a few days later.
The parties did not stipulate this particular issue; however,
this Commissioner feels that for the final disposition of this
case, it is worthy to mention Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
It specifically states that:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks
of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigations or levied upon execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
xxx
This is a classic case where a lawyer acquired the interests
of his client in certain properties subject for execution.
Regardless of the courts apparent lack of jurisdiction,
Respondent Paderanga acquired the two (2) matters
subject for execution in the forcible entry case in violation
of [the] Canon of Legal Ethics. A thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over
it in court, but also the moment that becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge. x x x
In all likelihood, although Complainant failed to get a
favorable resolution from the City Prosecutors office
in Cebu City, the Affidavit of Third Party Claim was
simulated to defeat the rights of Complainant herein. It is
immaterial that the decision of the lower court granting a
judgment award was subsequently reversed or nullified. It
is immaterial that the City Prosecutor did not find a prima
facie case of falsification. The fact remains that there was a
MULTITUDE of irregularities surrounding the execution of
the Affidavit and, coupled with the letter sent by the
Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Respondent
Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit
of Third Party Claim was purposely filed to thwart the
enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case.
It is worthy to note that the proceedings before the
prosecutors office did not take into consideration the
 handwritten letter from the Panaguinip spouses. For
whatever reason, Complainant did not present such letter,
which if he did, the prosecutor may come up with a
different resolution.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
While Complainant cannot fully prove the existence
of falsity in the execution of the Affidavit of Third Party
Claim, this Commissioner is convinced that there was
indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the
property of his client which is in litigation. x x x Respondent
necessitates a heavy penalty since the circumstances
surrounding the transfer of ownership of properties tend to
indicate an anomalous transfer aimed to subvert the proper
administration of justice. The numerous discrepancies in
the transfer document, some dismissed as clerical errors
and other explained by incredulous stories by way of
affidavits, compounded by the letter left uncontested by
Respondent Paderanga, inevitably lead a rational person to
conclude that Paderanga may not have acquired the
properties prior to the judicial action of execution. Even if
the City Prosecutor found no prima facie case of
falsification, this Commissioner finds substantial evidence
to support a conclusion that Respondent Paderanga
committed an ethical violation and should be meted the
penalty of suspension of five (5) years from the practice of
law.[19]
In a Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that a lawyer ought to know that he cannot
acquire the property of his client which is in litigation, Atty.
Goering Paderanga is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.[20]
On March 23, 2006, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and,
on August 18, 2006, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated August 23, 2006, the Court referred the motion
for reconsideration to the IBP.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP issued a Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, and affirmed its Resolution
dated December 17, 2005.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138[21] of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. In the
present case, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.
Although respondent denied having acted as counsel for therein
defendants, the Spouses Panaguinip, in the forcible entry case filed by
complainant, his involvement in the said case was still highly suspect.
After the writ of execution had been issued on February 18, 2002, he
went with defendants-spouses to amicably settle with complainant
on two separate occasions, ostensibly to protect his own interests.
Complainant claimed that during those two meetings, respondent did
not disclose his ownership over the properties in question, leading
5
the former to believe that respondent was, in fact, the counsel for
defendants-spouses. He averred that respondent and defendant
spouses initially offered a settlement of P3,000.00, which he refused
as he had already spent P10,000.00 on court expenses. On their
second meeting, the offer had been raised to P25,000.00, which again
complainant declined, as the latter had, at that time,
spent P25,000.00. Complainant maintained that it was only after said
meetings had transpired that he received the affidavit of a third-party
claim executed by respondent, stating that the latter was the owner
of the property and motor vehicle. On the other hand, respondent
claimed that the meetings took place in April 2002, after he had filed
a third-party claim.
Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor
vehicle that were still registered in the name of defendants-spouses,
he should have immediately disclosed such fact immediately and filed
a third- party claim, as time was of the essence. Moreover, in their
letter dated March 1, 2002, defendants-spouses did not mention any
transfer of ownership of the said properties to respondent, as the
former still believed that they owned the same. The continued
possession and ownership by defendants-spouses was also attested
to by a certain Brigida Lines, who executed an Affidavit [22] in favor of
complainant.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that
when complainant and defendants-spouses failed to reach an
agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party claimant to
prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore,
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [23] which
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has been
construed not to pertain exclusively to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties.[24] In previous cases,[25] the Court has held that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor; or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
Notably, in the falsification case earlier filed, complainant was able to
cite several irregularities in the documents evidencing the deeds of
sale in question: the non-registration by respondent of the sale
transactions; a Community Tax Certificate number appearing on said
deeds which was different from that issued to defendant Ma. Teresa
Panaguinip; and the erasures of the entries pertaining to said deeds
from the Notarial Register.
Of these irregularities, only one can directly be attributable to
respondent his non-registration of the sale transaction. He argues
that the sales were valid despite non-registration, and maintained
that it was perfectly normal and regular for a lawyer like him to
choose not to register and cause the transfer of title of the land and
the FUSO jeepney after the execution of the Deeds of Sale, so the
transactions would not appear in the records of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the
Land Registration Office. He added that he had also bought four lots,
which had not yet been transferred to his name, for estate planning
or speculation purposes. He claimed that he found it legally wise not
to immediately register after buying so that he would not pay for the
expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or
place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying estate and
inheritance taxes upon his death.[26]
While the act of registration of a document is not necessary in order
to give it legal effect as between the parties, requirements for the
recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to
permit and require the public to act with the presumption that a
recorded instrument exists and is genuine. [27] However, while the RTC
was correct in holding that said omission on respondents part may
not be considered falsification, he had shown an intent to defraud the
government, which had the right to collect revenue from him, as well
as from other persons who may have an interest in said properties.
