You are on page 1of 156

T h e N e w C r i t i q u e o f I d e o l o g y

Lessons from Post-Pinochet Chile

Ricardo C a m a r g o
Faculty of Law, University of Chile, Chile

p 3 I Q f 8 \ / 8
m a c m i l l a n
^

Ricardo Camargo 2013 For Andrea and our son Clemente,


All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this with thanks for everything
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmilan in the UK is an imprint of Macmilan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmilan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmilan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave and Macmilan are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-137-32966-0
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.
C o n t e n t s

List of Tables x
Acknowledgments xii
List of Abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1
What is the problem with ideology? 1
The methodological framework 7
Outline of the book 9
Part I Toward a New Model of Ideology Critique
1 The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 15
Marx's notion of ideology revisited 17
Three approaches of research on ideology 22
Ideology in the descriptive sense 25
Ideology in the positive sense 28
Ideology in the negative sense 31
Althusser's theory of ideology revisited 37
Summary 40
2 The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 41
The 'Archimedean true point' problem 43
Freeden's methodological approach to ideology 46
Laclau's non-essentialist notion of ideology 55
Summary 66
3 A Universal Notion of Truth: Habermas avec Zizek 67
Habermas's inter-subjective approach to the truth 68
The 'ideal versus the real world' 71
A Zizekian critique of Habermas's theory of truth 74
Cynicism and fantasy in Zizek's theory 76
A critique of Habermas's constitutional patriotism 81
Toward a universal notion of truth 84
The fictional 'Real' as a universal truth 85
Summary 90
4 The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 92
First phase: the socio-historical analysis 93
Second phase: formal or discursive analysis 94
Third phase: a symptomatic (re)interpretation 95
Research design of the case study 95
viii Contents Contents ix

Conceptual framework 7 The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 206


96
Justification of the case study Traumas and fantasies of ChPEs 208
97
Definitions and assumptions The 'two fears' of ChPEs 210
99
220
Empirical research question (ERQ) 99 One or two models?
226
Discourse 100 Income inequality in a 'successful' economy?
229
Consensus 100 The strategy of naturalization/eternalization
232
Recognition of success 101 From the 'two souls' to the 'test of governance'
236
The political economy model 101 Quality of education ergo income equality?
242
Post-Pinochet Chile (1990-2006) 102 Conclusion
243
Chilean political elites 102 What about class struggle?
247
Discursive strategies 103 The denial of the Real: toward a new ideology 249
Class struggle 103 Summary
The (operative) discourse of class struggle 105 251
Conclusion
Class struggle as the fictional Real 106 254
Lessons for a new ideology critique
The denial of class struggle 108 260
Final reflections
The denial of the fictional Real 109
Summary 110 264
Notes
Part II Post-Pinochet Chile: A Case Study 271
Bibliography
5 The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 113 291
Index
The power structure in Chile pre-Pinochet 113
The power structure in Allende's government 114
First phase: the great transformation (1973-81) 119
The changes in the productive structure 120
The formation of new economic groups 123
The transformation of social classes 124
The second phase: the crisis and the recovery 130
The deepening of the productive structure 130
The reshaping of power within the economic groups 135
The legacy of Pinochet's regime 140
Summary 152
6 The Discourse of Class Struggle 153
The discourse of class struggle in Chile pre-1973 153
The socialists: the 'most revolutionary' party 157
The communists: a conservative proletarian party 159
The dilemma of the Christian Democrat Party 163
The radicalization of the oligarchical parties 167
The military coup and the renovation of politics 171
The socialist renovation 173
The 'isolationism' of communists 182
The 'pragmatization' of the Center 190
The emergence of a neo-liberal Right 196
Summary 204
List of Tables xi

5.20 Labor share in the GDP (Chile) (percentages) 146


List of Tables 147
5.21 Income inequality indicators (Chile, 1964-2003)
5.22 Variations of GDP in Chilean governments (1960-2005) 149
5.23 Participation of capitalist, professional-executive
and petty entrepreneurs classes in the EAP (Chile, 1990-8) 150
5.1 Percentage of GNP and productivity activities controlled
5.24 Indicators of household consumption and incomes of the
by the state 115
richest part of the population (Chile and other countries,
5.2 Participation of productivity activities in GDP 116 1968-2003) 151
5.3 Participation of productivity activities in employment
and labor force 117
5.4 Participation of social classes in the EAP (Latin America) 117
5.5 Participation of informal proletariat and pretty bourgeoisie
in the EAP (Latin America) 119
5.6 Participation of productivity activities in GDP
(Chile, the 1970s) 121
5.7 Participation of productive activities in the employment
and labor force (Chile, 1970-80) 122
5.8 Participation of informal and formal proletariat in
the EAP (Latin America) 125
5.9 Rates of union affiliation in industry (Chile) 127
5.10 Income inequality indicators in Chile (1969-81) 128
5.11 Indicators of dominant and bureaucratic-technical
classes in Chile (1960-80) 129
5.12 Participation of productivity activities in GDP
(Chile, 1974-93) 132
5.13 Participation of manufacturing industry in GDP
(Chile, 1985-2000) (at constant prices of 1986, percentages) 133
5.14 Participation of labor force in productivity activities
(Chile, 1985-93) 134
5.15 Participation of informal workers in the EAP
(Chile and other countries, 1990-8) 140
5.16 Structure of non-agricultural employment (Chile and Latin
America, 1990-2003) (percentages) 142
5.17 Wage and salaried workers with social protection coverage
(Chile and Latin America, 1990-2003) (percentages) 143
5.18 Number of unions and rates of unionization
(Chile, 1973-2004) 144
5.19 Number of strikes in Chile (1969-2004) 145
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s
List of A b b r e v i a t i o n s

A great many people have contributed to the making of this book. Through- AFP Asociacidn de Fondos de Pensiones (Pensions Funds
out this time Andrew Gamble and Jean Grugel were supportive, insightful Associations)
and inspiring supervisors. Andrew in particular has shown enormous gener-
osity and encouragement and remains a great source of inspiration. Aletta ANEF Asociacidn National de Empleados Fiscales (Chilean Public
Norval and Andrew Vincent contributed a great deal in the way of critical Workers Association)
insights. More people than I can mention have given me invaluable support APEC Asia Pacific Economic Forum
while I was working toward the completion of this text. A special thanks to CDP Christian Democrat Party
all those colleagues and students from the University of Chile and University
of Buenos Aires for helping me to think through many of the problems cov- CENDA Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Altemativo (Centre
ered in this book. I am deeply grateful to Ernesto Laclau and the friends and of National Studies for an Alternative Development)
comrades of the Latin American review Debates y Combates for inspiring me CEP Centro de Estudios Publicos (Centre of Public Studies)
to pursue not only academic but also emancipatory political endeavors. In CIA Central Intelligence Agency
addition, I am thankful to the Chilean government's funding agency for
science and technology (Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y CIEPLAN Corporation de Estudios para Latinoamerica (Corporation
Tecnologica; CONICYT); research funding for this book was provided by of Economic Research for Latin America)
Fondecyt de Iniciacion N 11100170. Last but not least, a special thanks to ChCP Chilean Communist Party
my immensely supportive and patient family: my wife Andrea and our little ChPEs Chilean Political Elites
son Clemente, and my parents Carlos and Lidia.
ChSP Chilean Socialist Party
Preliminary versions of Chapters 1 and 2 originally appeared as 'Notas acerca
de la determination de lo ideologico y verdadero en Teoria de la Ideologia' CPC Corporation de la Production y el Comercio (Confederation
Revista Cientia Politka 2005, vol. 25, no. 2, 117-42 (and thereafter in El Sublime of Industry and Trade)
Re-torno de la Ideologia, Metales Pesados, 2011), and are reproduced here with CODELCO Corporation Nacional del Cobre de Chile (National Copper
the permission oi Revista Cientia Politka. A preliminary version of Chapter 3 was Corporation of Chile)
originally published as 'The Critique of Ideology Revisited: A Zizekian Appraisal CORFO Corporation de Fomento de la Production (Production
of Habermas's Communicative Rationality' in Contemporary Political Theory Development Corporation)
(2008) and is reproduced here with the permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
Finally, a shortened and modified version of Chapter 7 was originally published CUT Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (Workers' United
as 'Dealing with Income Inequality during the Bachelet Administration: A Center of Chile)
Critical Analysis of the Discourse of Chilean Political Elites' in Latin American DNS Doctrine of National Security
Perspectives 2012 and is published here with the permission of Sage.
EAP Economically Active Population
I also want to give a special acknowledgment to the participants who agreed
to take part in this research. I thank them for giving so generously of their time ERQ Empirical Research Question
and energies and for allowing me to use the narratives of their experiences ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
in my research: Genaro Arriagada, Hugo Baeiriein, Ana Bell, the late Edgardo ENAP Empresa National del Petrdleo (Chile's State-Run Oil Company)
Boeninger, Ronald Bown, Maria Luisa Brahm, Jose Joaquin Brunner, Manuel
Concha, Vittorio Corbo, Enrique Correa, Raul de la Puente, Roberto Fantuzzi, FLACSO Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American
Faculty of Social Sciences)
Hugo Fazio, Alicia Frohman, Jaime Gazmuri, Jose Antonio Guzman, Hernan
Larrain, Evelyn Matthei, Carlos Peria, Coral Pey, Joseph Ramos, Osvaldo Rosales, FEUC Federation de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Catdlica
the late Maria Rozas, Raul Saez, Ernesto Ottone and Guillermo Teillier. de Chile (Union Student of the Catholic University)

xiii
xiv List of Abbreviations

FPMR Frente Patridtico Manuel Rodriguez (Manuel Rodriguez


Patriotic Front) I n t r o d u c t i o n
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
ILO International Labour Organization
ISAs Ideological State Apparatuses
ISI Import Substitution Industrialization
MAPU Movimiento de Action Popular Unitaria (Agrarian Popular
Unitary Movement)
MIR Movimiento de lzquierda Revolutionaria (Revolutionary Left
Movement) This book seeks to revitalize the ideology critique, which appears nowa-
MJ Modes of Justification days as an outdated discipline, mainly because it cannot give a satisfactory
account of a kind of 'God's eye' discourse, which a critic of ideology - in
MUN Movimiento de Union Nacional (Movement of National Unity) an apparently inescapable way - has to assume to formulate his or her
NGO Non-governmental Organization critique. This work, however, by revisiting Habermas's theory of communi-
PEM Programa de Empleo Minimo (Minimum Employment Program) cative action viewed through the lens of the theory of ideology formulated
by Slavoj Zizek attempts to present an 'alternative route' to insist on the
POJH Programa de Jefes de Hogar (Program for Heads of Family) pertinence of an ideology critique for political analysis. For the sake of the
PU Popular Unity argument, this book also includes the case study of the consensus reached
PROCHILE Programa de Fomento a las Exportaciones Chilenas by Chilean political elites on the post-Pinochet political economy model
(Promotion of Exports Unity) (1990-2006). In this way, the case study is used to obtain new theoretical
RN insights in order to return critically to the problem of the possibility and
Renovation Nacional (National Renewal)
necessity of a universal truth as a way of rehabilitating an ideology critique
RP Radical Party for political analysis, identified as the main concern of this book.
SNA Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (National Society of
Agriculture) What is the problem with ideology?
SOFOFA Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (The Chile's Manufacturers'
Association) It is worthwhile noticing that the debate between rival theories of
ideology(ies) has always been impinged by the setting up of a distinction
SONAMI Sociedad Nacional de Mineria (The National Mining between the ideological and the non-ideological. This is something that has
Corporation) not always been acknowledged by scholars working in the field; yet it could
SRQs Specific Research Questions explain many of the confusions and misconceptions that have surrounded
SSCs the notion of ideology. In fact, scholars in the field have argued fan favor of
Strategies of Symbolic Constructions
the end of ideology at least twice. However, what proponents of these posi-
UDI Union Demdcrata Independiente (Independent Democrat Unity) tions probably had in mind on both occasions was to defeat a particular
USA United States of America conception of ideology rather than to negate the existence of ideologies alto-
USSR gether. David Bell (1988: 409), for instance, one of the proponents of the 'end
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of ideology' thesis in the early 1950s, explicitly recognized in the Afterward
of the 1988 edition of his book The End of Ideology that he has always argued
in favor not of the 'death' of all ideology but rather of one specific kind of
ideology, which originated in the nineteenth century, whose main characters
2 The New Critique of Ideology
Introduction 3
were to be universalistic, humanistic and fashioned by intellectuals. However,
at the same time he explicitly recognized that the states of Africa and Asia - Western philosophy, which has traditionally assumed a bipolar structure
which were rising during this time - were fashioning new ideologies with dif- that distinguishes between illusion and reality (Camargo 2007: 29). This
ferent appeal for their own people. Therefore, ideologies were not really dead, classical epistemological bipolar matrix, illusion/reality, was chiefly based on
rather they were of new types that were conceptualized by Bell as 'parochial, the assumption that the rational-individual thinker is the exclusive locus,
instrumental and created by political leaders' (ibid.: 409). that is, the beginning and the end of that reflection. In other words, the
'Archimedean point of truth' within the epistemological debate was mostly
Furthermore, it is in a series of theorizations raised around the distinction
associated with a true knowledge condition, that is, a rational (in the sense
between the ideological and the non-ideological in which the debate about
of logos) exercise practiced by an isolated individual in order to make sense
the theory of ideology largely consists. A central feature of such a distinc-
(to know, to acquire logos) of the external world. This individual rationality
tion is what I have called the problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth'.
legacy - the philosophy of consciousness - is going to be inherited by the
The 'Archimedean point of truth' suggests the idea that in order for a given
new concept of ideology as a whole.
social order or political discourse to be criticized as ideological, a universal,
fixed and absolute true stage must necessarily be assumed, as it would only However, the complexities of the notion of ideology, theoretically speak-
be from this point that the former statement could be asserted. Otherwise, ing, are explained to a large extent by the modification suffered by this
such a critique might be unfounded. The 'Archimedean point of truth' is initial 'rational-individual legacy', throughout a dispute that extends from
thus threefold. Firstly, it demands universality, which means that the true Marx to Zizek. A first move was made on the understanding of the notion
point must be valid for all who are addressed in a given context (that is, of illusion as the ideological component of the concept of ideology. Indeed,
for all living in England the summer starts on 21 March of every year). although the theorists of ideology initially maintain the matrix illusion/
Secondly, it requires fixity, which means that the true point must always reality coined during the previous epistemological debate, they progres-
be placed in the same locus (that is, for all human beings the definition of sively shift the meaning of the term 'illusion' from an assumed non-real
whether it is day or night is always placed in relation to the movement of category - not part of the reality - to a component of the 'imaginary' or
the sun). Thirdly, it demands absoluteness, meaning that the true point is 'lived' reality, as Althusser finally asserts. In a way, this has been an insight
assumed as infallible (that is, the sun will always be what defines summer provided by Marx himself in his mature works but promptly forgotten by a
and a day upon the earth). tradition that insisted on conceiving the ideological as a false illusion with-
out concrete correlation to the real world. Althusserianism seemed to put
It is worthwhile noticing that it has been the adoption of a given an end to such confusion, conceiving ideology as a special component of
'Archimedean point of truth' that has made possible explicitly critical con- the superstructure of societies. However, Althusser could not avoid coining
ceptions of ideology, such as those defended by Marxists and critical theo- the science of historical materialism as a new objective standard to make
rists, who define ideology as a negative category that correlatively demands possible not the critique of ideology, because ideology was something with
a positive dimension with which to be contrasted. However, this has also which to cohabit, but something even greater: the advent of communism
been true for descriptive approaches, which although they intend to assimi- professed by Marxism. The somewhat infallible status attributed to the
late ideology into a natural operation of understanding - a cognitive map to Marxist science within the Althusserian architecture inevitably recalls the
act in politics - also tacitly assume the scientific method as their somewhat problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth' back to the theoretical dispute
Archimedean standard for distinguishing a non-ideological assertion. over the theory of ideology.
Andrew Vincent (1995: 20), for instance, refers to this problem as an ines-
capable condition linked to the analysis of ideologies, as he said: 'we examine A subsequent twist of this debate is produced by the post-structuralist
ideology as fellow sufferers, not as neutral observers [...]' (ibid.). Nonetheless, ethos, whereby the rejection of any 'Archimedean point of truth' is explicitly
he seems to still assert the possibility of a critique when he adds, assumed by a wide range of scholars, who deny the possibility of asserting
such a universal, fixed and absolute true point in a world now understood
to be deprived of fixed meanings (Rorty 1991: xxxix). The dismissal of any
[...] however, even though we are sufferers, we are not completed suffer-
ers. We can both belong and also, to a degree, distance ourselves in the 'Archimedean point of truth' has predictably forced most post-structuralist
very fact of theorizing self-consciously. (Ibid.) authors to abandon the notion of ideology altogether (Foucault 1980: 118).
However, a truly outstanding circumstance has been the insistency of a group
of scholars who, in spite of assuming the main premises of post-structuralism,
It is worthwhile noting that the 'Archimedean point of truth' has also been
manage still to propose new theorizations in the field of ideology. These new
an underlying basic premise of the whole epistemological reflection upon theorizations, however, cannot avoid relegating any universalistic notion
4 The New Critique of Ideology Introduction 5

of the truth to the rubbish bin, either by focusing on the more valuable (cogito) and non-rational' is present both as a condition of possibility and as
concern, or at least that which is assumed to be the most valuable, of the a limit of the critique of ideology. That ambivalence, which is explained by
way in which (political) ideologies take place in a social context rather than the limitations of the Habermasian and Zizekian theoretical formulations,
in the concept of ideology itself, or by assuming an explicit anti-essentialist has indeed favored relativist post-structuralists, which constantly raises
vantage point to produce a critique of ideology. Two important examples of doubts about the utility of using a refurbished 'Archimedean point of truth',
this trend in theory of ideology are Michael Freeden's morphological concep- in a world in which such a tension seems to be inherently unstable.
tual approach and Ernesto Laclau's theory of hegemony, both of which are This book attempts to propose a way to surmount the instability of this
reviewed in Chapter 2 of this book. tension. It is suggested that it is not only worth insisting upon the use of
However, if we assume - as suggested by Norval (2000a: 315) - that the the notion of ideology for political analysis, as Freeden and Laclau would
reasons which explain the survival of the concept of ideology refer to the probably agree, but also to persist in re-problematizing a notion of universal,
theoretical and practical significance of the problems and questions left unre- though not fixed or absolute, truth, which, based on a certain equilibrium
solved by the classical debate in the field rather than with the pertinence of of the aforementioned tension, would make feasible an ideology critique for
the theoretical assumptions and answers actually provided by that debate, we 'post-modern times'.
can observe that such insistence upon using the notion of ideology is due It is thus assumed that this book has the explicit intent of revitalizing an ide-
to a sense of awareness that by discarding ideology, in the way proposed by ology critique for political analysis. The reason behind this insistency is theo-
'the end of ideology thesis' or Foucault's circumspection attitude, we would retical (and political) rather than normative, meaning that the re-introduction
imply that we had abandoned the whole set of unresolved theorizations of a notion of universal truth can be assumed as a conceptually necessary
involved in that debate. Implicitly, then, there is an appreciation of the condition to get a better understanding of a given social order in which the
challenges posed by the classic theories of ideology, which entails the open- ideological can still be distinguished from the non-ideological. In other words,
ing of new avenues to rethink the old but actual problems of ideology. Aletta it is worthwhile acknowledging that common sense would probably suggest -
Norval calls this a 'process of reinscription', which entails a repetition of ear- after a century characterized by philosophical and political defense of a 'thick
lier themes and a certain alteration of them. It follows the logic of 'iteration' rationality' and 'big Truths', which induced the biggest confrontations and
introduced by Derrida (1988) in Limited Inc. abc (Norval 2000a: 315). atrocities ever known in the history of humankind - that any pretension
Lastly, both components of the classic legacy of the aforementioned notion of asserting a universal notion of truth should be immediately rejected as
of ideology - its rational (cogito) and its individual character - have been non-sense. However, this book, on the contrary, will argue that we still miss
contested in a new way by two outstanding scholars, who either challenge too much - theoretically (and politically) speaking - when we renounce in
the classical understanding of the 'Archimedean point of truth', as a fixed advance the possibility of asserting a point from which an expression such as
and permanent point of true knowledge in the sense of cogito, replacing it 'Muslims are inferior to Christians or vice versa' cannot be universally identi-
with a non-rationalist though still universalistic approach, as defended by fied as ideological. Moreover, as recent history has started to show, there is no
Slavoj Zizek, or profess a definitive abandonment of the 'philosophy of con- guarantee that, in an epoch under the reign of a 'non-vantage point mantra'
sciousness', asserting instead a dialogical inter-subjective rationality to set (either assumed by an authentic sense of tolerance or by a sense of fear or
a new 'Archimedean point of truth' (universal pragmatics) as postulated by guilt), atrocities such as those which occurred in Auschwitz can be excluded
Habermas. In this new twist of theorization, the classical bipolar structure altogether from the imaginary or reality of the current political arena.
reality/illusion has been challenged - either directly by Zizek with the adop- The adoption of a universal notion of truth does not of course exclude
tion of a new Lacanian trilateral matrix, the symbolic/the imaginary/the ipso facto the possibility that such a notion could be(come) ideological - an
Real, or indirectly by Habermas by problematizing 'the symbolic' compo- outcome that can only be (partially) prevented by the continuous exercise
nent rather than 'the illusion' one of the former bipolar matrix, as one only of the critique of ideology practiced, this time, on the (fictional) universal
conceived as non-ideological when it is rationally communicatively asserted truth adopted, as it will be argued in Chapter 3. It is, in this way, only the
by a given community. constant adoption of fictional notions of universal truths - avoiding, in
However, it is worthwhile noting that both Habermas's and Zizek's new this way, fixity and absoluteness - in a continuous process of checking, that
efforts to assert a plausible critique of ideology for post-modern times, would reasonably provide a basis for the indispensable exercise of a new ide-
although very significant, are far from decisive. Moreover, they have inau- ology critique, as well as preventing such a critique from becoming biased.
gurated a new stage in the theorization of ideology, in which a constant ten- With regard to the assertion of a 'conceptually necessary' notion of truth,
sion between the pairs 'individual versus collective rationality' and 'rational it is worthwhile remarking that the necessity of such a notion - as Taylor
6 The New Critique of Ideology Introduction 7

(1975: 96) has put it - 'doesn't repose on the analytical relation, but on far from meaning a complete abandonment of a dialogical aspiration to
something else: that we are here at a conceptual limit, such that we could reach rational agreements through a process of a shared understanding and
not form a coherent notion of experience which did not incorporate such meanings - a la Habermas - rests on the fact that it allows visibility of the
[a notion]' (ibid.), that is, the universal truth from which the ideological and necessity of assuming a universal notion of truth - a la Zizek - though in
non-ideological could be distinguished. a fictional way, as a necessary complement for any sincere communication
However, 'theory' - as Robert Cox (1996: 87) has famously put it - 'is field based on a thicker rationality.
always for someone and for some purpose'. In this book, the purpose of Furthermore, since this book is proposing a theoretical model to rehabili-
theory is inscribed within a post-Habermasian 'unfinished project of mod- tate ideology critique for political analysis, it also refers to the investigation
ernization' by proposing a re-introduction of a universal notion of truth of an empirical case study as a strategy to test, recreate or abandon such
within a conceptualization of ideology that would offer a new route to a theoretical model. A more general justification of the strategy of using
overcome Habermas's communicative rationality project by supplementing an empirical case study to revisit a 'theoretical thesis', which distances
it rather than by completely replacing it.1 itself from a 'pure' conceptual analytical philosophical investigation, can
It is worthwhile noticing that Habermas and Zizek have not been directly be found in the classic tradition of a theoretical analysis following Marx
involved in a theoretical dispute, so to confront their theorizations may and the early works of the critical theory school, notably by Adorno, who
seem, at first sight, uncanny. Even more, Habermas's theory of communica- understood 'theoretical research' as an intellectual exercise linked closely to
tive action and Zizek's critical theory of ideology are inscribed in two differ- an empirical case study, either as a strategy to deductively test or inductively
ent theoretical traditions, Habermas being the most important contemporary create a theory (Bernstein 1991: 1-28).
thinker in defense of the unfinished modernization project and Zizek, cur- For this purpose, this book extensively considers the consensus reached
rently one of the main critics of such a project. However, far from assuming by Chilean political elites on the post-Pinochet political economy model
their theories are incommensurable, it is here argued that it could be worth (1990-2006) as a case study applied to the main theoretical thesis of this
observing Zizek's theoretical endeavor as a continuation of Habermas's pro- work. Furthermore, the case study is researched in such a way so as to seek
posal, though 'with other ways'. Moreover, the main thesis of this book is to highlight how a 'fictional' use of Zizek's notion of the Real would make
that by using a fictional notion of the Real taken from a Zizekian reading of possible and necessary the distinction between an ideological and non-
Lacan, it would allow the production of an ideology critique for political ideological political consensus, which within a Habermasian matrix can be
analysis in which the truth - the unmasking of the extra-ideological place - considered always as valid. In this way, the case study is used to obtain new
becomes possible as a universal fictional category. This possibility emerges as theoretical insights to return critically to the problem of the possibility and
a consequence of shifting the traditional matrix illusion/reality, or its mod- necessity of a universal truth for an ideology critique for political analysis,
ern version, illusory reality, for one in which the 'Real' appears as a condition identified as the main research concern of this book.
of the possibility of reality but it is itself excluded from such a reality, as it is The Chilean case is particularly attractive because it has been commonly
analyzed in Chapter 3. presented as a model for the rest of Latin America, though most of those
Therefore, the truth would become not only viable but also even con- studies have been inscribed within traditional methodological approaches.
ceptually necessary as a condition that would make fictionally possible Therefore, to choose Chile as a case study for research that intends to high-
the fictitious existence of a communicative action field as a place in whicli light ideological components as explicative (alternative) factors that might
the 'validity claim' of truth in a Habermasian matrix could be saved from better explain Chile's exceptionality in the 1990s and 2000s within a Latin
being affected by a falsification of truth, which is the main weakness that American context might also allow the development of comparative multi-
Habermas's theory of communicative action suffers, as will be shown in approach analyses.
Chapter 3. In other words, it is only by assuming a universal fictional (not
fixed or absolute) truth in relation to which any 'truth validity claim' pro- The m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k
duced within a field of communicative action can be assessed that a risk of
being trapped - due to the 'thin rationality' of a Habermasian matrix - in This book is developed within a particular methodological framework,
an ideological delusion - such as that denounced by Zizek - could be tem- which is inscribed in two main theoretical traditions: the 'deep herme-
porarily avoided. It is in this point that a Zizekian theory of ideology and a neutic matrix', formulated by John B. Thompson in Ideology and Modern
Habermasian matrix of communicative action have found a quite uncanny Culture (1990), who follows the hermeneutic tradition from Paul Ricoeur
meeting point. Indeed, the real value of Zizek's approach in this respect, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and
8 Tlie New Critique of Ideology Introduction 9

Interpretation (1981), and the 'symptomatic reading' coined by Althusser and ineludibly incorporate value judgments. Nevertheless this is not a problem
Balibar in Reading Capital (1970). Therefore, the methodological approach within a hermeneutic methodology. Indeed, it is a basic premise of that
of this work can be summarized in four central premises, all of which are methodological approach to assert clearly that what is offered is no more
assumed in this book. than a mere interpretation of a complex, contingent and pre-interpreted
The first assertion establishes a clear distinction between studies that take phenomenon. Still, although an interpretation is always made by an inter-
place within the field of social science and humanities, and those which ested researcher - there is no discussion on this point - it is also very dif-
develop from the sphere of natural science. The distinction lies essentially ferent from those 'doxa' or opinions which are no more than structures of
in the character of the object domain that is to be researched. In contrast to daily understandings, attitudes and beliefs of individuals who make up the
natural science, where the object domain of study is formed by a concatena- social world. Lastly, the key factor that distinguishes a 'doxa' from a more
tion of events, objects or facts, which are there to be observed and explained rigorous interpretation is that the latter has an adequate methodological
by the researcher, a social or indeed a humanistic inquiry field is focused research design.
on an object domain, which, apart from being a set of configured events, Finally, since the central task of this book is conducted at the interpretative
objects and facts, is also integrated by subjects that are related to those mate- level of texts - either in the theoretical corpus of scholars of the field or in
rial objects in a meaningful way, which includes both the interpretation and the interview transcriptions of the qualitative empirical research case study -
production of meanings. This implies - as Thompson (1990) has noticed - the interpretative exercise will follow the practice of a 'symptomatic read-
that social inquiry is always a matter of reinterpretation of a pre-interpreted ing', which was coined by Althusser and Balibar in their analysis of Marx's
domain. Indeed, the social sphere is always firstly pre-interpreted by the Capital. In other words, what is here pursued when a text is interpreted are
subjects themselves who are the objects of the inquiry. Therefore, social the gaps, contradictions and other flaws in logic that the text might have
inquiry is essentially an interpretation of a meaningful phenomenon, which in order to show that these may be a sign of another set of ideas at work in
in many cases only exists because it exerts some particular meaning on the the text, of which authors are normally unconscious. Althusser and Balibar
subject or subjects analyzed. (1979: 28) have summarized this method better than anyone:
The second premise asserts that a critical inquiry (in fact, all social and
even natural inquiries) implies the assumption of a certain point from [it is] a reading which might well be called 'symptomatic', insofar as it
which the whole critical investigation is conducted and from which the divulges the undivulged event in the text it reads, and in the same move-
object domain of the inquiry is assessed. As this issue is precisely the matter ment related it to a different text, present as a necessary absence in tiie
of examination within the field of ideology in this book, it cannot be fully first. Like his first reading, Marx's second reading presupposes the exist-
resolved now. However, it cannot be completely ignored either. The solution ence of two texts, and the measurement of the first against the second.
adopted here is based upon the methodological framework of a deep herme- But what distinguishes this new reading from the old one is the fact that
neutic matrix that, far from offering some sort of uncontaminated point of in the new one the second text is articulated with the lapses on the first.
analysis, presents, at least, a method that explicitly declares that its central (Ibid., emphases from the original)
aim is no more (but also no less) than a matter of (re)interpretation of a
pre-interpreted domain - the socially constructed world - which includes
Outline of the book
three stages of analysis (Chapter 4). In this way, the biased tendencies always
present in any social inquiry are acknowledged but restricted to the una- The current stage of the debate on ideology is mostly inscribed within a
voidable limitations of the methodology of the deep hermeneutic matrix sort of 'post-critique of ideology' context. That does not mean to assume
adopted in this book. that all of the authors here analyzed have excluded altogether any role
Thirdly, it is necessary, however, to make clear that although this book is for an ideology critique, but it seems that almost all of them have indeed
fully committed to reaching, through the adoption of a deep hermeneutic abandoned the idea that associates the critique of ideology with any sort of
matrix, some sort of standard of objectivity to formulate an ideology cri- 'Archimedean point of truth' from which a critique might be possible, as
tique mentioned above, it could not avoid incorporating - to a certain was assumed as a basic premise by the classical debate in the field. The dis-
degree - a normative perspective, which is worthwhile recognizing from the association of the notion of ideology from the notion of the 'Archimedean
very beginning. However, that does not a priori mean to affirm the impos- point of truth' is usually explained by recalling a shared, common-sensical
sibility of assuming a negative character of ideology - a point rejected in premise that asserts the obsolescence of such an Archimedean notion in the
this book - but to recognize that in any case an ideology critique might current stage of the philosophical debate. This, in turn, means that to insist
10 The New Critique of Ideology
Introduction 11
upon asserting a more classical distinction between the ideological and non- is subjected to an ideology critique, following a Zizekian matrix, in which
ideological as two opposing categories - one that represents the truth of the the denial of the notion of class struggle, assumed as the Real, is used as a
world and the other falsehood - seems to be no longer reasonable. criterion to assert the ideological character of the consensus investigated.
But is there still room for a universal, though not fixed or absolute, notion The case study, which is researched following a deep hermeneutic matrix,
of truth acting as the kernel of an ideology critique, formulated for post- considers different methodological approaches and methods of analysis.
modern times? In other words, can we still justify, both theoretically and Firstly, an analysis of the main structural features of the political economy
normatively, the existence - real or fictional - of a universal stage, underly- Chilean model is undertaken, focusing on social classes and social inequali-
ing an intellectual and political exercise of an ideology critique, after the ties (Chapter 5). Secondly, a historical analysis of the discourse of Chilean
relativist recurrent formulation of the end of ideology theses? political elites from 1960s to 1990 is developed, focusing on the use of the
As I have already pointed out, the central thesis of this book assumes that, notion of class struggle (Chapter 6). Thirdly, an argumentative analysis of the
by using a fictional notion of the Real, we can allow for the production of discourse of Chilean political elites (collected by a series of semi-structured
an ideology critique for political analysis in which the truth becomes not interviews) on the consensus of post-Pinochet political economy model is
only possible but also necessary as a universal, though fictional, category to produced, focusing on the justification of the issue of income inequality
make possible the fictional existence of a communicative action field as a (Chapter 7). Finally, on the basis of the findings of the previous chapters,
place in which the 'validity claim' of truth in a Habermasian matrix could be both an interpretative appraisal of the ideological (or non-ideological) char-
temporarily saved from being affected by a falsification of the truth. acter of the consensus reached by the discourse of Chilean political elites
To illustrate these points, Part I of this book will firstly revisit Marx's notion (Chapter 7) and an interpretative analysis of the implications of the case
of ideology and show the different trends around which the post-Marx clas- study for the general thesis of this book are presented (Conclusion).
sical debate on ideology has revolved. The aim of Part I will be to highlight As a conclusion, the book will reflect on the idea that it would not only
the central premises of each theoretical stream in order to scrutinize the be worth insisting upon the use of the notion of ideology(ies) but also worth
way in which the 'Archimedean point of truth' has been built in each case persisting in re-problematizing a notion of truth that, though valid for all,
(Chapter 1). Then, the contemporary evolution of the debate around ideol- that is, universal, must be restricted to a particular situation and perma-
ogy will be analyzed, focusing on Michael Freeden's and Ernesto Laclau's nently revised (fictional character) to avoid as far as possible becoming fixed
theories, in order to exemplify two endeavors of theorizing the notion of and absolute. Thus this book is, in a way, an attempt to preserve the univer-
ideology - and their shortcomings - which have explicitly renounced any sal character of the thesis of the 'Archimedean point of truth', but cleared
pretension of assuming an 'Archimedean point of truth' (Chapter 2). With from its components of fixity and absoluteness - an endeavor that, if it is
these theoretical insights in mind, a subsequent chapter, following Zizek's successful, will eventually revitalize an ideology critique for political analy-
theory of ideology, will eventually defend the thesis of the necessity of a sis, as a renovated field of political theory for current times. In turn, this
fictional universal notion of truth within the theory of ideology by high- would also be particularly relevant for overcoming the shortcomings of the
lighting the weakness that Habermas's communicative rationality presents 'thin rationality' presented by Habermas's theory of communicative action.
when such a notion of universal truth is absent (Chapter 3). In short, what this book ultimately intends to propose is a Zizek-inspired
Part II of the book will apply (and test) the aforementioned thesis to the theoretical model of ideology critique that can be suitable for applying to
case study of the post-Pinochet Chilean political economy model. Indeed, the political analysis of any political consensus.
based on the historical background of the Chilean political elites investi-
gated, this research selects the notion of class struggle as a fictional Real to
assess critically the consensus of Chilean political elites on the post-Pinochet
political economy model (Chapter 4). Assuming as a hypothesis the consen-
sus of Chilean political elites on the post-Pinochet political economy model,
the investigation focuses on the discursive strategies of symbolic construc-
tions (SSCs) and modes of justification (MJ) that those elites have deployed
to sustain such a consensus In the presence of counteracting factors, such
as high levels of income inequality (Chapter 4). The aim is to contrast
a Habermasian interpretation of the consensus on the Chilean political
economy model with that which might result when such an interpretation
P a r t i

T o w a r d a N e w M o d e l o f

I d e o l o g y C r i t i q u e
T h e Classic D e b a t e o n t h e T h e o r y

of I d e o l o g y

This book adopts Marx's works as the truly theoretical beginning of the
notion of ideology. This does not exactly coincide with the traditional date
given by historians to the first use of ideology which, as it is known, is
attributed to the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, who coined it in 1796
to refer to his project of a new science concerned with the analysis of the
origin of ideas, inspired in the spirit of the Enlightenment (Kennedy 1978;
Larrain 1979; Thompson 1990: 26-33).
However, to set Marx as the starting point of the notion of ideology
seems to be more accurate if we assume that since Marx a new discipline -
the theory of ideology - emerged, giving rise to a peculiar systematic
theoretical dispute. It is worth noticing, however, that even before any sys-
tematic reflection on ideology had given rise to it, the term ideology had
already been object of a political dispute, incited by Napoleon I, who, in
Reponse a Tadresse du Conseil d'etat, accused Tracy and his fellows of 'suffer-
ing on ideology, that shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first
causes on which to base the legislation of people, rather than making use
of laws known to the human heart and of the lessons of history' (Kennedy
1978: 215).
However, to suggest a new criterion to establish the origin of ideol-
ogy does not absolve the subsequent theoretical from being conceived in
many ways as confusing, ambiguous or even contradictory. Ideology has
given rise to countless theorizations, and researchers are often less than
keen to acknowledge that what they are in fact investigating has very
few features in common with rival theories in the same field. Indeed, the
fact that from time to time revitalized attempts to proclaim the end of
ideology have been launched is indicative of the peculiar contradictory
character of ideology, seen by many as a notion that must be definitively
eliminated from the political theory discipline. But this also gives an idea
of the melange of rival theories, working on very different conceptions of
ideology, which, paradoxically, by their own distinctively and mutually

15
16 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 17

exclusive ways of reflection have often arrived at similar conclusions. Marx's notion of ideology revisited
Take for instance the cases of the thesis of the 'end of ideology' of the
early 1950s and 1960s coined by Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Seymour At least four theses have been deployed, disputing the way in which Marx
Lipset, Edward Shils and Chaim I. Waxman, on the one hand, and the would have developed his notion of ideology. The first thesis affirms that
post-modernist approach of the 'irrelevance of ideology' posed in the late there is only Marxist conception of ideology and that it presents equiva-
1970s and 1980s by Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard, on the lently in each of his works, which would have basically been formulated
other hand. Although both approaches drastically criticize the notion of in The German Ideology. The second thesis asserts that there is an epistemo-
ideology, they do so from different standpoints, not only citing different logical break in the works of Marx, which allows a distinction to be made
reasons but also referring to very dissimilar objects of inquiry, giving rise between the young (or pre-Marxist) and the old (or properly Marxist) Marx.
in fact to two divergent concepts of ideology altogether. While Aron, Bell, This is the position held by Louis Althusser, who identifies the texts from
Lipset, Shills and Waxman focus on comprehensive and totalizing doc- the first period, including The German Ideology, as 'positivists and histori-
trines originating in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centu- cists', not Marxist, while the texts from his more mature stage would repre-
ries, such as Marxism, Liberalism and Fascism, the post-modernist authors sent a properly Marxist conception of ideology based on the notion of class
refer to a kind of ideology, which due to a new so-called post-modern structure. A third thesis, set up by Jorge Larrain (1983: 9), assumes that the
condition of the late capitalist society, is then assumed as fused with real- concept of ideology is developed along the whole work of Marx following
ity, and therefore ineffectual.1 a basic coherence core of premises, which will acquire new dimensions and
To avoid such intermingling, it is thus worthwhile clearly delimiting, as expression as Marx develops his position and tackles new issues. Finally,
far as possible, the boundaries of the different positions existing within Michael Rosen (1996: 222), asserting a fourth position; has stated that 'Marx
the debate on post-Marx ideology. The aim is to highlight the theoretical has no [consistent and single] theory of ideology, only a series of models',
assumptions behind different conceptions of ideology in order to examine which he identifies as the 'reflection model', the 'interests model', the
the way in which the 'Archimedean point of truth' was developed in each 'correspondence model', and the 'appearance and essence' model.
stream of the debate. Chiefly, this chapter seeks to show how the trajectory In light of Larrain's interpretation, we assume that Marx does not develop
followed by the notion of ideology is an expression of a more comprehen- the notion of ideology as a systematic autonomous field. Rather, it is a
sive dispute of paradigms (positivism, Critical Theory-Marxism, 'great narra- notion that must be traced through the evolution of his works. We add,
tives' doctrines) in which the problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth' however, that ideology only becomes possible as a specific field of theo-
appears as a subjacent argument for imposing one dominant paradigm. rization when the original epistemological discussion in which Marx was
In such a dispute, while Marx's notion of ideology is either abandoned involved is able to escape from the constraints imposed by the classical
by positivism, revisited by Critical Theory or transformed into a political epistemological structure of reflection.
instrument by 'great narratives' theories, the epistemological dichotomy In fact, the debate about the origin of knowledge in philosophy has tradi-
'rational versus unconscious structure' is finally challenged, making ide- tionally been accompanied by a normative aspiration for establishing evalu-
ology not only a real reflection of a partial reality as Marx identifies but ative criteria to judge the acquisition of justified knowledge, or the rejection
also a category operating mainly from the superstructure (Ideological State of this possibility. This has been called the 'epistemic account of justifica-
Apparatus) to the level of an individual's unconscious, an individual who is tion', meaning the series of necessary and sufficient conditions required for
now interpellated as a subject. having a justified belief (Audi 2003: 3). It was this philosophical normative
The delimitation here offered, however, does not seek completely and disposition that induced most of the classical epistemological tradition to
satisfactorily to eliminate all inconsistencies existing among rival theories assume a binary structure of analysis: reality/appearance as an epistemo-
of ideology, as for instance when one conception could be included in more logical strategy to analyze knowledge. In other words, to assert that which
than one category, a fact which is related to the complexity of the theoreti- we know is justified always seems to demand something that is assumed as
cal object of analysis. Furthermore, it does not aspire to produce a detailed non-valid knowledge, a category with which to be contrasted (ibid.: 2). The
account of the specific positions within the debate on ideology but to focus appearance or illusion understood as something in opposition to reality was
on the analysis of the central features of each classification.2 one of the first negative epistemic categories called to fulfill this function
But before going directly to the analysis of such a delimitation of the (Camargo 2007: 29).
debate on ideology, let us revisit the original notion of ideology developed A second common characteristic of the classical epistemological tradition
through the works of Karl Marx. was a distinction between the subject and object as two spheres, which were
18 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 19

conceived as dependent upon but separated from each other. The notion of At this stage, Marx's critique of Hegel was focused on Hegel's Doctrine of
the subject emerged when the classical rational individual optic coined by the State and The German Ideology. It was not until his mature age (the writ-
Western philosophy, not only associated with Plato and Aristotle but also ings from the Grundrisse (1858) onwards) that the influence of a dialectical
the Cartesian tradition of Descartes, was universalized and adopted, in spite logic developed in Hegel's Science of Logic marked Marx's works more impor-
of the permanent contested tension represented by empiricism as a precon- tantly (ibid.: 10-31).
dition of any cognitive possibility within the modern rationalist-empiricist Indeed, Marx seems to accept the dialectical character of the constitution
debate. The subject has thenceforth been used introspectively to explain to of reality as a process that implies a negation of negation, in which every-
his or herself the world in which he or she lives. The world - the object - was thing is defined and transformed by its opposite. However, he emphatically
then relegated to an external given reality to be explained. It is worthwhile contests Hegel's intention of resolving every contradiction - even those
noting that the notion of subject was only developed during the modern produced in the phenomenological world - in the essence of the things:
rationalist/empiricist debate, particularly by Descartes and the German ide- 'Hegel's chief error is that he regards contradiction in the phenomenal world
alist tradition. However, what is here suggested is that to read the classical as unity in its essence, in the Idea' (Marx 1975: 158). For Marx, this cannot
epistemological debate having in mind such a distinction (subject-object) mean anything but the useless intent to resolve in the Idea a contradiction
may result in a reader finding it useful to trace the path of another related existing in the phenomenal world, which for Marx can only be resolved
notion, that is: ideology and the associated problem of the true condition. 3 with a transformation of the material world.
Finally, a third common feature was the adoption of an individual rational Marx is, therefore, in the prolegomenon of a new epistemological conception
focus of reflection. The arrival point of the epistemological inquiry, either of the formation of ideas, which is centered on the notion of historical social
when it assumed the name of reason or sensory experience, was usually an practices - material conditions - as the key constitutive factor of knowledge.
individual considered to be isolated from any other external (social) con- This is a whole new starting point of reflection on the epistemology debate
straints or a collective rationality - as later termed by Habermas - which were that adds a reformulation of the analytical dichotomy - the individual versus
not related to the assumptions of the basic interrogation about knowledge. the social - which until then had remained almost unaltered since Plato.
The rationality instead understood as logos, that is, an individual cognitive
Previously, for Kant and Hegel, the distinction between subject and object
exercise to make sense of the world, usually excludes any other non-
had been substantially revised (Stern 1990: 14-15). Hegel also first presented
cognitive faculty or 'unconscious structures' - as coined by Althusser - as
a new way of theorizing the structure reality/illusion that sought to surpass
a component of the philosophical reflection. Therefore, although in the
definitively that distinction (Bowie 2003: 89-0; Soil 1969: xxiii, 3-4). However,
classical epistemological debate the individual-rationality aegis was domi-
no philosopher until Marx had presented an epistemological account that
nant, in order to understand the subsequent emergence of the notion of
overcame a reflection centered exclusively on an individual imagined isolated
ideology in Marx's works we should read such a debate as having two new
from any constraints from his social practices, as a central piece of the process
distinctions in mind: the individual versus collective rationality, on the
of producing knowledge. Furthermore, apart from the originality of Marx's
one hand, and the cognitive knowledge versus the unconscious structures,
account in this respect, it is worthwhile clarifying that it is still a controversial
on the other.
point amongst scholars in the field to ascertain the role that Hegel could have
Indeed, Marx's more original theoretical advance is mainly focused on finally given to historical constraints in the process of the constitution of
his challenge to the assumption that it is an individual thinker, assumed as consciousness (Bowie 2003: 88).
isolated from societal influence, who is calling introspectively to explain the However, Marx presents a theory in which knowledge cannot be under-
world in which he or she is living, that is, to distinguish the true reality from stood individually but as a social product of an individual's interaction
the falsehood. Marx develops his theoretical position in this field by produc- within a concrete historical social context. Marx was precise in establishing
ing a critique of Hegel's philosophical approach that assumes an immanent that the first premise of his reflection is the existence of human individuals
presence of the notion of Idea in the thing, which would require that the and therefore nothing can be understood without posing this first premise.
practical activity of a subject 'necessarily appears as the activity and prod- Nevertheless, for Marx the individual assumed as a starting point of his
uct of something other than itself (Marx 1975: 98). Although, at the time reflection was not an abstract category but one who was immediately sub-
of that critique Marx had not yet developed a whole account of historical jected to the determinations posed by the organization in which they lived
materialism, he was already committed to the concept of the origin of ideas (Marx & Engels 1974: 42). Thus, knowledge and falsehood become social
as dependent on the historical practices of the subjects and not the other constructs, all of which would make possible, for the first time, the study of
way round as Hegel had postulated (Larrain 1983: 11-15). ideology as a specific epistemological problem.
20 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 21

Marx definitively completes this new epistemological turn when he devel- of production - both being real, in the sense that they correspond to a deter-
ops his historical materialism method. This explains the origin of ideas and mined level of the whole capitalist economic system. The essential point to
any other form of consciousness as the result of the interweaving of the bear in mind here is that the two levels in which a capitalist economy is
material activity and the material intercourse of men (ibid.: 47). It is worth- presented determine, for Marx, different sets of forms of consciousness or
while noting that Marx does not conceptualize ideas as a mere reflection of ideas. Moreover, as the spheres - circulation and production - are for Marx
a fixed external object, as classical empiricists do, but as the product of social in contradiction with each other, the former appearing as the predominant,
relations, that is, social practices. He assumes the external world not to be perhaps even as the only one that really exists; the ideas related to this
a static and given reality, as Feuerbach does, but rather as a dynamic and sphere become also the dominant ideas in society.
contingent social result of successive generations (ibid.: 62). Then, as long as these dominant ideas also conceal an inner inverted real-
Indeed, although for Marx and Engels (1976: 36) the material determines ity of production, they become ideological (Marx 1974b: 209). Therefore,
the ideas, the material in turn, far from being an a-historical dimension, is Marx has arrived at a conception in which reality is not only comprehended
understood as a set of social practices that are organized in a determined in the totality of the system, as Hegel (1977: 53) previously postulated, but
historical form by concrete human beings: it is also displayed in spheres, which are conceptualized as contradictory to
each other. This means that the ideological character of ideas is again not
[The] ideas are the conscious expression - real or illusory - of their real assumed to be an illusion, false representation or false consciousness, but a
relations and activities, of their production, of their intercourse, of their concrete reflection of a very existent sphere of the system, though a limited
social and political conduct. (Ibid.) expression of the whole reality (Marx 1972: 296).
In sum, the 'realty/illusion' dichotomy (in which illusion is understood as
Therefore, Marx not only rejects the empiricist's assumption that asserts the not being part of the reality, as a ghost floating in the air), inherited from
immediate constitution of ideas as a mere reflection of the external world, the epistemological debate, has now found a transitory point of resolution.
but also, following Hegel, assumes a dialectical logic of mediations in which Indeed, for Marx, to produce a critique of ideology it is no longer necessary
social practices and ideas are mutually constituted. This point is often mis- to ascend to the reign of episteme or to go deeper into the introspective
understood by contemporary theorists of ideologies, who criticize Marx by innate condition of individual rationality - as the classical epistemology has
assuming that 'being determines ideas', but without noting the mutually asserted - but rather, simply to situate himself within the historical material
dialectical logic of the constitution between ideas and practices that Marx conditions - the social practices - that give rise to true (total and transpar-
has in mind.4 ent) and ideological (partial and inverted) forms of consciousness. It is at
Like Hegel, Marx rejects the idea that the reality can only be identified in last a shift from individual to collective rationality, which, however, is still
opposition to a non-existent entity - as the classical epistemology asserts - but inscribed within the illustrated framework of reason. This means that the
in a dialectical mediation within reality. However, contrary to Hegel, Marx universal non-ideological stage proposed by Marx to make possible the cri-
locates the mediation of the constitution of reality in the equation of social tique of ideology is understood as a true knowledge condition. In other words,
practices and forms of consciousness, both of which, far from having any the last implicit dichotomy of the classic epistemological reflection: ration-
sort of essence, are conceptualized as being historically rooted in the specific ality versus unconsciousness is inherited as a whole in the new concept
form of social organization in which they take place. of ideology forged by Marx, for which a critique of ideology is assumed
In the mature stage of his intellectual evolution, Marx is able to formulate exclusively as a rational (in the sense of individual logos) exercise, that is,
a concrete analysis of the specific form of social organization, in which all a matter of knowledge of the whole material condition. That is despite the
forms of consciousness, ideological and non-ideological, take place at the fact that for Marx knowledge of the exploitative condition of the whole
time of Marx's writings: capitalism. From Grundrisse (1858) to Capital, under reality - the two spheres of capitalist society and their real and illusory forms
the influence of Hegel's logic, Marx analyzes the structure of capitalist society, of consciousness - cannot have a resolution but 'by altered circumstances,
reaffirming his previous thesis that ideas are directly 'interwoven with the not by theoretical deductions'. However, the history of the theorizations
material activity and the material intercourse of men' (Larrain 1983: 31). of the new emergent notion of ideology will soon stress such an implicit
However, he also discovers that such material activity and the material tension - rationality versus unconsciousness - seeking to overcome it in
intercourse of men are much more complex than they seem at first sight. what we can see as a definitive surmounting of a Platonic-Cartesian aegis.
Indeed, in a capitalist society - Marx asserts - there are two distinct spheres Nevertheless, in an explicit proof of the complexity of the trajectory fol-
of material practices - the sphere of circulation or exchange, and the sphere lowed by the notion of ideology, a sort of permanent resurrection of the
22 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 23

former traditional meanings attributed to the categories reality/illusion, of its plausibility lies in the fact that it gives the world a particularly
subject/object, individual versus collective rationality are constantly reintro- appealing kind of intelligibility. (Ibid.)
duced in classical and contemporary theorizations on ideology, a multifac-
eted story that is reviewed in the next sections and chapters. In turn, the criterion of legitimizing relations of domination has given rise
to 'the dominant ideology thesis' (Abercrombie et al. 1980), which in gen-
Three approaches of research o n ideology eral terms assumes that ideology works as a social cement that legitimizes
the oppressive social order in the form of binding individuals, who con-
A classical distinction posed by many authors distinguishes between the sciously or unconsciously accept it without major complaint. This thesis,
negative and neutral conceptions of ideology. While the former assumes in its broad sense, is shared by authors as diverse as the theorists of the
ideology - in one sense or another - to be a misleading phenomenon, the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer and Adorno (1972, 1974), on the one
latter explicitly or implicitly strips ideology of any negative connotation hand, and post-Marxist structuralist writers, such as Louis Althusser (1971)
and integrates it within a descriptive enterprise of social science (Thompson and Nicos Poulantzas (1972), on the other.7
1990: 5).5 The neutral conception of ideology, in turn, also constitutes an ambigu-
However, it is not clear at all that this distinction has produced results that ous category, which is more clearly identifiable as something that opposes
are satisfactory enough even for the authors who coined it. Indeed, the one the negative thesis of ideology rather than for the precise identification of
sense or another in which ideology is assumed as a negative category con- its standards of distinction. In this sense, neutrality has been assimilated to
figures, in fact, a whole set of different uses of ideology, narrower or broader, everything that is not part of the negative thesis, placing under the same
depending on the extension of the criterion of negativity included by those label very dissimilar notions of ideology. Thompson (1990), for instance,
authors. The criteria have ranged from the notion of false consciousness, seems to include by default very different visions within the neutral concep-
with or without material base (illusion), to a legitimizing criterion of rela- tion of ideology, such as those held by Lenin and Martin Seliger, a grouping
tions of domination either based on social classes alone or - in its more that may not be totally accurate (Thompson 1990: 5). Indeed, while Lenin
comprehensive versions - on social groups and genders. (1963: 71) positively speaks of a socialist ideology as a doctrine that must
The false consciousness criterion has traditionally been associated by schol- be 'introduced by the ideologues' from outside of the capitalist production
ars with Marx. Indeed, Plamenatz (1970:23) in his central book Ideology explic- relation process due to his belief that,
itly affirms, 'Marx often called ideology "false consciousness"' (ibid.). This is,
however, not completely accurate since Marx never used this expression - it [...] there can be no question of an independent ideology being worked out
was Engels who coined it in a letter to Friedrich Mehring (Engels 1975: 523). by the working masses in the every process of their movement. (Ibid.)
However, Michael Rosen (1996: 222) has recently argued that,
Seliger (1976: 11) uses the notion of ideology only descriptively, referring to:
Marx, throughout his career as a social thinker, was committed to the
idea that class societies in general and capitalism in particular are char- A set of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of
acterized by some forms of false consciousness and that he believed that organized social actions, and specifically political actions, irrespective of
this pervasive false consciousness was an indispensable part of the reason whether such actions aim to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given
why such societies can survive. (Ibid.)6 social order. (Ibid.)

Also it is not clear that those who followed the Marxist tradition on ideol- The shortcomings of the neutral conception of ideology have led some
ogy had abundantly used this criterion either (Larrain 1983: 103). It was authors to opt for abandoning altogether this last classification and to adopt
Habermas (1971: 81-22) who recreated the notion of false consciousness instead a positive conception - a la Lenin - which assumes ideology as a set
in his early writing, abandoning it in his latest works. However, it has been of beliefs that have been created by someone rather than assumed to be a
Michael Rosen (1996:270) who has recently offered the best account of such given part of a society, to be the object of description (Larrain 1979: 13-14).
a notion, which holds the thesis that, However, although this latest posture overcomes the ambiguities charac-
teristic of the neutral thesis, it loses the amplitude that the former used to
The theory of ideology is a theory about false consciousness that is itself have, since it becomes inapplicable, by its own terms, to merely descriptive
(in part at least) to be explained as a product of non-rational belief: part theories of ideology such as Seliger's.
24 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 25

However, a more integrative version, which distinguishes three general Although in this book Zizek's aforementioned distinction is used exten-
uses of ideology as 'three different research contexts within which theories of sively, I have preferred to follow Geuss's classification because it allows for
ideology have been developed', as proposed by Geuss (1981: 4), has become clearer identification of the three paradigms operating behind each trend of
the more accepted classification of ideology. Indeed, Raymond Geuss, sepa- ideology, which are essential for tracing the evolution of the 'Archimedean
rating the neutral from the positive senses of ideology and retaining the point of truth' problem that this book is more concerned with.
negative, proposes a threefold distinction between 'descriptive', 'pejorative'
and 'positive' uses of ideology. What is actually suggested by Geuss are not Ideology in the descriptive sense
simply three diverse definitions of ideology, but three distinctive lines of
research which, as a consequence of divergent theoretical assumptions, have Raymond Geuss refers to ideology in a descriptive sense as the set of beliefs,
arrived at different ways of using the notion of ideology. However, although concepts, attitudes, psychological dispositions, motives, desires, values,
Geuss is rigorous enough to identify differences in the constitution of the predictions, works of arts, religious rituals and gestures that the members
common object of inquiry called ideology assumed by each 'program of of a given social group hold (Geuss 1981: 5). It fundamentally corresponds
research', he also seems to acknowledge a shared central content in the three to the classical empiricist-positivist program of research, which proposes
strands of the use of ideology: empirical and non-empirical beliefs, which to follow the logic of the scientific method to analyze those phenomena
make them commensurable with each other, allowing critical assessment inscribed within what is assumed as the 'human science' - understanding
of the accurateness of each program of research, which is precisely one of people through their constants and the regularities of the law that rules
the aims of this book. Geuss's classification is also useful for an inquiry them.8 Positivism imagines the historical trajectory of societies as a set of
into the way in which the 'Archimedean point of truth' was built in each given phenomena that only demands to be described and classified to be
strand of the debate because it does not merge - as the neutral concep- known, rather than explained. In other words - according to John Stuart
tion of ideology - theoretical positions that assume ideology to be a given Mill (1925) - an accurate application of the scientific method would imply
phenomenon to be described ('descriptive sense') with those that assume that: 'The first step of inductive inquiry is [would be] a mental analysis of
ideology as something imposed by someone from the outside ('positive complex phenomena into their elements' and 'The next is [would be] an
sense'). Although this last point was not explicitly formulated by Geuss, it is actual separation of those elements' (ibid.).
fundamental for the purposes of this book.
In the same way, society is divided into parts, one of which is ideology,
Recently, Andrew Vincent (2004) has offered a new typology that seeks which is assumed to be broad enough to encompass all of the components
to distinguish between ideology and political theory. This gives rise to two that configure the interpretative apparatus of members of social groups,
main categories. Firstly, what Vincent calls the integration thesis, that is, through which they make sense of the world in which they live. In this
one that has sought to fully integrate ideology and political theory, either way, every member of society has an ideology. Even more, there is nothing
in a negative (negative integration, for instance Marx's works) or a positive reprehensible about having an ideology because it is assumed to be a natural
way (positive integration, notably Skinner and Gramsci's works). Secondly, the phenomenon of human society (Boudon 1989: 44).
segregation thesis that seeks completely to demarcate ideology and political As a positivist endeavor, the descriptive sense of ideology is abundant in clas-
theory. This last thesis also has a negative (negative segregation) and positive sifications that seek to highlight different criteria of analysis. Geuss (1981: 5),
(positive segregation) pole. The main example of the negative segregation the- for instance, mentions six types of classifications developed by scholars in the
sis is Anglo-American political theory. In turn, Michael Freeden's work can field, which distinguish between: (a) ideology with discursive and/or non
be assumed as perhaps the main representative of the positive segregation discursive contents; (b) with explicit or implicit elements (Plamenatzs 1970:
thesis (Vincent 2004: 65-3). 17-21); (c) with sophisticated and/or unsophisticated elements (ibid.: 18);
Finally, it is worthwhile noticing that Slavoj Zizek (1994: 9) has recently (d) the general 'purely descriptive sense' and the narrower version, which
proposed a new classification that distinguishes between: in turns correspond to Karl Mannheim's 'total and special sense' of ideology
(Mannheim 1936); (e) with manifest contend and/or functional properties;
Ideology as a complex of ideas (theories, convictions, beliefs, argumenta- and (f) the programmatic and non-programmatic sense of ideology, the
tive procedures); ideology in its externality, that is, the materiality of ide- former being the use given by David Bell (1988: 403).
ology, Ideological State Apparatus; and finally, the most elusive domain, This, in turn, has caused the accumulation of a sophisticated background
the 'spontaneous' ideology at work at the heart of social 'reality' itself. of specific knowledge about the ideological phenomenon. Take for instance
(Ibid.) the broader descriptive sense of ideology, that is, as a part of society which
26 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 27

includes all the beliefs that individuals have. A definition such as this is is a shift in which the individual is stripped of any metaphysical pretension
seemingly useless because of its amplitude, but still retains a very important and transformed into a value-free researcher, permanently looking for those
use, however, as a base to specify narrower senses of ideology, which would laws that are assumed present in an independent external world.
be more helpful as descriptive methodological tools. By surpassing the empiricist-rationalist debate, positivism, however, loses
However, as we have already seen, the descriptive sense of ideology, the facade of certainty that epistemology had always provided to resolve the
both in its general use and in the set of specific classifications, implicitly problem of objective knowledge. In its place, positivism coins its own new
assumes that ideology exists as a natural phenomenon. It is a strategy of criterion, based on the self-confirming character of 'objectivity', given by
naturalization that is based on a syllogistic reasoning. It first assumes an 'facts', which are now assumed by Comte, quoted in Habermas (1978: 77),
omni-comprehensive notion of systems of beliefs, attitudes, concepts, desire to be the foundation of laws, that is, the raw material of laws:
and so on, which, defined in this way, cannot be but present in all members
of society as a central feature of their behavior in society. And then it goes It is really in the laws of phenomena that science consists, for which the
on to specify classifications of ideology, which, by deduction, acquire the actual facts, no matter how exact and numerous, always provide only the
same blessing of being conceived as part of a given nature. indispensable raw material [...]. (Ibid.)
The more important critique of this theory refers to the general pretension
of positivism of assimilating the study of human society with that of nature Indeed, positivism uncritically assumes not only that observable phenom-
under the methodology of scientific inquiry. This pretension has been ena are subjected to constant relations but also that these relations are
largely criticized not only by theorists of the critical theory school (Agger discoverable through facts, which are imagined to be naturally posed before
1998: 1; Calhoun 1995: 1; Frisby 1974; Habermas 1978: 65; Holub 1991: the eyes of the agent, keen to be discovered, described and inferred, inde-
20), but also by those with post-Weberian perspectives (Giddens 1984: 281). pendently of human interest. In this way, positivism fails twice. First, when
This dispute first emerged as a theoretical debate in the 1960s with Popper it conceives facts and laws as a reality, which is presumed to be a value-free
(1963: 312-35) and Adorno et al. (1976: 298-300) as the major leading dimension, and second, when it reduces the whole reality to facts and laws,
figures.9 Although both Adorno and Popper coincide in criticizing the posi- excluding the dimension of values and human interests as being an integral
tivist conception of scientific methodology, they differ on the reasons given part of reality (Habermas 1978: 89). Ultimately, positivism has condemned
for their rejection and also in the alternative they propose (Frisby 1972). itself to reflect a limited analysis of the world, that is, a mere systematically
However, the aforementioned dispute reached a definitive systematization connected set of external given relations between facts, which, however,
with Habermas in the early 1970s (Heller 1978; Holub 1991: 41). overlooks the view that - as Habermas suggests - 'a given scientific system
Positivism, intending to overcome the empiricist-rationalist debate, of reference [is always ... ] the result of interaction between the knowing
sought to put an end to the classical epistemological aspirations of inquiry subject and reality' (ibid.: 90).
about tiie conditions of the possibility of knowledge, which were based on Therefore, the descriptive research project of analyzing ideology, inspired
a dimension of human subjectivity, whether that be innate principles of by positivism, cannot be but segregating if it wants to be objective - an
the mind, a sensory experience or a transcendental reason conceived as an exclusion that evades altogether the challenge posed by Marx's theory on
autonomous faculty. Ultimately, positivism resolves the empiricist-rationalist ideology, which assumes ideology, as an epistemological problem, to be
controversy by renouncing the study of ultimate causes - metaphysics - and simultaneously real and false, in which the falsity results as a consequence
conceiving a method of inquiry based exclusively on the investigation of of a lack of a dialectic totality, or conversely, in the falsehood of partiality.
laws. Auguste Comte, quoted in Habermas (1978: 78), one of the fathers of This is also the weakness in the case of the set of narrower descriptive
positivism, has asserted: senses of ideology. Indeed, the inadequacy of the use of particular descrip-
tive notions of ideology is not given by the fact that their conclusions,
The fundamental revolution that characterizes the generation of our deriving from the analysis of the specific criterion adopted, are methodo-
spirit consists essentially in everywhere replacing the unattainable deter- logically ungrounded but theoretically partial. Take for instance the case
mination of authentic causes (that is final causes or substantial forms) of religion as ideology, using the same example analyzed by Geuss but with
with the simple investigation of laws [...]. (Ibid.) different purposes. Religion can accurately be described as an ideology from
a methodological point of view, with narrative, sophisticated and mani-
Also, as Habermas (1978: 67) has highlighted, this new method of inquiry fest contents. However, from a theoretical perspective, this description is
heralds the replacement of epistemology with the philosophy of science. It unsupported because it is based on the (unacknowledged) assumption of the
28 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 29

existence of an undisputed natural factual objectivity: the religious belief, Furthermore, the positive perspective is able to realize that these frame-
which is not disputed as an ideological (deluding) construction. Therefore works of interpretation, as long as they are created by people, are also histor-
when religion is reduced to the status of an ideology merely by the descrip- ically contingent and can compete with each other to be 'the best ideology'
tion of its contents but is denied any analysis of its deluding functions, such in relation to those wants, needs and interests that they are supposed to
a description becomes ideological par excellence. satisfy. The main task within this research program is thus to identify what
In the end, positivism and the descriptive program of ideology that it gives kind of world views would be more appropriate for the members of a given
rise to, in spite of proposing a way to overcome the rationalist/empiricist dis- group to satisfy their wants, needs and interests.
pute, share with such a debate the purpose of coining a definitive criterion Such conceptions are, for instance, produced by Lenin in What Is to Be
to distinguish between reality and appearance, that is, to affirm the existence Done? and Georg Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness. Lenin (1975: 48)
of an 'Archimedean point of truth' that is now more than ever inscribed assumes ideology to be a product of the political struggle existing between
within the individual's rationality. Furthermore, although the positivist the bourgeois and proletariat, as he says:
'Archimedean point of truth' does not appeal to metaphysical categories, it
ends up finding in science, and its 'putative daughter' technology, the new
The only choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no mid-
organon, the measure of all things, to describe an ideology(ies) as no more
than a mere descriptive exercise of reality. This descriptive character attrib- dle course (for mankind has not created a 'third' ideology, and, moreover,
uted to ideology constitutes a perspective that is rejected by both of the other in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or
lines of researcfi that are analyzed in the sections that follow. an above class ideology). (Ibid.)

