G.R. No. L-9596 February 11, 1916 EN BANC Trent, J.
judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be
MARCOS MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO DE LEON, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS: Action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council
of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an
exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No.
1643 of the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the
plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
ISSUE: Are the members of the municipal council personally liable?
RATIONALE:
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both
governmental and corporate or business functions. Act No. 1643 provides that the
use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse
belonging to any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or
for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township
is located. The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease,
when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect.
A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its
corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial
property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability
to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into,
may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or
agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the
same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the
principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality
is made liable to suits in the courts. Municipal corporations are subject to be sued
upon contracts and in tort.
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly of
the negligence or want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured.
Municipal corporations, under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of
this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability coexist. To create such liability, it is fundamentally
necessary that the act done which is injurious to others must be within the scope of
the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or positive enactment (the extent of
which powers all persons are bound, at their peril, know); in other words, it must not
be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the corporation
to act in reference to it under any circumstances.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff had a
vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of
his lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a
proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either ex
contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of
municipalities.
In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private
corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may be used, such as
the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable judgment. It required
some considerable amount of business acumen to compel performance on the part of
lessees of these privileges in accordance with the terms of their leases and in a
manner which will not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions must continually
arise which are not expressly provided for in contracts and which must be settled, if
possible, in a manner that will preserve the just claims of the municipality. The rule of
personal liability should be with municipal councilors in such matters as it is
with the directors or managers of an ordinary private corporation.
The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Vilas vs City of Manila 42 Phil 935 1921
Facts: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an
action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that
incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to
the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by
virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.
Issue: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability
of the City of Manila to its creditor?
Held: No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve
the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of
Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to
all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities.
The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the
present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its
character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old
City of Manila.
Mun. of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands
[G.R. No. L-5631; October 17,1910 ]
Petitioner: Municipal President of the Municipality of Catbalogan
Respondent: Attorney-General Villamor on behalf of the Director of Lands
FACTS:
1. On June 19, 1908, the municipal president of the pueblo of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, filed an application with the Court of Land Registration in
 which he asked for the registration, in conformity with the Land Registration
Act, of a parcel of land which the said municipality was the absolute owner.
2. The said land has an area of 666.60 sq. m. and was levied for the purpose
of the payment of the land tax.
3. The mayor further stated that in the unlikely event of the denial of the said
application made in accordance with the Land Registration Act, the applicant
invokes the benefits of Chapter 5 of Act. No. 926, since the said corporation
has been in possession of the land mention, which is entirely surrounded by
a fence, and has been cultivating it for a great many years.
4. On March 18, 1909, the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Director of Lands
filed an opposition and alleged that the land in question belonged to the
United States and was under the control of the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
5. The trial court ruled in favor of the Municipality of Catbalogan, awarding the
land to the applicant and be registered in its name.
6. The Attorney-General filed an appeal but was denied. They now brought this
case to the Supreme Court.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
1. The property described was appraised at the last assessment levied for the
purpose of payment of the land tax, and that there is no encumbrance on it;
that no one other than petitioner, to its best knowledge and belief, has any
right or interest therein
2. The said land was acquired by possession and material occupation for a
large number of years and is at present occupied by applicant.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
1. The land in question belonged to the United States and was under the
control of the government of the Philippine Islands.
2. Should the property be declared to belong to the Insular Government, the
same be awarded to it, together with the issuance of the proper certificate of
registration.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the lot occupied by the court-house of the municipality of
Catbalogan, of the Islands and Province of Samar, belongs to the said
municipality or is state land under the control of the Insular Government?
HELD:
It belongs to the MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN. By right under the Law of the
Indies and Municipal Code.
RATIO:
1. Before reaching the ratio of the case, the ponente discussed first the
historical basis of the law governing municipalities.