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he
should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no
falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has
also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain
from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system. [28] Respondents act of
non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be
illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make
himself an exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a
lawyer are greater than those of a private citizen. He is looked up to
in the community.[29] Respondent must have forgotten that a lawyer
must refrain from committing acts which give even a semblance of
impropriety to the profession.
In cases wherein lawyers have similarly engaged in deceitful and
dishonest conduct, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six (6) months to one (1) year.
In Spouses Donato v. Asuncion, Sr.,[30] where therein respondent
lawyer filed a complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain
financial gain, and prepared a contract which did not express the true
intention of the parties, he was found guilty of gross misconduct and
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In Yap-Paras v. Paras,[31] where therein respondent lawyer applied for
free patents over lands owned by another person and not in the
formers physical possession, he was found guilty of committing a
falsehood in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year, with a warning that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors recommended a penalty of suspension to be
imposed upon respondent for five (5) years and one (1) year,
respectively. The Court, however, believes that a penalty of one (1)
year is more commensurate to respondents deceitful and dishonest
conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga is found
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into respondents record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
3. [A.C. No. 4914. March 3, 2004]
SPOUSES JENELINE DONATO and MARIO DONATO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR., respondent.
DECISION
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Jeneline and
Mario Donato against Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.
The complaint alleges that on July 22, 1994, complainant spouses and
respondent Atty. Asuncion, Sr. executed a Contract to Sell wherein the
latter conveyed to the former his parcel of land with an area of
10,776 square meters (or 1.0776 hectare) situated at San Miguel,
Pangasinan covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-12256. The parties
agreed that the purchase price is in the amount of P187,500.00
payable by installments.
6
On December 20, 1994, after the complainants had paid the last
installment, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. This
document was prepared by respondent wherein he made it appear
that the consideration is only P50,000.00 in order to reduce the
amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.
More than two years later, or on January 10, 1997, the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, an action for eminent
domain, docketed as Civil Case No. U-6293. Among the parcels of land
being expropriated was the lot purchased by complainants for which
NAPOCOR was willing to pay P3,000,000.00.
Respondent then offered his legal services to complainants and
demanded 12% of whatever amount they will receive from
NAPOCOR.
When respondent learned that complainants intended to hire the
services of another lawyer, he threatened them by filing with the RTC,
Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan Civil Case No. U-6352 for
reformation of instrument. In his complaint, he alleged that the
contract executed by the parties is not a deed of sale but an equitable
mortgage because the price of the lot (P50,000.00) stated in
the contract is unusually inadequate compared to NAPOCORs offer
of P3,000,000.00.
The complaint further alleges that in filing Civil Case No. U-6352 for
reformation of instrument, respondent has dragged them to useless
and expensive litigation. His act is contrary to law and morality which
warrants his disbarment.
In his comment on the instant administrative complaint, respondent
claimed that complainants violated the rule on forum
shopping. According to him, the issue raised in this administrative
complaint and in complainants answer to his complaint in Civil Case
No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument is the same, i.e., the legality
and morality of the filing of this civil case.
In a Resolution dated February 7, 1998, we referred this case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 3, 2003, Atty.
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, IBP Hearing Commissioner, made the
following findings:
After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence
presented, we find respondent to have committed gross
misconduct. In the Civil Case No. U-6352 before the RTC, Branch 45,
Urdaneta City, for Reformation of Instrument, respondent was not
telling the truth when he alleged under paragraph 6 That although
the document is captioned Deed of Absolute Sale, the true intention
of the parties is not expressed by reason of mistake on the part of the
person who drafted the document, because the instrument should be
equitable mortgage x x x. Between the complainants and the
respondent, it is the latter who knows about the law, be it the
difference between a Deed of Absolute Sale and an Equitable
Mortgage. And because he is the lawyer and he has a law office
together with his son, it is presumed that he was the one who
prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the consideration
indicated was only P50,000.00. We believed complainants that the
Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent to lessen the
amount of capital gain tax. Respondent cannot deny that he was the
one who prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale as shown by his letters
to Myrna Tugawin (sister of Jeneline Donato) dated 31 August
1994, 1 September 1994 and 20 December 1994. After the lapse of
several years, respondent filed the complaint for Reformation of
Instrument because he realized that the price paid to him by
complainants was unusually inadequate in view of the fact that the
same land was being purchased by NAPOCOR for P3,000,000.00.
The contention of respondent that this administrative complaint is a
violation of the rule on forum shopping is without merit. There is
forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another (First Phil International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259), or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition (Chemphil Export & Improt Corp. vs. CA,
251 SCRA 257).
and recommended that complainant be suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-345, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report of Commissioner Maala with the
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for only six (6) months.
We sustain the finding of the Hearing Commissioner that respondent
was not telling the truth when he alleged in his complaint for
reformation of instrument that the intention of the parties is not
expressed therein; that what they intended to execute was a deed of
equitable mortgage, not a deed of absolute sale; and that the mistake
was committed by the person who drafted the instrument.
We observe that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the
parties on December 14, 1994. However, respondent filed Civil Case
No. U-6352 for reformation of instrument only on April 23, 1997, or
after two years, four months and nine days. Why did it take him more
than two years to realize that the previous contract did not express
the true intention of the parties?The reason for this delay can be
gleaned from the allegations in his complaint in Civil Case No. U-6352
for reformation of instrument. He alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Sale should have been an equitable mortgage since the consideration
stated therein is only P50,000.00, while the NAPOCOR has agreed to
purchase the lot for P3,000,000.00. It is thus clear that it was only
when he knew that the value of the lot suddenly increased by leaps
and bounds that he thought of filing the complaint for reformation of
instrument.