Ideology in the positive sense However, he also explicitly affirms that socialist ideology is something that
has to be created and imposed onto the working class:
The second program of research analyzes ideology in a positive sense (Geuss
1981: 22). Although the basic contents - a set of empirical and non-empirical Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from
beliefs - are in this approach mostly similar to those in the neutral and without... the history of all countries shows that the working class, exclu-
negative perspectives, the theoretical assumptions are very dissimilar. In fact, a sively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness.
positive perspective, far from conceiving that ideology is composed of a set of (Ibid.: 37)
beliefs, which are imagined as a given reality ready to be described, as the neu-
tral conception affirms, starts by assuming that human beings are complex Lukacs, following the same line traced by Lenin, distinguishes between
creatures who have, as a basic natural necessity, the requirement of producing 'psychological class consciousness' and 'imputed class consciousness', the
some sort of framework of interpretation that gives meaningful sense to their latter being the proper ideology conceived as the expression of class inter-
life, including the justification of the type of society in which they live. ests, either bourgeois or proletarian class interests. In this sense, Lukacs
This basic assumption of the positive program of research also implies that (1971: 258-9) maintains that Marxism is 'the ideological expression of the
ideologies are conceived as natural phenomena, being part of the 'specificity' proletariat in its efforts to liberate itself, but he also speaks of 'bourgeois
of human beings, presumed present in the whole history of humankind. It ideology' (ibid.) and even of the 'ideology of the broad masses of the pretty
is precisely on the basis of this sort of natural requirement for a meaningful bourgeoisie' (ibid.: 266-7). However, it is worthwhile noting that there is
framework of actions that explains, for instance, the persistence of almost a debate about the specific character of Lukacs' conception of ideology,
everlasting phenomena in the history of mankind such as religions, which including a broad range of authors who assume that Lukacs postulated a
are formulated precisely to satisfy this assumed basic natural human need. notion of ideology as a 'false consciousness'.10
However, this framework of interpretation does not arise arbitrarily but in For the matter of this book it is important to highlight that both were
direct relation to other basic wants, desires, needs and interests that human classical Marxists who, however, did not follow the main path traced by
beings have. In other words, ideology becomes a meaningful apparatus as Marx on the study of ideology as a negative category. On the contrary, they
long as it provides an approved model of actions, values and goals to satisfy pose ideology as the main tool that the proletariat might use to achieve its
those basic human necessities. The richness of this approach is that it does freedom from the bourgeoisie, which marked in this way the beginning
not assume ideology to be an external static construct in relation to human of an influential (post-Marx) Marxist tradition on the study of ideology,
actions but directly as a product of human activity. which also includes the leading figure of Antonio Gramsci. In fact, Gramsci
30 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 31

(1971: 376) firstly rejects the 'bad sense of the word' ideology because, as to serve, as in the example given by Lukacs (1971: 65-6) for the members of
he says: the bourgeoisie who might need to be deluded about their real interests in
the long run within a capitalist system in order to continue to be productive
[...] there is a potential element of error in assessing the value of ideolo- in the short term.
gies, due to the fact (by no means casual) that the name ideology is given In this sense, a positive conception, despite looking quite correctly at the
both to the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and to the satisfaction of the interests of particular groups as a criterion to identify
arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals. The bad sense of the an ideological phenomenon, misses the point when it reduces all constitu-
word has become widespread, with the effect that the theoretical analysis tive characters of an ideology to such a criterion, thereby abandoning any
of the concept of ideology has been modified and denatured. (Ibid.) reflection upon its falsity. Take for example Lenin's conception of ideology,
which in spite of having been a very powerful instrument for the politi-
However, Gramsci ultimately asserts a conception of ideology which is based cal struggle of communist parties, and in some cases also in the interest of
on the notion of hegemony given by a historical bloc: the proletariat, does not provide either a theoretical or a practical account
that satisfactorily explains how ideology comes about in more complex
Material forces are the content and ideologies are tfie form, though this contemporary societies. Moreover, the positive conception of ideology
distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the simply ignores the epistemological challenges posed by Marx's conception
material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the of ideology, replacing it with a supposedly more efficient call to focus on
ideologies would be individual fancies without material forces. (Ibid.: 377) producing ideologies rather than interpreting them. However, by ignoring
epistemological challenges, this line of research often becomes a somewhat
It is worthwhile noting that as Gramsci never read The German Ideology, the short-sighted activity, ignoring the fact that although ideology is always a
'bad sense of the word' ideology that he refers to does not correspond to social creation it is not a biased-free interest, just given to the profuse and
Marx's negative concept of ideology (Larrain 1983: 78). often capricious imagination of a 'free floating intelligentsia', as Mannheim
However, the first shortcoming of this conception is given by the strict (1991: 137) has asserted.
restriction which must be applied to the set of wants, needs, desires and Furthermore, since the positive conception of ideology leaves aside any
interests that an ideology is required to satisfy. Indeed, it needs to be pre- concerns of assuming a criterion to distinguish the ideological and non-
stripped of all reprehensible elements, such as egoism, hatred, sadistic ideological of a given situation, it consequentially also appears to abandon
desires and so on; otherwise, it would be easily confused with the negative any pretension of adopting any 'Archimedean point of truth' (which is
conception of ideology, losing all of its particular character as a new explan- no longer required since the critique of ideology has been abandoned).
atory framework. In this compulsory move, however, a positive sense of However, this is certainly an illusion. Indeed, due to the fact that what this
ideology becomes a short-sighted theory, which leaves without explanation conception really proposes is a 'program of actions' for political struggle, it
the whole set of 'negative' non-rationalist wants, needs, desires and interests cannot avoid assuming even in a stronger (and perhaps explicit) manner
that ideologies are also very often posed to satisfy, as has been highlighted a version of this 'Archimedean point of truth', which is now required to
by contemporary theorists of ideology.11 give efficiency and certitude to the program of actions promoted. This is a
Second, a positive conception of ideology also tends to eradicate from tendency, as has been shown in the path of the great positive ideologies of
the theoretical discussion the problem of falsity altogether. Indeed, there the twentieth century - mostly Italian Fascism, German Nazism and Russian
is no room within this thesis to analyze the ambiguity of the ideological Stalinism - that has often led these positive ideologies to present themselves
phenomenon, which, although it can be a very real experience in the sense as universal, fixed and absolute truths, therefore bringing the 'Archimedean
that it allows the satisfaction of certain wants, needs, desires and interests point of truth' back to the scene.
that human beings could have, might also be a misleading framework of
interpretation for the satisfaction of certain partial interests in society. This
is not only true in the obvious case of members of other groups of society Ideology in the negative sense
different from those integrants of the group directly benefited by a given The negative, pejorative or critical sense of ideology corresponds to a pro-
ideology, as for example in the case of the bourgeoisie ideology in relation to gram of research that, in spite of having its origin in Marx's conception of
the rival interests of the working-class members, but also with regard to the ideology, has been mainly developed within the extensive framework of
interests of the individual members of the group that ideology is expected the tradition of Critical Theory.12 Critical Theory, in contrast to positivism,
32 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 33

is not exclusively, even primarily, a descriptive program of research but an rationality - dominated by the techniques and procedures of natural
emancipatory endeavor. This requires a radically different point of departure science, which are assumed to be capable of resolving all of the problems
for the study of society. Far from being assumed as a given reality - ready and myths existing in our current society (Agger 1998: 84; Eagleton 1991:
to be discovered by a free value researcher - or a given 'program of actions', 125). It is worth noticing that the thesis that a reification of commodity
society is now analyzed as a dialectical construct, being conceived as mutu- exchange transmutes the uniqueness and plurality of things into a mere
ally configured by the interaction of the subject and reality. Furthermore, misleading homogenization of the world, giving rise to an 'identity think-
this new complex reality is assumed to be the actual consequence of the ing', is a position mostly developed by Adorno in Negative Dialectic (1973).
development of capitalism, which has moved from an initial moment of This thesis is revealed in daily facts, as for instance when he says 'we are all
liberalization to a more sophisticated stadium of oppression, unpredicted free to buy a car, or to vote in an election, or to choose our friends', fail-
by Marx. ing to notice the huge difference existing amongst workers and employers'
The first assumption of critical theorists, that is, the idea that the rise freedoms. In turn, the notion of instrumental rationality is analyzed in
of industrial capitalism was followed by a secularization process of beliefs, Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972).
marked by the decline of religious and magical beliefs and the emergence of However, the shared critical theorists' original contribution is centered on
the new kind of political beliefs or 'ideologies', is inscribed partially within the conceptualization of a new kind of ideology, characteristic of advanced
a wider framework of interpretation, which is also shared by mainstream capitalist societies, which might explain the survival of capitalism. The nov-
classical authors like Max Weber, known as the 'grand narrative of cultural elty of this ideology is not its negative character, a feature which has already
transformation'. This is the name given by John Thompson to the narra- been identified by Marx, but its condition of being conceived as a system
tive or interpretation of the process of cultural transformation associated of beliefs, blended in an almost unidentifiable way with the central logic of
with the rise of modern industrial societies, whose main characteristics are advanced capitalism, as it would seem that there is no ideology operating at
secularization of religious and magical beliefs, and pragmatization of politics all but only technology.
(Thompson 1990: 76). Terry Eagleton (1991: 127), alluding to the paradigmatic book by Marcuse,
Furthermore, Critical Theory, following the views of Marx and Weber, One-Dimensional Man, has put it in this way:
agrees on giving an initial positive role to the emergence of capitalism in
the cultural sphere, as long as it allows the replacement of an obscurantist Ideology, in short, is a 'totalitarian' system which has managed and
society with a more rational one. processed all social conflict out of existence. It is not only that this thesis
A further legacy of Marx is the assumption adopted by the Critical Theory would come as something of a surprise to those who actually run the
school that affirms that the capitalist system, despite freeing men from Western system; it is also that it parodies the whole notion of ideology
the old chains of the medieval society, brings new shackles in the form of itself. (Ibid.)
exploitation - by the bourgeoisie - of the working class, who are now obli-
gated to sell their own labor force to survive. The real point of departure Marcuse (1972: 23), in turn, has asserted that,
for Critical Theory is, however, marked by the necessity of producing a
new account to explain the failure of one of the main predictions of Marx's This absorption of ideology into reality does not, however, signify the
theory of capitalism: the (non)emergence of communism and at the same 'end of ideology'. On the contrary, in a specific sense advanced industrial
time, to fight rival explanations offered - amongst others - by the 'grand culture is more ideological than its predecessor, inasmuch as today the
narrative' thesis, which announces the end of ideologies as a consequence ideological is in the process of production itself. In a provocative form,
of a process of pragmatization of politics that would take place in Western this proposition reveals the political aspects of the prevailing technologi-
societies (ibid.: 77). cal rationality. (Ibid.)
This brings us to the second assumption of Critical Theory, which pro-
poses the embodiment of a new kind of domination that deludes individu- The important point here to retain is that Critical Theory formulates its
als about their own interests, as a result of the development of advanced notion of ideology in order to explain its own challenge, that is, to explain
capitalism. Advanced capitalism gives rise, on the one hand, to the reifica- the failure of Marx's prediction of the end of capitalism. In this sense, it
tion of the sphere of consumption or commodity exchange, which, in turn, is not only that critical theorists assume that individuals in a society are
derives from the negation of differences or 'identity thinking'; and, on the deluded about themselves, their position and their interests, but it is the
other, to the materialization of a new type of rationality - instrumental main aim of the critique of ideology to help them to be emancipated from
34 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 35

their conditions of domination, by explaining why they hold the beliefs and The functional perspective, in turn, maintains that the constituent beliefs are
attitude they do. ideological if they 'function in a reprehensible way'. In fact, Geuss (1981: 15)
Therefore, the emancipation pursued by Critical Theory can be originally identifies three types of use of ideology by virtue of their functional proper-
assumed as an epistemological task because its inquiries relate to the 'whys' ties: (a) to support, stabilize or legitimize certain social institutions or prac-
of the existence of the delusionary beliefs of individuals. That does not mean tices, that is to say, ideology as a world picture which stabilizes or legitimizes
to affirm that emancipation can be reached automatically by the enlighten- domination or hegemony, such as presented in Habermas (1970: 99), Toward
ment proposed by Critical Theory. Indeed the existence of groups which a Rational Society and Habermas (1975a), Legitimation Crisis; (b) to hinder
might be interested in maintaining the current situation of domination that or obstruct the maximal development of the forces of material production,
benefits them might probably impede an automatic transformation of the such as presented in Cohen (1978), Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence;
oppressive conditions (Geuss 1981: 74-5; Habermas 1975a: 95). Put simply, and (c) to serve to mask social contradictions, a thesis defended by Larrain
Critical Theory is a theoretical and politically informed investigation of (1979: 45), The Concept of Ideology.
the origin of deluded beliefs, and the subsequent deployment of ways to Finally, ideology, on the basis of its genetic properties, points to some
overcome them. However, as soon as the critical theories incorporate the original facts or motives exhibited by individuals that might explain why the
theoretical influx coming from Freud, emancipation is no longer assumed as agents hold such beliefs, which are also facts and motives that have distorted
an epistemological endeavor but as a reflexive experience that includes the the individual's beliefs in a way that causes them to become ideological.
dimension of the unconscious, as Habermas (1975b: 182-3) put it: Although these three approaches to ideology in the negative sense are
not always compatible with each other, they are not necessarily contra-
In other words, he [Hegel] embraced a concept of reflection which con- dictory either. Take for instance the case of the 'objectification mistake',
tains the idea of an analytical emancipation from objective illusion. Later which falsely conceives a socially contingent process as if it were a natural
Freud removed this self-critical notion of reflection from its epistemologi- or eternal phenomenon. The 'objectification mistake' is basically defined as
cal context by relating it to the reflective experience of an empirical sub- a form of ideology because of its epistemic properties. However, it can also
ject who, under the compulsory sway of restricted patterns of perception be analyzed as an ideological phenomenon from a functional perspective
and behavior, deludes himself about his own being. By understanding if it serves to legitimize certain relationships of domination, or even if it
these illusions the subject emancipates himself from himself. (Ibid.) could be argued that it might be understood as genetically ideological if the
motives of the agents have to hold that belief is, for one reason or another,
Moreover, the way in which a false belief is studied by Critical Theory does reprehensible. This, of course, depends on the form in which we specifically
not reduce it to a mere empirical error. Indeed, within this program of define the three critical approaches of ideology, a matter that has not found
research, ideology in its negative sense can be analyzed by virtue of some an easy resolution within debates in the field.
epistemic, functional or genetic properties, or some combination of the Leaving aside this point for a moment, it seems, however, that an ideo-
three. logical belief on the basis of its functional properties cannot always be
A set of beliefs can be assumed as ideological by virtue of epistemic proper- compatible with the epistemic perspective. If we take, for instance, the func-
ties when there is a mistake about the epistemic status of beliefs that would tional definition of ideology as a set of beliefs, empirical and non-empirical,
result in an inappropriate course of action or behavior. Moreover, Geuss which legitimizes relations of domination, it is difficult to see how the non-
distinguishes four kinds of use of ideology by virtue of some epistemic prop- empirical beliefs, at least, can be conceived, on the grounds of an epistemic
erties: (a) the essential mistake on the epistemic status of some of the appar- perspective, in some sense, as false beliefs. This is basically the position held
ently constituent beliefs: normative beliefs confused with empirical beliefs; by John Thompson (1990) in Ideology and Modern Culture. Note also that a
value judgments with statements of facts; (b) the 'objectification' mistake: to functionalist definition of ideology can be composed of descriptive beliefs
assume the false belief that the effect of a social phenomenon is the same as only. Then again is hard to see how those beliefs can be in any sense false.
that of a natural phenomenon (if subjects falsely objectify their own activity, This might discredit the epistemic perspective altogether because it has
being foreign to them, as a natural process outside their control); (c) the con- increasingly become an uncontested matter among rival theories to include
fusion of particular and general interests: the false belief of taking the particu- within the contents of ideology both empirical and non-empirical beliefs.
lar interest of some subgroup as the general interest of the group as a whole; However, what is not mentioned in this analysis is the notion of falsity,
and (d) the use of self-validating or self-fulfilling beliefs as if they were not which we have assumed is taken from positivism. This implies that false
self-validating or self-fulfilling to justify courses of action (Geuss 1981: 13). beliefs are only those that are presumed not to be rationally sustainable,
36 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 37

meaning that they are not scientifically testable or do not have an observa- away from the initial Critical Theory tradition, which is assumed to be too
tional content. Indeed, within positivism there are two trends: 'scientism', far inscribed within a theory of knowledge, to one rooted in a theory of
which identifies those statements or propositions that are potentially true language, as Habermas (1982: 233) has suggested: 'My view today is that the
or false with those that are scientifically testable; and 'knowledge', which attempt to ground critical social theory by way of the theory of knowledge,
assimilates statements or propositions that are potentially true with those while it did not lead astray, was indeed a roundabout way' (ibid.). Althusser's
that have observational content (Geuss 1981: 26-7). theoretical endeavor is reviewed in the following section and Habermas's
The Critical Theory school drastically contests this assumption because view is analyzed in Chapter 3.
it presupposes a narrower conception of rationality, which leaves without
framework of explanation the whole set of non-empirical beliefs, attitudes,
Althusser's theory of ideology revisited
desires and unconscious motives, which in this way are excluded altogether
from the study of ideological phenomena. By contrast, it proposes a con- An outstanding extension of the negative conception of ideology is pro-
ception of ideology which, in one sense or another, integrates the epistemic vided by the French philosopher Louis Althusser who, from an initial dis-
perspective with one of the other negative senses. In sum, the great merit of tinction between science and ideology, was able to come up with a theory
the negative sense of ideology formulated by the Critical Theory tradition is to explain, by way of an ideological mechanism, how the ruling class could
that it is able to surpass the rigid notion of rationality defended by positiv- exploit the working class without significant complaint from the latter.
ism, thereby broadening the specific contents of an ideological phenom- Indeed, Althusser's first problematization of the idea of ideology is produced
enon in order to include notions such as non-empirical beliefs, attitudes, in his essay 'Marxism and Humanism', which first appeared in the Cahiers de
desires and so on, incorporating them within an explanatory framework of I'LS.E.A., June 1964, and was then published as a chapter in For Marx, where
a more extensive rationality.13 In this move, Critical Theory also develops a he defines ideology as a 'system (with its own logic and rigor) of represen-
more comprehensive notion of ideology, which, maintaining the primacy tations (images, myths, idea or concept, depending on the case) endowed
of an epistemic perspective, integrates the genetic view, thus becoming a
with an historical existence' (Althusser 2005a: 231). In this conceptualiza-
more accurate theory to explain a complex phenomenon, which, within the
tion, ideology, contrary to science, which provides theoretical knowledge, is
positivist research program, is only partially comprehended.
more related to a practical-social function. This 'system of representations',
Nonetheless, to assume either an epistemic, functional or genetic perspec- however, far from being assimilated to 'forms of consciousness' as Marx has
tive to define when we are in the presence of an ideology ineluctably con- put it in The German Ideology, in the majority of cases 'has nothing to do
fronts critical theorists with the necessity of defending a certain notion of with consciousness', as Althusser (2005: 233) has put it:
an 'Archimedean point of truth' from which (emancipated true) individuals
can be confronted with their false consciousness (that is, epistemically, func- [...] they are usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all
tionally or genetically false beliefs that individuals hold as a consequence as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their
of the influx imposed by the instrumental rationality of advanced capital- 'consciousnesses'. They are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects
ism). This assumption (that is, an 'Archimedean point of truth') - which is and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them. (Ibid.,
an essential requirement for the critique of ideology proposed - inevitably emphasis in the original)
raises a claim against the feasibility and desirability of such a project of
critique, at a time that any proposal of a vantage point perspective appears In this way, for Althusser, the final structure of the classic epistemological
hard to defend. Indeed, the 'crisis of reason' proclaimed by post-modernism reflection, that is conscious rationality versus unconscious structures, is
makes this endeavor a difficult task for critical theorists who have already contested. Ideology is now above all perceived as structures - unconscious
been affected by the tragic (irrational) path resulting from attempts to assert
structures mainly - that, however, are not the same as the real relationship
universal, fixed and absolute truths during the twentieth century, especially
between men and their conditions of existence but 'imaginary', though
with the impact of Nazism.
real, ways of living out those relationships. It is thus an 'imaginary' yet
However, despite of and in reply to the aforementioned criticisms, two 'lived' relation of the real condition of existence. Althusser (ibid.: 233) has
new responses have been produced from the 1960s, inscribed in or in dialog expressed this idea as follows:
with the Critical Theory tradition that preceded them. The first is based on
a revisited reading of Marx's notion of historical materialism, such as that In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and
masterfully represented by Louis Althusser. The second progressively moves their condition of existence, but the way they live the relation between
38 The New Critique of Ideology The Classic Debate on the Theory of Ideology 39

them and their conditions of existence: this presuppose both a real rela- into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which
tions and an 'imaginary' 'lived' relation. (Ibid.) I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along
the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other hailing):
Finally Althusser (ibid.) concludes that, 'Hey you there'. (Ibid.)

Ideology, then, is the expression of relation between men and their That means that for Althusser it is the subject that is the most fundamental
'world', that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real relation and the category of ideological delusion. It is one in which individuals believe (in
imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence. fact act to believe) they can be independent of the material conditions in
(Ibid.) which they live and autonomous enough to be the free origin of their own
thoughts and emotions. Ideology, through the action of ISAs, calls us as a
For Althusser, ideology as a system of representations of an 'imaginary' particular subject (as a teacher, entrepreneur and so on), in a way that it
'lived' relationship between individuals and the real world in which they constitutes us as such (free individuals). Furthermore, this 'interpellation'
live has a special connection with this last reality. It is a connection that can as a subject, that is, as a free individual in his or her acts and thoughts, is
be assumed to be both an allusion and an illusion, in the sense that ideology only produced in a specific way as 'a subjected being, one who submits to a
alludes to 'reality in a certain way' but 'at the same time it bestows only an higher authority, and it is therefore stripped of all freedom except of that of
illusion on reality' (Althusser 1990: 29). freely accepting his submission' (ibid.: 123).
What Althusser (ibid.: 29) means with this double connection of ideol- This is the paradox of the subject. The subject - an ideological construction -
ogy with reality is that ideology provides for individuals a certain piece of only exists in order to be submitted to a higher authority. Althusser (ibid.:
'knowledge' of reality, or as he says: 123) has put it in this way:

We also understand that ideology gives men a certain 'knowledge' The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit
[connaissance] of their world, or rather allows them to 'recognize' them- freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely)
selves in their world, giving them a certain recognition. (Ibid.) accept his subjection, i.e., in order that he shall make the gestures and
actions of his subjection 'all by himself. There are not subjects except by
However, Althusser immediately adds: 'but at the same time, ideology only and for their subjection. That is why 'they work all by themselves'. (Ibid.,
introduces them to [the world's] misrecognition (meconnaissance)' (ibid.: 29). emphasis from the original)
Why does this happen? To answer this question Althusser introduces his
notion of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) as those state apparatus that Moreover, such a submission is so everlasting precisely because it is (freely)
'function massively and predominately by ideology' in contrast to those made by a (free) subject 'all by himself. This is the kernel of ideology, one
repressive state apparatus that 'function massively and predominantly by that causes Althusser to view it as eternal.
repression' (Althusser 2001: 97-8). That does not, however, impede Althusser (ibid.: 99) from assuming that
This is a concept that allows the precise identification of the main fea- the ISAs are spaces of a permanent ideological struggle, a struggle that could
tures of ideology. Ideology for Althusser never exists on a pure ideal level eventually be won with the help of the science of historical materialism.
but has a material status, as he says, 'ideology always exists in an apparatus, This last point is, however, the most contentious in his theory regarding the
and its practice, or practices. This existence is material' (ibid.: 112). This notion of ideology. To put it simply, the question is: how is it possible that
is a decisive step toward seeing the notion of ideology as a kernel for the such a formidable conception of ideological misconception, such as that
configuration of the subjectivity of individuals rather than as imagining which Althusser put in place, can be avoided only in the locus and prac-
the subject as being deluded from a given external structure, as the classical tice of the science of 'historical materialism'? And does this not mean the
Critical Theory conceived. In other words, what Althusser (ibid.: 118) here assumption that historical materialism will be the new 'Archimedean point
suggests is what constitutes his final more impressive thesis: 'ideology hails of truth', one that, in a context of an almost eternal ideology, as Althusser
or interpellates individuals as subjects': theorizes, assumes itself also as the only universal, fixed and absolute safe-
guarding against the ideological? To be clear, these questions are not plainly
Ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects responded to in Althusser's works. This will be recognized to some extent
among individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals by Althusser himself in his late work. In fact, in his Essays of Self-Criticism
40 The New Critique of Ideology

Althusser rejects the role of guarantor of Marxist science attributed to phi-


losophy in his early works (For Marx and Reading Capital), insisting now that
philosophy is seen as a class struggle in the field of theory (Althusser 1976:
68). However, the status of science remains non-ideological by definition
(McLennan et al. 1978: 98-101). This latter point is something that has fre- T h e C o n t e m p o r a r y D e b a t e o n t h e
quently been emphasized as a remaining shortcoming by critics of Althusser T h e o r y of I d e o l o g y
(Callinicos 1976; Hirst 1975, 1976). Furthermore, this is a point that will be
at the basis of those contemporary theorizations on ideology that defini-
tively assume an explicit abandonment of any assumption related to any
'Archimedean point of truth', as we will see in the next chapter.

Summary

It has been argued that Marx's works not only give rise to the notion of ideol- The contemporary debate on ideology is mostly inscribed within a more
ogy as an autonomous field of inquiry, but also provide a conceptualization general philosophical trend, which assumes that we are living - as Norval
of ideology that tends to overcome the shortcomings associated with the (2000a: 313) has put it - in a sort of 'post-metaphysical world', that is, a
classical epistemological dichotomy reality/illusion. Marx's formula asserts a world devoid of intrinsic meaning. The deepening of this view in the current
dialectic system in which the production of knowledge is no longer located stage of social sciences and humanities is attributed, in part, to the so-called
in an isolated individual, but in the material practices of individuals socially 'linguistic turn', that is, the radical shift of the starting point of philosophical
organized. Nonetheless it is a conception in which the proposed universal non- analysis from a rational conscious individual-centered optic to the analysis
ideological stage remains inscribed within a rational aegis, that is, a matter of of the structure of language. Aletta J. Norval (ibid.: 313, note 4) reminds us
rational knowledge. Within the subsequent debate on the theory of ideology, that the first use of this term is found in the works of one of the members of
Marx's formula has been permanently altered, bringing back the problem of the 'Vienna Circle', Gustav Bergmann. However, it is since the publication of
the classical 'Archimedean point of truth' (reality/illusion). Firstly, the descrip- Richard Rorty's book, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method
tive approach of ideology is unable to overcome the necessity of coining a in 1967 that the use of the term began to be popularized. Far from being
definitive criterion to distinguish between reality and appearance, that is, to concerned with discerning the intrinsic meaning associated with a word, we
affirm the existence of a universal, fixed and absolute point that is now, more are now confronted, as Wittgenstein (2001: 2) has highlighted, quoting Saint
than ever, inscribed within the individual's rationality. Secondly, the positive Augustine's Confession, only with the use of words:
conception of ideology, focusing on producing ideologies and ignoring episte-
mological challenges, becomes a voluntarist endeavor that cannot adequately Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various
deal with the suspicion that ideologies often become ideological phenomena sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified;
in a negative sense. Moreover, due to the fact that such a conception proposes and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to
'programs of actions', it cannot avoid assuming a version of a vantage point express my own desires. (Ibid.)
of truth. Finally, the negative conception of ideology, whether it assumes
an epistemic, functional or genetic perspective, inevitably seems to demand The linguistic turn thus implies the assumption of a shared premise of
that critical theorists adopt a certain notion of the 'Archimedean point of the impossibility of access to the truth and definitive knowledge. In other
truth' in order to make possible such a theoretical operation, a demand that words, it seems that there is no longer room for an 'Archimedean true point'
even reaches Althusser's theory of ideology. This is an ongoing debate that from which the critique of ideology used to be possible as an intellectual or
seems - in its contemporary stage - to have taken the option of the explicit practical activity (Norval 2000a: 314). However, as we will see during the
abandonment of any vantage point in the study of ideology - a path that we specific analysis of the authors here considered, this anti-essentialist charac-
will revise in the next chapter. ter is an assertion that has to be carefully calibrated. Indeed, there are not
only important differences in the specific theoretical approaches employed
to reject the idea of a true 'objective' reality but also dissimilar readings of
the way in which such a true reality was understood in the classical theory
41
42 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 43

of ideology, particularly by the Marxist tradition. In any case, what is shared The main shortcoming of this reductionist Marxism is, as has been argued
by contemporary authors in the field of ideology is their insistency on using byjakubowski (ibid.: 68) that,
the notion of ideology(ies), in contrast to other post-structuralist scholars,
who, following similar patterns of analysis, end up abandoning the notion [it] abandons Marx's dialectic and consequently fails to understand the
of ideology altogether on the basis of its actual uselessness. Michel Foucault humanist character of his theory ... [furthermore, in this account] theory
(1980: 118), for instance, explicitly explains his doubts about continuing and practice do not form a real unity, that consciousness is separated
the use of the notion of ideology on the basis of his rejection of the ideas of from its object and theory from its practice. (Ibid.)
(objective) truth and a given subject, as well as of the determinism that he
necessarily sees as associated to such a notion: Althusser, in turn, prefers to describe this relationship by using a spatial met-
aphor: a topography in which the society is assimilated to an edifice contain-
ing a base (infrastructure) upon which are erected the other levels (political,
[There are three reasons to reject the notion of ideology,] the first is that,
legal and ideological) of the superstructure. Although Althusser (2005: 101)
like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else
asserts either the relative autonomy of the superstructure, especially of
which is supposed to count as truth ... The second drawback is that the
the ideological state apparatuses with regard to the economic base, or the
concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order
'overdetermination' of each level above the other (superstructure levels over
of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to
infrastructure and vice verse), he ultimately credits the spatial metaphor for
something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic
accurately representing the 'determination in last instance' of superstructure
determinant, etc. For these three reasons, I think that this is a notion that
by the economic base (Althusser 2001: 90; Larrain 1983: 169-97).
cannot be used without circumspection. (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, later on, in Reading Capital, Althusser set up the notion of
But how can we then explain such insistency in the use of a notion with Darstellung, which for him is,
such a negative reputation? It seems - as suggested by Norval (2000a: 315) - [...] the key epistemological concept of the whole theory of value, the
that one reason that might explain the survival of the concept of ideology is concept whose object is precisely to designate the mode of presence of
related to the theoretical and practical significance of the problems and ques- the structure in its effects, and therefore to designate structural causality
tions left unresolved by the classical debate in the field, rather than with the itself. (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 188)
pertinence of the theoretical assumptions and answers specifically provided
by that debate. The insistency upon using the notion of ideology is thus due On the contrary, contemporary scholars concerned with the theory of ide-
to a sense of awareness that through discarding it, in the way proposed by ology mostly assume ideology to be a completely autonomous sphere of
the thesis of 'the end of ideology' or Foucault's circumspection attitude, there society, totally free of any mechanical economic determination. This gives
would be an implication of abandonment of the whole set of unresolved rise to an inclusive conception that presumes that we live in a world in
theorizations involved in this debate. Implicitly, then, there is an apprecia- which ideology is a constantly present feature of social and political life.
tion of the challenges posed by the classical debate on the theory of ideology, Ideology is thus now bestowed with a ubiquitous condition, which allows
which would entail the opening of new avenues to rethink them. 1 it to be assumed as present in all kind of political activities, in a sense that
A second main feature of the contemporary debate on ideology is its everything can now have an ideological reading.
assumed post-reductionist character, which distances it not only from the Both the impossibility of assuming an 'Archimedean point of truth' and
economistic versions of Marxism but also from the Althusserian intent to the ubiquity condition of ideology are central theoretical assumptions in
overcome it. The reductionist Marxism, diffused originally by Plekhanov and the works of the authors here analyzed. However, as we will see, both state-
Kautsky, assumes the unidirectional determination of the superstructure - ments are far from free of inconsistency and misunderstanding, which are
the political, legal and ideological levels - by the economic structure existing necessary to take into account in the task of proposing a more integrated
on the basis of society. Furthermore, reductionist Marxism ultimately conception of ideology, postulated in the next chapter.
assumes a structure of separated planes in which the 'state of productive
forces' determines, almost in a biological sense, 'the economic relations'. The 'Archimedean true point' problem
This economic base, in turn, determines 'the social and political order'.
Finally, the 'social psychology' of man is determined by both the economy Do we live in a world where ideology is a constantly present feature of social
and the social and political order Qakubowski 1976: 39). and political life? The ubiquity condition, that is, an inclusive conception

.
44 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 45

ideology, responds positively to this question. More importantly, this seems The restrictive thesis of ideology materializes once O'Sullivan reveals that
to be the main common characteristic of contemporary conceptions on he believes ideology is only associated with a specific kind of politics, that
ideology. What does it mean? is, the programmatic style of politics, while the formal sphere of politics is
First, it explicitly affirms that all kinds of politics can have an ideologi- imagined to be liberated from any ideological activity.
cal reading. The great force of the ubiquity condition thesis is found in the O'Sullivan mentions five related aspects, which distinguish formal poli-
increasingly popular position that affirms the impossibility of a completely tics from programmatic politics: (a) what is the central concern of politics?:
universal, fixed and absolute standpoint outside the political arena as a the concept of legitimacy in the case of formal politics and the effective
necessary condition for escaping from ideology, which is another way to say implementation of an end or purpose for programmatic politics; (b) the
that there is no longer any 'Archimedean point of truth'. This is of course a attitude toward power: in formal politics, both the existence of power and
position resulting from the criticisms posed by post-structuralist and post- the possibility that it will be abused are considered inevitable and ineradi-
modernist scholars against the rational aspiration of accessing a universal cable, and the focus of attention is to limit the power through the creation
and absolute truth. The ubiquity condition thesis finds, thus, a powerful ally of institutions and rules. In programmatic politics, there is no suspicion of
in the relativist post-epistemological spirit in vogue within the contempo- power as such; therefore, the attention is focused on who is best qualified
rary philosophy ethos (Rorty 1991: xxxix). Even more, the endeavors that to exercise power and to what purpose; (c) importance assigned to law: in
have been proposed to construct a more restrictive theory of ideology and formal politics the authority is constituted by legal rules and its activity
which avoid the 'everything is ideological' statement, derived from the ubiq- consists in making rules or laws. In programmatic politics, the author-
uity conditions, have followed a structure of argumentation that was not ity is constituted by a common aim or purpose, and its activity is mainly
intended to combat the thesis of the impossibility of the 'Archimedean true expressed by decrees, orders and commands rather than law; (d) division
point' at all. On the contrary, in most cases, the restrictive versions of ideol- between public and private life: while in formal politics there is a sharp dis-
ogy explicitly or implicitly end by assuming such impossibility as their basic tinction between the two, in programmatic politics there is no distinction
premise. Two examples might be given in this respect. David Morrice (1996) in principle at least; (e) meaning and place of rationality in political life: in
in his Philosophy, Science and Ideology in Political Thought, recognizing the risk formal politics rationality has no content because it is only concerned with
of assimilating all thought to ideology, eventually proposes a formula that the acknowledgement of formal procedures for the resolution of conflicts.
divides 'political thought' into political science and political philosophy, In programmatic politics there is always a substantive rationality, in accord-
on the one hand, and political ideology, on the other, the former being the ance with the ends of proponents and in contrast with those of the rivals
sphere that would allow one to engage in rational (non-ideological) political (O'Sullivan 1989: 203).
philosophy. Morrice's distinction, apart from rendering ideology illegitimate
It seems that although O'Sullivan's distinction could have a high utility
as a valid object of study as Norval (2000a: 317) has rightly highlighted, still
in the pursuit of a normative conception of politics, it does not present a
seems much more concerned with giving a relevant place to political phi-
real advance in the search for an accurate representation of what politics
losophy and political science within the discipline of political theory rather
really is, in at least contemporary societies. In fact, it is hard to see how it
than to putting arguments in favor of a less relativistic thesis on ideology. It
could be possible nowadays to conceive of a type of politics that assumes a
is, consequently, a disciplinarian preoccupation rather than a more theoreti-
sharp distinction between the concepts of legitimacy, power, rules, aims or
cal one, which tries to avoid the risk of the dissolution of political theory- a
purpose, empty and substantive rationality as O'Sullivan proposes. In other
risk that has already been announced by McLellan (1995: 72) when he affirms
words, the emphasis given to an apparently aseptic preoccupation with
that the 'omnipresence of ideology' would reduce 'all social phenomena to
establishing a neutral 'system of law' could in fact hide the most formidable
the status of mere propaganda' (ibid.).
ideological state apparatus, as Althusser (2001) had already established more
Noel O'Sullivan (1989), in turn, explicitly recognizes that his restric- than 20 years before O'Sullivan's work.
tive approach to the study of ideology '[...] will be defended, but in a way However, apart from a few 'anomalies', such as those scholars mentioned
which does not involve the above-mentioned difficulty [the existence of above, the 'mainstream' contemporary authors on ideology are both anti-
an "Archimedean point of truth"]' (ibid.: 189). Indeed, O'Sullivan's thesis Archimedean and pro-ubiquity, meaning that they explicitly seek to coin a
asserts the existence of two different kinds of politics: the programmatic and concept of ideology that is both deprived of any pretension of asserting an
the formal style of politics. While the former always supposes the pursuit 'Archimedean true point' and has a permanent presence within any political
of an aim or purpose, the latter is concerned only with the safeguarding of activity or discourse. In what follows, the works of two of the most outstand-
procedures that allow citizens to pursue their purposes under the rule of law. ing of those scholars, Michel Freeden and Ernesto Laclau, are revisited.
46 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 47

Freeden's methodological approach to ideology For Freeden, non-Marxist conceptions of ideologies assume them to be
'empirically ascertainable sets of political beliefs, opinions and attitudes,
Freeden's main aim is to propose a study of ideologies that could be distin- consciously-held and articulated at accessible levels of coherence' '[whose
guished from two kinds of traditional approaches he identifies as concep- main aim is to provide an] "ideational framework" to preserve or change
tualizations, which 'cause disarray and confusion among scholars' (Freeden the social order' (ibid.: 7).
1996a: 1). First, he criticizes those conceptions that he defines as, Amongst those rationalist non-Marxist approaches that Freeden needs to
reject is, remarkably, the American variant elaborated by the authors of the
[...] expression(s) of distorted and power-serving political thinking 'end of ideology' thesis. Indeed, for Freeden, the particular permutation of
[because they assume a point d'appui from which a transformative expo- the American variant within the non-Marxist tradition that describes ideolo-
sition of social thought and practice can be launched. (Ibid.) gies as 'a priori, internally consistent, deductively rationalist yet substan-
tively emotive systems of political thought, closed, dogmatic and rhetorical'
Second, he also rejects those conceptions of ideologies that establish a associates ideologies with left and right totalitarianism, reintroducing a
simplistic classification for 'broadly based political belief-systems and the pejorative connotation to the term (ibid.: 8).
historical traditions in which they unfold' (ibid.). From the beginning, however, he recognizes as important theoretical
In the first editorial of the Journal of Political Ideologies, in a sort of first allies for this new approach of the study of ideologies, all of those enrich-
manifesto, Freeden makes clear his objectives and contenders. He asserts his ments produced in the last decades of the twentieth century, coming from
challenge of filling the space left between political philosophy and the his- sociological and psychological perspectives, on the one hand, and cultural
tory of ideas in order to: anthropology and linguistic, on the other (ibid.: 8-10). Indeed, the new role
of the unconscious in the configurations of human belief makes it possible,
[...] assert the centrality of the study of ideologies as a vital access route in Freeden's view, for ideologies to be analyzed as an amalgam of rational
to an understanding of the nature of political thought and its bearing on and irrational components, something unthinkable during the previous
political practice. (Freeden 1996b: 5) rationalist non-Marxist tradition.
At the same time, ideologies are situated in concrete contexts, far from
Freeden is very aware of the difficulties of his endeavor - that in order to the totalizing 'ism' proclaimed by the American variant, and rather in a
be successful he firstly has to distance himself from an influential Marxist constant - 'permanent and ubiquitous' - interaction with political institu-
tradition in the field. Freeden resumes the legacy of the Marxist's theory of tions and the making of political process (ibid.: 8). Freeden also highlights
ideology in five propositions: (a) since ideology conceals the social truth, the contribution of cultural anthropology as a tool to assimilate ideologies
it is not the focus of study but it has to be removed in order for scientific with the notions of symbols, representations and interpretative frame-
knowledge to become possible; (b) since society can reveal concealment works. Freeden explicitly affirms that cultural anthropologists assimilate
produced by ideology through the changing of material conditions, ideol- 'ideologies into the category of cultural symbols and representations,
ogy is an 'ephemeral product of temporal and spatial circumstance', which reflections on human experience, and organizing frameworks of that
ultimately has no room for political and social science; (c) ideology is a experience' (ibid.). Moreover, the main aim of cultural anthropology is the
manifestation of power because it consolidates the grip of a social class or 'decoding' of the related social reality, through the form of 'deliberate acts
group over society; (d) since ideology is a result of a socio-economic distor- of symbolic creation' (ibid.). This 'decoding' function of cultural anthro-
tion, expressed in the inverted consciousness of a single class, there can be pology will be central for Freeden's theorization of ideologies. Indeed,
either only one ideology or a dominant ideology; and (e) since ideology is a although Freeden (ibid.: 8) acknowledges the notion of 'interdependent
'negative connoted term' (as a consequence of the precedent propositions), systems', abundantly used by cultural anthropologists to highlight the
to practise and study ideology are neglected and second-order activities. structural interdependence between ideology and the other social spheres,
Freeden, however, recognizes that most of the propositions above have he seems more interested in a softer - say, less structural - notion, such
been modified by subsequent Marxists theorists, including Gramsci and as that of 'mapping' suggested by Geertz (ibid.). In fact, to map ideology
Althusser, who suggest that ideologies 'may be permanent ... produced by in Freeden's sense, far from being only a matter of charting representa-
all classes ... express human relations ... and be multiples' (ibid.: 6-7). tions or descriptions, demands the analyst, on the one hand, to discern
However, Freeden has also to distance himself from the more descrip- the existence of 'internal structures and relationships' among different
tive and excessively rationalist non-Marxist approaches to ideology. ideological families and, on the other, to find a way to confer sense onto
48 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 49

social reality, which ideology shapes and reflects (ibid.). It is thus a reading materialism of Feuerbach, who did not conceive of reality 'as sensuous human
of the notion of cultural interdependence which has been stripped of any activity, practice' (Marx 1974a: 121). In other words, as Larrain (1983: 18) has
pretension of universal dependence with the economic structure of soci- accurately pointed out:
ety a la Althusser because of - in Freeden view - its high risk of becoming
deterministic. Marx wanted to assert his conviction that consciousness is not independ-
Freeden also recognizes a significant input from the study of linguistics ent of material conditions, against idealism, and that consciousness is
into the new relationship between ideology and the order of words and not a passive reflection of external reality, against the old materialism. (Ibid.,
meaning. As he says: emphasis added by the author.)

Ideologies were now proffered as repositories of meaning: particular Therefore, it is fair to affirm that, for Marx, it is not being, conceived statically -
ordering of words and, through them, of the signified to which they as Freeden seems to assert - but historical social practices that condition
attached - both concepts and practice. (Ibid.) consciousness.
In fact, Freeden, firstly assumes that, for Marx, ideology is a 'conscious-
The central enrichment that comes from the 'linguistic turn' is, in Freeden's ness reflected [in] the dehumanized and alienated existence of human
eyes, located at the level of epistemology. From Wittgenstein's and Austin's beings' (Freeden 1996a: 25). Consciousness, in turn, is itself distorted,
emphases on the uses of words to derive their meanings, language - or 'reinterpreting negative aspects of human existence, such as exploitation, in
games of languages - not only expresses social reality but constructs it. positive language such as that of rights' (ibid.). Freeden thus concludes by
Then, Freeden (ibid.: 8-9) sees here a radical displacement of the former saying that ideology for Marx is 'inextricably connected' to the dichotomy
central preoccupation of the debate on ideology, namely 'its deliberate or of truth and falsehood with respect to an objective reality.
unintentional misrepresentation of an external social reality', in favor of a Therefore, Freeden, despite his initially correct reading of the distorted
new epistemology in which reality was at least partly a result of a spatial consciousness mechanism in Marx's analysis, ends by assuming that the final
temporal situated understanding, which would definitively undermine aim of a Marxist study of ideology is to explain the impediments - conscious
the Marxist pretension of 'the dialectical juxtaposition of ideology with and unconscious - 'placed in the path of uncovering truth and reality' - a
objective truth' (ibid.: 9). reality which is assumed by Freeden (ibid.) to be a given and fixed dimension
In fact, Freeden's definitive intellectual endeavor seems to be his battle in Marx's works.
against the shortcoming that he believes is shared by the whole classical The point to bear in mind here is not that Freeden misrecognizes Marx's
Marxist tradition, that is, to be iredeemably trapped in a 'point d'appui' conception of ideology as an attempt to discern an objective true real-
perspective.2 Freeden explicitly announces that his departure from the ity, but that he assumes that Marx's notion of an objective true reality
'Marxisant schools', as he called it, is due to the fact that the critical dis- is static, unilaterally given, and unaltered by the practices of individuals
position characteristic of these perspectives draws attention away from that constitute it. Freeden's misinterpretation about the conception of
the product itself, reducing its status to an intellectual phenomenon and reality in Marx, despite seeming at first sight unrelated to his new theo-
as 'a means through which social understanding may be attained directly' retical morphological analysis of ideologies, becomes a central feature of
(Freeden 1996a: 1). it. Indeed, his rejection of a notion of a fixed and external reality is also a
Furthermore, it seems that the main explanation of Freeden's condemna- rejection of the possibility of acquiring certain and definitive knowledge, as
tion of Marxism is founded on his particular understanding of the epis- that which proposes to be discovered in a classic endeavor of ideology cri-
temological-ontological sphere that he attributes to Marxism. From the tique. Freeden here is of course not alone but is part of an influential philo-
beginning, Freeden assigns to classical Marxism a somewhat mechanic and sophical tradition that Norval has assertively called 'post-metaphysical'.
static materialist conception of reality. 'For Marx and Engels [...]' - Freeden Indeed, Aletta Norval identifies this philosophical trend within the works
asserts - '[...] the phenomenon of ideology rested on the ontological of post-modernist authors like Richard Rorty. But she also points out the
premise that being conditions consciousness' (ibid.: 25, cursives added by the Anglo-American (most influential) tradition in political theory, which
author). This view, however, appears as a somewhat unfair reading of Marx's has given rise to the so-called 'linguistic turns in political theory' (Norval
theory of ideology.3 Indeed, it underrates the fact that the earlier debates 2000a: 313-14, notes 3 & 7).
in which Marx was involved were not only against a German idealism that However, Freeden himself prefers to appeal only to a classic work: Karl
'did not know real, sensuous activity as such', but also against the classical Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, which, although it is recalled as an example
50 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 51

of a theory that detaches ideology from a particular social class, is also cen- It is worthwhile noting, however, that the 'illusory certainty' of ideologies
trally celebrated for introducing a 'new epistemology', called relationism: proposed by Freeden's account does not derive from the fact that ideologies
mask an 'objective reality' that for Freeden does not exist at all, but on the
Relationism does not signify that there are no criteria of Tightness and contrary highlights that no knowledge is certain - that there is a funda-
wrongness in a discussion. It does insist, however, that it lies in the mental lack of certainty in all knowledge.4 In other words, the certainty of
nature of certain assertions that they cannot be formulated absolutely, ideologies is illusory because their real ontological status is based on uncer-
but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation. (Mannheim tainty. In other words, ideologies present an operationally necessary but
1991: 254) epistemologically unfounded certainty.
The real problem of this theoretical perspective is not located on the
Furthermore, this new epistemology contests the fixed objective reality, notion of 'illusory certainty' but in the formula proposed by Freeden for its
supposedly defended by Marx as the unique determination of ideology, and resolution. Freeden is very aware that the great risk involved in his theory
proclaims in turn that 'all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, is to get closely associated with a relativist post-modernist position. Freeden
and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer' makes this risk explicit by asking,
(Freeden 1996a: 26).
The conclusion eventually reached by Freeden is to accept the uncertainty [...] how can the uncertain knowledge we have as practicing thinkers
principle as a basic necessary condition of all knowledge, and - as an appar- about politics, as ideologists, be assessed? Do we dismiss it because we
ently inevitable consequence - to offer a new legitimizing basis for knowl- cannot be satisfied about its truth-value; will this orthodox view of ideol-
edge supplied by ideologies, as he says, ogy have to give way to a starkly relativist approach to political thought,
as some postmodernist suppose; or can new strategies be introduced for
If certain social and political knowledge is impossible, it follows that evaluating our perceptions and conceptions on the basis of their moral,
we must ask two questions: what uncertain knowledge may be gained emotional, or intellectual persuasiveness, or their ability to interpret facts
through ideology; and what can our uncertain knowledge of ideology be? meaningfully? (Ibid.: 46)
(Ibid.: 45)
His preoccupation is thus centered on the old classic concern shared by the
Then ideologies are now rehabilitated as a new genre of (political) thinking critique of ideology school: how can an uncertain knowledge - illusorily
and a particular provider of legitimate knowledge. Moreover, Freeden asserts certainty - as provided by ideologies, be assessed? Surely, Freeden has already
that since ideologies cannot but share the same weaknesses of other forms of discarded any solution related to an objective reality or any adoption of an
knowledge - the uncertainty of knowledge - they should not be condemned 'Archimedean point of truth' since he assumes that ideologies are a legiti-
by this reason alone. In other words, for Freeden, ideologies as a type of mate kind of knowledge, which is by definition lacking in certainty. He then
knowledge must be judged by their particular features and not by the epis- has to trust his own methodological approach to the study of ideologies to
temological shortcomings owing to their proper condition of knowledge. act as a new evaluating strategy. In this move, Freeden explicitly abandons
This is why Freeden from now on will focus exclusively on the analysis the classical critical conception of ideology and assumes rather an analysis
of the specific character of ideologies (as a type of knowledge). He first of ideology whose main concern is 'the appraisive handling which interpre-
proposes that the main feature of ideologies is their decontesting character, tative morphological perspectives level at political thought-processes' (ibid.:
which allows the provision of certain, though provisional, knowledge neces- 135). This is a methodological solution that highlights the morphological
sary for political action. As that seems to be in contradiction with his gen- specificity of ideologies as the key factor to guarantee both their ubiquitous
eral statement that any certain social and political knowledge is impossible, condition and their non-arbitrary character (Norval 2000a: 321-5).
Freeden has no other option but to conclude that the certainty provided by Linked to this point is Freeden's excessive distrust of the notion of power,
ideologies is somewhat of an illusion: which he sees as the shadow of classical Marxist analysis on some recent
developments on the analysis of ideology. Freeden mentions here three
Ideologies or, more precisely, practicing ideologists (and we are all such new approaches: Hermeneutics, Psychoanalysis and Discourse Analysis.
in one capacity) often feel unable to live with uncertainty and insist on He recognizes that these new developments have contributed to a broader
establishing an illusory certainty, necessary to political decision-making. focus of analysis of ideology from the classical philosophical concern on
(Ibid.: 45, emphasis added by the author) the thoughts of unique individuals to the thought pattern of larger groups
52 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 53

and generalized means of communication (Freeden 1996b: 9). However, he it - 'to limit the range of possible contestation around central political con-
resumes his position saying that although ideology is always about power it cepts' (idem). Therefore, it appears that the requirement of having a univer-
is not only about power, 'in the Marxist inspired sense - that considers ideol- sal standard to assess the fixation provided by ideologies is essential. This is
ogy to be an instrument of legitimating the power of leaders and dominant because decontesting always gives rise to an exclusion of other possibilities
groups' (ibid.: 10). First, it is necessary to point out that Freeden's notion of contestation, which implies the risk not only of a naturalized fixation but
of ideology as power is abstractly related to the determination of meanings, also of arbitrary, exclusionary and illegitimate power domination.
without consideration of any pre-assumed privileged class, group or central The second problem refers more specifically to the three levels of actions,
interest. As he says: categories, processes and linkages that Freeden associates with his 'not only
about power, in the Marxist sense' reading of ideologies. The first level refers
Ideology is always about power because it involves the determination to 'understanding, explaining, expressing, imagining, inventing, criticiz-
of meaning and the legitimating of one set of meanings from among a ing, actualizing, [and] identifying' (Freeden 1996b: 10). The second level is
competing field. (Ibid.: 9) about:

In contrast to reductionist Marxism, Freeden's notion of ideology as power The multiplicity of viewpoints and pluralism of groups, failure as well
is at first sight methodologically much more accurate, because it can be as success, convergences and divergences of ideas, interrelationships of
applied to all competing fields in which the determination and legitimation groups, masses and individuals, the shaping, structuring, development,
of meaning is an open question. decay and exchange of political values over time and space, the morphol-
However, one may argue that it could be more theoretically correct to ogy of conceptual configurations. (Ibid.)
assume - as Marx actually does - that at all ideological power levels, even
those defined by Freeden, ideologies 'serve the power of leaders of dominant Finally, the third level relates to 'the linkages between thought and action,
groups' or at least - as suggested by Eagleton - are related to central interests and the decoding of political practices as receptacles of ideas, opinions
and power conflicts. Indeed, Terry Eagleton has arguably pointed out that it and beliefs' (ibid.). However, it is not at all clear that the expansion of the
is 'forceful and informative' to distinguish, as a criterion in defining ideol- notion of ideologies to include the contents of the aforementioned levels
ogy, between those interests and power conflicts which, at any given time, could avoid the loss in subtlety and knowledge that Freeden fears. On the
are central to a whole social order and those which are not, in order to contrary, it could actually be the precise cause of such a loss. Indeed, such
avoid the notion of ideology becoming wholly uninformative because of its extension of the notion of ideologies, although it could surely provide con-
omnipresence (Eagleton 1991:10). To Eagleton's point, the answer offered by crete knowledge of a specific ideology, not only in a descriptive way but also
Freeden is found in his statement that ideologies are not only about power, as a prospect for future options of courses of political action (mapping char-
in the Marxist sense, because if that is the case - Freeden warns - 'the loss acter), retains the high risk of becoming futile knowledge if, for one reason
in subtlety and, indeed, in knowledge, is immense' (Freeden 1996b: 10). or another, ideologies had some constitutive dependence upon the running
However, the problem with this answer is twofold. The first criticism is force (power-interest) - assuming for a moment that there is one - of social
more general and refers to the broad notion of ideology as power used by reality. This is because, in such a case, Freeden's methodology would provide
Freeden. Indeed - as Eagleton has made clear, criticizing Foucault's pervasive a partial understanding of this phenomenon - actually a mere outline.
conception of power - an excessively broad optic of the analysis of power However, if the main risks involved are methodological, for example, the
assimilates all power struggles produced within a society to the same degree risk of misunderstanding the phenomenon of Ideologies, which is precisely
of relevance, making it absurdly possible that 'the level of food supplies in the main concern of Freeden's new methodology, why then does he take
Mozambique is a weightier issue than the love life of Mickey Mouse' (Eagleton that risk? Or inversely, why does he not consider, for instance, the option of
1991: 8). not abandoning either a functionalist or genetic perspective altogether?
Furthermore, the point here is to stress the idea - using Freeden's Actually, it is not that Freeden does not provide any account of the 'social-
terminology - that, due to the 'decontesting' character attributed to ideolo- cultural determination' of ideology. Indeed, he is very aware that such a
gies, a sort of 'logical adjacent' universal standard appears to be necessary method should exist through which concepts (or at least their ineliminable
for a formulation of a critique of ideology. In fact, for Freeden, ideologies are features) are fleshed out, through which decisions about which paths to
ultimately 'groupings of decontested political concepts' (Freeden 1996a: 82). follow within a set of options of logical and also illogical adjacency will be
Furthermore, 'to decontest' means - as Norval (2000a: 316, note 18) has put established. This method is provided by the notion of 'cultural adjacency',
54 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 55

which imposes constraints on political concepts, acting as a brake within the so on, overlooks concrete-universal (structural) factors, such as the illegitimate
framework of logical adjacency and as a sort of 'ordinary usage chooser' to hidden inclination of the surface of the table, which affects the result of the
those elements that do not follow logically from 'ineliminable' components whole game, although it does not necessarily determine it.
of concepts (Freeden 1996a: 69-1). But is it really true that Freeden overlooks the inclination of the table? The
For Freeden this is more than a simple social determination of con- answer seems to lie in his explicit theoretical intentions. Actually, the key
cepts. Rather, the 'specific internal formation' attached to the ineliminable is found in Freeden's 'anti-closed' notion of society, which, while trying to
components is shaped by culture. Culture, for Freeden, is 'temporally and escape from the 'concrete universal' of Marx's conception of ideology and
spatially bounded social practices, institutional patterns, ethical systems, the 'universal without concrete' of the American version of non-Marxist
technologies, influential theories, discourses, and beliefs (to include reac- notions of ideologies, ultimately assumes a sort of 'concrete without universal'
tions to external events and to unintentional or non-human occurrences)' conception of ideologies, substantially rich in the contents of its concretion
(ibid.: 69-70). Therefore, for Freeden the meaning of a concept is ultimately but relatively vacuous in the links and relationship to the totality, that is,
determined by its usage. It is worth remembering that Freeden asserts the the structure(s) of society.
thesis of the essential contestability of concepts, which leads him to react It is worth remarking, however, that Freeden's conception of ideologies
against the idea that concepts have cores that are logically necessary to the has become one of the most influential theoretical endeavors of the cur-
meaning of the word. Later on, he prefers to speak of 'effective contestabil- rent time in the field of theory of ideology, which has stimulated a new
ity' rather than 'essential contestability' (ibid.: 61-2; Freeden 2004: 3-1). wave of study on ideologies. This new wave of study assumes that between
Nevertheless, in any case, it is the use of concepts that gives them their real political philosophy and the history of ideas 'there is a sphere of political
meaning. thought-pattern, enmeshed in political practices - that of political ideolo-
Furthermore Freeden recognizes that there is always the unpredictable gies' (Freeden 1996b: 5), which has to be identified as an autonomous object
human agency, which constitutes the 'non-rational "rogue factor" of prefer- of inquiry. It is worth recognizing as Freeden (ibid.: 5) has convincingly
ring one option over another' (Freeden 1996a: 69-70). Similarly, ideologies, argued that,
acting as combinations of particular concepts, mainly seek to optimize
determinacy, which is necessary for political action. Freeden concludes that Societies consciously and unconsciously, on a large or modest scale,
ideologies, although not necessarily ignoring logical adjacency, privilege engage in the continuous production of conceptions, perceptions, mis-
'socially situated and partisan value-arbitrated choices among adjacent com- perceptions, languages, veritable epistemologies, whose function it is to
ponents' (ibid.: 75-6). There is thus a greater influence of cultural adjacency explain, justify, support, or contest the political space they inhabit, and
than is presumed, which results in a display of 'various mixes of rational the intuitions that take root, or could be nourished, in that soil. (Ibid.)
criteria, emotional inclinations and cultural value preferences' in the shape
of concrete ideologies (ibid.). This endeavor, by abandoning any pretensions of adopting an 'Archimedean
However, for Freeden, the socio-cultural determination of concepts and point of truth' has heralded Freeden as one of the leading figures of the current
ideologies is located at the level of a concrete entity, imagined as a specific stage of the study of ideologies in their positive as well as descriptive senses.
space-temporal framework which in that way is assumed to be neither deter-
mined nor overdetermined by greater structural 'social formations' (to use Laclau's non-essentialist notion of ideology
one of Althusser's terms) in which such a framework is inscribed.5 In this
way, ideologies are imagined to be open constructs with many routes traced There are three stages in the intellectual development of Laclau's discourse
from 'the core through adjacent concepts, to a perimeter one as well as by theory: the early stage is marked by the influence of Gramsci on his critique
the reverse movement' (ibid.: 81). This might be a very accurate picture of structural Marxism. This extends from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s.
of the deployment of ideologies, but it does not explain satisfactorily the Here Laclau combats the economistic tendency in the works of Althusser,
'whys' of those movements in a more suitable way than of appealing to a Balibar and Poulantzas, which in Laclau's view negates the specificity of the
particularized notion of cultural adjacency and partisan values. political; produces a functionalist and instrumental definition of the state;
The problem here is that Freeden's cultural adjacency has the same deficits, and reduces ideology to interpellations of the subject with a necessary class
which may affect a sports analyst who, while trying to explain the reasons of content (Torfing 1999: 12).
the defeat of a favorite snooker player focusing on concrete-particular factors The second stage refers to the development of a neo-Gramscian theory
alone, such as bad personal equipment, excessively stressful conditions and of discourse in the mid-1980s (Laclau 2009: 816). Here Laclau goes on to
56 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 57

combat the essentialist character of Gramsci's theory, criticizing his insist- Classical Economics: Outline of a Concept of Historical Time' (Althusser &
ency upon a privileged position for the proletariat in hegemonic struggles. Balibar 1979: 97-9), and in Chapter 1, Part III: 'From Periodization to the
This leads Laclau to reformulate the notion of hegemony in terms of a proc- Modes of Production' (ibid.: 224). It was also subsequently assumed by
ess of articulation of social identity in the context of social antagonisms, Poulantzas (1973: 13-15) in Political Power and Social Classes (1968). Later
rather than as a process of unification of political forces around a pre- on, Althusser (2001: 135) sets up a complementary thesis of the reciprocal
constituted interest: the interest of the proletariat. The third stage is dedi- action of the state and the economic base in his essays 'Ideology and ideo-
cated to the formulation of a new theory on the subject. Indeed, from the logical state apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation)' (1970). Finally, it
late 1980s onward, Laclau progressively abandons the Althusserian notion is Poulantzas (1980: 16) who, in his later work Stare, Power, Socialism (1978),
of 'subject positions' and starts conceiving instead a theory in which the arrives at the abandonment of a structuralist determination of the state.
subject only emerges as 'an empty place of a lack within a dislocated struc- Therefore, Laclau observes that the class character of Althusser's theory of
ture, and then seeks to constitute itself as a fully achieved identity within a ideology (Althusser 2001: 185-6) prevents him from analyzing the ideologi-
recomposed social totality' (Torfing 1999: 14). cal state apparatus as a terrain for hegemonic struggle (Torfing 1999: 26).
There is, however, a central principle, which is at the bottom of the whole Then, Laclau's first original contribution is his theory of non-class inter-
of Laclau's intellectual development, though it reaches its highest levels of pellation, developed during his first intellectual stage. Here Laclau extends
autonomy in the last stage, that is, the primacy of the political. Indeed, for Althusser's theory of ideology as an interpellation of individuals as subjects,
Laclau, Marxist structuralism postulates a rigid picture of the state, which, which has always been reduced 'in last instance' to class antagonism, to a
as a part of the superstructure, is determined by an objective structure, new non-class interpellation terrain at the level of a popular-democratic
becoming the only reflection of the objective interest of the dominant class. struggle. Laclau (1977: 107) asserts that,
Social classes, though still perceived as the engine of the history, are assumed
to be the bearers of the structure, and their struggles are not just restricted to The first contradiction - at the level of mode of production - is expressed
the advancement of a pre-given interest. The real point in question here is the on the ideological level in the interpellation of the agents as a class,
necessity for a reversion of essentialism, that is, the assumption that exists the second contradiction is expressed through the interpellation of the
about an underlying essential principle that structures the social totality (by agents as the people. (Ibid.)
itself escaping the process of structuration) (Derrida 2001: 352).
Laclau's primarily concern was against the Marxist version of essentialism: In this way, Laclau opens the door to a theory of ideology conceived as an
economicism, which is in turn presented in two versions: epiphenomenal- 'interpellation' mechanism located in the realm of the civil society and the
ism and reductionism. Epiphenomenalism refers to the general thesis that state, that is, in the sphere of the political struggle for the hegemony of a
asserts that the whole superstructure (the legal, political and ideological new subject, the people. It is worth noticing that 'interpellation' is a concept
spheres) of society is determined by an economic base, in the sense that the also introduced by Althusser to refer to the effect produced by ideology on
superstructure cannot play any autonomous role in history. Even if the rela- individuals by addressing them in a way that constructs individuals as a
tionship is mediated by intermediate categories or instances, the important particular subject (women, consumers, workers, foreigners, etc.), which does
point is that there is a linear determination between structure and super- not exist before the interpellation (Torfing 1999: 302).
structure. Reductionism, in turn, points to the nature of the superstructure, However, Laclau (1977: 108) at this stage still clearly asserts that 'if not
in the sense that it assumes a reduction of social contradiction in capital every contradiction can be reduced to a class contradiction, every contra-
societies (capital-labor) whose interests are determined by their position diction is overdetermined by class struggle' (ibid.). Indeed, Laclau was still
within the sphere of material production. It is thus a class reductionism working within the architecture of Althusser's structural Marxism and then,
(Mouffe 1979: 169-70; Torfing 1999: 20). Laclau observes that the efforts by default, was also the target of most of the criticisms that had affected
of Marxist structuralism to bring to the surface the epiphenomenalism of the French philosopher. Torfing (1999: 32) has identified four shortcomings
classical Marxism, postulating a relative autonomy of the superstructure, are in Laclau's theory of non-class interpellation at this stage: (a) the notion
finally defeated by its insistence in maintaining that societal instances are of interpellation, being a topographical concept, indefectibly leads to the
determined structurally, in the last instance by economics. As is well known, terrain of the model of base-superstructure; (b) the constitution of class is
the thesis of the determination 'in the last instance' of the superstruc- produced at the level of modes of production, having no role for discursive
ture by the economic infrastructure was originally presented by Althusser intervention in the formation of the proletariat; (c) the marriage of popular
and Balibar in Reading Capital (1970), Chapter 4, Part II: 'The Errors of and democratic components is controversial theoretically and empirically;
58 77ie New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 59

and (d) the formula of 'non-class interpellation' presents an excessive sup- configure an idea that is contradictorily coherent. As Derrida (2001: 352) has
plementary character of 'class interpellation', introduced in order to explain stated, the idea of a fixed transcendent center becomes contradictorily coher-
social contradictions without returning to the excessive reductionism of ent when it is assumed that the center structures the structure, while itself
class struggle. Some of these shortcomings were diminished in Laclau's sub- escaping the process of structuration (Torfing 1999: 39).
sequent early works. Particularly, a relatively distant framework from the Laclau, in turn, is not far from the old Kantian preoccupation upon the
base-superstructure model, a new view of the influence of discursive inter- condition of possibility for knowledge when he asserts that: 'the very pos-
vention on the formation of social class, and a new conceptualization of the sibility of perception, thought and action depends on the structuration of
relationship between popular and democratic components can already be a certain meaningful field which pre-exist any factual immediacy' (Laclau
found in Laclau's works of the early 1980s (Laclau 1980a: 87-3). Particularly, 1993: 431). However, in contrast to Kant, Laclau argues that the 'pre-existing
a first sense of awareness about the excessive supplementary character of the meaningful field' or discourse is something that is permanently renegotiated
thesis of non-class interpellation is only developed by Laclau (1980b: 138) in through a process of political hegemonic struggle.
his article 'Democratic Antagonisms and the Capitalist State' (ibid.). From here, Laclau is able to consequentially move into the second funda-
However, it was not until Laclau reached the second stage of his intel- mental premise of post-structuralism: the abandonment of any pretension
lectual development that he was able to overcome Althusserianism defini- of postulating a permanent and definitive closure of society. In fact, if we
tively (Laclau 2009: 817). The second stage of Laclau's output starts with the assume that there is no transcendental fixed center, the conclusion is that we
eradication of the last remnant of essentialism that he observes in Gramsci's have only provisional attempts to provide 'sutures' to a constitutively opened
works, rejecting in fact the idea that only a fundamental class (the bourgeoi- society.6 Furthermore, it is the absence of a structuring center that extends the
sie or proletariat) can become hegemonic. It is worth noticing, however, that efforts of implanting sutures - the process of signification - infinitely (Torfing
the reason given by Gramsci for holding this 'essentialist' viewpoint was far 1999: 86). As Derrida (2001: 365) has asserted,
from arbitrary. In fact, Gramsci argues that the transformation of a funda-
mental class into a hegemonic force demands a high degree of homogeneity, If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the Infinite*
self-awareness, organization and so on, which is only obtained in the sphere ness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse,
of production (Torfing 1999: 36). As Gramsci (1971: 180-1) affirms, but because the nature of the field - that is, language and a finite
language - exclude totalization. This field is in effect that of play, that
The level of development of the material forces of production provides a is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is
basis for the emergence of the various social classes, each one of which to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical
represents a function and has a specific position within production itself. hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it:
(Ibid.) a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitution. (Ibid.)

However, this approach isolates the whole sphere of production from the Finally, Laclau arrives at one of his main theoretical premises: the primacy
political struggle - something which has already been questioned by the of the political. In fact, if there is no structuring center, society cannot
pervasive conception of politics held by post-structuralist scholars such as be permanently and definitively closed, and the attempts of sutures or
Foucault and Derrida. significations will extend infinitely due precisely to the absence of such
Following this trend, Laclau also began to analyze the sphere of the a center. Therefore, it is the presence of hegemonic (political) practices
'economic' as another terrain of discursive formation. At this stage, Laclau of articulation that partially fix the meaning of social identities by giving
is fully settled in the field of Discourse Theory, which negates the existence rise to a discourse. The notion of hegemony in Laclau's works, far from
of a transcendental fixed center that determines the structure of societies. being attached to any historical predestined fundamental class as it was in
As Laclau (1988: 254) has asserted, discourse can be defined as 'a decen- Garmsci's theory, is conceived as an eminently contingent category, mean-
tred structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed' ing that the unstable and radical incomplete character of society is also
(ibid.). transmitted to the whole set of discourses that compete with each other to
It is worthwhile noting here that what Laclau and post-structuralism in gen- become hegemonic, all them being placed in a plural and non-privileged
eral neglect is not the notion of a pre-established category (which makes pos- position (Laclau & Mouffe 1982: 101 ).7
sible that our cognitions become meaningful), but the transcendental, fixed Two things are important to stress here. First, as Laclau denies the exist-
and a-historical character of such a category, which for the post-structuralists ence of a closed society, he also reacts against the idea of social classes as
60 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 61

historical subjects whose identities are constituted on the basis of pre-given being beyond the system - a constitutive outside - configures the limits of
interests, determined by the structural position of the subjects within the a discourse, which, in turn, cannot have any common measure with that
capitalist system of relations of production. In contrast, Laclau attributes system. In fact, Laclau (ibid.: 37) argues that,
to the notion of hegemony the condition of being the constituter of all
social identities, including class identity. Class identity continues to exist If what we are talking about are the limits of a signifying system, it is
in Laclau's theory, but its constitution is now freed of any structural condi- clear that those limits cannot be themselves signified, but have to show
tioning. Class identity is, instead, the result of the articulation of different themselves as the interruption or breakdown of the process of signification.
positions within each subject (Laclau 1983: 43-4; Laclau & Mouffe 2001: (Ibid., emphases from the original)
135-45). Torfing (1999: 86), following Laclau (1987: 32) in this point, refers
to the fact that the strong correlation existing between formerly ghetto-like Furthermore, this breakdown must pose a permanent threat to all of the
living circumstances of workers and the positions of their subjects (who other differences within the system (Laclau 1996b: 52).
all lived in well-defined neighborhoods with their own social, cultural and This logic of exclusion is not merely a matter of choice, that is, to decide
political organizations) favored the political attempts to transform the pro- between different excluded categories, but is really a condition that makes
letariat into a class. possible the development of a system of signifying. Furthermore, for Laclau
Second, for Laclau, at the root of any hegemonic process there is a dislo- it is because there is a radical impossibility of a system as pure presence,
cation of a social order, which a hegemonic practice intends to temporar- beyond all exclusions, that an actual system can exist (Laclau 1996a: 38).
ily overcome through the establishment of social antagonisms. Indeed, as The logic of exclusion has three clear consequences. First, it means that
society - for Laclau - cannot be definitively closed and prevented from each element of the system becomes constitutively split. On the one hand,
disruption, there is always a risk that it will become dislocated, that is, each element expresses itself in a differential relation to other elements.
destabilized by the emergence of events that cannot be domesticated, sym- On the other, it cancels out these differences by entering into a logic of
bolized or integrated through the dominant discourse. Torfing (1999: 301) equivalence with all the other differences in the system. All differences are
has cited as an example how the 'concurrence of inflation and unemploy- equivalent to each other inasmuch as they are all located within the system,
ment in the early 1970s dislocated the Keynesian orthodoxy which basically in which the constitutive outside becomes a point of unity for the ground-
claimed that "stagflation" would never occur' (ibid.). The response to such a ing of the new identity of the system as such, which is now also part of the
dislocation is the constitution of a social antagonism which, far from being identity of each element (ibid.: 38).8
responsible for any disruption in society, is assumed to be part of the solu- Second, the constitutive outside must be reduced to a pure negativity
tion, being intrinsically linked to politics (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 13). because it is only in this character that anything beyond it can become
Indeed, as Laclau (1990: 39) has put it 'on the one hand they [dislocations] the limits of a system. At the same time this coincides with the moment of
threaten identities, on the other, they are foundation on which new identi- the constitution of a system as an objective order. This constitutive outside
ties are constituted' (ibid.). signifies a pure threat from the excluded categories. But in order to be a
However, in order to fulfill this function, a social antagonism cannot be threat the various excluded categories have to, in turn, cancel out their dif-
conceived to be another difference within a discursive formation because ferences through the constitution of a chain of equivalences, which allows
as a difference it cannot assume a foundational character that might allow the system to assume all to be only one demonized category, to signify itself
all the internal differences to survive in the event of the emergence of a (ibid.: 39).
dislocation (because the dislocation cannot be resolved within the current Third, this last process of cancellation of differences, by the forming of
discursive formation by definition). It cannot be either a mere difference a chain of equivalences of the excluded categories, means for Laclau the
outside the discursive formation - if it were it would not be possible to emergence of an empty signifier. But why an empty signifier and not just a
discern whether it is itself inside or outside of the system of differences. (normal) signifier? Laclau's answer is fully coherent: because 'we are trying
Actually, Laclau, following Ferdinand de Saussure (1913/1995), explains to signify the limits of signification [...] and there is no direct way of doing
that all signifying systems are systems of differences in which identities are so except through the subversion of the process of signification itself (ibid.:
purely relational. Any element of the system has an identity only in so far as 39). Indeed, following the Lacanian reasoning that the only way to repre-
it is different from the other. The problem is - says Laclau (1996a: 37) - that sent something that is not directly representable (unconscious) is by the
the very possibility of signification is the system and the very possibility of subversion of the signifying process, Laclau assumes that the problem with a
the system is the possibility of its limits. It must be then something that, (normal) signifier is that it is attached to a specific signified, becoming itself
62 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 63

a difference within a signifying process. Thus a (normal) signifier cannot sig- non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impos-
nify the limits of a system of signifying because the limits are beyond - not sibility of any ultimate suture' (Laclau 1990: 92).
within - a system of signifying. In other words, they are not directly repre- Laclau's non-essentialist notion of ideology is a consequence of his
sentable. The solution is then the subversion of the process of signification, post-structuralist theoretical assumptions, which although assuming the
which here means the suppression of any particular attached signified to a impossibility of a definitive closure of society, demand at the same time the
(empty) signifier in order that this signifier can represent the 'pure being' of constitution of a temporal closure not only to avoid the risk of a social implo-
the system (ibid.: 39). sion in a process of the exacerbation of differences, but also as a condition of
The ontological grounds that make this subversion possible are again for possibility of the existence of society as such. As Laclau (1996a: 37) says,
Laclau the split of each unit of signification on which an 'undecidable locus'
is constructed.9 This construction takes place through the prevalence of the [...] we are left with the paradoxical situation that what constitutes the
logic of equivalences over that of differences, which are almost obliterated condition of possibility of a signifying system - its limits - is also what
in order to make possible the signifying of the system as such (ibid.: 39). constitutes its condition of impossibility - a blockage of the continuous
From here, Laclau is now able to construct a new conception of ideol- expansion of the process of signification. (Ibid.)
ogy, which sets itself apart from his initial notion of interpellation taken
from Marxist structuralism. Indeed, Laclau's critique of Marxist's essential- Therefore, the closure is both always necessary and also always illusory.
ism leads him also to neglect the Marxist conception of ideology that he Moreover, it becomes ideological when its illusory character is negated, for-
identifies with two main strands: as a superstructural category and as a false gotten or deluded. It seems then that in Laclau's theory the negative charac-
consciousness (Laclau 1990: 89). Indeed, if as Laclau suggests society is not ter of ideology is still retained, though it is now stripped of any 'essentialist'
a unitary, fully intelligible and structural totality, then the temporal suture condition.
provided by a hegemonic dominant discourse is always ideological, as far as However, the critique of ideology proposed by Laclau cannot avoid being
it presents itself as a permanent and definitive closure. conceived as an epistemological endeavor. Indeed, what Laclau tries to pre-
For Laclau, the non-ideological sphere, the Lacanian Real, is always a vent is the ideological tendency to take a historically contingent category
dispersed movement of differences. Therefore, the problem with Marxism - as if it was a transcendental and permanent entity. In other words, he
Laclau argues - when it assumes the non-ideological reality to be a sphere wishes to avoid the confusion of the epistemic status of the beliefs involved
freed from ideological representations, unitary and wholly structured, is in such a hegemonic practice. This situates the critique of ideology pro-
that such a reality is already ideological (Torfing 1999: 113). In this way, posed by Laclau surprisingly close to the framework explored by the school
Laclau manages to conceive of a new non-essentialist notion of ideology of critical theory, if not as that elaborated by Habermas - at least it is very
attached to the operation of the hegemonic practices. As Howarth and close to the contextualist's view of Adorno (Geuss 1981: 66). In any case,
Stavrakakis (2000: 14) have stated, hegemonic practices are 'an exemplary in Laclau's theory of ideology it seems impossible to avoid a reference to a
form of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities notion of true and false belief, the latter being defined as ideological on the
and subjectivities into a common project [...]' (ibid.). This, in turn, hap- basis of its epistemic properties (to assume a structurally temporary closure
pens by the construction of myths, which involves, as Laclau (1990: 61) has as if it was a definitive one).
affirmed, 'a new objectivity by means of the articulation of the dislocated A second point of contention in Laclau's conception of ideology is his
elements' (ibid.). If a myth proves to be successful in neutralizing social dis- insistency upon the empty condition of the constitutive (signifier) outside,
location it will eventually be transformed into a collective social imaginary, a premise that is related to the contingent character of the hegemonic prac-
that is, 'a horizon or absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility' tices and also with his assumption of the primacy (autonomy) of the politi-
(Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 15). cal. Indeed, Laclau argues that in all hegemonic articulations the constitutive
Furthermore, since Laclau (1996c: 201) recognizes the very general (ideo- outside, wfiich makes possible the existence of the system, must be a signifier
logical) tendency existing within a given discursive hegemonic articulation that has been stripped of any of its specific contents in order to represent the
to present itself as a fully essential constitutive unity, ignoring its inherently universal character of the system. This, which for Laclau is the only necessary
contingent character, he also insists upon retaining a role for a critique of possibility to resolve the paradoxical situation of trying to signify the limits
ideology, which, far from being perceived as a reflective (logos) enlightening of a signifying system, implies the assumption of an infinite chain of tenta-
exercise that is intended to disclose a deceived objective social reality, is now tive candidates who wish to become the contents of such a (empty) signifier.
assumed to be a 'warning practice', which constantly warns us about 'the Indeed, although the empty signifier is an empty place by definition, Laclau
64 The New Critique of Ideology The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology 65

clarifies that it '|h]as to be incarnated in some concrete content' (Laclau & implausible to assume that all contents could become proper candidates
Zak 1994: 15). However, he finally concludes that the empty signifier is for filling an empty signifier that seeks to become universal: the universal
'[ijndifferent to the content of the filling' (ibid.: 15). As he says: identity of the system. This does not imply the affirmation of an a priori
transcendental character for any specific content, returning to the classical
The filling function requires an empty place, and the latter is, to some essentialist conception, but to explore, as the old epistemological debate has
extent, indifferent to the content of the filling, though this filling func- always proposed, the conditions of possibilities that make plausible, in fact,
tion has to be incarnated in some concrete contents, whatever those that only some of the components, not all, in an infinite chain of signified,
contents might be. (Ibid., emphasis from the original) become capable of filling the empty place described by Laclau.
This also implies the prevention of being caught in a new version of
Therefore, Laclau has now arrived at a totally opposed position to that held ideological distortion never explored by Laclau. Indeed, it is not only pos-
by structural Marxists, whom he had criticized in his early stage, that is, sible to assume, as Laclau (1996c: 201) does, an ideological distortion as the
the apparently everlasting contingent character of the temporal closure of 'illusion of closure' (ibid.), but also the ideological belief expressed in the
society. illusion of assuming that all of the contents might, eventually and theoreti-
The problem with this position is that it presents itself as the only necessary cally, be equally suitable to the task of filling (temporarily) the openness of
conclusion of a theoretical conception that conceives of society as 'a decentred society - something that we could call the illusion of openness.
structure in which meaning is permanently negotiated and constructed' Finally, this also implicitly suggests that we should not ignore altogether
(Laclau 1988: 254). Indeed, even if we accepted the post-structuralist thesis the possibility of a certain relation between the 'material conditions' of
of the impossibility of a definitive closed society, it is not clear at all that the society - in Marx's sense - and the articulation of a hegemonic discourse.
only possibility of closure would always be an infinite chain of equivalent Slavoj Zizek has expressed this idea in the following terms:
contents.
It is worth emphasizing that the point here is not to contest the assump- Yes I agree with your formulation that hegemony itself is hegemonized.
tion of a pure abstract or formal absolute signifier, which never really In what sense? I think that the idea that today we no longer have a
became empty, as it has been criticized by Butler (2000: 167) and accurately central struggle but a multitude of struggles is a fake one, because we
responded to by Laclau (2000: 304). Indeed, Judith Butler has affirmed, shouldn't forget that the ground for this multitude of struggle was cre-
ated by modern global capitalism. (Zizek & Daly 2004: 149-50)
But is such a notion of universality ever as empty as it is posited to be? Or
is there a specific form of universality which lays claim to being 'empty'? ... Laclau's answer to this point, however, is as follows:
And is it truly empty, or does it carry the trace of the excluded in spectral
form as an internal disruption of its own formalism? (Ibid.) The assertion that there is an essential unevenness of the elements enter-
ing the hegemonic struggles is something with which I can certainly
Laclau responds to these questions by convincingly asserting that, concur - the theory of hegemony is precisely the theory of this uneven-
ness. Yet Zizek presents not a historical argument, but a transcendental
This universality, however, is neither formal nor abstract, for the one. For him, in every possible society this determining role corresponds
condition of the tendentially empty character of the general equivalent necessarily to the economy (it seems, at this point, that we are going
is the increasing extension of a chain of equivalences between particu- back to those naive 1960s distinctions between 'determination in the last
larities. Emptiness, as result, presupposes the concrete. [...] the universal- instance', 'dominant role', 'relative autonomy', and so on). (Laclau 2005:
ity obtainable through equivalential logic will always be a universality 236, emphases from the original)
contaminated by particularity. There is not, strictly speaking, a signifier
which is truly empty, but one which is only tendentially so. (Laclau Despite Laclau's answer, it is worth insisting in the idea that the contin-
2000: 304) gent character of politics is something that might be observed carefully in
order to avoid becoming trapped in a new ideological illusion as that here
On the contrary, the point here is to criticize the supposition made by described - a matter, notwithstanding, which will always be more related
Laclau that all of the contents are equally capable of filling the empty space, to historical research rather than to merely philosophical-framcertdt'Mta/
as has been highlighted by Gasche (2004: 30). In other words, it seems speculation.
66 The New Critique of Ideology