HISTORICAL BASIS:
a. During the beginning of the Spanish occupation, the policy was to
seek out a group of inhabitants and establish pueblos, and later
barrios.
b. The administrative authority of a province, represented by the
Governor-General, had the authority to designate the territory of
new pueblos.
c. The Spanish officials tasked to colonize the Philippines observed
the Laws of the Indies in forming new towns:
i. Law 6, Title 5, Book 4 provides: Within the boundaries of a
town, there must be at least 30 residents, and each
resident must have a house.
ii. :aw 7, Title 5, Book 4 provides: whoever wishes to
establish a new town of only 10-30 residents shall be
granted the time and territory necessary for the purpose
and under the same conditions.
iii. Law 7, Title 7, Book 4 provides: manner of allotment of
territory by the provincial government:
iv. Law 8, Title 7, Book 4: casas reales (municipal buildings),
the cabildo, the concejo, customs buildings, and the like
shall be constructed between the main square and the
church.
v. Law 14, Title 7, Book 4: viceroys have the authority to
designate common lands, pastures, and public lands for
those pueblos which have non (but they cannot designate
areas meant for churches or courthouses because that
authority lies with the provincial government)
vi. Law 1, Title 13, Book 4 provides: viceroys have the
authority to designate to each villa and lugar additional
lands and lots which they may need, but the territory must
not be detrimental to a third party and they must send
statements of the designations of the government.
d. The municipality of Catbalogan is the provincial seat of Samar and
it is possibly the oldest pueblo in the province.
e. The inhabitants of a pueblo, being required to build decent and
habitable municipal buildings by paragraph 92 of the royal
ordinances of February 26, 1768, may be assumed to have built it
on their own ground after the provincial government had designated
territory for it according to the Law of the Indies.
f. The land designated for the church and the land designated for the
court house is considered property of the municipality because no
pueblo can exist administratively without having a church and a
courthouse which represents the seat of its local authority and
municipal government. Thus in this case, the parcel of land in
question is patrimonial property of Catbalogan.
2. The said municipality today is in possession fo the land in litigation, as the
owner thereof, under the protection of the civil and administrative laws which
guarantee the right of ownership of the corporations that are capable of
contracting, acquiring, and possessing real and personal property.
3. CIVIL LAW BASIS:
a. Under the Art. 343 of the Civil Code, property of provinces or towns
are divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
b. Art. 344, property for public use in provinces and towns comprises
provincial roads, squares, streets, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works of general services supported by
said towns or provinces. All other properties are patrimonial.
4. Sec. 2 of the Municipal Code states, (a) Pueblos incorporated under this
Act shall be designated as municipalities (municipios), and shall be
known respectively by the names heretofore adopted. Under such
names they may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with,
acquire and hold real and personal property for the general interest of
 the municipality, and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred
upon them.
(b) All property and property rights vested in any pueblo under its
former organization shall continue to be vested in the same
municipality after its incorporation under this Act.
5. By this last-cited administrative Act the rights of the old municipalities to
acquire real and personal property, in accordance with their former
organization, are recognized, and it is declared that the said property and
rights shall continue to pertain to the municipalities created in harmony with
the provisions of the Municipal Code, on account of such property being the
patrimonial property of the municipalities.
6. Under these principles, perfectly in accord with both the old and the mother
legislation of this country, the municipality of Catbalogan ought to be
considered as the owner of the land in question, on account of the same
having been awarded to it as its own, under its exclusive ownership, on the
founding of the pueblo, for the erection of the courthouse, the record of the
case showing no proof nor data to the contrary. As the plaintiff municipality,
the applicant, has been occupying the property on which its court-house is
situated during such a long space of time, much longer than that required for
extraordinary prescription (art. 1959 of the Civil Code), it can not be denied
that the presumption exists, in its favor, that it has been holding the land in
its character of owner, since the trial record exhibits no proof that any other
parcel of land, distinct from that in controversy, was awarded to the said
municipality for the erection thereon of its court-house, a court-house and
the land on which to build it being necessary and indispensable for the
existence of the pueblo.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For the foregoing reasons, and considering that the municipality of Catbalogan is the
owner of the land occupied by its court-house and that it is entitled to have the said
property registered in its name in the Court of Land Registration, it is proper, in our
opinion, to affirm and we hereby affirm the judgment appealed from in its present
form.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: (I believe this case if for the appreciation of how our local
government code was formed during the Spanish occupation.) Municipalities are the
nucleus of inhabitants and require land for the construction of its various buildings.