At this point, it bears stressing that respondent does not dispute
complainants contention that they paid him P187,500.00,
not P50,000.00. As earlier mentioned, complainants explained that
the latter price was specified in the deed of absolute sale in order to
reduce the amount of the corresponding capital gain tax.
We likewise sustain the finding of Commissioner Maala that the Deed
of Absolute Sale was prepared by respondent himself, as shown by
his letters to Myrna Tugawin, sister of complainant Jeneline
Donato. In his letter dated August 31, 1994, respondent informed
Myrna that a Deed of Sale will be executed by us (referring to
him and the complainants). In his letter of September 1, 1994,
respondent asked Myrna to bring P50,000.00 on September 3,
1994 for the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. And in his letter
dated December 20, 1994, respondent requested Myrna to bring
complainants balance on December 22, 1994. If it were true that the
contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage, why did he
prepare a different one a Deed of Absolute Sale?
We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing
any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.[1] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
7
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
x x x.
In SPO2 Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,[2] we explained
the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is
generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent.
In committing such gross misconduct, respondent violated his
solemn oath as a lawyer imposing upon himself the following duties,
thus:
I, ______________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
By filing the unfounded complaint for reformation of instrument to
obtain financial gain, respondent did not only abuse and misuse the
judicial processes, but likewise harassed the complainants and forced
them to litigate unnecessarily. Indeed, his act was intended to
advance his own interest at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, a manifestation of flaw in his character as a
lawyer.
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.[3] We have been exacting in our demand
for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. [4] We
expect them at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession[5] and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.[6]
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity
is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for
the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege.[7] We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months for gross misconduct.
Incidentally, respondents defense of forum shopping is utterly bereft
of merit. Suffice it to state that complainants did not institute two
actions grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition that
one or the other court might look with favor upon them.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ISAIAH B. ASUNCION, SR. is found
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar; and be furnished the Bar
Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
4. [A.C. No. 5535. August 28, 2003]
SPOUSES STEVEN AND NORA WHITSON, complainants, vs. ATTY.
JUANITO C. ATIENZA, respondent.
DECISION
At issue in this administrative case is the proper decorum that must
be possessed and practiced by a member of the bar.
A civil case for Damages with Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Stay Away Order, [1] was filed by complainants, Spouses
Steven and Nora Whitson (Whitsons) against Spouses Wilardo and
Edith Alcantara (Alcantaras). The Alcantaras obtained the services of
respondent, Atty. Juanito C. Atienza (Atty. Atienza) in connection with
the case. During the course of the trial, there was a heated
confrontation between Steven Whitson and Atty. Atienza, which
culminated in the latter punching the chest of Steven. The incident
led to the filing of this administrative case against Atty. Atienza.
The Whitsons alleged that they came to the Philippines to stay
permanently with Noras relatives. Steven enrolled at the Ramon
Magsaysay Technological University. During their stay here, they got
acquainted with the Alcantaras from whom they bought pieces of
furniture. They became the Alcantaras regular customers and close
friends. As such, the Alcantaras allowed them to purchase furniture
on credit on behalf of relatives who cannot pay on cash. They
promptly and regularly paid the installments.
Sometime in March 2001, the Whitsons decided to purchase a
multivan from Norkis Group of Companies for their personal use.
They executed a Chattel Mortgage over the van and undertook to pay
monthly amortizations for thirty-six (36) months. However, they
planned to leave for the United States of America by November 2001
in time to be with their daughter who was to give birth. As such, they
negotiated with the Alcantaras if they could turn over the van to them
in exchange for the balance of their (Whitsons) credit. The Alcantaras
were to assume the mortgage of the van. The Alcantaras agreed. Thus,
both parties came to an understanding that if Norkis will approve the
agreement, the van will be turned over to the Alcantaras. However,
Norkis advised the parties to wait for the approval of the
endorsement before possession of the van will be transferred.
A few days after, Wilardo Alcantara called the Whitsons and told them
that Norkis allegedly approved the endorsement. He informed them
that he will take possession of the van. Although surprised, the
Whitsons trusted the Alcantaras and did not bother to confirm the
approval from Norkis. After a briefing on how to operate the van,
possession thereof was immediately transferred to Wilardo. Within a
few days thereafter, Rene Tantay of Norkis visited the Whitsons and
inquired as to why possession of the van was already with the
Alcantaras when Norkis had not yet approved their agreement.
Having been told the whole story, Tantay advised the Whitsons to get
back the van from the Alcantaras, otherwise Norkis will forfeit the
Chattel Mortgage and repossess the van.
Distressed, the Whitsons contacted the Alcantaras and requested
them to return the van, informing them of the warning of Norkis.
After ardent appeals, the Alcantaras conceded and returned the van,
but only after asking the Whitsons to tell Norkis that they
(Alcantaras) used the van for a road test. However, when the
Whitsons did not comply with the request, Wilardo Alcantara made a
scene at the office of Norkis and alleged that the van was turned over
voluntarily by the Whitsons as payment of the balance of the
furniture the latter bought from them on credit. Nonetheless, since
Norkis disapproved the endorsement, the van was given back to the
possession of the Whitsons.
After this incident, the Alcantaras bombarded the Whitsons with
persistent calls and visits, demanding payment for the balance of the
credit the latter owed them. In the process, the Whitsons were
subjected to embarrassment and worries since the Alcantaras always
made a scene and did not bother to be discreet in their actions. The
Whitsons also underwent mental and physical stress and anxiety. As
8
such, they filed the aforesaid civil case for damages against the
Alcantaras.