Summary

This chapter has analyzed the contemporary debate on ideology, focusing


on the theories of Michael Freeden and Ernesto Laclau. It has argued that
the mainstream contemporary debate on ideology is based, though not A U n i v e r s a l N o t i o n of Truth:
consistently, on the one hand, on an abandonment of the possibility of
H a b e r m a s avec Zizek
assuming an 'Archimedean point of truth' and, on the other, on the ubiq-
uity condition in the study of ideology. In this context, Freeden's conception
of ideologies constitutes an attempt to assert a sphere of political thought
pattern - political ideologies - placed between political philosophy and the
history of ideas. It is an ambitious endeavor that, based on an 'anti-closed'
notion of society (which distinguishes itself from Marx's and American
totalizing versions of ideology), appears to be equipped adequately to
describe concrete ideologies but is less competent at dealing with structural Since the advent of a post-structuralist ethos, the assertion of a notion of
determinations, such as power serving interests. Laclau's approach, in turn, truth, conceived as a universal, fixed and absolute point d'appui from which
postulates a non-essentialist notion of ideology, which is a consequence of a given social order could be evaluated as ideological or non-ideological,
his post-structuralist theoretical assumption that asserts the impossibility seems no longer possible. As Rorty (1991: xxxix) has pointed out, '[we
of a definitive closure of society. Any attempt of sutures or significations of can now] see ourselves as never encountering reality except under a
societies, which continue through hegemonic practices, must be assumed chosen description as ... making worlds rather than finding them?' (ibid.).
as having a transitory character due to the absence of a determined center. Ultimately, the debate of the theory of ideology seems to be trapped either
Furthermore, the closure provided by a hegemonic practice is both always in the study of the operation of ideologies a la Freeden, a somewhat defen-
necessary (to makes possible the existence of society in the first place and sive 'anti-closed' notion of ideology a la Laclau, or in an abandonment of
avoid social implosion once society is constituted) and always illusory, the notion of ideology altogether a la Foucault. However, we could still
becoming ideological when its illusory character is negated, forgotten or legitimately ask whether or not an inevitable condition of the 'post-modern
deluded. However, Laclau's theory of ideology seems unable to avoid a world', that is, a world deprived of a manifest intrinsic meaning, is the
reference to a notion of true and false belief, the latter being defined as renouncement of the assumption of a certain notion of a universal truth
ideological on the basis of its epistemic properties (to assume a structurally for a critique of ideology.
temporary closure as if it was a definitive one). Finally, this chapter contests
Laclau's premises upon the empty condition of the 'constitutive outside' A way to respond to this question is by revisiting Habermas's theory of
(empty signifier) by asserting that it seems implausible to suppose that all of communicative action viewed through the lens of the theory of ideology for-
the contents of a signifier will be equally capable of filling the empty space mulated by Slavoj Zizek. Habermas and Zizek have not been directly involved
in a decentered society. in a theoretical dispute, so to compare their theorizations may seem, at first
sight, peculiar.1 Furthermore, Habermas's theory of communicative action
Nonetheless, Laclau's version of the constitutive outside, as the limit of a and Zizek's critical theory of ideology are inscribed in two different theoreti-
signifying system, though excessively contingent, seems to leave open the cal traditions, Habermas being the most important contemporary thinker in
route to re-examining the problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth', defense of the modernization project and Zizek being one of the main critics
from a perspective in which the necessity of a universal - though not fixed of such a project.
and absolute - truth can be posed as a condition of possibility of a critique However, far from assuming their theories to be incommensurable, it
of ideology for political analysis in 'post-modern times'. This route will be is here argued that it could be worthwhile observing Zizek's theoretical
explored in the next chapter by relating Habermas's theory of communica- endeavor as a continuation of Habermas's proposal 'with other means'.
tive action to Zizek's Lacanian theory of ideology. Moreover, what is here affirmed is that by using a fictional Lacanian notion
of the Real or 'primordial repressed' taken from a Zizekian reading of Lacan
would allow the production of a critique of ideology in which the truth -
the unmasking of the extra-ideological place - becomes possible as a uni-
versal, though fictional (that is, neither fixed nor absolute), category. This
67
68 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 69

possibility emerges as a consequence of the shifting of the traditional matrix reaching understanding attributed to language, expressed in a speech-act,
illusion/reality, or its modern version, 'imaginary reality', to one in which as he says, 'reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech'
the Lacanian Real appears as a condition of possibility of reality but is itself (Habermas 2004: 287).
excluded from such a reality. Therefore, although Habermas's inter-subjective The key point in Habermas's approach is to assume that the basic func-
consensual notion of truth can be criticized because of its 'rationalist tion of language is to help individuals to coordinate their actions, through
bias' - following a Zizekian approach, as that suggested in this chapter - the mobilization of shared and accepted meanings. This is a pragmatic
the real point of value in such a critique lies in the fact that it would allow and inter-subjective function rather than an essentialist-objectivist one.
the formulation of a certain kind of universal notion of the truth - used in Therefore, the meaning of any linguistic utterance is given by its underlying
a fictional way - as a conceptually necessary 'condition of possibility' of a reason, which can be accepted (therefore shared and known) or not by all
post-Habermasian field of communicative action. individuals interacting in a communicative action.
This chapter is divided as follows: the following section presents Furthermore, Habermas asserts that each speech-act always involves cer-
Habermas's notion of truth in the context of a communicative versus an tain validity claims, which are a sort of commitment that a speaker assumes
instrumental action; a subsequent section uses Zizek's account to present to justify his or her speech rationally. A validity claim - said Habermas
a critique of Habermas's theory of truth within the field of communicative (2001a: 89) - must be grounded in experience and 'must be able to hold up
action and, a final section, using a Zizekian matrix, proposes the formula- against all counterarguments and command the assent of all potential par-
tion of a universal, though fictional, notion of truth as a necessary comple- ticipants in a discourse' (ibid.). According to Habermas (2004: 305-6), valid-
ment of a post-Habermasian matrix of communicative action. ity claims are of three types: truthfulness, truth and Tightness.2 Moreover, in
each act of speech, the speaker must be in a position, if he is required to do
Habermas's inter-subjective approach to the truth so, to give reasons (which means that there must be reasons) and to justify
(by discourse) that he is sincere in his communication (truthfulness), and
Aristotle (1996: 13) reminds us that men can only be social beings because that what he is saying is true and right.
he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is suf- It is worthwhile noting that the validity of the reasons referred to is only
ficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god. However, historically, reached when the hearer accepts them as a satisfactory foundation of the
the constitution of society has been far from an obvious fact. Moreover, as speech, and thus the coordination of actions mobilized by the meaning of
the Contractualists have pointed out, there are good reasons to consider a the utterance takes place. As Habermas (2004: 308) has put it, in order to be
pre-social and savage stage as the more natural condition of human beings, accepted as valid a speech-act must be 'in agreement with our world of exist-
rather than a regulated societal order. ing states of affairs, or with the speaker's own world of subjective experiences'
Take, for instance, a contemporary metropolis, like London, and parti- (ibid.). In other words, although Habermas asserts a rationalist basis for a
cularly a crowded place like Piccadilly Circus. It seems very clear that the communicative action, he uses a notion of rationality that is assumed to be
multicultural diversity there reflected is also an expression of a massive multi- an inter-subjective pragmatic construction (ibid.: 308-9). This is a notion
plicity of individual interests, most of them - we can assume - in contradic- very far from the tradition of an enlightening individual reason, which, in
tion to one another. In such a collage of multiplicities one would expect that fact - as has been suggested by McCarthy (2004: xi) - defines a definitive shift
the stronger should always impose themselves over the weaker. Although from a declining 'paradigm of consciousnesses to an - emergent - paradigm
this sometimes happens, it is not always the case. of language' (ibid.). The direct consequence of this inter-subjective matrix is
Habermas, like many other social theorists, is very aware of this dilemma. that the truth validity claim, that is, the speaker's commitment to offer rea-
His answer, however, differs from the classic explanation, which highlights the sons to justify the truth of his or her utterance, only becomes (a real) Truth
role of a 'third party' (the terror of authority; the sanction of the law; or the (with a capital T) - pragmatically speaking - if it is accepted by the hearer on
'collective consciousness') entitled to act as a sort of traffic light, defining who the basis of the reasons given by the speaker. That, however, does not mean
is allowed to pass: the cars or the people - a thesis that is remarkably shown that Habermas is willing to accept any kind of agreement, but only those that
in Terry Gilliam's film Brazil, in which an over-powerful bureaucracy controls fulfill a rationalist base.
almost every detail of the daily activity of the unhappy but 'safe' citizens. Even more suggestive is the distinction posed by Habermas (1996) in
Habermas, in contrast, asserts that the foundation of a social order rests Between Facts and Norms between two types of validities: Gidtigkeit (which
on an inter-subjective basis, which is explained by the natural telos of 'conceptually transcends space and time') and soziale Geltung ('based merely
70 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 71

on settled customs or the threat of sanctions'), and the initial primacy given this relationship is not only genetic but primarily epistemic. In other words,
to the former (ibid.: 20-1). Indeed, Habermas explicitly asserts that, the falseness of a belief, given the basic epistemic principles of the ideal free-
speech situation, is not only explained by the circumstance of originating
The validity we claim for our utterances and for practices of justification under conditions of coercion, but also by the fact that the subject barely
differs from the social validity or acceptance (soziale Geltung) of actually holds such a belief because he or she ignores its origin. Ideology, following
established standards and expectations whose stability is based merely on Habermas's account, might then be defined as a set of false beliefs, in the sense
settled custom or the threat of sanctions. (Ibid.: 20) that subjects hold such beliefs in ignorance that they have been acquired in
opposition to the basic epistemic principles accepted in a given community.
Furthermore, for Habermas, this is a logical conclusion reached after assert- This, however, does not imply for Habermas that ideological beliefs do
ing a series of 'pragmatic or dialogue-constitutive universals'. Ttiese are, as not commonly have any functional properties as, for example, when they
Thompson (1984b: 263) has asserted, 'intersubjective, a priori linguistic ele- sustain or legitimize the condition of surplus repression. However, what
ments which enable the speaker, in the course of producing a speecti-act, to make those beliefs specifically ideological is not that they legitimize rela-
reproduce the general structure of the speech situation' (ibid.). In other words, tions of domination but that the legitimation that they provide is false, in
the pragmatic or dialogue-constitutive universals give rise to implicit validity the Habermasian sense, that is, those beliefs become ideological as soon as
claims present in any speech-act, making a communicative dialogical act pos- they make individuals accept as legitimate a relation of domination - for
sible and desirable. Nonetheless, as has been noted by Callinicos (2006: 26-9), instance: 'men are superior to women' - which if individuals were located
a permanent tension appears to exist, at least in Habermas's latter works in a situation of free speech they would not accept as valid.
(particularly in Between Facts and Norms), between these two types of validity In this way, Habermas is able to get rid of any essentialist notion of truth
(Gultigkeit and soziale Geltung) - a tension that Habermas (1996: 14) seems from his matrix of communicative actions, replacing it with a consensus
ultimately to resolve by privileging soziale Geltung rather than Gultigkeit: theory of truth. As Habermas (2001a: 89) asserts, according to a consensual
theory of truth, T can attribute a predicate to an object if and only if every-
[...] With the assertoric sense of her statement, a speaker raises a criticis- one else who could enter into discourse with me would also attribute the
able claim to the validity of the asserted preposition, and because no same predicate to the same object' (ibid.). In other words, the main criterion
one has direct access to uninterpreted conditions of validity, 'validity' of validity of this theory of truth is given by a sort of 'success rate' of the act
(Gultigkeit) must be understood in epistemic terms as 'validity (Geltung) of speech in its declared pragmatic aim of reaching inter-subjective assent of
proven for us'. (Ibid.) all other potential participants in a given discourse.
Although the results of this thesis are very attractive for an era in which
The reason for this more pragmatic option seems to be the fact that, for any assertion of a vantage point results in a theory that is hard to defend, it
Habermas (ibid.: 21), this is the only way in which a true validity claim opens new problems for the place and status of the truth in the constitution
could '(b)ear the burden of social integration for a context-bound everyday of society. Let us consider separately some of these main problems.
practice' (ibid.). This option, however, apart from underrating the position
of social critique, making it 'collapse into the descriptions of existing condi- The 'ideal versus the real world'
tions', as Callinicos (2006: 28) has emphasized, exposes Habermas's proposal Habermas (2004: 286-7) employs the expression Verstdndigung to refer to
to new kinds of ideological delusions, such as those highlighted by Zizek, as the concept of reaching understanding, which 'is considered to be a proc-
we will see later in this chapter. ess of reaching agreement (Einigung) among speaking and acting subjects'
Another way to see this point is from the perspective of falsehood in (ibid.). Furthermore, what Habermas is really referring to when he speaks of
Habermas's approach. The falsehood is located in relation to, or in contrast reaching understanding is a process aiming 'at an agreement that meets the
to, a system of basic epistemic principles, imagined as an ideal free-speech conditions of rationally motivated assent (Zustimmung) to the content of
situation, which defines a new notion of rationality. In fact, as Thompson an utterance' (ibid.: 287). In other words, Habermas is referring to a type of
(1984b: 271-2) has stated, 'a situation in which there is a symmetrical dis- agreement (Einverstdndnis) that rests on common convictions, that is,
tribution of chances to select and employ communicative, constative, repre-
sentative and regulative speech-acts is an ideal speech situation' (ibid.). The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer
For Habermas, the ideal free-speech situation, understood as a number of contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a 'yes' or 'no' position on
basic epistemic principles, determines what is a true belief in origin. However, a validity claim that is in principle criticisable. (Ibid.)
72 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 73

Therefore, for Habermas, the process of reaching understanding demands (individual, private) reason behind that agreement and not a shared under-
that both parties of the communicative action have a necessary shared standing of it, that is, the speaker has nothing with which to convince
understanding of the reasons behind that action, which then, and only the hearer but only a private interest to impose upon him. Therefore, by
then, might give rise to a rational agreement (rationales Einverstdndnis). accepting both spheres - the system and the lifeworld - as two valid but
Take for instance the following situation: A (the speaker) asks B (the differentiated areas of social life, Habermas manages to keep untouched his
hearer) to switch off the light in a room shared by both of them. In order ithesis of the predominance of the communicative action. In this way, the
that B will be able to reach an understanding of the utterance coming from communicative action becomes a type of communication that aims to reach
A, B has to know the reason behind A's requirement. Imagine that B asks understanding naturally due to its roots in the telos of language.
for the reason of the requirement. A then explains that he or she has an eye Let us leave Habermas's account at this point in order to summarize some
problem, which is exacerbated by the light. B is now in a position to under- of the conclusions related to the status of truth in his theory. For the purposes
stand the reason that justifies A's petition, and both can reach a rational of this book the important point to bear in mind is that the Habermasian
agreement about switching off the light in the room. matrix of communicative versus instrumental actions considered above
For Habermas this would be a case of a communicative action (reached implicitly assumes that it is only within the former field (communicative
through a discourse, that is, by making explicit the validity claim performed action) that the truth might have a place in the constitution of social order.
by A and accepted by B) in which the act of speech has an illocutionary Indeed, the function of the field of instrumental action in Habermas's the-
effect. This means that the speech-act of A aims to produce a rational moti- sis seems to be more related to the necessity of highlighting the sphere of
vated consensus, and would be inscribed within the field of 'lifeworld', communicative actions as a regulatory dimension - the sphere of a true
defined by Habermas (2004: 130) as the domain of an unregulated social communication - rather than describing exactly how the process of com-
life in which the actions are regulated by consensus and that is assumed 'as munication (communicative or instrumental) takes place in society. This
a complementary concept to "communicative action"' (ibid.). seems to be a more complex process, as we will analyze later in this chapter.
However, the most obvious objection to this model comes from the claim Therefore, from the bipolar structure - communicative versus instrumental
that asserts that the 'real world' does not work in this way - the daily expe- action, proposed by Habermas - we can conclude three further premises
rience of our lives being the best proof of this objection. Indeed, normally regarding the problem of the truth:
we observe that what is predominant in an inter-subjective relationship
is not a rational communicative action, but different types of enforced (a) The truth is assumed to be an anti-essentialist notion, placed within a
actions in a classical dominant relationship in which the stronger imposes formal, contingent and pragmatic inter-subjective field (the field of com-
its will over the weaker. In which case, the final coordination of actions or municative actions) expressed, as we have seen, in the speaker's validity
agreement reached by people (rationales Einverstdndnis) would not be found claim to offer public reasons to justify that what he is saying to a hearer
through a shared understanding of the reasons (Verstdndigung) behind that is the truth. Public reasons are here taken to mean arguments that can be
agreement. On the contrary, it will come through a mere imposition of known, understood and accepted by the hearer as valid foundations of a
will motivated by fear or ignorance. This is a distant point from the ideal received speech, which aims to reach understanding, as well as a rational
situation of an unfinished project of modernization, as Habermas has pos- agreement on a pursued action.
tulated, and much closer to the classic model of a negative conception of (b) In that way defined, the truth becomes sufficient and necessary as an
ideology.3 indispensable claim to achieve rational understanding between indi-
This is, however, a claim that in a way has already been acknowledged viduals. In other words, while it might be that agreements can exist
by Habermas. Furthermore, Habermas is able to recognize that the field of without understanding (instrumental actions), it cannot be that rational
lifeworld - the reign of communicative actions - has increasingly been colo- understanding exists without a validity claim of truth.
nized by another field, named the system, in which the act of speech rather (c) Consequentially, there is no room for a universal notion of truth in
than exerting an illocutionary effect has a perlocutionary one, that is, it does Habermas's account, meaning that a truth is only considered within
not aim to reach a rational understanding and consensus but only to reach the formal inter-subjective and consensual structure of a validity claim
agreement on the final action motivated by the speech (Habermas 2004: (communicative action). In the next section, premises (a) and (b) are
311-12). In other words, it is a field of instrumental action in which the problematized, taking into account the critique formulated by Zizek, and
real relevant factor is the final agreement rather than the process of reaching in the last section, premise (c) is reformulated in light of the conclusions
understanding. This is because in most cases there is only an instrumental of the aforementioned Zizek critique.
74 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 75

A Zizekian critique of Habermas's theory of truth rather than true and false.6 A descriptive belief is of course a real belief in
the sense that it really exists in the symbolic sphere, but it only becomes
From a Zizekian perspective, Habermas's bipolar 'black and white' matrix, a true belief if it is able to fulfill all of the criteria of trueness existent in a
communicative versus instrumental action, could be criticized by claiming rational community.7 In the case considered by Habermas, in which a belief
that it assumes an excessive conceptual rigidity, which impedes the cap- could be assumed as descriptively accurate and false at the same time, it
ture of the grey tonality characteristic of a postulated post-modern society. seems clear that the main criterion, referring to a reflective acceptability of
Indeed, Habermas's notion of falsity is primarily related to the ignorance of a belief, that is, a belief originating in a non-coercion environment of com-
agents with respect to the origin of their beliefs or the motives they have municative action, is not satisfied. Furthermore, this is precisely the reason
to hold such beliefs. For Habermas, beliefs and motives must be broadly why Habermas rightly concludes that such a belief would be false, though it
interpreted to incorporate empirical and non-empirical beliefs. Therefore, could also be a very accurate descriptive belief.
the ignorance of agents cannot be reduced to an empirical mistake but must However, what Habermas seems not explicitly to analyze is that, if any of
include a broader criterion of assessment, which for Habermas is based on a the criteria of trueness accepted by a rational community are not satisfied,
new extensive notion of rationality. then the belief must also and always be necessarily false, even if it is true
This leads Habermas to perceive the ignorance of agents as an unreflec- in the rest of the other sets of criteria. This is because in that case the belief
tive state in which the origins and motives of their beliefs have not been might, at best, be partially true - as, for instance, a belief ruled by a com-
critically contrasted with the basic epistemic principles accepted by a com- municative rationality - and a partial truth is always false from a point of
munity as valid.4 Furthermore, those basic epistemic principles, which for view of the whole a la Hegel.8 This point is in a similar line to the criticisms
Habermas constitute a free-speech situation, are now the new criteria of raised by both Thompson (1984b) and Callinicos (2006), who emphasize
assessment for the ignorance of the agents. A key consequence derived from that Habermas's theory of truth does not give a satisfactory account of the
this idea is that it cannot be possible to conceive of an agent who has been so-called 'evidential dimension of the concept of truth', which highlights
freed from his or her ignorance and who still insists upon holding such false the 'objectivity of experience' associated with a preposition of truth. In
beliefs. In other words, in Habermas's account it is not possible to assume other words, Habermas's theory of truth does not properly consider the fact
the cynical logos that Zizek takes from Sloterdijk (1987): 'they know very that what is affirmed by a given preposition (for example, the earth is flat)
well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it' (Zizek 1989: 29). The does not necessarily coincide with what is true in experience (for example,
reason for this impossibility is explained by the fact that Habermas imag- the earth is not flat but spherical). Indeed, Thompson (1984b: 274) expresses
ines an immanent notion of basic epistemic principles, which are present this idea saying that,
as a universal pragmatic condition in all human speech-act communicative
interactions (Habermas 1976: 1-68; 2004). This basic immanence, expressed One may have very good grounds for maintaining that it will rain tomor-
by Habermas as a criterion of judgment of the true/false categories, gives row, but the truth of this statement is dependent upon what happens
rise to a notion of falsity, which is now only assessed with relation to those tomorrow and not upon the grounds that one has today. (Ibid.)
aforementioned fundamental epistemic principles.
Furthermore, these principles are derived from a free-speech situation Callinicos (2006: 26-7) instead affirms, 'the Ptolemaic theory of the plan-
ruled by a communicative rationality, without consideration of other criteria etary system was firmly entrenched in classical and medieval thought, but
of falsity, such as those that highlight the contradiction existing between, the world proved not to be how this theory asserted it to be' (ibid.).
on the one hand, the public reason expressed by the agent to reach a given Therefore, the point here is not to censure Habermas by assuming that
rational consensus and, on the other, the individual's subjective motive act- there would be only one criterion of judgment of the truth or falsity of a
ing as a driver of such expressed reason versus his or her real practical activ- belief or a set of beliefs. Rather, it is to criticize him for choosing a (limited)
ity, as is proposed by Zizek. We will consider this new criterion extensively criterion (free-speech situation; communicative rationality) that might not be
in the next section. For now, the important point to bear in mind is that enough to give an accurate account of the totality of reality that is intended
although the result of Habermas's argument seems very accurate against the to be comprehended. Indeed, it seems that Habermas, in his endeavor to coin
background of an essentialist notion of truth, it presents some shortcom- a more complex category of falsity, is able to surpass essentialist notions of
ings, which we must take into account.5 truth, yet he still becomes trapped in a somewhat narrow notion of truth.
First, it confuses the notion of truth with the notion of reality. Indeed, Furthermore, it is worth stressing that there may be no reason not to con-
it seems more accurate to say that a belief could be both real and false cur with Habermas in denouncing the fact that we are experiencing a process
76 Tlie New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 77

of internal colonization of 'lifeworld' by system imperatives dominated by to the classic epistemological aspiration: objective knowledge with univer-
the logic of instrumental actions, as he has recurrently stated (Habermas sal validity (ibid.: 16). Indeed, Zizek argues that before abstract categories
2004: 196, 305, 311-12). However, what seems to be more relevant here could be conceived in science and philosophy, the abstraction was already
is to stress an additional theoretical caveat, omitted by Habermas and the present in the market. As he says, in the exchange of a commodity there is
scholarly discussion in the field - a caveat that seeks to contest the dimen- a double abstraction: the abstraction from its real value use and the abstrac-
sion of a speech-act communicative action itself directly as one that usually tion from the concrete, empirical character of the commodity (ibid.: 17).
expresses no more than a mere falsification of an inter-subjective rationality. Likewise, Zizek highlights that the abstraction produced in the exchange of
The falsification of an inter-subjective rationality is a different phenom- commodities, the 'real abstraction' - as Zizek, quoting Sohn-Rethel, calls the
enon from the negation of rationality, which manifests itself in a de facto act of abstraction at work in the very effective process of the exchange of
accord of an instrumental action field, derived either from the forced or commodities - is a complex category in two senses. First, it has nothing to
deceptive imposition of an agreement. On the contrary, the falsification of do with the reality of the effective properties of the commodity; rather it is a
rationality, which gives rise to a narrow notion of truth, implies an active role sort of postulate - 'as if - assumed by the individual in the act of exchange.
for the deceived individual in making truth its own deception, though that Moreover, a given commodity does not include exchange value in the same
does not mean that the falsification is an entirely subjective matter. In fact, way that it comprises use value (color, taste, form and so on).
the main characteristic of this new type of deception is its objective material Second, from this 'non-reality' character of commodity is also derived the
basis, as Zizek has highlighted. Let us explore these points in more detail. condition that the abstraction does not take place in the 'interior' of the
thinking subject, but is always an external practical activity. Furthermore,
Cynicism and fantasy in Zizek's theory this external 'effectivity' of the exchange process is misconstrued by individ-
From the beginning of his intellectual development Zizek (1989: 7) sought uals, who act as 'practical solipsists' during the act of exchange (ibid.: 20).
to reformulate the debate on the theory of ideology through a re-reading of Paradoxically, this misrecognition of the reality, this non-knowledge of the
a classic Marxist category, such as commodity fetishism, and the application participants is part of its very essence, in a way that the 'social effectivity' of
of some fundamental Lacanian concepts, such as the 'quilting point', sub- the exchange process becomes possible as a reality only as a condition that
lime object and surplus-enjoyment.9 Zizek, inquiring about the reason that individuals acting on it are not aware of its central logic (ibid.: 21).
would explain the fascination produced by the commodity-form through- Finally, Zizek (ibid.) concludes that ideology, for the post-Marxist criti-
out generations of philosophers, sociologists and art historians, alludes to cal theory school, far from being a simple illusory representation of reality,
the frame offered by such a notion (commodity-form) so that we might is reality itself, which is already conceived as 'ideological' in a sense that,
be enabled to produce all other forms of 'fetishistic inversion' (ibid.: 16). '[the] "ideological" is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-
Indeed, following Freud's teaching of focusing on the form rather than on knowledge of its participants as its essence' (ibid.). In other words, ideology is
the content to get an accurate interpretation of the dreams, Zizek manages here captured by the formula 'they do not know what they are doing', which
to propose a new formula to capture the mystery of commodities, which is a statement that Habermas would probably find easy to agree with.
also centers on the form of the commodity. Zizek considers three compo- Therefore, Zizek's first main theoretical effort focuses on distinguish-
nents on the Freudian interpretation of the dreams: the manifest dream-text ing the classical version of ideology as a misleading understanding of the
(the relation of the dream), the latent dream-content (the signification of the so-called reality from the more sophisticated version of critical theory, which
dream) and the unconscious desire (the Real), which are articulated in a conceives one's own reality as ideological, and without which it cannot
dream. The important point here is two-fold: the content of the dream (the reproduce itself. However, thereafter, Zizek concentrates mainly on what is
latent content) is not hidden but very explicit to the subject. It is rather going to be his main thesis in this respect. Indeed, he eventually affirms that
the unconscious desire that is in one sense missing; it only reveals itself in although the two versions of ideology are different, they share a common
the form of the dream, in the dream-work, in the elaboration of the 'latent underlying assumption: to place the misleading character of ideology on the
content', not in the interpretation of the content (ibid.: 13). Moreover, for side of the internal subjectivity of the individual. In other words, while in the
Zizek, the point of inflection, far from being the hidden content of a com- classical version the deception of the subject is due to a sort of spectacle,
modity, a content which had been already discovered by classical political which obtrudes the access to the truth reality, in the critical theory account
economists (that is, labor as the true source of wealth), is the question the subject overlooks reality itself in a way that if he or she saw (knew) the
about the form of the commodity itself. In other words, the mystery of the reality as 'it really is', the reality would 'dissolve itself into nothingness, or,
commodity-form lies in the fact that it offers a key to producing a response more precisely, it would change into another kind of reality' (ibid.: 28).
78 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 79

For Zizek, the problem with these two versions of ideology is that both (non-dialectic) relationship in which the content of a belief is conditioned
put the accent on the dimension of knowledge rather than on the practical by factual behavior (ibid.: 40). Then, Zizek concludes, since a belief is
(external) side, becoming obsolete and/or naive in a (post-modern) world In always materialized in effective social interaction, it 'supports the fantasy
which individuals 'know very well what they are doing, but still, they are which regulates social activity' (ibid.: 36).
doing it' (ibid.: 29). However, it is a mistake to interpret Zizek's thesis as an argument that
In fact, individuals in a post-modern world seem to behave no longer as from this external character of a belief it follows that the symbolic machine
misleading personages, who need to be subjected to an enlightening critique of ideology (the action of the Althusserian 'Ideological State Apparatus') is
in order to know reality. On the contrary, they act more like a sort of cynical by interpellation immediately and fully internalized into the ideological
character, who most of the time knows very well the falsehood of his or her experience of the truth and meaning of the subjects. On the contrary, Zizek,
situation or the particular interest hidden behind a misleading universal dis- following Lacan, asserts that this internalization process, which represents
course, but still insists upon acting in accordance with it (ibid.). If then, the the belief in a cause, is never fully successful. As Zizek puts it: 'there is
ideological - asserts Zizek - were on the side of knowing, as the classical and always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senseless-
the critical theory perspective affirm, the notion of ideological misconcep- ness sticking to if (ibid.: 43). However, Zizek (ibid.: 43) emphasizes that this
tion would become obsolete and non-existent for a world best described as residue 'far from hindering the full submission of the subject to ideological com-
a place in which individuals follow the prescription of an anti-naive cynical mand, is the very condition of it' (ibid.). In other words, it is precisely because
reason. However, as Zizek points out, if the illusion were not located in the there is always a leftover that is not ideologically integrated by symbolic
knowing but in the doing - as he believes actually happens - we would still apparatus that ideology acquires its real potentiality.
experience the ideological misconception, even if we were aware - as hap- But how does it happen? Zizek's answer alludes to two ideological mecha-
pens most of the time - that there is an illusion structuring the reality. nisms working together, as described below. First, through the action of the
Take for instance, Marx's example quoted by Zizek (ibid.: 32), of the 'fen Althusserian symbolic apparatuses, which by interpellation seek to obtain
ishistic inversion' of the use of the concept of law. Indeed, instead of saying the identification of the subject into the symbolic system (recognition/
Roman and German law are both law (the abstract and universal count only misrecognition). Second, by the previous operation - in the sense that it
as a property of the concrete), we say: the Law, the abstract thing, real- operates before the symbolic interpellation apparatuses are able to get the
izes itself in Roman law and in German law (what is concrete and sensible identification of the subject - of a fantasy-construction device by which the
counts only as a phenomenal form of what is abstract and universal) (ibid.). subject is ideologically trapped. In fact, the fantasy-construction mecha-
Now, in a world dominated by a cynical reason, individuals really know that nism, far from being conceived as an illusion to escape the insupportable
Law is no more than a property of the German and Roman law, so, in this reality, in fact serves to support it, that is, it structures the reality.
sense, they are not ideologically deluded. However, since despite knowing Let us now go back to our first example related to those two individuals
the illusion (fetishistic inversion) of reality they act (doing) following that reaching a rational communicative agreement on switching off the light in
illusion (as if Law realizes itself into particular laws), they are still - argues a shared room, in order to see how Zizek's approach critiques Habermas's
Zizek (ibid.: 33) - ideologically deluded in their practice, in their 'doing', matrix of communicative action. Indeed, following Zizek's account, the
which is precisely the locus where the illusion is located. example described at the beginning of this chapter could be explained
It is worthwhile noticing that behind Zizek's original thesis of locating within a formal structure of communicative action, but biased by the opera-
ideological delusion on the side of doing rather of knowing is his reading of tion of the logic of a cynical reason and fantasy-construction.
Lacan's objective status of beliefs, that is, a belief, instead of being some- Indeed, suppose now that B knows that A's reason to switch off the light
thing internal to the subject, is rather 'radically exterior, embodied in the in the room, despite being formally true because A has a widely known eye
practical effective procedure of the people' (ibid.: 34). This also implies infection, has also been exaggerated due to A's well-known melodramatic
that a subject, by following a custom, ritual, practice or 'common sense', character. B still decides to agree to give validity to the truth claim of A (the
believes in something without really knowing it. Then, the final act of eye problem) because he or she secretly thinks that in this way he or she is
conversion to, for instance, a religious belief or an ideological credo is fulfilling the requirements of a high morality standard imposed by his or her
merely a formal act of recognition of what he or she already believes. In a ideal type of citizen (mandating for a religious or an ideological belief) that
way, there is already a belief before the belief emerges. Zizek, who is here he or she aspires to become one day. In other words, he or she agrees to give
following Pascal, argues that this 'belief before belief is what distinguishes rational validity to A's claim because he or she has constructed a fantasy to
'Pascalian custom' from the behaviorist thesis that assumes only a direct support his or her agreement. Then, B's agreement to switch off the light is
80 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 81

going to be based on a cynical reason (he or she knows very well that despite based on an ad hoc fantasy-construction device. This is possible because
the fact that A's petition is true, it is also exaggerated, therefore not totally true, Habermas's concept of truth within a communicative action field (premise
but he or she - rationally - agrees on that as if it were unquestionably true) as (a), above) rests too much on a public and formal discursive exercise of rea-
well as on a supporting fantasy-construction mechanism (his or her dream of sons. This is a sort of 'thin rationality', which could perfectly make compat-
becoming an ideal citizen). ible a shared understanding, and consequentially a rational agreement on a
Therefore, despite B knowing very well that the rational agreement specific coordination of actions, with a cynical or fantastical reason, giving
reached with A is a falsification of the truth, he or she is not - subjectively rise to an ideological delusion in the praxis of individuals.
speaking - ideologically deluded. However, as he or she follows in practice The resulting conclusion of this statement is that a validity claim of truth -
the agreement as a rational one - moved by his or her fantasy - he or she within a field of communicative action - is not always sufficient, nor neces-
is in fact affected by a delusion. Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that the sary, to get a rational - in the sense of non-ideological - agreement between
cynical distance that allows B to realize the ideological illusion operating individuals (premise (b), above). Indeed, a rational agreement, because of the
in his or her social relation with A is one way - 'one of many ways' asserts 'thin' rationality demanded by Habermas's matrix, seems to be very often
Zizek - that gives efficiency rather than obsolescence to the structuring (more often than we actually acknowledge) accompanied by a formal validity
power of an ideological fantasy (ibid.: 33). claim of truth that is in fact no more than a falsification of truth.
In the context of this book the important point illustrated in the afore-
mentioned example is that, from a Zizekian approach, it is possible to con- A critique of Habermas's constitutional patriotism
ceive of a hypothesis of a communicative action in which, although all of A Zizekian critique of Habermas's communicative rationality can also be
the formal requirements to achieve a shared understanding and meanings of extended to the more recent works of Habermas on legal and political
a rational agreement are present, there is still room to reach a non-rational, theory, particularly his thesis of deliberative democracy and 'constitutional
even ideological, agreement. In other words, we could have a situation in patriotism', because all of these theoretical endeavors are ultimately rooted
which a validity claim of truth is present, acting as a public and shared rea- in what here has been called a 'thin' rationality."
son accepted by both parties of the communication (free-speech situation; Indeed, the thesis of deliberative democracy starts by asserting that,
communicative rationality) for reaching an understanding and a rational
agreement. However, there would still be space to envisage an individual Democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed
within such a situation whose rational - in the Habermasian sense - agreement not even predominantly, from political participation and the expression
rests on a cynical reason and/or a fantasy-construction, which in fact might of political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative
shift the validity claim of truth from the truth - pragmatically speaking - to a process whose structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable
falsification of the truth. results. (Habermas 2001b: 110)
It is worthwhile noting that a Zizekian critique of Habermas's commu-
nicative action, such as that presented here, is not easily inscribed within Habermas is here stressing the fact that democratic legitimacy not only
the realm of the traditional objection that contests the priority of reaching demands a formal process of democratic will formation expressed in rep-
understanding which Habermas (2004: 288) attributed to language - the resentative bodies (representative democracy), as liberal theory has always
original mode of language - in opposition to its 'parasitic' instrumental argued, but also, and primordially, an informal process of opinion-formation
use, commonly cited in the literature (Thompson 1984b: 267-9).10 Rather, based on the rich field of civil society associations. It is worth noting that
it would be better placed as a critique directly posed against the field of a Habermas (1999a: 249-50) distinguishes his proposal from both a 'liberal
rationally motivated consensus (Zustimmung) itself, which is now observed view', which asserts that '[a] democratic will formation has the exclusive
as the privileged place for a more sophisticated type of delusion. function of legitimating the exercise of political power', and from a 'repub-
Indeed, the falsification of truth takes place not because B (the hearer) does lican view' in which '[a] democratic will-formation has the significantly
not know that A's petition is not rationally justified (he or she is not actually stronger function of constituting society as a political community and keep-
deceived) but because B knows that although A's requirement is formally ing the memory of this founding act alive with each new election' (ibid.).
true and formally acceptable as a justified rational communicative basis of Instead, for Habermas,
an agreement, it is also not totally true. Therefore, he or she does not entirely
give validity to that claim, though he or she acts - in his or her practice - as A discourse theory brings a third idea into play: the procedures and com-
if he or she really believes (pretends to believe) the claim without any doubt, municative presuppositions of democratic opinion- and will-formation
82 77ie New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 83

function as the most important sluices for the discursive rationalization constitutional principles that are equally embodied in other republican
of the decision of a government and an administration bound by law and constitutions - such as popular sovereignty and human rights - in light of
statute. (Ibid.) its own national history. A 'constitutional patriotism' based on these inter-
pretations can take the place originally occupied by nationalism. (Ibid.)
This idea has been developed by Habermas on the basis of his thesis of the
co-originality of constitutionalism (rule of law, human rights and private For Habermas, thus, constitutions not only exert a popular attachment based
autonomy) and democracy (public autonomy and popular sovereignty). on their rational and universal contents but also on the specific national way
This asserts that there is a relationship of mutual and internal implication in which citizens of a given nation-state reach agreement on the interpreta-
between constitutionalism and democracy (Habermas 1996: 104-27; 1999b: tion of constitutional principles, according to their own national institu-
253-64; 2001c; 2003). In other words, for Habermas (1996: 110) a democ- tions. What Habermas is here stressing is the fact that since the rational
racy must follow two principles. Firstly, the democratic principle which assent of the citizens of a national state is assured - due to the natural telos
establishes that 'only those [legal] statutes may claim legitimacy that can of reaching understanding found in human speech - it is worth now leaving
meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process space - without assuming any risk of falling into political irrationalism - for
of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted' (ibid.). Second, the the development of 'patriotic ways' of interpreting constitutions, displacing
discourse principle which asserts that 'just those action norms are valid to the somewhat disturbing but appealing role once occupied by nationalism.
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational However, contra Habermas, if we observe the logic of 'constitutional patri-
discourses' (ibid.: 107). For Habermas (ibid.: 449), from those two principles otism' through the lens of Zizek's theory of ideology we might argue that
it follows that a proper democratic autonomy is reached when 'the citizens ideological risks are not only not excluded but also frequently inscribed as a
are always able to understand themselves also as authors of the law to which common feature of a process of deliberation, such as that found at the root
they are subject as addressees' (ibid.). This latter condition only becomes pos- of 'distinctive national interpretations of constitutional principles' advocated
sible in a 'constitutional democracy' or, as Habermas (1999b: 264) has stated, by Habermas. In fact, this can be observed if we follow the attempt posed
in 'a proceduralist conception of law [in which] the democratic process must by Habermas to overcome the circulating and regressive problems involved
secure private and public autonomy at the same time' (ibid., emphasis from in his thesis of the aforementioned co-existence of constitutionalism and
the original). In other words, 'the private autonomy of equally entitled citizens democracy by relating it to the logic of 'constitutionalism patriotism'.
can be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy' Indeed, although for Habermas the co-originality of constitutionalism and
(ibid., 264), which ultimately demands that the rule of law co-exists with democracy is a normative principle, it must also pursue its historical realiza-
popular sovereignty. tion. Furthermore, for Habermas (2001c: 768), such a principle '[c]an develop
It is worth recognizing that Habermas's thesis of the co-originality of con- only in the dimension of time - as a self-correcting historical process' (ibid.).
stitutionalism and democracy has raised several criticisms (Honing 2001; In other words, Habermas explicitly assumes that democracy and constitu-
2006: 161-75; Thomassen 2006: 176-94). Leaving aside these criticisms, tionalism, far from being petrified - a thesis that would be contradictory to
however, the important point to stress here is that at the root of Habermas's his proposal of deliberative democracy - are mutually reinforced in a histori-
theses of deliberative democracy and the co-existence between constitu- cal process of 'self-correction'. For Habermas (ibid.: 775), however, this proc-
tionalism and democracy lies a notion of communicative rationality, as a ess of self-correction cannot be conceived as a tabula rasa, but, as he says:
foundation of a democratic legitimacy, which cannot avoid the possibility
of giving rise to a series of 'deluded zones or issues'. These are zones or issues The interpretation of constitutional history as a learning process is predi-
that although deliberatively assented, might be in fact linked to a 'falsifica- cated on the nontrivial assumption that later generations will start with
tion of rationality', as we have noted in the previous section of this chapter. the same standards as did the founders [...] the descendants can learn
A way to observe this circumstance is by analyzing the correlated thesis of from past mistakes only if they are 'in the same boat' as their forebears
'constitutional patriotism' formulated by Habermas (1999c). Indeed, discuss- [...] All participants must be able to recognize the project as the same
ing the problem of interpretation and application of universal values and through history and to judge it from the same perspective. (Ibid.)
principles consecrated in constitutions, Habermas (ibid.: 118) argues that:
The problem with this last proposal is not only that - as has been suggested
The political culture of a country crystallizes around its constitutions. by Thomassen (2006: 182) - it appears arbitrarily to place the deliberation
Each national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those process of present and future generations in the 'same boat' of the founders
84 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 85

of constitutions, but also that this contention is produced even if the new there is no guarantee at all that, in an epoch under the reign of a 'non-
generations deliberatively accept working within the 'same boat'. In other vantage point mantra' (either assumed by an authentic sense of tolerance or
words, even if 'all participants in the deliberative process recognize the con- by a sense of fear or guilt), atrocities such as those which were carried out in
stitutional project as the same through history and judge it from the same Auschwitz can be excluded altogether from the history of mankind.
perspective', the risk of ideological exclusions cannot be omitted altogether Clearly, this is a point that cannot completely be resolved here. Instead,
due to the 'thin' character that the rationality involved in the deliberative bearing in mind our use of Zizek's approach to criticize Habermas's matrix
process presents. Even more, one could argue that it is precisely the (nor- of communicative action, it might now be worth reassessing the problem
mative) posing of such a limit (that is, to deliberate within the same boat) of a universal notion of truth from a perspective that assumes that the
that makes the ideological risk possible in the first place, as, for instance, real problem with such a notion would be located in the way in which an
the impossibility of suggesting a change in private property of productive 'Archimedean point of truth' has been conceived, rather than in the asser-
means in today's political community just because it has been fixed as an tion of the impossibility of any universal notion of truth altogether.12
essential part of the private autonomy of the 'constitutional boat' forged The problem of the existence of an 'Archimedean true point' is expressed
by the founders of liberal contemporary democracies (we will go back to directly by Zizek (1994: 3) when he asks:
this point in the conclusion of the book). Therefore, in order to avoid such
an ideological risk, the assumption of a universal, though fictional, truth Does not the critique of ideology involve a privileged place, somehow
seems to be unavoidably required - a possibility that is explored in the next exempted from the turmoil of social life, which enable some subject-
section. agents to perceive the very hidden mechanism that regulates social vis-
ibility and non-visibility? (Ibid.)
Toward a universal notion of truth
Truly, what Zizek (ibid.: 1-3) is trying to highlight is that the problem with
Let us finally engage with the problem of a universal notion of truth within ideology, despite the very actuality that he recognizes in many examples
the field of communicative actions (premise (c), above). It is well known taken from our contemporary life, is that it would apparently demand an
that a universal, fixed and absolute notion of truth has been the main object indispensable embracing of a 'God's view' perspective (ibid.: 25).
of denouncement within a post-structuralist ethos that assumes that we For Zizek, however, the apparently inevitable conclusion, reached by -
are living in a sort of 'post-metaphysical world': a world devoid of intrinsic among others, post-modernist scholars - is that 'the only non-ideological
meaning (Norval 2000a: 313). Post-structuralism pre-supposes, as a central position is to renounce the very notion of an extra-ideological reality and
premise, the impossibility of accessing a true and definitive knowledge from accept that all we are dealing with are symbolic fictions, the plurality of dis-
which it might be possible to discern the misleading or false character of cursive universes, never 'reality' - such a quick, slick 'postmodern' solution, how-
any political statement or discourse. If access to a place of definitive truth - ever, is ideology per excellence (ibid.: 17). He reacts against this new intellectual
commonly accepted as a pre-condition of a critique of ideology - is no longer mode by essaying a two-fold solution to that apparent paradox. He firstly
possible, then the possibility of a critique of ideology itself might become strips out any 'representationalisf character from the notion of ideology.
obsolete. In other words, within a post-structuralist ethos there is no room In this sense, for Zizek, far from being related to an illusion or a mistaken
for an 'Archimedean true point' from which the critique of ideology becomes representation of its social content, ideology is part of the reality itself (Zizek
possible as an intellectual or practical activity (ibid.: 314). 2005: 262). If ideology is part of reality, we do not require any 'Archimedean
Does this, however, mean that we have to exclude any possibility of affirm- point of truth' outside of reality to see a false representation of it, as the clas-
ing a more universal notion of truth that could avoid the objections posed sic post-Marx negative conceptions of ideology assert, because ideology is
by a Zizekian approach to a Habermasian matrix of communicative action? now within it a la Marx. We do not need to go outside to see it because we
In other words, are we condemned to assume that the greatest level to which are permanently seeing it. The problem, however, is still in knowing how we
we can aspire is a truth (or a falsification of truth) reached through a process can then realize that there is an ideology operating around us if we are also
of a 'thin rationality' - a la Habermas? A cautionary, even realistic, answer part of such a reality. In other words, how can we recognize that reality is
could be: yes, indeed. In fact, after a century characterized by the philosophi- itself ideological if ideology is part of the air that we daily breathe?
cal and political defense of 'thick rationality' and 'big Truths', which often
induced the biggest confrontations and atrocities ever known in the history The fictional 'Real' as a universal truth
of humankind, this might be the more sensate attitude to assume. But is it The second part of Zizek's thesis intends to answer these questions. Indeed,
the more accurate answer? Moreover, as recent history has started to show, Zizek continues his analysis, affirming that although ideology is confused
86 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 87
1
with reality, 'ideology is not all' because it is still possible to conceive a place However, still the question remains: how is this empty place going to be
from which the ideological and non-ideological (that is, a universal truth) specified? Zizek's answer resorts to Derrida's notion of 'specter' (Zizek 1994:
can be identified within the reality. This place is assumed to be neither part 20; 2005: 262). Indeed, Zizek (1994: 21), again following Lacan, firstly asserts,
of the reality, understood as a symbolic dimension, nor as a mere illusion '[what we experience as] reality it is not the "thing itself", it is always-already
floating in the air of the imaginary, but as the kernel Real of society, which, symbolized' (ibid.). This motto, which actually dates back to Kant, becomes
as a condition of being non-ideological, 'must remain empty', free of any problematic when one considers the related premise that assures the failure
'positively determined reality' (Zizek 1994: 17). of a complete symbolization. The symbolic mechanism - as we have seen -
The Real is a notion originally developed by French psychoanalyst Jacques through which we experience reality has always - in Zizek's reading of
Lacan throughout his career. In the early 1930s Lacan used the Real to refer Lacan - failed to fully cover the concept of the Real. There is always a residue
to a somewhat philosophical concept of absolute being, which was assumed that remains non-symbolized; it is 'this real (the part of "reality" that remains
to be beyond appearance. In the 1950s, the concept lost its philosophical non-symbolized) [that] returns in the guise of spectral apparitions' (ibid.: 21,
trait and was posed as one of three orders that Lacan identifies in the realm emphasis from the original).
of the subject: the symbolic, the imaginary and the Real (the latter meaning Furthermore, it is by distinguishing between 'symbolic fiction' and
an indivisible materiality that exists prior to symbolization). It is, how- 'specter' that he allows for the determining of the content of such an empty
ever, from the 1960s onward that Lacan in his The Ethics of Psychoanalysis place. Symbolic fiction refers to the symbolical construction of the fictional
(1959-60), discussing the character of the unconscious in Freud's works, (failed) structure of reality. Specter, in turn, relates to the spectral apparition
emphasizes the meaning of the Real as the core of the unconscious, which that precisely emerges in the gap that exists (and separates) reality from the
always remains unsymbolizable but is 'the cause of the most fundamental Real. Both notions are 'co-dependent in their very incompatibility' because
passion' (Lacan 1992: 97). This he calls Das Thing, or the representative of the eternal separation that Zizek affirms as existing between reality and the
representation. However, from 1964 the concept of Das Thing was replaced by Real allows for the emergence of the spectral apparitions and also deter-
the notion of object petit a that comes to represent the lack of the big Other, mines the fictional (failed) character of symbolical reality.
which is ultimately not a specific object but a lack thereof (Homer 2005: In this way, Zizek resolves the problem of affirming an extra-reality
85-7). Therefore, the Real becomes, in the late works of Lacan, no longer a dimension ('that consists of the spectral apparition that fills up the hole of the
materiality but a void that is at the core of the constitution of subjectivity. For real' (ibid., emphasis from the original), while at the same time assuming
the matter of this work the important point to highlight here is the ambigu- the whole (symbolized) reality as ideologically structured (but failed). In
ous character of the Real. As Parker (2004: 64) has stressed, the Lacanian this sense, although (and because) ideology is present in the reality - in fact
Real is 'the structurally necessary limit to representation that is resistant to structures the reality - it does not conceal the reality at all. However, that
a simple recoding' (ibid.). In other words, the Real allows the emergence of does not imply that ideology is not masking anything. Actually it masks the
symbolical subjectivity but also poses the more impenetrable limits to it. kernel of society, which is at the bottom of any ideological construction. In
Zizek (1994: 21), following this later sense of Lacan's notion of the Real, other words, it masks the Real.
defines it as the '"primordial repressed" (of Society), the irrepresentable X on Thus, Zizek manages to offer a negative conception of ideology, in which
whose "repression" reality itself is founded' (ibid.). It comes to represent the the misconception is no longer located in the classical epistemological
original 'antagonism' of society,13 'a traumatic social division which cannot structure illusion versus reality. There is now a tripartite structure operat-
be symbolized and that is thus not part of reality' (Zizek 1989: 45; 2005: ing, composed of the symbolical, the imaginary and the Real. Indeed, the
262). However, in a more recent book Zizek (2006: 26) asserts a new notion reality (the symbolical sphere), structured by a fantasy (the imaginary field),
of the real as a 'parallax real': is offered as an escape from the Real. The Real cannot be symbolized in
the reality, but instead appears as a specter in the fantasy-construction of
The parallax Real is, rather which accounts for the very multiplicity of the subject. Therefore, the ideological or non-ideological status of a given
appearances of the same underlying Real - it is not the hard core which political position (the universal truth) is determined by the masking (or the
persists as the Same, but the hard bone of contention which pulverizes unmasking, in the case of the non-ideological) that such a political position
the sameness into the multitude of appearances. (Ibid.) tends to produce, of the 'antagonism', the Real, of society.
Although Zizek (ibid.: 17) recognizes that there is no clear distinction
In this way, Zizek is somewhat moving away from a Lacanian (standard) between ideology and what we experience as reality, he also affirms that it
notion of the Real (Porter 2006: 65-1; Kay 2003). is worth maintaining the 'tension that keeps the critique of ideology alive'
88 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 89

(ibid.). Moreover, it is this primordial repressed antagonism (the irrepresent- coherent', because in that matrix nothing can really be outside of reality. In
able X) - a non-symbolized reality - that constitutes the extra-reality place of a Zizekian approach there is - conceptually speaking - a place - the Real -
reference that makes possible the critique of ideology. It is worth noting that which is neither part of the reality (the symbolic sphere) nor the imaginary,
although Zizek (ibid.: 25) uses the notion of 'class struggle' to represent this which, furthermore, is at the root of a failed symbolized reality, although
'irrepresentable X' he explicitly warns us that he is not necessarily referring it itself can never be totally symbolized. Therefore, this approach does not
to the suitability of that term to designate a contemporary dominant form give rise to an idea that is 'contradictorily coherent', like that denounced by
of antagonisms - a matter that for him concerns concrete social analysis - Derrida; therefore it is a perspective that is theoretically more consistent.
but rather to highlight the more important fact that the very constitution (b) Consequently, while in the classical matrix, the 'Archimedean point
of social reality involves a primordial repression of an antagonism, which in of truth' gives rise to an opposition between reality and illusion - illusion
turn provides the final support of the critique of ideology. being something that was excluded from reality altogether (floating in the
Furthermore, the new role reserved for a truly 'post-modern' critique of nothingness as a ghost). In the Zizekian approach both the ideological and
ideology is now: non-ideological are part of the reality. Moreover, reality is supported by an
extra-reality place - the Real - which is at the bottom of its constitution as a
[T]o designate the elements within an existing social order which [...] symbolized failed reality. The Real, in turn, would ultimately allow the deter-
point towards the system's antagonistic character, and thus 'estrange' us mination of what is ideological and what is non-ideological, that is, a universal
to the self-evidence of its established identity. (Ibid.: 7) truth, through the critique of ideology.
In this way Zizek manages to overcome the problem of the 'Archimedean
Zizek is clear in affirming that a political standpoint can be both true (accu- point of truth' traditionally understood as a universal, fixed and absolute
rate in its objective contents) and ideological, or vice versa: false (wrong vantage point, which focuses too much on drawing a line of separation
in its objective contents) and non-ideological (ibid.). Moreover, a political between 'true' reality and illusions (or grounding illusion in reality). On the
standpoint is not ideological due simply to its falsehood - a la Habermas - contrary, for Zizek (2005: 262-3) the key point to highlight is that what we
but only if such a character masks the fundamental kernel of society, the experience as reality only emerges if something is excluded. In other words,
Real. It is actually a functionalist perspective, the functionality criterion of the 'condition of possibility' for reality, which is always symbolized, is the
which is not located in the masking of any inner symbolic reality but rather exclusion of some lack that both cannot be symbolized (in the reality) and
in the intent of denying the Real. Moreover, for Zizek the non-ideological is the 'X' that determines the failure of a complete symbolization of the
perspective is commonly manifested in a 'false in fact' position - a fiction, reality.
an illusion - which, precisely due to its fictional character, is able to point But, could the notion of the Real - as defined by Zizek - have any utility
directly to the Real. Zizek is of course here referring to the Lacanian thesis in solving the shortcomings of Habermas's theory of communicative action,
according to which truth has the structure of a fiction (ibid.: 7). which are generated as a consequence of its underlying logic of 'a thin
Zizek (2006: 26) himself has put it as follows: rationality'? I suggest that we - as critics of ideology - avoid giving in to
the notion of the Real as having a literal material status, that is, refuse to
In a first move, the Real is the impossible hard core which we cannot put it within an imaginary or symbolical universe (in other words, we seri-
confront directly, but only through the lenses of a multitude of symbolic ously envisage it as a Real), but rather conceive of it as a 'fictional notion', 14
fictions, virtual formations. In a second move, this very core is purely the functional result of which would be to reintroduce the possibility of
virtual, actually non-existent, an X which can be reconstructed only a critique of ideology. This, in turn, would give rise to a universal - though
retrospectively, from the multitude of symbolic formations which are 'all also fictional - notion of truth, conceptually necessary to discern the ideo-
that there actually is'. (Ibid.) logical from the non-ideological without being trapped in an Archimedean
'black hole'.
In sum, what we have here is an extra-reality place that differs from a A fictional notion would not only give rise to a sort of logic of 'possible
traditional notion of an 'Archimedean true point' in the following main explanations' as Nozick (1974: 9), referring to the use of the 'state of nature'
features: stories to explain the emergence of a civil and political society, puts it: 'we
(a) From a theoretical point of view, while in the classical matrix, the learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen even if it did not arise
identification of the non-ideological cannot avoid assuming a vantage stage, that way' (ibid.). But it would also introduce the idea of functionality - in
placed above the reality and giving rise to an idea that is 'contradictorily this case of a universal notion of truth - where you would not necessarily
90 The New Critique of Ideology A Universal Notion of Truth 91

expect it. Therefore, we can now add a final feature, although this time one Such a truth, however, is not only possible but also conceptually neces-
that was not directly formulated by Zizek, to those two considered above, sary as a condition that would make achievable the existence of a post-
that distinguishes an extra-reality place - a la Zizek - from a traditional communicative action field as a place in which a 'validity claim of truth'
Archimedean point notion, affirming that: can be distinguished from a falsification of the truth. In other words, it is
(c) While the 'Archimedean point of truth' cannot avoid being assumed as only by assuming the existence of a universal truth - the unmasking of an
universal, fixed and absolute if it is envisaged as able to discern the ideologi- unwritten and unspoken lack - in relation to which any validity claim of
cal from the non-ideological in a classic matrix of reality versus illusion, the truth produced within a field of communicative action can be assessed, that
Real, non-symbolizable by definition, cannot but be unfixed and deprived a risk of being trapped - due to the 'thin' rationality of the Habermasian
of any absolute content, though still universal, that is, valid for all compo- matrix - in an ideological delusion - as that denounced by Zizek - could be
nents of the symbolic universe that constitutes it. postponed.
Conceived in this sense, for the purpose of the rehabilitation of ideology It is in this point that a Zizekian theory of ideology and a Habermasian
critique the Real can adopt a fictional character, that is, a fiction to be used matrix of communicative action can find common ground. Indeed, the real
and tested against any political situation that wants to be subjected to a value of Zizek's approach, far from meaning an abandonment of the dia-
critique of ideology. This fictional character of the Real would ultimately logical aspiration to reach rational agreements through a process of shared
allow the discerning of the universal, though also fictional, truth of such a understanding and meanings, might lie in the fact that it highlights the
situation, that is, the distinguishing of the non-ideological from the ideo- necessity of assuming a universal notion of truth, though in a fictional way,
logical. Furthermore, such a universal notion of the truth would not only be as a necessary complement for a sincere communication field based on a
possible but also conceptually necessary to ensure that a given social order thicker notion of post-Habermasian rationality.
could actually take place without ultimately being affected by a falsification But, could a model of critique of ideology, as one here proposed, be useful
of the truth. to assess the ideological or non-ideological rationality of a political con-
It is worthwhile noting that the meaning of 'conceptually necessary' is sensus reached by a given political community? Furthermore, could this
here inscribed within a dialectical logic, rather than posed within an ana- model, applied to an empirical case, contribute to the appreciation of new or
lytical or positivist tradition in which a necessary truth is held only in an revisited reasons to still insist upon proclaiming the necessity of a universal
analytical judgment by virtue of what the words mean (as in the expression notion of truth for a critique of ideology for political analysis? Or, on the
'bachelors are unmarried'). In other words, following Hegel's dialectic tradi- contrary, would it ultimately confirm that it is time to put a definitive seal
tion, my starting point is that a social order cannot exist on its own because to the reiterative announcement of the death of the critique of ideology?
the forces acting upon it are contradictory. Subsequently, we can only The chapters that follow present an attempt to answer these questions by
understand such an order if we assume that it rests on a greater reality in researching the case study of the consensus reached by Chilean political
which a given (fictional) notion of a universal truth appears as indispensable elites in post-Pinochet Chile (1990-2006).
to assess whether or not such a social order can be assumed as ideological.
This is because, according to the model here presented, and following Taylor
(1975: 96), 'we could not form a coherent notion of experience' in which
the ideological and non-ideological could not be distinguished.

Summary

Could we still be in a position to rescue a certain notion of a universal truth


in a 'post-metaphysical' world? What has been suggested in this chapter is
that if there is one way to do this, it is by discarding the 'Archimedean point
of truth' but not the aspiration of universality associated with it. Moreover,
it has been argued that using a fictional notion of the Real taken from a
Zizekian approach would allow the production of an ideological critique
in which the truth, the unmasking of the extra-ideological place, becomes
possible, as a fictional universal category.
The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 93

in itself, it is mainly used in this work as a strategy to obtain theoretical


insights in order that we might return in the interpretative section of this
book (Chapter 7 and Conclusion), to re-discuss the accuracy of this new
ideology critique. That does not, of course, imply the exclusion of an inter-
T h e M e t h o d o l o g i c a l F r a m e w o r k
pretative level in the case study here considered. However, the important
of t h e C a s e S t u d y point to bear in mind is that the empirical case study and its research design
must be understood as part of a more complex and wider methodological
framework, which mainly aims to offer insights into a formulation of a new
ideology critique for political analysis.
The methodological approach adopted to analyze the case study is the deep
hermeneutic matrix offered by Thompson (1990), which includes three stages:
social-historical analysis; formal discursive analysis; and interpretation.

This chapter presents a methodological framework of the case study used First phase: t h e socio-historical analysis
to critically evaluate the new ideology critique exposed in the preliminary
chapters. The main contention of this ideology critique can be summarized The argumentative line of the critique raised by Thompson (1990: 278)
as follows: by using a fictional notion of the Real taken from a Zizekian against Ricoeur's deep hermeneutic conception - briefly, that it assumes an
reading of Lacan, we can allow for the production of a critique of ideology excessive 'semantic autonomy of texts' from the socio-historical conditions
in which the truth - the unmasking of the extra-ideological place - becomes in which the text is produced and received - is followed in this analysis of
not only possible but also necessary as a universal, though fictional, cat- the socio-historical context in which the case study takes place. Furthermore,
egory to make possible the existence of a post-communicative action field as this research concurs with Thompson (1990: 282) in assuming that,
a place in which the 'validity claim' of truth in a Habermasian matrix could
be saved from being affected by a falsification of truth. The case study cho- The aim of the first phase of socio-historical analysis is to reconstruct the
sen is the consensus reached by the discourse of Chilean political elites on social and historical conditions of the production, circulation and recep-
the political economy model implemented during the post-Pinochet regime tion of symbolic form. (Ibid.)
period (1990-2006). The justification and specific research design of the case
study are presented later in this chapter. What is important to stress now is However, two modifications are made in this book to Thompson's first
that the aim of the methodological design of the case study is to contrast hermeneutic phase described above.
a Habermasian interpretation of the consensus reached by the discourse of First, although ideology is researched as a meaningful phenomenon expr-
Chilean political elites on the political economy model implemented during essed through symbols, the notion of symbols used here is mainly restricted
the post-Pinochet regime period (1990-2006) with that which might result to oral semi-structured discourses captured by interviews and translated into
when such an interpretation is subjected to a critique of ideology following written transcriptions. This is not the case in Thompson's matrix, which also
a Zizekian approach. On the basis of the conclusions reached in that con- focuses on less structured symbols such as images. Second, in this book, the
trasting interpretative exercise (Habermas versus Zizek), a final re-assessment socio-historical phase is twofold. On the one hand, it focuses on the analysis
on the new ideology critique here proposed is offered in the Conclusion of of the formation and reproduction of social classes, its mobility, its forms of
this book. organization, which would exist in the spatio-temporal setting in which the
The strategy of using an empirical case study to revisit a 'theoretical research takes place. Therefore, it does not consider the analysis of any other
thesis', which distances itself from a 'pure' conceptual analytical philosophi- social structures, such as the division between men and women, that Thompson
cal investigation, demands a complex methodological framework. Indeed, (1990) expressly incorporates. This is because focusing on a more classical polit-
it requires a double research design. On the one hand, it must consider a ical economy approach rather than on a wider methodological matrix creates
theoretical defense of a new ideology critique, which has already been devel- more suitable results (for instance, the identification of high levels of income
oped in Chapter 3 and, on the other, it includes the specific research plan of inequality) to contrast Habermas's communicative rationality with Zizek's
the empirical case study here presented. Moreover, although the empirical approach, which is the main research proposal of this book. On the other
case study might be considered as an autonomous systematic investigation hand, it includes an interpretative historical analysis of the rise and retreat of
92
94 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 95

the discourse of class struggle used by Chilean political elites from the 1960s to case study. This interpretative exercise will follow the practice of a 'symp-
1990. The aim of this analysis is to make explicit the shift (and the process that tomatic reading', which was coined by Althusser and Balibar (1979: 28) in
accompanied it) from ttie pre-coup political landscape of Chile 1973, in which their analysis of Marx's Capital. In other words, what is here pursued when
a discourse of class struggle was openly expressed, to one (beginning March a text is interpreted are the gaps, contradictions and other flaws in logic, in
1990) in which a harmonic societal consensus seems to be dominant. order to show that these may be a sign of another set of ideas at work in the
For the analysis of the formation and reproduction of social classes this text, of which authors are normally unaware.
book recalls the theoretical approach to class analysis mainly represented in This operation is made on the basis of the empirical research question,
Latin American studies by Alejandro Portes (Portes 1985; Portes & Hoffman theoretical prepositions and specific research questions developed later in
2003; Grusky & Sorensen 1998). In turn, for the analysis of the rise and this chapter. Chapter 7 presents this second phase of formal or discursive
retreat of the discourse of class struggle used by Chilean political elites from analysis.
1960s to 1990, an interpretative historical critical approach is followed. In
this way, the aim is to exclude any deterministic interpretative framework Third phase: a symptomatic (re)interpretation
for the explanation of a complex phenomenon, such as the formation of a
political consensus. Furthermore, it seeks to produce an accurate characteri- As Thompson (1990: 289) has outlined, the phase of interpretation is built
zation of the socio-historical context of the political economy model inves- upon the result of the two previous phases but 'it involves a new moment
tigated, in relation to the discursive strategies deployed by Chilean political of thought: it proceeds by synthesis, by the creative construction of pos-
elites to reach a consensus on the political economy model, in order to sible meanings' (ibid.). In this case, it seeks to propose an interpretative set
fulfill the first phase of the deep hermeneutic matrix. This first phase of of meanings of the consensus reached by the discourse of Chilean political
social-historic analysis is developed in Chapters 5 and 6. elites on the political economy model implemented in the post-Pinochet
regime period (1990-2006). This interpretative exercise is conducted at two
Second phase: formal or discursive analysis different hermeneutic levels:

The second phase of formal or discursive analysis relates to the internal (a) The first level seeks to assess the finding of the case study (the discourse
organization of symbolic forms (written discourses) in which the consensus of Chilean political elites on the consensus of the post-Pinochet politi-
reached by the discourse of Chilean political elites on the political economy cal economy model) through the empirical research question (developed
model implemented in the post-Pinochet regime period (1990-2006) has been below) and specific research questions. Furthermore, it aims to identify
expressed: their structural features, patterns, relations, gaps, contradictions the shortcomings and strengths of the theoretical model proposed.
and flaws in logic. Within the specific research on the consensus about the (b) The second level intends to use the finding of the aforementioned first
political economy model, the formal or discursive analysis is focused on the level to revisit the new ideology critique defended in this book. The aim
structural features of symbolic forms that facilitate the mobilization of its here is to assess the pertinence of the model proposed for the endeavor
meaning (Thompson 1990: 292). In other words, the structural features of of a rehabilitation of the ideology critique.
symbolic forms (mainly written discourses) are analyzed in order to estab-
lish a typology of strategies of symbolic constructions, which in turn can Therefore, the interpretative phase comprises a double task: the creative
be linked to certain modes of operation of an ideology,1 which allows a explication of the consensus reached by the discourse of Chilean political
'symptomatic' interpretative reading. elites on the political economy model implemented in the post-Pinochet
The main method used in this second phase is the argumentative analysis regime period (1990-2006) and the synthetic interpretation of how the
of discourses, of which the aim is to reconstruct and render explicit the pat- character of that consensus relates to the new ideology critique proposed in
tern of inferences and gaps, which characterize such a discourse (Thompson this book. This third phase of a symptomatic (re)interpretation is developed
1990: 289). This method seeks to divide the discursive corpus into a set of in Chapter 7 and also in the Conclusion.
assertions grouped around specific topics and then to assess the relationship
between these assertions and topics in terms of certain logical or quasi- Research design of the case study
logical operators (ibid.).
The argumentative analysis is ultimately conducted at the interpretative In the elaboration of the research design for the case study I follow a modi-
level of the interview transcriptions of the qualitative empirical research fied version of the theorization-testm# model presented by Rose-Wengraf
96 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 97

in Wengraf (2001). While the Rose-Wengraf model is concerned only with Justification of the case study
using a case study to test a pre-given theory by deriving from it testable The empirical research seeks to assess the paradigmatic case of the consensus
hypotheses, the case study in this book is used both to test a theory in an reached by the discourse of Chilean political elites on the political economy
empirical study and as a strategy for building or rectifying such a theory. model implemented during the post-Pinochet regime period (1990-2006).
Therefore, the starting point of the Rose-Wengraf model, that is, the con- Despite being a small country, not only within the global system but also
ceptual framework, must be understood as a point of arrival from the point in a Latin American context, curiously Chile has frequently been seen as a
of view of the final aim of this research. political economy 'model'. This was the case, for instance, in the so-called
In other words, the central concern of this book, far from being focused 'Revolution on Freedom', a political reformist project implemented during
on merely testing a piece of a given theory, might be better captured by the the Christian democrat government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70),
idea of a combined testing-rectification model, in which the research proc- which was praised by many, including the United States' administration, as
ess is ordered in concatenated stages that follow a circular pattern of two a sort of 'third-world social democracy' alternative to the Cuban revolution,
cycles: from a conceptual framework through a number of stages until suf- in a time of a deep confrontation between revolution and reform models in
ficient results are reached, and then from the results back to the conceptual Latin America. It was also the case of the 'Chile road to socialism' - the name
framework. This can also be captured by the idea of articulation, as Howarth given to the unusual tentativeness of reaching socialism through democratic
and Stavrakakis (2000: 5) have emphasized: mechanisms, pursued by Salvador Allende's regime (1970-73) - which was
warmly celebrated by international social democrat movements, mainly in
[...] instead of applying a pre-existing theory on to a set of empiric! Europe, as the 'Prague spring' within capitalism.2 Even more, the early neo-
objects, discourse theorists seek to articulate their concepts in each par- liberalism implemented by Pinochet's regime in the 1970s was frequently
ticular enactment of concrete research. The condition for this conception highlighted as a pioneer model of 'authoritarian capitalism' by international
of conducting research is that the concepts and logics of the theoretical financial sectors (Arellano etal. 1982: 34).3
framework must be sufficiently 'open' and flexible enough to be adapted, Therefore, in a way it is not surprising at all that Chile's post-authoritarian
deformed and transformed in the process of application. (Ibid., cursives experience has again been praised as a model, this time, of a successful demo-
from the original) cratic transition with economic growth (Bosworth etal. 1994; Hojman 1995;
Castells 2005; Mufioz Goma 2007).4 Indeed, some literature tends to confirm
Furthermore, a combined testing-rectification model implies an assumption the singularity of the Chilean case, showing critical differences between the
that the results of the last stage of the model are here not only considered features of the Chilean post-authoritarian process and other experiences of
as a proof or refutation of a piece of theory but as a building stage in the democratization that have taken place in the context of neo-liberalism in
creation of new avenues toward a new ideology critique. Latin America, notably on the reduction of poverty. In Chile there is a general
consensus that the reduction of poverty has been an important achievement
Conceptual framework of the democratic Concertatidn governments in the 1990s (DIVEST 1998;
Meller 1999: 41-64). However, more recent studies have showed that even
The theoretical conceptual framework that illustrates the case study has been the widely recognized achievement of the Concertatidn governments could be
extensively elaborated and discussed in the previous chapters of this book indeed to a certain extent due to a 'statistical artifact of the method used to
(Chapters 1-3). In short, it relates to the possibility/necessity of using a fic- determine the poverty line', as has been suggested by Escobar (2003: 70-8).
tional notion of the Real - taken from a Zizekian reading of Lacan - to allow In this way, it would seem that we have enough reasons to justify a new
the production of a new ideology critique. Here, the truth - the unmasking attempt to present the Chilean experience of the 1990s as a model for the
of the extra-ideological place - becomes not only possible but also necessary successful application of democracy with (neo-)liberal economic policies,
as a universal, though fictional, category, to make possible the existence the results of which are now particularly significant considering the trau-
of a communicative action field a la post-Habennas. Within this field the matic experiences suffered by almost all other Latin American countries in
'validity claim' of truth could be deferred from being affected by a falsifica- an era of neo-liberal democratization processes.5
tion of truth. However, it is worthwhile noting that, as was also the case in the previous
Therefore, in what follows, this chapter will restrict itself to presenting examples of assuming the singular Chilean political economic experience
a more specific conceptual framework, which justifies the selection of the as a paradigmatic case for the rest of Latin American countries, the current
case study. post-authoritarian trajectory followed by Chile is far from free of important
98 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 99

deficiencies, principally the high level of income inequality existing in the irrational or non-rational features, a la Zizek, present in a given political
country (Barrett 2001). This fact alone should induce us to be more critical experience of reaching understanding or consensus. This is particularly rele-
when considering those views that tend to present the Chilean model as vant in the analysis of the Chilean case in the 1990s and 2000s, which seems
the final desirable panacea for an unstable Latin American political envi- to be predominantly concerned with a political elite that is confronted with
ronment. As Drake and Jaksic (1999: 16) argue, these excessively optimistic the historical challenge to be in charge and to provide legitimation to an
views often correspond to powerful economic groups, which intentionally authoritarian neo-liberal political economy model that had been fiercely
exaggerate the virtuousness of the Chilean model to push for better liberali- criticized as 'irrational', authoritarian, anti-democratic and essentially une-
zation conditions and privatization. qual during the opposition years of the struggle for democracy. Therefore,
However, there are also other considerations, less commonly analyzed, to research the specific discursive strategies, and more importantly the
which make the Chilean experience a worthwhile case study in the context character of those strategies, used by Chilean political elites to preserve a
of the theoretical concern of this book. Indeed, most researches on post- political economy model founded by Pinochet - the most hated or beloved
Pinochet Chile, whether they praise it as a model or not, have applied insti- of Chilean personages in the early 1990s - is methodologically useful for
tutional or political approaches to the analysis of the factors that explain confronting rational and irrational (or non-rational) components that take
its singularity.6 This is particularity true in the abundant studies that have place in a historical process of reaching consensus within a given politi-
focused on the analysis of the transition to democracy in post-Pinochet cal community. It is worth stressing that a methodological approach that
Chile (Barton & Murray 2000; Garreton, 1999; Munk 1994), but also on confronts rational and irrational components - as one here presented - has
the few studies that have presented a perspective from the modification normally been absent from studies of the post-Pinochet Chilean transi-
of social structures produced in Chile since 1990, particularly in the labor tion. Take, for instance, the last edition of the influential book of Hecht
sector (Peppelenbos 2005; Frank 2002; Barrett 2001; Valenzuela 1998). This Oppenheim, Politics in Chile (2007), where, in order to explain 'why the
has meant, by default, that more reflective-interpretative approaches, such Concertatidn decided from the outset not to change in any fundamental way
as those offered by critical and post-structuralist theories, have commonly the economic framework that it had inherited from the military' (ibid.: 171-2),
been excluded altogether, implying that a more integral understanding of Hecht Oppenheim enumerates a series of internal and external constraints,
the praised Chilean singularity is still very underdeveloped. 7 all of which, however, are presented as logical restraints to the formation of
This is particularly significant when one takes into account the academic a rational political conviction, which in that way excludes any pattern of
and political mainstream that insists upon presenting the Chilean case as the irrational behavior altogether (ibid.).
new route to development, or at least as a potential exception to a general
failure of political and economic development in Latin America.8 Indeed, to Definitions and assumptions
focus on reflective approaches might highlight factors that, apart from com-
monly being omitted in a traditional piece of research, are hardly extendible As the case study must be related to the main contention of the aforemen-
to other situations that differ from the specific historical-subjective context tioned new ideology critique proposal, the main definitions and assump-
in which those idiosyncratic factors have arisen. This might therefore con- tions are presented as follows:
test the whole logic of an extensive 'model', or at least it might make those
who pursue its unreflective application more cautious. Empirical research question (ERQ)
A reflective approach, however, does not imply the exclusion of other This includes two main premises: (a) that by using a fictional notion of the
approaches to the analysis of the singularity of the Chilean case but, as Real, or 'primordial repressed' taken from a Zizekian reading of Lacan, it
is here intended by placing it within a deep hermeneutic matrix, rather would allow the production of an ideology critique in which the truth - the
includes them in a more integral theoretical analysis. Furthermore, and unmasking of the extra-ideological place - becomes possible as a universal,
related to the more specific topic on ideology in which this book is inscribed, though fictional, category; (b) that a universal, though fictional, notion of
to take the 'consensus' reached by the discourse of Chilean political elites on truth is not only possible but also conceptually necessary as a condition
a post-authoritarian inherited political economy model as a specific research that would make achievable the existence of a post-communicative action
object is particularly attractive for a work that pursues the rehabilitation of field as a place in which a 'validity claim of truth' - a la Habermas - can be
a new ideology critique for political analysis, because the Chilean experi- distinguished from a falsification of truth.
ence directly allows us to confront the assumed rational components, that 1 do not mean to exclude other alternative explicative perspectives, such
is, communicative rationality a la Habermas, with their less recognized as Laclau's hegemonic discourse, but rather to center on the two theoretical
100 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 101