Such a courthouse is considered the patrimonial property of the municipality and
cannot be taken away by the National Government.
Mondano v. SIlvosa 1955
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him
for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary
who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor
Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him.
Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition
enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that
he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive
Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the
power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,but not of all
local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he
does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in
the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided
by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of
the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious,
he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing
a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to
the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral
turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must
suspend a mayor not because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but because
of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
Basco v. Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corp. 1991
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the
power to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success
hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983,
PAGCORs charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that
PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law
creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates
the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the
constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it
legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is
violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of
the equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that
some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as
amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP
42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not
render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of
the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The
equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution
does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as
the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly
on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject
to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right
to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress
which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
Alvarez v. Guingona 1996
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the
House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817
was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB
8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA
7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law
on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and
that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per
annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average
income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows.
Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was
on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing
on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation
of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to
classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-
owned-or-controlled corporations.
Lidasan v. COMELEC 1967
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790,
entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in
Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA
4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA
4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in
another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here
presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato
voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao
FACTS: Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for
its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project
was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo
the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: WON the LGUs are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which
requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
HELD: No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGUs are juridical
persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not
within an environmentally critical area neither being a critical project. The said project
is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area.
Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage.
It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ
of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
Reynaldo R. San Juan vs CSC, DBM, Cecilia Almajose
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
FACTS:
The position of Provincial Budget Officer for the Province of Rizal was left vacant on
March 22, 1988.
Provincial Governor, petitioner informed the Director of DBM that Ms. Dalisay Santos,
then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal, assumed offices as Acting PBO since
March 22, 1988 and requested the Director of DBM to endorse the appointment of
Ms. Santos to the position of PBO. DBM Regional Director found Cecilia Almajose,
among the nominees of the petitioner to be the most qualified and recommended to
the DBM Secretary the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal, which the DBM
USec signed the appointment papers of Almajose as PBO.
Upon learning of Almajoses appointment, petitioner wrote DBM Sec protesting
against the said appointment on the grounds that the DBM Usec is not legally
authorized to appoint the PBO, that Almajose lacks the required 3 yrs works
experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31, and that under EO No. 112,
it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has
the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DBM has the power to appoint the PBO without violating the
principle of Local Autonomy.
RULING:
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of
two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy but distinguished
presidential control to supervision:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935
Constitution)"
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and
circumscribed by statute.
Article II, S. 25, 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."
The 14 sections in Article X, on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
"Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units."
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of
the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must
return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.
Pimentel v. Aguirre 2000
Facts:
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at
least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) .
On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount
of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all
LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal
autonomy
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their
internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments
Held:
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy
does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the
head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible
for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and
economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs
are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga,
to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to
show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector
deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different
leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no
authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue
allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake
cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country,
which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case
of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well
within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the
directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule,
the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit 1990
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed
that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the
Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was
then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by
issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had
virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the
President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative
powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of
government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220
did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O.
No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the
National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the
act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the
Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Limbona vs. Mangelin 1989
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November
as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However,
on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker
of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the
case moot and academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction
of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to
the two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of
the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make
the petition moot and academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due
process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is no
showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not appear
that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and
corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded
any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12
by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the
Presidential Decree provides that the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions... Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
president exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second
place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be
invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and
speaker of the Sanggunian.
HEBRON v. REYES 1958
PETITIONER: Bernardo Hebron
RESPONDENT: Eulalio Reyes
SUMMARY: Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor and vice-mayor
respectively of the Municipality of Carmona in the province of Cavite in the general
elections of 1951. On May 1954, petitioner was preventively suspended by the
Office of the President due to certain administrative charges lodged against him.