It was an incident during the hearing of the civil case that gave rise to
this administrative case against Atty. Atienza, the counsel of the
Alcantaras.
During the first hearing of the civil case, the judge advised the parties
to compromise. Thus, the Whitsons sent a letter to the Alcantaras
bearing the terms of their offer of settlement. However, the Whitsons
were surprised with what happened on October 3, 2001, during the
next hearing after the Alcantaras got the letter. The Whitsons went to
court early that morning. While waiting for the session to start, they
saw Atty. Atienza enter the room. The minute he saw them, he
pointed a finger at them, erupting into an outburst of angry
words, viz:
Hey you, Mr. Whitson. Why did you call me stupid. You, son of a bitch!
I demand an immediate apology! You should not forget that you are
just a visitor here in the Philippines! You are only here on vacation.
How dare you call me stupid! Fuck you! Tang-ina ka![2]
Aside from the vehement words, Atty. Atienza kept shoving the
astounded and embarrassed Steven. Because of the actions of the
respondent, the parties were told to move to the hallway.
Nevertheless, despite being restrained by the people surrounding
them, Atty. Atienza could not be stopped. They were thus further
asked to go out of the building. Once outside, Atty. Atienza motioned
for Steven Whitson to approach him, telling him, I want an apology,
Mr. Whitson(.) (W)e can talk over here. [3] Thinking the latter had
already cooled down, Steven approached him and offered an apology.
However, even before he was done with his apology, Atty. Atienza
punched him on the chest. Because of the tense atmosphere, the
hearing scheduled for the day had to be postponed.
Atty. Atienza, on the same day, likewise filed a case for libel against
the Whitsons. He alleged that their letter of compromise sent to the
Alcantaras contained libelous remarks, viz: Your stupid attorney did
not know where the van is (sic).[4] A warrant of arrest was issued
against the Whitsons. They were not able to immediately post bail
and had to spend the night in jail.
Atty. Atienza denied the incident. He alleged that what happened was
a very emotional and heated exchange of words between respondent
and Mr. Steven Whitson, which did not result to (a) physical
confrontation because of the intervention of a police officer. [5] He
claimed that the incident was caused by a letter [6] sent by the
Whitsons to his clients, the Alcantaras, which contained
words/remarks written against him, i.e., liar and stupid, which he
found libelous and defamatory, and that his clients even hesitated to
show him the letter, knowing that he would be hurt and embarrassed.
An investigation was conducted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The Investigating Commissioner recommended the
suspension of the respondent for three months with the following
rationalization:
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the respondent lost his
composure at the sight of complainant who accused him of being
stupid and (a) liar(,) which led him to forget his sense of propriety
and proper decorum unbecoming of a seasoned and respectable
practitioner in law.
Respondent should have been magnanimous in dealing with the
complainant, (es)specially so (sic) he had already made the proper
remedy of filing a libel suit against the complainant; and for such
misgiving of having punched complainant, proper sanction should be
made against the respondent.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof. [7]
The Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in
its Notice of Resolution, modified the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, viz:
5. RESOLUTION NO. XV-2003-182
Adm. Case No. 5535
Sps. Steven & Nora Whitson vs. Atty. Juanito C. Atienza
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent
should have been magnanimous in dealing with complainant,
especially so that he had already made the proper remedy of filing a
libel suit against complainant, Atty. Juanito C. Atienza is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months.
We affirm with modification the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors. The practice of law is a privilege that is subject to
regulation by the State. [8] The Supreme Court is mandated by the
1987 Philippine Constitution to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of ... the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar .... [9] Thus, Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
It is shown that Atty. Atienza exhibited gross misconduct in his
dealing with the Whitsons. Gross misconduct is improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. [10] Any
gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity
which shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because
good character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. [11]
In the case at bar, the medical certificate [12] presented proved that
Steven Whitson suffered contusion from the blow delivered by Atty.
Atienza. Respondent failed to exercise the propriety and proper
decorum expected from members of the bar. Even in the heat of
anger, his act, along with vehement words and shouts, was uncalled
for. Furthermore, the Board of Governors correctly noted that Atty.
Atienza should have been more magnanimous in dealing with the
Whitsons, especially since he already vindicated himself with the
filing of the libel suit.
Thus, Atty. Atienza should properly be penalized for his conduct
which is unbecoming of a lawyer. The penalty of suspension is
9
imposed to punish the lawyer [13] or to set an example or a warning for
the other members of the bar.[14]
However, we believe that the penalty of suspension recommended by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not commensurate to the act
committed by Atty. Atienza. Pursuant to the Courts power of
discipline over the members of the Bar and Bench, we reduce the
penalty to a fine, considering that it is the respondents first offense.
[15]
There was likewise sufficient provocation on the part of Steven
Whitson when he referred to Atty. Atienza as stupid and a liar. [16]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Juanito C. Atienza is fined
P1,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offense
will merit a more severe sanction. SO ORDERED.
5. [A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the
Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City [1] and as a result of their
marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that
they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted
to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the
later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations
of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on
and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime
in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a
second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime
in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was
then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman
in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated
that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his
intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their
Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let
the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii
and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update
her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to
Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she
was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife
of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two
(2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her
office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with
her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is
not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988
when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off
all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived
with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in
Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious
and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply [7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent
with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal
complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to
the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered
by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal
home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that
altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it,
had been prima facie established by complainants
10
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie
establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala
Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the
offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact
of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence
thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy,
20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by
respondents in support of their respective positions on the
matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527
San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred,
among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985
and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was
October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for
that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon
the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within
the wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of
respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting
an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),
[15]
respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the
marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos
Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith
on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and
raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in
an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent
with the requirement of good moral character for the
practice of the legal profession; and
 (ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that
respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner. [17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not
know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of
this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so
much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. [18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason
for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and
informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988.
Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not
present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored
car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of
the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing
Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, [19] does
not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the
Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for
lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of
Justice [21]to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos
Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell
in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant
Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate
relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the
late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would
not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated
that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant
her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that
such information was made known to respondent.
11
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent
was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to
be single. The Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman,
he represents himself to be single, separated, or without
any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single
women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware
the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United
States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.
When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she
lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui
and respondent only talked to each other because of the
children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they
live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to
find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of
a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this
sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross
Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate
of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing
the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to
the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of
law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
 g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to
the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result
of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations
of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree
of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs
with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more
vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived
with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui
was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
12
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
[27]
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. [28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." [29] Respondents
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions
to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to
do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom
how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the
year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED.
6. [A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, respondent.
DECISION
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every
member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting
standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or
her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative
complaint[1] for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M.
Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.[2]
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of
Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-
time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences
and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina
Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student,
enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his
influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the
legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita,
gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded
to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in
various circles in the community, but which they managed
to keep from me. It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain
when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms.
Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as
a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to
cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of
Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro
Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita
agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness
and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty.
Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live
with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in
the tertiary level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated
the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband;
(2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were
forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional confusion arising
from extreme jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband
had remained a faithful and responsible family man. She further
asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship
with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. [5] Supporting her
letter were an Affidavit of Desistance [6] and a Motion to Dismiss,
[7]
attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP
commission on bar discipline. [8] In a Decision dated October 8, 1991,
the IBP Board of Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag
for failure to prosecute.[10]
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court[11] received another letter[12] from the complainant, with her
seven children[13] as co-signatories, again appealing for the
disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier
dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats
against her.[14]
In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991,
filed in compliance with this Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,
[15]
respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his
wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of
Desistance[16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17] even appearing before the
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that
she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on
her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof.
13
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and
denied abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he
described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz.:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an
incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every time the
streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or
complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all
without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the
consuming demands of her loving jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she
repents and feels sorry for her acts against the
Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11,
1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.
[18]
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring
the Comment of respondent to the IBP. [19] In the hearing before IBP
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: [20]
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have
left him not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best
legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful
education.Complainant comes from what she claims to be very
rich parents who value material possession more than
education and the higher and nobler aspirations in
life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the
gentle ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the
poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely
different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done
all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect
and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a
comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most
of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and
compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying
times, he remained calm and never inflicted violence on
them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals,
mature, and gainfully employed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a
social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable
jealousy, Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly
destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their
family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which
Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED,
BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED,
physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the Complainant, in
public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and
bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost
infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their
marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never
mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and
understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your
Respondent does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to
shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from
enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in Death and the Maiden,
can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and
uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy,
 destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret
and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending. But your Respondent never revealed these
destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good
name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the
marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or
for worse, in sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your
Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It
is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to
defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage,
Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to
colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious
societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them
how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to
hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other capacity because
her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when
did love become an instrument to destroy a mans dearest
possession in life - his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign
against her husband, employing every unethical and immoral
means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been
irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and
humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he
who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the
Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges,
respondent presented as evidence the following list of the complaints
she had filed against him and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm.
Case No. P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors
Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and
concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case
No. 4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors
Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x).
Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x
x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme]
C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x x). DISMISSED by IBP Board of
Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No.
3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC,
Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. x x x[22]
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x),
picture (x x x) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
xxxxxxxxx
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He
never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of
Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said
woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit
relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived
with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in
14
Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other
place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs.
Narag are false and fabricated, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag
and her two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of
the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to
the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual
friends to save the marriage and the family from
collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case,
he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous,
violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife
since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat,
battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and
humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally,
emotionally, and psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-
manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the
affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27,
1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not
true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily,
and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by
the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge
Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No.
12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the
Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior
citizen of 63 years - sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened
and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and
arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very
physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions
render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to
him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical
certificates, x x x, among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering
from hypertension.[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,
[24]
recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the
practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the contending parties, two (2)
issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of
alleged abandonment of respondents own family
and [whether he was] living with his paramour,
Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his
illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on
paragraph 1(g) of respondents Comment vis-a-vis
his handwritten love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he objected to their
admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were
never denied by him on the witness stand much less
presented and offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose
testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs.
 Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman
suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did
not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be
cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he
present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the
adulterous relationship between him and their having
begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle
Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondents denial that he is the father of the two is a
ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125
SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the
respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member of
the legal profession.[25]
In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and
approved the investigating commissioners recommendation for the
indefinite suspension of the respondent. [27]Subsequently, the
complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a
Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP
granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30,
1997, denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the
evidence presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of
respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [28] to
the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of
the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[29]
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. [30] Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree [31] or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.[32]
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his
family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[34]
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself, [35] were:
Charlie Espita,[36] Magdalena Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice
15
Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag, [40]Dominador Narag, Jr., [41] and Nieves F.
Reyes.[42]
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita,
corroborated complainants charge against respondent in these
categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina
Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are
now living together as husband and wife and that they already
have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
x x x x x x x x x [43]
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself,
Charlie Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living
with the respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your
sister as husband and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife
and you have already two children and I know that that is really
an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my
moral values dont allow me that my sister is living with a married
man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did
you see them in the house?
A Yes, si[r].