approaches (Habermas versus Zizek) that have ultimately been identified alone, but also tastes, wishes, desires, goals, and so on [...] For consensus -
(Chapter 3) as the most suitable ones for keeping the ideology critique alive. agreement among diverse individuals or groups - can prevail in all three
Bearing all these precisions in mind, the ERQ of the case study is formulated of these areas: the theoretical/cognitive, which is concerned with agree-
as follows: ment or disagreement in matters of belief, the practical/pragmatic, which is
Assuming as a hypothesis that the discourse of Chilean political elites concerned with agreement or disagreement with respect to action; and the
reached a consensus on preserving a given political economy model in Chile evaluation/axiological, which is concerned with matters of value. (Ibid.)
post-Pinochet (1990-2006), we could ask: what are the discursive strategies
of symbolic constructions (SSCs) and modes of justification (MJ) that those However, this notion of consensus does not assume any other a priori spe-
elites have deployed to deal with the overt presence of the issue of income cific connotation, whether negative (for example, a hegemonic-ideological
inequality which features in such a model, and whether or not such SSCs and imposition) or positive (for example, an inter-subjective explicit communi-
MJ seek both to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle and to cative agreement or a process of reaching understanding). This is because
deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle assumed as the Real? it is precisely the specific meaning given to the notion of consensus by the
discourse of Chilean political elites that constitutes the object of inquiry.
Discourse
Following the approach suggested by van Dijk (1998: 194-6), the notion Recognition of success
of discourse used in this empirical research refers to a spoken or a written Furthermore, the operational meaning of 'general agreement' given to the
verbal product of a communicative event. In turn, such a communicative notion of consensus only intends to reflect the basic assumptions underly-
event: ing this case study, which assert that the political economy model building
in Chile after the end of Pinochet's regime has been generally acknowledged
[ijs it itself rather complex, and at least involves a number of social actors, (perceived) by the discourse of Chilean political elites as a successful experi-
typically in speaker/writer and hearer/reader roles (but also in other roles, ence (Nunez 2005: 265; Barrueto 2005: 249). It is important to highlight
such as observer or overhearer), taking part in a communicative act, in a that the notion of recognition of success is only assumed to be a general
specific setting (time, place, circumstances) and based on other context perception held by the discourse of Chilean political elites that the politi-
features. (Ibid.: 194) cal economy model is working satisfactorily well, though the reality of this
assertion and/or its causes or explicative factors are - at this stage - unknown
Furthermore, while a written discourse is assumed to have the same writer(s) and are the main object of this empirical research. In this way, other more
and present a beginning and an end, a spoken discourse is required to be con- common objective measures of political economy success, such as macro-
tinuous in time, have the same participants and also a marked beginning and economic equilibrium, growth and income inequality, are only considered
an end. Additionally, in this book the notion of discourse is used within the as components of such subjective perception. However, some of these, spe-
specific realm of politics, meaning that the discourse researched is the political cifically those that present a negative performance of the Chilean political
discourse, understood as one concerned with formal and informal struggles economy model, notably income inequality, will be utilized to confront the
for the organization of society and the state.9 Finally, the aforementioned hypothesis of the perception of success held by the discourse of Chilean
notion of discourse is inscribed within a Foucaultian approach, meaning that political elites critically.
discourse is both assumed as 'actively constituting or constructing society on
various dimensions and maintained an interdependent relationship with the The political economy model
society or institutions that constitutes' (Fairclough 1992: 39). The notion of the political economy model used in this research is also
defined only in general terms, referring to a set of components, factors, proc-
Consensus esses, policies, institutions and practices that define a (real or imaginary)
The notion of consensus is taken here only as an operational and neutral market-orientated political economy framework governed by a (neo-)liberal
concept that points to the idea of a 'general agreement' in matters of beliefs approach. This wide definition seeks to avoid the imposition of too narrow
and actions. As Reseller (1993: 5) has stated, aprioristic arbitrary definitions, the results of which would be useless for a
qualitative research that, focusing on subjective theories and deep structures
Consensus is a matter of agreement. But people can of course agree or of the discourse of Chilean political elites, intends to investigate those fac-
disagree on many different sorts of things - not beliefs and opinions tors which might explain the consensus about a given political economy
102 The New Critique of Ideology T The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 103

model - a circumstance that is somewhat determined by the conceptualiza- the notion of elite, far from being understood as a monolithical and closed
tion assigned to the notion of the 'political economy model' by the elites pre-defined group, should refer instead to 'the category of "top persons"
themselves under investigation. However, in order to fix the spatio-temporal in any interest group or in any activity which affects politics' (Parry 1969:
setting of the research, a trajectory of the most commonly accepted origins, 68). Therefore, the Chilean political elites are divided into seven groups:
configurations and characteristics of the current Chilean political economy politicians, business leaders, union leaders, civil society representatives,
model implemented during Pinochet's regime will be outlined in Chapter 5. the academic world, government economists and representatives of
the army.
Post-Pinochet Chile (1990-2006)
This sets the period that the empirical research will mostly focus upon. Discursive strategies
However, since it is very probable that the subjective theories and deep On the basis of the definitions above described, the empirical research ques-
structures investigated are rooted in the memory of past historical events, tion of the case study will seek to discern the discursive strategies, that is,
notably in the traumatic events of the coup d'etat of 1973 and Pinochet's SSCs and MJ, that are used by the discourse of Chilean political elites to deal
subsequent dictatorship, the research is also open to the examination of with the overt presence of the issue of income inequality, which features in
this earlier period. However, the review of Pinochet's dictatorship is only the so-called Chilean model.10 For SSCs and MJ I follow the classification of
focused upon searching for explicative factors for the emergence of subjec- typical modes of operation of ideology offered by Thompson (1990: 60). He
tive theories and deep structures held by the discourse of Chilean political distinguishes between SSCs that are typical ways through which symbolic
elites, which might underlie the consensus reached on the political eco- forms may serve to mobilize meanings11 and modes of ideology (which
nomy model implemented during the years 1990-2006. The post-Pinochet here I have preferred to call modes of justification to avoid terminological
regime period encompasses the three first democratic governments of the confusion). Modes of ideology (or justification) are those general categories
Concertatidn that have ruled the country since 11 March 1990: the presiden- (legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and reification)
cies of Patricio Aylwin (1990-94), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) and linked to some SSCs, by which a given political discourse expresses itself as
Ricardo Lagos (2000-06). ideological.
Chilean political elites Class struggle
This constitutes the group studied in the empirical research. The notion of As it has been highlighted by Dahrendorf (1959: 16), the notion of class
a political elite used in this work refers to a group of people who, because of struggle is an analytical category conceived in the unwritten 52nd chapter
their role or position in society, exert a significant influence, direct or indi- of volume 3 of Marx's Capital:
rect, institutional or non-institutional, on the definition of a consensus on a
political economy model. The central feature of this definition is the degree Increasingly the collision between the individual worker and the indi-
of influence that a group of people must be in the position to exert in order vidual bourgeois assume the character of coalitions between two classes.
to qualify to be part of a political elite, rather than the methods, formal or The workers start forming coalitions against the bourgeois; they join in
informal, institutional or non-institutional, through which the influence is order to maintain their wages. (Ibid.)
displayed. This implies that this research will not be reduced to the formal
and institutional political elites (the politicians) but will include other less It has been extensively developed in sociological theory, mainly for the
traditional political elite groups, such as members of the academic world and purpose of describing social conflicts within industrial capitalist socie-
representatives of civil society. In other words, this book adopts the central ties (ibid.). However, and precisely because of the changes experienced by
assumption of the 'classical elitist thesis' developed by Pareto in The Mind and 'industrialism', the category of class struggle has been progressively aban-
Society (1935), Mosca in The Ruling Class (1939), Michels in Political Parties doned by social theorists, prevailing only amongst 'orthodox' Marxists.
(1958), Burnham in The Managerial Revolution (1942) and Wright Mills in The Nonetheless, the notion of class struggle has recently been rehabilitated
Power Elite (1956), which essentially asserts that 'there may exist in any society from a Lacanian perspective by Zizek (1994: 22) as a hermeneutic category
a minority of the population which takes the major decisions in the society' to represent the Real, as he puts it:
(Parry 1969: 30). However, this classical approach is complemented by the
'pluralist-elitist thesis' developed by Dahl in Who Governs? (1961) and Scott in Class struggle is the 'real' in the strict Lacanian sense: a 'hitch', an impedi-
Elites in Latin America (1967), which in essence states that in pluralist societies ment which gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one
104 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 105

endeavors to integrate and domesticate it ... but which simultaneously In fact, in countries like Chile, which have never corresponded to that
condemns these endeavors to ultimate failure. (Ibid.) classic model of industrial capitalism envisaged by Marx to develop the
notion of class struggle, it is plausible to expect that the over-presence or
However, Zizek explicitly warns us that he is not necessarily referring to over-absence of the use of such a notion by the discourse of Chilean political
the suitability of that term to designate a contemporary dominant form of elites may come to signify something else - something that, although absent,
antagonism - a matter that for him concerns concrete social analysis - but ultimately works as a reminder of an unfathomable social antagonism.
rather to highlight the more important fact that the very constitution of
social reality involves a primordial repression of antagonism, which in turns The (operative) discourse of class struggle
provides final support for the ideology critique (ibid.: 25). In fact, for Zizek Taking into account the aforementioned theoretical caveats, it is worth now
(ibid.: 21-2), class struggle, far from acting as a kind of ultimate guarantee asserting an operative fictional definition of the notion of 'the discourse of
to grasp society as a rational totality, stresses the fact that society is 'held class struggle' that is used in the case study.
together' by the very antagonism that 'forever prevents its closure in a har- Firstly, let us remember that this book defends the thesis that a fictional
monious rational Whole' (ibid.). notion of the Real taken from a Zizekian reading of Lacan can allow for the
However, it is worthwhile clarifying that in Zizek's account, class struggle, production of an ideology critique in which the truth - the unmasking of
far from being conceived as a classic and open confrontation between work- the extra-ideological place - becomes not only possible but also necessary
ing and capitalist classes, which is probably unlikely to be found in current as a universal, though fictional, category. However, as we have already seen,
reality, acts - precisely due to its non-existence - as a point of reference that the notion of class struggle in Zizek's account cannot present itself as a posi-
warns us that every social phenomenon can become an attempt to hide the tive entity, otherwise it would no longer be the Real. Thus we are facing the
everlasting (class) antagonisms. As Zizek (ibid.: 22) has put it: dilemma of, on the one hand, asserting a notion of class struggle that, in
order to be assumed as the fictional Real, cannot have any positive content,
[...] although 'class struggle' is nowhere directly given as a positive entity, but, on the other hand, is required to be operationalized for the purposes
it nonetheless functions, in its very absence, as the point of reference ena- of the formulation of a model of ideology critique for a concrete empirical
bling us to locate every social phenomenon - not by relating it to class study, as one here pursued.
struggle as its ultimate meaning ('transcendental signified') but by con- The solution here adopted is to set up a concept of discourse of class strug-
ceiving it as (an)other attempt to conceal and 'patch up' the rift of class gle that explicitly acknowledges the core of the notion of class struggle as
antagonism, to efface its trace. (Ibid., emphasis from the original) the Real (a repressed and unresolved social antagonism) but - and unlike
the classical Marxist concept of class struggle - without fixing or making
In this book the discourse of class struggle as the fictional Real is employed in absolute any concrete content for the parties involved in antagonisms.
the aforementioned double character, that is, on the one hand, as a 'hitch', that Therefore, the operational concept of the discourse of class struggle is for-
gives rise to new symbolizations, aimed to domesticate it (class struggle), but mulated as follows.
which are condemned to ultimate failure, and, on the other hand, as a point The discourse of class struggle is assumed as one that explicitly acknowl-
of reference (a non-positive entity) that in its very absence effaces the rift of edges and encourages (by calling - politically-ideologically - for radical or
class antagonism. In other words, the discourse of class struggle as the fictional revolutionary social and political transformations) primordial social antago-
Real is assumed as a 'primordial repressed' (of society), the irrepresentable X, nisms, irrespective of whether or not those antagonisms correspond to a
on whose 'repression' reality itself is founded, that is, the original 'antagonism' classic confrontation between working and capitalist classes.
of society: 'a traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized and that is It is worthwhile stressing that, as we have already seen in Chapter 3, the
thus not part of reality but, rather, makes it possible' (Zizek 1989: 45). adoption of a notion of the Real has an explicit fictional character, mean-
This meaning of the notion of class struggle as the fictional Real is used both ing that it is not assumed to be a fixed positive category but rather a fiction
to trace the trajectory of a political process of the constitution/de-constitution to be tested and emended during the empirical research in an essentially
of the discourse of political elites in the pre-coup and post-coup period - from dynamic and creative exercise of critique. In other words, the introduction
the 1960s to 1990 (Chapter 6) - and to analyze the strategies of symbolic con- of a notion of the Real allows the existence of an ideology critique because it
structions and modes of justification that are used by the discourse of Chilean is around such a notion of the Real that an investigation on ideology (strate-
political elites to deal with the overt presence of the issue of income inequality, gies of symbolic constructions linked to some general modes of justification)
featured in the so-called Chilean model (Chapter 7). is displayed. Even more, this would allow the notion of class struggle as
2

106 The New CritUjue of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 107

the fictional Real to be replaced at the end of the research by another more The empirical research works around this last hypothesis, although it does
suitable category, if necessary, or it would alternatively conclude that the not exclude a priori the other two. Moreover, what is important to bear
political experience investigated ends up being a non-ideological one, that in mind here is that this research seeks to explore two levels of enquiries
is, one governed by a thicker rationality. expressed in the empirical research question of the case study.
In the case of the political experience here investigated, that is, the con- First, what are the SSCs and MJ - if any - that the Chilean political elites
sensus on the post-Pinochet political economy model held by the discourse might have used to deal with the overt presence of the issue of income
of Chilean political elites, a notion of class struggle as defined above is inequality that features in the Chilean model? Secondly, whether or not
particularly attractive because most of the elites investigated are part of the such SSCs and MJ seek both to deny any reference to the discourse of
same political generation, or very much influenced and deeply affected by class struggle and to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle
it, as those who led a very explicit discourse of class struggle in the 1960s assumed as the fictional Real? That is, can such a notion of the discourse
and continued until a dramatic coup d'etat came to drastically end the expe- of class struggle be assumed as a primordial repressed and excluded cat-
rience in 1973 (Chapter 6). Even more, it seems that during the Pinochet egory but at the same time be posed at the root of the political discourse
regime (1973-89) the discourse of class struggle of the past was progressively about the consensus on the post-Pinochet political economy model? In
replaced by a so-called discourse of 'struggle for democracy', a constant fea- other words, is it possible to assume it to be the fictional Real (or is it bet-
ture, which was maintained throughout the years of the new post-Pinochet ter to adopt some of the other options suggested by the lines of inquiries
democracy (1990-2006) (see Chapter 6). (a) and (b) aforementioned)? Evidently, the answer to the second question
will reveal itself once the first has been addressed. Indeed, it is only by
Class struggle as the fictional Real empirically researching the SSCs and MJ that might have been formulated
Firstly, it is worthwhile clarifying that if we assume that such a notion by the discourse of Chilean political elites to deal with the overt presence
of class struggle is in fact excluded or denied from the political discourse of the issue of income inequality that features in the Chilean model that
of the post-Pinochet Chilean elites, we can hypothesize three possible we would be in position to know whether or not such SSCs and MJ, as
explanations: a matter of fact, deny any reference to class struggle and if so, whether
or not they deny it ideologically, that is, as the fictional Real, or instead
(a) The class struggle type of political discourse in the past was only part of as some of the other options suggested by lines of inquiries (a) and (b)
an immature rhetorical political discourse of elites, which has now been aforementioned.
overcome (because of a rational process of renovation of socialism, for However, it is worthwhile noticing that although typical MJ such as those
instance). In other words, class struggle discourse was never based on here considered - legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation
true social antagonisms, rather only misleadingly assumed to be. It is and reification - are immediately associated with ideology, the truth is that
now correctly assumed to be an old-fashioned discourse because there they are not in themselves ideological.12 Indeed, typical MJ such as dissimu-
are no such social antagonisms in the current reality. lation can easily be non-ideological. This of course depends on the criteria
(b) The class struggle type of political discourse was part of an adequate dis- one chooses to assert when a given MJ will become ideological. For the pur-
course in the past, that is, it was based on true social antagonisms, but pose of the empirical research of this book the operational criterion used to
has now been surpassed because of the end of those social confronta- define when an SSC and MJ become ideological is as follows:
tions in reality (because of the successful application of a given political
economy model, for instance). In other words, class struggle discourse A given MJ (and the SSC linked to it) of the issue of income inequality becomes
was correctly assumed to be true in the past, and it is correctly assumed ideological if, and only if, it seeks both to deny any reference to the discourse
to be false in the present. of class struggle and to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle
(c) The class struggle type of political discourse amongst Chilean politi- assumed as the fictional Real.
cal elites was and still is a reflection of something else: a primordial
repressed social antagonism, which was openly expressed in the past That, however, does not end our methodological troubles. We still have
but, though still existent, is now excluded from the political discourse to recognize when such a situation arises. In other words, when do SSCs
and transformed into consensus. In other words, class struggle discourse and/or MJ seek both to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle
was correctly assumed to be true in the past and is now also true but and to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle assumed as the
repressed or denied - in other words, it is assumed to be the Real. fictional Real?
108 The New Critique of Ideology The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 109

This is a difficult task due to the risk of becoming contradictory, as for he explains the high levels of income inequality of the model as something
instance when we say that an MJ of income inequality becomes ideologi- that has always been that way and is not caused by the economic model.
cal (that is, denies any reference to class struggle, assumed as the fictional Real) We could thus assert that the modes of legitimation (successful economic
just because it has concluded that such an MJ denies class struggle (we have growth) and reification (by naturalization or eternalization) of income ine-
already seen that we can deny class struggle without being ideological in quality used by the interviewee are two MJs that, taken together, could sug-
the sense here adopted, see (a) and (b) above); or by simply tautologically gest the idea that the consensus is something imposed because the benefits
repeating that it is ideological because it denies any reference to class struggle, of the economic growth are being appropriated only by a minority of people.
assumed as the fictional Real. Therefore, it is worth being clear on this point. Therefore the explanation of the consensus provided (the success of the eco-
In order to determine whether or not a given MJ of income inequality (and nomic growth) may not coherently explain the way in which the consensus
the SSCs linked to it) seeks to deny any reference to class struggle assumed was built (for example, it does not explain how a political economy model
as a fictional Real, that is, becomes ideological, two sets of criteria are here with such levels of income inequality could reach a high level of consensus
adopted: one to define when we are in the presence of an MJ (and the SSCs amongst elites). This case could, once subjected to further research, reason-
linked to it) of income inequality that denies any reference to class strug- ably be attributed to the denial of class divisions and ultimately class struggle
gle, and a second to determine when such a denial of class struggle can be by elites, as a category which is not included in the analysis.
assumed as a denial of the fictional Real.
The denial of the fictional Real
The denial of class struggle The criterion here refers to finding sufficient reasons to argue that the denial
The criterion here chosen refers to the degree of coherence discovered in of class struggle is a denial of a primordial repression, conceived as an origi-
the discourses of interviewees to explain either the denial (exclusion) or nal and traumatic social division or 'antagonism' of society, that cannot be
inclusion of the notion of class struggle from the explanations of the issue symbolized and that is thus not part of reality but it makes it possible, that
of income inequality on the consensus of the political economy model is, it is a central constituent of the consensus of the discourse of Chilean
investigated. In other words, the ideological character of a given mode of political elites on the post-Pinochet political economy model (that is, the
justification of income inequality will be given by the appreciation made irrepresentable X on whose 'repression' the consensus is itself founded), as
by the researcher of whether or not interviewees could coherently give rea- has been developed by Zizek (Chapter 3). This is of course a matter of inter-
sons to explain the way a consensus on a political economy model with pretation that can only be decided after analyzing the whole set of inter-
a huge level of income inequality comes about. The point is not, however, viewees in which a denial of the category of class struggle (as above defined)
to assume that the interviewees must explicitly speak about class struggle, has been significantly found. In such an interpretative exercise one should
either to deny it or to exclude it in their interviews (on the contrary, it is look for constants and patterns in the way in which the denial of the notion
expected that most of them do not speak at all of it), but to provide elements of class struggle is used by interviewees and around which different modes
that can satisfactorily and coherently be used to understand (by the inter- of justification of income inequality are displayed that could be best inter-
preter) the issue of income inequality investigated without making a coher- preted, on the basis of the contradictory features of the phenomenon inves-
ent reference to class struggle as above defined. It is therefore worthwhile tigated (for example, a 'successful' growth that cohabits with high levels of
stressing here that income inequality comes to act as a sort of methodologi- income inequality), as a denial of a primordial repressed social antagonism
cal recourse, which, due to both its huge unresolved presence in the post- that acts as a central constitutive category of the consensus.
Pinochet Chilean political economy model and its theoretical association Finally a methodological caution should be stressed: if the findings of
with class division, allows the researcher to confront the interviewees with the empirical research seem to suggest that either the notion of class strug-
an issue that - it is expected - could 'force' them to discursively set their gle is not in fact denied within the political discourse, or is denied but not
positions (through SSCs and MJ) with regard to the notion of class struggle, ideologically, that is, as a denial of the fictional Real, the conclusions of the
which is the object of inquiry.13 study will only be in the position to recommend - because of the limits of
Take for instance the interviewee who defends the Chilean model as an this research - new lines of empirical inquiry but not to affirm the definitive
example of a successful economic model with sustainable growth. The inter- validity of any of those lines of investigation. This, far from being a short-
viewee, interrogated about reasons that would explain the consensus on such coming of the methodological design of a new ideology critique as that here
a model, mentions the economic success of the model as the explicatory fac- adopted, might show instead the strength of that theoretical option, which
tor, understood as a constant economic growth; however, at the same time is permanently revisited with the data taken from experience.
110 The New Critique of Ideology

Summary
Part II
After presenting the three phases of the deep hermeneutic matrix proposed
for the research of the case study (the socio-historical analysis, formal or P o s t - P i n o c h e t C h i l e : A C a s e S t u d y
discursive analysis and a symptomatic (re)interpretation), this chapter has
developed a testing-rectification methodological design. The aim of this
methodological design is to allow the 'articulation' (testing and revising)
of a new ideology critique to the consensus reached by Chilean political
elites on the political economy model applied during the post-Pinochet
regime period (1990-2006). That is, the methodological designs seeks to
establish how a 'fictional' use of Zizek's notion of the Real - in this case,
class struggle - may become necessary to subject the consensus reached
by Chilean political elites to a critique of ideology that discerns either its
ideological or non-ideological character. As a part of the methodological
design, this chapter has also presented the justification of the selection of
post-Pinochet Chilean elite's consensus as a valid case study in the context
of this book and stated the hypothesis, assumptions and criteria that con-
figure the empirical research questions and their relationship with a new
ideology critique proposed.
In Part II (from Chapters 5 to 7), each phase of the deep hermeneutic
matrix analysis is presented, starting in Chapter 5 with an examination
of the main structural transformations that have accompanied the imple-
mentation of the Chilean political economy model from its origin (1973)
to inception, and the development of the democratic governments (1990
onward), focusing on the evolution of social classes, the transformation of
the productive structure and their impact on income inequality.
The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of P o w e r

in P i n o c h e t ' s Era

This chapter, inscribed within the first phase of the deep hermeneutic
matrix defined in Chapter 4, reviews the origin and trajectories of the
structural transformations, and their social effects, that occurred in Chile
as a consequence of the implementation of a neo-liberal political economy
model during Pinochet's regime (from September 11, 1973 to March 10,
1990). Furthermore, the chapter also highlights the inheritance and pres-
ervation of the aforementioned structural transformations, and their social
consequences - mainly social inequality - in the post-Pinochet democratic
period (1990-2006). In other words, this chapter seeks to define the initial
character of the political economy model faced by the new Chilean political
elites, which took power in March 1990, and on which a particular consen-
sus would be built up during the following democratic period. The chapter
presents three fields of analysis: first, a review of the changes experienced by
the structure of economic production as a result of the trade and exchange
liberalization policies; second, a review of the composition and change of
ownership, focusing on the evolution of the largest economic conglomer-
ates; and, finally, an analysis of the modifications of class structure and
their impact on income inequality, brought as a consequence of the new
economic model.

The power structure in Chile pre-Pinoche t

Between 1958 and 1973 Chile was ruled by three ideologically opposed
administrations Gorge Alessandri, Conservative, 1958-64; Eduardo Frei
Montalva, Christian Democrat, 1964-70; and Salvador Allende, Socialist-
Marxist, 1970-3). This was a period of increasing polarization of the political
debate, which extended into almost all spheres of social life. An expression
of this ideological confrontation was a political economic debate, which
took place in the country as part of a more general discussion that was tak-
ing place in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s between structuralists
and monetarists on the causes of and solutions for the high rates of inflation

113
114 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 115

that had affected Latin America for decades (Foxley 1982a: 12). While struc- could be best understood as a deepening of the ISI model rather than a
turalists highlighted unsuitable economic structures as the main cause of creation of a totally new socialist state-model, such as that existing in
inflation and proposed a gradualist long-term program of stabilization, Cuba or the USSR at that time. Indeed, at the end of Allende's govern-
which included social and political reforms, monetarists pointed out the ment in 1973, only 39 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) was
disequilibria of fiscal balance as the main explicative factor, recommending controlled by the state, though in contrast to 14 percent in 1965 (Table
a strategy of short-term adjustment to control the monetary supply, reduce 5.1). In both cases, the agriculture sector is excluded (Mesa-Lago 2000:
the fiscal deficit, induce a devaluation of the exchange rate, promote lib- 30). This was a direct result of an increase of state firms in services from
eralization of prices and end subsidies (ibid.: 14-5). Both approaches had 25 percent in 1965 to 100 percent in 1973, from 13 percent to 85 percent
their chance to be implemented before neo-liberalism appeared in Latin in mining, from an unknown proportion to 85 percent in finances (which
America. During the 1950s, mild orthodox monetarist policies had already included the intervention of banks and 70 percent of the state's control of
been applied in a short period of time in Chile (1956-8, during the govern- total investment), from 11 percent to 70 percent in communications, and
ment of Carlos Ibafiez), Argentina (1959-82), Bolivia (1956) and Uruguay from 3 percent to 40 percent in industry, but also of the nationalization of
(1959-62). However, in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, alongside a new the copper industry and the deepening of the agrarian reform (ibid.: 30 &
intent of liberalizing the economy promoted by Alessandri's government in 139). The agrarian reform, which had been progressively implemented since
Chile (1958-64), the structuralist approach was a dominant feature in most Alessandri's government, aimed to resolve the huge concentration of land
Latin American countries, including Chile. property that always characterized the agriculture sector in Chile, revealed
Nonetheless, despite the aforementioned theoretical-ideological discus- by the fact that, whereas in 1925 the 'latifundio' (lands over 200 hectares),
sion about the cause of inflation, it is worthwhile noting that all post - which corresponded to 91.6 percent of the total land, belonged to 9 percent
Second World War Chilean governments before the coup of 1973 operated of landlords, in 1965 the 'latifundio' represented 86.8 percent of the total
within the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model. In fact, the ISI land and belonged to only 5.3 percent of landlords (Meller 1996: 87).
model was operating in some Latin American countries, including Chile, Additionally, Allende's administration was characterized by a strong ten-
even since the 1930s. However, it was during the 1950s and 1960s that the dency to close the economy - another typical feature of the ISI model - which
conceptual framework of this model was developed within the Economic in 1973 was subjected to 5,125 tariff positions, of which 3,218 (63 percent
Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Prebisch approximately) were prohibitions (Mesa-Lago 2000: 31; De la Cuadra &
1950). The ISI model was based on two main premises: a closed economy Hachette 1991: 218). In turn, the nominal tariff averaged 94 percent in
(high tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls) and a strong role for the 1973, 600 percent being the maximum (Mesa-Lago 2000: 31). Other stud-
state, that is, government expenditure as a large share of Gross Domestic ies found that the average nominal tariff in 1973 was 105 percent, and the
Product (GDP), extensive regulations and the increasing presence of state- maximum nominal tariff rate was 220 percent, but for some items reached
owned firms (Sapelli 2003: 2). Therefore, in spite of the fact that the ISI up to 750 percent (Meller 1996: 62-3). As a result of this protection policy
model had already been an object of important criticisms since 1950s (ibid.: 8), the productive structure existing in 1970 was intensified at the end of
it was never really abandoned by Chile's governments until Pinochet came Allende's government, as is showed by the data collected by Foxley (1982a)
to power.1 Therefore, the analysis of the changes in ownership, structure of (Table 5.2). Indeed, between 1970 and 1974, the main economic activities
economic production and class structure that took place after neo-liberalism were still in the industrial sector (26 percent and 25.9 percent of the total
was applied in Chile cannot be made without taking into account the status
that the ISI model presented during the last democratic government of this
period: Salvador Allende's administration (1970-3) - an overview of which
is outlined in the next section. Table 5.1 Percentage of GNP and productivity activities controlled by the state
Years % GN1* % services % finances % mining % communication % industry
The power structure in Allende's government controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled by the controlled
Although the Popular Unity, the Socialist-Communist coalition that came by the by the by the by the state by the state
state state state state
to power with Salvador Allende in 1970, always had the explicit discursive
intention of putting an end to the old ISI model and replacing it with a 1965 14 25 N/A 13 11 3
1973 39 100 85 85 70 40
socialist model of democracy - 'the Chilean road to Socialism'2 - what actu-
ally happened during the almost three years of Allende's administration Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Mesa-Lago (2000: 30).
116 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 117

Table 5.2 Participation of productivity activities in GDP Table 5.3 Participation of productivity activities in employment and labor force
Years % industry % commerce % service % mining % agriculture Years Services Agriculture
in GDP in GDP in GDP in GDP In GDP
% of total % of labor force % of total % of labor force
1970(1) 26 22.3 19.9 10.7 9.7 employment employment
1974 (2) 25.9 21.9 20.1 11.6 9.1
1960-1970 33.2 16.9 28.3 N/A 9.3 1960 N/A 23.2 16.5
(average) (3) 1970 26 24.2 24.6 18.7
1971-1973 34.4 18.1 29.5 N/A 7.2 1974 31.7 21.7
(average) (4)
Year Industry Commerce
Note: Industry includes manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas and water.
.Source: Elaborated by the author. (1) and (2) with data taken from Foxley (1982a: 66); (3) and (4) % of total % of labor force % of total % of labor force
with data taken from Mesa-Lago (2000: 143, Table 11.4). employment employment
1960 28.6 10.4
1970 18.8 21.8 15.1 13.8
production, respectively), commerce (22.3 percent and 21.9 percent), service 1974 16.9 14.7
(19.9 percent and 20.1 percent), mining (10.7 percent and 11.6 percent) and
agriculture (9.7 percent and 9.1 percent) (Foxley 1982a: 66). Furthermore, Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Foxley (1982a: 66); Mesa-Lago (2000: 155,
if we look at a more long-term series of statistics, we find that while during Table 11.14).
the 1960s (1960-70) the average of industry as a percentage of GDP was 33.2
percent, in the three years of Allende's administration (1971-3) this average
rose to 34.4 percent, reflecting the increasing relevance of industry in the Table 5.4 Participation of social classes in the EAP (Latin America)
total economy during the Popular Unity government (Table 5.2) (Mesa-Lago
2000: 143). Instead, services, commerce and agriculture reached an average Year i formal proletariat in the EAP
% dominant % bureaucratic-technical
class in the EAP class in the EAP
of 28.3 percent, 16.9 percent and 9.3 percent of GDP respectively between
Chile Argentina Uruguay Latin Chile Latin Chile Argentina Latin
1960 and 1970, in comparison to 29.5 percent, 18.1 percent and 7.2 percent American American American
between 1971 and 1973, respectively (ibid.: 143). These figures show that average average average
a strong industry sector shares predominance with an already powerful
tertiary sector in an economy in which the state had a leading but not 1972 60.5 59 88.5 22.4 1.9 1.7 7.1 7.5 5.4
monopolist role. Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes (1985: 22-3, Table 2).
In turn, the main source of employment was services, which experi-
enced an important increase from 26 percent in 1970 to 31.7 percent in
1974 as a consequence of the increasing role of the state in the economy The change in the productive structure was expressed in the particular
(Table 5.3). The second traditional source of employment - agriculture - constitution of social classes existing in Chile at that time. Indeed, Portes
showed, however, a reduction from 24.6 percent in 1970 to 21.7 percent (1985: 22-3) - one of the few studies on the field, which uses data from
in 1974 due in part to the end of 'latifundios' (large land). Industry, in 1972 - shows that the most important social class in Chile was the formal
third place, experienced a reduction from 18.8 percent to 16.9 percent - a proletariat with 60.5 percent of the economically active population (EAP),
probable consequence of the economic crisis of 1973. Finally, commerce the second largest percentage in Latin America after Uruguay with 88.5
experienced a small fall from 15.1 percent in 1970 to 14.7 percent in percent and very close to Argentina, which averaged 59 percent, but far
1974 (Foxley 1982a: 66). Complementarily, Mesa-Lago (2000: 155) shows higher than the regional average, which only reached 22.4 percent of EAP
that the percentages of labor force in service, agriculture and commerce (Table 5.4). The high percentage reached by the formal proletariat in Chile
increased during the 1960s, passing from 23.2 percent in 1960 to 24.2 could be understood as a direct result of the way in which the ISI model
percent in 1970; 16.5 percent to 18.7 percent; 10.4 percent to 13.8 percent, was implemented, which emphasized the promotion of a national indus-
respectively; and reduced in industry from 28.6 percent to 21.8 percent try that followed, at least in part, the classic Fordist model of production. 3
(Table 5.3). This was a tendency that was accelerated during the period 1970-3 with
118 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 119

the creation of the 'socially owned sector', meaning that all enterprises Table 5.5 Participation of informal proletariat and pretty bourgeoisie in the EAP
with capital of 14 million escudos or above on December 31, 1970 were to (Latin America)
be transferred to the socially owned or mixed sector (Vuskovic 1973: 51). All
Year % informal proletariat in the EAP % informal pretty bourgeoisie in
of which resulted in a strong industrial formal proletariat.
the EAP
At the same time, the entrepreneurial role of the state became increasingly
more relevant, which gave rise to a growing number of public workers, also Chile Argentina Uruguay Latin Chile Argentina Uruguay Latin
traditionally integrants of the formal proletariat. In fact, while between American American
1964 and 1970 the variation of the employment annual rate in the public average average
sector was 4.9 percent, that percentage rose to 6.5 percent between 1970 and 1970 26.0 22.3 3.8 60.3 4.5 9.7 1.0 10.2
1974 (Foxley 1982a: 55). Finally, the democratization of Tatifundios', which
followed the implementation of the agrarian reform and the passing of an Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes (1985: 23, Table 2).
act (Ley N 16.625) in 1969 during Eduardo Frei Montalva's administration,
which allowed the unionization of the sector, prohibited until then, was situation from the average participation found in the whole Latin American
also an explicative factor in the predominance of the formal proletariat as a region at that moment, where the main feature was the predominance of
social class at the end of 1972. informal social sectors.
Furthermore, the formal proletariat was not only the biggest social class This assessment is also confirmed by analyzing the state of the informal
in Chile but also the most integrated as a social actor, which is reflected in class in Chile in 1970 in comparison to the rest of Latin America (Table 5.5).
the percentage of unionization, mostly concentrated within formal workers, In fact, Portes (1985: 23) also shows that the informal proletariat, tradition-
which grew to 17.7 percent between 1965 and 1970, reaching 29 percent ally the most important social class in Latin America, which ranked an aver-
in 1971-3 and eventually 33.7 percent in 1973 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 31). The age of 60.3 percent of the EAP in 1970, only represented 26 percent in Chile
growth in unionization came from industry and mining sectors, in which the same year, in a similar range to the percentage reached in Argentina
the number of workers unionized increased from 54,801 in 1932, 283,383 in (22.3 percent), though far from that registered in Uruguay (3.8 percent). The
1952, 271,141 in 1960, and 290,535 in 1965, to 436,974 in 1970, in this latter same can be said if we look at the relatively less significant percentage of the
case being an increase of 50.4 percent in only five years. But also importantly informal petty bourgeoisie in Chile in 1970, which only reached 4.5 percent
the growth in unionization came from the agriculture sector, which, after being of the EAP, a percentage very much lower than the 10.2 percent aver-
almost insignificant in the 1950s and 1960s (1,035 in 1952; 1,825 in 1960; and aged by the whole region, though higher than that registered in Uruguay
2,126 in 1965), experienced a huge increase to 114,112 unionized workers in (1 percent) but lower than that found in Argentina (9.7 percent), for the
1970 and 208,000 in 1971, an increase of 82 percent with respect to the previ- same year (Table 5.5).
ous year (Meller 1996:110 & 143). Another indicator that reveals the degree of Although we do not have statistics for previous decades, the results found
importance presented by the formal proletariat at that time was the increasing by Portes (1985) seem to show that the ISI model in Chile was functioning
number of workers who went on strike, which in 1971-3 reached nearly half a with a tendency toward increasing integration rather than toward segrega-
million, or 16.3 percent of the labor force (Mesa-Lago 2000: 31). tion of the labor force, a tendency that was expected to be even greater in
In turn, the dominant class in Chile in 1970, which reached 1.9 percent the period 1970-3 due to the deepening of the model rather than to its
of the EAP, was almost in the same range of the Latin American average for removal, as we have seen before. The coup d'etat of September 11, 1973,
the same year, that is, 1.7 percent (Table 5.4). This shows the homogeneity however, came to radically change this tendency and the whole social
of the capitalist class in the region (Portes 1985: 22). The same tendency structure in Chile.
can be observed if we add to the dominant class the percentage reached by
the bureaucratic-technical class in Chile (7.1 percent), a percentage somewhat First phase: the great transformation (1973-81)
higher than the regional average (5.4 percent) but very similar to that in
Argentina at that time: 7.5 percent (Table 5.4). However, the important point The first eight years of Pinochet's regime can be considered the most impor-
to bear in mind here is that those three social classes taken together (formal tant for the implementation of neo-liberalism in Chile, not only because
proletariat, dominant and bureaucratic-technical social classes) present a during this period the struggle for a neo-liberal (orthodox) orientation was
picture of a society in which almost 70 percent of the EAP was defined by its gained by a group of economists later known as the 'Chicago Boys', but also
participation in modern capitalist relations (the ISI model) - a very different because it was then that the framework of the structural transformation
120 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 121

that shaped the new model took place in its essential components. In what Table 5.6Participation of productivity activities in GDP (Chile, the 1970s)
follows, a review of the most important structural transformations in the
productive structure, which are at the root of the huge changes experienced Years % industry % commerce % service % mining % agriculture % construction
in GDP in GDP in GDP in GDP in GDP in GDP
by social classes during the first eight years of the Chilean authoritarian
military regime, is presented. 1974 25.7 21.9 20.1 11.6 9.1 4.8
1978 22.7 23.6 21.6 12.2 10.2 2.81
The changes in the productive structure
Soiree: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Foxley (1982a: 66, Cuadro 20).
As we have seen, by 1973 the Chilean productive structure was inscribed
within the ISI model. However, from 1973 a drastic trade liberalization pol-
icy was implemented. Between 1973 and 1976 the average import tariffs and also increased their percentages from 11.6 percent to 12.2 percent and 9.1
maximum tariff were unilaterally reduced from 90 percent to 35.6 percent percent to 10.2 percent, respectively, between 1974 and 1978. Construction,
and from 600 percent to 65 percent, respectively, and then to 10 percent in however, decreased from 4.8 percent to 2.8 percent in the same period.
June 1979, all of which stimulated an indiscriminate increase of imports, Mesa-Lago (2000), though with dissimilar numerical results due to a differ-
especially of luxury goods (Mesa-Lago 2000: 39-53). In turn, to stimulate ent calculation method, shows similar tendencies for the cases of industry,
the exports sector a single exchange rate, which replaced the existing 15 services, agriculture and construction. However, contrary to Foxley (1982a),
multiple exchange rates at the end of 1973, was adopted between 1974 and Mesa-Lago (2000) finds that commerce reached only 18.3 percent in 1981,
1975. During these years the exchange policy consisted of a series of unan- and experienced an average of 16.1 percent between 1974 and 1981 - lower
nounced mini-devaluations. Also, between 1975 and mid-1976 there was a than the average for the 1960s (16.9 percent) but far from the percentage
series of devaluations, the main objective of which was to solve the crisis in averaged during Allende's regime (18.1 percent).
the balance of payment already in place (ibid.: 40). After an appreciation in The key factor of these figures is that service and commerce were then
1976, from late 1976 to 1978 a system of pre-announced mini-devaluations the most significant economic sectors of the economy because, considered
was again implemented. Finally in June 1979, and for three years thereafter, together, they not only grew from 42 percent in 1974 (Foxley 1982a: 66) or
the exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos with the aim of transferring lower 48.5 percent in 1973 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 155) to 45.2 percent in 1978 (Foxley
international inflation to the domestic economy. This policy was highly 1982a: 66) or 50.1 percent in 1981 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 155), but also because
criticized by less orthodox economists at that time and future leaders of the they increased their participation in total employment from 46.4 percent
new democratic government that would take power in March 1990 (Foxley in 1974 (Foxley 1982a: 66) or 38 percent in 1970 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 155) to
1982b). 50.8 percent in 1978 (Foxley 1982a: 66) or 50.9 percent in 1980 (Mesa-Lagos
A fixed exchange rate policy can be seen as the main expression of the 2000: 155), as it is shown in Table 5.7.
great influence that the new dominant financial conglomerates exerted on Moreover, 34.7 percent of total employment in 1978 (Foxley 1982a) or
the economic operation of the country. As a matter of fact, this policy was 33.5 percent of the total labor force in 1980 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 62) was now
very much in tune with the interests of financial conglomerates, most of exclusively concentrated in services. Eventually, by 1980, almost 60 percent
which were heavily indebted in dollars. In this way, they benefited directly of the labor force was concentrated in the tertiary sector: services, com-
from the export sector, the main sector affected by the fixed rate policy merce, transportation and finance. Mesa-Lago (2000: 155) also registers the
(Mesa-Lago 2000: 53). distribution of the labor force by economic activity between 1975 and 1980
The result of the trade liberalization and exchange rate policies can be separately for services (27.2 percent and 30.5 percent, respectively); financial
observed in the changes experienced in the productive structure in Chile by services (2.6 percent and 3 percent respectively); commerce (14.1 percent
1978. In fact, Foxley (1982a: 66) shows that after five years of liberalizing and 17.4 percent, respectively); transportation and telecommunication (6.4
trade and privatization policies the industry no longer represented the main percent and 6.3 percent, respectively).
economic activity in Chile, being displaced to second place by commerce, These figures are even more explicative in understanding the great change
which grew from 21.9 percent in 1974 to 23.6 percent of the total produc- that was taking place in Chilean society at that time if we consider that
tion in 1978 (Table 5.6). the state reduced its participation in the economy between 1973 and 1983
The industry sector, in turn, decreased by 3 percent from 25.7 percent from 39 percent to 24 percent of GDP (ibid.: 50), and the annual variation
to 22.7 percent, followed very closely by services, which increased from of public employment was negative (-5 percent) between 1974 and 1978
20.1 percent to 21.6 percent in the same period. Mining and agriculture (Foxley 1982a: 55). Moreover, this decreasing tendency of the labor force
122 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 123

Table 5.7 Participation of productive activities in the employment and labor force or 'disappeared' (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 255-6). These transformations and
(Chile, 1970-80) repressions consequentially brought a substantial modification of the social
Years Services and commerce Services structure in Chile, as we will see in the next section.

% total employment % labor force % total employment % labor force The formation of new economic groups
1970 38 Alongside trade and exchange rate liberalization, one of the main structural
1974 46.4 transformations implemented by the new authoritarian government was
1975 43.9 29.81 the privatization of the public sector. Publicly, the objectives of privatiza-
1978 50.8 34.7 tions were to solve financial problems in the public sector, give efficiency
1980 50.9 33.5 to state enterprise and distribute ownership to people through the sale of
Years Agriculture Industry stocks (Mesa-Lago 2000: 35). As a matter of fact, the results were very dif-
ferent. Indeed, although there is little empirical evidence to support the
% total employment % labor force % total employment % labor force idea categorically that the hidden purpose behind the great transformation
1974 21.7 16.9 experienced by ownership during this period was to induce a redistribution
1975 17.5 17.0 of economic power within the dominant class, the fact is that the shift of the
1978 20.2 13.3 hegemonic role from the state and traditional national industrial groups to
1980 15.3 16.3 emergent national financial conglomerates was the main result of this proc-
ess. For idiosyncratic evidence of this thesis it is worth referring to the 'special
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Foxley (1982a: 66, Cuadro 20); Mesa-Lago relationship' that existed between Sergio de Castro, considered to be one the
(2000: 155, Table 11.14).
most important members of the Chicago Boys, and Manuel Cruzat, the head
of one of the most powerful economic groups that resulted as a consequence
employed by the state, mostly formal proletariat associated with state enter- of the privatizations in 1973 to 1981. Furthermore, Cavallo et al. (1997: 77)
prises and government services, extended further than 1978, experiencing a suggest that Cruzat was in fact the intellectual power behind de Castro.
total fall from 5.6 percent in 1973 to 3.3 percent as a percentage of national Furthermore, the evidence in this respect was very clear. While in 1966 the
employment in 1983 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 140). This meant that the new main main economic conglomerates in Chile, such as Matte's, Angel ini's, Luksic's,
source of employment was no longer the state but an increasingly private Said's, Ibanez's and Yarur's, were all associated with the industrial sector, the
financial-service economy. In turn, the percentage of labor force in agricul- Hipotecario group, linked to the financial sector, was in a secondary place
ture, the second source of employment, reduced its participation in the total (Fazio 1997: 13). In 1978, in turn, the two main economic conglomerates
employment between 1974 and 1978 from 21.7 percent to 20.2 percent, and were those headed by Manuel Cruzat and Fernando Larrain, on the one
the labor force in industry also experienced a dramatic fall from 16.9 percent hand, and Javier Vial, on the other - both of them formerly part of the
to 13.3 percent, more than 3.5 percent in four years (Foxley 1982a: 66) (see Hipotecario group and strongly linked to a new financial sector. These were
Table 5.7). Mesa-Lago (2000: 155), in turn, with different data taken from actually the main beneficiaries of the privatization process that took place
Central Bank Indicators, shows that between 1975 and 1980 the percentage in this period, displacing to third, fourth, fifth and sixth places the Matte,
of the labor force in agriculture fell from 17.5 percent to 15.3 percent, in Angelini, Edwards and Luksic groups, respectively (ibid.: 12). By 1978 both
industry from 17 percent to 16.3 percent, in mining from 2.8 percent to 2.2 Cruzat-Larrain and Vial controlled over 50 percent of the assets belonging to
percent and in construction from 5.4 percent to 5.1 percent. the 200 big corporations registered on the stock exchange (Yotopoulos 1989:
This transformation took place in a scenario of high unemployment rates 696). Moreover, Cruzat-Larrain's went from controlling only 14.6 percent of
and a strong repression of working class and union organizations. In fact, the the total assets of the 100 largest companies in 1968 to controlling 25.5 per-
open unemployment in Chile averaged 13 percent between 1974 and 1981, cent by late 1978, that is, US$507 million of out a total of US$1,993 billion
reaching 16.8 percent if we include those workers employed by Programa de (Dahse 1979: 194-200). Also by 1978, 62 (24.8 percent) out of a total of 250
Empleo Minima (Minimum Employment Program; PEM) (Mesa-Lago 2000: large Chilean enterprises were controlled by both Cruzat-Larrain and Vial
156). Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (Workers' United Center of (Fazio 1997: 137).
Chile; CUT), the most important workers' union organization at the time, The first step in the reconfiguration of the economic power that took
was dissolved, strikes were restricted and dozens of union leaders were killed place in this period in Chile was the returning to their former private owners
124 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 125 1

of those enterprises that had experienced previous intervention by the state. of the neo-liberal model.5 The most relevant feature is the increase in more
In 1974, 202 out of a total of 259 were returned to the private sector and in than 1 percent of the size of the informal proletariat in the EAP, which
1976 the number rose to 251. In 1977 only 19 state enterprises remained passed from 26 percent in 1970 to 27.1 percent in 1980, a higher percentage
in the public sector. Also, at the end of 1973 only 30 to 40 percent of the than that registered in Argentina (23 percent) and a little under the average
expropriated land had been returned to its former owners, a percentage registered for the whole region (30.2 percent), both in 1980 (Table 5.8).
that rose to 65 percent in 1979 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 36-49). Simultaneously, This would suggest that the new tertiary-orientation of the Chilean
an obscure and unregulated process of privatization was initiated. Only economy was in fact accompanied by a pauperization of the labor market,
between 1973 and 1976 were 100 manufacturing firms and 13 banks priva- in which the growth of the informal proletariat played a central role. Two
tized, with an estimated loss to the state of around 30 percent of the book additional factors help to confirm this conclusion. In a more recent study,
value of such assets (ibid.: 36). By 1983, the state controlled only 47 out of a Campero (2000: 2) shows that the industrial proletariat, mostly composed of
total of 529 of the state enterprises existing in 1973, which represented 24.1 formal workers, experienced a fall of more than 10 percent, from 63.4 percent
percent of GDP, far lower than 39.0 percent reached in 1973.4 This was due of the EAP in 1970 to 53 percent in 1979, which would corroborate the rela-
to a reduction of the state's participation from 85 percent to 28 percent in tive displacement at the end of the decade of the status of the formal prole-
financing, from 70 percent to 21 percent in transport, from 100 percent to tariat as a central social class in Chile up to the beginning of the 1970s.
75 percent in services, from 40 percent to 12 percent in industry, and from This picture is even clearer if we analyze the labor policy implemented
85 percent to 83 percent in mining. The exception was communications, during the first eight years of Pinochet's regime and the associated changes
where the state increased its participation from 70 percent to 96 percent, experienced in unionization rates. Indeed, far from applying liberalization
which is explained as a consequence of the monopolistic character of the to the labor markets, as was the case in other areas of the economy, the
sector (Mesa-Lago 2000: 50). military government implemented from 1973 to 1979 strict control over
The emergence of the new financial dominant economic groups in Chile labor organizations and a fixed wage policy, showing that the claim about
was also helped by the process of liberalization of the domestic financial keeping a strict orthodoxy policy of non-state intervention in the market
markets, the control on capital movement and ultimately interest rates, was not valid for those who had to pay the cost of the adjustment: the
all of which facilitated the inflow of foreign capital but also dramatically workers. In fact, for the first five years the government fixed wages under
increased the domestic interest rate (Meller 1996: 187). This increase in the level of inflation, which rebounded in a decline in real wages and a uni-
the domestic rate, which was negative throughout 1975, reached its high- fication of the minimum wage paid to blue and white collar workers.6 Also
est rate of 65 percent per year in 1976, and since then the gap existing entrepreneurs were allowed to freely fire workers without the need to justify
between international and domestic interest rates has continued to increase, the cause of dismissal and to reduce unemployment compensation. Most
remaining two to six times above the international level (Yotopoulos 1989: unions, including CUT, were prohibited, along with strikes and direct collec-
692). This differential, in turn, directly benefited Cruzat-Larrain's and Vial's tive bargaining (Mesa-Lago 2000: 40-1). These restrictive wages and repres-
economic groups, which could access the external financial market and act sive policies, which were crucial to allow the change of ownership and the
as intermediaries between foreign and domestic credit, making huge gains transformations in productive structure that took place at that time, only
in the operations. An estimation of the profits obtained by those groups improved with the implementation of the 'labor plan' in 1979 when the
between 1976 and 1979 is in the order of US$800 million (Yotopoulos 1989:
693; Zahler 1980). These profits were used to build up their holding of
industrial and financial enterprises. It has been estimated that only Cruzat-
Larrain's and Vial's conglomerates were the recipients of the 20 percent of Table 5.8 Participation of informal and formal proletariat in the EAP (Latin
America)
the total domestic and international credit extended during those years.
However, as those groups also controlled their own financial institutions, Year % informal proletariat in the EAP % formal proletariat in the EAP
it is probable that they received an even greater share of total credit
(Yotopoulos 1989: 696). Chile Argentina Latin America Chile
1970 26.0 22.3 60.3 63.4
The transformation of social classes 1979 53.0
1980 27.1 23.0 30.2
Portes (1985: 23) presents data for the year 1980 that allows us to observe the
situation of some social classes in Chile, seven years after the implementation Simile: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes (1985: 23, Table 2); Campero (2000: 2).
126 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 127

state started to focus more on regulations rather than on the fixing of wages Table 5.9 Rates of union affiliation in industry (Chile)
and direct repression of unions. The 'labor plan' was an act passed in 1979
(DL 2756) that created a new legal framework to regulate collective bargain- Year % affiliation by types of unions
ing and unionization. Although collective bargaining was now allowed, the Small Medium Larg e unions
negotiation power of workers was reduced due to not only several restric- unions unions
tions applied to the strike but also because collective bargaining was in fact 50-124 125-399 400-999 1,000 and
concentrated into small economic unities with unions with a very small affiliates affiliates affiliates plus affiliates
number of affiliates (Mizala & Romaguera 2001: 205). Although the 'labor 1973 5.5 38.7 34.9 16.6 3.3 0.8
plan' brought relative improvement to union organizations, strikes and 1977 12.4 40.4 30.0 13.9 2.4 0.6
collective bargaining, its main objective was to install the legal framework
that would accompany the new neo-liberal model already implemented in Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Campero (2000: 11).
the country, based on principles of voluntary union membership, restrictive
collective bargaining, de-politicization of trade union federations and con- 30 percent, 13.9 percent, 2.4 percent, and 0.6 percent in 1977, respectively.
federations, weakening of legal protection for union leaders, an extremely A similar pattern is seen in the construction sector. In the mining, electric-
limited strike right and unrestricted freedom for employers to lay off work- ity and energy sectors the only category that shows growth is that of the
ers subject to compensation (Mesa-Lago 2000: 54). small unions (25 or fewer affiliates): all the rest experienced a decline (ibid.).
It is worthwhile insisting that although it is clear that the 'labor plan' However, it is worthwhile noticing that mining was the only economic sec-
meant a weakening of the power of unions, it was no more than a sort of legal tor in which a significant percentage of total unions (31.1 percent) still had
instrument of 'normalization' of that huge transformation of labor relations more than 124 affiliates. This was a significant percentage in comparison to
that was already in place in the country. Indeed, although between 1973 and those in industry (17 percent), construction (24.16 percent), and electricity
1977 the number of people affiliated to unions fell only by 3.5 percent, the and energy (22.6 percent) in 1977, which would explain the relevant role
decrease reached 57.7 percent between 1977 and 1980 (Campero 2000: 8-9). played by those mining unions in the social protests process, initiated in
Other estimations show that between the periods 1971-3 and 1980-5 the 1983, as we will see in the next section.
number of unionized workers declined by 56 percent, from 29 percent to Again, the 'labor plan' of 1979 meant the legal consolidation of this phe-
12 percent of total employment (Mesa-Lago 2000: 54). This shows that the nomenon of a decline in the number of affiliates per union because it allo-
major impact upon the weakening of union organizations took place after cated collective bargaining only at the level of a small productive unit, in
1977, two years before the implementation of the 'labor plan'. This also which the only possible union organizations in most cases were small weak
reveals that in spite of the dramatic effects that the repression policy exerted unions or even groups of workers associated exclusively to initiate a process of
against union organizations and their leaders, whose zenith was reached collective bargaining with obligatory arbitration if required (De la Cuadra &
between 1973 and 1977, the real and definitive impact on the weakening of Hachette 1991: 231).
unionization happened when the new neo-liberal economic model was in
Finally, both the increase in informal proletariat and the decrease of the
an advanced stage of implementation, and not before.
formal proletariat were directly reflected in the reduction of labor share in
Conversely, the decline in the number of affiliates per union organization, the Gross National Income (GNI), which fell from a base of 100 in 1970 to
which is a consequence of the abandonment of a Fordist-type model of produc- 73.7 in 1977 and 86.1 in 1980 (Table 5.10).
tion and the consequential reduction of the basic productive unit (la fdbrica), Also, the Gini co-efficient of income distribution for the labor force in
is another indicator that shows the decreasing importance of the formal pro- the Greater Santiago area worsened, passing from 0.518 in 1974 to 0.599
letariat as a social actor (Table 5.9). In 1973 only 5.5 percent of the unions in 1977 and to a slightly improved register of 0.578 in 1981 (Mesa-Lago
in industry had 25 or fewer affiliates (small unions), a percentage that 2000: 158). In turn, the Gini co-efficient for the working population in the
grew dramatically to 12.4 percent in 1977. As well as this, the percentage Greater Santiago area passed from 0.468 in 1974 to 0.534 in 1977 and 0.522
of unions with 25 to 49 affiliates (medium unions) in the same sector in 1980 (ibid.).
increased from 38.7 percent in 1973 to 40.4 percent in 1977 (Campero Instead, according to Table 5.10 the distribution of household consump-
2000: ll). 7 In turn, the unions in the industry sector with 50 to 124, 125 tion of the lowest 20 percent of the population of Santiago fell from 7.7
to 399, 400 to 999 and 1000 plus affiliates (large unions) experienced a percent in 1969 to 5.2 percent in 1978 (ibid.: 160); and the percentage
fall from 34.9 percent, 16.6 percent, 3.3 percent, 0.8 percent in 1973 to of poverty and indigence in the Greater Santiago grew dramatically from
ff O ff. is) SB
| NO s a 2 6 re ^i NCNONONONONONONO
cr 9 ro ^ 3 CCCONJSJMVJNIJ,
ON < B *" VI 5 cH ~ff O B3 ff 00
O <T O (D j* X r^ IN) 3 3 W E ff 13 NO t-uOOO\I4i.WONO
l-t , n 3"
o S oG re 3 O to
M M 3 3' ff *-* *" C n> *3 vi " f^-T
0 - 3 >
5^2 E D. ff. re S * B
ON 3 3 I I rr t re
Q ere re"< IO3 - re_ 1 3 rj
o re
B o 3* Sj
X. re ** ^ re w fh 3- _. 0" re to M. M^ 3 ^ * ff 2:
>i e S re 5 ? J O < n o -ff to 00
2 3" 3 n ff On rt ff ff 3
rt re 3" ff E " ff 3 ON
. Cl ty
... n n
n 3 n ff ff 3 3 O q i- O N
VI
O 3 ff
3 "> u> St a C/l ff 5' ff CL 3L
re a: > ato i ac 5- O re re n n =" Z92.
re
ff os re r^ M. 3 OrqreP :. ON
n * j> E ft D. O "S vi 7
re 3 3 c
a < re Q
O re re CJ 3 3# &c/i 3 h^ 13 g g1 8>o
rt re LT3 0 Xto M r.i M
a> i-h a 3 en re B 8 Z a a 5
a a O It C rq o S t_i 2rere ff ff ct 3 re 3
*s to re
. ff. re'
N re * ff NO SJ ff o P ff re ff 3T ^
1/1
to re X re i B.&S 3 C/
l PC/l
NO c 8 3 tt S 3 N
NO
D 0W0 I" O
i fi;
K ft0
wi 21
3 0 ftto "3 . re 3 re p 3 D. ^u wOre - L to N
ff M 3
On J,NO re to . 1 1 5' re M re g ff o p vjO 09 33 rtff 0ff
IS ff Q s a a n r+ NO
" Crq NO B 3 ,, c/i 0 8 Q 3 re ^ m < 0) rt CL CffL O vl
V] N< O 9 S b S J tt n 3 S " ff
00
N 3 NO B 3 re ro O SP o ff Q sa
9 t
*H O r* Q^ ^O * K a g o re rj -J N 3 CL | 8 ! ff X re
g re re 0) Q, o to IN 5" o a
o a- cr 2) " H * * to *i
5 J Q. re ffE -S 3 O. o re to K r 3 - n 3 5
S NO J z c/> 13QTQ 5' S. i o 3, ^ M M n
a ff^ u 3_ re 3 S> 3">' ff o 3
^ re i l off - UJ
n 3" 3fD -4. 6) S ff 5 3
re " ff r* 3. re -i 13
re OS ' 8 C ff
(t nB ff3 O
2 ff i

R s &
S m 5 3" vi 6) .c
n 5 S to o c re 13 ca NO re i - I
re c to B o 4 2 o 3o
re re C D n R "ff B
NO S t/i to 3 2 3 SI'S Q 5' Q, 5. I ff re & uB
V|
9 ff sf C I < re ff 2 re n s P. & ffSS* I rt
3- NO . S V ff. 3 o. E T X3 3 l s I
00 S <* re o 3 re r-f
- re 3- g B.
O 3 o- 3 vi
to 4-
re * o ff O mre 3 $ 2 3 - U
S 3 o ? rj 3 4-
ff o N5" O 3 3 2 re 3 ff C 7H Q 313 i 8. 13 a
i ff o o g a x B 3 3 o Sg < ff O3 n3 O re : o re
o c * O to
re i/i o Nh 3 O (T> ff re a Si
. re a a
O S"^
"I ** C M ff3 to re
9 2 a B 8 S*
I
re I - O re 5 ** L 3 3
3 Q 3* tos 3 _ o> B ff 2 S 4- to'
93. 5" S s re "* re
3 3 re o vTre is re v T3
2. re C7N 95
o 3- 3" t/5 ^- n re re
w 2 9 3 "^ to ff ff, NO O
O tt -. " re
3 3" ff. 3 E-3 5" c 5 oe b
N<
% S.'S. -
K S. ' oi' 3" a. E ? 3 o re 2
o
MM f5_ C 3" 3" &>

TaWe 5.IJ Indicators of dominant and bureaucratic-technical classes in Chile (1960-80)


Year % dominant class % bureaucratic- Household Participation in Household consumption of the
in EAP technical class consumption of total income of the richest 5% of population
in EAP the richest 20% richest 10% of
of population population
of Santiago
Chile Latin America Chile Latin America Chile Latin America Chile Argentina Uruguay Brazil
1960 46.6
1968 34.4
1969 44.5
1970 1.9 1.7 7.1
1975 47.3
1978 51.0 35 22
1979 25.5
1980 2.4 1.6 6.6 20 19
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes (1985: 22 & 25, Table 3); Mesa-Lago (2000: 160, Table 11.20); Fazio (1996: 56); Rosenthal
(1996: 16, Figure 1).

to
NC
130 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 131

However, Rosenthal (1996: 16), taking only the richest 5 percent of The exchange policy was also dramatically altered; the orthodox fixed
households, a percentage much closer to the real dominant class in Chile, rate that had been adopted in June 1979 was abandoned. Indeed, finally, in
shows that in 1978 its portion of total income reached 22 percent in Chile, June 1982, against the will of Miguel Kast, then Executive Director of the
a higher percentage than that found in Argentina in 1980 (approximately Central Bank and last leader of the Chicago Boys in power who struggled
20 percent), Uruguay in 1980 (approximately 19 percent), and only lower to keep that policy alive, a devaluation of 18 percent was imposed, giving
than Brazil in 1979 (approximately 25.5 percent), the least equal country in rise to the beginning of a huge debt crisis.10 A new 40 percent devaluation
the region (Table 5.11). This shows the significant regressive redistribution was adopted in September of the same year, as well as successive devalua-
impact that the neo-liberal model implemented in Chile at the end of the tions in 1983 (averaging 55 percent). After a short period of a free-floating
1970s already presented. exchange rate in August 1982, a 'dirty' flotation policy (free exchange rate
but with intervention in the dollar market) was adopted, which meant that
The second phase: the crisis and the recovery periodic devaluations of the peso continued, averaging a real rate increase
of 23.8 percent between 1984 and 1989, with the explicit aim of promoting
Although the period that extends from 1982 is most often studied in two exports, improving the competitiveness of traditional agricultural products,
different stages (the economic crisis of 1982-3 and the subsequent recov- equilibrating the trade balance and collecting resources to serve the foreign
ery), for an analysis of social classes as that here presented it is worthwhile debt (Mesa-Lago 2000: 70 & 88).
keeping it as a whole. The main feature of this period is the deepening and The consequences of these policies were reflected in the structure of
consolidation of the transformation of the new structure of social classes, productive sectors (Table 5.12). Indeed, by 1989, at the end of the military
and its progression to social inequality, resulting as a consequence of the government, services were still a very important economic sector as a per-
change in ownership and productive structure which occurred during the centage of GDP in Chile, representing 29.7 percent of GDP and an average
first eight years of Pinochet's regime - a circumstance that also extends of 30.7 percent between 1982 and 1989 - an average that remained almost
during the post-Pinochet democratic governments. However, this does not unaltered (30.2 percent) during the first year of the democratic govern-
mean that everything remained unchanged in the structure of power during ments (1990-3) (ibid.: 114). This was, however, a lower percentage than that
this period. Let us look at the main changes in this respect. reached in the period 1974-81 (32.3 percent) due to annual growth of only
5.1 percent (less than GDP), reflecting a cut in the volume of credits after
The deepening of the productive structure the crisis of 1981-3 (ibid.: 95).
As a consequence of the 1981-3 crisis the trade policy during this period Commerce registered 18 percent of GDP in 1989 and an average of
experienced a briefly more pragmatic character, which was expressed in 17.1 percent between 1982 and 1989, which with an annual growth of
an increase in tariffs from 10 percent (which had been in place since June 7.3 percent was higher than both GDP and the percentage observed in
1979) to 20 percent in March 1983, and then to 35 percent (with an aver- the period 1974-81 (16.1 percent) (Table 5.12). This means that in 1989
age of 24.4 percent annually) in September 1984, plus the implementation services and commerce represented together a significant 47.7 percent of
of new taxes on imports of cars and electronic items. This coincided with GDP in Chile, though it was more than 2 percent lower than that reached
a period of less influence from the Chicago Boys.9 Also at this time a pro- in 1981 for both sectors considered together (50.1 percent). However, if we
posal policy was launched to protect national industry, which had been add transport/telecommunication, which reached 6.4 percent of GDP in
severely affected by the crisis. Tariffs were increased when Luis Escobar was 1989 and an average of 5.7 percent for the years 1982-9, a little higher than
Minister of Finance in 1984 (Stallings 2001: 30). However, when a new era the average registered between 1974 and 1981 (5.3 percent) due to annual
of the Chicago Boys' aegis began in February 1985 and Hernan Biichi was growth of 9.2 percent, the highest rate of all sectors, we find that in 1989
appointed Minister of Finance, a unilateral trade liberalization policy was the tertiary sector of the economy represented 54.1 percent of the total
again implemented. Tariffs were reduced in March 1985 from 35 percent to GDP. This tendency is even greater during the first years of the democratic
30 percent and to 20 percent in June of the same year, and were eventually governments, reaching 54.2 percent and 55.2 percent in 1990 and 1993,
lowered to 15 percent in January 1988 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 88). Moreover, this respectively (ibid.: 144) (Table 5.12).
tendency toward the unilateral reduction of tariffs, far from being altered It is worthwhile acknowledging that the tertiary sector had progressively
by the post-Pinochet democratic governments, was increased in 1991 when increased since 1960 and has always represented more than 50 percent of
the Chilean Congress almost unanimously passed legislation that reduced the total GDP. In 1960 that percentage reached 50.3 percent, 51.1 percent
the plain tariff rate to 11 percent (Agosin 2001: 111). in 1970, 55.5 percent in 1980 and 54.3 percent in 1990 (ibid.: 143-4).