During that period, respondent was directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor.
Since petitioner remained suspended for more than a year and 7 months and there
was no action on the administrative case, an action for quo warranto was instituted
on the ground that respondent was illegally holding and has unlawfully refused to
surrender the office. The Supreme Court
DOCTRINE: Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the
municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear
and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations
and none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that the executive
department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision
over local governments, may conduct investigations with a view to determining
whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain
whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action;
that the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial
governor and the provincial board to take said action, if the same is warranted, and
they failed to do so; that the provincial governor and the provincial board may not
be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon
them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that such would
be the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said
assumption of powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for the
authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in character.
FACTS:
1. In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner, a member of the Liberal
Party, and respondent of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and
vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite
for a term of 4 years beginning January 1952. Petitioner discharged the
 duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24 1954 when he
received a communication from the Office of the President of the Philippines
informing him that the President has decided to assume directly the
investigation of the administrative charges against said petitioner for alleged
oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office. The
Provincial Fiscal of said province was designated as Special Investigator of
the said charges. In the interim, petitioner was preventively suspsended and
the Vice Mayor was directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during
said period of suspension.
2. Respondent acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite
investigated the charges. After holding hearings in connection with said
charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 15, 1954.
Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the President for
decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the
term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May
13, 1955, he instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground
that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and
had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner,
who claimed to be entitled thereto. Respondent denied the alleged illegality
of petitioners suspension and claimed that the former was holding the office
of the mayor in compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President.
3. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and
said amici curiae Dean Vicente Sinco and Professor Enrique Fernando,
appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed their respective
memoranda and the case became submitted for decision. The case could
not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the
members of the Court could not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach
an agreement on the decision thereon. Although the term of office of
petitioner expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot, as regards such
rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto.
ISSUE: WoN a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the
Philippines regardless of the preocedure set forth in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code NO
RULING: Petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. Referring to local elective officers, We held in Lacson v. Roque that the
President has no inherent power to remove or suspend them. There is
neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping
authority to remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph
(1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision
over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate control.
Far from implying control or power to remove the President's supervisory
authority over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso "as may be
provided by law", a clear indication of constitutional intention that the
provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative
implementation. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove
specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to
law, which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for
any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
2. Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code provide the
causes, fashion, and the procedure prescribed by law for the suspension of
elective municipal officials. My. Justice Tuason, in construing the
aforementioned provisions states that the preceding sections should control
in the field of investifations of charges against and suspension of municipal
officials. The minuteness and care, in three long paragraphs, with which the
procedure in such investigations and suspensions is outlined, clearly
manifests a purpose to exclude other modes of proceeding by other
authorities under general statutes, and not to make the operation of said
provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of higher authorities.
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified
by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
absence of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist
with respect to municipal officers. What is more, the language of sections
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt
that the law in the words of Mr. Justice Tuason "frowns upon prolonged
or indefinite suspension of local elective officials"
3. The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which is consecrated policy in other jurisdictions whose republican
institutions this country has copied, requires speedy termination of a case in
which suspension has been decreed, not only in the interest of the
immediate party but of the public in general. The electorate is vitally
interested, and the public good demands, that the man it has elevated to
office be, within the shortest time possible, separated from the service if
proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and restored if found innocent. In the
case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the
investigation were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 1954 yet
the decision on the charges was not rendered either before the filing of the
complaint or before the expiration of petitioners term of office.
4. Respondent cannot rely on Sections 79(c) and 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code because although the Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C), he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the
investigation by any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under
his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be
provided by law. If the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1,
section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all
local government's is to be construed as the same power granted to the
Department Head in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then
 there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of
control and that of supervision. Section 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of municipalities. If it be construed
that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in
the Department Head by section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code,
then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by
section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution. The word "offices", as used
in section 79 (C), was not deemed to include local governments, even
before the adoption of the Constitution.
5. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code relied upon by respondent
and the amici curiae, provides that the President shall have authority "to
order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an
investigation of any action or conduct of any person in the government
services and in connection therewith, to designate the official committee or
person by whom such investigation shall be conducted. Since the powers
specified therein are given to the President, "in addition to his general
supervisory authority", it follows that the application of those powers to
municipal corporations insofar as they may appear to sanction the
assumption by the Executive of the functions of provincial governors and
provincial boards, under said sections 2188 to 2190 would contravene the
constitutional provision restricting the authority of the President over local
government to "general supervision."
6. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said
Section 64. There is no question of disloyalty in the present case. Upon the
other hand, the power of removal of the President, under the first sentence
of said paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised "conformably to law", which, as
regards municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
7. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of
the Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to
2191 of the same code, on the other, the latter being specific provisions,
setting forth the procedure for the disciplinary action that may be taken,
particularly, against municipal officials must prevail over the former, as
general provisions, dealing with the powers of the President and the
department heads over the officers of the Government.
8. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor
directly, without any opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and
the provincial board to exercise the administrative powers of both under
sections 2188 to 2190 of the Administrative Code, cannot be adopted
without conceding that said powers are subject to repeal or suspension by
the President. Obviously, this cannot, and should not, be done without a
legislation of the most explicit and categorical nature, and there is none to
such effect. Moreover, as stated in Mondano vs. Silvosa (supra), said
legislation would, in effect, place local governments under the control of the
Executive and consequently conflict with the Constitution (Article VII, section
10[1]).
9. The case of Rodriguez v. Montinola is enlightening as regards the lack of
power of the Secretary of Finance to disapprove a resolution of the
Provincial Board abolishing positions of 3 special counsel in the province.
The Court ruled that the power of general supervision granted the President,
in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be
interpreted to mean that he, or his alterego may direct the form and manner
in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties.
10. It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General
had both control and supervision over all local governments, (Section 22,
Jones Law) The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional
Convention in introducing the change, therefore, must have been to free
local governments from the control exercised by the central government,
merely allowing the latter supervision over them. But this supervisory
jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be exercised "as may be provided by law."
Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political Law expressed himself as
follows: Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over the supervised party. Hence, the power of general supervision
over local governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the authority to
appoint and remove local officials.
11. The respondents argue that although the power of general supervision of the
President imposes upon him the duty of non-interference in purely corporate
affairs of the governments, such limitation does not apply to its political
affairs. n the Philippines, the constitutional provision limiting the authority of
the President over local governments to General supervision is unqualified
and, hence, it applies to all powers of municipal corporations, corporate and
political alike. In fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the
constitutional powers of the President as regards the corporate functions of
local governments, inasmuch as the Executive never had any control over
said functions. What is more, the same are not, and never have been, under
the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of corporate, non-
governmental or non-political functions, municipal corporations stand
practically on the same level, vis-a-vis the National Government or the State
as private corporations
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque is substantially different from the one at bar.
Administrative charges were filed, against Mayor Villena, with the office of
the President, which referred the matter to the Provincial Governor of Rizal,
but the Provincial Board thereof failed to act on said charges for an
unreasonable length of time. Under such facts it is understandable that the
power of supervision of the President was invoked, either to compel action,
which the Provincial Board had the duty to take, or, in view of its obvious
unwillingness to comply therewith, to cause the charges to be investigated
by somebody else, in line with the responsibility of the Executive "to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the present case, however, the
Provincial Board of Cavite never had a chance to investigate the charges
against petitioner herein. From the very beginning, the office of the
Executive assumed authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such
assumption of authority was made under such conditions as to give the
impression that the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board were
banned from exercising said authority.