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children,
Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left
your family.[44]
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to
Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2)
that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the
disbarment proceedings.[45]
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie
Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by
the name of Charlie Espita.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo
Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is
the residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are
allegedly living as husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.[46]
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple,
testified that she learned from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and
Rowena -- that their father left his family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the
Narag couple again separated when the respondent went back to his
woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. [47]
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant
was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived
with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these
witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent,
their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that
respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as
evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by
the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of
one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent
as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by
one and the same person. [48] Besides, respondent did not present any
evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him;
he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has
the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is
morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not
suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right
to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must
meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of
the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his
name in the Roll of Attorneys.[49] This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina
Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a violent husband-
beater, vitriolic and unbending, and as an insanely and pathologically
jealous woman, whose only obsession was to destroy, destroy and
destroy him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded
charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he
presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence [50] and
ten (10) witnesses.[51]
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of
respondent did not establish the fact that he maintained that moral
integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to
continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the
fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family
and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of
them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but
merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other
people, while others were presented to impeach the good character
of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a
comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may
have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned
politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his
moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of
law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also
duties e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according
to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual
guidance.[52] As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support.[53]
16
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often
away from home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only
because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with his
paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he
was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His
children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must
have scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.
Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his
fathers moral frailties in his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be
forgiven, is there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of
forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is
with the emotional part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a
person although I am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give
the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his
mistakes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that
your father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you
send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he
has to be given a lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive
him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also
suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins,
his flesh is your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now
disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you
are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because
your father has sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I
was still a kid because my father is not always staying with us at
home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But
for sure, sir, you did not give me love.[54]
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating
officer the trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains
the fact that your father is maintaining a paramour, could you
please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my
brothers and sisters, especially my married life, sir. And it also
affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted
ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one
reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted
ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family
and that she could not face the people, our community, especially
because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our
community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us
what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister
because she knows so well that my mother suffered so much and
she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our
family, Your Honor.
Q In your wifes family?
 A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and
that my father went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling
my wife a puta in provincial government, which my mother-in-law
hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my
wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with
Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand
firm to this, Your Honor.[55]
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of
marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man
who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has
solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to
her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the
practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after
the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained
an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court
declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As
held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be disbarred for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of
this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and
furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.
7. A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G.
DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he
or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he
should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this
jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all
the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of
grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. 2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and
law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
17
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent
purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one
after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the
time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular
support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant
to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant
pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his
lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to
the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-
Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though
admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of
their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had
abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San
Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant
returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated
in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was
forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best
school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought
two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had
abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force
him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the
complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established
that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were
married7 and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that
time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends
meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on
dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and
Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980, 8October 14, 19819 and
August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of
respondents extra-marital affairs. 11 Sometime in 1983, she brought
their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work
because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From
1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was
just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she
returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living
with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did
not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his
mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth
certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, 12 all
surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate
children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of
complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that
respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to
appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He,
however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants
Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the
Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to
Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents
motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had
already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final
chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting
evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the
resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente
lite18 filed against him by the complainantbefore the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case should
be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar
Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD
Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the respondent be
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-
taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. 22 To be the basis of
disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 24
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
18
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has
three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to
protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only
upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships
with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to
the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality.
Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his
lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning
ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within
that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral
delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution
of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the
most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
8. A.C. No. 10207 July 21, 2015
RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-
28361 ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C.
BARROZO"
DECISION
This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor
Joselito C. Barrozo (respondent) is taken up by this Court motu
proprio by virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar under
Section 11 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Factual Antecedent
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 2which were assigned to
respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City,
Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, respondent told her that he
would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for 20,000.00.
hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to
report the matter. The Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, after being
told of respondents demand, immediately planned an entrapment
operation. During the operation conducted of February 15, 2005,
respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the
amount of 20,000.00 from Valeriano.
As a result, a case for direct bribery 3 under paragraph 2, Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code was filed against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case, however, was later on
indorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was occupying a
position with a salary grade 27 or higher.
After finding the existence of all the elements 4 of the crime, the
Sandiganbayan, in a Decision5 dated March 17, 2011, found
respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and
sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional maximum, as
minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prison mayor medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of 60,000.00.
in addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of special temporary
disqualification.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 (MR) but was denied
in a Resolution7 dated September 28, 2011.
Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari8 before this Court but was denied in a Resolution 9dated
December 14, 2011 on the ground that the Petition failed to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible
error in its challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise of the
Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Respondent thrice move
for reconsideration. 10 the first two MRs were denied, 11 while the third
one was ordered expunged from the records. 12
Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment 13 was issued stating that the
Courts Resolution of denial had already become final and executor
on August 16, 2012.
In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a
letter14 dated in August 14, 2013 from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating
that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines
signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment
from the employers of domestic helper Anita G. Calub who passed
away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that
said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the
OBC to inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice
law.
19
Prompted by Wat & Co.s letter, the OBC inquired from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) whether respondent is still connected
thereat.15 in reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already
resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005.16
On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that
respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment
and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.
In view of the foregoing and considering that respondents conviction
is a ground for disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a Resolution 17 dated
December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he
should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
In his Comment18 respondent identified the issue in this case as
whether he can engage in the practice of law despite his conviction.
He then argued that he did not engage in the practice of law as his act
of signing the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He
averred that he signed it not for any monetary consideration, but out
of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no
payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of the
law on his part.
Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case
and came up with its February 20, 2015 Report and
Recommendation19 recommending the disbarment of respondent.
Our Ruling
The court adopts the OBCs recommendation.