.
132 Tfte Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 133

a However, it is important to note that the type of tertiary sector that we


S found at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s is one in which the state
-. 1/5 00 tv csj only represents 15.9 percent of GNP, a far cry from the 39 percent reached
So i/j IT) i/j io NO in 1973 (ibid.: 140).
s.s Industry (including mining, electricity, gas and water), in turn, due to
annual growth of 6.2 percent, slightly below growth in GDP, represented a
significant 31.1 percent of GDP in 1989 and an average of 31.3 percent for
the years 1982-9, though somewhat less than that reached between 1973
* nC and 1981 (32 percent) (ibid.: 95). However, there is a decreasing tendency
M S Q
P. M. 0 H PO rNi of such rates in the 1990s when industry reached 30.6 percent in 1990 and
^ -^ tn
B i g3 un to io 30.1 percent in 1993 (Table 5.12).
cU a,
c Additionally, industrial exports doubled during this stage, reaching
c c t US$2.5 billion in 1980 or 9.5 percent of GDP as a direct consequence of
E II B the successful policy of redirecting the economy toward the export market
Big rather than domestic output (ibid.). This was also reflected in the increase
U3 M of the manufacturing industry, which grew slightly after the crisis of 1981-3
<FftJS from 18.3 percent in 1985 to 18.6 percent in 1990 (Table 5.13). Thereafter,
however, there is a clear decreasing tendency that passed from 18.3 percent
a M N ^ ^) M in 1991 to 16.0 percent in 2000.
3 l/l i/i VO N CO Furthermore, it is worthwhile noticing that, as has been shown by Agacino
6
4is E ft. (1996: 1), who analyzes the features and patterns of 26 manufacturing sec-
9 S Q tors in Chile between 1984 and 1994, the manufacturing industry in Chile
mostly focused on semi-elaborated raw products, for which added value is
8 relatively scarce.
& Q t<5 N Is 00 K
Q N O ON d ON
PO PO PN| PO N
O Table 5.13 Participation of manufacturing industry in GDP
c
(Chile, 1985-2000) (at constant prices of 1986, percentages) (1)
3
H H q q N Year Manufacturing industry as % GDP
NO v! oo NO IV
IS 1985 18.3
8a 1990 18.6
1991 18.3
3 1992 18.3
a
o 1993 18.5
3 ft. PO Ml NO H 1994 18.3
.5 3 CNI ^ -< d d 1995 18.0
c PO
o PO PO PO PO 1996 17.4
3 1997 17.2
ft :.; 1998 16.3
Ml 6A
n
1 U ::; 1999 16.1
>
rr. > 2000 16.0

, at
a:
I a:oI- Note: (1) It does not include aggregate value taxes and import duties but
>#i
*
lv 00N U 00O M
ON ON
includes imputed bank services changes.
ON ON ON ON ON Inner Elaborated by the author with data taken from ECLAC (1999 &
2001), The Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.
134 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 135

Finally, the construction sector, due to an expansion of 8.2 percent annu- The labor distribution in the agriculture, industry and construction sectors
ally, the second highest rate of all sectors, reached 5.8 percent of GDP in also expanded due to incentives given for the development of labor-intensive
1989, and an average of 5.5 percent for the years 1982-9, higher than the export activities (agriculture-forestry and industry) from 18.6 percent,
percentage registered between the years 1973 and 1981 (5.1 percent) - a 13.2 percent and 4.6 percent in 1985 to 19.4 percent, 15.6 percent and
tendency that was consolidated in the 1990s when it reached 6.2 percent in 6.9 percent in 1990, respectively.11 It is worthwhile noting that the indus-
1993 (Table 5.12). trial sector experienced an increase in jobs by 88 percent between 1983 and
The tertiary sector of the economy (service, commerce and transport/tele- 1989, revealing a recuperation from the crisis of 1981-3 (ibid.: 97).
communications) represented the highest percentage of the labor force in However, this was a tendency that only intensified in the industrial and
the 1980s (Table 5.14). Indeed, in 1985, 58 percent of the total labor force construction sectors in the 1990s, which reached 16.8 percent and 8.1 percent,
was employed in the tertiary sector, services (35.6 percent) being the most respectively, in 1993. Agriculture, instead, experienced a fall to 16.6 percent for
important sub-sector, followed by commerce (16.7 percent) and transport/ the same year. Finally, mining experienced a slight decrease from 2.2 percent
telecommunications (5.7 percent) (Mesa-Lago 2000: 155). in 1985 to 2 percent in 1990, and to 1.9 percent in 1993.
Five years later in 1990, their percentage of the labor market was still
The reshaping of power within the economic groups
high, though it had decreased to 54.3 percent as a consequence of the
fall in labor participation in the non-financial services (personal, social) The economic crisis of 1981-3 has been characterized as the 'most acute eco-
from 31.6 percent in 1985 to 26.6 percent in 1990 and despite the growth nomic recession in Chile since the 1930s' (ibid.: 66). To sense the scale of the
experienced by the labor force in financial services, commerce and trans- crisis, it is sufficient to observe the huge decline in GDP, which fell by 14.1
portation/telecommunications sector, which passed from 4 percent, percent and 15.5 percent per capita in 1982, and 0.7 percent and 2.4 percent,
16.7 percent and 5.7 percent in 1985 to 4.3 percent, 17.0 percent and respectively, in 1983; also open unemployment was 19.6 percent (26.1 per-
6.4 percent in 1990, respectively (ibid.). In 1993 the tertiary sector of the cent including Minimum Employment Program (PEM) and Programa de fefes
economy (service, commerce and transport/telecommunications) again deHogar (Programme for Heads of Family; POJH)) in 1982 and 26.4 percent
experienced an increase in the percentage of labor force employed, reach- (31.2 percent including PEM and POJH) in 1983 (Meller 1996:199). Therefore,
ing 56.6 percent thanks to the increase in transport/telecommunication, it is not exaggerating to affirm that the whole economic model would have
commerce and financial services, and despite the fall in non-financial been at risk during that time. However, the only year in which an economic
services (Table 5.14). crisis coincided with a real risk to political stability as a result of the so-called
'Protestas' (social protests) was 1983. Since then, although the 'Protestas' kept
going, the macro-economic indicators started improving.
Table 5.14 Participation of labor force in productivity activities (Chile, 1985-93) The 'shock' economic policies implemented since 1975 by the Chicago
Boys, which implied a radical financial and trade liberalization, unregulated
Year % labor force % labor force % labor force privatizations and (from 1979) a fixed exchange rate policy, had brought
employed in employed in employed in transport/
commerce telecommunications transitory economic growth between 1975 and 1981. This was known as the
service
'Chilean miracle', of which the main beneficiaries were Cruzat-Larrain's and
Non-financial Financial Vial's financial conglomerates. Even Pinochet himself, encouraged by the
1985 31.6 4.0 16.7 5.7 good economic results of the second half of the 1970s, famously declared
1990 26.6 4.3 17.0 6.4 that at the end of the 1980 'one among every five Chileans would have a
1993 24.7 5.8 18.6 7.1 television and one among every seven Chilean would have telephones and
cars' (Cavallo et al. 1997: 305).
Year % labor force % labor force % labor force % labor force However, the intransigent orthodoxy that characterized the governmen-
employed in employed in employed in employed in mining
tal economic team, particularly its insistence upon keeping untouched the
agriculture industry construction
fixed rate exchange policy, despite all the evidence in favor of changing it,
1985 18.6 13.2 4.6 2.2 contributed to the dramatic failure of the economy in 1982 (Meller 1996:
1990 19.4 15.6 6.9 2.0 198; Ffrench-Davis 1982; Arellano & Cortazar 1982; Zahler 1983).
1993 16.6 16.8 8.1 1.9
Moreover, a key explicative factor of the collapse of the financial sector,
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Mesa-Lago (2000: 155, Table 11.14). which eventually defined the magnitude of the crisis, was the closely
136 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 137

interwoven relationship between the ownership of productive enterprises and time headed by Hernan Biichi. However, Biichi applied a more pragmatic
that of financial institutions, particularly among those belonging to the largest economic policy, which implied keeping relatively higher tariffs in compari-
economic conglomerates. This, which had been a direct result of the unregu- son with the first phase of the 1970s, and also some special protectionist
lated process of privatization applied in the first phase of the implementation tariffs. He was eventually far more aggressive in bringing about a new stra-
of neo-liberalism in Chile, meant that a high percentage of financial loans tegic phase of redistribution of ownership through a process of privatization
were given by financial institutions to productive enterprises that were part of that extended between 1985 and 1989 (Huneeus 2001: 403).
the same economic groups. Added to this is the fact that either the loans were The total value of the enterprises privatized reached approximately US$3,600
not given with an adequate guaranty or they were excessively higher than a million.13 Eventually, the state's ownership was reduced from 24.1 percent of
reasonable ratio loan/capital. In 1982, for instance, the related loans repre- GDP in 1983 to 15.9 percent in 1988, a long way from the 39 percent of 1973
sented more than three times the capital of banks (Held & Jimenez 2001: 144; (Mesa-Lago 2000: 81).
Meller 1996: 208). The result was extremely high vulnerability for the whole It is worthwhile noting that although the enterprises privatized between
financial and productive system, whose critical situation was already notori- 1985 and 1990 were affected by stricter regulation and control of selling
ous by the end of 1981. At this point, Rolf Liiders, then a vice president of the prices than the privatization process that happened in the 1970s, in most
main bank belonging to the Vial Conglomerate (Banco Hipotecario), decided cases the result was a low selling price, which led to state capital losses
in accordance with Joaquin Vial to inform Segio de Castro, then Minister of equivalent to 37 percent - 56 percent of the real, potential value of the assets
Finance, of the critical situation that was affecting one of the main Chilean sold (ibid.: 82). Also, more diversified policies of privatization were promoted
economic conglomerates at that time. This was the definitive confirmation by the government. For instance, to avoid a concentration of property, the
that a huge economic crisis was imminent (Cavallo etal. 1997: 312). new wave of privatization asserted that 50 percent of the property of public
During the economic crisis the two dominant economic conglomerates - enterprises would be sold on the stock exchange; 23 percent by stock sales to
Cruzat-Larrain and Vial - collapsed, which, as well as producing dramatic workers in public enterprise; 18 percent by stock sales to Asociacidn de Fondos
economic and social consequences, also led to a modification of the power de Pensiones (Pensions Funds Associations; AFPs); and 9 percent by auctions
within the dominant class in Chile. In fact, between November 1981 and (Mesa-Lago 2000: 82). However, despite these policies a huge private concen-
December 1983, 14 banks and four financial institutions experienced tration of property of former public enterprises occurred, giving rise to a shift
intervention by the state, including the Banco de Chile, owned by Vial's group, in the economic power positions among the largest economic conglomerates
and the Banco Hipotecario, owned by Cruzat-Larrain's, the two largest private in Chile. Indeed, Fazio (1997: 101-259) has extensively documented that
banks in the nation at that time.12 This meant that the state took control of after the crash of Cruzat-Larrain's and Vial's economic groups during the debt
more than 60 percent of all the deposits in the financial markets and 69 per- crisis of 1981-3, and as a consequence of the privatization process that took
cent of the deposits in private funds (Mesa-Lago 2000: 66). However, since the place between 1984 and 1990, Angelini's, Luksic's, Matte's, Yuraseck's and
medium-term goal was always to re-privatize the system as soon as possible, Said's became the five new largest economic conglomerates in Chile.
the state had to absorb the losses of the private banking system - which have As we have seen, in 1966 the Angelini group was already the second larg-
been calculated as 35.2 percent of GNP (Held & Jimenez 2001:153) - to make est economic conglomerate in Chile. The head of the group was Anacleto
those institutions attractive to new private investors. Angelini (who died in 2007), an Italian immigrant who came to Chile after
Indeed, between 1984 and 1985, those enterprises intervened in by the the Second World War (1948) and who was a pioneer in developing the
state during the economic crisis of 1981-3, the so-called 'rare area' of the industry of fishing in Chile between 1953 and 1956, during the zenith of
economy, were re-privatized with a total value of US$1,100 million, rep- the ISI model (ibid.: 102). However, in 1978 Angelini's had been displaced
resenting 6 percent of GNP at that time (Meller 1996: 267). Additionally, to the fourth position by the Cruzat-Larrain and Vial groups. Up to the begin-
between 1985 and 1990 a new wave of privatizations, affecting those ning of the 1980s the Angelini group was mostly aligned with the fishing sec-
public enterprises that the government had previously kept in the public tor plus some lesser investments in forestry, tourism and insurance. The main
sector, was launched. The privatization program was directed at tradition- enterprises of the group were Indo and Eperva in the fishing sector, both with
ally state-owned enterprise in sectors such as steel, sugar, pharmaceuticals, assets of US$51,68 million and US$40,24 million, respectively, in 1978 (ibid.:
electricity, insurance, coal, energy and sanitation. The only exceptions were 104). However, an expansion of the group occurred in 1985 when it acquired,
copper (Corporation National del Cobre de Chile; CODELCO) and oil (Empresa as a consequence of the privatization process, 14 percent of the property of
National del Petrdleo; ENAP) (Mesa-Lago 2000: 81). This new wave of priva- Copec, one of the largest enterprises in the country. Since 1934, when Copec
tization reflected the recovery of hegemony by the Chicago Boys team, this was founded, it had been a company focused exclusively on the fuel business.
138 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 139

In 1976 it was privatized and acquired by Cruzat-Larrain's group. Since then concentration of ownership. Indeed, the majority of the property of the
Copec has expanded its activities to the forestry sector, controlling two of the Bank of Santiago had been distributed among a wide series of minor actors,
major enterprises of the sector (Celulosa Arauco and Constitution SA), and also through a financial mechanism highly subsidized by the state, known as
in fishing (Pesquera Guanaye) and coal (Cocar). As a consequence of the col- 'popular capitalism'. This was a mechanism through which the state sold
lapse of Cruzat-Larrain's group, Copec was temporarily acquired by the state stocks in those enterprises that belonged to the 'rare area' at lower prices
(passing to the so-called 'zona rara' (rare zone of the economy) through the than that of the market price, giving credit for 95 percent of the total value
Corfo, a state agency formerly in ctiarge of the management of public enter- of the operation with an interest rate equal to zero. Also, the workers - those
prises (ibid.: 107). This acquisition was deeply criticized at the time because it to whom the selling was directed - were allowed to get an anticipated
meant the selling of an important part of the property of Copec at only 71.4 payment of their lay-off compensation to acquire those stocks that, how-
percent of its real value. One of the main critics at that time was Alvaro Garcia, ever, ultimately were appropriated by the big conglomerates (Meller 1996:
who went on to become Minister of Economy in Frei's government (1996- 267; Fazio 1997: 143). Indeed, in 1995 - in the heart of the Concertatidn
2000) and also a minister in Lagos' Administration (2000-01) (ibid.: 107-8). governments - the Luksic group eventually acquired majority control of the
The criticisms highlight the fact that despite stricter regulations the origin of bank, revealing a tendency toward concentrations of wealth, seen in most
the new fortunes of the 1980s was also dramatically marked by a controversial of the privatized enterprises, which, at the end of the day, were financed to
process of privatization promoted by a new team of the Chicago Boys. a large extent by the state (Fazio 1997: 144).
Due to its new participation in Copec, the Angelini group became the larg- In third place within the largest conglomerates in the 1980s we find the
est economic conglomerate in the forestry sector, particularly in cellulose. Matte group. This is the oldest and most traditional economic group in Chile,
Finally, in 1987 the Angelini group took dominant control of Copec, becom- having already been in 1966 the largest economic group in the country.
ing the wealthiest economic conglomerate in the country. The head of the group is Eliodoro Matte Larrain, who succeeded his fattier
The second largest economic conglomerate in the 1980s was the Luksic Eliodoro Matte Ossa. The group has not been only economically powerful
group. This was headed by Andronico Luksic Abaroa (who died in 2005), but also politically and ideologically influential. One example is the Centro
the son of a Croat immigrant who started his fortune in 1950s as an inter- de Estudios Publicos (Centre of Public Studies; CEP), one of the most promi-
mediary of Ford cars in the north of Chile (Antofagasta) and then moved on nent liberal think tanks in public policies of the country, which is financed
to the mining sector (La Tercera, August 21, 2005). This group was already mostly by the group (Correa 2004: 28-9). Although, in 1978, the financial
the third largest in 1966 but had been displaced to sixth place in 1978, as conglomerates had displaced the Matte group to third place, it always main-
a consequence of being excluded from the first process of privatization due tained a privileged place among the largest fortunes in the country. The main
to a sense of political distrust that the first generations of the Chicago Boys business of the group has traditionally been the manufacturing of papers, in
felt against Andronico Luksic. This was due to the fact that during Salvador which its main enterprise is the holding of Compania Manufacturera de Papeles
Allende's regime, Andronico Luksic reached an agreement to sell part of the y Cartones, focusing on the forestry sector, particularly cellulose. Due to its
property of his enterprises to the state (Crav, Madeco, Carozzi, Refractarios conservative policy of indebtedness, and because it was focused on produc-
Lota Green, Cristalerias Chile, Campania Minera Chanaral Talal and Carbonifera tive and export sectors, the group was not greatly affected by the economic
Lota Schwager). For this, he was assumed to be a traitor by the Ctiicago Boys crisis of 1980-3 (Fazio 1997: 173). This, in turn, placed it in a solid position
(Fazio 1997: 136). During the 1980s, however, the Luksic group participated to take advantage of the new wave of privatization that was launched in
intensely in the privatization of the 'rare area' of the economy and in the 1985. This was, for instance, the case with the acquisition of Inforsa in 1986,
new wave of privatizations that took place between 1985 and 1990, which a paper company, which produced 54 percent of the paper for newspapers
allowed it to acquire a dominant position - a place it holds to this day. In at that time, which was assumed to be one of the greatest scandals within
the industrial sector, the Luksic group revived Madeco, a traditional copper the privatization process that year. Estrategia (1986, November 11, quoting
manufacturing enterprise, and acquired in 1986 the Campania de Cervecerias in ibid.: 182), a business newspaper, diplomatically asserted, '"lnfbrsa's opera-
Unidas, a beer and soft drinks company, which allowed the group to start tion" is one of the most curious acquisitions that has ever taken place in the
taking control of the Bank of Santiago because an important percentage of entrepreneurial sector in our country' (ibid.). With Inforsa, the Matte group
the property of that bank belonged to the Compania de Cervecerias Unidas. consolidated a monopolist position in the market, becoming the main pro-
The case of the Bank of Santiago is interesting because it reveals how a big ducer of paper in Chile (ibid.: 181).
conglomerate progressively took control of a bank which had been priva- Finally, we have the scandalous case of the Yurasek group, the fourth larg-
tized in a supposedly more regulated way by wanting to avoid an excessive est fortune in the country at that time and an economic conglomerate that
140 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 141

emerged exclusively from the privatization of the electrical sector, which and technicians) and waged workers in firms with fewer than five workers
took place between 1985 and 1990. The Yurasek group owes its name to (Table 5.15). The category of informal workers can be considered a legacy
Jose Yurasek, a formerly middle-ranking public employee appointed by of the neo-liberal model implemented by Pinochet's regime, a legacy that,
Pinochet in 1981 to privatize the Chilean electricity company owned by the although it has tended to decrease in the 1990s, still presented a rate that
state since the 1950s (Compania Chilena de Electricidad).u Yurasek, using soft covered one-third of the total EAP of Chile in 1998 (Table 5.15).
public credits, divided the company into three new enterprises: Chilectra Considering the same sub-categories that configure the informal workers
Metropolitana, which was in the origin of the Holding Enersis; the Chilectra class (domestic service, 'own account workers' (excluding professionals and
Quinta Region, which gave rise to the holding Chilquinta, another economic technicians) and waged workers in firms with fewer than five workers), we
conglomerate exclusively originating in the privatization process of the find a very similar result (37.9 percent) in 1990 from data taken from the
1980s, and Chilectra Generation (ibid.: 201). Yurasek took control of the 2005 Labour Overview, International Labour Organization (ILO), which
newly created Chilectra Metropolitana in 1987 and then formed the holding also shows an average of 42.8 percent for the whole Latin American region
Enersis in 1988, which became during the 1990s one of the most powerful (Table 5.16). However, what is more striking is the fact that in a longer
economic groups in Chile, especially after acquiring control of Endesa in series of statistics, such as those presented in Table 5.16, the informal work-
1995, a formerly national company of energy owned by the state since it was ers in Chile have increased in number rather than decreased during the
formed in the 1950s and until it was privatized to the Luksic group during post-Pinochet democratic governments, passing from 37.9 percent in 1990
the years 1985 to 1990 (ibid.: 203).15 to 38.8 percent in 2003 (see column 'Total' in Table 5.16).
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that these figures do not include those
The legacy of Pinochet's regime workers of the formal sector who are not covered by social security, thus
In 1990, at the end of more than 16 years of military dictatorship in which the percentage of informal workers should be even greater. Indeed, a second
the neo-liberal model was almost completely installed in Chile, the growing column in Table 5.16 (Total (1)), using an approximation of wage and sala-
number of informal workers was presented as the most relevant feature in ried workers within formal sectors without social protection coverage taken
the definitive process of the constitution of social classes that accompanied from Table 5.17, shows that the percentage of informal workers in Chile
the neo-liberal revolution (Table 5.15). jumped from 46.4 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2003.
Indeed, in a second seminal work Portes and Hoffman (2003: 56-7), with This indicates that the percentage of informal workers in Chile, which
data for the urban class structure, show that in 1990 the number of infor- had reached 26 percent in 1970, was far lower than the regional average
mal workers in Chile reached 37.5 percent, more than 10 percent higher at that time (60.3 percent), evolved in 33 years to become an increasingly
than the number recorded by Portes (1985: 22-3) in 1980. This percent- predominant social class, which is now very close to 50 percent of the total
age is greater than those registered for the same year in countries such as non-agricultural labor force, and also increasingly reaching up the regional
Costa Rica (32.2 percent) and Uruguay (36.2 percent), but lower than that average.
found in Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires, 40.3 percent). Informal workers As we have already seen in the previous section of this chapter, by 1983
include domestic service, 'own account workers' (excluding professionals this new constitution of class structure was already notorious in Chile's
social landscape. Furthermore, it was between 1983 and 1986 that the
supremacy of the informal class had for the first time a political - though
Table 5.15 Participation of informal workers in the EAP (Chile and other countries, very unarticulated - expression, which made this new reality clear for all
1990-8)
who wanted to see it. Indeed, on May 11, 1983 an improvised national
Year % informal workers in the EAP (percentage of urban class structure) demonstration against Pinochet - known as the 'Protesta' - organized by the
Confederation de Trabajadores del Cobre (Confederation of Copper Workers)
Chile Costa Rica Uruguay Brazil Argentina and unconvincingly supported by the political opposition was called in
1990 37.5 32.2 36.2 40.3 the country.16 The magnitude and violence that this social demonstration
1994 32.1 reached in the country was great, especially within shantytowns, which
1993 43.1 surprised all the formal protagonists: union leaders, traditional politicians
1997 44.1 of the opposition and the military government. In a way, it was the 'new
1998 30.8 30.8 37.7 40.1 society', mostly from the informal sector, that showed its most ugly face
witli a force ttiat almost everybody feared. In fact, it is clear that, particularly
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes and Hoffman (2003: 56-7, Table 3).
142 The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 143

(LI 3* TflWe 5.27 Wage and salaried workers with social protection coverage (Chile and
Latin America, 1990-2003) (percentages) (1)
I-C ON * NO PONO CN00 NO ON Year Informal sector Total
be 43 LO CN] ON 00 LOo LOON OLO 0P
0O
-* PO LO PO Total Domestic Small Formal Proxy (4)
3 "o 1 service establishments (2) sector (3)
1990 Chile 59.0 51.7 63.6 86.3 0.863 79.9
U t 1990 Total 29.2 17.6 34.7 80.6 0.806 66.6
00 PO Latin
I i O PO America (5)
1996 Chile 56.4 46.7 62.9 87.6 0.876 67.0
1995 Total 24.2 19.1 28.3 79.3 0.793 65.2
PO >*
C\l 1
LO o o Latin America
f2
f ' CU 1998 Chile (6) 51.0 44.6 54.0 86.0 0.86 77.4
LO LO a H
PO 1998 Total 26.9 20.4 29.9 79.0 0.79 65.9
o PN| ON LO NO O r-H CN NO S is Latin America
o
<N IV NrtOP0LO
II f2 PN| 2000 Chile 50.9 53.8 44.9 81.2 0.812 62.8
o CN PO CN PO MM r-j l i
ON NO LO NO LO NO LO NO LO 2000 Total N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
ON 3
a Latin America
2003 Chile 48.9 46.6 50.5 83.3 0.833 76.4
00 CO ON 00 I 2003 Total N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
6 a PO LO LO NO H q
CN -* c<i io H NO < Latin America
c
4C
u3 >%
B
V. (1) Affiliated to a social security system (public or private).
O T3o (2) Employed persons in establishments with a maximum of five workers.
-a (3) Includes the public sector and establishments with six or more employed persons.
c i
* CO ON r^ CN O
NO Iv
(4) Proxy of Wage and Salaried workers within Formal Sectors without social protection coverage:
43 IS (100 - Formal Sector)/100.
U LO LO LO NO (5) Data for Total Latin America taken from Labour Overview 2000, Latin American and the
Q3
I I Caribbean, 1LO (Table 8-A).
B of B 5 -S (6) Data from ibid.
s Source: Elaborated by the author with data extracted from Labour Overview 2005, Latin American
o O CN | and the Caribbean (First Semester Advanced Report), 1LO (Table 7-A).
D. a ar O
CNl CP
NN
1I 00
i-H P
PO MM nf
Nl ON * C
6 N CN| 1 ? of
o MM (N OJ 3 +Je.7
H n after the fourth 'Protesta' (August 10, 1983), in which 26 people were killed,
O Q the center-left political opposition began to understand that this calling for
open social demonstration was a risky opposition strategy and would lead to
P0 CN] NO <C 9ON <& 43 the hegemony of more leftist sectors (Serrano & Cava Ho 2006: 191; Oxhorn
NO IV ON' ST *t MC
f2 * LO 1995: 238-40). That also was the fear of the Reagan's administration, as was
recently shown by Morley and Mcgillion (2006).
00 M M IV NO O ON oq * cu O Alongside informality, we must take into account a weakly organized
00 00 NO
3
rv CN| P 0N*O P0 ** PO -* 00 tv I : workers sector. In fact, the rate of unionization in 1981 reached 12.1
PO **
0J aj PO * percent and decreased to 11.4 percent in 1989 (Table 5.18), far from
CMJ 3 T3
43 -n -a -c
43
-a M 43 the historical rate of 32 percent reached in 1973 (Campero 2000: 18).
u G8 uu S2u u So 0 D
( . ^^ C^M. I PMM, i Sinjra I i n -a Although, in 1990 the rate of unionization experienced an improvement,
.-. MJ s-i
< ._.
a _2 -3 <! reaching 13.4 percent, the tendency followed a decreasing pattern during
OOtSNONOnOOOO 3 ND the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, in absolute terms, despite the number
51 ONONJJONON^JONON O
O O
ONONONONONON NOts] o o ^
Nnf 0H of workers affiliated to unions growing from 395,955 people in 1981 to
ONI PN|
i^g

144 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 145

Table 5.18 Number of unions and rates of unionization (Chile, 1973-2004) Additionally, the number of strikes per year, which in 1973 had reached
2,050, dramatically declined to 89 in 1980 and 38 in 1984, only experienc-
Year Number Number % unionization % unionization % unionization
ing marginal improvement in 1989 when it reached 101. Thereafter, despite
of total of total on EAP on total workers of dependent
existing active (A/EAP) (1) (A/W) (2) workers a slight increase in 1990-2, the number of strikes tended to decrease from
unions unions (UDW/DW) (3) 1994 to 2004 (Table 5.19).
Finally, the number of workers involved in strikes, which had reached
1973 32 (*)
711,028 in 1973, fell to 29,730 in 1980 and to 17,900 in 1989. Thereafter,
1981 3,977 ** 12.1 (4) ** **
1982 4,048 ** 11.8 (4) ** ** the number of workers continues to decrease from 25,010 in 1990 to 13,013
1983 4,401 ** 9.9 (4) ** ** in 2004 (LABORSTA INTERNET, ILO 2007). In other words, by the end of the
1984 4,714 ** 10.2 (4) ** ** 1980s and during the 1990s and 2000s, it was increasingly clear that labor-
1985 4,994 ** 9.7 (4) ** ** type conflicts had lost their former relevant role in the struggle for better
1986 5,391 ** 10.0 10.8 12.3 social and economic distribution in the country.
1987 5,883 ** 10.6 11.4 12.9 This process of weakening unionization was eventually reflected in the
1988 6,446 ** 10.4 11.3 12.8
1989 7,118 ** 11.4 12.3 14.2 decrease in real wages, which were kept under the level of inflation and only
1990 8,861 13.4 14.6 16.6 began to recover in 1988-9 due to some government concessions at election
1994 12,109 7,891 12.9 13.8 15.6 time (Mesa-Lago 2000: 157 & 89).
1998 14,276 7,439 11.3 11.9 13.0 There was also a high rate of unemployment, which between 1982 and 1985
2000 14,724 7,659 11.1 11.7 12.5 reached over 20 percent, only improving in the last years of the decade. In fact,
2004 18,047 9,414 11.6 12.3 13.3 the highest rate of unemployment was reached in 1983 (31.3 percent). These
Campero (2000: 19 & 8).
**No information available in those years.
1. A/EAP: total affiliates to active unions [except for the years 1981-5, see below: (4)]/total EAP. Table 5.19 Number of strikes in Chile (1969-2004)
2. A/W: total affiliates to active unions [except for the years 1981-5, see below: (4)/lotal workers
covered within the EAP (dependent waged workers + domestic servant + own account workers. It Years Number of strikes
excludes employers).
3. UDW/DW: Total affiliates to unions of waged dependent workers/total dependent workers 1969 1,277
(dependent waged workers + domestic servant). 1970 1,819
4. Estimation on affiliates to total existing unions/total EAP; sources taken from Statistics N 1: 1971 2,696
Evolution of Unions and Affiliates 1981-2002, Statistics Compendium, Ministry of Labour, Chile 1972 3,325
(2005) and LABORSTA (2007: Table IA). 1973 2,050
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken Statistics Compendium, Ministry of Labour, 1980 89
Chile (2005).
1983 41
1984 38
1985 42
507,616 in 1989 (22 percent), that quantity was lower than the number 1986 41
of people affiliated to unions in 1973 (939,319) (ibid.: 19 & 8), and the 1987 81
1988 72
employed labor force proportion declined from 12 percent in 1980-5 to 1989 101
10.6 percent in 1986-9 (Mesa-Lago 2000: 90). 1990 176
Related to the decline in unionization rates is the low number of people 1992 247
who participated in collective bargaining during that period. Indeed, the per- 1994 196
centage fell from 11.3 percent of the total employed labor force in 1970-3 to 1998 121
3 percent in 1980-5, or 5.1 percent in 1986 (Mizala & Romaguera 2001: 222). 2000 125
In turn, despite an initial increase in the number of people who participated 2002 117
2004 125
in collective bargaining during the post-Pinochet democratic government,
which reached 7.6 percent in 1992, thereafter there is a decreasing tendency
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from
that reached 4.3 percent in 1998 (ibid.). LABORSTA INTERNET, ILO (2007: Table 9A).
146 The New Critique of Ideology 147

figures also consider workers employed by emergency programs (PEM and v


POJH) with salaries lower than the legal minimum (ibid.: 156). In the 1990s C3 5-
C M rH o LO m ro o O
B 62J .3o o\ oo LO r-v ^o <i rv t! 31
the rate of unemployment was 7.8 percent and reached 9.2 percent in 2000 -2P- fa c4 CO CN IO LO LO* *'
(Mizala & Romaguera 2001: 214). During the 2000s this rate experienced a .3 M. a, d <. . a
slight improvement in comparison to the year 2000, but was still high, at -^ c S >v M
MO
8.5 percent in 2003 and 8.8 percent in 2004 (Fazio 2005: 58). d- .3 O. w
Even more relevant, Agacino (1994: 13) also shows that the labor share
rf o * cr>
i i XH
in GDP was negative not only during the crisis years (1981-3), as would be t o -2 H boss-
P 00
expected, but also between 1987-92, 1990-2, 1987-93 and 1990-3, periods I *" <s oj
's 3 IT ^ NO IJO ?>j N o
of economic recovery (Tables 5.20 and 5.21). Indeed, during those years, O 43 3 TO -M ^N 00 tN ts fO H CN a
C MJ CM 52 <5 9 fO ro M tN N (<VI MJ
while GDP grew at an average of 7.6 percent, 7.2 percent, 7.4 percent
P .3 P. So
o
and 7 percent respectively, one of the highest percentages in the whole eco-
nomic history of Chile, the labor share in GDP was actually negative in each C3 CD
B ON IV Mf LO NO o
ua 5
period considered, which shows the regressive character of the economic
3 -O
LO NC LO LO NO 0-O>
N ^ boe
model implemented in Chile (ibid.). Mf Mf ** 3
The statement that the regressive character of the model is not merely a 2 >-
* B
transitory consequence of the economic crisis of the first half of the 1980s S 43 N
HON0H
0 t00
J ONO ON 2 2
is also shown by other series of indicators (Table 5.21). First of all, the Gini I
I I
co-efficient of income distribution for the Greater Santiago area reached 8 c
0.557 in the years 1982-6 (Larranaga 2001: 305). This index was predictably S.S c w o s<JJi
, .
worse than that registered in the period 1974-81 (0.513) due to the effects 2 8 G as
of the economic crisis of 1981-3, but also significantly worse than those 1 i d ra
3 o
registered in the periods pre-coup: 0.467 for the Allende administration (the CM O 00
s 3a 1 2
best ever distribution of income) and 0.498 for Frei M.'s government (see <9B Oo oOM
K <*" O.s/5
O 2 (9
o^
Table 5.21). However, what it is most striking is that the Gini co-efficient for
the years 1987-90, when economic growth had already recovered, is even ro LO PO NO
CM * ON ^ ON PNI 00
worse, reaching 0.570 (ibid.). In turn, during the first eight years of the new to CN
PO CN *' ON ON
democratic governments the Gini co-efficient tended to improve slightly, 33
reaching 0.525. However, thereafter, in the period 1999-2001 it rose again 3 '3
to 0.553. This last assessment is confirmed when one regards the variations act Iw
O OLO
in Gini co-efficient for the whole population of Chile during the years v CO
3
5 i-v
.3 c_
MaJ O
be 00 lv PO lv O LO
ON NO MM LO IV CN
Table 5.20 Labor share in the GDP (Chile) (percentages) 3 . LO LO LO J3 cc
X PU M
odd '5
Year Labor share in the GDP (%) (1) GDP
-1
Average 1987-92 -1.0 7.6 S
g 2O B0 ON IN N00rOON
r^ N ON* g
Average 1990-92 -1.2 7.2 LOr^LOtv LO LO LO LO o
" u a o d d d ci d
Average 1987-93 -0.4 7.4 , J 5 1
Average 1990-93 -0.2 7.0 3 V u g. 2 co
3 3 SM MM N
(1) Rate of the participation of remuneration in the GDP: Rate of O
NN
O PIV
O 00 00O OO
N O X)
-N
variation of average real wages minus rate of variation of average O
MN
M ON
r^
ON ON O N ON OCN
IN PO
productivity. I
* I
O 00 tv OO^LNIVOCNTNOOOMMO O
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Agacino NO IV 1^ 00 ON O
OOIVOOOOONONONONONONO O
ON ON ON ON ONONONONONONONONONONO N O
(1994: 13). MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMPNIMMPSI ,2M5 S
148 The New Critique of Ideology The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era 149

1992-2003 (see Table 5.21). Then, it is observed that income inequality has Table 5.22 Variations of GDP in Chilean governments (1960-2005)
definitely worsened, passing from 0.579 in 1990 to 0.592 in 2003.
Year GDP Chilean governments
Additionally, the distribution of household consumption of the lowest 20
percent of the population of Santiago, which had already experienced an 1960-1970 4.4 Alessandri/Frei M.'s governments
important fall from 7.7 percent in 1969 to 5.2 percent in 1978, eventually 1971-1973 1.2 Allende's government
reached 4.4 percent in 1988, a year in which GDP grew by 7.3 percent (Mesa- 1974-1981 3.0 Pinochet's regime: first period
Lago 2000: 142 & 160). It is worthwhile noting that the second and third 1982-1989 2.9 Pinochet's regime: second period
lowest quintiles also decreased their percentages of distribution of household 1990-1993 7.7 Aylwin's government
consumption between 1969, 1978 and 1988. The second lowest quintile fell 1994-1999 5.4 Frei R.-T.'s government
2000-2005 4.3 Lagos's government
from 11.7 percent (1969), 9.3 percent (1978) to 8.2 percent (1988), and the 1999-2003 2.5 Asian crisis
third lowest quintile fell from 15.6 percent (1969), 13.6 percent (1978) to 2004-2005 6.2 post-Asian crisis
12.7 percent (1988) (ibid.).
Finally, by 1987 (Table 5.21) the percentage of poverty and indigence Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Hrench-Davis (2005:
30-1), Tables 1 and 2.
reached 48.6 percent and 22.6 percent, respectively, of the total popula-
tion in Chile, also coinciding paradoxically with a year that showed high
absolute and per capita GDP rates, reaching 6.6 percent and 4.8 percent, figures far above those registered in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. It is
respectively, (Mesa-Lago 2000: 142 & 158). However, both rates of poverty worthwhile noting that the size of this category in Chile would be due to
and indigence for the whole population have dramatically decreased dur- the inclusion of a sub-category of middle dependent professionals as a part
ing the post-Pinochet democratic governments, signaling a feature of the of this social class, which would be better classified with the formal work-
Chilean model that, while maintaining economic growth (see Table 5.22), is ers rather than with the dominant class, but for which there is a lack of
able to reduce poverty but increase income inequality, as shown by the gap adequate statistical data.
between the poorest and the richest income quintile of population, which Furthermore, the 'petty entrepreneurs' class, that is, owners of firms
grew from 15.26 percent in the years 1991-8 to 17.48 percent for the years employing fewer than five workers plus self-employed professionals and
1999-2001 (see Table 5.21). technicians, reached in Chile 2.7 percent of the EAP in 1990, lower than
The reverse of the situation above pictured for the working class is pre- in Argentina in 1990 (6.4 percent), Uruguay in 1990 (5 percent) and Brazil
sented by the dominant class in Chile (Table 5.23). Indeed, Portes and in 1993 (3.3 percent) (ibid.). The phenomenon noted in the executive and
Hoffman (2003: 56-8) show that by 1990 the 'capitalist' class, that is, own- professional category also occurred with these petty entrepreneurs, which
ers of firms employing five or more workers, only reached 1.6 percent of the increased their percentage of national wealth during the 1990s in contrast
EAP in Chile, lower than the percentage registered for 1980 (2.4 percent), to what happened in the other countries analyzed (see Table 5.23).
though similar to those showed by Argentina in 1990 (1.6 percent) and If we take the two first classes together we see that in 1990 the dominant
Uruguay in 1990 (1.9 percent) (ibid.).17 This percentage remains essentially class in Chile reached 14.5 percent of the EAP (probably less than this
unaltered during the 1990s. Furthermore, it is worthwhile noticing that the because of the aforementioned factors), plus 2.7 percent of petty entrepre-
'real' capitalist dominant class would be even smaller than that shown by neurs, which resulted in 17.2 percent of the EAP - a percentage that reached
these percentages, due to the fact that owners of firms employing between 23.1 percent in 1994 and 25.8 percent in 1998. These results (corrected due
five and 20 workers are really small or medium entrepreneurs. However, to the factors already commented upon) approximately coincide with those
there is no data to distinguish these categories. figures that show that the highest 20 percent income population is the only
Additionally, we have to consider the salaried administrators, university quintile that experienced a constant growth in household consumption in
professionals and technicians in firms employing five or more workers, who the Greater Santiago area, from 44.5 percent in 1969 to 51 percent in 1978,
are labeled as 'professional/executives', a category which, despite not being and to 54.6 percent in 1988 (Table 5.24).
a proper capitalist class, is considered by Portes and Hoffman (ibid.) to be However, as expected, this household consumption is not evenly
part of the dominant class, reaching 12.9 percent of the EAP in Chile by distributed within the richest 20 percent of the population. Indeed, if we
1990, a greater percentage than those registered in Argentina in 1990 (6.9 look more precisely at the richest 10 percent of the population, a figure
percent), Uruguay in 1990 (5.1 percent) and Brazil in 1993 (4.6 percent). closer to the real dominant class in Chile, we find that it constantly
Furthermore, during the 1990s this percentage tended to increase, reaching increases its participation in the total income from 34.4 percent in 1968 to
Table 5.23 Participation of capitalist, professional-executive and petty entrepreneurs classes in the EAP (Chile, 1990-8)
Year % capitalist class in the EAP % professional and executives classes % entrepreneurs class in the EAP
in the EAP
Chile Argentina Uruguay Chile Argentina Uruguay Brazil Chile Argentina Uruguay Brazil
1990 1.6 1.6 1.9 12.9 6.9 5.1 2.7 6.4 5.0
1993 4.6 3.3
1994 1.5 15.4 6.2
1997 4.9 3.9
1998 1.6 1.4 1.7 17.0 6.9 6.5 7.2 5.6 5.9
Source: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Portes and Hoffman (2003: 56-8).

5' S NO O p;- o_ O" ' CJJ M


OGNONONONCNcococccrxooac^j^jaN O
>ONCNONONCNONCNONONCNONCNDNCNCNo
M M -
TO
CD B>'-M 2. J* OJOCCONrfMtsJOOC^JONNOMJONOOCNCCO
OM S" N O 3 NO SJ5' * C CD _r SL V* O 3. o x iC
N<: oo 3. M D*< n K* * *"
00 n 3 -< "(> CD C nD C Dn 3M3 3 2
MJ s: B O K , CD C 3 BJ ID E5* o* S 3. o 3. S 5 J 3
n s> 3" B ) "5 rt O ) "-< B J 'a N5O: 5 0.
rt> 3 o - TO
3 3. I* Q u o>3.- MTS NV. ~ CTM - o
I o "> Jj. O fll R B Q.
rM- O re CJ C ^_D a VI R ** C ON M-O
rj n a CSrq)i 3
Q. S )
_ " CD g N^JH rt C
(f 3 D o Or: ?,* t* Sr
3 4^
3. are ON 3- S v> c/i CDC ^D
T CD CDC M +- M M S
to o 5to 9 S,
o
J
O C D CD *
CD & t
S 3 X
=r O CD<* 3" B) -
r
M - n W on n N Ja 3 -s O M O 3- "3 a o o
a Cu i/>L^S 3- CDK> % M. a CD a 3
u s 3 4M S CD CD n 4J.JJ.JAJ-J4J.4J-4J.4J- 3 " B s
O O re
M. 31 n s 13 -" MMMMMM^C-HMMMM CJ-I ST 2. MT 5)
Ct M-. CD _;g Q S n n CD
KjloloONNONOlNObo i s
b 3. 3.-0 r,s a
3" 13 2 ^ 3 MJ K'S "
MM 5 CD a 3' M-i ^B OO ^J ON "cTi J> o' BT 3 3. 3 3 0
NO NO g 2 3 $ 9 3 Q ^M ^M M^ ^^ ^M ^M 3 I P 3- 3
3 8 8
*- -cCD c3 a u
1
N0
.
NO 3 3 S 3 C 3D^3SC O fi V 0 B)
NO ' or. CD CD t
o < Si 3 3. 3 3r* CD 3 CD (/: ft N NO 0C y s
1ft O S a ts)
vl 2 2. p-> 3 -
NO 3 3 a n q fl to to tN) MM 3
O 6 H 3. m NCXJ
n CD M-. "S 5 NO T B"
2 gB n cr C S. ON 4J- n o ON M M
H 3 N BD
! '.; fl
% => 3 3" 3* CD C
CD
D 5" = oo 5
M - 3. 53 S 3 ^ n- s
55 MMa
c3
n a CD 0 5C 3
CD r-r
O NiNOCD sn a NO'crq N) CD U N IM
3 I I I CD NO C
3 CO B)r+ M, 3 5 B-g NO K . o <.Q CDO B>
r-r .. C D p. "3
14 3 3
B) 3NOCrqCDc O ON O O Bj* P
a 3. NO SJ ^ S a
C n
j go
o MO vl n n #s E 3 9"
3 B) V. B) tNiC OC9- < 3. n crc S. 2 3- r MM of-M-j
a On 5 CD
x
~ C 3 CD M.<' CDCM-" O < tW>J O B! f O NO "s
2. C S C nDO- a o CD NO
C c S ff ts>- " CD o a 3 3 3
Cro CD c >t. 2
~ i a r? Si -M 3 O CD S 9 ^ N
CD C CDo _5 3 - VI)
3 1 3
n B> M-3 n S B ' S . 3" 3 In
,< 3 i l l
CD
152 The New Critique of Ideology

experienced an important decrease since 1987, at which point it was at 31


percent (Rosenthal 1996: 16).
6
The indicators above analyzed suggest that at the end of the military
regime the dominant class in Chile, despite seeming politically beaten
The D i s c o u r s e of Class Struggle
because Pinochet had been defeated by the Concertatidn - the new demo-
cratic coalition - in the Plebiscite of October 1988,'8 was actually (in
structural terms) by far the most powerful social class in Chile. In turn, the
formal proletariat, formerly, largest class in Chile, had ceded its place to a
far less organized class of informal workers, which, during the 1990s and
2000s, consolidated as the main feature of the social class structure in post-
Pinochet Chile.

Summary
This chapter corresponds to the second part of the first phase of the deep
After revising the ISI model existing in Chile before the coup of 1973, hermeneutic matrix (see Chapter 4). It traces the shift (marked by the 1973
Chapter 5 has reviewed the main structural features of the new Chilean coup) from a stage when the notion of class struggle was overtly present
political economy model implemented in the country between 1973 and in the political discourse of Chilean political elites - from the late 1950s
the post-Pinochet democratic period considered (1990-2006), focusing to September 11, 1973 - to the progressively extreme absence of such a
on the changes experienced by the structure of economic production, the discourse - from September 11, 1973 to March 1990. It includes an interpre-
evolution of the largest economic conglomerates, and the modifications of tative historical review of the discourse of the leadership of the main political
class structure and their impact on income inequality. The analysis of this forces of the Left, the Center and the Right, using the notion of the discourse
new political economy model has been divided into two periods: 1973-82 of class struggle as defined in Chapter 4, that is, one that explicitly acknowl-
and 1982 onward, the conclusion for both periods being similar and high- edges and encourages (by calling - politically-ideologically - for radical or
lighting: (a) the growing number of informal workers, (b) the weakening of revolutionary social and political transformations) primordial social antago-
the organized worker sector, (c) the increasing predominance of the domi- nisms, irrespective of whether or not those antagonisms correspond to a
nant class, and (d) the reaching and maintenance of high levels of income classic confrontation between working and capitalist classes.
inequality. The trajectory of the aforementioned discourse of class struggle since the
Furthermore, the transformation of class structure appears to be at the 1960s to 1990 will give rise to a discursive frame that is going to be at the root
bottom of a new peculiar feature of the political economy model analyzed: of the analysis of the discursive SSCs and MJ of the issue of income inequality
a relatively constant economic growth that cohabits with huge, and unre- in the context of a consensus reached on the political economic model in the
solved, income inequality. This 'growth with income inequality' factor, 1990s by the Chilean political elites, as presented in Chapter 7.1
which started to reveal itself in 1986 and consolidated in the 1990s and
2000s, despite a transitory decrease in growth due to the Asian crisis, will The discourse of class struggle in Chile pre-1973
become an undesirable circumstance for the consensus on the post-Pinochet
political economy model, which the discourse of Chilean political elites will During the period that extends from 1930 to 1973, a discourse that pro-
seek to deal with by deploying a series of modes of justification and strate- moted an inward-looking development became dominant among political
gies of symbolic constructions, as we will see in Chapter 7. However, before elites in Chile, marking a sharp contrast with the previous phase of outward-
reaching this stage, Chilean political elites faced a peculiar process of recon- looking development. For the political Right, which never totally ascribed
stitution of their former class struggle-type political discourse - a process to this model but ultimately accommodated it, it signaled the origin of its
signaled dramatically by the coup of 1973, as we will review in Chapter 6. nationalism; for the economic Right, the emergence of its social corporativ-
ism; for the Center and military, the base of their state corporativism; and
for the emergent parliamentary Left, the beginning of the phase of populism
(Salazar & Pinto 1999: 151).

153
154 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 155

It is worthwhile asserting that this discourse of inward-looking develop- workers is necessary. The evolutionary transformation through a democra-
ment that existed among Chilean political elites since the middle of the 1930s tic system is not possible because the dominant class is organized in armed
was preceded by a sense of awareness about the critical social situation - civil bodies and has set up its own dictatorship to keep the workers in misery
the so-called 'social crisis' - faced by Chile during the first decades of the and ignorance, and to impede their emancipation. (Jobet 1971: 79-80)
twentieth century and the disruptive risks created by such a crisis. The 'social
crisis', which marked the eruption of the popular and working classes onto Finally, the Chilean Communist Party (ChCP) clearly asserts in its opening
the social and political landscape, was the context in which political elites statement that:
started to deploy some discursive categories that resembled the notion of
class struggle.2 These new discursive categories were an attempt to provide The Communist Party of Chile, the party of the working class and mostly
a more accurate description of this increasing process of social convulsion, composed of workers, fights for the achievement of the total political
a social process that had a deep impact upon a bewildered elite accustomed and economic independence of Chile ... and works to put an end to
to living in a more predictable environment, such as that provided by the slavery and exploitation of the international capital and indigenous
nineteenth-century oligarchic Chilean society (Petras 1969: 79-97). bourgeoisie. (Partido Comunista de Chile 192-: 3)
Hector Rodriguez de la Sotta, then president of the Conservative Party, the
more traditional party of the Right until its dissolution in 1966, warned in However, although such recognition of 'the rebellion of the masses' was due
a statement made during the convention of the Chilean Conservative Party to the huge impact caused by the social crisis within the political elite in the
in 1932 that: early 1900s, it would be misleading to assume that this meant the immediate
launch of an explicit discourse of class struggle in Chile, which still had to
[ljn this tragic hour [due to] the tragic experience of the Soviet Union, the wait some decades to emerge. Indeed, after some politically unstable years,
disruptive factor is none other than the rebellion of the masses. (Rodriguez following the setting up of a new more liberal Constitution in 1925, which
de la Sotta 1932, quoted in Salazar & Pinto 1999: 227, emphasis added included the short-term experience of a 'Socialist Republic' in June 1932,
by the author) Chilean political elites seemed to center their political activity around the
inward-looking development modernization project, which after the severe
Also, an official declaration emanated from the tenth convention of the economic crisis of the 1930s was assumed, though occasionally reluctantly
Radical Party (RP) - the largest Center party in Chile from 1939 to 1964 - by some sectors of the Right, to be the dominant paradigm to work within.
which took place in Santiago in 1931, stating: Furthermore, the radical discourse deployed by the Left in the 1910s, 1920s
and beginning of the 1930s, which was deeply influenced by the Soviet rev-
The class struggle being a reality, the Radical Party, in front of this strug-
olution and the Third International in the case of the ChCP, or the impact of
gle, is in favor of the waged earners that intend the attainment of the
the economic crisis, the anarchic political situation and the increasing mass
social rights that would end this struggle [...]. (Palma 1967: 175)
mobilization in the case of those socialist groups that would later create the
From the Left, the very recently created Chilean Socialist Party (ChSP) ChSP, which often openly proclaimed a socialist revolution of 'workers and
peasants' that would replace the capitalist system (Altamirano 1977: 15),
emphatically declared in its principle statement that:
was progressively abandoned. Instead, from 1935 the Left adopted a wider
[it] adheres to Marxism as a method of interpretation of reality ... recog- alliance type of political strategy based on a project of state corporativism.
nizes the class struggle; and supports the instauration of the dictatorship The Frente Popular (Popular Front), the political coalition formed by the
of the organized workers. (Altamirano 1977: 16) Socialist, Communist and Radical Parties that took power in 1938 alongside
President Pedro Aguirre Cerda, far from being a proletarian-peasant class
Moreover, the statement of principle of the Socialist Party also establishes organization, was rather a Center-Left coalition in the same way that the
that: popular fronts formed in Europe against the rise of Fascism, which included
an important representation of middle-class sectors, and whose main aim
The current economic capitalist organization divides humanity into was the promotion of bourgeoisie-democratic transformations, as well as a
two classes, each day more defined: one that has acquired the means of plan of national industrialization for the country (Petras 1969: 160).
production ... and the other that works and produces ... During the process However, the end of the Popular Front, first due to the fact that members
of the total transformation of the system a dictatorship over the organized of the ChSP left the coalition in 1941 and then by the proscription of the
156 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 157

ChCP from legal political activity in 1948, marked the beginning of the This statement made by Angell, however, must be qualified with the experi-
end of class collaboration type politics in Chile. Since 1958, after the inter- ence of tfie 'Cordones Industriales', a somewhat 'Soviet' council of workers
regnum of a populist experience headed by the former dictator General developed in the last year (1973) of the Unity Popular government without
Carlos Ibanez del Campo, who won the election of 1952 with the promise- the explicit approval of most of its political leaders. In fact, according to
unfulfilled - of sweeping up corrupt political parties, there began in Chile Gaudichaud (2004) and Silva (1999), it is clear that workers who participated
what has been known as the 'three thirds' style of politics, that is, a quasi- in these councils presented a more advanced 'revolutionary consciousness',
political electoral equilibrium between the Left, the Center and the Right, to use Angel's expression.
that extended until 1973 (Garreton 1983: 42-4).
In 1956 the Left formed a strong political alliance - the Frente de Action The socialists: the 'most revolutionary' party
Popular (Popular Action Front) - which included the ChSP and ChCP - a coa- The ChSP is probably the political force that most clearly expressed this new
lition that almost allowed them a victory in the election of 1958. However, stage of the overabundance of the discourse of class struggle in Chilean poli-
it was not until 1970 that under the umbrella of a new wider coalition - the tics before the coup. Indeed, the ChSP, despite always showing a very hetero-
Unidad Popular (PU) - including the RP, the Left finally elected Salvador dox appropriation of classic Marxism, from the very beginning adopted the
Allende as the first Marxist president in the history of the country. class struggle as an orientating principle for its policies (Jobet 1971: 79).
The Christian Democrat Party (CDP), the party that became the new Furthermore, even when, by renouncing its initial popular-revolutionary
political force of the Center at the end of the 1950s, elected Eduardo Frei orientation it adhered to the policy of the Popular Front promoted by both
Montalva as president in 1964. Even the Right was able to elect Jorge the ChCP and RP since 1936, it did so reluctantly, which was traduced in
Alessandri as president in 1958 and thereafter, despite the crisis that affected a permanent tension between its 'revolutionary' bases and its increasingly
their former traditional parties (conservative and liberal) in 1965, managed bureaucratic leaderships. The resignation of Marmaduque Grove - one of the
to set up a new political party - The National Party - which decisively influ- historical founders of the ChSP, who incarnated in 1938 a discourse of class
enced the increasingly political polarization of the period between 1966 and struggle that explicitly sought to found a socialist society (ibid.: 52-78) -
September 1973. from his pre-candidacy for the presidency election of 1938, in favor of
However, the politics of the 'three thirds' was not only the name given to the unity of the Popular Front, as well as the participation of some ChSP
the rejection of a conciliatory policy alliance either from the Left-Center or members in the first 'Popular Front' reformist government of Pedro Aguirre
from the Right-Center coalitions but was also an expression of the shortcom- Cerda were both hurtful decisions for the more pro-orientated revolution-
ings of the inward-looking development paradigm that had been revealed ary socialists. These formed a group that, some years later, would lead the
as unable to provide economic development to the country. Therefore, the ChSP to a small excision in 1940, and then would force the party to leave
political logic followed since 1958 (from right-wing to left-wing govern- the coalition of the Popular Front in the parliamentary election of 1941,
ments) resulted in frustrated attempts to resolve within the liberal legal though not the government. The period between 1941 and 1946 repre-
framework provided by the Constitution of 1925 the deficiencies of a model sented for the ChSP a time of political crisis and ideological confusion that
of development that demanded high participation by the state. This condi- was only partially resolved in 1946, when a new party congress elected Raul
tion added to the political isolationism to which each government fell as Ampuero as its party leader with the mission to shift to a more Marxist and
a result of the trapping of the 'three thirds' politics and was the context popular political approach. Raul Ampuero was then a young socialist, who
for the successive failure of those projects headed by the Right, the Center appeared at that time to be the only one able to save the party on the basis
and the Left. Furthermore, it set the stage for the incremental development of fidelity to Marxist and revolutionary principles (ibid.: 54). However, very
of a discourse of class struggle, which political elites practiced increasingly soon the internal tensions of the ChSP re-emerged, giving rise to a more
during those years. It is worthwhile noticing that this exacerbation of the important excision in 1948, which was motivated by the decision of the
discourse of class struggle was mainly restricted to the leadership of political reformist government of Gonzalez Videla to pass a law that proscribed the
parties, contrasting sharply as it did with the discourse used by the unionists ChCP from legal political activity. However, it was really the year 1957 that
who, as has been emphasized by Alan Angell (1972: 146-7), marked an inflection point toward a more class-struggle-orientated discourse
for a faction of socialists who had supported and were part of the populist
government of Carlos Ibanez del Campo. In fact, the majority of socialists
[d]id not develop a level of revolutionary consciousness such that they
grouped in the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) supported Ibanez in the elec-
overwhelmingly favored a mass general strike and recourses to arm to
tion of 1952 and were part of his government alongside three ministers
overthrow the political system. (Ibid.)
158 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 159

(Clodomiro Almeyda, Carlos Altamirano and Felipe Herrera), but after one insisted on deploying a political discourse in which - as Carlos Altamirano's
year when they realized that Ibanez would not carry out reforms, such as political statement during the twenty-third congress of the ChSP in 1971
nationalization, agrarian reform and democratization of the state, they left reveals - the contradiction between 'the increasing power of the mass and
the government, deeply disappointed (Furci 1984: 67). After such a sad the power of the bourgeoisie' was acknowledged without any ambiguity
political experience, the ChSP once again gained unity in the 'party congress (Casanueva & Fernandez 1973: 240). This gave rise, as has been suggested by
of unification' in 1957 and the class struggle was proclaimed the central Pollack and Rosenkranz (1980: 10), to the advocacy of the thesis of a 'quasi-
principle of its politics, as the final statement of the congress asserted: inevitability of armed struggle to gain access to power in Chile' (ibid.).
Furthermore, this somewhat schizophrenic political behavior by the leader-
The socialist unification opens a new stage in the development of social- ship of ChSP, which, on the one hand, fully participated in and defended the
ism in Chile, in the constitution [of the ChSP] as a revolutionary move- institutional 'bourgeois' framework and, on the other, discursively promoted
ment, putting an end to any dualism of political principles, as well as it a radical crush of the formal political system, may also explain the promo-
strengthens the position of vanguard of the popular class in the struggle tion of two incongruent proposals. Firstly, that 'only the mobilization of the
with the proprietary class and against imperialism, for the overthrowing masses, apart from any bourgeois paternalism, can make possible the radical
of the capitalist regime. (Final Statement of the Socialist Party Congress transformation of our economy', as Altamirano - the leader of ttie ChSP at
of Unification 1957, reproduced in Jobet 1971: 33) that time - asserted in a political statement during the twenty-third congress
of the ChSP in 1971 (Casanueva & Fernandez 1973: 241). And, second, that
It is worth noting, however, that already from the sixteenth congress of the a reactionary coup d'etat would be the inevitable result of such a mobilization
Socialist Party, which took place in October-November 1955, the thesis of of the masses. Curiously - and tragically - the awareness that a coup was
a 'Front of Class' that promotes a proletariat-autonomous type of politics coming was reiteratively expressed by different socialist leaders with pro-
in direct confrontation with the bourgeoisie had begun to gain ground portional intensity to its actual occurrence (Almeyda 1967). It was as if the
(Casanueva & Fernandez 1973: 187). Thereafter, the ChSP adopted a political socialists desired to show themselves to be as the most revolutionary among
rhetoric in which the notion of class struggle was not only central but also leftist forces, especially after the tough competition presented by ultra-leftist
increasingly associated with the inevitability of revolutionary violence as the groups, such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left
only way to take power. Raul Ampuero, for instance, explicitly recognized in Movement; MIR). The MIR was a political organization set up in 1965 by a
1955 that 'the Left should have worked within democratic rules, and at the group of young ex-socialists and ex-communists, plus some old Troskyist
same time for an armed insurrection' (Furci 1984: 69; Pollack & Rosenkranz unionist leaders, who, disappointed with the reformist route followed by the
1980: 1-2). The zenith of such rhetoric took place in the twenty-second traditional Left, proclaimed a revolutionary Castroist-inspired type of strug-
congress of the ChSP in 1967 when, as well as reaffirming the policy of the gle (Naranjo et al. 2004; Garcia Naranjo 1997: 21-218). Faced by this 'revo-
'front of workers', meaning 'the unity of proletarians, peasants and poor lutionary competition' coming from the MIR, the leadership of the ChSP
middle classes under the direction of the proletariat', it asserted that: incongruously proclaimed that a violent revolution was the only way ahead
and at the same time explicitly ignored their own material incapacity to sup-
[r]evolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate ... being the only port an armed struggle. In other words, socialist leaders negligently decided
way to take political and economic power ... [asj the pacific or legal to ignore that this material incapacity to conduct an army revolution that
forms of struggles (economic, ideological, electoral, and so on) do not affect their party should have been seriously taken into account to avoid
lead by themselves to power. (Majority Statement of the Twenty-Second making vociferous proclamations of a discourse of class struggle - a mistake
Congress of the ChSP, quoted in Jobet 1971: 130) for which they would dolorously pay with their own blood.

It is worthwhile mentioning, however, that such a discursive policy of class The communists: a conservative proletarian party
struggle was no less often in contradiction with the political practice followed The ChCP has a rather different history. As a party strongly influenced
by the ChSP during the subsequent years, which, inserted in a new political by the directives of the Third International since 1922, it historically
coalition called the PU, ultimately accepted an alliance with the 'bourgeois' assumed different political ideological phases: 'bolshevization' (1923-4),
RP and the centrality of the electoral struggle and institutional framework 'anti-colonialism' (1925-7) and 'class against class' policies (1928-33) (Kriegal
that came about as a result of the victory of Allende in 1970. Nonetheless, this 1968: 178).3 During those phases the notion of class struggle was associ-
political pragmatism was no obstacle for the leadership of the ChSP, which ated with the idea that only a violent workers' and peasant uprising could
160 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 161

bring about a revolutionary process. However, thereafter the ChCP rapidly formulation of a 'peaceful road' by the Left that would later lead to the
assumed a policy of a Popular Front, in which the predominant feature in triumph of the PU coalition in 1970. This does not mean, however, that
this respect was that of class collaboration. Coincidently, as Furci (1984: since the mid-1950s a much clearer statement in favor of a class-struggle-
28-1) and (Ravines 1957) have asserted, the policies of the Popular Front orientated policy was asserted in the ChCP, proclaiming that only if the
were adopted by the ChCP after this orientation was set up in the seventh working classes acted in concert in their struggle against 'imperialism and
congress of the Communist International in 1935 - a well-documented his- oligarchy' would a victory for the people result (Gonzalez 1958: 76-7).
tory despite the opposing opinion held by Corvalan (1978: 61-2). In the context of this book this point is crucial. Indeed, it has been com-
Furthermore, from 1935 to 1957 the official endeavor pursued by the ChCP mon among scholars to emphasize the dispute between communists and
was the setting up of 'a broad alliance with the participation of: workers in socialists about the definitive character of the program and the types of polit-
industry and on the land, the peasants, the intellectuals, the middle class ical alliance of the Frente de Action Popular (Popular Action Front; FRAP) - the
and the national bourgeoisie' (Montes 1971: 83, quoted in Furci 1984: 34). new alliance of the Left set up in 1956. The FRAP was founded on March 1,
The pursuit of a Center-Left alliance came to obliterate the centrality of a dis- 1956 by the ChCP, the Popular Socialist Party, the Socialist Party of Chile, the
course of class struggle in the political strategy of the ChCP - a circumstance Democratic Party of the People, the Democratic Party and the Labour Party
that coincided with a period in which the ChCP exerted a broader political (Furci 1984: 69). While the ChCP defended the democratic character of the
appeal that attracted many middle-class intellectuals to the party. However, present political endeavor and a broader alliance which included some sec-
the tensions of an emergent Cold War, traduced in the evident compulsion tors of the bourgeoisie, the ChSP advocated the immediate socialist character
exercised by the government of the USA on the third consecutive president of of the Chilean process and the rejection of any alliance that would include
the popular front coalition headed by the member of the RP Gabriel Gonzalez the bourgeoisie sector (ibid.: 70-4; Pollack & Rosenkranz 1980: 2). However,
Videla, President of Chile from 1946 to 1952 (Reyes Alvarez 1989), to exclude apart from those programmatic differences, the significant point to take into
communists from the government, ultimately meant the passing of the Ley de account - often overlooked by the scholarly dispute in the field - is that
Defensa de la Democracia (law of protection for democracy) and the subsequent both parties coincided in the promotion of a political revolutionary process
banning of the ChCP from the political sphere (Furci 1984: 38-9; Halperin exclusively commanded by the working class against national oligarchy and
1965: 54-5). This gave rise not only to the second underground period for the international imperialism, the specific form that the discourse of class strug-
ChCP (1948-58), but also to a significant reformulation of its political strategy gle expressed in Chile during those years.
(Furci 1984: 43-62) - a process that started with an acknowledgment of the Furthermore, it is clear that the ChCP was fiercely opposed to both the
misguided nature of the Popular Front policy, as Galo Gonzalez, ChCP leader Chinese theory of the 'two legs', which advocated that a revolutionary party
at the time, asserted: should be prepared for the peaceful road and simultaneously for an armed
confrontation (Cerda 1972: 111-25), and to the generalization of the Cuban
The problem was that we had illusions about the bourgeoisie, and we guerrilla strategy for Latin America, a common debate during the 1960s
did not manage to transform the working classes into a hegemonic com- among Chilean leftists. However, this dispute never really meant a rejec-
ponent of that popular movement. (Gonzalez 1971: 94, quoted in Furci tion of the discourse of class-struggle type of politics already professed by
1984: 54) the Chilean communists during those years. On the contrary, it implied the
framing of that debate in the so-called 'pacific road' in order to win politi-
The new policy was passed following the 'emergency' program (1950): the cal power precisely because of the fear - and thus the recognition - of the
Frente de Liberation National (National Liberation Front) (1952) and the potentiality of the counter class reaction. Luis Corvalan, for instance, then
revolution anti-imperialista, anti-feudal y anti-oligdrquica (anti-imperialist, the leader of the ChCP, unambiguously declared,
anti-feudal and anti-oligarchic revolution) (1956). It is worth noting that
in contrast to the ChSP all of these directives made an explicit rejec- The policies of the party, now and forever, are based on struggle and mass
tion of a violent way of accessing power. In fact, the violent or armed mobilization ... our strategy is revolutionary, and the fact that we are in
method of accessing power was first defeated in the ChCP by the favor of the peaceful road does not mean that we are passive, reformist,
expulsion of Luis Reinoso and other militants in 1950, who practiced legalistic or that we are in favor of class reconciliation. (Corvalan 1961:
such a policy during a brief period between 1948 and 1950, and then 33, quoted in Furci 1984: 86)
when the pacific route of the Frente de Liberation Nacional was officially
adopted in 1956 (Furci 1984: 56). This rejection of violent or armed Notwithstanding, after a new defeat of the Left in 1964, the strategy of the
methods of accessing power by the ChCP was actually the outset of the ChCP tended to stress the necessity of a broader political coalition, which
162 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 163

included bourgeoisie sectors, particularly those represented by the RP and victory that ultimately defines the correction of a political strategy and not
some leftist sectors of the CDP, which ultimately led the ChCP and ChSP the other way round. It is this somewhat bewildering sensation that is at the
to set up the PU - a coalition that included the RP and the Movimiento de bottom of the particular route of reconstruction of political discourse that
Action Popular Unitaria (Agrarian Popular Unitary Movement; MAPU) (Furci followed the ChCP after the coup, which marked the actual defeat of ChCP
1984:113; Corvalan 1965). However, it would be misleading to interpret this strategy - an awareness that would lead the younger generation of leaders
emphasis of broad alliance policies promoted by the ChCP as a new version of the party to question the accuracy of the policy conducted by the 'old
of a class collaboration as that represented by the Popular Front in the late leadership' during the PU, as we will see later in this chapter.
1930s - an interpretation that was common among Chilean Left intellectu-
als during the 1960s (see, for instance, Faletto & Ruiz 1970: 249). On the The dilemma of the Christian Democrat Party
contrary, and despite all the tensions that increasingly divided the Allende As well as the parties of the Left, the actuality of the discourse of class strug-
government, the discourse of the ChCP was based on a realistic strategy that gle in the Chilean political arena since the 1960s can also be observed along-
stressed the fact that class struggle was already present in the country. This side the trajectory followed by the new political force of the Center: the CDP.
does not mean to negate the explicit and common disputes between those Indeed, the CDP, which emerged in 1957, was permanently marked, from
headed by the ChCP and those who wanted to 'consolidate that already its very outset, by an ideological tension that not only helped to forge its
gained', in other words: 'to put the accent in defense of the popular govern- political identity but also gave rise to a very attractive political appeal, during
ment, in its preservation and in the continuity of its achievement' (Millas a time in which many acknowledged the social revolution as an inevitable
1972, quoted in Castells 1974: 237), and those led by the ChSP, who asserted outcome as well as afraid of uncertainties that would lead from it.
the notion of 'advancing without transaction', meaning that, 'in order to The origin of the CDP can be found in a group of young Catholic uni-
destroy the legal and class based foundation of a bourgeoisie society, the versity students whose main leaders were Eduardo Frei Montalva, Radomiro
main obstacles to the development of the revolutionary process, it is first Tomic, Bernardo Leighton, Rafael Agustin Gumucio and Manuel Garreton.
necessary to destroy its support base' (Carlos Altamirano, interview in Corghi They were deeply influenced by the new developments in Catholic social
& Fini 1973: 62, quoted in Furci 1984: 128). The point, however, is to stress thinking, particularly by the influxes provided by the encyclicals of Popes
that such disputes were really more on the tactical level rather than on an Leo XIII and Pius XI as well as the writings of the French Catholic philoso-
epistemological interpretation of reality. In other words and to put it in a pher Jacques Maritain (Fleet 1985: 44).6 Despite its origin as a youth branch
nutshell, faced by the reality of class struggle, Chilean communists con- of the Conservative Party, the group clearly distanced itself from rightist and
vinced themselves that it was better to avoid, as much as possible, rhetori- leftist political options, and it became very soon clear, after it formed a new
cally over-proclaiming it, as - they assumed - the ChSP normally did.4 political group called the Falange National in 1938, that a tension between
In other words, the, at first glance, naive ChCP directive: 'no a la guerra those who openly called for a much decisive alignment with the Left headed
civil' (no to the civil war), asserted in the most bitter period of class con- by Bernardo Leighton and those who wanted to preserve a centrist position,
frontation (Corvalan 1973: 126-43), far from revealing a class collaboration led by Radomiro Tomic, was to be a central feature of this new political
attitude, might be considered the most radical awareness of the danger of movement. Indeed, Bernardo Leighton, as the president of La Falange in
promoting further class confrontation without having the material means 1945, led the organization to leave the somewhat right-wing 'center-left'
to succeed. government of Jose Antonio Rios, a member of the RP and president of Chile
However, this sense of 'conservatism' which characterized the ChCP's from 1942 to 1946 (Reyes Alvarez 1989), and to join the Left opposition party.
interpretation of the political scenario that faced the PU government at that Furthermore, Leighton clearly asserted that 'in the struggle between the capi-
time would become later, after the coup, a somewhat puzzling sensation talist and the proletarian, we must be with the proletarian' (Leighton 1945:
based on two contradictory facts. On the one hand, the conviction expressed 4, quoted in Fleet 1985: 50). Radomiro Tomic, in turn, defeated Leighton in
by ChCP leaders that the policy orientation followed by the ChCP during the the party presidency race of La Falange in 1946 and induced the movement
PU was in fact formally right, that is, if the others - the ultra-leftist members to support the Conservative Eduardo Cruz Coke in the presidential election
of the MIR, a faction of the MAPU and the leadership of ChSP - followed of 1946 (Fleet 1985: 50).
ChCP's self-assumed more mature revolutionary political behavior, the The Leighton - Tomic dispute was the first of many that permanently
coup, as well as the tragedy it brought, could have been averted.s And, on marked the Falange and years later the CDP, which can be read as a sense of
the other hand, in the less explicit assertion that for true revolutionaries - incommodity of their leaders to deal with what for all of them was assumed
as Chilean communists have always considered themselves to be - it is the to be an inescapable reality: the presence of the 'sin of exploitation of man
164 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 165

by man' as Leighton has explicitly termed it (ibid. 1945: 4, quoted in Fleet supporting Frei's more pragmatic and technocratic policy orientation,
1985: 50).7 'rebeldes', led by Senator Rafael Gumucio and Deputies Alberto Jerez, Julio
Furthermore, this was not a mere dispute on a matter of political alliance Silva Solar and Vicente Sota, and 'terceristas', led by Deputy Bosco Parra and
but a much deeper debate on the necessity of transforming the Falange into a Jacques Chonchol. Petras (1967: 12-15) prefers the term 'corporativists'
political party that would be able to offer an alternative to capitalism, based rather than 'oficialistas', to refer to the older Democratic Party leaders and
on a communitarian form of socialism, with theoretical roots in the works agrarian laborists, as well as 'populists' rather than 'terceristas', to emphasize
of thinkers like Louis Joseph Lebret, Emmanuel Mounier and even Karl that they defended the idea of social promotion and were located mainly in
Marx himself, and whose main advocators were Julio Silva Solar and Jacques the trade unions, particularly peasant unions.
Chonchol. The two key texts in this debate were Silva Solar and Francosi 'Rebeldes' and 'terceristas' pressed for a more doctrinaire government ori-
(1948), {Que: es el Socialcristianismo? and Silva Solar and Chonchol (1951), entation that promoted the idea of a communitarian society and sought to
Hacia un Mundo Comunitario. Also it is important to consider the essential accelerate the structural reforms, particularly the agrarian reform, which
text: Castillo Velasco (1963), Las Fuentes de la Democracia Cristiana? was one of the main political proposals of the Christian Democrat project
The social Christianism of Silva Solar and Chonchol, who decisively called 'Revolution in Freedom' (Fleet 1985: 98; Kaufman 1972: 79). Although
for 'an abolition of the private ownership of productions', was not an isolated the CDP congress agreed to a compromise solution, the debate increased
doctrinaire deviation within the Falange, but a well-rooted background of in dimension the following year when a group of CDP leaders approved a
the peculiarity of this new political movement of the Center whose influence draft for a 'non-capitalist development program' that openly called for a
would reach even to the foundation of the CDP. The internal statutes of the development that undercut capitalist structure. The 'non-capitalist devel-
CDP consecrated the struggle to implement a communitarian society, as has opment program', for instance, proposed a division of the economy into
been highlighted by Vitale (1964: 115-16). For Vitale, however, who writes public, mixed and private sectors, which is very similar to that implemented
from a Troskyist position, this did mean that the CDP advocated derogating later on during Salvador Allende's regime (PDC 1967; Castillo Velasco 1973:
the capitalism system (ibid.). The important point to bear in mind here is 255-61). These were proposals that were in direct opposition to Frei's poli-
that this radical 'communitarian socialism'9 was obliterated by the pragmatic cies and that Frei chose to ignore.
leadership of the main political figure of the CDP, Eduardo Frei Montalva, Finally, the option of a 'camino propio' (own route) - a strategy through
who, after its foundation in 1957, ran for the presidency of the Republic in which the party would follow its own way in opposition to the Left and
1958 and 1964. Nonetheless, Frei was eventually elected with a high majority the Right - in the CDP congress of 1969, promoted by 'oficialistas', and the
only in the latter instance (1964), thanks to the support of a trembling Right, defeat of 'rebeldes' and 'terceristas' which encouraged an alliance with the
which feared a victory by Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Left.10 Left as a commitment toward a revolutionary change, led to the secession
It was Frei who, in the first congress of the CDP in 1959, far from advo- of its left-wing faction in May 1969. Among those who resigned from the
cating a doctrinaire position, led the CDP to a more pragmatic turn, which CDP were the 'rebeldes' Rafael Gumucio, Julio Silva Solar, Alberto Jerez and
sought to appeal to all sectors and representatives of society, defeating both the 'tercerista' Jacques Chonchol, all of whom formed a new political party,
the so-called 'purists' who called for 'a small, efficient, and ideologically Movimiento de Action Popular Unitario (MAPU) (Fleet 1985: 111; MAPU 1972).
homogeneous party devoted to the uncompromising propagation of its own Nonetheless, curiously, despite the adoption of the thesis of 'camino propio',
doctrine' (Politka y Espiritu 1959: 13-14), and the left-wing faction of Silva the candidate of the CDP in the presidential election of 1970 was Radomiro
Solar and Chonchol, which directly defended an alliance with the political Tomic who, although not aligned with the left of the party, was clearly in
Left." The triumph of Frei's thesis allowed him to lead the CDP to a great favor of a broad alliance that included leftist parties. Moreover, Tomic came
electoral victory in the presidency of 1964 with a project called 'Revolution to represent those Christian Democrat sectors that strongly believed that the
in Liberty', but it did not ameliorate the internal divisions that arose as CDP still had a debt to the country by failing to make a proper structural
early as July 1965 over the party's role in policy making and the pace of transformation. In fact, Tomic once famously exclaimed, 'we have done a lot
the 'Revolution in Liberty' political project. For instance, the left-wing dis- of things but we have not made the revolution' (Dooner 1985: 11), express-
sidents, supported by younger party militants, strongly criticized the slow ing a common feeling among many Christian Democrats during that time.
pace of reforms, the conciliatory attitude held through private capital and He was, however, defeated, which meant that the CDP now appeared to be
the hostility toward labor movements and the Left (Fleet 1985: 97). demoted to a third place after the candidates of the Left and the Right.
The internal divisions were then articulated in political factions in Under Salvador Allende's government (1970-3), the ideological tensions
the congress of the CDP held in August 1966 between 'oficialistas', those that existed within the CDP dramatically escalated, coinciding with a
166 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 167

progressive radicalization of the type of opposition practiced by the CDP would be on the government due to its incapacity to get a solution to a
during those years. The CDP firstly defined, regarding Allende's adminis- legitimate conflict. (Ibid.)
tration, itself as a constructive opposition party, a period that lasted from
December 1970 to September 1971 - marked by the presidency of Narciso The support of the CDP for the illegal lorry driver strike is reflected by the
hureta, who defended this policy in a national meeting of the CDP (Congreso number of CDP gremial leaders who participated in the strike - among them
Plenario National) that took place in Cartagena, Chile, May 8-9, 1971. It Rafael Cumsille, the leader of small sellers (Fenner 1975: 255). Nonetheless,
then adopted an open constitutional opposition policy (from September it is worthwhile clarifying that it was not the case that the CDP openly
1971 to the Congressional election of March 1973). Finally, from March called for a coup as a solution to the crisis that they saw was due to the PU
to September 1973, the CDP assumed a total oppositional policy to the government. In fact, in May 1973 the CDP celebrated a national meeting
Allende's administration (Fleet 1985: 36). (Junta Nacional) in which the party rejected any solution that implied the
At that time, there were different factions within the party. Firstly, it is worth pursuing of a political option outside the Constitution and the laws, includ-
examining the 'freistas', the right-wing section of the CDP, which included ing a coup. In this meeting Patricio Aylwin was elected as the new president
former cabinet ministers of Frei's government, most of the party's congressional of the CDP (Dooner 1985: 158-9). However, the CDP did in fact play a more
delegation, and the majority of regional leaders. Opposing them were the left- decisive and functional role for those in the Right who were planning the
ists, which grouped the former 'terceristas' and 'rebeldes', who increasingly coup well in advance, that is, it ultimately canceled all of the institutional
pressed the party to make a definitive alignment with Allende's government. spheres to find a compromise solution to the political crisis. For instance,
The leftists had support from students, laborers, females, young professionals in the previous days of the coup, Aylwin and Allende carried out a direct
and peasant circles. Finally, there was also the group of the 'notables' (outstand- bilateral dialog under the auspices of the Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez. The
ing leaders), including Radomiro Tomic, Renan Fuentealba, Benjamin Prado dialog did not come to fruition and Aylwin unmistakably stated, 'we declare
and Bernardo Leighton, who promoted a kind of social democratic view, which the conversations concluded [...] we consider it useless to prolong the con-
coincided with the leftists during the first stage of the opposition. However, the versations that will only contribute to the confusion of the people' (quoted
'notables' were also defeated by the supremacy of 'freistas' (Fleet 1985: 133-4). in Dooner 1985: 180-1).
Indeed, it was very soon clear that the 'freistas' managed to impose their In this way, the CDP provided legitimacy to an authoritarian solution to
views on the party strategy concerning Allende's government, producing a new the political crisis, which in September 1973, after the final dialog led by
secession of the rest of the CDP's radical Left wing in August 1971. The Left Patricio Aylwin - then CDP leader - and president Allende failed, appeared
wing that left the CDP was headed by Congressmen Luis Maira, Pedro Videla, to be the only way ahead even for many Christian Democrats. This would
Fernando Buzeta, Pedro Urra, Jaime Concha, Osvaldo Gianini and Alejandro be an experience that would remain a bitter memory for the CDP and play
Jaramillo, and ex-Congressmen, including Bosco Parra, Pedro Felipe Ramirez, a central role in the process of reconstitution of its political discourse that
Santiago Rojas, Alvaro Barros and Jorge Leiva. They formed a new political took place after the coup, as we will analyze later in this chapter.
party called the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left; CL), which also included
leaders like Jacques Chonchol, Julio Silva Solar, Alberto Jerez and Rafael Agustin The radicalization of the oligarchical parties
Gumucio, who had formerly created the MAPU in 1969 and were now unhappy The political evolution of the Right also vividly expressed the clear central-
with the Marxist-Leninist orientation adopted by this latter movement (Fleet ity that the discourse of class struggle acquired in the 1960s and early 1970s
1985: 146-7; Dooner 1985: 46-7). in Chilean politics. Indeed, from 1939 to 1957, despite being officially part of
Thereafter, the CDP followed a clear path that helped to deepen a dis- the opposition, the Right, represented by the Conservative Party - a confes-
course of class struggle. An exemplary case thereof was the attitude of the sional Catholic traditional party - and the Liberal Party - a secularist tradi-
CDP during the lorry driver strike of October 1972 when the party, as well tional elite party - managed to preserve a high degree of political influence
as 'keeping its militants in a combative stage' (Dooner 1985: 115), made an based on important political representation in Congress. The Conservative
indirect call for the unseating of the government. In fact, at the peak of the Party received 21.3 percent, 17.1 percent and 23.4 percent in the parliamen-
strike that the CDP explicitly supported, Renan Fuentealba, then president tary elections of 1937, 1941 and 1945, respectively. In turn the Liberal Party
of the CDP, declared, obtained 20.7 percent, 14.0 percent and 18.4 percent in the same elections.
The high percentage of votes received by the Right during the 1930s, 1940s
We are not seeking the unseating of the government. But if the strike and 1950s can partially be explained by the 'vote-rigging' extensively prac-
goes deeper, bringing consequences that we had not desired, the guilt ticed by the Right parties at that time as well as the mobilization of local
168 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 169

client networks and the captive electorate, due to the fact that the right (between 1937 and 1949), 27.8 percent (1952) and 21.1 percent (1953)
to vote in parliamentary elections was until 1949 only granted to literate (Pollack 1999: 208). This process was produced by the gradual progression
men over 21 years old (Correa 2004: 72; Pollack 1999: 25; Pollack & Suarez of an electoral enfranchisement, expressed by the inclusion of women in the
1989: 49-1). This fact led the Right to assume a more conciliatory strategy congressional election of 1949 and presidential election of 1952; the end of
in defense of its interests - something that has been called by some authors cohecho (vote-rigging) with the creation of the cedula unica (individual elec-
'the strategy of mal menof (least bad) (Pollack 1999: 25). This explains the toral card) in 1958; the compulsory electoral registration in 1962; and the
fact that despite the menace that the Right saw in the victory of the Popular allowing of 18-year-olds and illiterates to vote in 1969 (ibid.: 209; Correa
Front in 1938, its tactics usually had the aim of permeating the more 2004: 77).
important projects presented by the center-left governments rather than of Added to the loss of electoral power of the Right was the raising aware-
presenting a radical antagonistic opposition. ness experienced by both the Conservative and the Liberal parties about the
A paradigmatic case was the creation in 1939 of the Corporation de Fomento new dangers that they saw in the populism that the country faced. This also
de la Production de Chile (Production Development Corporation; CORFO), led them to assume a more defining position in favor of a liberal capitalist
a governmental entity for the promotion of industrial production and an strategy, which, as a matter of fact, meant a tacit rejection of its own past
emblem of the inward-looking development policy orientation followed by political practices, which had openly been aligned with inward-looking
the Popular Front, to which both the economic Right - represented by the development policies.
entrepreneurial organizations such as the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Chile's The dangers of populism were first experienced as a temptation coming
Manufacturers' Association; SOFOFA) and the Sociedad National de Agrkultura from within rightist forces themselves, expressed by the 'Christian populism'
(National Society of Agriculture; SNA) - and the political Right - led by the held by Eduardo Cruz Coke. Indeed, in 1946 the Right faced the presidential
Conservative Party - despite rising doubts about the financial aspects of such a election deeply fractioned due to the fact that Eduardo Cruz Coke, the candi-
project, gave their support, concentrating their influence upon getting a guar- date for the Conservative Party, was unable to get the support of ttie Liberal
antee that the direction of such a body would have a broad representation of Party, who saw him as a 'populist' (Correa 2004: 112). However, the truly
their own interests. The executive committee of the CORFO finally included populist 'menace' eventually became palpable with the sweeping victory of
representatives of the most powerful entrepreneurial organizations such as the former dictator Carlos Ibanez (president of Chile from 1952 to 1958) in
SNA, SOFOFA, the Sociedad National de Mineria (National Mining Corporation; the presidential election of 1952 (Grugel 1992). Furthermore, after a failed
SONAMI) and the Cdmara de Comertio de Santiago (Santiago Chamber of attempt to influence Ibanez's government toward a more liberal capitalist
Commerce) (Correa 2004: 89). Furthermore, since the second government of orientation, which included the contracting of an international economic
the RP headed by Jose Antonio Rios (president of Chile from 1942 to 1946), mission (Klein & Sacks) in 1955 to get technical advice to solve the huge
that strategy of collaboration was expressed, at least by the Liberal Party, by problem of inflation that affected the country, the Right convinced itself that
the direct participation in the coalition government. In fact, the Liberal Party only a man from its own forces would be in position to head a new capitalist
managed to have influential ministers in the cabinets of the second and third liberal modernization process. In 1958, with the election of Jorge Alessandri
governments led by the RP (from 1942 to 1952), particularly in the economic (president of Chile from 1958 to 1964), that opportunity duly arose.
area. For instance, during Jose Antonio Rios's government the following cabi-
However, after just two years of Alessandri's government, in which such a
net ministers were members of the liberal party: Ernesto Barros Jarpa (Minister
liberal capitalist modernization project seemed initially to work well, it was
of Foreign Affairs), Benjamin Matte Larrain (Minister of Economy), Arturo
very soon clear that due to a combination of structural and institutional
Matte Larrain (Minister of Economy) and Osvaldo Lira (Minister of Land
constraints the results were not as favorable as expected. The capitalist
and Colonization). During Gonzalez Videla's administration (1946-52) Jorge
liberal modernization promoted by Alessandri came to an end after the res-
Alessandri, who would win the 1958 presidential election representing the
ignation of the Minister of Finance Roberto Vergara in 1960, the incapacity
Right, was both Minister of Economy and President of the Corporation de la
of the Right to obtain a majority in the congressional election in 1961 (only
Production y el Comertio (Confederation of Industry and Trade; CPC), the most
31.4 percent) and the financial crisis of December 1961 due to the deficit of
important Chilean entrepreneurial umbrella organization (ibid.: 95-9).
the commercial account resulting from the liberalization of imports and the
The conciliatory strategy of the Right started to change as a consequence lack of a high level of exports (Correa 2004: 229-30).
of two main factors. The first factor was the loss of the 'captive vote', which In 1962, Alessandri's government re-inaugurated a conciliatory policy
had held for decades the electoral power of the Right. In fact, the electoral of 'mal menor', now launched from the government, seeking to imple-
support of the Right decreased from 40 percent before 1937 to 31.4 percent ment structural reforms such as the agrarian reform that not only were
170 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 171

demanded by the ChCP, ChSP and the CDP but also by then American Despite its professed doctrine of de-politicization of universities, the gremi-
President John F. Kennedy, who sought in this way to block the increas- alistas, in their position as student leaders, played a central role in the polar-
ing influence exerted by the Cuban revolution in the continent (Kaufman ization of the political process that took place during Salvador Allende's
1972: 46-7). At the end of Alessandri's administration, the Right, far from administration. In the words of Jaime Guzman (1992: 63), 'the gremialismo
having successfully implemented a liberal capitalist project as it originally became the civic vanguard in the struggle against the Popular Unity' (ibid.).
proclaimed, frustratingly ended up acting as a contentious advocate for an This means that the gremialistas actively participated in contingent discur-
accelerated process of structural changes that openly clashed with their sive politics as a normal political party and explicitly demanded Allende's
more essential interests. Added to that, the Right experienced a loss of sig- resignation. For instance, Javier Leturia, president of the FEUC, published
nificant electoral power, which ultimately led to its failure to present its own in August 1973 a letter in the right-wing newspaper El Mercurio calling for
candidate in the presidential election of 1964, and rather to give uncondi- Allende's resignation (Pollack 1999: 36). More importantly, the gremialistas
tional support to Eduardo Frei Montalva, the CDP candidate, motivated by also supported insurrectional activities such as the strike of October 1972,
the fear of seeing the 'menace Marxist', represented by the candidate of the explicitly aimed at unseating Salvador Allende (Pollack 1999: 36).I5
Left, Salvador Allende, arrive in power. Therefore, both the nacionalistas (nationalist) and gremialistas were, from
Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1966 both the Conservative and the the second half of the 1960s, the new expression of a radicalized Right that
Liberal parties dissolved,12 giving rise to a new party - the National Party - had definitively abandoned its traditional conciliatory role to immerse itself
that, under the influence of a more virulent anti-Marxist nationalist faction in an explicit discourse of class struggle. During those years, and particularly
led by Jorge Prat and taking heed of the failed conciliatory attempts prac- during the PU government, this discourse only served to express a resolute
ticed before Alessandri's government, inaugurated an explicit discourse of and well-organized but defensive attempt to safeguard their deeper social
class struggle. In fact, from 1966 the National Party headed an increasingly and economic traditional interests. Furthermore, the development of a more
polarized political strategy that moved it firstly to try to avoid the electing of strategic discourse of capitalist 'modernization' was then very underdevel-
Salvador Allende in 1970, and then to an explicit political and conspiratorial oped among rightist forces and had to wait until 'better' conditions were to
support of a coup d'etat during the last months of the Allende government in emerge in the country. These conditions were none other than the repres-
March 1973 (Gonzalez 2000).13 Alongside the radicalization of the traditional sive authoritarian political regime that emerged by force after the coup of
Right came the emergence of the gremialistas (gremials) in the mid-1960s - a 1973, as we will see later in this chapter.
new Right movement with a corporativist and strong traditional Catholic
orientation. The gremialistas were primarily an elite student organization
The military coup and the renovation of politics
formed in the Catholic University's law school and deeply influenced by
the dictates of the main leader, Jaime Guzman, who sought to de-politicize The character of post-coup Chilean politics cannot be explained without
higher education in favor of more autonomic and universal objectives that referring to the previous shift of paradigms that occurred in Latin America,
he thought must point to the integral development of man. Guzman, taking from an epoch dominated by a struggle for revolution in the 1960s to
inspiration from the Chilean Catholic historian Jaime Eyzaguirre, professed another under the aegis of the struggle for democracy in the 1980s (Vasconi &
a Catholic corporativism, which considered the true expression of the people Sanchez 1990). Although this process is explained in part by the influence
to be found in the family, the municipality, the gremio (guild) and the trade that euro-communism exerted on political and intellectual Latin Americans
union (Pollack 1999: 34-5; Cristi 2000). The gremialistas constituted itself as exiled in Europe (Chilcote 1990), it seems that in the case of Chile the
an official entity - the Movimiento Gremial de la Catdlica (Gremial Movement political experiences faced in exile, though influential (Furci 1983: 18), were
of the Catholic University) - in March 1967, and presented strong internal mostly processed as a first-hand auxiliary recourse to try to ameliorate the
opposition to the occupation of the central building of the University organ- traumatic impact that the loss of democracy and its repressive consequences
ized by the Christian Democrat-dominated student federation, the Federation produced on a political generation accustomed to living in an imaginary
de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Catdlica de Chile (Union Student of civilized republican democracy - albeit with a certain actuality within a
the Catholic University; FEUC) in August 1967 in protest of the University's more unsteady Latin American context.' 6 Take for instance the case of Jose
reactionary position adopted with regard to the educational reform pro- Joaquin Brunner, a sociologist educated in the 1960s, a research fellow of
moted by Frei's government. the Facultad Latino-Americana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of
In 1968 the gremialistas became dominant not only in the FEUC but also Social Sciences; FLACSO) in the 1980s, Minister of Communications under
in an important number of student organizations throughout the country.14 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle's administration (president of Chile from 1994 to
172 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 173

2000), and a key adviser on educational issues under Bachelet's government Finally, Carlos Ominami (Enriquez-Ominami & Ominami 2004: 82-3), an
(president of Chile from 2006 to 2010), who declares (interview 2005a): ex-Mirista in the 1970s, ex-Minister of Economy during Aylwin's administra-
tion and for many years senator of the Socialist Party, declares,
In the short term I believe that, mostly due to the political process that
took place in Chile from 1969-70 to 1990, the coup has produced a very The coup was a huge political, cultural and psychological defeat ... that
singular attitude toward the necessity of reaching a consensus ... because experience meant for all of us that we got an extreme motivation to make
of the trauma, because of the dissipation, and because they are of the things right. We have been greatly influenced by the monumental defeat
same generation, we would say, that are in power despite everything. that we experienced. (Ibid.)
I am, for instance, from 1967 but also from 2005, am I not? and most of
the ruling class in its different streams is all the same. (Ibid.) Therefore, Chilean politicians seem to be very aware of the direct and huge
influence that the traumatizing experience of the coup and Pinochet's
A similar case is that of Ernesto Ottone, an intellectual and academic also repression exerted upon their personal process of renovation of political
educated in the 1960s, an orthodox communist militant during Salvador positions (Arancibia 2006: 306-61; Lagos 1993: 27-33). Furthermore, as
Allende's government who adopted an orthodox social democratic pos- Pollack and Rosenkranz (1980: 1) have argued:
ture during his exile in Italy, former executive director of the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the main politi- The coup of 1973 was not merely a reaction against the 'Marxist govern-
cal adviser of Ricardo Lagos (president of Chile from 2000 to 2006), and an ment' of Allende, but above all a reaction against the wider process of
informal political adviser under Bachelet's administration. He has asserted political mobilization and change in developmental strategies initiated
(interview 2005b) that, in the sixties. (Ibid.)

