BAR MATTER No.
914 October 1, 1999 be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is
the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the
application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia
West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has
resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws
course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application
to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the
Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18
November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth
B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were
released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The
oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment
on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents
evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being
the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born
under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner
in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared
by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that
"(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age
of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may
must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be
made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age
of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of
Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p.
51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940).
Said period may be extended under certain circumstances,
as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s.
1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was
held that an election done after over seven (7) years was
not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond
the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However,
due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction
of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself
as one in my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to
by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July
1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized
in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born
before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under
the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be
followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should
be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be
made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions
of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect
that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is
the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under
the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself
a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944.
His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It
is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching
cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic)
legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established
that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22
years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case,
thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No.
625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the
1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship
would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an
obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary
for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we
held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]),
the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he
came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as
they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
 xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because
he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned
twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of
Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of
the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed
from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason
why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can
be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One
who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with
fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on
his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of
unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and
accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath
as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted
without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to
reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court
binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and
adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and
the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10
February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,
complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were
acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in
part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to
take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and
maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That,
of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28
June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that
Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant
Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are
in no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing
respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986,
certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has
been careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed
only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the
Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification,
dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had
not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character
and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and
that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of
1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to
require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as
to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason
 therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from
notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte,
filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August
1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the
respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands,
Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del
Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in
this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which,
upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land until the present.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification,
dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and
attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the
Office of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of
Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E.
Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any
pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the
above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by
the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine
Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP
Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's
comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement
objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616)
and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August
1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving
respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a
date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge
Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled
Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as
soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another
Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in
SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the
Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990,
complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her
relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had
asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no
necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further
stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the
Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she
believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine
Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly
recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request
this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most
convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October
1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their
comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private
personal disposition which raises the question whether
personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate
these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the
importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and
discretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutions
which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the
foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore
should not in the least be considered as anything which is
subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions
of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not
improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico
M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who
apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed
of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on
17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December
1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion,
which, according to him, was already considered closed and
terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October
1990, had been reached between the principal parties, approved by
the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural
Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate
of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's
mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered
by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said
land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of
Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural
Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas
Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were
NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution,
complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on
the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990,
was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga
del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court
and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine
Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1
August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January
1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M.
Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution
by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the
termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to
oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution
of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his
plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take
the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and
passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his
show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance
of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor
were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in
1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of
a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the
public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to
obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau
of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default
by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was
eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent
surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and
paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in
Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed
that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable
settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant"
(Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said
case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had
already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then
submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his
good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of
that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its
termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about
respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at
the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of
the free patent title over property which he could not but have known
was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross
dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the
termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no
determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit
had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession
on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the
intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by
securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding
the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public
auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case
filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection
on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this
Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several Motions for
Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But
these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case
instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can
not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack
of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and
Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his
motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That
complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath
can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a
matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always
tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training as well as
in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this
high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is
to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good
moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been
held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a
member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989
is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is
hereby denied. SO ORDERED.