It must first be clarified that the issue in this case is not what
respondent essentially argued about in his Comment, i.e., whether his
act of signing the claim letter constitutes practice of law. As aptly
stated by the OBC in its recommendation and viewed from proper
perspective the real issue here is whether respondent should be
suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of
direct bribery. Hence, the Court finds respondents comment to be
totally without merit as he veered away, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, from the crux of the controversy in this case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds
for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondents
conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be
answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral
turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act
constituting the same must have been "done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. [it must involve] an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 20
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 21 the Court already had the occasion to
answer the same question posed in this case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a will disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to
do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Xxxx
[T]he crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In
Magno v. COMELEC,22 we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the
elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does
not constitute a crime but the act must unjust, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that
the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of
the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen
and society in general. Also the fact that the offender takes advantage
of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by
the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary o the accepted rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.23
Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as
mentioned, is a ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer
from his office as an attorney.
The Court is mindful that a lawyers conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose
to impose the less severe penalty of suspension. As held, the
determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.24 here, however, the circumstances surrounding the case
constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as
recommended by the OBC.
It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime
respondent was an assistant public Prosecutor of the City of
Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting money from a party to a case
handled by him does not only violate the requirement that cases must
be decided based on the merits of the parties respective evidence but
also lessens the peoples confidence in the rule of law. Indeed
Respondents conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good
moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a
public office.1wphi1 Lawyers in public office are expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and
20
confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public
faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
higher than his brethren in private practice, 25
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his
disregard of his oath as a government official but is likewise of such a
nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent
must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function be competent, honorable and reliable lawyers in
whom courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence. Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that
vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the]
profession of odious members.26
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
the Decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country. SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in
this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C
of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney,
using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
21
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration
of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p.
665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in
many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term,
as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice
of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once
the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon
role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
22
both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d]
as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes
in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating
the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for
fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions
by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
23
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in
the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness
of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
24
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which
are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the
most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of
vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his
stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work
of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field
of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging
in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system
for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank
of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of
the United States Agency for International Development, during
the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
25
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one
or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also
state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143
SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has
no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers
of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since
no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
26
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-
appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of
the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April
1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and Don a Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act
No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925)
and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a
series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as
they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."
Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
 Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui,
si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio
Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar
a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores,
la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a
una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el
varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor
dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere
asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto,
al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8
May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,
beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations
ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as
they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in
this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers,
being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Don a Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them
and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February,
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no
prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of
the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be
turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not
having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this
case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews
mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the
older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor
impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
27
February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said
that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-
fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and
considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore
means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the
term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish
the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua
Espan ola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a
defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses
de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o
puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and
has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of
the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by
law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is
under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138
such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the
lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to
the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that
an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved
by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances,
particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons
who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were
allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers.
(Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect
to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from
some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or
a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the
conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it
that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in
conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to be
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice
the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it
is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on
the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office
or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the
fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957
for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however,
that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the
office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will
depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that
the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein
in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy
the court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and
proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he
was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and
the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled
to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a
pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater
degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney
& Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are
whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in
which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and
is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of
the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications
are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the
public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate
and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one
seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting
than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a
requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by
lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16
of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act
190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the
right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in
question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a
complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the
plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by
28
the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the
case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37,
48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in
the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby
Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named
"legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as
assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of
extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare
Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the
office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with
another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over
the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took
his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social
Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the
position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The
rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the
Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No.
45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect
ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the
administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court
controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action
against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen
the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as
stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the
ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order
dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take
another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay,
and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No.
R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case
was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath"
thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the
other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of
dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This
was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted
a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540),
which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui
should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it
reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who
agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ...
should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated
against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but
believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was
filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by
this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr.
Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the
"convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this
Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769),
remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr.
Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an
action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when
the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of
the parties could be ventilated in such an action all these
circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of
the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year
after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that
the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July
1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of
the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one
year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does
not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action
is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose
that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party
is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the
founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation.
He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma.
Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.
The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano
Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de
mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui,
Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the
intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in
the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to
whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not
justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as
the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally
against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
11. A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D.
MANIWANG respondent.
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for
the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the
Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he
refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit
relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child,
Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970
at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the
Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the
San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when
Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the
following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had
dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like
29
Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had
gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual
intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with
another man and that she had a child with still another man.
Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind
because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started
telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly
married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del
Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained
in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for
her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant,
she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise
Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not
really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church
wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage
license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he
expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He
reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he
passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena
gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the
baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on
April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena
also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing
that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July,
1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get
married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him
there only to be told that their marriage could not take place
because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was
broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She
reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station
and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers
and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he
repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that
promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been
accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate
child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his
opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral
character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7
C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who
was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd
896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance
with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary
action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of
rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a
lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of
immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the
surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned
morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the
frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of
dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into
temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels
himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the
saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt
a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533,
535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in
the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which
he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and
despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse;
he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez
urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he
tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree.
(Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that
they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of
Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later
give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
30
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo
vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous
marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion
Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her
the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her
and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the
latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not
worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged
to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual
congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to
have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get
married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry
her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28,
1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting
that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a
marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to
Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this
world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony."
"Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my
Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life."
(Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous
relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman
separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece
who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases.
This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil.
1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with
Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They
indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950
and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual,
tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to
impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy
between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint
whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a
consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she
filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant
was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See
Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975,
62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January
29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs.
Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby
dismissed. SO ORDERED.
12. A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JESUS B.
TOLEDO, respondent.