We, those from the Left, were not democrats until we were dramatically This is not an insignificant point but, rather, one that will define the par-
defeated, were we? In other words, we only learned to appreciate the ticular features of the so-called process of 'renovation of paradigms' that
democratic system after we lost it. I am referring to everybody - for affected the political elites in post-coup Chile.
instance, we do not even have to mention the miristas [members of the Indeed, the process of renovation of paradigms has been frequently cir-
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement; cumscribed to Chilean socialists and those political forces that would later
MIR)], or the socialists, but also the communists that made up the join the ChSP, such as the MAPU and the Christian Left. This is a view that
stronger political party at that time. They were the most reformist, though is marked by a tendency to observe the so-called 'renovation' as a somewhat
only tactically, because they [the members of the ChCP] did not believe progressive rationality that passed from self-assumed 'mistaken' notions,
in democracy as a permanent system for the long term - no, no, they such as socialism, class struggle and violent revolution, to new 'adequate'
did not believe in that, they were not 'bobbians', were they? We certainly conceptions, such as democracy, Center-Left political alliances and moder-
were not, we were not. (Ibid.) ated consensus. However, if we observe instead the political renovation as
a reconstitution of political identity - after the impact of the democratic
Finally, Jaime Gazmuri, one of the founders of the MAPU (Agrarian Popular breakdown, which affected to some extent all political elites (and not only
Unitary Movement) - a small political organization that openly called for a the Left) from 1973 onward - we could assume that the so-called 'renovation'
proletarian revolution in Chile in the late 1960s (MAPU 1972: 89) - later on can be analyzed as a process mutually reinforced by the particular dynamics
vice president of the ChSP, a key man in the renovation of Chilean social- followed by each of the political forces that existed - and survived - at that
ism, senator during all the Concertatidn governments, and one of the leaders time. Following this perspective, and principally observing the new place
of the political transition, unambiguously affirms (interview 2005c): given to a discourse of class struggle in this process, the post-coup renova-
tion of discursive paradigms that took place in the Left, Center and Right is
Uf! that was because of the dread, the fear ... Believe it or not this is a reviewed in what follows.
very fearful society, because the shock was huge ... because the Chileans
were scared, not only the ruling politicians. If you see the United Nations The socialist renovation
human development report it shows that only very recently has this idea If there is one political group hugely affected by the traumatic experience
that the difference is dangerous begun to be modified. (Ibid.) of the coup it is the Left, and particularly the ChSP. Immediately after the
174 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 175

coup, and despite the fact that the ChSP was involved in a dramatic proc- as the only way to recuperate from the defeat. As Altamirano (ibid.: 290)
ess of survival of the fierce repression ordered by the dictatorship against says,
its most important leaders and militants, the underground executive of
the ChSP in Chile, most of whom were later on killed by the dictatorship, We envisage the Chilean Socialist Party as a Marxist-Leninist party, organ-
led by Exequiel Ponce, Carlos Lorca, Gustavo Ruz and Ricardo Lagos Salina ized with the principle of the democratic centralism; an autonomous
launched in March 1974 a first general assessment of the causes of the coup party to define the route to the Chilean Revolution [...]. (Ibid.)
of 1973, known as the 'Document of 1974' (Furci 1983: 7-9; Arrate & Rojas However, very soon Altamirano would change his position. In 1977 he pub-
2003: 213). This was a very critical assessment, which placed responsibility lished 'Mensaje a los socialistas en el interior de Chile' (A Message to the Socialists
for the defeat on the 'isolationism of the working class', as a result of the Living in Chile), in which he performed a self-critique that, apart from reval-
incapacity of the political leadership of the PU, particularly of the ChSP, to orizing the political and heroic example of Allende (formerly heavily criticized
lead the revolutionary potentiality existing in the forces of the masses (ChSP by Altamirano), now advocated the 'revolutionary, democratic and popular'
1974, quoted in Arrate & Rojas 2003: 213). Furthermore, it explicitly called and peculiar traditional character which had typified the ChSP since its foun-
for the transformation of the ChSP into a truly Marxist-Leninist organiza- dation, which was far from a classic Leninist outlook. Altamirano also posed a
tion based on the principle of 'democratic centralism', which would lead somewhat more complex explanation for the defeat of 1973 which, far from
the party to 'its concrete practice of the class struggle' (ibid.: 214). In other being centered on the lack of a military policy, rather argues that the key
words, it was an appraisal in which the notion of class struggle was not only factor was actually the incomprehension of the diphase between a 'relatively
still valid but also the central inspiration for a discourse that postulated the underdeveloped structure of the Chilean society' versus a 'relatively developed
transformation of the party into an organization suitable for a more direct institutional superstructure' (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 251). He famously stated
class confrontation. Chile as 'the mythological Centaur, half man and half horse' (ibid.).
Following this same line, Carlos Altamirano, then ChSP leader and one of Therefore, it was no surprise that in 1979, when the ChSP divided itself
the most outstanding representatives of the discourse of class struggle dur- into two main factions, the faction led by Altamirano, Jorge Arrate, Jaime
ing the pre-coup political landscape in Chile, led a first diagnostic on the Suarez and Luis Meneses was expelled because they opposed the transfor-
causes of the coup made by the leadership of the ChSP in exile. In 1977 he mation of the party into a Leninist organization, which had been precisely
published Dialectka de una Derrota (Dialectics of a Defeat) in which, alluding the thesis publicly defended by Altamirano in Dialectka de una Derrota
to an 'irremediable error' as the main cause of the defeat, he says: (Dialectics of a Defeat) but then rejected in 'Mensaje a los socialistas en el
interior de Chile' (ibid.: 287-8; Furci 1983: 9-18). On the contrary, it was the
[The error] was the incapacity of the revolutionary leadership to build a dominant section of the ChSP, headed by the former Ministry of Foreign
military defense of the process, to assume the confrontation as inevitable, Affairs of Allende's government and historical leader of the ChSP, Clodomiro
not because of our will, but because of the decision of our adversaries. Almeyda, which finally attempted to implement Altamirano's appraisal of
(Altamirano 1977: 213)17 j977 is -rv^ somewhat contradictory 'taking of positions' of the two main
factions of the ChSP may reflect that the so-called renovation in which social-
This was a political balance that was shared at that time by outstanding ists were involved at that time, far from being a coherent communicative
Chilean and Latin American leftist intellectuals such as Marta Harnecker, exchange of ideas, was rather a political review attempt, very much marked
Theotonio Dos Santos, Maximo Lira, Jorge Arrate and Pio Garcia, who acted by a retrospective personal process of self-rectification.
as Altamirano's advisers (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 226). Indeed, despite the fact that many scholars have recognized that a dif-
These two early assessments were a reaffirmation of the class-struggle- ference in the type of political organization needed to face the challenges
style of politics practiced by the ChSP until the coup, supporting the idea posed by the dictatorship was the main cause for the division of the ChSP
that they failed because they were not revolutionary enough, meaning that (Furci 1983: 15-6), what actually occurred was a more profound dispute
a party composed of factions was not the type of political organization about how to deal with the question of 'revolution versus democracy' - a
suited to a revolutionary struggle, nor was one that lacked a truly military dispute that really formed the basis of the crisis and renewal of Chilean
policy. The corollary of this critical appraisal was a political proposal socialism. As Tomas Moulian (1983a: 304) has asserted,
formulated by Altamirano at the end of his writing, reaffirming the idea
posed by the 'Document of 1974', which aimed to transform the ChSP into The truth is that the division [of the ChSP] was produced by the
a Marxist-Leninist party able to command a revolutionary confrontation, dispute between two conceptions of party, one of which proposed the
176 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 177

construction of a Leninist organization (demanding a reconstruction of the first half of the statement - that is, 'a pluralist and democratic society' -
the historic ChSP). Obviously, these positions relate to different visions but not necessarily the second one - that is, 'with the full participation of
of socialism and assessments, thus, of the complex world of real social- workers in power' - would become the hegemonic motive of the new stage
ism. (Ibid.) for the struggle for democracy in Chile in the 1980s. It also marked the begin-
ning of the discarding of the principle of class struggle from the political
This was a quarrel that, despite being articulated politically, might better discourse, thereby giving priority to a broader political consensus. This was,
be explained by the trauma of the coup - an idea that would only become however, a somewhat complex and contradictory process, as reflected by the
explicit ten years hence, apropos of the 'congress of reunification' of the political view of Jaime Gazmuri expressed in 1983, which still combined, on
ChSP, as we will see later in this chapter. the one hand, a rejection of social democracy - '[because European social
Indeed, alongside the process of division of the ChSP was a much longer democrats] have been unable to reach true socialism ... [and] we, instead,
term and less explicit process of revalorization of democracy, which during the intend to develop a struggle that aims to change the bourgeois society and
1960s and early 1970s was denounced by the Left as merely 'formal' - meaning capitalism' (Editores Contemporaneos 1983: 166-9) - with, on the other
a democracy, which socialists believed benefited only the bourgeoisie. As hand, a proposal for a broad democratic political alliance (ibid.). Also Oscar
early as January 1975, Jaime Gazmuri, a leader of the MAPU, clandestinely Guillermo Garreton made a similar self-contradictory reflection asserting,
published a book - Aprender de las lecciones del pasado para construir el futuro on the one hand, that 'the working, popular and socialist project of the PU
(Learning from the Lessons of the Past to Construct the Future) - in which, for has failed' and, on the other, still reaffirming a theoretical principle in favor
the first time, by using Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, a leader of the Left, of class struggle (Garreton 1985: 11-29).
though still retaining the centrality of the working class, produced a critique Furthermore, it is fair to say that what is criticizable of the socialist renewal -
in which the revalorization of democracy played a central role (Gazmuri 1977; denounced in its early years as 'revisionist' by Almeyda - is not posed in its
Arrate & Rojas 2003: 223; Editores Contemporaneos 1983: 71-2). adoption of a new democratic paradigm - a valuable asset in the middle of
This 'democratic turn' is largely explained by the dramatic enlightenment a fierce dictatorship - but in the specific form in which former key issues,
of most Chilean socialists (particularly those in the faction led by Altamirano such as class struggle, were rejected. Indeed, the main core of the social-
and Jorge Arrate, but also in a different way by those who integrated the ist renewal aimed primarily to 'emend' those excessively ideological views,
more orthodox group commanded by Almeyda) about the fact that there as they were assumed, which Chilean socialists - especially those formerly
was a vital difference between living in a democracy (though a 'bourgeois over-revolutionary socialists such as Altamirano - believed had affected their
democracy' as they used to call it) and surviving a fierce dictatorship, such as political actions during the 1960s, thereby implicitly making the coup more
that which they faced in the late 1970s when the process of socialist renewal politically viable. Certainly, the recognition of a certain political co-responsibil-
took place (Arrate 1983: 93). Dramatic events helped to consolidate this ity for the coup has always been a difficult task for those deeply involved in the
'enlightenment'. For instance, during the first six years of the dictatorship promotion of a discourse of class struggle during the PU, such as Altamirano.
more than 450 socialists were killed, including its underground executive, Although he has assumed responsibility, he has also emphasized that the
420 members of the MIR, around 400 member of the ChCP and 36 members coup would have happened anyway because the 'golpistas' (the coup leaders)
of the MAPU (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 185-227). had taken this strategic decision well in advance, irrespective of any political
An early political expression of this new spirit in favor of democracy was a conditions (interview with Carlos Altamirano in Arancibia 2006: 176).
meeting that took place in Caracas, Venezuela in July 1975, which was known The abandonment of the category of class struggle was also a central
as the meeting of 'Colonia Tovar1 (Tovar Colony). The meeting gathered his- caveat held by the intellectuals of the socialist renovation, such as Tomas
torical leaders from the CDP such as Bernardo Leighton, Renan Fuentealba Moulian, Manuel Antonio Garreton, Norbert Lechner, Agusto Varas, Enzo
and Gabriel Valdes; from the ChSP such as Clodomiro Almeyda and Aniceto Faletto, Rodrigo Bano, Julieta Kirkwood, Angel Flisflish and Jose Joaquin
Rodriguez; from the RP such as Anselmo Sule and Hugo Miranda; and from Brunner, who were militants of the ChSP and MAPU, working at the Facultad
the Christian Left such as Rafael Agustin Gumucio and Sergio Bitar (Arrate latinoamerkana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) since 1977; and Eugenio Tironi,
& Rojas 2003: 232). As a result of this meeting a statement proclaiming the Jose Bengoa, Alfredo Rodriguez and Javier Martinez, who worked with the non-
necessity of building a 'democratic and pluralist society, with the full partici- governmental organization (NGO) Centro de Estudios Sociales y Education (Arrate
pation of workers in the distribution of power', was made. The statement of & Rojas 2003: 247-8). These intellectuals defended the idea of a 'secularization'
'Colonia Tovar", although promptly dismissed by Patricio Aylwin, then CDP of Marxism (Moulian 1981a: 100-4; 1981b; 1983b), inspired by Ernesto Laclau's
leader, became the first antecedent for a future Center-Left alliance, in which theory of hegemony. Laclau's first formulation of his theory was presented in
178 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 179

a seminar on 'Hegemonia y Altemativas Populares en America Latina' (Hegemony potentiality', that is, to be integrated to the disabled 'life' that is offered
and Popular Alternative in Latin America) that took place in Morelia, Mexico to us under the rhythms of military hymns. (Ibid.)
in 1980 (Laclau 1980c), but was developed further in Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy, co-authored with Chantal Mouffe (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Then, when the economic crisis of 1982-3 came about, Tironi himself had
Therefore, from the early 1980s it seemed that all maimer of class confron- to recognize that the 'capitalist revolution' - the name given to the eco-
tations and class analysis, which had been openly and abundantly exercised nomic transformations that took place in the second half of the 1970s in
by Chilean politicians and intellectuals in the past, suddenly disappeared. Chile - which he had elevated to a definitive status, was not as solid as he
However this was not because it was analytically assumed that either a class had thought (Tironi 1984b: 114).
struggle situation was repressed due to the victory of a particular class, as It is, therefore, for this reason that the theory of 'socialist renovation' can
one might think happened after the coup of September 1973, or because be best understood as a process of redemption or extirpation of the ideologi-
such a conceptual category was no longer theoretically accurate, but simply cal 'virus'. For instance, Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo, an ex-leader of the MAPU
because it was repressed. It became an unmentionable word. It was rejected in the 1970s who would become an influential senator of the Socialist
as an 'old-fashioned' symbolic category that would be too painful to be Party during the Concertatidn governments, and was also a minister during
recalled by those who had used it abundantly in the past. Bachelet's government (2006-10), has explicitly remarked, '[...] I hope the
Particularly, in the eyes of the intellectuals, it was not that the socialist new generations will absolve the sins that all of us, in blinded times, com-
renovation did not recognize a huge transformation in the country's class mitted against Chile' (Viera-Gallo 1998: 7).
situation at that time as a consequence of the implementation of a neo- This is thus a recognition that is far from an accurate or rational - in the
liberal model. On the contrary, they acknowledged that a huge transforma- Habermasian sense - critical assessment of past experiences, as their propo-
tion was taking place, but they elevated it to the category of an unmodified nents have always wanted to present the experience of renovation of ideo-
definitive factual dimension, meaning that the 'bourgeois revolution' or the logical paradigms (see, for instance, Arrate & Rojas 2003: 286-91).
'new scenario' (as this dimension was called) presented itself as proof that The result of the socialist renovation was a revalorization of democracy,
any discourse of class struggle was rationally no longer feasible. However, which became the hegemonic signifier during the political process followed
Petras (1990), in a less polite interpretation than that here offered, attributes by the political opposition to Pinochet in the 1980s. For instance, Luis
the metamorphosis of Latin America's intellectuals, particularly Chilean Maira - a very influential left-wing social Christian Chilean politician -
ones, to the emergence of the category of institutional intellectuals, who made in this respect an explicit acknowledgment regarding the revalori-
were - actually still are - too dependent upon mainstream external funding zation of democracy and the necessity of socialist renovation due to 'the
agencies that pre-figure their research agendas. In any case, the discourse of painful experience of these years [1973-]' (Maira 1984: 323). Furthermore,
class struggle was definitively assumed as a demode discourse because social such a peculiar revalorization of democracy became a key factor in the
antagonisms - it was argued - had been overcome forever. advocating of the proposal for a Center-Left coalition - later known as the
A notable case in this respect is Eugenio Tironi, whose writings on the Concertatidn - which, along with the CDP, was launched by those formerly
socialist renovation before the economic crisis of 1982-3 were full of a more revolutionary socialists and members of the MAPU - the 'renovados'
somewhat 'pessimistic realism' that emphasized his critique of the old Left (the renovators). In fact, the proposal for a Center-Left coalition can be
by not assuming the existence of a new radical and definitive scenario but observed in the discussion within the Left, documented by Moulian (1983a:
at the same time expressing some sort of subjective disaffection, a sense of 309-10), between those - the orthodox - who would insist in seeing the PU
hopelessness and frustration as he realized they - the revolutionaries of the defeated - expiating in this way their own responsibilities - and those - the
1960s - were no longer 'gods' (Tironi 1984a; 1984b; 1984c). This disaffec- renovators - who saw it as a failure. Moulian favored this last position, add-
tion felt by Tironi became crucial to forge a kind of 'necessity' of renovation ing that the failure of the PU was in the inadequacy between the 'magnitude
that, far from exclusively originating as an 'objective' assessment of the new of the revolutionary reforms and the quality of the social and political bloc
scenario, though this assessment existed, was also tinged with frustration that pursued them' (ibid.). However, one also could argue that to assume the
caused by 'the loss of the omnipotence' - a circumstance that no less often PU a failure has the indirect effect of making it appear to be an experience
clouded his judgment. As Tironi (1984c: 23) has stated: that is over and will never happen again. This more subtle ideological effect
is at the root of the socialist renovation process.
Our generation cannot accept the dilemma of either continuing to be In turn, a proposal for a Center-Left coalition was a proposition that
puzzled by the frustration or renouncing its historical feeling of 'omni would have been very hard to oppose among the more orthodox supporters
180 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 181

of Clodomiro Almeyda (almeydistas), considering that both the rejection of United Left), defended at that time the thesis of the 'democratic rupture',
a 'bourgeois democracy' and the incapacity to produce an alliance with the that is, to give the Plebiscite of 1988 a constituent character in order to
Center were factors that were connected to the painful memory of the defeat change the Constitution of 1980 radically. This thesis was, however, never
of 1973. As Clodomiro Almeyda (1987: 323) declares, dominant among socialists who, already part of one united party, accepted
much softer reforms agreed with Pinochet's regime after the Plebiscite of
The democracy is a necessary condition for the reconstruction of Chile ... 1988 (Maira 1988: 177-83).
it is the contradiction between democracy and dictatorship that set up At this stage it is worthwhile making a precautionary point that applies
the dividing line in the political field, it is the main contradiction in the to the whole socialist factions. Both renovados and almedystas entered into
midst of our society, here and now. Ami everything must subordinate to the the new coalition of the Concertatidn - abandoning their former discourse
solution of this conflict, everything, absolutely, everything. (Ibid., emphasis of class struggle and their former ally, the ChCP - with a sense of contra-
added by the author) diction. This was expressed in a critical theoretical reflection in the case of
renovados and in an open but controlled political 'self-flagellantism' in the
The almeydistas, who had built an alliance with the ChCP and the MIR case of almeydistas. Carlos Altamirano, for instance, immediately before the
during the first half of the 1980s, could not ultimately deny their support 'unification congress' of the ChSP in November 1990, sent a letter - 'carta
to both the more institutional strategy to defeat Pinochet through the a los socialistas' (letter to socialists) - to the party congress. As well as reit-
Plebiscite in 1988, encouraged by renovados (the renovators), and the crea- erating the collapse of those projects based on Marxism-Leninism, this
tion of the Concertatidn along with the CDP, and the exclusion of the ChCP. gave a critical reflection of the current stage of global capitalism, though
Notwithstanding, it is interesting to retrospectively consider the political it was a critique formulated within the context of a call for a shift from an
position of Almeyda in the 1960s in relation to the CDP in order to under- old dated 'social revolution' to a 'deepening of democracy' (Arrate & Rojas
stand the difficulties he would have faced in accepting an alliance with the 2003: 434). This point is not irrelevant and can explain why, since 2003, the
CDP in the 1980s. In fact, Almeyda (1964: 9) had critically declared regard- former renovados, particularly Jorge Arrate (La Nation 2007, June 11) but also
ing the political attitude of the CDP in the 1960s that, Carlos Altamirano (El Mostrador 2007, March 10), have led a critical posi-
tion against the lack of a historical attempt by the Concertatidn to face the
[...] behind the Alliance for the progress, the popular capitalism, the challenges experienced by the new stage of global inequalities in Chilean
Peace Corps, the technical aid, the free world and the revolution in free- contemporary society.
dom, are meeting under the Christian Democrat leadership all of those Furthermore, the almeydistas continued to express, through small political
who want to stop the impetuous advance of the socialism inspired by the gestures, their sense of non-conformity with a political transition that did
Marxist Leninist thought. Now it is more necessary than ever in Chile to not fulfill their expectations. An example of these small but necessary ges-
initiate, from the perspective of the revolutionary ideology of the prole- tures of rebellion of almeydistas is the self-critical book of the current social-
tarian, an offensive of clearness and truth, which shows the mystification ist senator Camilo Escalona (1999), the political heir of Clodomiro Almeyda.
and helps the people to recognize where their friends are and where their Notwithstanding that the ex-MAPU was the only political group within the
adversaries are. (Ibid.) ChSP that probably felt very comfortable with the new stage of the strug-
gle for democracy without any class consideration, as Enrique Correa, a
That is the reason why the almeydistas only accepted the new Center-Left former young leftist leader of the MAPU during the 1960s and early 1970s,
alliance reluctantly. They supported the proposal but also managed to has made clear, referring particularly to those who continued to propose a
present candidates with their former ChCP and MIR allies in the parliamen- change in the Chilean economic model in the 2000s (interview 2005d):
tary election of 1990. However, the route was already fixed. The ChSP finally
agreed its reunification between renovados and almeydistas in November [...] the ideological views [about changing the economic model] that, as
1990, following a path that had included a previous accord for giving well as the viruses, survive in nature, are still alive in the political parties,
enthusiastic support to the victorious candidate of the Concertatidn for the and appear each time there is a discussion about the economic model.
presidency of the republic in 1989, the Christian Democrat and formerly Well, Adolfo Zaldivar [ex-senator and president of the CDP in 2005, who
fierce opponent of the Left, Patricio Aylwin. died in 2013] is now proposing to emend the model and to put an end
A similar process affected the Christian Left which, alongside other politi- to this liberal model. Also if you voted on the economic policies of the
cal forces of the coalition of the more orthodox Left Izquierda Unida (the government within the socialist party, 1 assure you that they would be
182 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 183

rejected without any doubt. This is the reason why the ruling politicians individual terrorism or putsch against the dictatorship (Furci 1984:156). This
never allow a vote on such policies. (Ibid.) document has been attributed to Jorge Inzunza - a leader of the ChCP -
who, in a somewhat naive way, warned that,
However, the important final point to make clear here is that, acknowledg-
ing the contradictions presented in the process of configuring a new political The experience of these months of dictatorship has shown that the fascists
identity among Chilean socialists, all these complexities appear to be obliter- want the people to use these sorts of [violent] actions to justify the terror
ated by a deep sense of guilt and fear, coming from the traumatic experience that is at the root of their power. (Quoted in Arrate & Rojas 2003: 221)
of the coup of 1973 and the following dictatorship, which almost uniformly
affected the Chilean socialists, acting as a leveler that helped to constitute Immediately after this first assessment, a new document, 'Al Partido y al
a very particular new political discourse - without class struggle - in the Pueblo de Chile' (To the Party and the People of Chile), published in October
former, most revolutionary members of the Left. 1974 repeated the political analysis of the causes of the defeat, blaming the
ultra-leftist tendency within and outside the PU, and advancing as a politi-
The 'isolationism' of communists cal proposal an anti-fascist front that ranged from the Left to the CDP as the
Although the ChCP did not follow the same pattern of 'progressive' renova- only way to combat the dictatorship. The characterization of Pinochet's dic-
tion as that observed in the ChSP, it pursued a reconstitution of its political tatorship as fascist, meaning that it was an irrational regime and condemned
discourse, which can be characterized as following a trajectory 'from blam- to short-term viability, was at the root of this new policy, which sought to
ing "the other" as ultra-leftists to a self-condemnation as reformists'. This 'defeat the dictatorship and build a renovated democracy' but also insisted
reconstitution of a political discourse led the ChCP to adopt a militarized upon 'retaking with the majority support of the people the route of revolu-
peculiar expression of a discourse of class struggle in the 1980s, contrary to tionary changes' (ChCP 1974, quoted in ibid.: 221; Furci 1984: 153). These
its historical ideological orientation, which ultimately contributed to the first assessments, inscribed within an ethos of historical optimism that
political isolationism experienced by the ChCP at the end of that decade. revealed a confidence that the dictatorship would not last, made explicit
The ChCP is one of the most organized political parties in Chile, strongly that for the ChCP it was very clear that a political proposal either to end the
fortified by two periods of underground activity in its history. The first of dictatorship or to pursue the 'revolutionary changes' of socialism could not
these occurred in 1927 under the first government of Carlos Ibanez del be successfully made without the support of the majority, expressed in the
Campo. The second occurred in 1948 during the government of Gabriel policy of an anti-fascist front - a proposal that, at the time, was not shared
Gonzalez Videla (Ramirez Necochea 1965: 162; Halperin 1965: 55). Due to by socialists.
this condition of being so well structured, the ChCP seemed to face this This somewhat optimistic appreciation of the weakness that the Chilean
new adverse political scenario in a more mature way than the other politi- communists believed was evident in the dictatorship, as well as the obses-
cal forces of the Left during the early stages of Pinochet's dictatorship. It sion for building a wide anti-fascist front, led the party to over-criticize the
ordered, without any vacillation, all of its better known leaders into exile actions of those revolutionary Left movements such as the MIR, which, at
and kept its leadership in recess for two years. This decision was recounted that time, were simply attempting to organize an (ineffectual) self-defense.
to the other parties of the PU by Orlando Millas - a high-ranking leader of An example of this short-sighted dispute is the document 'El ultaizquierd-
the ChCP - in an underground meeting that took place on September 15, ismo, caballo de Troya del imperialismo' (Ultra-Leftism, the Trojan Horse of
1973 in Santiago (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 189). However, with the capture of Imperialism) - published in September 1975 by the underground executive
its party leader, Luis Corvalan, in September 1973, it soon became clear of the ChCP - which fiercely criticized the actions of the MIR (Arrate &
that the ChCP - the most structured political party in Chile - was not Rojas 2003: 234). The response of the MIR to a similar article published by
sufficiently prepared to face as fierce repression as that launched by the Orlando Millas (L'Humanite 1974, September 4) can be found in 'Respuesta
dictatorship.19 de Edgardo Enriquez, Miembro de la Comisidn Politka del MIR, a Orlando Millas
The first political analysis of this new post-coup scenario was made by the Dirigente del Partido Comunista' (Response of Edgardo Enriquez, Member
ChCP in a document of July 1974 entitled 'Chile: Ensenanzas y Perspectivas of the Political Commission of the MIR, to Orlando Millas Leader of the
de la Revolution' (Chile: Learning and Perspectives of the Revolution), which Communist Party) (Varios 1976: 354-61).
asserted, on the one hand, that the defeat was political rather than mili- This early enthusiasm, as well as the perception that the MIR's actions
tary, due to the isolationism of the working class and the lack of unique facilitated the justification of the repression practiced by the intelligence
leadership of the PU and, on the other hand, the rejection of any form of secret services of the military regime, started to change dramatically when
184 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 185

the ChCP itself began to be the main object of repression, particularly in Left, the CDP and the democratic sectors of the army, in order to form a
1976 when the party lost two underground executive committees (Furci provisional government that would replace the dictatorship without bring-
1984: 153). In fact, in May 1976 the members of the underground execu- ing back the PU (Furci 1984: 162). As Corvalan (1979), quoted in Arrate and
tive of the ChCP, Jorge Munoz, Mario Zambrano, Uldarico Donaire, Rafael Rojas (2003: 293), says:
Cortes, Jaime Donato and Victor Diaz, were 'disappeared' by the 'Comando
Conjunto', a repressive apparatus of the dictatorship. In December of the [t]aking into account the whole situation we cannot go back to the same
same year, a similar fate befell Fernando Ortiz, Fernando Navarro, Horacio past. Without dismissing the greatness of the PU period, we do not want
Cepeda, Lincoyan Berrios, Luis Lazo and Reinalda Pereira (Arrate & Rojas to go back to that time nor the time that preceded it. (Ibid.)
2003: 238-46).
Hugely affected by this repressive coup, in August 1977 the ChCP organ- It was a document celebrated as a welcome 'democratic turn' of the ChCP
ized a meeting of its central committee (comite central), which took place by other political forces of the Left, which coincided with similar reflections
in exile. The impact of the repressive coup of 1976 was expressed by the that were taking place among socialists at that time.
tribute that Orlando Millas made during the meeting to the 23 members of However, one year later the leadership of the ChCP made clear, through a
the central executive who were absent either because they had been killed document written by Corvalan, that the type of 'turn' desired by the ChCP
or 'disappeared' by the dictatorship (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 282; Teitelboim was somewhat different to that outlined by 'Nuestro Proyecto Democrdtico'.
2001: 279-80). The resolutions of this meeting were somewhat contradictory, Indeed, in September 1980 the document 'El Derecho del Pueblo a la Rebelidn
which reflected the change that was already subtly affecting the political es Indiscutible' (The People's Right to Rebellion is Undisputable) proclaimed
position of the ChCP. Indeed, on the one hand, the meeting reaffirmed a the new policy of the 'popular rebellion of the masses' in which, as an
proposal for a wide political alliance with the CDP, reassured the correction attempt to tackle the 'vacio histdrko' (the historical lack) detected in the cen-
of the pacific route as a path to the Chilean revolution, and announced the tral meeting of 1977, a military policy was made a keystone of the political
proposal of a provisional government which included all democratic forces practice of the ChCP. As Corvalan (1980), quoted in Arrate and Rojas (2003:
as well as some potential democratic sectors of the army (Furci 1984: 164-5). 296), has put it,
However, on the other hand, the meeting recognized for the first time the
lack of an appropriate military policy in the ChCP as one of the main short- Fascism gives rise to a situation in which people have no other route than
comings of the PU period - a deficiency known as the 'vacio histdrko' (the to recall all the means they can to help, even deep violence, to defend
historical lack). Furthermore, three theses traditionally held by Salvador their right to the bread, liberty and life.20 (Ibid.)
Allende and historically supported by the ChCP were now rejected, all of
which would have substantial relevance in the 'strategic turn' of ChCP This not only prevented any possibility of a wider political alliance that
policy in 1980, that is: (a) the indivisibility of liberty, which implies the idea would have included the CDP, like that which the ChCP had insistently
that liberty must be given to everyone, even adversaries; (b) the thesis that it pursued after the coup of 1973, but also meant a radical turn in the tradi-
would be possible to construct socialism without returning to a period of the tional pacific route defended by the ChCP during its history, claiming now
'proletariat dictatorship'; (c) the idea that a social change would necessarily as legitimate any way to combat the dictatorship, even extreme violence.
demand a social and political majority. This last rejection was in direct con- This was a shift known as the 'strategy turn' that, for Moulian (1983a: 305),
tradiction to that affirmed in the document 'Al Partido y al Pueblo de Chile' of is mostly explained by a 'psychology of frustration' that was dominant in the
October 1974, as we have already seen (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 281-3). ChCP at that time. In any case, this 'strategy turn' inaugurated a peculiar and
Therefore, in a subtle way the ChCP also experienced a renovation of somewhat contradictory new period of class-struggle-type politics discourse
paradigms, though rather than renouncing the principles of orthodox for the ChCP. According to Furci (1984: 166), a triggering factor, which adds
Marxism, it pointed to the radicalization of a certain orthodoxy, closer to some rationality to the cycle of both documents here analyzed, was the ratifi-
Stalinism - a tendency that had existed throughout the history of the party cation on September 11, 1980, by an obscure and fraudulent Plebiscite, of the
(Furci 1984: 30). Constitution of 1980 that was perceived at that time as Pinochet's definitive
Furthermore, it was also a confusing and no less contradictory process, attempt to stay in power until 1997 and institutionalize the neo-liberal model.
as shown by two documents launched by Luis Corvalan, then ChCP leader This thesis, added to the frustration felt by Chilean communists at that time,
in exile. The first, 'Nuestro Proyecto Democrdtico' (Our Democratic Project), as has been suggested by Moulian (1983a: 305), seemed to be confirmed by
dated July 1979, was a convincing call for reaching consensus among the Volodia Teitelboim (1988: 241-4) - an important leader of the ChCP.

.,
186 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 187

In fact, the 'strategy turn' was a shift made in direct contradiction to the resurfaced after a report that was published by the central committee of the
historically dominant tradition of the ChCP, which since 1935 had defended ChCP in January 1985, which asserted that the country was facing a revolu-
an institutional route to democratic and socialist transformations. In six tionary situation that would make inevitable a popular uprising of the masses -
years the ChCP had passed from a fierce critique of the ultra-revolutionary a diagnosis severely criticized by Orland Millas and hesitantly accepted by
sectors of the Left, blamed as the main cause of the defeat of September 11, Luis Corvalan, who soon after reminiscently expressed: 'the comrade Millas
1973, to the self-acknowledgment of a historical lack - the military policy - objected [the report of the central committee of the ChCP of January 1985]
and then to a radical turn that would eventually lead the ChCP to ascribe to altogether. In turn, I expressed my doubt on it' (quoted in ibid.: 367).
a thesis that had been historically rejected: to build a military apparatus for The internal discussion of the ChCP basically centered on two points.
the revolution. In fact, Guillermo Teillier, the current president of the ChCP, Firstly, the doubts about whether, taking into account Chile's then current
explicitly recognizes that, political situation, pursuing the policy of popular rebellion of the masses
was a wise decision; and secondly, a debate on the type of alliance that such
The option was either that the party was transformed into an instrument a new policy would help to forge in order to put a successful end to the dic-
able to face all forms of struggle or we build an apparatus, separate from tatorship. The supporters of the 'popular rebellion of the masses' believed
the party. This last option was taken, not with the agreement of the whole both that the political situation of the country was 'mature' enough to
party, because there were comrades, including me, who warned about the launch a popular uprising and that the best alliance policy was to concen-
dangers involved in the creation of this kind of apparatus. (Quoted in trate efforts on building a strategic force of the Left - not including the CDP.
Herreros 2003: 510) Instead, the old school leaders of the ChCP doubted the success of such a
policy and strongly advocated a wider policy alliance.
In this reconstitution of political identity those more combative sectors It is worthwhile clarifying at this point that the two internal factions
of the ChCP, which either remained in the country to face a fiery repres- within the ChCP agreed that the central task at that time was not only to
sion or lost their loved ones while in exile, exerted a decisive influence. An put an end to Pinochet as a dictator, but also to his institutional legacy.
exemplary case in this respect was Gladys Marin, an enthusiastic supporter However, it was not clear that either group presented a proposal of politi-
of the hard-line new policy of the popular rebellion of the masses, whose cal strategy based on a rigorous analysis of the situation that social classes
husband was killed by the dictatorship in 1976, and who went underground presented at that time, which would have sustained an accurate democratic
to lead the party during the 1980s, and thereafter became the main leader of and subsequently socialist revolutionary policy, as they did in the pre-coup
the ChCP in the 1990s until her death in 2005. She frequently complained period (Herreros 2003: 414-25). Indeed, Orlando Millas, for instance, seemed
about the leadership of the party in exile, which only in 1987 reluctantly to defend a very orthodox approach to Marxism, which put him in a position
recognized the underground executive in Chile as the unique leadership of very close to the official dogmatic Marxism-Leninism professed by the Union
the party (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 325). of Soviet Socialist Republics. This approach impeded Millas from appreciating
Furthermore, despite the disbelief that such a strategic turn produced the richness of the theoretical inputs provided by Gramsci and other critical
among old school militants, those more resolute sectors led by Gladys Marin thinkers in terms of analyzing the complexities of contemporary societies.
eventually managed to consolidate their already accumulated influence in the This reveals a very important failure to interpret the huge transformation in
internal underground leadership of the ChCP after a national conference that Chilean society as one caused by a neo-liberal model, which had not only
the party celebrated in March 1984 in Santiago - the first time that the ChCP destroyed the traditional working class but also hugely detached society from
was able to organize an event of such magnitude after the coup. In this meet- any idea of collective identity. These more so-called 'post-Marxist' approaches
ing, the central executive (comite central) of the party was partially renovated - had been appropriated by those 'renovados' (renovators) intellectuals of the
11 new members came from the underground struggle against the dictator- Left whom Millas himself strongly accused of being 'propagandists of the
ship while 23 old members ceased in their functions (ibid.: 358). Furthermore, dominant class', most of whom were socialists and mapucistas representative
although the central policy of the 'popular rebellion of the masses' was ratified of the socialist renovation (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 367-8).
and Luis Corvalan - the historical leader of the ChCP - unanimously con- The more radical left-wing sector led by Gladys Marin also failed to pro-
firmed as the ChCP boss, this event was marked by an increasing sense of disa- pose a characterization of the transformation experienced by the country
greement felt among the more traditional leaders of the party, led by Orlando that would have resituated and more successfully adapted the 'popular
Millas - a member of the party old guard - with a policy that they felt was rebellion of the masses' policy to the condition of high pauperization for the
not co-terminous with the traditions of the ChCP. This internal disagreement labor force but not extreme social marginalization, existing in the country
188 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 189

at that time.21 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting that the leaders of the latter group formed the Frente-autdnomo, a new faction whose last, more sig-
Frente Patridtico Manuel Rodriguez (Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front; FPMR), nificant, armed action took place in October 1988 (ibid.: 538-49). This actu-
the armed front created by the ChCP to command the military actions of ally signaled the defeat of the 'strategic turn' adopted by the ChCP in 1980.
the popular rebellion of the masses policy, were not talking about socialism Since then the ChCP would act as a very reactive and marginalized political
or class struggle at that time (Garcia Naranjo 1997: 249-93). In fact, far from force in the new institutional stage of the struggle for democracy and the sub-
being inspired by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the leaders of FPMR spoke of sequent negotiated political transition that was inaugurated after Pinochet's
a somewhat patriotic, nationalistic and popular doctrine that they called defeat in the Plebiscite of 1988. Indeed, due to the reluctance of the leader-
'rodriguismo', which would inspire 'a strong armed vanguard that decisively ship of the party to abandon altogether the policy of popular rebellion, only
fights for liberty' (Arrate & Rojas 2003: 394). in June of 1988 did the central committee of the ChCP decide to publicly
During the 1980s, the strategic turn of the ChCP triggered a polariza- support the 'NO' option (to Pinochet) in the Plebiscite of October 1988, when
tion of the Left between those who defended the political or pacific way the Concertatidn de Partidos por el No (Coalition of Parties for the NO), the
to restore democracy and those who advocated a violent uprising to end Center-Left coalition formed by all democratic parties opposed to Pinochet
the dictatorship. An exemplary case in this respect was the discussion held apart from the ChCP, was already in place and well advanced in the political
between Jorge Insunza - a high-ranking leader of the ChCP - on the one campaign and the process taking place. Finally, the ChCP supported Patricio
hand, and Tomas Moulian and Eugenio Tironi - two of the more outstand- Aylwin in the presidential election of December 1989 - the candidate of the
ing intellectuals of the process of renewal of ideological paradigms within recently created Concertatidn de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties
the Chilean Left - in a seminar that took place in Chantilly, France in 1983, for the Democracy), though it had been a coalition formed between socialists
where Insunza accused both Moulian and Tironi of giving an illusion that and Christian Democrats with the explicit exclusion of communists.
the dictatorship would end without a popular uprising (ibid.: 331). Such a This was a very reactive policy for a party that in its fifteenth congress
polarization trapped the discussion of the renovation of paradigms, mean- of April 1989, far from criticizing the failure of the strategy of the 'popular
ing that neither the ChCP nor the socialists (almeydistas and renovados) rebellion of the masses', ratified in the central agreement of the congress,
were able to focus on the real change that the country was experiencing - as Cesar Quiroz - a communist militant who was a former member of the
an analysis that was ultimately left, by default, to the 'intellectuals of the FPMR - asserted: 'the military as the permanent matter of the revolutionary
Left', a group that, as we have seen, had already unreservedly excluded any policy of communists and as a preoccupation of the whole party' (quoted
possibility of reformulating the discourse of class struggle for the new socio- in ibid.: 415).
political conditions of the country. This statement was a vivid expression of political isolationism in which
In sum, this new period of discourse of popular uprising launched by the the ChCP had fallen, such that it could only be understood retrospectively
ChCP paradoxically led to the abandonment of a classic analysis of class by recalling how huge the impact was that the so-called 'vacio histdrko' (the
struggle, the discussion now being centered almost exclusively on an abstract historical lack of a military party policy) had upon the critical assessment
debate of the 'means of struggle' and the somewhat more concrete 'types of that the younger generations of communists had made of the PU experience
alliance' necessary to end the dictatorship (Herreros 2003: 414-15). (ibid.: 416-18; Korol 2003: 76-7). The younger militants could not absolve the
The discovery of an illegal smuggling of armaments in June 1986 and historical mistake made by the old leaders - the viejos (the old ones) - accused
a failed attempt to assassinate Pinochet in September 1986, both actions of being more concerned with the so-called 'battle of production' (that is,
commanded by the FPMR (ibid.: 526-38), resulted in repressive side effects the building of socialism within a democratic and capitalist framework) than
brought about by those actions, which contributed to the increased political the crucial 'battle for power' during Allende's administration. The rhetorical
isolationism of the ChCP among Left allies. This in turn led ultimately to assertion of a permanent 'military' policy (vacio histdrko) became then the
the de-legitimation of the policy of the 'popular rebellion of the masses'. imaginary insurance that would 'guarantee' in their political imagination
The end of 1986 (the decisive year as it was labeled by the leadership of that the ChCP could never again be blamed for not being truly revolution-
ChCP) marked a decrease in political attempts to promote a popular upris- ary, even though that would mean the abandonment of the masses. As Cesar
ing in the country, which now only persisted in the rhetoric of political dis- Quiroz, a former militant of the FPMR, in a self-critical statement asserts:
courses and internal documents. Indeed, in 1987 the internal, though never
official, support that ChCP had given to the FPMR was withdrawn, which History was passing us by. There were seven million people already regis-
motivated the division of this last organization between those who accepted tered to participate [in the Plebiscite of 1988] and we were instead calling
the decision and reintegrated into the party, and those who did not. The for a National Patriotic War. (Reproduced in Herreros 2003: 547)
190 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 191

In sum, the ChCP ended the 1990s by insisting upon proclaiming, though shortly return power to the civilians, through which the CDP could have
with less enthusiasm and consistence, a very peculiar version of a discourse the first chance to recuperate the presidency (Serrano & Cavallo 2006: 247).
of popular uprising. Rather than being based on a concrete reading of the Furthermore, since September 1973 the CDP insistently sought to make con-
political and structural social antagonisms of the country a la Marx-Lenin, tact with those sectors within the military regime that favored an early return
as had historically been the tendency in the ChCP, this version of political to civilian rule, the so-called 'blandos' (sofy-liners) within whom the CDP had
confrontation policy was, in fact, at least partially inscribed on the self- some military friends or potential allies. Among those members of the army
condemnation of a failed revolutionary past - a tragic past indeed - which who were part of the 'blandos' and had close links to the CDP were Manuel
could only be avoided by permanently recalling a 'military policy', the Torres de la Cruz, a general who was forced to resign in early 1974; General
obsession that now decides /'/; the last instance who is truly revolutionary Oscar Bonilla, Frei's former aide-de-camp, who died in a probable sabotage
among Chilean communists. of his helicopter; and General Arellano and Hernan Brady, who were also
forced to resign in January 1976 and 1977, respectively (Fleete 1985: 191-2).
The 'pragmatization' of the Center However, it soon became clear that the 'blandos' had been defeated by the
At the time of the coup of 1973, the CDP was dominated by the right-wing so-called 'duros' (hard-liners) who preferred a much longer period of transi-
section of the party - the freistas - led by Patricio Aylwin, who headed a tion to civilian rules, rendering this CDP collaborationist strategy useless.
fierce opposition to Salvador Allende. Although, there is no proof that the It slowly became apparent that the collaboration policy promoted by the
CDP directly participated in the coup, the fact is that most of the more leadership of the CDP was a great and costly miscalculation (Hofmeister
outstanding leaders of the freistas, including the former president of the 1995: 203). In fact in January 1974, the national executive of the CDP,
Republic, Eduardo Frei Moltalva (president of Chile from 1964 to 1970), including Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei Montalva and Radomiro Tomic,
were in favor of a military coup as the only solution to resolve the politi- met the military junta in order to save a special political recess status for the
cal, economic and moral crisis that they believed the PU had brought to CDP. The response, however, as related by Aylwin, was a 'diatribe, an insult
the country. Patricio Aylwin himself relates that Eduardo Frei M. saw the to everybody present in this meeting, to Frei, to Tomic and to the whole
military coup as the only solution to the crisis (Serrano & Cavallo 2006: Christian Democracy' (Serrano & Cavallo 2006: 251).
228). Therefore, it was not surprising that when the coup came about, the By the end of 1974, the majority opinion within the CDP was that the
leadership of the CDP offered, as Eduardo Frei M. declared, 'patriotic support military regime was in fact a fascist and repressive dictatorship - an opinion
to the military government in its tasks of "national reconstruction"' (Fleet that became consolidated on November 26, 1974 when the CDP leader,
1985: 178). However, it is worthwhile stressing that on September 13, 1973 Renan Fuentealba, was arrested and exiled by the junta. The exile of Renan
a group of leaders of the CDP made public a letter in which they directly Fuentealba meant also the end of the official technical collaboration of the
rejected the coup, though they still insisted that the PU was responsible for CDP with the military regime, meaning that CDP technocrats such as Juan
the chaotic state of the country (Arancibia 2006: 603). Villarzu presented their resignations to the military government (Cavallo
The fact is that from September 11, 1973 to April 1975, the official policy etal. 1997: 76). However, it was not until the party plenum of April 1975
of the CDP was one of collaboration with the authoritarian regime, which that a more direct opposition policy was adopted by the CDP. Yet it was
included the holding of technical posts in economic areas. Notably, the still a cautious policy - the so-called constructive opposition - revealing the
Christian Democrat and former Central Bank director during Frei's govern- mixed feelings that were still present in a party deeply affected by the expe-
ment, Jorge Cauas, accepted the Ministry of Finance in 1974 becoming the rience of the PU. Indeed, the poll results on the strategic preferences among
brains of the Chicago Boys team. Also, Juan Villarzu became the Director of Christian Democrats in April 1975 presented by Fleet (1985: 181) shows
Budget and Raul Saez was in charge of the economic co-ordination of the that the option 'Active critical independence' represented 68.2 percent of
first years of the military regime (Fleet 1985: 180; Cavallo etal. 1997: 31-77). preferences; 'Critical collaboration', 28.8 percent; 'Outright opposition',
The 'collaborationists', led by the former Senator and Minister Juan de Dios 9.1 percent; 'Full collaboration', 4.6 percent; and 'Resistance' (presumably
Carmona during Frei M.'s government, made public their position in a let- armed), 1.5 percent.
ter of November 1974 (Fleet 1985: 180).22 It was an utterly anti-communist It was, however, the former president of the Republic and historical leader
statement that, despite acknowledging some human rights abuses commit- of the CDP, Eduardo Frei Montalva, who marked most notoriously this
ted by Pinochet's regime, essentially justified the repression of the Left as a new stage of opposition adopted by the CDP. He started speaking publicly
necessary step in the restoration process of the country. The collaborationist against the military and its policies, notably in an interview for the right-
policy of the CDP was based on the assumption that the armed forces would ist magazine Ercilla in 1975 and in his book El Mandato de la Historia y las
192 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 193

Exigencias de] Porvenir (The Command of the History and the Exigencies a government that the CDP had willingly welcomed, the CDP's dissatisfac-
of the Future), published in December 1975. Frei M., who had previously tion would evolve into political shame - a factor that would be at the root
given tacit support to the coup, despite still blaming Salvador Allende and of the re-emergence of political activity in the CDP during the 1980s.
the PU for the breakdown of democracy in Chile, defended the legacy of his In fact, the new decade started with fresh challenges for the CDP. In
Christian Democrat government - distorted by the military regime - as a April 1980, during a secret plenary session, a new policy of opposition was
vindication for a route to development within democracy (Hofmeister 1995: launched to support the option 'No' in the Plebiscite of September 1980,
205-6). He also criticized the economic and social policies implemented by which Pinochet had called to institutionalize his regime with the explicit
the military government as well as the restrictions enforced upon political intention of assuring his power held until 1997 (Huneeus 2001: 245).
parties, unions and grassroots organizations, which he believed had only Curiously, in this political battle the CDP coincided with the ChCP as the
favored the Left due to the fact that this sector would be better prepared for only other political force that had decided to participate in the Plebiscite.
clandestine political activities. Nonetheless, the most significant point made The ChSP and the MAPU called for abstention instead (Fleet 1985: 194).
by Frei M. (1975: 51) in his book was his expression of regret at not being The defeat of the Plebiscite, however, brought new desolation to the CDP.
able to seek 'a broader consensus from other political and social sectors' in A major loss was the president of the CDP, Andres Zaldivar, who, as a result
the crisis of 1973 (Fleete 1985: 184). of openly denouncing the results of the Plebiscite as fraudulent, was exiled
However, in Frei M.'s words, this did not mean a revalorization of Radomiro indefinitely by the dictatorship. Subsequently the CDP fell into a new depres-
Tomic's classic thesis of Center-Left alliance in order to bring about revolu- sive stage that was followed by almost one and a half years of complete
tionary change.23 On the contrary, Frei M.'s assessment seemed to point to political inactivity. In light of this pessimistic spirit Eduardo Frei M. called
moderate rightist forces with which he may have envisaged future political the CDP to set realistic long-range objectives because, as he says: 'politics is
alliances (Hofmeister 1995: 206). In any case, as a whole this assessment the art of the possible, not a way of compensating for the dullness of daily
would come to represent the first stage of self-criticism adopted by the CDP life by dreaming' (Fleet 1985: 196).
with respect to both the thesis of 'camino propio' (the own route) promoted To make things worse, in January 1982 the former president of the
by the 'freistas' and the support given to the dictatorship, which they had Republic and historical leader of the CDP, Eduardo Frei M., died in Santiago
naively believed (as Aylwin declared) would restore (and respect) the histori- in an episode that many saw as due to the intervention of Pinochet's secret
cal democratic institutions of the country (Serrano & Cavallo 2006: 250). policy (Cavallo et al. 1997: 313-16; Serrano & Cavallo 2006: 188-9).
The complete disenchantment with the military regime came as a result The economic collapse that began in mid-1981 and became the hugest
of the effect of repression upon the CDP. Indeed, after the exile of Renan economic crisis in Chilean history in 1982 and 1983 helped to revitalize
Fuentealba, the dictatorship expelled Claudio Huepe, Jaime Castillo and not only the CDP but also all political activities in Chile (Huneeus 2001:
Eugenio Velasco, all of whom were historical leaders of the CDP (ibid.: 519-34). The first sign of the revitalization of the CDP was the dispute about
252-3). A vivid expression of the desolation that affected the CDP during its presidency, which had been unoccupied for more than a year after the
those years was Patricio Aylwin's renunciation of the presidency of the CDP expulsion of Andres Zaldivar. The CDP was shaken again by the re-emergence
in 1977, after succumbing to depression, which caused him to abandon of political and ideological debate, which provided a view into the new fac-
politics and dedicate himself to private matters for almost five years (ibid.: tions that co-habited within it. The two dominant groups were now the so-
260-1). Aylwin had been the leader of those Christian Democrats who tac- called 'chascones' (long-haired guys) and 'guatones' (fat guys). The 'chascones'
itly advocated a military solution to the crisis of 1973 and naively believed showed a tendency toward social democratic forces, including young party
in a fast return to democracy following the coup. activists and some former 'freistas', who advocated an alliance with the Left.
To replace Aylwin, Andres Zaldivar was elected president of the CDP in More importantly, following the tradition of social Christianism and a 'non-
March 1977. Zaldivar's main proposal was the seeking of an alliance with capitalist route to development' defended in the past by leftists and 'terceris-
all of the democratic forces who opposed Pinochet's regime but explic- tas', they still spoke of the replacement of capitalism, though not as a central
itly excluding the ChCP and tacitly excluding other parties of the PU part of their political proposal, with more participatory economic structures.
(Hofmeister 1995: 208). However, they also acknowledged the dangers and difficulties involved in the
Despite the exclusion of the Left in the new policy of the CDP, a repres- construction of a democratic socialism, for which they proposed a gradual
sive reaction from the dictatorship immediately ensued. In March 1977, the and cautious political option.
CDP, which had been in recess since September 1973, was finally ordered to The 'guatones' were the heirs of the most conservative factions of the
dissolve, forcing it to function clandestinely. With this decree coming from CDP, composed mainly of ex-'freistas'. This group defended the option of a
194 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 195

Center-Right alliance, which they saw as more consistent with the socially the 'Alianza' meant a significant advance in the organization process of the
sensitive liberal approach that they had developed during these years.24 democratic opposition, it ultimately failed in its explicit proposal of agree-
Furthermore, they explicitly defended the thesis of development within cap- ing to the immediate resignation of Pinochet and the opening of the door to
italism - a system that they considered better than socialism because the lat- an anticipated democratic transition. The same fate was experienced when
ter had proved very difficult to operationalize and unacceptable to Chilean the 'Acuerdo National' (The National Accord) was signed in 1985 by an even
society (Fleet 1985: 200). It is interesting to note that the 'guatones' were in broader range of political parties, including some moderate rightist forces.25
this way rejecting the historic Christian Democrat thesis of the 'non-capital- This failed because of a disagreement about the specific chronogram of the
ism route to development'. Notably, Jaime Castillo Velasco (1973: 255), one transition to democracy.
of the ideologues of the CDP, once affirmed in 1973 'from the point of view Furthermore, both initiatives can be seen as failed attempts to negotiate
of the Christian Democrat ideas, the non-capitalist route to development is an end to the dictatorship - a task that finally succeeded when the opposi-
a natural and logic consequence' (ibid.). However, the 'guatones' were also tion (as of 1987) finally accepted the legality posed by Pinochet. In fact, the
already making a tacit positive valorization of the capitalist transformation opposition defeated the dictator in the Plebiscite of 1988 and gained the
that took place during the dictatorship. They did, however, criticize the rigid subsequent presidential election of 1989 only when they decided to play
orthodoxy of the Chicago Boys, whom they considered responsible for the by the rules imposed by the Constitution of 1980. In this scenario, those
economic crisis. sectors of the CDP led by Patricio Aylwin, who well in advance had been
Despite the differences, the common ground between the factions of the announcing this route as the most realistic one, were the most favored. In
CDP was the abandonment of the thesis of 'camino propio' (own route), fact, Patricio Aylwin, in a seminar that took place in Santiago 1984, had
which had been dominant during the 1950s and 1960s within the party. already ascribed to the thesis that the legitimacy of the Constitution was a
This move had already been made by Eduardo Frei M. in his book El reality that had to be recognized if Pinochet was to be defeated on his own
Mandato de la Historia (1975), and thereafter became a distinctive feature of terms (Serrano & Cavallo 2006: 192-3). In the end, the more pragmatic
the renovation of the CDP. The double shame that wracked the CDP - that voices came to lead the CDP, and in 1987 Aylwin was finally elected presi-
is, the sense of guilt for not actively seeking a Center-Left or Right alliance to dent of the CDP - the outset of his future candidacy to be president of the
avoid the coup, and the naive and somewhat opportunistic attitude of hav- Republic in 1989.
ing believed in the democratic intentions of the military junta - ultimately The pragmatism of Aylwin in the political 'institutional' strategy to defeat
made possible a basic consensus on building a broad political alliance either Pinochet coincided with another less well-known process of pragmatization
from the Left or the Right to bring an end to the dictatorship. It was a com- of the former doctrinaire identity - the social communitarianism of the
promise solution that, despite not completely resolving internal divisions, CDP - led in this case by Edgardo Boeninger, an old school technocrat and
allowed for the rebuilding of the damaged political identity that would accomplished political operator of the CDP. It is worth noting that this was
eventually save the CDP from its habitual post-coup depressive stages. not an open process of discussion, nor a formal exchange of documents.
Outwardly, the old debate about the 'non-capitalist route to development', On the contrary, the evidence suggests that it was a process that took place
which had characterized the CDP before the coup, would be progressively indoors and included only the elite of the CDP. Probably the only well-
abandoned, leaving the only discussions that this rebuilding process of known document in this respect is 'Bases de un orden econdmico para la futura
political identity allowed: the character, either Left or Right, of the political democracia en Chile' (basis of an economic order for a future democracy in
alliance and the nature of the particular strategy to end Pinochet's dictator- Chile) published by Boeninger in 1986. Here Boeninger explicitly aban-
ship, by either accepting or rejecting the institutional route consecrated in dons the thesis of social communitarianism and openly and unequivocally
the Constitution of 1980. ascribes to the 'social economy of the market' (Boeninger 1986: 93), which
On the character of the political alliance, the efforts of the CDP were posed endorsed the capitalist system, the primacy of the market and proclaimed
in the building of a broad coalition, which included for the first time some private property as a natural right. This position was by far the much clearer
of the political forces that had been part of the ex-PU. In fact, in April 1982 statement on the new pragmatic economic conception of the majority fac-
the presidency of the CDP was finally, in a compromise solution, awarded to tion of the CDP and the best expression of the silent process of renovation
Gabriel Valdes, who initiated a stage of more open confrontational opposi- of the Christian Democrat doctrinarian paradigm - a process that, alongside
tion to the dictatorship. In September 1983, as a result of an intense period of the adoption of the institutional option led by Aylwin, ultimately advocated
social mobilization, the 'Alianza Democrdtka' (The Democratic Alliance) was 'neo-liberalism with a human face' - a feature that became dominant in the
formed with the CDP and renovated socialists as the main actors. Although political discourse of the CDP at the end of the 1980s.
196 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 197

Therefore, the political and doctrinaire turn imposed on the CDP in the It was this attitude of appeasement that not only affected the Right's indif-
second half of the 1980s completely obliterated the old thesis of a 'non- ference about the issue of human right violations but also conditioned the
capitalism route to development' and the necessity of a social revolution - pacific acceptance that the economic factions of the Right showed toward
the discourse of class struggle proclaimed by part of the CDP before the coup the dramatic consequences of the implementation of the neo-liberal system,
of 1973. This was not, however, the result of an open 'communicative' debate bringing about the ruin of many formerly powerful entrepreneurs (Arriagada
a la Habermas. Rather, it was a tacit consensus imposed on a party, marked by 2004: 140-52). In a way, it was this fear of an epoch full of revolutions that
the tragedy and shame of a painful past that desperately sought to recuperate caused the traditional Right to pass from blind acceptance of a radicalized
its prestige as a main political force - a task in which it found in the renovated and highly barbaric political restoration process to a pragmatic treasuring of
socialists - as we have seen - a powerful ally. a somewhat unexpected result, which was received and defended as a gift:
the implementation of a neo-liberal model carried out within Pinochet's
The emergence of a neo-liberal Right regime by a young generation of technocrats and non-traditional rightists.
The coup of 1973 not only affected socialists, communists and Christian This was a political economic model in which any trace of a feared dis-
Democrats but also hit the Right heavily. Indeed, the coup was not only course of class struggle seems to have now been eliminated altogether, para-
encouraged and supported by the traditional Right, but also euphorically doxically also influenced by the decisions adopted by Chilean communists,
celebrated as a relief of the end of an epoch that had seriously threatened its socialists, Christian Democrats, ex-members of the MAPU and ex-members
more essential interests.26 Then, when the coup actually occurred, the Right of the MIR, in the reconstitution of their formerly revolutionary subjectivi-
understood that, in this new scenario, it no longer made sense to maintain ties, as we have already seen.
its partisan political interests. This was very clearly expressed by the decision The path followed by this process was, however, not free of struggles for
taken by the traditional Right, grouped since 1966 in the National Party, to hegemony. During the first weeks of the military regime a somewhat veiled
order its self-dissolution as a party, only days after the coup (Arancibia etal. political dispute took place. On the one hand, there were the so-called
2002: 199). In this way, the traditional Right not only consciously immo- 'blandos' (soft-liners), whose aim was always to achieve a fast restoration
lated its own aspirations to be considered as a valid political actor of the of the political democratic institutional order, though not before purging
new political landscape, but also left the military free to do all the necessary the 'Marxist cancer' - as had been declared by Gustavo Leigh, the head of
work to 'normalize' the country - an unavoidable task after the chaos that the airforce. Leigh has commonly been associated with a hard-line position
had been left by Allende's government. Sergio Onofre Jarpa - a key leader of because of his declaration during the first days following the coup that 'we
the National Party - asserts on this point: must purge the Marxist cancer from it roots' (Gonzalez 2000: 405). However,
he was in fact inscribed within those who wanted a swift restoration of
The priority task was normalizing and re-building Chile, by promoting constitutional order, as well as a somewhat more corporativist welfare state
the productive activities to produce the necessary resources, particularly model. On the other hand, there were the so-called 'authoritarians' who
food, which was scarce because of the destruction and chaos in the agri- advocated a much longer radical transformation for the institutional order.
cultural sector. (Quoted in ibid.: 201) The quarrel, however, was very soon decided in favor of the authoritarian
tendency, with which Pinochet himself felt more comfortable (Garreton
This much deeper recognition of an awkward sense of salvation that the 1984; Pollack 1999: 52; Valdivia O. de Z 2003: 201).
coup and the new military junta (the executive de facto committee composed This point resolved, the dispute was now centered on the character of the
of the Commanders in Chief of the army, navy, airforce and the General transformations that the military regime would implement. Three doctrines
Director of the Policy) brought to the country would be at the bottom of a struggled for control of the military junta during this stage, all of them
somewhat uncritical and over-receptive attitude toward the military regime headed by civilian rightist sectors rather than militaries, which seemed
shown by the Right, despite the fact that they had previously displayed a to lack any strategic plan to implement. The exception was the Doctrine
strong aversion to any authoritarian militarist breakdown of the institu- of National Security (DNS), which, as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
tional order. In fact, the Right was always opposed to the military coups strategy to combat Marxist insurgence, had been promoted by the military
attempted by sectors linked to General Ibanez during the governments in Latin America. The DNS had permeated the Chilean armed forces and
headed by the RP (1939-52). Furthermore, up to the 1960s the Chilean encouraged a somewhat messianic approach to combat the Marxist menace
Right, far from following the same rupturist pattern shown by the rest of that they saw as seeking to infiltrate Chilean society and destroy national
Latin American Rights, was resolutely constitutionalist (Correa 2004: 101). unity (Cavallo etal. 1997: 15).
198 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 199