13. In Villena, the majority held that the President of the Philippines, under
sections 64 (b), and 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the later
has been amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution, is
vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal officials for grave
misconduct, and it appears that the suspension was ordered by virtue of that
 authority; and (2) the Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers
conferred upon him by section 79 (c), in connection with section 86, of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, in ordering an administrative
investigation of the charges against the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor
of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. Those who dissented
disagreed insofar as the majority held that the acts of the department
secretaries are presumptively the case of the executive and that the
suspension directed by the Secretary should be considered as decreed by
the President himself. More important still, said majority opinion and the
aforementioned separate opinions cited section 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code as the source of the power of the Executive to suspend
and remove municipal officials. However, said provision deals with such
power of suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the
Provincial Board in proceedings held under sections 2188 to 2190 of the
said Code. Nowhere in said opinions was anything said on the question
whether said appellate authority implies a grant of original power to suspend,
either without an appeal from said decision of the Provincial Board, or
without any proceedings before said Board calling for the exercise of its
disciplinary functions under said provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies
and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void
for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
RTCs Ruling:
1. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared
Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power
of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.
Petitioners Argument:
1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Courts Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but
supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act
undone or re-done. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain
ultra vires provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment
but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.
BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001
FACTS:
Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra,
Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra,
Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both
Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in
the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the
province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.
RULING:
In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng
mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league
or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed
or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng
mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of
determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall have
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay
representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected
presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the
provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected
presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila
chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National
Liga ng mga Barangay.
We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes
the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a
post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both
the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for
review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect
amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board
and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject
to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more
than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of
control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given
the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative
Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units
of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is
compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local
governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.28
Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government
Pelaez v. Auditor General 1965
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action
to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section
68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides
that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar
and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains
that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may
require which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the
public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the
seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and
eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya 1988
SUMMARY: Kapalong moved to dismiss Sto. Tomas complaint for settlement of
boundary. Court held
that dismissal was proper, since Sto. Tomas has no legal personality and cannot be a
party to any civil action. Presidents cannot create municipalities, and Sto. Tomas here
was created by Pres. Garcia.
FACTS: Pres. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas from portions of the
Municipality of Kapalong. Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of
Kapalong.
Sto. Tomas filed a complaint against Kapalong for settlement of the municipal
boundary dispute. From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P.
Garcia created Municipality of Sto.Tomas. Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over 8
barrios of Kapalong.
For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two
municipalities was brought, at the instance of the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, to the
Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, no action was
taken on the same.
The Municipality of Sto. Tomas eventually filed a complaint against the Municipality of
Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute. The Municipality of
Kapalong filed a MTD on the ground of lack of legal personality of the Municipality of
Sto. Tomas.
ISSUE: Does Santo Tomas legally exist? NO.
HELD: As ruled in the Pelaez case, the President has no power to create a
municipality. Since Santo Tomas has no legal personality, it cannot be a party to any
civil action, and as such, Judge Moya should have dismissed the case, since further
proceedings would be pointless. The Rules of Court expressly provides that only
"entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs MENDEZ, SR.,
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued Executive Order No.
353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. By
virtue of EO No. 174, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district
of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning by operation of RA No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that
"(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House
Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of
San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 and prayed
that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently
ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective
offices. The petitioning municipality contended that EO No. 353, a presidential act,
was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued,
the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
Respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative
and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that
the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of EO No. 353, it
should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence
since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that,
considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the
proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting
through the Solicitor General. The trial court dismissed the petition 9 for lack of
cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State.Hence, this
petition "for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction."
RULING: NO. Granting the EO No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.
Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of EO
No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six
years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The
ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain
governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of
the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal
district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth
class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in RA No.
1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the
municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978,
issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension
of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just
that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"
are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.22
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of
Quezon must now be conceded.
DECISION: The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
Cawaling vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities
Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day
period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
unconstitutional ,contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby
violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city
may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by
merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance
with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply
with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we
are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it
clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because
we feel it is unwise or impractical.
3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation
was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each
other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the
fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds
for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that
petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption
of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
League of Cities v. COMELEC 2011
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.
The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001
while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause.
Aquino III v. COMELEC 2010
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31
October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716,
runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the
cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is

merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.