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus
B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27
December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that
she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the
bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he
abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of
Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting
with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July
1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the
complaint.3The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter,
which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that
the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out
distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or
disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the
Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be made in the logical
sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity
in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was
dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court
on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L." 4 It was
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July
1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D.
Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman
who had borne him three children is not true because her very
informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an
affidavit to the effect that the respondent was employed in the
Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three
children referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and
Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding.
Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a
copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the
Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October
1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956
the record of the case was received by the Office of the Solicitor
General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15
February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the
Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the complainant
presented her evidence both oral and documentary and the
respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her
witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but
reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule
128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against
the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a
complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment
of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by
whom he has a child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to
the respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor
General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from
receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958
the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on
and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation
conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September
1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at
9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent
filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August
1958 be first resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a
period of ten days within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of
his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception
31
of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing
of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning
be held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing
of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent
appeared and was given a period of 15 days within which to submit a
written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor
General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the
respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October
1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the
respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also
within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General,
his memorandum in reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the
final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity
to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no
statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional
evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of
such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent
in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to
file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after
investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf,
to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule
requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating
that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving
his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the
Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in
his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for
him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably
filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a
dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law
student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the
Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they
lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in
Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume
his studies at the Far Eastern University, 5 and she remained in
Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still
studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to
Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the
respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she
came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived
with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who
cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about
three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his
graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and
embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that
she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless,
being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for
the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days
before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar
examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became
actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of
the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at
Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked
her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3
June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the
respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and
their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon
Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who
was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple
slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate
their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the
respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon
"Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon
Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as
operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the
respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public
lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in
March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office
at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided
to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to
the respondent's place of residence and office. Among those who
lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a
maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was
in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person
as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the
respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room where the
respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and
shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were
repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the
respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad
introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of
the station wagon in their proper places and while he was helping
Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask
her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to
address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14,
t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina
Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been
put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the
presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and
cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the
investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or
whether anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether
she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration,
Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner
answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the
latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell
nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour
in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify
at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way
of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going
further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she
was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-
feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could
be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that
she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister;
that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought
her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never
scolded her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not
know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was
because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her
credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour
looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion.
Comparing her (Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the
complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that
the latter had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller than
the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent
32
who lived with Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen
Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the
same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had
not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor
asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the
complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law
and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if
he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he
frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description
of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair
in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion,
more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina
Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in
education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the
sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive
questions propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the
lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the
respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The
apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her
innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the
questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to
remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of
more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she
was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her
confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready
answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity
and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his
testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands
unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be
taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in
evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
Bar.6
THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
13. A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant, vs. ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an
Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of
respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his
(complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere.
Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his
conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street,
Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has
been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment
and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of
complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had
been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking
advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and
unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against
her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently
sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to
what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his
wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious)
that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's
"Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further
allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that
respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical
bills of complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at
the hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop
seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical
appliances where she was living although she had no
means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further
allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had
merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The
Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place
from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and
respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to
establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla
(tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in
l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-
15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal
house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live
with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired
household appliances which she could not afford to buy as
she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985,
Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the
FEU Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took
care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an
incident between respondent and complainant took place
in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and
'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took
place involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa
33
Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8-
10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent
and complainant were brought to the attention of the police
(Exhibits 'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for
immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that
respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and
'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in
the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice
regarding her difficult relationship with complainant; that
Priscilla left complainant because she suffered
maltreatment, physical injuries and public humiliation
inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived
with her at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent
visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU
Hospital, as assistance in her medical expenses; that he
reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla
in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the
security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding
hands with her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment
at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from
her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried
to stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said
incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel
with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel
was between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and
complainant; that respondent went there only to intervene
upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21,
1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at
No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their
marriage, and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered
respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their
residences being one house away from each other.
 4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him
for advice, because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived
at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila;
that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was
staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant
had indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in
1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but
complainant was staying two or three houses away in his
mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for
immorality against respondent in CLAO, where respondent
was found guilty and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-
39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of
immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the
same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent
had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of
complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was
having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon
whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of
respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit
his friend, in spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious
incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers
(Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening
when she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again
of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to
properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior
which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing
possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was
"unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40).
The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo
Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months
and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been
cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon
respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be
reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of
34
conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and
officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent
attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer
of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or
similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
14. Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, vs. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN,
JR., respondent.
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her
husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly
immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow.
They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on
November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso
came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was
subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972,
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage
was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh.
C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street,
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has
never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much
patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A
Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced
himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name
is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the
owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She
Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent
Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was
terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to
time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of
giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the
plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that
he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the
conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife,
their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did
not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional
evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has
sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of
her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he
was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman,
fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed
to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.
15. MARCAYDA v. MARI WANG [106 SCRA 591 (1981)]
16. A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE
D. CORDOVA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to
then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion
Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-
complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required
complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on
27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and
detailed complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent
was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint
35
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required
complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte,
on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant
for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing
scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-
first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The
hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed
the Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled".
In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties
(respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation
and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file
a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from
either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its
report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that
any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976
and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the
couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent
Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children
to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent
Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado
using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado
funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had
an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would
separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was
no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one
Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie
along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take
back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to
live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to
give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the
IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.
An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement
is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the
law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though
the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is
important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer
to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed
and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's
conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself
arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue

as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and
accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife,
in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of
his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or
refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and
bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and
the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the

practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court.
The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court
that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he
has clung to.

36