However, apart from the DNS, the dispute for gaining the strategic military regime because he had been a strong critic of Allende's administra-
conduction of the military junta in the transformation of the country was tion during his self-exile in Venezuela (Arriagada 1998: 55). Fernando Leniz,
raging among civilians. The first group was the nationalists, led by Pablo as the president of El Mercurio in 1973 - the most influential conservative
Rodriguez Grez, who had actively participated in clandestine conspiracies to newspaper in Chile - was closer to the traditional economic Right. Having
unseat Salvador Allende. The nationalists defended the idea of an extreme been a strong critic of Allende's government, he was appointed Minister of
authoritarian government headed by the Chilean armed forces, whose main Economy in an ingenious way in 1974. Nonetheless, despite the fact that
aim would be to reinvigorate the concept of national unity and rescue an Leniz was not part of the Chicago Boys, he never directly opposed the influ-
assumed heroic past, represented in the figure of Diego Portales. This was a ence of that group (Cavallo et al. 1997: 21-2).
Chilean politician of the nineteenth century, considered by historiography The onset of an economic crisis in 1975 gave the Chicago Boys the
as the founder of the Chilean state (Villalobos 1989; Jocelyn-Holt 1999). chance that they were waiting for. In April 1975 they succeeded in con-
Portales was highlighted as a historical symbol of a conservative-nationalistic vincing Pinochet that the cause of the crisis was the gradualist rhythm of
society by nationalists in order to oppose what they considered to be a deca- the economic transformation, rather than the model itself. Pinochet, who
dent liberal democratic order (Rodriguez Grez 1972: 92-138; Fernandes Fafe at that time held almost total executive power, seems to have also taken
1973: 23-38). political considerations into account in his final decision of April 1975
Although the nationalists had some influence in the first political state- to back the Chicago Boys' 'shock' economic program instead of a more
ments launched by the military junta,27 they never really had direct con- gradual approach, as that promoted by Saez and Leniz. Indeed, some evi-
trol over the key decisions of the junta, as they were marginalized after dence suggests that both Saez and Leniz criticized, although in moderate
1975 when the gremialistas and Chicago Boys, the other groups in dispute, and private tones, 'the complicated situation of human rights' existing in
became dominant. 28 the country at that time, something that was never part of the Chicago
The Chicago Boys were a group of neo-liberal economists, mostly from Boys' discourse (Huneeus 2001: 400; Cavallo etal. 1997: 78). However, far
the Catholic University of Chile and with post-graduate degrees from the from being a solution, the Chicago Boys' shock policy brought a deepen-
University of Chicago. However, some scholars have rejected this label, due ing of the economic crisis. In 1975 GDP fell to 12.9 percent (14.4 GDP per
to the fact that it seems to be associated with the University of Chicago, capita), annual inflation was still excessively high (340.7 percent) and open
rather than the whole American influence on the Chilean intelligentsia unemployment had reached more that 15 percent in all indicators (Mesa-
(Hojman 1993: 28). The main figures were Sergio de Castro, Jorge Cauas, Lago 2000: 141 & 156).
Alvaro Bardon, Pablo Baraona and Roberto Kelly (Valdes 1989; Delano & Nonetheless, the Chicago Boys managed to survive this economic debacle
Traslavina 1989; Silva 1991). and from April 1975 to 1982 they led the structural transformations that
However, for the Chicago Boys and gremialistas the achievement of shaped the new model in its essential components - a model described by
supremacy was not an easy task. From September 11, 1973 to April 14,1975, many economists as neo-liberal orthodoxy in its most pure form29 (Ramos
the economic leadership of the new government followed a somewhat prag- 1986; Sheahan 1987).
matic orientation characterized by a sort of ambiguity. Although it empha- It is worth noticing that the beginning of neo-liberal orthodoxy in Chile
sized a general policy of price liberalization and the control of inflation, as also coincided with the visit of two eminent economists in April 1975:
well as the devolution to the private sector of the enterprises captured by the Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger, invited by Javier Vial, president of
state during Allende's administration, it also promoted a set of restrictions the Hipotecario Bank. They both met privately with Pinochet and publicly
on the liberalization of prices and an active role for the state in the produc- supported the new orthodoxy, implemented by those who had been their
tive sector, as well as a gradualist process of control of inflation (Huneeus students at the University of Chicago (Friedman 1975; Harberger 1975). This
2001: 399; Arriagada 1998: 56; Fontaine 1988: 82). reveals the huge influence exercised by international networks of neo-liberal
At the head of this policy were two influential men, Raul Saez and thought on the Chilean experience and that it was observed as a laboratory
Fernando Leniz, neither of whom were gremialistas or Chicago Boys. Raul for a recipe that soon would be implemented, in a somewhat improved
Saez, one of the most prestigious Chilean economists of the time, was a and softer way, in central countries such as the United States and United
Christian Democrat and had been for a brief period Minister of Finance Kingdom (Harvey 2005).
during Frei Montalva's administration (1964-70). Although he was ideo- In this task, the Chicago Boys also counted the gremialistas as strong
logically opposed to the Chicago Boys, he was appointed by the military allies, who had shifted from an originally more corporativist doctrinaire
junta to be in charge of the economic co-ordination of the first years of the conception based on intermediate social bodies or gremios to an ultra-liberal
200 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 201

ideological framework in which a Hayek-inspired thesis of free individuals Between April 16, 1982 and February 11, 1985, the hegemony of the
became central (Pollack 1999: 66; Moncada 2006:112-13). This strategic alli- Chicago Boys was called into question. Sergio de Castro, Minister of Finance
ance existed from April 1975 throughout the military regime, but it became and the leader of the Chicago Boys, was forced to resign on April 16, 1982
more evident in two central junctures of consolidation of the regime: the when the crisis was already triggered. However, his successor - Sergio de la
first, known as the 'seven modernizations', refers to the seven areas in which Cuadra - (April to August 1982) was also part of the Chicago Boys, though
the economic model was radically transformed following a neo-liberal orien- with less influence than de Castro. Instead, Rolf Liiders, the Bi-Minister of
tation. The seven areas were labor, pensions, education, health, agriculture, finance and economy between August 1982 and February 1983, though he
justice and decentralization, in which a radical and sometimes innovative conducted the transitory intervention of the financial sector, can also be
process of private market-orientated policies were implemented (Pollack classified under the 'neo-liberal' aegis. The same can be said for the next
1999: 69-81). Added to the privatization process and the internal and Minister of Finance, Carlos Caceres (February 1983), who agreed with Liiders
external liberalization of goods and financial markets,50 it was these seven about the 'necessity' of being appointed as the new Minister of Finance to
modernizations that really transformed the country into a neo-liberal ori- tackle the influence of those who defended greater state intervention in the
entated society. The seven modernizations were carried out by the Chicago economy, represented by the new Minister of Economy, Manuel Martin, at
Boys with the explicit endorsement of the gremialistas, as was palpably that time (Cavallo et al. 1997: 338). The lowest point of influence of the
expressed by Jaime Guzman - the historical leader of the gremialistas at that Chicago Boys happened between March 1984 and February 1985 when
time (Pollack 1999: 213). both the political team headed by Sergio Onofre Jarpa, as the Minister of
The second and more telling occasion in which the gremialistas and the the Home Office, and the economic direction of the government, led by
Chicago Boys alliance showed their strategic importance was the redaction Modesto Collados and Luis Escobar Cerda, were in the hands of those who
and ultimate adoption of the Constitution of 1980. Indeed, although there openly disagreed with the Chicago Boys' policies.
was a vivid dispute between the gremialistas, the traditional Right and nation- Sergio Onofre Jarpa was at that time one of the most important leaders
alistas surrounding the structuring of the state's political organs, transition of the traditional Right (Partido Nacional), a classical politician who deemed
period and the character of democracy needed by the country (ibid.: 73-7), it necessary to confront a complex political and economic period. Indeed,
the economic model was almost never debated and the neo-liberal posi- he opened a short stage of dialog with the political opposition known as
tion of the Chicago Boys, expressed through Jaime Guzman in the original 'La Apertura' (the opening), and made contact with entrepreneurial (small,
manuscript, was unaltered during the whole discussion process. Moreover, medium-sized and big) organizations, all of which helped the government
the acquiescence of the Right on the economic model consecrated in the to decompress the political environment. Later on, Jarpa would recount that
Constitution also tacitly reached those sectors of the opposition, namely he sometimes used a confrontational discourse against the Chicago Boys'
socialists and Christian Democrats, who, after closuring their debate on the policies to show entrepreneurial organizations that he agreed with their
legitimacy of the Constitution as such, concentrated their contention upon demands, though he knew that his solutions were no more than 'aspirins'
the political aspects of the constitutional card. In this way, it is fair to say (Arancibia etal. 2002: 348-60).
that the Constitution of 1980 was the definitive victory of the gremialistas- In turn, Modesto Collados, an entrepreneur and ex-Minister of Eduardo
Chicago Boys' alliance in their attempt to preserve the all-encompassing Frei Montalva's administration (1964-70) with a more Keynesian economic
neo-liberal project, which would be at the bottom of the model inherited approach, promoted a triennial plan of public investment to resolve the prob-
by the Concertatidn in 1990. lem of unemployment also shared by the Cdmara Chilena de la Construction (the
However, from 1980 onward, life became unexpectedly difficult for the Chilean Construction Chamber), the entrepreneurial organization of construc-
new alliance. Indeed, the economic crisis of 1982-3 hugely damaged the tion (Cavallo etal. 1997: 369). Finally, Luis Escobar Cerda, a member of the RP
prestige of the Chicago Boys, opening a debate for greater influence in eco- who had been Minister of Economy in Alessandri's government (1961-3) and
nomic and political matters within the government itself. In fact, although Dean of the faculty of economy of the University of Chile, a school influenced
Pinochet's leadership was never disputed, the Chicago Boys - the team of by structuralism, was the first Minister of Finance who was not part of the
economists that had indisputably conducted the economic policy until then - Chicago Boys. He promoted an increase in both tariffs and tax rates.
started to be affected by criticisms from sectors closer to the traditional However, the influence of the Chicago Boys never fully disappeared. For
entrepreneurial sector and political Right, which advocated major govern- instance, the influence of 'mandos medios', middle-rank officials, within the
ment intervention in the reactivation of the economy, particularly in terms Ministry of Finance and Central Bank was a decisive factor in diminishing
of a liberation of the exchange rate. the authority and efficacy of those new Ministers who were not part of the
202 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 203

Chicago Boys' agenda (Cavallo et al. 1997:372). This was especially the case of The MUN was set up in 1983 and represented those sectors of the Right
Luis Escobar Cerda, who was repeatedly accused of promoting an 'expansion- that had been part of the national party before the coup, plus some outstand-
ist and protectionist economic policy' by Chicago Boys' officials (Fernandez ing new leaders such as Andres Allamand, who now acted as the party leader.
1994: 199, quoted in Huneeus 2001: 510). The hegemony of the Chicago The distinctive feature of the MUN was its position in favor of the 'apertura'
Boys was completely recovered after February 1985 when Hernan Biichi, an (opening) - a dialog with the opposition aiming to explore early solutions to
economist of the second generation of the Chicago Boys, was appointed as the dictatorship. Unlike the UDI, most of the members of the MUN had not
Minister of Finance. Hernan Biichi, younger than the first generation of the held posts in the military regime, and they increasingly felt that the return to
Chicago Boys, actually got a Masters in Economics from Columbia University democracy, though a new one, was necessary to preserve the 'obra' (achieve-
rather than from Chicago. He started to work in Pinochet's regime in 1975 in ment) of the military regime. In other words, the MUN was essentially in
different positions until February 18, 1985, when he was appointed Minister agreement with the UDI in treasuring the neo-liberal model as the most pre-
of Finance (Huneeus 2001: 402; Biichi 1993). cious achievement of the dictatorship. Moreover, it was precisely to guaran-
The economic crisis of 1982-3 marked a revitalization of political activi- tee that such a treasury was not dismantled that they were now prompted to
ties in the country, in which opposition parties and social movements sacrifice the ugly side of the dictatorship incarnated in Pinochet. Therefore,
started to play increasingly important roles. The Right faced the dilemma for the MUN, the thesis of a 'protected' democracy linked ineluctably to
of continuing to be attached, as a mere undifferentiated appendix, to the Pinochet and defended by the UDI was a nonsensical political statement
military regime or deciding to transform into a political party. The latter that did not take into account the new political scenario that was in place,
option was favored, though the degree of independence to the regime nationally and internationally. These were years in which the Reagan admin-
was a point of contention between the different forces of the Right. The istration began to rethink its support of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile
gremialistas and some Chicago Boys decided to set up the Union Demdcrata and shifted toward advocating a return to democratic civilian rule, as it has
lndependiente (Independent Democrat Unity; UDI) led by Jaime Guzman in recently documented by Morley and McGillion (2006).
August 1983, with the explicit aim of defending the Constitution of 1980 However, for the MUN this was, in a way, a tactical difference with the UDI
and the neo-liberal model. Furthermore, outwardly the UDI became an within a more substantial strategic understanding about which both branches
active political organization that maintained a very doctrinaire adherence of the Right were in fact in agreement: the defense of the Constitution of
to the figure of General Pinochet, opposing all initiatives launched by those 1980 as the new institutional framework for the country and the protection
sectors of the more traditional Right that favored a dialog with the opposi- of the neo-liberal model consecrated in the same Constitution. Nevertheless,
tion. Having formed a strong popular base of support, thanks to the key the short-term period in which both the MUN and UDI attempted to form
postings held by the gremialistas in the municipalities during the 1970s, one party - Renovation Nacional (National Renewal; RN) - was marked by the
the UDI had no doubt of becoming the civil arm of Pinochet in his desire tactical differences imposed over the strategic agreements, making such a
to stay in office until 1997. Behind this political position was the common period of co-habitation a time of tumult. In fact, RN was set up on April 29,
interest of both gremialistas, who saw in a long-term transition the most 1987 with the fusion of the MUN, UDI and the Frente Nacional del Trabajo
compatible route with its thesis of a 'protected' democracy and the Chicago (the National Front of Work), whose main leader was Sergio Onofre Jarpa.
Boys' technocratic approach, which meant that more years of authoritarian In April of 1988 Jaime Guzman, the leader of the UDI, was expelled from
power would facilitate the consolidation of the neo-liberal model, without the party under the accusation that he was infringing the party's declara-
the 'incommodities' brought about by a democratic regime. tion of principle, taking the majority of the members of the UDI with him
It is important to highlight here that although the thesis backed by the and restructuring the UDI as a new political party (Pollack 1999: 99). The
UDI was ultimately beaten with the defeat of Pinochet in the Plebiscite of differences were actually posed in the fact that the UDI was struggling to
1988, which impeded the authoritarian regime from remaining until 1997, gain from the new party - RN - explicit and partisan support for Pinochet
most of the notions of a 'protected' democracy, as well as the essential as the candidate for the Plebiscite of 1988, and the MUN, on the contrary,
components of the neo-liberal model, survived intact in the new political was reluctantly opposed to such an option under the naive hope that the
scenario between the Plebiscite and the presidential election of 1989. To junta would nominate a civilian. Yet it was also not surprising that such a
understand this point clearly is important to seeing the role played by the dramatic break between the two main forces of the Right caused a fissure
other more significant political party that represented the traditional Right, that only reached the level of the tactical but never of the strategy. In other
though with a new leadership, that emerged at that time: the Movimiento de words, the two aforementioned pillars - the Constitution and the neo-
Union National (Movement of National Unity; MUN). liberal model - appeared to be safeguarded by a much deeper consensus
204 The New Critique of Ideology The Discourse of Class Struggle 205

within the Right, which, it would be very soon clear, would also reach the was marked by a less explicit sense of constriction for self-assumed mis-
political forces of the opposition. takes of the past - a circumstance that ultimately meant a revalorization of
It was both this strategic consensus and a much more flexible tactic that democracy, but one depurated of any class or even social confrontations.
gave the RN, already separated from the UDI, greater space to maneuver the For the ChCP, it translated into self-condemnation for a failed revolution-
negotiation to reform the Constitution of 1980 after the defeat of Pinochet ary attitude during Allende's government that led the party to fetishize the
in the Plebiscite of 1988. It was not that the RN sought to dismantle the military policy - a circumstance that helps to explain its political isolation.
strategic institutional framework, including the economic model consecrated For the CDP, the coup configured a somewhat difficult process of acknowl-
in the Constitution but, on the contrary, to pragmatically eliminate those edgment of its political shame (the policy of 'camino propio' - own route -
over-authoritarian aspects that impeded the generation of a higher degree and the naive expectation of becoming the heirs of the military coup),
of legitimation around it. The UDI, in turn, although formally opposed to which, though successful, ended by de-legitimizing any ideological discus-
any amendment of the Constitution - due to its more doctrinarian tactical sion within a party formerly heavily crossed by such debates - a circum-
orientation - eventually recognized, as Hernan Larrain, a key politician of the stance that led to the passive acceptance of the neo-liberal model (with a
UDI, has asserted (interview 2005e) - that the whole process was successful human face) as the main proposal for the new democracy. Finally, for the
at the strategic level. Right the coup meant both a definitive defeat of its republican legacy and
It is thus fair to say that it was the defeat of Pinochet in the Plebiscite the treasuring of a neo-liberal and institutional model very much in tune
of 1988 that allowed the opening of a door for the consolidation of a stra- with its interests - an ideal situation in which, at the end of the dictatorship,
tegic victory for the Right - a victory that would have been very difficult even its formerly feared adversaries refused to speak of class struggle, as they
to achieve if Pinochet had continued to hold office until 1997, and which had done vociferously before the coup.
ultimately meant a democratic consolidation of an institutional framework In sum, from September 11, 1973 - the date of the coup - to March 11,
(restricted democracy and neo-liberal economic model) in which any trace 1990 - the outset of the Concertatidn governments - a huge reconfiguration
of a discourse of class struggle - hugely feared by the Right - seemed to have of the political discourse of the Left, the Center and the Right took place
disappeared altogether. in Chilean politics. It was this new, somewhat contradictory, scenario that
would be at the root of the Chilean political elites' consensus on the politi-
Summary cal economic model in the 1990s, as we will see in the next chapter.

Chapter 6, divided into two sections, marked by the coup of 1973, has traced
the trajectory followed by the political discourse of the main political forces
of the Left, Center and Right in Chilean politics from the 1960s to 1990. The
first section has argued that the 'three thirds' politics inaugurated since 1958
signaled the incremental development of a discourse of class struggle among
Chilean political elites. For the leaders of the ChSP, this process represented
a contradictory sense of compulsion to prove themselves as the most revo-
lutionary; for the ChCP, it represented a conservative, measured and a pos-
teriori (when the defeat came) self-assumedly uncanny promotion of a class
struggle discourse that privileged the 'battle of production' over the 'battle
of power'; for the CDP, it represented the polarization of the factions of the
party, the de-legitimation of the PU government and the indirect promo-
tion of a naively unexpected long dictatorship; and for the Right, it meant
a fierce and confrontational defense of its class interests, which cracked its
formerly republican tradition.
The second section has argued that the coup exerted a significant impact
in the reconstitution of political discourse of political forces in Chile, sig-
naled by a process of expurgation of the notion of class struggle. For the
ChSP that meant advocating a so-called 'renovation of paradigms', which
The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 207

^7 central role in regulating the market and implementing large-scale social


policies, though not to the extent that would impede the expansion of the
economy (Aylwin 1994: 173-276; Taylor 2006: 113-19; van der Ree 2007:
249). Furthermore, as was suggested by an editorial in the Chilean main-
T h e Ideological D i s c o u r s e i n
stream newspaper La Tercera (2005a, October 8), one could argue that such
P o s t - P i n o c h e t C h i l e vociferous debate on the issue of inequality was no more than a campaign
strategy. This in turn might reflect the strength and success of the Chilean
model, which was able to accommodate an open discussion on a formerly
disruptive issue without referring to ideological discussions of proyectos de
pais (major projects) (van der Ree 2007: 249) as was common during the
1960s. One could also argue, however, that the occurrence of this discussion
revealed the political elites' response to a sense of frustration in the elector-
ate as a consequence of the unsatisfactory results of 22 years of implementa-
Following the methodological design defined in Chapter 4, this chapter tion of the 'growth with equity' model. In fact, as we have already analyzed
presents an argumentative formal analysis of the MJ and SSCs deployed in Chapter 5, the Gini co-efficient for the years 1987-90 reached 0.570,
by the Chilean political elites (ChPEs) to deal with the issue of income one of the highest scores in the history of Chile (Larranaga 2001: 305).
inequality within the post-Pinochet Chilean political economy model - the During the first eight years of the new democratic governments, the Gini
so-called 'Chilean model'. co-efficient tended to improve slightly, reaching 0.525, but in 1999-2003
Although income inequality has been a constant feature of the Chilean it rose again to 0.592 (Santibanez, 2006: Table 2). Additionally, by 1987
political economy model (Drake & Jaksic 1999: 13; Oppenheim 2007: 193; the percentages of poverty and indigence reached 48.6 percent and 22.6
Taylor 2006: 136), open debate around it acquired increasing notoriety in percent, respectively, of the total population, coinciding paradoxically with
the Chilean political arena after the presidential contest of December 2005 high absolute and per capita rates of increase in GDP, 6.6 percent and 4.8
(first round) and January 2006 (second round). Curiously, it was the Right percent (Mesa-Lago 2000: 142 & 158). Rates of poverty and indigence dra-
that began the debate through statements by both of its candidates: Joaquin matically decreased as economic growth increased during the post-Pinochet
Lavin, the conservative right-wing candidate of the UDI (La Tercera 2005, democratic governments (Fazio 2005), but the gap between the poorest and
May 6), and Sebastian Pinera, the liberal right-wing candidate of the RN, who the richest income quintiles of the population grew from 15.26 percent in
eventually became president in January 2010 (La Nation 2005b, November 1991-8 to 17.48 percent in 1999-2001. Thus, despite providing economic
17). As expected, the candidate for the left-wing coalition Juntos Podemos Mas growth and poverty reduction, the Concertatidn was unable to resolve the
(We Can Do More Together), Tomas Hirsch, was also explicit in denouncing high levels of income inequality in the country, which, in the context of
the huge inequality brought about by the neo-liberal model adopted by the economic prosperity, became increasingly unacceptable to the majority of
post-Pinochet democratic governments (El Mercurio 2005, October 23). Even Chileans (Cumsille & Garreton 2000).
the candidate of the Concertatidn de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Adopting this second line of interpretation, this chapter will make a dis-
Parties for Democracy), Michelle Bachelet, ultimately had to say, inequality cursive formal analysis, following the methodology described In Chapter 4,
persists in our country, and my central political aim will be to fight against of the set of MJ and SSCs through which the ChPEs have managed, from the
it' (La Nation 2005a, November 17). It is worth noticing, however, that this very beginning of the democratic period (March 1990), to provide reasons
was a reaction to a debate opened by the Catholic Church, somewhat moti- for the permanent, rather than occasional, presence of the issue of income
vated by its necessity to overcome the relatively retrogressive traditional inequality, which seems to threaten the enduring character of the consen-
influence it exerted on moral issues within Chilean society (La Nation 2005, sus on the Chilean model. My focus will be on income inequality as it is
May 8; La Tercera 2005, September 18). measured by the Gini index, that is: 'the extent to which the distribution
In a way, however, there was nothing new about this recalling of the issue of income/consumption among individuals or households within an econ-
of income inequality, for equity had always been at the core of the distinc- omy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution' (World Bank 2006: 287).
tive project that the Concertatidn had pursued since 1990. The 'growth with Although equity has been understood in broader terms as the condition in
equity' project assumed that growth and equity were not only compatible which 'individuals have equal opportunity to pursue a life of their choos-
but interdependent, and that to achieve equity the state had to play a ing and are spared extreme deprivation in outcomes' (World Bank 2006: 2),
206
208 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 209

income inequality signals more directly to what was at issue under the (Garreton 1995: 22). These enclaves, according to Manuel Antonio Garreton
period analyzed (1990-2006): a 'modern' political economy model that (1989a: 3), included 'constitutional aspects, the political power of the armed
operated on the premise that a small sector of population would concentrate forces, possible political exclusions, unresolved human rights problems,
in its hands most of the income and consumption of the whole economy. the absence of democratization of local and state power, and so on' (ibid.).
Furthermore, and bearing in mind the conceptual criteria defined in Such institutional constraints were put forward as the main or even the sole
Chapter 4, the discursive analysis here developed will assess - in the explanation for the particular character of the Chilean political economy
conclusions of this chapter - whether or not the justification of the issue model in the 1990s and even the 2000s - a model that some have called
of income inequality can be considered as ideological, that is, whether or 'tutelary democracy' (Przeworski 1988: 61; 1991: 3; Shain & Linz 1992) but
not such SSCs and MJ seek both to deny any reference to the discourse of that others have argued cannot be so labeled (Rabkin 1992).
class struggle and to deny any reference to the discourse of class struggle It was, for instance, by pointing to the persistence of institutional con-
assumed as the Real.1 In other words, the discursive analysis presented in straints that the Concertatidn officials and mainstream scholars commonly
this chapter will allow the assessment of whether or not those MJ and SSCs took positions on whether the Chilean political transition had ended and
deployed by ChPEs show coherence in explaining either the denial (exclu- if so when - a somewhat bizarre quarrel of the 1990s and 2000s (Barton &
sion) or inclusion of the notion of class struggle from their explanations of Murray 2002; Fuentes 1996; 2000; Garreton 1999; 2003; La Tercera 2005,
the issue of income inequality on the consensus of the political economy September 25). More importantly, it was implicitly through reference to
model investigated. And if there is an actual denial, it will consider whether such 'structural conditions' that ChPEs managed to overlook an alternative
or not this can be considered as both a denial of a primordial repressed and strand of the literature, which highlighted the regressive and exclusionary
a central constituent of a given political discourse, as developed by Zizek character of the Chilean model of the 1990s and 2000s, particularly with
(see Chapters 3 and 4). regard to popular participation (Oxhorn 1995; 2004; Posner 2004; Silva
2004), the weakening of the labor movement and the insufficiency of labor
Traumas and fantasies of ChPEs reforms (Barrett 2001; Duran-Palma, Wilkinson & Korczynski 2005; Frank
2002; Winn 2004), income inequalities (Agacino 2003; Cademartori 2003;
The end of Pinochet's regime was followed by a period of new democracy in Fazio 1997; 2005; 2006; Hojman 1996) and state 'continuism' (Barton
Chile that has lasted 22 years and included four governments of the political 2002). Any criticism from social or political adversaries was promptly and
coalition, the Concertatidn, which defeated Pinochet in 1988, and one gov- efficiently resolved by stressing a sort of 'structural impossibility', the bind-
ernment of the Right, headed by Sebastian Pinera (2010-14). At the core of ing laws (leyes de amarre) left by Pinochet that prevented the Concertatidn
this new democratic period was a huge transformation of power in Chilean elites (against their will, it was argued) from altering the model. This was,
society as a result of the dictatorship's implementation of a neo-liberal model, for instance, the argument made by Genaro Arriagada, a key politician of
expressed in a substantial modification of productive structures and social the Concertatidn, president of the CDP, head of the democratic coalition, the
classes (Gindling & Robbins 2001; Leiva, Petras & Veltmeyer 1994; Portes Comando por el No (the coalition of the 'NO') that defeated Pinochet in the
1985; Portes & Hoffman 2003; Veltmeyer, Petras & Vieux 1997; Winn 2004). plebiscite of 1988, a key figure in the presidential campaign of Eduardo Frei
This was no mere continuation of the democratic republican tradition - the Ruiz-Tagle in 1994, Minister of Communications during the first three years
so-called compromised state that existed in Chile from 1931 to the coup of of Frei Ruiz-Tagle's administration, and head of Ricardo Lagos's first-round
1973, which was characterized by high levels of protection for big business and campaign during the presidential contest of 1999 (interview 20051):
landowners, restrictive socio-political integration, and limited state strategic
economic interventions despite the adoption of state-led import-substitution Because of the 'binomial' electoral system, the Right had control over
industrialization (Barrett 2000: 2). Rather, the new democracy inaugurated in the Senate, in which, because of the presence of unelected senators, the
March 1990 can be considered a new political economy model whose main government never had the majority. 1 think it had 69 deputies, but with
feature was the co-existence of a limited democracy with high levels of income 69 deputies you cannot change the constitutional laws. Therefore, the
inequality. These are regressive features that have often been overlooked by strategy of Aylwin's government was to govern in such a way as to avoid
analyses that treat the resulting state of affairs as a causal factor. conflict. But what did this mean? It meant encouraging constitutional
The discursive resource most often employed in this respect was a set of reform, supporting the elimination of unelected senators, and many
constraints derived from the particular negotiated character of the Chilean other things but without moving those proposals to a point where a con-
political transition that had been designated as 'authoritarian enclaves' stitutional rupture could occur, do you see my point? (Ibid.)
210 The New Critique ofldeotogy The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 211

Furthermore, this was not only a dominant view among ChPEs but also an of the Concertatidn politicians, as confirmed by Jaime Gazmuri, a key
approach shared and reinforced by influential scholars in the field, such as ex-senator of the Chilean Socialist Party (interview 2005c):
Alan Angell (2007) as well as Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic (1999: 16).
However, it is worthwhile stressing that this analytical description of pre- Yes, to me it made sense that at any moment a scenario of economic
senting 'authoritarian enclaves' as the explicative factor of an incomplete instability could have stimulated a new authoritarian attempt. (Ibid.)
democracy often fails to notice a set of discursive MJ and SSCs deployed by
ChPEs to deal with those more pressing issues, such as income inequality, This fear was also declared by many politicians interviewed, such as Genaro
which in a way came to supplement the thesis of institutional impossibility Arriagada, and also by some academics such as Joseph Ramos, the former
represented by the authoritarian enclaves. In fact, although the discursive director of the department of Economy of the University of Chile who
stratagems employed by ChPEs recall permanently the backing of such declares (interview 2005g):
institutional constraints as a justificatory frame (Escalona 1999: 48), they
actually seem to have an inner origin, rooted in the historical process of Well, listen, I think Pinochet plays a role, an ambivalent role, if not
discursive reconstitution experienced by ChPEs after the coup of September negative. It was ambivalent because there were some people who said:
1973, known as the process of renovation of ideological paradigms.2 Indeed, why not preserve the good things (about the model) and change the
the process of the reconstitution of a political discourse, dramatically influ- bad things! However, there were others, the most romantic, who declare
enced by the breakdown of democracy in 1973, is permanently recreated 'Leave this model aside and build a new one!'. They were repeating
by ChPEs by recalling a set of discursive stratagems, often expressed in the the history of the critique to the model. Well, but I would say that the
form of fantasies and traumas, which supplements the discourse of the con- argument of the fear of Pinochet that we inherited was an argument to
sensus on the Chilean model at any time it appears to be threatened by the preserve the model. (Ibid.)
'specter' of income inequality. Let us look in detail at the evolution of these
discursive stratagems. This fear of Pinochet supplements the thesis of the 'authoritarian enclaves',
acting as a traumatic support that provides verisimilitude to an otherwise
The 'two fears' of ChPEs seemingly naive statement, unacceptable for the political register of a
former revolutionary political elite who used to be proud of their ability to
One of the first MJ employed by ChPEs to explain their acquiescence in deal with impossibilities.3
accepting a slow and reformist path to tackling the issue of income inequal- In fact, the permanent recalling of those 'authoritarian enclaves', which
ity inherited from Pinochet's regime was the thesis of the two fears. was the explicit discourse of politicians of the Concertatidn at that time,
Ernesto Ottone, an influential political adviser during Lagos's government apparently pursues the objective of showing indisputably how and why
and ex-member of the ChCP, expresses this idea in the following terms a drastic change in the model was beyond the Concertatidn 'good faith'.
(interview 2005b): However, the actuality of this impossibility was always something disputable.
Alan Angell (2007: 49-50) informs us that to pass a law regulating the state's
In the two first years of the government, we could govern, I think, thanks activities as entrepreneurial - something that has meant a radical change of
to two fears that confronted each other. On the one hand, on the side the model - the Concertatidn needed 23 senators and 61 deputies and it had
of the democratic forces, the necessity that this [the political process] obtained in the parliamentary election of 1989, 22 senators and 72 deputies,
was conducted through a consensus, not by confrontation, taking into so it was really only a matter of one senator. Nevertheless, it also seemed that
account that this process had been a process of a partial transition. And the recalling of 'authoritarian enclaves' aims to make clear, though implic-
on the other hand, the fear experienced by the forces that had been sup- itly, that the true reason impeding any change of the model was the risk of
porting Pinochet that they could - we may put it in these terms - lose a the authoritarian irruption of Pinochet - a factor that actually finds a much
lot of more if they were not able to give up something. (Ibid.) wider resonance, affecting all ChPEs, particularly union and civil society
leaders. For instance, Maria Rozas, a former leader of the Central Unitaria de
The first fear referred to by Ottone is the fear of Pinochet, that is, a new Trabajadores de Chile (CUT), explicitly recognizes (interview 2005h):
authoritarian irruption. This was, at the beginning of the new demo-
cratic period, a possibility that deeply touched the traumatized memory There was a lot of fear, and particularly in our case, it was very easy to
of the ChPEs, and would become an explicit component of the discourse threaten us with that [the authoritarian irruption] because if you see
212 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 213

the list of the first people missing that are publicly acknowledged in the the union leaders of the CUT, militants of different political parties of
report of Patricio Aylwin, you will see that 483 are Union leaders, which the Concertatidn and the Chilean Communist Party expressly assumed
means that they were not 'pure' politicians, which means that we were a self-restraining attitude in order '[t]o care for the democracy that was
considered politicians anyway. (Ibid.) threatened by Pinochet', as Maria Rozas, a former union leader of the CUT,
declares (interview 2005b).
Furthermore, it is worthwhile highlighting here that the use of Pinochet's However, the fear of Pinochet, which was implicitly associated with the
authoritarian irruption was not a completely unfounded and artificial impossibility of drastically changing the 'authoritarian enclaves' in the 1990s,
political invention, created by 'Machiavellian' politicians to reinforce the often represented a somewhat mixed political device. It acts, on the one hand,
legitimacy of the new political order. Rather, it is more accurate to assume it as a sort of fetishist expression of the axis 'dictatorship versus democracy',
as a political fantasy - in a Zizekian sense - that was rooted in the very real which the Concertatidn has permanently used as the basis for legitimacy dur-
experiences - immediate or not - of those people at whom it was aimed. ing the whole political transition (Huneeus 2003: 59). But also, on the other
Moreover, it may come as a surprise that even Chilean communists were hand, it obtained such legitimacy without directly compromising the special
often affected by the effects of this fantasy, as Guillermo Teillier, the current status accorded to Pinochet during the 1990s, as an untouchable senator for
president of the Chilean Communist Party, recognized when he explained life, after being retired as Commander in Chief in 1998. Therefore, for the
why they supported Ricardo Lagos in the second round of the presidential Concertatidn, the discursive resource of 'authoritarian enclaves', particularly
contest in January 2000 (interview 2005i): during the 1990s, was a symbolic artifact that allowed both the sublimation
of the figure of Pinochet, as someone with whom one had to live inexorably
In the last presidential election [December 1999-January 2000] when because of the imaginary threat that he incarnated (the first fear referred
Ricardo Lagos was elected, we had a huge discussion in the party due to to by Ottone), and the public condemnation of Pinochet practiced by the
the fact that there were sectors in the party who believed that if Lavin politicians of the Concertatidn, who, aspiring to get political credit, played
[the rightist candidate] won it would mean the return of dictatorship, in the game of seeming to be furiously anti-Pinochetist on every occasion it was
other words, the continuity of the Right. Then they argued that we had necessary to gain legitimacy.
to support Lagos, and that was what happened in the first and in the In turn, this fear of Pinochet, which worked efficiently to get politi-
second round, many of our votes went to support Lagos ... I do not know cal acquiescence from the 'democratic forces', was paired with another
what's going to happen nowadays, I have no idea, I do not know if that opposing fear, to 'lose everything', which affected 'those who have sup-
situation has changed, but it is a factor that the Concertatidn employs in ported Pinochet', namely, the Right and entrepreneurs, as well as the army.
its favor: the subjacent fear of the people, in part of the people, that a Publicly, it was a fear of the demagogy and tabula rasa that it was expected
coup will happen again. (Ibid.) would come when the new democratic government took office, as Evelyn
Matthei, a leader - at that time - of the liberal rightist party, RN, has put it
This, however, does not mean that Pinochet's presence has ever been (interview 2005k):
a true menace to the new democracy, as has been clearly recognized
by many members of Concertacidn's elite, including Ernesto Ottone, In my case, I saw the risk, the political risk on the side of the demagogy,
Enrique Correa and Edgardo Boeninger (interviews 2005b; 2005d; 2005j, of damaging economic policies, of a serious social conflict, 1 mean, in
respectively), though rarely made public. However, the fear that a coup a resemblance of the social convulsion that had been in Argentina [in
will happen again acquired its own actuality as a threat as soon as the 2001), for instance, where there have been already two presidents that
remembrance, in one way or another, imaginatively fitted with the actual could not have been able to end their periods in office. (Ibid.)
circumstances of those it aimed to disarm. Such an illicit connection was
mastered by the Concertatidn elites during the 1990s as a political device However, the true fear that affected the political and economic opposition
for getting acquiescence from all ChPEs, particularly from those more to the Concertatidn governments during the first years of the political transi-
critical sectors, such as union and civil society leaders, which otherwise tion, far from being focused on a general concern that highlighted the risk
may have had a much stronger reaction against the shortcomings (high of destabilization that - it was argued - loomed over the new democracy,
levels of income inequality, for instance) presented by the Chilean model potentially threatened by social unrest, was posed in relation to a much
at that time. The efficiency of such a logic was expressed throughout the narrower particular social interest: the risk of losing the privileged posi-
1990s, but with particular vividness during Aylwin's government, when tion in which 'the forces who supported Pinochet' found themselves after
214 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 215

an authoritarian imposition of a regressive neo-liberal model.4 Moved by However, it is worthwhile stressing that the acknowledgment of the thesis
this more partisan fear, the entrepreneurial sector opted for acknowledg- of the two fears, the fear of Pinochet that affected the 'democratic forces'
ing the 'cost' of the Pinochet model but alleged that it was a cost already and the fear of losing everything held by the former supporters of Pinochet,
paid for the benefit of the whole country, and therefore, it would be a crazy seemed to be ineluctably linked to a much deeper and unacknowledged
and destabilizing idea to try to go back to the previous situation, as Jose trauma that affected all ChPEs and that would better explain the solidity
Antonio Guzman, an ex-leader of Confederation de la Production y el Comertio of the consensus on the Chilean model, despite the high levels of income
(Confederation of Industry and Trade), the Chilean umbrella business asso- inequality. Indeed, at the root of these aforementioned acknowledged fears
ciation, makes clear (interview 20051): seems to reside the trauma of the remembrance of a discourse of class strug-
gle, such as that which was dominant until the coup of 1973, and in which
The period between the plebiscite [October 1988] and the election most of members of the ChPEs directly or indirectly participated.6
[December 1989] was a crucial time. We led a process of discussion with Due to the nature of this trauma,7 it is not directly expressed by the elite
the future authorities represented by leaders of socialism, Christian discourse but it can be recognized through the lens of a 'symptomatic'
democracy and radicalism, in order to explain. We said: listen, it is reading, such as that offered by Althusser and Balibar (1970).8 On the side of
unthinkable to go back to the past, we already made the change; we the 'democratic forces', those who formed the Concertatidn, this trauma is ulti-
made the 'switch'. If you go back to the past, firstly, the whole cost that mately articulated as a fear of themselves, that is, as a fear of what they imagine
we have paid is going to be in vain ... [b]ecause we, and some members they once were (or how they once lived) - as a political generation - and now
of the Concertatidn, were convinced that the transition had to avoid being reject as an undesirable, that is, political actors who irresponsibly proclaimed
traumatic because otherwise it would have brought ... a huge frustration an openly revolutionary discourse.
into the country. (Ibid.) Edgardo Boeninger, for instance, despite being a conservative Christian
Democrat leader rather than a revolutionary, has explicitly recognized the
In this way, the entrepreneurial sector astutely defended a thesis that com- impact that the rejection of a past of confrontations has had in the success
bined both a calling for a 'political realism' and an implicit remembrance of the Concertatidn (interview 2005J):
of the trauma of the social destabilization that would come about if Chile
were to 'go back to the past'. Those were two discursive components that The trauma of the past years, not only during Pinochet's regime, not only
proved efficient in obtaining a wide consensus among ChPEs on the idea during the Popular Unity, but even further back, the brutal confrontation
that abandoning the model, despite the huge social cost they were still that the Chilean society had during 25 years, I think, it left this country
paying at that time,5 was both unrealistic and nonsensical. The strength very exhausted of conflicts, it wants peace, it does not want more wars,
of the 'consensus' reached by the entrepreneurial sector and the Right on and that is one of the reasons - along with our luck and the fact we have
this point, among all the ChPEs, is ultimately acknowledged by one of the made things right, everything that you want - by which we have been
leaders of the fiercest rightist conservative opposition party (UDI), Hernan successful in the Concertatidn. (Ibid.)
Larrain, who eventually praised the Concertatidn politicians for preserving
the model (interview 2005e): However, after stressing the rejection of 'a time of confrontations' as
an explicative factor for the successful governance of the Concertatidn,
Well, I would say that when one observed [Carlos] Ominami's [a member Boeninger cannot avoid expressing a kind of deeper sense of distrust about
of the MIR - Left Revolutionary Movement - during Allende's administra- the status of its own generation, the generation of the Concertatidn, which
tion and then Ministry of Economy during Aylwin's government] meet- is eventually revealed in the motivation behind his proposal for shorten-
ing with the Confederation de la Production y el Comertio [Confederation ing the presidential period from six to four years - a motivation that we
of Industry and Trade], the umbrella entrepreneurial organization, one can identify as the need to police his generation in order to avoid another
would have to say: well, here there is a common language, there is a attempt by someone wishing to risk 'changing the world':
respect, there is a valorization of what has been done ... There was a
government that accepted the model of open economy and even wanted Likewise, with a shorter presidency of four years, the risk of foundational
to increase it because, remember: who was the first one to make an agree- political projects, or of wishing to change everything, is very much
ment with the USA? It was [Alejandro] Foxley [Minister of Finance during reduced, because, in four years, you cannot change the world! To be
Aylwin's government], (Ibid.) honest, I was the first author in 1993 of the project that seeks to reduce
216 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 217

the presidential period because of the experience that we have had during discussion within his own party, as he finally recognizes in a kind of cynical
the Aylwin government. (Ibid.) statement:

It is curious to notice that alongside the struggle against authoritarian Also if you would make a suffrage on the economic policies of the gov-
enclaves inherited from Pinochet, which Concertatidn politicians have always ernment within the Socialist Party, I assure that such policies would be
proclaimed as their central task, they have also built new 'democratic' insti- rejected without any doubt. That is the reason why the ruling politicians
tutional restraints in the hope that these would be useful to protect them never suffrage those policies. (Ibid.)
against their own revolutionary 'ghosts' of the past. In this way, the fear of
their own past, the suspicion of themselves, moved the politicians of the To avoid a public discussion, including one within their own political parties,
Concertatidn to eventually appreciate the safety provided by some of the the Concertatidn politicians cannot but reveal their fear that such a discussion
institutional restraints that featured in the new democracy. would bring about policy orientations that could actualize a now rejected
The same fear of the revolutionary past of his generation can be found discourse of class confrontation, which Correa and the Concertatidn elites
in the discourse of Enrique Correa, an ex-leader of the Movimiento de Action seem to fear deeply. A new chapter in the revelation of this 'fear of them-
Popular Unitaria (MAPU) and of the ChSP, who firstly reaffirms the idea of selves as a political generation' has been performed by Camilo Escalona in
the necessity of overcoming a past in which democracy was associated with 2007, the former president of the ChSP, who, in a discussion on a tax incen-
instability, as he says (interview 2005d): tive proposed by Bachelet's government (2006-10) which was rejected by his
ex-partner socialist Senator Carlos Ominami, has no qualms in condemning
I have the impression that there was a debt, and the debt was that in the col- Ominami by recalling 'the irresponsible attitude of co-government that the
lective memory of the country, democracy was associated with instability, ChSP adopted during Allende's government' (El Mostrador 2007, April 24).
disagreement, conflicts and confrontations. That was what had been hap- For the Right and the entrepreneurial sector, in turn, the trauma triggered
pened since Ibanez's government (1952-8). Actually, it had happened since by the memory of a discourse of class struggle means no more than a fear of
before the first half of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla's government (1946-52). After the masses - the old fear that the oligarchical Chilean political parties already
the Center-Left 'pax' (peace), inaugurated in 1938, was broken with the expressed at the start of the 1930s.9 However, after the experience of the
'law of protection for democracy' [which banned the Chilean Communist Popular Unity, which for the Right and the entrepreneurial sector represented
Party] in 1948, democracy was associated with instability, also with posi- a fearfully close encounter with a truly popular threat to their more essential
tive things, with popular clamor, but with instability. We [the Concertatidn] interests, and the capitalist 'revolution' experienced during Pinochet's regime
had the mission to again join democracy and stability. (Ibid.) that put the Right and the entrepreneurial sector in a privileged economic and
social position, this fear acquired a particular reality. It is a fear that makes the
However, Correa eventually cannot avoid recognizing that such a mis- Right and the entrepreneurial sector aware that in order to preserve their posi-
sion (to join democracy and stability) was pursued against the 'ideological tions it was worth paying the price of allowing the new democratic regime to
resistances' that he still perceives (and fears) in the political parties of the keep the masses as far away and quiet as possible. This attitude becomes palpable
Concertatidn. apropos of the negotiation process of the tax reform passed by Aylwin's govern-
ment (1990-4) to finance social programs, defended as the core of the 'growth
[...] the ideological views [to change the economic model] that, as well as with equity' program of the Conceitacidn. The Right and the entrepreneurial
the viruses, survive in nature are still alive in the political parties, and they sector, as declared by Jose Antonio Guzman, not only accepted the reform but
appear each time that there is a discussion on the economic model ... well also facilitated, though privately, the agreement on it (interview 20051):
Adolfo Zaldivar [President of the Christian Democrat Party (CDP) in 2005,
who died in 2013] is proposing now to emend the model and to put an [t]he entrepreneurial within the Confederation de la Producidn y el Comertio
end to this liberal model. (Ibid.) said: here there is a reality, they have a project, a program, we cannot be an
obstacle, first because it is not realistic, and second, they will finally have to
Correa, referring to the so-called 'virus of ideological views', is here recall- realize that we are all partners in this ... There is one thing that 1 have never
ing a time of agitation and class struggle which was so common in the before said: the agreement on the tax reform was closed in my home with
pre-Coup of 1973 discursive stage of his own generation, and which now [Alejandro] Foxley, Manuel Marfan, [Andres] Allamand and [Jorge| Prat. It
he assumes is worth avoiding at any cost, even aborting a public democratic was not that we were completely in favor of the reform, nor that we were
218 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 219

the promoters of the tax reform at all, but we wanted this reform to be the mostly due to the shaming discovery of his secret foreign banking accounts -
least worst-case scenario for investment, commerce and so on. (Ibid.) the Riggs case - which finally gave him the traditional status that all Latin
American dictators have earned: that of a murderer and a thief. However,
Therefore, compelled by this fear of the masses, the Right and the entrepre- for the Concertatidn, Pinochet was never really politically dead. Moreover,
neurial sector were smart enough to realize that the pragmatic thing to do he continued to represent a common counter-argument for any occasion
in this new democratic scenario was to give up something, though not too in which it was necessary to recall the figure of the ogre as a symbolic
much, to avoid losing everything. In this pragmatic exercise, it met func- recourse to save their more fundamental deficiencies as a ruling coalition,
tionally with the trauma of the Concertatidn elites, who feared their own particularly the large unresolved income inequality, but also more recently
past of class-struggle discourse, giving rise to a peculiar reinforced dynamic as a useful device to deal with the increasing cases of corruption that started
on the consensus of the Chilean model. to appear in the political arena since the end of Frei R.-T.'s government
For the Chilean elites linked to the unions and civil society organiza- (1994-2000) and increased during Lagos' (2000-06) and Bachelet's admin-
tions that were closer and more sensitive to the social drama reflected in istrations (2006-10).
the income inequality, only a much more palpable threat, such as that Regarding income inequality, after the unsatisfactory results reached during
represented by an arrogant and menacing Pinochet of the early 1990s, Lagos' government, the Concertatidn leaders showed no remorse in discursively
would credibly act as a restraining mechanism to avoid them demanding referring to the so-called 'accumulative deficit', inherited from Pinochet's
a drastic change of the model. Between 1990 and 1998, with an inversely regime, which they continued to cite as the main excuse for their own fail-
proportional intensity, the fear of Pinochet seemed to work well as a limit- ure, even after many years in power. In fact, Camilo Escalona (1999: 48), the
ing factor on unions and social civil leaders, most of which had experienced former president of the Chilean Socialist Party, for instance, has affirmed in
the authoritarian repression directly, as Raiil de la Puente, a union leader of this respect:
public sector workers, declares (interview 2005m):
This chronic insufficiency [the inequality] of the ongoing political proc-
In fact, in the first years of the transition government there was a cau- ess, which we do not deny, is importantly explained by the current insti-
tious attitude, meaning that there still was no assurance that democracy tutional framework [inherited from Pinochet's regime). (Ibid., emphasis
had been effectively restored; there was a situation of transition with added by the author)10
Pinochet as Commander in Chief of the army, with armed forces that still
had a lot of power, and in the first years the social organizations had the Pinochet has again and again been evoked as a repudiated tyrant who is now
fear, actually the country in general had the fear, that it would be a going even more useful, due to his personal discrediting, in providing legitima-
back and again the military would take the power. (Ibid.) tion to a weary political coalition. In fact, the Concertatidn has increasingly
proved unable to succeed in the achievement of its more precious objective:
Nevertheless, that character assigned to Pinochet was no longer viable after 'growth with equity'. This is a fact even to their own protagonists - as Jose
the new scenario inaugurated by his imprisonment in London in 1998, his Joaquin Brunner, a socialist intellectual and politician, and Jaime Gazmuri, a
liberation after 17 months in custody, his subsequent prosecution in Chile, leader of the ChSP - recognize by revealing themselves as perplexed with the
and ultimately his death in 2006 (Burbach 2003). The main consequence strong durability of the income inequality structure in Chile in the 2000s
of which was making impracticable the maintenance of Pinochet's political (interviews 2005a; 2005c, respectively).
status, as one untouchable by justice and therefore a reasonable threat to More striking, however, has been the recent use of the remembrance of
social sectors, agreed by the Concertatidn elites in the early 1990s. the horrors of Pinochet's regime to produce a sort of 'equalization' of the
However, this new scenario, which coincided with the beginning of the increasingly complex issue of corruption in Chilean politics in the 2000s
third Concertatidn government headed by Ricardo Lagos in March 2000, far (Rehren 2004: 14), with the corruption scandals that took place during the
from showing that Pinochet had lost any significant role in the Chilean politi- Pinochet dictatorship (Monckeberg 2001). As Belisario Velasco (El Mercurio
cal arena, would reveal a more complex development. It is true that Pinochet 2006, December 19), the former Minister of Home Office of Bachelet's
started to lose his formal status as someone untouchable by justice, being government, has declared,
ultimately prosecuted for several cases of violations of human rights in 2005,
though he was never finally sentenced (Perez Guerra 2006:8-9). Furthermore, We do not seek to equalize the corruption but we want people to know
it became increasingly clear that Pinochet turned out to be undesirable com- how the reserved funds were wasted |during Pinochet's regime] and how
pany, even for those on the Right who used to be enthusiastic partisans, we have used them during the Concertatidn governments. (Ibid.)
220 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 221

It is worthwhile noticing that Velasco's statement was made only nine days denying that the level of income inequality and other regressive characters
after the death of Pinochet. In that way, he attempted to justify a new scandal of the Pinochet model have been preserved by the Concertatidn govern-
revealed by the acknowledgment made by some of the Concertatidn leaders ments, to those who, despite accepting to some extent that assumption,
like Gonzalo Martner (El Mercurio 2006, December 17) that they had actu- seek either to see in this no more than pragmatic politics or, alternatively,
ally received reserved governmental funds to finance their political activi- to argue that there was no other viable option available and, in this way,
ties during the 1990s and until at least 2003. To defend themselves against relieve themselves of responsibility. While among the first we find a deci-
increasingly critical public opinion, which was now willing to severely sive attempt to make the case that 'growth with equity' is a project that is
scrutinize the behavior of any government, the Concertatidn elites again able to resolve income inequality, the latter either praise their attitudes as
learnt how useful it is to recall the ogre who, as well as violating human a politically admirable endeavor or, the more cautious ones, prefer to stress
rights - as they insistently repeat (in a moralizing tone) - was also the head the constraints that would have impeded the Concertatidn from being suc-
of the 'truly' corrupt government. And, it works. By keeping Pinochet in the cessful in this task.
memory, even 18 years after his regime ended, everything - notably, income Jaime Gazmuri (interview 2005c), for instance, explicitly follows the first
inequality but also some levels of corruption - seems to find a greater, 'logic route', by denying that the Concertatidn model is the continuation of
though now decreasing, degree of acceptance in the country. one implemented by Pinochet:

O n e o r t w o models? I am one of those who believe that if we are going to talk in such an ana-
lytical level of model then there are two models ... of market economy
The memory of Pinochet, however, comes to play a very different role when that have been applied in this country in the last 30 years. One model
the Concertatidn elites, leaving aside the 'authoritarian enclaves', have to was implemented by Pinochet and the other model by the Concertatidn.
assume a more pro-active role and begin to justify their specific historical (Ibid.)
contribution, as a political generation, to the resolution of the social and
democratic problems - particularly income inequality - of the country that Also, Genaro Arriagada (interview 2005f) is very eloquent in his defense of
they have ruled since March 1990. In this case, when the Concertatidn elites the idea that the Concertatidn did not follow the same model as Pinochet:
need to prove their own merits by building a successful 'growth with equity'
model, the specter of Pinochet comes to play a somewhat ambiguous role. Therefore, there have been huge, huge changes in policy. One cannot
On the one hand, the shortcomings inherited from Pinochet's neo-liberal simply say that such [social expenditure] is not important. But, why is
model remain useful as an initial point to expiate the Concertatidn's responsi- such an increase in housing expenditure, health expenditure, a 30 percent
bility for having failed to resolve social inequalities. But, on the other hand, of increase in education expenditure in five years not important? Then,
Pinochet's 'shadow' becomes an undesirable factor that the Concertatidn's how can someone say that it is the same model? (Ibid.)"
elites have felt increasingly uncomfortable dealing with. Indeed, the point
is not to deny the fact that, for the Concertatidn elites, the fear of Pinochet However, contrary to Gazmuri and Arriagada's efforts to neglect the idea
has been useful for gaining legitimation for a political reformist path that that there is in fact only one model, Enrique Correa (interview 2005d)
has contributed to the consensus of the Chilean model, as we already seen, explicitly and more pragmatically recognizes this dilemma:
but to argue that when the time comes to justify the way in which they, as
members of a political generation, will be remembered by history, to appear However, those reforms had an original sin, that is, their association with
associated with Pinochet becomes clearly undesirable. a dictatorship, not only harsh, not only authoritarian as all dictatorships,
In fact, the discursive sequence adopted by the Concertatidn elites to but also bloodthirsty. In fact, it was a dictatorship that had a very bad
deal with this issue has firstly been to situate the presence of inequal- reputation in the world. It was a bloodthirsty and disrespected dictator-
ity in the country within the context of a somewhat 'alien' neo-liberal ship! (Ibid.)
economic model, implemented during Pinochet's regime. This argument,
however, poses the additional problem of explaining why such a legacy However, the reasons behind Correa's recognition of the problem of adopt-
of inequality was accepted and maintained by the Concertatidn. The posi- ing economic reforms associated with Pinochet are far from a simple assump-
tions here have not been uniform, ranging from those who deny that tion that the Concertatidn elites have merely applied a model inherited from
the Concertatidn simply adopted Pinochet's model, therefore implicitly a dictatorial regime. Instead, he asserts a more subtle interpretation. He
222 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 223

recognizes that the 'ruling classes' - as he said - decided to keep the same the possibility of assuming the notion of a model as a way to explain the
model despite fierce criticisms made against it in the past, but adds that this post-Pinochet political economy experience:
attitude, far from being criticizable, must be seen as a lucid vision in favor
of the stability of the country: Well, the first issue that I want to raise is a methodological one and one
of definition: what actually constitutes a model? Because what really hap-
The ruling group decided to preserve the model, probably the same pens during a political transition such as that with the characteristics of
model that was so strongly critiqued in the first stage. Even more, the the Chilean one is that what one ends up with are not models but con-
ruling group lucidly realized that the continuity of that model was a crete and working countries, with a given institutional framework. (Ibid.)
component of governance. (Ibid.)
This methodological objection is also shared by Ernesto Ottone (interview
It is this recognition of the necessity of preserving the model that constitutes 2005b):
the real value of the Concertatidn elites, in Correa's view. Furthermore, the
lucidity of the 'ruling group' to which Correa refers seems not to be a mere The first thing to say is that I have many difficulties with speaking in
subsidiary indication but an explicit symptom that he seriously appears to terms of a model. I prefer to speak about the Chilean experience, because
enjoy seeing himself as an integrant of a 'special' elite that Chilean people I find it hard to use the category of model, but let's ignore this point.
are lucky to have had, as he finally asserts: (Ibid.)

[...] The adoption of this model [was made] by the most prestigious However, it is immediately clear that neither Brunner nor Ottone are really
democratic ruling class in Latin America, which is the Chilean one [...]. concerned with methodological issues, but rather they intend to justify why
(Ibid.) the Concertatidn did not substantially change Pinochet's model, particularly
its undesired consequences such as income inequality. In this endeavor,
A similar position, though one that highlights the hegemony of the neo- contrary to Correa, Brunner seems to appeal again to structural reasons, as
classic orientation, is held by Carlos Pena (interview 2005q), one of the most in the case of the thesis of authoritarian enclaves, rather than to a sort of
outstanding public intellectuals in the Chilean political arena: special talent found in the Chilean elites as Correa does:

What 1 would suggest is the idea that the economic model, the current [...] to me, actually, the truly surprisingly fact is not that things have not
economic model, is essentially the same model of the 1980s in Chile and changed structurally. What would be weird is to ask the question from
that is a model that is set up when a group of civilians built hegemony, the other side, that is, how was it that the Concertatidn did not abandon
a long-term project, within the military government. Therefore, I do not it [the model] ... well, the answer, I guess, is very simple, and it basically
believe that, from the point of view of its origin, this is a model estab- refers to a matter of power relations, that is, to the structure of power that
lished in the democratic transition, rather it seems to me a model, which in the first stage of the political transition made a reversion of the model
is the neo-classic model of growth, we could say, that is a global ideology, unthinkable. (Interview 2005a)
which is the only one that was able to hegemonize the military regime
in the 1980s. (Ibid.) Here, Brunner is not only following the opposite strategy to Correa but is also
absolving the Concertatidn elites from any reproach against them for preserv-
Furthermore, although Pena also ultimately praised the model for 'improv- ing Pinochet's model simply because, for him, a realistic alternative was not
ing substantially the material conditions of the people in the last 15 years, available. It is curious to notice how Brunner is able to present himself as
(ibid.), he is also forced to recognize that the Chilean model brings with it an intellectual in two lights. First, as one who seems to share a somewhat
a permanent condition of 'precarious welfare' that leaves society with unre- fashionable tendency towards post-modernism, as evidenced when he says,
solved suffering. for instance:
Correa's and Pena's acknowledgment that the Concertatidn model is
essentially the same model as Pinochet's is something that Jose Joaquin Yes, I believe these frames are completely different, that is, we lived in a
Brunner (interview 2005a) is not prepared to share. He instead takes the frame until the 1980s in which such formulations of great narratives as
opposite route, firstly attempting to present a methodological case against those criticized by post-modernists had a cultural space in societies, and
224 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 225

people passionately lived out their Utopias. I believe that the cultural and as was the case in the 'logical route' thesis of denial raised by Gazmuri and
intellectual framework has radically changed and we do not have great Arriagada, or the self-praising lucidity of the Chilean elite posed by Correa,
narratives anymore ... today everything is post-modern. (Ibid.) or the intellectual acid recognition that there is only one model but it does
not matter because it works, despite its new dilemmas, presented by Pena,
But also as a politician who has no doubts in presenting a very orthodox or, finally, the inescapable determinism of structures defended by Brunner.
structuralist deterministic view to defend himself from those who could This might explain why the Concertatidn elites have opted for a 'personal
reproach him for not changing Pinochet's model, his answer is simply: we view option', that is, they have left each of their main protagonists to imag-
could not change it because the 'power of the real' impeded us: ine for themselves freely the best answer to that undesirable antecedent of
a successful democracy - an option that, far from meaning a weakening of
[...] But [the limitations] were not only the rules of the game in the the Concertatidn's hegemony, reflects its complex strength.
political arena in which, due to an agreement, you could not alter or In fact, the strength of the aforementioned hegemonic vision of the
revise certain things about the privatizations nor the high quorum Concertatidn on the Chilean model can be observed when one analyzes the
required to modify the constitutional status or the constitutional pro- discourse of union and civil society leaders. In fact, most of them share
hibition to set up public enterprises. I refer rather to the role of the the thesis that the Concertatidn model and the Pinochet model are essen-
historically given structure, inserted in the working of markets, in the tially the same. For instance Hugo Fazio, a left-wing economist and execu-
distribution of ownership, do you see my point? ... there is always a tive director of the Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Altemativo
greater power, that is, the power of the real, is not there? That people (Centre of National Studies for Alternative Development; CENDA), explic-
end up believing that it does not exist, and that is the main factor. Over itly declares 'the model [of the Concertacidn\ is the same that was applied
this [the power of the real] were the relations of power that were obvi- during the dictatorship' (interview 2005q).
ously very limiting. (Ibid.) Moreover, although union and civil society leaders share the perception
that the model has failed, they also tend to agree that a drastic change is
Ernesto Ottone, instead, decides to refer to a more broad distinction unviable. Coral Pey, executive director of the NGO the Chilean Network for
between neo-liberalism and market economy in order to explain that what Fair and Accountable Trade, for instance, firstly evaluates the Concertatidn
the Concertatidn really did in the 1990s was to preserve a market economy model harshly, saying: 'we believe that the strategy of growth with equity
rather than a neo-liberal one: has failed' (interview 2005s), but she immediately adds, '[w]e are not a
revolutionary group that assumes a la Evo Morales, the immediate install-
[...] then, the Chilean democratic forces that took over the government ation of socialism, and the immediate change of the economic and social
faced the decisive question of how to continue with high growth, but ... model' (ibid.). This is a posing of a discursive limit that again may better be
there was no ground-breaking view towards economic openness. Here, explained by alluding to the trauma of the past rather than to an exercise of
there is great theoretical confusion between neo-liberalism as a doc- communicative rationality a la Habermas, as Pey herself ultimately seems to
trine and the market economy. The Chilean democratic forces of the recognize when, asked to explain the stability of the Chilean model, despite
Concertatidn had reached the conviction that Chile had to follow a the failure that she attributes to it, she declares:
market economy; therefore, the return to democracy does not mean the
setting up of alternatives to the market economy, economic openness or [that is] due to a disciplinarian tendency existing in the country. This is a
to the basic core of the economy. (Interview 2005b) social disciplinarian tendency that comes from the past. Also because the
following statement still works [after 15 years]: it is this or the dictatorship]
The point here is not to assess the accuracy of the distinction posed by is not it? (Ibid., emphasis added by the author)
Ottone between neo-liberalism and market economy,12 but to highlight the
fact that he seems to be involved in constructing his own discursive device to In this way, the central discursive MJ of the Concertatidn elites, which advo-
deal with the inescapable and unpleasantly close antecedent of the Chilean cates, though for different reasons, the preservation of the status quo, extends
model in the 1990s and 2000s: the neo-liberalism despotically implemented its influence to those more critical members of the ChPEs, such as union and
during Pinochet's (the hated dictator's) regime, including its intrinsic pat- civil society leaders, who, despite drastically criticizing the Chilean model
terns of income inequality (Taylor 2006: 136).13 Ottone thus is merely as well as advocating new strategies of economic development, ultimately
building his own peculiar justificatory strategy for his political behavior, concur - in their practices - with the consensual preservation of the Chilean
226 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 227

model, which remains as an undisputable boundary to work within, as Pey discursive element that tends to pose Chile as the 'first student of the course'
finally asserts: in a Latin American context, declares:

Now, leaving aside the idea of a radical change, there is the possibility of In the end, what has been done in Chile is better that what was done in
the adoption of different strategies |but] within the same model. (Ibid., neighboring countries in our regional context. (Ibid.)
emphases added by the author)
Likewise, Maria Luisa Brahm, a former executive director of the Freedom
Income inequality in a 'successful' economy? Institute (the main think tank of RN), former director of the national com-
mittee of Chilean National Television, and one of the main political advisers
The aforementioned dispute about whether there are one or two models, of President Sebastian Pinera (the acting president of Chile from 2010), in a
or why a given model was ultimately applied, has always been linked to somewhat patronizing view asserts (interview 2005v):
the challenge faced by the Concertatidn of being successful in resolving the
issue of social inequality. It is worthwhile noting, however, that this does The problem of Latin America is a political problem ... You cannot have
not affirm that the resolution of social inequality has always been the most an economic program if you do not believe in the judiciary; it is impos-
common criterion used by the Concertatidn elites to assess the success of sible. I mean they [the rest of Latin American countries] are so deficient
the Chilean post-Pinochet experience. Even more, the image of a success- in this area, so deficient in civic education that they need to learn how
ful Chilean political experience has been built despite the disturbing and to respect institutions ... 1 do not know, they are 'banana' countries. The
resistant presence of income inequality. In a way, it may be more accurate democracy, the respect for the law, the separation of power and economic
to say that the discourse on success was developed as a complement to that freedom cannot be separated. And that is what Chile did, you know what
more panic-inducing discourse associated with Pinochet - chaos, political 1 mean? Chile firstly implemented the economic reforms but after that it
agitation and remembrance of class struggle - which was at the root of the added and legitimized it with the democracy in the year 1990 and then
aforementioned thesis of the two fears. pum! (Ibid.)
Enrique Correa (interview 2005d) clearly expresses the dominant convic-
tion of the Concertatidn elites regarding the success of the Chilean model The 'discourse of success', of 'presenting oneself as a model' and of the
when he asserts: assumption of being 'the first of the course in Latin America', held by part
of the Chilean elite are linked to a stereotyped view of the real but par-
well, at the end, the proposal that democracy and economic growth tial economic and social performance experienced by Chile in the 1990s
could stand together, on the basis of political stability, was so successful and 2000s. The undeniable but restricted healthy economic performance
that, around 1995, there was no doubt that we were having the most suc- is given by indicators of growth and poverty. In fact, the GDP of Chile
cessful economic performance of our history. (Ibid.) was 7.7 percent during Aylwin's government (1990-94); 5.4 percent dur-
ing Frei R.-T.'s government (1994-2000); and 4.3 percent during Lagos'
It is worthwhile noticing that in this view the Concertatidn elites were government (2000-06). The average of the whole period was 5.6 percent
aligned with the almost unanimous discourse of Chilean entrepreneurs, (1990-2005). That result contrasts with the GDP average during Pinochet's
who openly defended the idea that the Chilean experience was not only regime, which only reached 2.9 percent (1974-89). In turn, poverty was
successful but also presented itself as a model for others to follow, as Ronald reduced from 45 percent in 1985 to 18 percent in 2003 (Ffrench-Davis
Bown (interview 2005t), the leader of the fruit exporter entrepreneurs, one 2005: 27-45).
of the sectors that benefited most from the open economy in Chile, says: The point here is not to criticize the elite's celebration of the success of
the Chilean model but to explore whether that euphoria is able to resist the
Well, Chile is a paradigm for many people, is it not? This can be unpleas- unpleasant side of the shortcomings of the model adequately,15 which is per-
ant for some one, I do not know, but I think that we have made the thing manently highlighted by union and civil society leaders, as Ana Bell (inter-
right in general. (Ibid.)14 view 2005w), a union leader of the CUT, vividly asserts:

Moreover the military sector and the political Right confirm this idea of The employment that exists in Chile is essentially informal, and you can
success. In fact, the General Manuel Concha (interview 2005u), adding a find that data practically in all of the statistics sources in the country,
228 The Nciv Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 229

almost all of them, this is a permanent situation of social inequity in the dictatorship. It was almost commonplace in any third world country that
country, of bad income distribution, of a huge difference between poor in order to implement those kinds of [neo-liberal| reforms it would require
and rich people and that situation is actually observed through a very a dictatorial regime. I have the impression that a more virtuous relation-
deficient lens [by politicians]. (Ibid.) ship between democracy and openness has now developed. (Ibid.)

The 'very deficient lens' used by politicians to observe the shortcomings of However, it is a mistake to assume that politicians from the Concertatidn,
the model referred to by Bell could find an explanation in the confession the political Right, entrepreneurs, or even Chilean economists and intel-
that Enrique Correa (interview 2005d) made when he was explaining the lectuals openly denied the shortcomings of the model, notably income
origin of the Chilean model: inequality, in their endeavor to build a discourse of success. Indeed, despite
their efforts to present the Chilean political economy model post-Pinochet
What I am saying is that they [Alejandro Foxley, Carlos Ominami and as a successful experience, curiously they cannot omit the fact that there
other key economists of the Concertatidn] 'lower their flags', that is, they is something wrong with the issue of income inequality. This is a recogni-
restrained their critiques in order to get democracy to work with a model tion that is, however, neither plainly made nor posed as a central argument
that could generate economic growth ... [because] the desire for winning of their discourses. Rather, it is something that appears to be a somewhat
and being successful was so great that it was more determining than the 'parallax' object, that is, an object that only appears after different discursive
ideological resistances. (Ibid.) devices have been deployed to explain income inequality in the context of a
self-assumed successful model. In fact, as Zizek (2006: 17) affirms, a parallax
In other words, the anxiety of presenting themselves as a successful gen- object, rather than being simply
eration seems to have led the Concertatidn's elites to adopt a short-sighted
set of criteria for evaluating the success of the Chilean model, without full the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a
consideration of its accuracy. Take for instance Ernesto Ottone (interview background), caused by a change in observational position that provided
2005b), who only appears to refer to a limited common public opinion a new line of sight as a standard definition, ... is also something else,
expressed by poll surveys, as well as statistical reports covering univer- that is, the 'observed difference is not simply "subjective" ... but that an
sity student rates as indicators that Chile has performed well in a Latin "epistemological" shift in the subject's point of view always reflects an
American context. "ontological" shift in the object itself. (Ibid.)

When you consider public opinion, the Chilean public opinion, you In this way, income inequality becomes a sort of permanent presence,
find that it is a public opinion that says: in Chile we complain a lot but a 'specter' that traverses throughout the Concertatidn governments, and
if we compare ourselves with other countries, Chile is a country that although everybody - say elites - knows very well that it is there, as a
looks fine. It reveals the fact that 70 percent of the university students remembrance of a divided society, nobody really seems to know what to
are first generation in their families to have gone to university, I mean, do to resolve the issue. In this way, different parallax discursive recognition
it shows a very important sector whose life conditions have dramatically strategies of the issue of income inequality have been deployed by ChPEs,
improved. (Ibid.)10 as we will see in the next section.

Also, Enrique Correa (interview 2005d) himself asserts the success of the The strategy of n a t u r a l i z a t i o n / e t e r n a l i z a t i on
Concertatidn by recalling the advances in governance and democratic
legitimation that the Concertatidn provided to an already 'successful' but A first parallax strategy to deal with income inequality used by the
authoritarian economic model through, what he refers to as, a 'virtuous Concertatidn elites has been to naturalize/eternalize it, making it appear
association': as an inevitable condition of a continent (Latin America), which seems
to be condemned by divine fate to be an unequal place forever. In a way,
[B]ut 1 said [that it was an association] of mutual benefits because the this has been a somewhat surprising strategy, considering that what we are
adoption of this model by the most prestigious ruling democratic class dealing with is a smart and educated generation of politicians. In fact, the
in Latin America, which is the Chilean one, brought a positive effect on Concertatidn elites have always praised themselves as a unique and extraor-
the model, because, up to 1990, the model was strongly associated with a dinary generation. We have already seen Enrique Correa's statement on this
230 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 231

subject, but Genaro Arriagada also fails to reveal any shame when he refers But it is Jaime Gazmuri (interview 2005c) who even more explicitly makes
to that extraordinary generation, through which of course, although he the point:
does not explicitly mention it, it is clear that he is also including himself as
a member (interview 2005f): Inequality is one of the social elements that is with us from ever, I tell
you, it is like the human matrix of Latin America. We are not the poor-
The Chilean ruling class is exceptional. There is a study that was est continent but we are the most unequal one. In other words, we have
made ... there is one book that shows the high level of education of been built on roots of inequality and exclusion since those [Spanish]
the political elite. It says that there are more PhDs, more postgraduates gentlemen arrived, who are portrayed in the picture on the wall of the
in the senate than amongst the entrepreneurial elite, you know what Congress, have not we? (Ibid.)
I mean? The educational level of the chamber of deputies is similar to
the level of education of the entrepreneurial elite. Therefore, this is a Finally, Genaro Arriagada (interview 2005f) does not go so far as Gazmuri,
political ruling class of very high quality. Furthermore, it is an honorable but he also expiates his own responsibility, highlighting again the 'accumu-
political class; you know the bureaucracy here is of a high quality, a very lative deficit' inherited from Pinochet's regime:
high quality. (Ibid.)
Well, but also the Concertatidn, when it began to be in charge of this issue
Furthermore, Arriagada is even more explicit when he specifically refers to [income inequality] there was... 1 mean, the military regime was very crim-
the Concertatidn elites: inal in this matter. It destroyed the educational and health structures ...
Then, I think that was an important factor. In other words, in many
[...] But the political elite that is part of the Concertatidn is perhaps the areas we had to face a huge accumulated social deficit, you know what
most brilliant group of people that has participated in politics in Chile I mean? (Ibid.)
in 150 years of history. They are basically people more or less my age
with some other, older, outstanding guys like [Gabriel] Valdes, [Patricio] It is even more surprising that the same argument of naturalization/eter-
Aylwin, Jaime Castillo, you know what 1 mean?, but the majority is made nalization is given by intellectuals and economists to refer to the origin
up of people that are 65 and 55 years old. Those people are very bright. of income inequality. The point made by them, far from highlighting the
(Ibid.) historical data of income inequality in Chile, seems to be based rather on
using such evidence as a discursive recourse to dissociate income inequality
Therefore, it is surprising to discover that, despite the exceptionality that the from the political economy model. A case in this respect is Joseph Ramos
Concertatidn elites claim to share, they have to recall an old-fashioned and (interview 2005g) who asserts:
much less sophisticated ideological strategy of naturalization/eternalization
when tfiey refer to the issue of income inequality. It is like an introductory Well the problem with income inequality is older than the economic
statement that announces a cautionary point: 'Please pay attention! We are model. That is, income inequality was equally high during the time of
dealing with a problem that has existed throughout the history of mankind, so do Frei Montalva [1964-70] and almost as high during Alessandri's govern-
not be too demanding of us!' ment [1958-64]. I believe that income inequality in Chile has existed
Ernesto Ottone (interview 2005b), for instance, makes explicit such a since Pedro de Valdivia [the Spaniard who founded Santiago in Chile in
point: 1541], from the time of the distribution of the land ... and I do not think
it originated with the economic model, it started before! (Ibid.)17
[...] I have been studying the issue of income inequality for a long time
and I believe that we must analyze it from a different perspective. The In this way, those intellectuals and economists, far from exercising a critical
inequalities, in a society have a strong historical root. My research has role, as would be expected, concur to consolidate a view on income inequal-
been placed within the comparative studies of such issues and I know ity that, in the end, causes it to appear as something that one can openly
that inequalities have a considerable historical root. You know, the level (and eternally) discuss but only when it has been discursively established -
of inequality is very much associated to the history of the individual in a sort of common sense way - that to risk immediate and drastic policies
country, to the structure of the nineteenth century, of the twentieth cen- for its resolution is nonsensical, due to the long-term character associated
tury, and so on. (Ibid.) with it.
232 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 233

However, the strategy of naturalizing/eternalizing income inequality, modified, but it is a shame that it cannot be modified because if it could be
though useful as an opening statement of recognition of an uncomfortable changed as a consequence of a new power balance and so on, they would be
issue, becomes increasingly unsatisfactory to the whole elite, for which new amenable to that. I think this last position has obviously been discredited,
discursive parallax ways to deal with the issue have been demanded. this second 'soul' of the Concertatidn. (Ibid.)

From the 'two souls' to the 'test of governance' The dispute of 'two souls' has thus been an efficient way by which some sec-
tions of the Concertatidn elites - the so-called self-flagellants - have been able
To see income inequality as a failure of the modernization project of 'growth to express their complaints against the deficits of the Chilean model while
with equity' might seem to be so painful for the Concertatidn elites that at the same time allowing those more pragmatic sectors of the same elite -
an oblique way of analyzing income inequality in post-Pinochet Chile the so-called self-complacents - to circumscribe the dispute to no more than
has associated it with an expression of a sort of internal political tension a sort of identity expression of a political faction, which a mature coalition
existing within the Concertatidn. In this way, income inequality is certainly such as the Concertatidn must allow itself to express. The actuality of the the-
recognized but as no more than a by-product of a political faction within sis of the 'two souls' had one of its last expressions in the political dispute
the Concertatidn - the self-flagellants - who need it as an expression of their within the Concertatidn, led by former Senator Carlos Ominami, who, along
identity, not as a positive reality in itself. Correa is explicit in this respect by with other leftist leaders of the Concertatidn launched the document 'La
firstly affirming (interview 2005d): Disyuntiva: una Concertatidn Conservadora o Una Concertatidn al Servicio de la
Mayoria' (The Disjunction: Either a Conservative Concertatidn or One for the
It has been, it has permanently been present in the Concertatidn vives whole Majority of People), calling for the Concertatidn to take an anti-neo-
almas (lived souls), has not it? Along with the soul of the success it cohab- liberal turn (La Nation 2007, May 4; El Mercurio 2007, May 5).
its this soul that shows that the Concertatidn did not do all that was pos- Notwithstanding, it is worthwhile noticing that the metaphor of the
sible to correct the original economic model, and despite the economic 'two souls', originally circumscribed to the internal tension of a wide and
success, such economic success has not brought forth a solution to the complex coalition such as the Concertatidn, has also found expression in the
most demanding problems of the most deprived people. (Ibid.) discourse of the entrepreneurs and the Right, though with a different pur-
pose. The entrepreneurial sector has been able not only to recognize a deficit
But, after setting income inequality within the discursive device of the 'two in income inequality but also to stress the critical character of that issue,
souls', he immediately adds: although only when such a critique is directed against the management
of the Concertatidn governments for not adopting the accurate economic
[...] However, this is a very relative discussion, to be honest, because the policies, excluding any criticism of the model itself, as Hugo Baeirlein (inter-
average prosperity of the country has increased and the number of poor view 2005x), the executive manager in international trade of the Sociedad
has decreased. This is a country with much more secure prosperity than de Fomento Fabril (Chile's Manufacturers' Association; SOFOFA), one of the
it was before the coup. (Ibid.) most influential Chilean industrial entrepreneurial organization, asserts:

Jose Joaquin Brunner (interview 2005a) also uses the metaphor of the 'two I believe that the last five years [2000-5] have seen an increase in the
souls' to describe the issue of income inequality but denies it any actuality distance between rich and poor people, and the middle class is disap-
because of the success of the model: pearing ... clearly the problem is that these economic policies are badly
conducted [by the government) from our point of view. (Ibid.)18
In the Concertatidn you have this famous discussion of the 'two souls' or the
tension between 'self-flagellants' and 'self-complacent'. It has thousands Likewise, the political Right speaks up about inequality but excludes any
of names, but it always points out the same thing, that is, that there are criticism of the Chilean model by simply blaming the Concertatidn govern-
actually those who have - though over a decade and half! - increasingly ments for not implementing adequate public policies, as Hernan Larrain has
accepted with more enthusiasm what seems to be a type of development declared (interview 2005e):
that is considered the best way to transform Chile into a developed country,
and another sector of the elite of the Concertatidn that does not agree with It has been a consolidation of the unequal income distribution at the
such a vision and believes that this is a model that cannot be substantially level of the individual and it has increased the inequality of income
234 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 235

between regions [of the country], and both phenomena seem to me soon gained the sympathy of the entrepreneurs. Moreover, the entrepre-
dangerous to the future of Chile, and for this reason they demand a cor- neurial sector, which was the most sensitive to the aforementioned fear
rection, and urgent mechanism, and that it is not, I repeat, a mere matter of an imaginary social convulsion, eventually gave strategic support to the
of the model. No, I believe that it has to do with public policies that can government of Ricardo Lagos. Indeed, fearing that Lagos's government could
be implemented within the model ... of course we can introduce certain not end its mandate, due to the political crisis caused by some cases of cor-
modifications, the growth is not enough, equity is necessary also, that ruption, the entrepreneurs were quick to support him and forge an alliance
is, to incorporate some elements of social justice to the model but with- to reinforce a market-orientated policy approach, the 'agenda pro crecimiento'
out implying a radical change to the model of economic policy already (pro-growth initiative), as has been narrated by Juan Claro (La Tercera 2005,
existing. (Ibid.) August 3), the leader in 2002 of the Confederation de la Production y el Comertio
(Confederation of Industry and Trade), the umbrella entrepreneurial organiza-
The discursive stratagem used by the entrepreneurial sector and political tion. Although, this can be considered a very pragmatic move by the entre-
Right to speak about income inequality - blaming the management of the preneurial leadership, it also appears to be stimulated by the aforementioned
political economy model made by the Concertatidn and avoiding criticizing somewhat imaginary fear of social convulsions, as Enrique Correa, now in his
the model itself - coincides with their final concern, which is at the root new work as a lobbyist, has observed (interview 2005b):
of their discourse on income inequality, which again tends to be based on
a fear of social convulsion that could happen in the future if something is The entrepreneurial sector needs a fear to live, do not ever forget that,
not done to tackle this uncomfortable problem, as Ronald Bown recognizes and you will always see the entrepreneurial ... well we work with entre-
without remorse (interview 2005t): preneurs now, the whole day, that is our work in this company, you will
always see a fear, an overreaction held by the entrepreneurial. (Ibid.)
There is a danger, if the situation of a lack of opportunities, if unemploy-
ment, if the scandalous levels of social inequity, the remuneration, and so The fear of the entrepreneurial sector came to be supplemented by a parallel
on, become permanent in the time, I have no doubt that we are going to obsession that has affected a whole generation of now renovated socialists,
have a similar problem to the Argentineans [referring to the social explo- which is embodied by Ricardo Lagos, as one of the most outstanding repre-
sion and economic crisis that happened in Argentina in 2001-2|. (Ibid.) sentatives of that group. This obsession has led Lagos to seek to prove to the
world that he and his generation can be both socialists and good governors.
The fear of an imaginary social convulsion - a fear reinforced by the actual This may explain why the 'help' provided by the entrepreneurial sector dur-
destabilizing political context, which was present in Latin America in the ing the worst moment of his government came to act as a lifesaver for Lagos -
1990s and the first half of the 2000s - meant that Lagos's government assistance that ultimately allowed him to fulfill his political target. Indeed,
(2000-6) could not avoid projecting a terrifying image in the imagination it becomes clear that for Lagos one of the most important achievements of
of the entrepreneurs, as the second socialist president after Allende, Jorge his government was to be able to declare at the end of his mandate that
Carey one of the most influential lawyers of the entrepreneurial sector in '[i]n Chile, for having done the thing as we have done, nobody can ever say
Chile, declares about the initial perception of entrepreneurial sector on the that the Left does not have capacity to govern' (La Tercera 2005, March 13).
presidency of Ricardo Lagos (La Tercera 2005, March 13): Moreover, with Lagos the sort of 'test of governance' that the Concertatidn
elites, particularly socialists, were so concerned with since March 1990 was
The victory of Lagos was not easy [for entrepreneurs). There was a rumor finally passed. It was an obsession that significantly influenced the way in
of a plot by the entrepreneurial against the government. Lagos had said which they sought to preserve the political and economic stability of the
in the 1980s, amongst other misleading things, that Chile had been country, at any price, as Edgardo Boeninger (interview 2005j) has pointed out
naive in reducing the tariffs instead of negotiating product by product, and Jaime Gazmuri (interview 2005c) has eventually confirmed as follows:
country by country. He was against the low and plain tariffs. So when he
took office as the President of the Republic of course there was concern. That was, in a moment, the major doubt hung over us, that is, would
(Ibid.) we be able to govern the economy? [It was a doubt of whom?| From
the entrepreneurial, from the international world [Did this doubt have
However, far from repeating Allende's socialist approach, Lagos's admin- any influence over you?) yes, it did, on the argument of the economic
istration set out very pragmatic pro-market-orientated policies that very stability, as a fundamental factor for political stability, it did. (Ibid.)
236 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 237

This successful passing of the 'test of governance' was, however, reached (La Tercera 2006, June 1; La Nation 2006, October 29; Ruiz Encina 2006). This
by softening any drastic and decisive measure that would have tackled the 'penguin revolution' was also the direct antecedent of the massive Chilean
issue of income inequality, which was the main leitmotiv of the first round of student demonstrations that have taken place in the country since 2011 -
Lagos's presidential campaign.19 Income inequality was thus the main issue a circumstance that has marked the definitive emergence of a huge social
that remained unresolved at the end of Lagos's government, as he himself revulsion against inequality in Chile, particularly in the educational system
ultimately has to recognize (La Tercera 2005, March 13): (Camargo 2012).
The technocratization of the issue of income inequality has circumscribed
I think that the main deficiency is that we have not been able to have an the meaning of income inequality to a fixed setting of denotation that sur-
economic system that produces a country with a better income distribu- passes 'old policies' associated with income inequality, such as redistribution
tion. We have huge social achievements, but, despite their importance, of wealth, and makes hegemonic the use of inequality of opportunities, closely
they do not transcend the essence of a country that is still very unequal. linked to the improvement of the quality of education.
(Ibid.) A first step in this endeavor is made by posing the issue of income inequal-
ity as a result of a technical deficiency in the efficacy of social expenditure,
In a way, the fear of the masses that affected the entrepreneurs, found in the particularly in education, as Enrique Correa affirms (interview 2005d):
obsession of passing the 'test of governance', which pre-disposed socialists -
headed by Ricardo Lagos - to be a powerful ally. This was a reinforcing We have an important level of investment in education, you know what
association, which came to change definitively the initial perception that I mean?, but we do not see an improvement of the quality of education
the entrepreneurial sector had of the figure of Lagos, who ultimately ended proportionally to the increase of the expenditure. I believe that there is
his mandate without resolving the issue of income inequality, but gained a very difficult discussion to be had regarding whether or not we have
instead the unreserved admiration of entrepreneurs by preserving the actually created a model of growth with equity. Not because we have not
Chilean model, as Hernan Somerville, then president of the Confederation increased the expenditure - actually there is an important increase in social
de la Production y el Comertio (Confederation of Industry and Trade), the expenditure - but that the efficacy of such expenditure is low. (Ibid.)
leading umbrella entrepreneurial organization in Chile, eventually declares
(La Tercera 2005b, October 22): The discursive strategy deployed by Correa, far from assuming a drastic
revision of the 'growth with equity' project, seems rather to be designed
All the entrepreneurs love him [Lagos], either in the APEC [Asia Pacific explicitly to rescue the issue of income inequality from the dangers that he
Economic Forum| or here; everybody has a huge admiration for him sees in the discursive field of redistribution policies, as he adds:
because of his superior intellect and because he is widely favored by a
country that everybody perceives as a model; all the entrepreneurs in Like a background melody there is at present another discussion, that is,
Latin America recognize him as having a very important role in the the distribution of the income, which is in essence the discussion about
region. (Ibid.) inequality. It is a relevant discussion, very substantive, but it is a discus-
sion of a high risk, the risk of classic solutions, the risk of thinking that
Quality of education ergo i n c o m e equality? the investment in education, in human resources, which in the long term
will reduce those gaps, can seem very slow, and the searching for faster
However, it is clearly the technocratization of the issue of income inequality routes and the return to distributive policies through tax policies that
that has been the most sophisticated parallax discursive device through which reduce the level of growth. (Ibid.)
the Concertatidn elites have been able to face this pending problem, which,
after 22 years of classical discursive stratagems designed to tackle it, seems Genaro Arriagada (interview 2005f) agrees with Correa about using educa-
to appear suddenly in the political landscape as a form of social disruption. tion as a discursive device to combat the persistence of income inequality in
In fact, the most recent and notorious case of the irruption of social convul- post-Pinochet Chile, as he comments:
sions was the strike of secondary students in 2006 known as the 'penguin
revolution', which not only surprised all ChPEs but forced Bachelet's govern- [...] but the level of income distribution is still the same, well you know
ment to announce a deep reformulation of the education system in Chile this better than me ... However, I believe that we have finally been
238 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 239

finding something and this is basically the improvement in education. Therefore, the quality of education appears not only to be a useful mecha-
(Ibid.) nism to speak about income inequality without considering all of its com-
plexities, such as wealth redistribution policies, but also as a way to reduce
However, as with Correa, Arriagada is in fact asserting the 'educational option' the resolution of income inequality to a mere matter of technocracy. In this
in order to resolve the issue of income inequality as an indirect mechanism sense, income inequality appears as something that people do not have to
to preclude any possibility of even considering other options, such as those worry about too much in the daily political dispute - something that is bet-
'irresponsible populist redistribution policies' of the past, as he recalls: ter left to the experts.
Moreover, the discursive exercise of associating the resolution of income
Now, I think that whenever you raise this issue of the policies of social inequality with better opportunities through improving education is not
justices, to give it one name, everything that we knew in the past is only restricted to the Concertatidn's officers but extends its influence to
useless, you know what I mean? and the Concertatidn has a huge opposi- almost all members of ChPEs, particularly economists and the political
tion to populism, you see my point? Then, where can we find a policy, Right. Vittorio Corbo (interview 2005z), for instance, former chairman
a policy of equality that does not employ mechanisms of the past? You of the board of the Central Bank of Chile (May 2003 to December 2007),
see my point? Those mechanisms of the past such as the irresponsible a professor of economics at the Catholic University of Chile since 1981, and
increasing of salaries and remunerations, fiscal deficit, policies of easy one of the key economic advisers to the Chilean right, expresses this same
subsidies, which had very bad results - well, all of these do not work, do conviction:
they? (Ibid.)
I see, as a precondition to reduce the gap of inequality, the necessity
Coincidentally, Edgardo Boeninger (interview 2005j) is able to speak up to give to the low income groups the opportunities to generate higher
about income inequality in Chile but only when he finds in the dream of income by giving them more human capital. I believe that this is a
an improved education an adequate device to avoid making extreme con- precondition, I mean, due to the level that we start with, with the huge
clusions regarding the failure of the Chilean post-Pinochet model in this differences in inequalities that exist in the country, one of the biggest
respect: ones is in opportunity, and opportunities are provided by either social
networks or education. Then, those that do not have social networks
With regard to the monetary income, this actually is the weak part of because of the place in which they have born have this handicap, then
this issue, the gap between monetary incomes. But the truth is that the you have to give them opportunities through education. I believe that
gap in the monetary income, that I believe is high in Chile, is due to a the best way to reduce inequalities is always by providing opportunities
factor that is hard to resolve, which is to improve very much the level of to the people to acquire human capital. (Ibid.)
education. In other words, it relates to the quality of education. As we
say, if we want the sons of the losers not to experience what their fathers The Right goes a little further, making a sharp distinction between income
did, a major social integration between the winners and the losers of each inequality and inequality of opportunities, concentrating its critique only
generation is needed. (Ibid.) with the latter and defending as a legitimate condition of a market society
the former, as Maria Luisa Brahm (interview 2005v) has declared:
Furthermore, despite his aforementioned reference to income inequality,
what Boeninger makes clear - as most mainstream leaders of the Concertatidn The inequality of income per se is not a bad thing, I mean if we can keep
also believe (see, for instance, Martinez 1999: 229-73) - is that the problems the difference but level towards the top, that is, if there were inequali-
with inequality in Chile are exclusively reduced to the issue of inequality of ties but those at the bottom continued to rise, the income inequality
opportunities, which is seen both as a problem solely related to the improve- would not matter, would it? The point is when we have inequality of
ment of the quality of education and as a long-term task: opportunities ... then what we propose is [to correct) the starting point,
to give everybody the opportunities of education ... in order to eliminate
The other weak point is the inequality of opportunities. The inequality or at least reduce the social inequalities. (Ibid.)
of opportunities depends basically on education, and above everything,
on the quality of education. There, we have a task for the next decade. It is worthwhile noticing that this distinction between income inequality
(Ibid.) and inequality of opportunities seems to be posed in order to exclude any
240 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 241

options to tackle social inequalities other than improving education, as They do this, however, in an oblique way by first proclaiming the achiev-
Evelyn Matthei (interview 2005k) makes clear: ability of the fantasy, as Jose Joaquin Brunner (interview 2005a) enthusiasti-
cally displays:
How will you reduce the social inequality if you do not close the gap
in education? Would you mean to pay a salary to someone who cannot 1 believe that requires many things, but I believe it requires more expend-
produce anything? Or is it going to be only subsidized? How can you be iture on education, a lot more ... However, 1 am not referring to the
sure that the subsidy is not going to be wasted in drinking? (Ibid.) expenditure alone but that such increase in expenditure should be linked
to a whole lot of other conditions that relate to the legal framework of
It is worthwhile making clear that the point here is not to assume that an teachers ... But also I am talking about changes in the management
improvement in the quality of education would have no real impact on the system of schools. Actually, 1 imagine a whole set of measures because
Issue of inequality, either inequality of opportunities or income inequality - that is the only way to make politically viable such a huge increase of
probably it will, at least indirectly. However, what is criticizable is the fact expenditure in education. I have the impression that we cannot do all of
that a great part of the ChPEs seem to revert to that solution in order to these in an incremental way but as a big 'coup'. (Ibid.)
avoid seeing the whole factual dimension of the issue of income inequality
in Chile. This dimension, as highlighted by union and civil society leaders, But then, ultimately doubting his own dream, he continues:
generates an inner imbalance in power relations within Chilean society,
which improvements in education seem insufficient to resolve, as Hugo Fazio I have no doubt that those [educational] programs have been making
(interview 2005r) has asserted. Also Ana Bell (interview 2005w) has made the educational system more equal. Now, we have arrived at a point
clear that: where we know all those things. Furthermore, we have done that
before. But we still realize that the final result, which is the aggregate
A way to explain inequality [in Chile] is by observing a situation in learning achievements, nationally and internationally measured, of
which you do not have anyone with a real possibility to influence power our students, are in general terms bad. Secondly, such results are dra-
or to act as a balance. In that case it is very difficult to change the gap matically affected by a component of social segregation! Well, the only
[of inequality]: you can ameliorate the gap, and long-term measures ... thing that 1 have said regarding this point is, despite the fact that eve-
well, one listens now to the candidate, 1 listen to Michelle [Bachelet] and rybody has agreed that education is the most important way to reduce
she still insists with the topic of education; the education is a long-term inequalities, 1 have to say that, look, nowadays, that is not the case. The
policy that will not resolve anything if you do not modify the root of the education system, despite all the improvements we have made on it, is
relationship that generates this gap of inequality. (Ibid.) not being the instrument by which equality can be improved. This is
because we are not able in this system to compensate the deficit coming
Furthermore, this strategy of using education to domesticate the issue of from the socio-economic origin of students. (Ibid, emphasis added by the
income inequality, to make it appear more tolerable, is not only mislead- author.)
ing but has increasingly become even unsatisfactory for the Concertatidn
elites themselves. It is deceptive because - as we said - it implicitly Ernesto Ottone is another member of the Concertatidn elites who ultimately
excludes a more widely understood approach to inequality simply because seems to be unhappy with those complacent assessments of the issue of
it would lead to the risk of assuming the need for 'old-fashioned' redistri- income inequality in Chile. The problem, however, is that he himself
bution solutions. It is therefore an arbitrary rejection, which appears to makes both a complacent and unsatisfactory statement on the same issue of
neglect a critical reflection just because of the fear that such an analysis inequality! He first praised the enormous achievements in reaching greater
could make visible the 'old phantasms' of a condemned political past equality in the country (interview 2005b):
of class confrontation. 20 Furthermore, it has also become unsatisfactory
for the Concertatidn elites themselves, or at least to some of their more If we saw the issue of inequality as not only restricted to the distribution
'perceptive' members, who, despite being passionately involved in the of income, but also as a more general topic linked to the issue of incomes
promotion of this new way of viewing and resolving income inequality in and witli other issues such as accessibility, mobility, and so on, then
the country, cannot avoid raising doubts about the novelty of the chosen 1 believe that in Chile we have dramatically improved the process of
fantasy. equality ... the real one. (Ibid.)
242 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 243

But he also eventually recognizes the precarious situation of those living ideological, that is, as both a denial of a primordial repressed and a central
outside of modernity, as he says: constituent of a given political discourse, which is the concept of the dis-
course of class struggle assumed as the Real (see Chapter 4)?
I believe that there is a concatenation, and there are possibilities of It is worth recalling that the criterion used to assert whether or not the MJ
more virtuous concatenations. I agree that there are currently [in Chile] and SSCs of the issue of income inequality deny any reference to class strug-
concatenations that are not very virtuous. In other words, a particular gle refers to the degree of coherence shown by those MJ and SSCs to explain
conception of a so-called modernity, using the term modernity in a more the exclusion of class struggle from a reasonable justificatory discourse of a
flexible sense, is reproduced in sectors that are close to globalization, consensus on a political economy model featuring a high level of income
or close to the world trade, or close to liberalization. And, on the other inequality.
hand, there is a sort of very deep gap, associated with other sectors in In turn, to determine when the aforementioned exclusion of class struggle
terms of their standard of life, conditions of production or even produc- can be assumed as a denial of the Real (that is, as ideological) the evaluative
tivity, is not there? I believe that Chile can no longer work in this way. (Ibid., criterion used is one that will weigh the sufficiency of considering such an
emphasis added by the author) exclusion of class struggle already found as a denial of a primordial repressed.
The primordial repressed is instead conceived as an original and traumatic
These final remarks by Brunner and Ottone seem to suggest that, despite social division or 'antagonism' of society, which cannot be symbolized and
their sincere efforts, the 'old-fashioned' category of social classes manages that is thus not part of reality but something which makes reality possible,
to persist, though in an oblique way, at the bottom of any technocratic that is, it is a central constituent of the consensus of the discourse of ChPEs
solution for the quality of education. This seems to have been the case, for on the post-Pinochet political economy model (that is, the irrepresentable
instance, with Brunner, who did not refer directly to class division - a term X on whose 'repression' the consensus is itself founded), as has been devel-
full of bitter remembrance - but rather alluded to 'the deficit arising from oped by Zizek (see Chapters 3 and 4). In other words, the assessment will
the socio-economic origin of students' (interview 2005a) to explain the firstly look for constants and patterns in the way in which the denial of
failure to resolve the problem. Brunner's latter statement results in a curious the notion of class struggle is used by interviewees and around which dif-
and contradictory recognition coming from a member of a political elite ferent MJ and SSCs of income inequality are displayed. Then it will assess
whose discourse, as a whole, is hegemonized by an ethos that presents no whether these constants and patterns can be best interpreted, on the basis
doubts in praising the Chilean model as an endeavor not only to be proud of of the contradictory features of the phenomenon investigated, as a denial of
but also one that assures long-term durability, despite those pending issues a primordial repressed social antagonism that acts as a central constitutive
such as income inequality, as Enrique Correa (interview 2005d) ultimately category of the consensus (that is, as the Real).
and optimistically declares: Therefore, in what follows, both an assessment of the coherence of the
specific SSCs and MJ of ChPEs regarding the notion of class struggle and an
I believe that what is happening here is very, very, very durable. I am assessment of the potential ideological character of these SSCs and MJ are
convinced myself of this ... we have made a lasting endeavor, of which presented.
we are proud. (Ibid.)
What about class struggle?
Conclusion Have ChPEs coherently explained how a consensus on the post-Pinochet
political economy model came about despite the high level of income
Having analyzed the SSCs used by ChPEs to deal with the issue of income inequality existing in the country, without needing to deploy a discourse
inequality on the consensus of the political economy model in post-Pinochet of class struggle, that is, without needing to explicitly acknowledge and
Chile, it is worth now assessing whether or not the aforementioned SSCs encourage (by calling - politically-ideologically - for radical or revolutionary
deny a discourse of class struggle. This would be a discourse that explic- social and political transformations) primordial social antagonisms?
itly acknowledges and encourages (by calling - politically-ideologically - From the previous analysis, the first thing to make clear is that a large
for radical or revolutionary social and political transformations) primordial part of the discourse of ChPEs is based on what we can call, following
social antagonisms, irrespective of whether or not those antagonisms cor- Habermas, an exercise of communicative rationality, that is, the primacy
respond to a classic confrontation between working and capitalist classes of the best argument in a context of a pragmatic structure of daily political
(see Chapter 4). And if there is indeed a denial, should it be considered communications.21 Furthermore, even when the SSCs used by ChPEs are
244 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 245

explicitly inscribed within a reductionist explicative framework, such as the However, one would contest that any given political discourse may be
MJ of Reification (for instance, the thesis of the 'authoritarian enclaves'), susceptible to including traumatic and fantastic components, this fact alone
they aim to communicate reasons that are presented as an explicatory basis being not enough to qualify this discourse as ideological in the sense used
for a given political behavior rather than simply, in an authoritarian or de in this book (see Chapter 4). Although this contention is fair, what is here
facto way, to impose a point of view. In this sense, it is fair to conclude that affirmed is not that the mere inclusion of traumatic and fantastic justifica-
on a first, more explicit, discursive level of analysis ChPEs tend to be part of tory devices is what tends to make, partially at least, the ChPEs' discourse
a communicative ethos, which is a long way from the authoritarian political ideological. Rather, it is the arbitrary and constant exclusion, in those SSCs
culture that ruled the country during Pinochet's regime. used by ChPEs, of the notion of social antagonism (class struggle) as a valid
It is worthwhile stressing that this is not a minor point, because it implies and central explanation (that is, a primordial repressed or the Real) for the
the assumption that a political consensus among political elites on the existence of a high level of income inequality in the country that produces
post-Pinochet Chilean model cannot be assimilated simplistically to a mere such an outcome.
ideological misrecognition imposed on some individuals 'who do not know In fact, from the analysis presented in this chapter we can state that
what they are doing', as the classical critical theory of ideology has argued among the 17 specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs to deal with the issue
(see Chapters 1 and 3). Rather, what we find after analyzing the discourse of income inequality, none of them make actual reference to the struc-
deployed by ChPEs to deal with the issue of income inequality is a great tural transformations in the country that occurred as a result of the
effort of justification - in accordance with the democratic character of post- implementation of a neo-liberal political economy model during Pinochet's
Pinochet ChPEs - of a circumstance, income inequality, that in some way regime - a model that remained unaltered in its structural components dur-
is acknowledged as a disruptive condition for the forging of a coherent and ing post-Pinochet Chile. This transformation, as we have seen in Chapter 5,
consistent consensus. resulted in a huge social division, which directly impacts the current level
However, the analysis presented in the previous sections of this chapter of income inequality.
suggests that the aforementioned preliminary conclusion must be carefully Moreover, on the only occasions in which ChPEs deal with issues that
calibrated. Furthermore, such an analysis shows that the discourse deployed indirectly refer to such a legacy of class division they either (a) present multi-
by ChPEs to deal with the issue of income inequality is far from being variable and inconsistent positions that cannot be coherently assumed as a
exhausted with a label that describes it as a mere exercise of communicative paradigmatic case of a rational communicative consensus a la Habermas
rationality a la Habermas. Rather, it seems reasonable to assert that within (just recalling, for instance, the thesis of 'the one or two models') or (b)
the ethos of 'the best argument' that characterizes the discourse of ChPEs we tend to have an indirect and contradictory recognition - something which,
also find a whole set of discursive devices that can be easily assimilated to following Zizek, I have called a 'parallax' view - of the influence of class
fantastic and traumatic recourses in the line suggested by Zizek's theory of division in the explanation of the failure to improve education as a way to
ideology (see Chapter 3), that is, as recourses that reinforce the reality con- resolve income inequality (for instance, 'the perturbing recognition of an
structed by a discursive exercise of communicative action - a supplement for enduring presence of income inequality despite improving education'), or
an already constructed justificatory framework. (c) simply deploy an euphemistic discourse of dissimulation (for instance,
In fact, the tendency towards (a) reification of the issue of income inequal- the discourse of success), which, far from acknowledging social-class struc-
ity (for instance, the metaphor of the 'two souls' and the naturalization and tural transformations, re-describes them in terms that elicit a positive value
eternalization of income inequality); (b) the recalling of Pinochet's presence and which overlook their impacts.
(for instance, the 'one or two models'; the fear of Pinochet; and the 'authori- Therefore, the point here is twofold. First, the assertion that none of the
tarian enclaves'); (c) the effects of the traumas of the past (for instance, the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs to explain income inequality explicitly refer
fear of themselves as a political generation; the fear of tabula rasa; and the to the neo-liberal structural transformations that feature in post-Pinochet
fear of the masses); (d) the pressure exerted by a sort of 'first of the course Chile (for instance, the strengthening of the upper classes; the weakening of
image' (for instance, 'to present oneself as a model'); and (e) the feeling of formal workers; and the expansion of informal workers) despite the evidence
permanently taking an exam (for instance, the 'test of governance') can that, partially at least, associates income inequality with such transforma-
be considered as examples of fantastic and traumatic discursive recourses tions (see Chapter 5). Second, that the aforementioned absence of reference
deployed by ChPEs to lock - in an anti-communicative way - a consensus to structural transformations in ChPEs' discourse, despite, as we have seen,
on the post-Pinochet Chilean model despite the high levels of income the evidence of its explicative relevance to the point in question, may suggest
inequality existing within it. that we are in the presence of an arbitrary exclusion - an arbitrary exclusion
246 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 247

(that is, the analytical category of class division) that is, by extension, at the theoretical framework of this book - for the exploration of the question of
root of another arbitrary absence: a discourse of class struggle, that is, one whether or not such ChPE discourse could be considered ideological, that is,
that acknowledges and encourages (by calling - politically-ideologically - for a discourse whose exclusion of the category of class struggle can be assumed
radical or revolutionary social and political transformations) primordial social as a denial of the Real - an endeavor presented in the next section.
antagonisms.
To be clear, the point here is not to assert that the absence of a discourse The denial of the Real: toward a new ideology
of class struggle, as above defined, is always arbitrary but rather that, in the Having found a reasonable basis to assert that the specific SSCs and the MJ
particular case of the ChPEs analyzed, such a conclusion becomes plausible. deployed by ChPEs to justify the issue of income inequality in a context
In fact, the exclusion of the issue of class division and class struggle from of a consensual post-Pinochet political economy model tend to deny any
the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs seems to be very much in accordance reference to the discourse of class struggle, in its operational sense, we could
with the process of political discourse reconstitution that faced ChPEs after now ask whether or not such a denial has an ideological character, that is,
the coup of 1973, the main feature of which was the expurgation of any whether or not it constitutes a denial of the Real in a Zizekian sense (see
discourse of class struggle due to the painful memory that such a discourse Chapters 3 and 4).
recalled (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, it is by recalling such a peculiar proc- The first thing to establish in this respect is that, from the analysis of the
ess of reconstitution of political discourse that one can plausibly explain previous sections of this chapter, we can be assured that the exclusion of
why ChPEs have built (discursively) a consensus on a political economy the discourse of class struggle found in the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs
model in post-Pinochet Chile that has uniformly excluded any reference to shows both a constant and arbitrary pattern. This means, on the one hand,
class division in the explanation of income inequality. that there is no mention within them of either the notion of class division,
Therefore, we are in a position to suggest that the consensus on the Chilean social-class structure, the weakening of the working class or social antago-
model, featuring high levels of income inequality, appears not to be coherently nism (class struggle) in the explanation of income inequality - the exclusion
explained by the discourse of ChPEs if one interprets such a consensus as one of such notions being thus almost absolute. On the other hand, we have
exclusively inscribed within a Habermasian framework. This is because there already stated that such an exclusion can be considered as arbitrary because
is no coherence in the discourse of ChPEs between two main factors. First, the it does not deal with the impact that the structural transformations, includ-
way in which the discourse of ChPEs deals with the presence of a pressing and ing the changes in structure of social classes that took place in Chile in the
disturbing issue like income inequality, including the building up - despite last 37 years (see Chapter 5), have had upon the explanation of income
this issue - of what is at first sight a wide-ranging communicative, though inequality - a reference that, according to the evidence that links structural
exclusionary (of the notion of class struggle), consensus toward the preser- transformations and income inequality (Chapter 5), is reasonable to have
vation of the post-Pinochet Chilean model - a consensus that even reaches expected to find in the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs.
those more critical sectors of ChPEs, as we have seen in previous sections of However, is it possible to establish that from these findings, which show
this chapter. And, second, the lack of consideration of relevant factors, such as that the aforementioned specific SSCs deny constantly and arbitrarily any
the structural transformation of class structure and class or social antagonisms reference of a discourse of class struggle, we could conclude that this a
in the explicatory framework of that consensus. This incoherency in the dis- denial of the Real? We should recall that a denial of class struggle as the
course of ChPEs allows us to conclude that the specific SSCs deployed by them Real means to argue that the negation of class struggle is conceived as a
tend to deny or exclude any reference to the discourse of class struggle from a primordial repressed social division or 'antagonism', which cannot be sym-
justificatory framework of a consensus built around a political economy model bolized and is thus not part of reality, but makes it possible, that is, it is a
featuring a high level of income inequality, which thus answers the first part central constituent of the consensus of the discourse of ChPEs on the post-
of the ERQ posed in Chapter 4. Pinochet political economy model (that is, the irrepresentable X on whose
Finally, before analyzing the second part of the ERQ it is worthwhile clari- 'repression' the consensus is itself founded), as has been developed by Zizek
fying that what is here argued is not that it is the exclusion of class division (Chapter 3). Then, how can we assert a denial of the Real for the sake of the
and class struggle from the discourse of ChPEs - which forge the consensus argument here pursued?
on the Chilean model - that constitutes the only explanation of income One way to do this is by critically reflecting on whether it could be
inequality in post-Pinochet Chile. Rather, that such an exclusion, being 'reasonable' to have expected, in the context of a discourse of a political
arbitrary (and thus rendering the ChPEs' discourse incoherent), as we have elite that aimed to build a consensus on a political economy model fea-
seen, may form a reasonable basis - according to the methodological and turing high levels of income inequality, to find a uniform and arbitrary
248 The New Critique of Ideology The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile 249

exclusion, as an explicative discursive device, of the notion of class struggle, on its recognition - a conclusion that is reinforced with the findings of the
as happened in the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs. And if it is concluded historical process of reconstitution of political discourse faced by ChPEs, as
that it would not be reasonable, then would it be plausible to consider we have seen in Chapter 6.
such an exclusion as an exclusion of the Real, regarding the fact that the On the other hand, the uniform or constant character of the exclusion of
'reasonableness' of the argument is based on the fundamental conceptual the notion of class struggle (that is, the almost absolute absence of any refer-
elements of the definition of the Real (class struggle in our case), considered ence to class struggle in the discourse of ChPEs), as an explicative discursive
in the situation analyzed, that is, social antagonism as a central constituent device of the issue of income inequality from their specific SSCs found in
of the consensus of ChPEs? the previous section, suggests that the aforementioned assumed denial of a
To develop this argument it is worth imagining what would be a 'pure' primordial repressed social antagonism could also be assumed as a central
case of a reasonable statement that one would expect to find among the constitutive category, because it is presented as a cornerstone exclusion for
specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs, in the sense that any exclusion of such the constitution of a general justificatory discursive pattern among ChPEs in
a 'pure' reasonable statement could be considered as a 'primordial repres- post-Pinochet Chile. Consequently, due to the fact that we have a uniformly
sion', because the whole discourse cannot but be based in its recognition. excluded primordial repressed category (class struggle) presented in the dis-
In fact, if we accept that a 'pure' reasonable statement in the case analyzed course of ChPEs, we can conclude that such an exclusion could be assumed
would be one that, among other factors, could not have omitted to take as a denial of the Real, that is, of the irrepresentable X on whose repression
into account the structural transformations that featured in the Chilean the ChPEs' consensus is rooted.
model (Chapter 5) in order to explain the issue of income inequality in Therefore, from the aforementioned analysis we are in a position to con-
post-Pinochet Chile, as, incidentally, we have already stated in the previous clude that the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs to justify the issue of income
subsection, we could thus imagine the following example of such a discur- inequality in the context of a consensual post-Pinochet political economy
sive statement by ChPEs: model could be considered, as a whole, as ideological, because they deny
any reference to the discourse of class struggle assumed as the Real, that is,
Amongst other things, due to the disintegration of the formal working as a primordial repressed social antagonism that constitutes a central cat-
class and the relative prevalence of the interests of one sector of society (for egory of ChPEs' discourse on post-Pinochet Chile.
instance, upper class, business sector, and so on) over others (for instance, However, it is worthwhile warning that this last conclusion must be
informal workers) we have now in the country a high level of income assumed with caution because, apart from the theoretical assumptions that
inequality. Since this is a reality, we have built a consensus on a political one has to accept in order for it to be asserted - particularly the notion of the
economy model based on such facts because this is the best model that we Real as developed by Zizek (Chapter 3) - one also has to bear in mind that
can have at the moment to resolve the issue of income inequality. this is a conclusion that is restricted by the scope of the empirical research
covered by this book, something that will always be liable to be contested
In other words, this is a discursive statement that, precisely because it rec- or confirmed with further empirical research.
ognizes an imbalance in the class situation, assumes as unrealistic a policy
proposal that encourages social antagonisms or class struggle to explain and Summary
resolve income inequality, and rather reasonably opts to build a consensus
on the inherited (from Pinochet's regime) political economy model as the Chapter 7 has presented a formal or discursive analysis of the MJ and SSCs
more realistic political option for the current conditions. through which ChPEs have managed to build a consensus on the post-
Therefore, if we accept that this can be considered a 'pure' reasonable dis- Pinochet Chilean model despite the permanent presence of the issue of
cursive statement that one could have reasonably expected to find among income inequality. The chapter identifies the 'authoritarian enclaves' as one
the discourse of ChPEs, one should also coherently have to conclude two of the main SSCs used by ChPEs to present a reasonable justification for the
things. On the one hand, that the arbitrary character of the exclusion - as preservation of a model featuring huge income inequality. However, it also
an explicative discursive device of the issue of income inequality - of the argues that such 'authoritarian enclaves' have become a fetishistic justifica-
notion of class struggle from the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs, described tory device, which cloak a much more complex process of discourse building,
in the previous section, constitutes an exclusion of a 'pure' reasonable rooted in the historical process of discursive reconstitution experienced by
statement, which thus can be assumed as a denial of a primordial repressed ChPEs after the coup of September 1973 (Chapter 6). This process of discur-
social antagonism, because the whole ChPE discourse cannot but be based sive reconstitution is at the root of the building up of traumatic and fantastic
250 The New Critique of Ideology

discursive devices that come to supplement and, sometimes, to contradict


C o n c l u s i o n
the justificatory framework of authoritarian enclaves, in the form of a series
of SSCs that can be summarized as follows: (a) the two fears (of Pinochet
and of tabula rasa); (b) the unacknowledged fear of themselves as a political
generation and the fear of the masses; (c) the one or two models; (d) the
discourses of success, of presenting oneself as a model, and of the 'first stu-
dent of the course' in Latin America; (e) the parallax recognition of income
inequality; (f) the naturalization/eternalization of income inequality; (g) the
metaphor of the two souls; (h) the test of governance; (i) the technocratiza-
tion of income inequality; (j) inequality of opportunities; (k) the improving
quality of education; and (1) the perturbing recognition of an enduring pres-
ence of income inequality despite improvements in education. Together,
these SSCs show the richness and complexities of the actual consensus on
the Chilean model reached by ChPEs. From the very outset the theory of ideology has been cursed with the chal-
The chapter concludes that, on the one hand, the consensus on the lenge of assuming, as an indispensable requirement, a given 'Archimedean
Chilean model, featuring high levels of income inequality, appears not to point of truth'. That is, the assumption of a universal, fixed and absolute
be coherently explained by the discourse of ChPEs within a Habermasian true stage from which an ideology critique could become possible.
framework. Furthermore, this incoherency allows us to conclude that the The 'Archimedean point of truth' has been a premise that has been contin-
specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs tend to deny any reference to the discourse ually refurbished throughout the debate on ideology - ultimately, reaching
of class struggle from a justificatory framework of the consensus referred. a stage in which it appears to be abandoned altogether by those contem-
On the other hand, and in order to assess the ideological character of the porary theorists working within a post-structuralist ethos. Yet, it has been
aforementioned denial of the discourse of class struggle, the chapter makes a compromise solution, adopted by those scholars who, in order to insist
use of a 'pure' case of a reasonable statement, that is, one that anyone would upon using such a poorly reputed notion as ideology, have agreed to keep it
expect to find among the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs; otherwise, the unattached from any pretension of universality, fixity or absoluteness.
discourse by definition would become ideological (that is, it would deny However, as was argued in Chapter 2, this is a move that has left unre-
the Real). The pure reasonable statement chosen was one that asserts the solved one of the main challenges posed by the whole tradition of the theory
disintegration of the working class and the relative prevalence of the inter- of ideology, which is still valid nowadays: that is, the possibility of asserting a
ests of one sector of society (for instance, upper class, business sector) over universal critique of ideology. In other words, the possibility of affirming that
others (for instance, informal workers) as one reasonable explicative factor reprehensive statements such as 'black people are inferior to white people'
of income inequality. Then, recognizing that such a statement has in fact can be universally recognized as ideological.
been excluded from the discourse of ChPEs, the chapter has concluded that A central contention of this book is that it is not only worth insisting
the specific SSCs deployed by ChPEs can be considered ideological. upon using the concept of ideology(ies), as contemporary scholars have
Finally, it is worth recalling that the purpose of this empirical study has accepted, but also worth assuming a notion of universal, though not fixed
been to contrast a Habermasian interpretation of the consensus reached by or absolute, truth to make possible an ideology critique for political analysis
ChPEs on the post-Pinochet political economy model with that which results in 'post-modem times'.
when such an interpretation is subjected to a model of ideology based on a To defend this contention this book has firstly traced the trajectory fol-
Zizekian approach. In other words, the main aim of this empirical research lowed by the debate on theories of ideology from its inception with Marx's
has been the application of a theoretical model that intends to revitalize works to its current stage. Chapter 1 has shown that although Marx's notion
an ideology critique for political analysis. Therefore, we are now in a posi- of ideology tends to overcome the previous epistemological dichotomy
tion to return to our main theoretical concern and to assess whether or not reality/illusion, it remains inscribed within a rational aegis. Furthermore,
the findings of this empirical research justify persisting using a universal, Marx's use of a dialectic logic, in which knowledge and ideology are
though fictional, notion of truth for a model of ideology critique for politi- understood as products of the material practices of socially organized indi-
cal analysis in 'post-modern times', as that applied to the Chilean case - viduals, was promptly altered by the subsequent debate in the field. In this
an endeavor presented in the Conclusion of this book. way, the problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth' was permanently
251
252 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 253

brought back to the scene of the study of ideology. The result has been that A second contention of this book is that an ideology critique as formu-
in descriptive, positive and negative conceptions of ideology, the assump- lated above can be suitably developed as a model for empirical research.
tion of a universal, fixed and absolute non-ideological stage appears as a With this purpose in mind, in Chapter 4 a methodology was developed
constant feature, inherently linked to the concept of ideology itself. that articulates the central contention for a new ideology critique in the
This somewhat inescapable association between an 'Archimedean point of particular enactment of a concrete empirical case study. Essentially, this
truth' perspective and the notion of ideology has led many scholars working means the setting up of a set of criteria that guides the articulation of a
within a post-structuralist ethos to abandon such a notion altogether. Even 'fictional' notion of the Real - in this case, class struggle - into the con-
more, as we stated in Chapter 2, scholars like Michael Freeden and Ernesto sensus reached by ChPEs on the post-Pinochet political economy model
Laclau, who still insist upon using the notion of ideology, explicitly reject (1990-2006). The goal is to discern either the ideological or non-ideological
any Archimedean approach for their theories. Freeden shifts the emphasis universal character of such a consensus. In this way, the Chilean case study
from the critique of ideology to the morphological analysis of concrete aims to work as a strategy to test and re-problematize the model of ideol-
ideologies. This is a theoretical endeavor that, however, does not provide a ogy critique defended in this book. For this purpose, a testing-rectification
satisfactory answer to the challenge of distinguishing between ideological methodological design, based on a deep hermeneutic matrix, is presented
and non-ideological statements, as we have argued in Chapter 2. Laclau's in Chapter 4 to research the case study. The deep hermeneutic matrix
theory of ideology does not abandon the idea of critique but instead reduces considers three stages: the socio-historical analysis, formal or discursive
it to a sort of abstract theoretical remembrance that permanently warns analysis and a symptomatic (re)interpretation, all of which are developed
against any definitive sutures for society. In this way, despite its evident mer- in Part II of the book.
its, Laclau's theory of critique of ideology appears reactive, that is, unable to The first phase of the deep hermeneutic matrix is offered in Chapters 5 and 6.
propose a pro-active theoretical model for an empirically orientated research Chapter 5 has analyzed the main structural features of the new Chilean
that universally affirms the non-ideological character of a given political political economy model implemented in the country between 1973 and
discourse. the post-Pinochet democratic period considered (1990-2006). The chapter
Taking into account the aforementioned current stage of the theorization has shown that the so-called 'Chilean model' features four main trends: (a)
on ideology, Chapter 3 has pursued a reformulation of a universal truth for the growing number of informal workers, (b) the weakening of the organ-
an ideology critique within Jiirgen Habermas's theory of communicative ized worker sector, (c) the increasing power of the dominant class and (d) the
action. Indeed, by using Slavoj Zizek's theory of ideology, it has been shown reaching and maintenance of high levels of income inequality. Furthermore,
that in the absence of a universal truth, Habermas's rationality becomes these trends configure a rather odd 'growth with inequality' feature in the
unable to cope with ideological delusions rooted in the concrete operation post-Pinochet Chilean model - a feature that will become an undesirable
of subjects' fantasies. presence that has to be dealt with by the ChPE discourse.
Nonetheless, as has been shown in Chapter 3, this is a shortcoming that Chapter 6 traces the trajectory followed by the political discourse of the
can be faced by rehabilitating an ideology critique through the fictional use main political forces of the Left, Center and Rigtit in Chilean politics from
of the Real, taken from a Zizekian reading of Lacan. This is because the use the 1960s to 1990. The analysis has focused on the way in which the ChPE
of a fictional Real makes possible the assertion of a truth - the unmasking of discourse has dealt with the notion (signifier) of class struggle. This is a
the extra-ideological place - as a universal, though also fictional category. The notion that was abundantly used, though in different ways, by politicians
truth, in this way considered, becomes not only viable but also even concep- from the Left, Right and Center before the coup of 1973. Furthermore, the
tually necessary as a condition that makes possible the existence of a post- different connotations and discursive intensity in which such a notion was
communicative action field as a place in which the 'validity claim' of truth employed before the coup will mark the new discursive identities of ChPEs
in a Habermasian matrix can be distinguished from a 'falsification of truth'. after the coup. In this way, the coup appears as a traumatic event that is at
Furthermore, this book ultimately argues that a universal ideology critique is the root of the so-called 'renovation of paradigms', which affected all ChPEs
crucial to avoid Habermas's validity claim of truth becoming trapped - due in the late 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Chapter 6 has argued that the rise of
to the 'thin rationality' of a Habermasian matrix - in an ideological delusion, 'democracy' as a new hegemonic signifier was based on the expurgation of
such as that denounced by Zizek. In this sense, the last section of Chapter 3 the discourse of class struggle. The implication and character of this expur-
asserts that the rehabilitation of an ideology critique here proposed can also be gation will only be actualized a posterior when a set of discursive strategies
observed as an overcoming - through 'Derridean' logic of supplementarity - of of ChPEs will be deployed to deal with disruptive issues, such as income
Habermas's communicative action theory. inequality, in post-Pinochet Chile.
254 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 255

In fact, Chapter 7 analyzes the MJ and SSCs used by ChPEs to build a con- other words, the notion of the Real - precisely because it is assumed as a
sensus on the post-Pinochet Chilean model, despite the permanent presence primordial repressed social antagonism and a central constituent on whose
of the issue of income inequality (the second phase of the deep hermeneutic repression reality itself is set up (Chapters 3 & 4) - gains accuracy by being
matrix). The chapter has identified the 'authoritarian enclaves' as a central placed within a multi-variable methodological matrix. Furthermore, this
excusing signifier that permanently recalls the 'objective' impossibility of integrated matrix, combining different methodological approaches, should
changing things. This is an allusion/illusion that has been complemented allow the selecting, in the first place, of a suitable candidate to be a fictional
by a series of other discursive strategies, ranging from the recalling of the Real. Then, it should also facilitate the realization of a consistent analytical
menacing figure of Pinochet, social convulsions and political chaos, to the exercise that eventually confirms or discards such a fictional selection of the
image of success and ultimately to the technocratization of income inequal- Real - something that, in this book, has been intended by displaying a deep
ity. Considering these discursive strategies in contrast to the notion of class hermeneutic matrix (Chapter 4).
struggle assumed as a fictional Real, Chapter 7 has shown the ineffectiveness In fact, the Chilean case study shows that it would have been almost
of a mere Habermasian framework to explain the post-Pinochet consensus. impossible and certainly inaccurate to select the discourse of class struggle
Indeed, there is incoherence between, on the one hand, a wide-ranging as a fictional Real if one ignored the whole evolution of the discourse of
consensus held by ChPEs and, on the other, the presence of high and unre- Chilean political elites that took place after the coup of 1973 (Chapter 6).
solved levels of income inequality. This incoherence, which remains inex- Furthermore, it is the centrality of the notion of class struggle in the earlier
plicable within a Habermasian matrix, is, rather, explained as a consequence ChPE discourse (until the coup of 1973) that turns such a signifier (class
of the exclusion or denial of any reference to a discourse associated with struggle) into a suitable candidate for being the fictional Real in the first
class struggle in the ChPEs' discourse. In other words, we are witnessing the place. Likewise, it is the significance that the expurgation of the notion of
exclusion of a signifier (class struggle) which, due to the significance of the class struggle has had on the peculiar process of reconstruction of ChPEs' dis-
transformation of class structure in the explanation of income inequality in course since the coup that supports the idea that the absence of class struggle
Chile, should not but have been considered within a justificatory discourse from that discourse can be assumed as a denial of the Real (Chapters 4 & 6).
by ChPEs. In this sense, Chapter 7 concludes that the exclusion of the Furthermore, it would have been difficult and certainly incoherent to ulti-
notion of class struggle, rooted in the traumatic reconstitution of political mately assert whether or not the denial of the notion of class struggle could
identities analyzed in Chapter 6, must be considered as universally ideologi- be assumed as a denial of the Real if we had not taken into account the struc-
cal (the third phase of the deep hermeneutic matrix). This is a conclusion tural transformations that were at the root of the political situation analyzed
obtained from the articulation of the theoretical model of ideology critique (Chapter 5). In other words, it is only by contrasting the justificatory dis-
here defended by the Chilean case study. The Chilean case study findings, in course of Chilean political elites on the issue of income inequality with the
turn, can be used to re-problematize the general thesis of a project of a new structural transformation that was at the root of the Chilean model that the
ideology critique as well as to reassess their impacts on Habermas's commu- exclusion of the notion of class struggle from such a discourse can be assumed
nicative action theory, as we will see in the next sections. as an arbitrary and eventually ideological phenomenon (Chapter 7). We
could even make a parallel here and affirm that a deep hermeneutic matrix
is to the use of the Real for political analysis what personal therapy is to the
Lessons for a new ideology critique
use of the unconscious Real for psychoanalytic treatment - an indispensable
A central contention of this book has been the proposal of a fictional notion and dynamic methodology that assures the accuracy of the diagnostic and
of the Real for the rehabilitation of an ideology critique in which the truth the putting forward of adequate solutions for 'dealing with' either personal
can become possible as a universal, though fictional category. The Chilean distressing conditions or political ideological exclusions.
case has allowed us to empirically articulate this contention, leaving some The Chilean case study also shows that the Real should not but be used in a
lessons that are now worth reconsidering for a more general project of reha- fictional way for political analysis. Indeed, if we take seriously the character of
bilitation of ideology critique for political analysis. the Real we have to be aware that the Real can only be confronted through the
First of all, the notion of the Real, although originally developed for a Tenses of a multitude of symbolic fictions', as Zizek (2006: 26) has stated:
psychoanalytical personal orientated framework of analysis, has proved itself
suitable for political analysis, vis-a-vis the fact that it is employed in combi- In a first move, the Real is the impossible hard core which we cannot
nation with other methodological approaches, which place such a notion confront directly, but only through the lenses of a multitude of symbolic
of the Real in the historical situation that is intended to be investigated. In fictions, virtual formations. (Ibid.)
256 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 257

Those 'symbolic fictions' alluded to by Zizek are not actually the Real but, is mostly due to the fact that the elites investigated are part of the same
rather, what 1 have here called the fictional candidates for the Real - a role political generation as those who led a very explicit discourse of class strug-
played in the Chilean case study by the discourse of class struggle. To be gle in the 1960s and continued to do so until a dramatic coup d'etat came
clear, the symbolic fictions are necessary to operationalize the use of the to drastically end the experience in 1973 (Chapter 6). Furthermore, as we
Real for an ideology critique of a given political situation. However, they do have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, during the Pinochet regime the discourse of
not make the Real real because this is, by definition, non-existent or, as Zizek class struggle was also an underlying, though somewhat repressed, feature.
(ibid.) has also pointed out: 'in a second move, this very core [the Real] is This was the case even when the discourse of class struggle was replaced by a
purely virtual, actually non-existent' (ibid.). so-called discourse of 'struggle for democracy', during the 1980s and 1990s.
Therefore, what the Chilean case study shows is that, even holding the Therefore, class struggle has been a constant repressed signifier that has
theoretical premise that the Real does not exist in reality, this - the Real - can been maintained throughout the years of the new post-Pinochet democracy
be used (operationalized) in reality in a fictional way for the purpose of reha- (1990-2006). This permanence (presence or absence) of the notion of class
bilitating an ideology critique. Furthermore, by using a fictional notion of the struggle within the discourse of Chilean political elites signals the accuracy
Real, those criticisms posed against a Zizekian ideology critique - excessively of its selection as a fictional Real.
focusing on 'the impossibility of reaching complete knowledge of the Real' However, it is worthwhile stressing that this could not be the case for
and therefore becoming useless for political analysis - can be addressed. other political situations intended to be analyzed. In such cases 'class struggle'
Norval (2000a: 346), for instance, referring to the suitability of categories like could not be necessarily assumed as a suitable candidate for a fictional
the Real for empirical analysis, has asserted that, notion of the Real nor could the historical background present clear evi-
dence of a distinctive potential Real. Nonetheless, this fact alone does not
even though the emphasis on impossibility reveals the ultimately ideo- seem to preclude the use of the Real for a rehabilitation of the critique of
logical character of all positivizations, it remains questionable whether ideology. Rather, it will demand the selection of a set of fictional candidates
this conception of critique is adequate for political analysis [...] in political to be the Real, according to the antecedents provided by the background
analysis one needs to go beyond the assertion of the ultimate impossibil- of the situation. These candidates of the Real should be alternatively tested
ity of reaching complete knowledge of the real towards an analysis of and contrasted with the criteria provided to determine whether or not we
the mechanisms which make the illusion of reality possible. (Ibid., emphases are in presence of a suitable Real, as for instance in the manner developed
added by the author) in Chapter 4 of this book.
Likewise, the idiosyncratic character of the selection process of the fic-
However, it is worthwhile clarifying that what the use of a fictional notion tional Real also implies that the scope of validity of an ideology critique
of the Real attempts is not only to focus 'on the mechanisms which make will only be circumscribed to the political situation in which such a Real
the illusion of reality possible', but also to externally intervene the decon- is applied. This means that the fictional Real can neither be postulated as a
tested reality, opening it up, recontesting it and, in that way, making a nega- fixed or absolute notion, nor can it be assumed as absolutely valid beyond
tive critique of ideology possible. Moreover, this is a critique that is built the extent of the political situation analyzed. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic
retrospectively, that is, by confronting the exclusion of symbolic formations character associated with the selection of a fictional Real makes plausible
already constituted (in the Chilean case, by confronting the post-coup the envisaging of a non-ideological stage that, conceived In this way, may
ChPEs' consensus) with the fictional candidate of the Real - in the Chilean prevent such a stage from becoming trapped in the vicious ideological circle
case, the notion of class struggle. As Zizek (2006: 26) has put it, '[this is] an that has affected the whole tradition of theory of ideology. As we have seen
X which can be reconstructed only retrospectively, from the multitude of in Chapter 1, the vicious ideological circle (that is, to become itself ideologi-
symbolic formations which are "all that there actually is"' (ibid.). cal) is a present feature of any line of research on ideology: either it assumes
It is worthwhile noticing, however, that the Chilean case study also ideology as a valid interpretative framework (the descriptive sense), or as a
shows that the selection of a fictional candidate for the Real is a highly program of actions (the positive sense), or as a negative category (the nega-
idiosyncratic process that, as we have seen, must take into account the tive sense). This is due to the fact that those approaches work mostly within
background of the political situation that is going to be the object of an an illusion/reality frame and cannot avoid adopting an 'Archimedean point
ideology critique. For instance, the selection of the notion of class struggle of truth' as a necessary condition for an ideology critique. Yet, this is a con-
as the Real proves to be suitable for an ideology critique of the consensus on dition that is no longer necessary to assume in a model of critique, as one
the post-Pinochet economic model held by the discourse of ChPEs. Yet, this here proposed.
258 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 259

In fact, this book defends a model of ideology critique that is based on Finally, the Chilean case also allows us to reflect critically on the rel-
an idiosyncratic fictional Real, conceived differently from the symbolic evance of the fictional character of both the Real and the truth for the
and imaginary dimensions. This trilateral structure, far from insisting formulation of a pro-active model of ideology critique, particularly tak-
on assuming an 'Archimedean point of truth', allows the adoption of a ing into account alternative approaches, such as that offered by Laclau
somewhat lighter proposition. This is a proposition that, although con- (Chapter 2). The fictional character of the Real and the truth revealed by
tinuing to assert the universality of a non-ideological stage which makes the aforementioned exercise of ideology critique implies the assertion of a
an ideology critique possible, explicitly rejects the fixity and absoluteness theoretical approach that is not only concerned with the constant warning
associated with the Archimedean thesis. For the Chilean case this means of 'the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the
that it is the universality of the (non)recognition of class struggle, assumed impossibility of any ultimate suture', as Laclau (1996c: 201) has recurrently
as a universal non-ideological stage, which makes possible the ideology emphasized (Chapter 2). Rather, its main concern is to articulate an active
critique of the post-Pinochet ChPEs' consensus. Yet, it is the explicit exercise of critique, which treats universal truths as no more than fictions
fictional and idiosyncratic character attributed to such a non-universal to contrast critically with new fictions of the Real adopted ex-profeso. For
stage that can prevent such a critique from becoming biased or even itself the Chilean case study this means that, far from conclusively declaring the
ideological. post-Pinochet Chilean consensus as ideological, the important point is to
This point is also relevant for the character of the truth revealed by an highlight the fictional character of such a declaration, providing that new
ideology critique through the use of the fictional Real. In fact, if the fictional endeavors of ideology critique (probably with new fictional candidates for
Real cannot but be universally restricted to the scope of the political situ- the Real) can be put forward. Furthermore, the point here is not only to
ation in which the Real is applied, equally it is the truth that appears as a assert the dynamic character of an ideology critique, but also the active
result of the model of ideology critique proposed - in the Chilean case, the role attributed to critics of ideology. This is a role envisaged as a permanent
ideological exclusion of the discourse of class struggle. 'search' for fictional candidates to become the Real, suitable for a critical
Likewise, the truth does not appear as a given objective reality which has evaluation of 'ours and theirs' truths already established in a political situ-
to be revealed by critics of ideology, as in the correspondence or realist theory ation. Going back to Laclau, and stretching him a little, the point is not
in which the truth remains as a function between a statement and the objec- only to warn - in a somewhat passive attitude - of 'the impossibility of any
tive (extra-linguistic) dimension that such a statement refers to (Hallward ultimate suture' (Laclau 1990: 92), but also to actively re-problematize any
2003: 153). Nor it is a mere matter of harmonious coherence between a (political or theoretical) closure, even Laclau's thesis (1996c: 201) of the 'illu-
discourse and a specific context, as the coherence theory of truth asserts sion of closure' itself. This is the proper way in which a pro-active model of
(ibid.). Furthermore, what the Chilean case shows is that the truth, though ideology critique, as one here proposed, must ultimately be understood.
grasped through an integrated methodological matrix, is something that is Furthermore, what the Chilean case has shown is that an ideology critique
always ultimately affirmed, at least fictionally (for instance, the exclusion gains accuracy when it focuses ex-profeso on a fictional notion of the Real,
of the discourse of class struggle) by the critics of ideology. Moreover, this which is never named or filled within an empty signifier. In fact, one can
is an affirmation that is offered to the scholarly and public community, as explain - following Laclau - the Chilean case by observing how the 'fear
Peter Hallward (2001: ix), introducing the translation of Badiou's Ethics, has of Pinochet' worked as a 'constitutive outside', which, by way of 'the logic
affirmed - '[as an] innovation en acte, singular in its location and occasion, of equivalence', ultimately filled the empty signifier of the 'democratic
but universal in its "address" and import' (ibid.). consensus'. This, added to the building of the 'myth' of reaching democracy
Therefore, we can assert that the universal character of the truth, made pos- with social equity ('growth with equity'), transformed such a consensus into
sible as a result of a new ideology critique here proposed, must be understood a hegemonic practice in post-Pinochet Chile. Yet, we could also add, follow-
as one subjectively (for the sake of critics of ideology who will permanently ing a Zizekian approach (and in that way enriching the political analysis)
subject it to revision) addressed to all, but circumscribed to the given political that such a hegemonic operation was ultimately based on an unnamed
situation analyzed. In other words, it is a universality that arises from, and is that remains unsignified: the discourse of class struggle. In this sense, the
inscribed within, a theoretical and methodological attempt to build a dynamic Chilean case shows that a political consensus or hegemonic operation can
and constantly self-revised model of ideology critique. This is a model that be formed around a non-symbolizable entity (class struggle), around which
avoids giving either to the Real or the truth that comes about with the critique several floating signifiers (fear of Pinochet, discourse of success and so on)
of ideology a fixed and absolute character. In this way considered, the classical struggle to avoid an eruption of such a non-symbolizable repressed, making
problem of the 'Archimedean point of truth' can ultimately be overcome. evident the ideological character of the 'democratic consensus'. This is why

260 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 261

the ultimate aims of an ideology critique as one here proposed would be a communicative action consensus is reached under the rule of the best
understood as an attempt to render the unnamed named in some way, or as argument, that is, with the free expression of validity claims by the parties
Zizek has put it, to 'intervene' in the Real: involved, any ideological consideration seems at first sight implausible.
It is for this reason that it is perhaps worth evoking a new case in order to
The Real is not some kind of untouchable central point about which you present a final reflection on the problem at hand. This is an example that
can do nothing except symbolize it in different terms. No. Lacan's point signals an exclusion, which nowadays everyone reasonably considers arbit-
is that you can intervene in the Real. (Zizek & Daly 2004: 150, emphasis rary but at the time in which the exclusion existed it was common sense to
from the original) consider it acceptable. For such an analytical exercise it is sufficient to recall
the case of the exclusion of women from political rights, which at some
Final reflections point existed as common sense in most Western countries. Invited to review
such a case, in say, England in the eighteenth century, it would be surprising
The Chilean case study shows that the likelihood that a political situation to find an agonistic dispute amongst mainstream scholars or politicians on
will become ideological, in its negative sense, is a possibility that we cannot this matter. Rather, what we would probably find would be a common sense
dismiss or relegate to a secondary line of preoccupation, as more descrip- consensus based on well-argued positions almost exclusively in favor of the
tive approaches of ideologies have opted to assert (for instance, Freeden's in exclusion of women. Moreover, we can assume that such an exclusion was
Chapter 2). Furthermore, even when one acknowledges, to some extent, the based on the 'lifeworld' of the epoch, this is to say, as Habermas has put it,
adequacy of a Habermasian framework of communicative rationality to give '[supported by] the social space inhabited in common that emerges in the
an account of a political consensus, one can still raise the possibility that course of dialogue' (Habermas 1991: 218). Leaving aside the historical accu-
such a communicative understanding will become ideological. This is due racy of this example and only stating it as an analytical exercise, we may
to the fact that a political consensus often also rests on fantastic and trau- agree that such an exclusion of women from political activities is, from our
matic discursive devices, as the Chilean case has shown (Chapter 7). These twenty-first-century Western communicative rationality, clearly an arbitrary
discursive strategies act by constituting the reality of individuals rather than exclusion. If that is so, one also has to conclude that communicative ration-
abstracting individuals from them, as the classic conception of ideology has ality, as that which existed at the root of such an exclusion in England in
defended (Chapter 1). the eighteenth century, was compatible with an arbitrary exclusion that one
The aforementioned potential ideological character of a communicative can label as ideological, regarding the fact it is in accordance with a negative
consensus is due to the 'thin' rationality upon which Habermas's entire conception of ideology previously adopted.
theory of communicative action is based (Chapter 3). This 'thin' rationality Yet, one could go even further on this point and contest our own twenty-
makes compatible a communicative action agreement - for example, the first century Western communicative rationality position in this regard.
post-Pinochet ChPEs' consensus - with a cynical or fantastic reason. This Indeed, if we assume, as Martin Morris (2004: 238) has stated, that 'lifeworld
gives rise to an ideological delusion in the praxis of individuals, which in the is the phenomenological terrain of sedimented traditions, shared contexts,
Chilean case has meant the uniform and arbitrary exclusion of the notion knowledge and competencies - a complexity on which every communicative
of class struggle as the explanation and the setting up of alternative political act depends' (ibid.), we can ask how we can be sure, on the basis of a pure
proposals of such a consensus (Chapter 7). To be precise, the point here is 'lifeworld', that our current view against women's exclusion is less arbitrary,
not to deny that ChPEs have actually reached a communicative consensus or even less ideological, than that exclusionary position, which was held by
on the post-Pinochet model. Rather, that such a consensus, due to the afore- people in eighteenth-century England, assuming the fact that both are based
mentioned 'thin' rationality factor, has become ideological by uniformly on similar exercises of communicative rationality? Furthermore, we could
and arbitrarily excluding the notion of class struggle, assumed as the Real. even apply a similar question to those exclusions set up by a given commu-
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile acknowledging that the likely configura- nicative political consensus in the present times, for which we do not have
tion of the ideological character of a communicative action consensus the benefit of history to qualify our views. Take, for instance, the widely
may not be easily appreciated. Indeed, what we are here suggesting is an accepted exclusion that we referred to in Chapter 3, regarding the thesis of
ideological exclusion that is not at first sight noticeable. Moreover, if one Habermas's 'constitutional patriotism'. This is an exclusion that rules out
stays in the framework of communicative rationality - assumed as the com- any political proposal which suggests changes to the private property rights
mon sense option - one could easily argue that such an ideological claim, of productive means in Western constitutional countries, simply because it
which potentially threatens any consensus, has no place at all. In fact, since is out of the current 'constitutional boat', as Habermas would put it.
262 The New Critique of Ideology Conclusion 263

In sum, the question to be posed here is: how can we be sure that the coherently, within the framework of a post-communicative rationality, the
exclusions that we make today, say, in a political situation, based on a com- aspiration of a non-ideological consensus.
municative rationality as that proposed by Habermas, will not be judged as In sum, we can conclude that an ideology critique is not only possible
arbitrary or even ideological 200 years hence? There are at least two answers but also necessary to prevent a given consensus, which nowadays can rea-
to this question, as explored in this book. The first is that since there can sonably be assumed as valid, from becoming arbitrary and ideological. This
be no 'Archimedean point of truth' outside a historical context that ensures implies the importance of insisting upon defending the idea of a fictional-
the Tightness of our judgments, we have no other option than to trust in universal truth, that is, a truth singular in its location and occasion, but
the potentiality of the 'lifeworld' and the universal pragmatics that give rise universal in its 'address'. Contrary to many current theoretical positions,
to a communicative rationality. Provided there exists an ideal speech situ- this is an endeavor that would ultimately show that a new ideology critique
ation, this would ultimately ensure - it is affirmed - an adequate (rational) for political analysis still has an important role to play within contemporary
consensus. As Habermas (1996: 20-1) has asserted: political theory.

The ideal moment of unconditionality is deeply ingrained in factual


processes of communication, because validity claims are Janus-laced: as
claim, they overshoot every context; at the same time, they must be both
raised and accepted here and now if they are to support an agreement
effective for coordination - for this there is no acontextual standpoint.
The universalistic meaning of the claimed validity exceeds all contexts,
but only the local binding act of acceptance enable validity claims to bear
the burden of social integration for a context-bound everyday practice.
(Ibid.)

It is thus the 'burden of social integration for context-bound everyday practices'


that defines, in the last instance, the meaning of a claimed validity - despite
theoretically exceeding all contexts - as only actualized by the local bind-
ing act of acceptance. In this way, Habermas's answer cannot but trust that
the assumed attached theoretical universality of validity claims will prevent
the pre-dominant operation of the local binding act of acceptance from
becoming ideological - a hope that history has permanently revealed to be
in vain.
The second answer - one that is defended in this book - does not ensure
an absolute and fixed guarantee against the ideological either (that is, it
does not bring the classical 'Archimedean point of truth' back to the scene).
Rather, it defends the idea that a fictional-universal (that is, valid for all
but circumscribed to the particular situation) notion of truth resulting from
an ideology critique, as here proposed, is not only possible but also con-
ceptually necessary as a way to prevent ideological exclusions within and
beyond a communicative consensus. That is to say, to make possible a place
in which a 'validity claim of truth' - a la Habermas - can be distinguished
from a falsification of truth (Chapter 3). To be clear, the point is not that
the identification of a universal, though fictional, truth as a result of a new
ideology critique will always prevent a political situation from becoming
ideological - a hypothesis that can never be excluded. Rather, it is that
a universal fictional truth becomes conceptually necessary to conceive
Notes 265

13. For a compelling analysis of the main theories for the explanation of beliefs
N o t e s within the theory of rationality, see Boudon (1997).

2 The Contemporary Debate o n the Theory of Ideology


1. Aletta J. Norval calls this a 'process of reinscription', which entails a repetition of
Introduction earlier themes and a certain alteration of them. It follows the logic of 'iteration'
introduced by Derrida (1988) in Limited Inc. Abe. See Norval (2000a: 315).
I. I am following a notion of supplementarity that seeks to enhance a previous 2. Note that Freeden seems not to be concerned with the different perspectives of
model exclusively but without assuming that either the previous or resultant the critique of ideology developed within Critical Theory, as for instance those of
enhanced models are 'full' or complete in themselves. In this way, I try to avoid Habermas's transcendentalism and Adorno's contextualism. For a review of this
conclusive paradigms or 'closure', which, as we will see in the conclusion of this point, see Geuss (1981: 63-5).
book, are not consistent with the type of critique of ideology defended in this 3. See Chapter 1 for antecedents of Marx's notion of ideology.
work. See on the notion of supplementarity the discussion provided by Norval 4. In this point Freeden is very close to a psychoanalytical perspective of the study of
(2007: 32). ideology formulated by Slavoj Zizek; see Chapter 3.
5. For a discussion of Althusser's notion of 'social formations', which is 'based
1 The Classic Debate o n the Theory of Ideology upon a particular reformulation of the classic structure/superstructure unity', see
McLennan et al. (1978: 79).
1. For a criticism of the first thesis, see Thompson (1990: 80-1). For a criticism of 6. It has also been argued that the idea of closure can be questioned from an empiri-
the second thesis, see Malesevic (2002). cal perspective that refers to the infinite richness of reality, which results in the
2. Detailed accounts on the whole debate on ideology may be found in Lichtheim impossibility of exhaustion by a finite closure; see Torfing (1999: 86).
(1967); Miller (1971: 21-36); Barth (1976); Larrain (1979); Thompson (1984a); 7. See also Norval (2005: 86-102) and Howarth (2004: 256-76).
McLellan (1987); Eagleton (1991); Boudon (1989); and Rehmann (2007). 8. For a discussion of the 'relation of reciprocal delimitation' existing between the
3. For a different approach to subjectivity within the Continental Philosophical logic of difference and equivalence in Laclau's works, see Norval (2000b: 219-22).
tradition, including post-Kantian idealism, post-IIusserlian phenomenology, psy- 9. Torfing (1999: 307) defines undecidability as 'the name for the irresolvable dilem-
choanalysis, Frankfurt Critical Theory and post-structuralism, see Critchley and mas which occur under wholly determinate circumstances [...] undecidability
Dew (1996). refers not only to the fundamental aporia within a discourse but also to the call
4. See section on Michael Freeden in Chapter 2. for a constitutive decision that articulates social meaning in one way rather than
5. For a revision of other different meanings of ideology, see Naess, Christophersen another' (ibid.).
and Kval0 (1956); and Birnbaum (1960). Por a reader and guide to political ide-
ologies, see Festenstein and Kenny (2005). 3 A Universal Notion of Truth: Habermas avec 2izek
6. See also Rosen (2000: 42-3).
7. For a broader but less totalizing version of the dominant thesis, see Thompson 1. Recently, an original but general endeavor of comparing Habermas's and Zizek's
(1990). theses on ideology has been produced; see Porter (2006: 118-2).
8. The term 'human science' (Geisteswissenschaften) comes about from the transla- 2. The first formulation of this distinction was made by Habermas in the V. Gauss
tion to the German of the term 'moral science' used by John Stuart Mill in Science Lecture at Princeton University in 1971 when he distinguished between intelligi-
of Logic, which has accentuated a meaning much closer to that of the natural bility, truth, normative Tightness and sincerity; see Habermas (2001a: 88).
sciences. For a discussion of this point, see Gadamer (2004: 3). 3. For a historical review of the negative conception of ideology, see the classic work
9. Adorno ef al. (1976) is a translation of Adorno et al. (1969), which contains of Larrain (1979: 28-4). See also, Chapter 1 of this book.
a short commentary by Karl Popper. 4. In relation to the epistemic principles, the Frankfurt School was divided into two
10. For a development of this last position, see McDonough (1978). For a defense of sharp positions: on the one hand, Adorno's contextualist view and, on the other,
Lukacs' positive conception of ideology, see McCarney (1980: 44); and Larrain Habermas's transcendental thesis. While the former affirms that epistemic prin-
(1983: 69). ciples vary historically, the latter argues that every human being has the innate
II. This is, for Instance, the case of Michael Freeden and Slavoj Zizek see ahead capacity to construct those basic principles (the ideal speech situation). For a dis-
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. cussion of this point, see Geuss (1981: 63).
12. I am primarily referring here to the works of authors of the critical theory 5. For a more classic critique of Habermas's Theory of Communicative action, see
school (The Frankfurt School), basically Theodor Adorno, Herbet Marcuse, Max , Thompson (1982: 116-33). For Habermas's answer to his critics, see Habermas
Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas, though I will also include a passage referring (1982: 219-83).
to Louis Althusser. For a review of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, see 6. It was in fact Adorno rather than Habermas who affirmed that a statement or belief
Martin (1973); Schroyer (1973); and Held (1980). could be both true and false. For a critique of this thesis, see Geuss (1975).
264
266 Notes Notes 267

7. 1 am assuming a 'thicker' notion of rationality than Habermas's one. See next 13. See Chapter 5 for antecedents of income inequality in post-Pinochet Chile. For a
section on this point. theoretical association between income inequality and class division, see Parkin
8. For an analysis of Hegel's notion of 'wholeness', see Camargo (2011: 107-13). (1972: 13-47) and Kingston et al. (2002).
9. For a recent analysis of Zizek's theory of ideology, see Resch (2005: 89-04);
Pfaller (2005: 105-24); Vighi and Feldner (2007: 29-40); and Nobus (2007:
134-45). 5 The Transformation of Power in Pinochet's Era
10. For a Deleuzian critique of Habermas's view of the orientation of reaching under- 1. There are of course differences between Alessandri, Frei and Allende's administra-
standing as the original model of language use, see Porter (2006: 122-8). tions on this point, particularly in the case of Alessandri's government, which
11. For a review and analysis of the thesis of deliberative democracy and its critics, promoted a frustrating attempt to open the economy and reduce state planning
see Norval (2007: 20-38); Vincent (2004: 288-90); and Hahn (2000: 257-421). and entrepreneurial roles. For a comparative index of Trade Control in Chile from
12. A different angle from which to observe these problems in the works of Slavoj 1950 to 1986, see De la Cuadra and Hachette (1991: 184).
Zizek and Terry Eagleton, based on a sort of 'aesthetic turn', can be found in 2. For an assessment of the objectives and strategies of socio-economic policies
Sharpe (2006). pursued by Allende's government, made by their own protagonists, see Zammit
13. Zizek is here referring to the notion of 'social antagonism' developed by Laclau (1973). See also Johnson (1973); Garces (1976); Medhurst (1972); and Debray
and Mouffe (1985: 122-7). (1971).
14. I am following a similar notion to that of 'imaginary genealogy' used by Williams 3. The Chilean experience has always been considered an extreme case of applica-
(2002: 32). tion of the ISI model in Latin America. For a discussion, see Ffrench-Davis and
Stallings (2001: 25).
4 The Methodological Framework of the Case Study 4. There is no data for 1981 but we assume that these percentages could have been
even lower due to the fact that in 1983 the state had already re-nationalized the
1. Thompson (1990: 60) identifies a correspondence between some typical strate- banks as a consequence of the 'crush' of the financial system which took place in
gies of symbolic construction and general modes of operation of ideology. For 1982, as we will see later.
instance, a strategy of rationalization, universalization or narratization is associ- 5. It does not include, however, data for the Formal Proletariat and Informal Petty
ated with a general mode of legitimation. Bourgeoisie.
2. For a review of the literature on a critical assessment of the Chilean Road to 6. For alternative indicators, see Mesa-Lago (2000: 159).
Socialism, see Oppenheim (1989). 7. Data taken from Isla, Tarud and Jorquera (1978).
3. See for instance the editorial of The Wall Street Journal (1980, January 18). 8. Only Panama and Venezuela had an increase in the dominant class bigger than
4. For a different perspective but based on the same assumption of the successful that produced in Chile, see Portes (1985: 22).
model, see Kurtz (2001). For a literature review on the discussion of the success 9. See Chapter 6 for an analysis of the Chicago Boys.
of the Chilean model, see Oxhom (1999). 10. Miguel Kast, traveling on business at that time, was not informed of that deci-
5. For a comparative analysis of the impacts of neo-liberalism on the social struc- sion, apparently taken by the inner circle of Pinochet's Regime. However, Kast
tures of Latin American countries, see Portes and Hoffman (2003); and Calderon advocated a far more regressive solution to confront the crisis: the end of mini-
(2003). For an analysis of the Chilean model, see Drake and Jaksic (1999: 11); and mum wages; see Cavallo et at. (1997: 310 & 328).
Castells (2005: 57). See also 'Chile, Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin American 11. Industry does not include electricity, gas and water this time (ibid.).
Success Story', The Economist (2005, March 31). 12. For further proof of the interweaving of dominant power in Chile, one only
6. A remarkable exception is Alfredo joignant, who presents an analysis of the sym- has to look to the final decision of the intervention, which was taken by the
bolic dimensions of the democratic construction in post-Pinochet Chile, though Bi-Minister of Finance and Economy Rolf Liiders, a former executive of Vial'
one that is mostly focused on the 'political' rather than economical aspects Group, who had broken his relationship with Javier Vial, on January 13, 1983.
of Aylwin's government; see Joignant (1998). See also Salazar and Valderrama For a detailed version of the process of intervention of the banking sector, see
(2000). Cavallo et at. (1997: 336-7).
7. A notable exception is Moulian (1997). 13. For a list of the total number of enterprises privatized between those years, see
8. There is, however, a fairly mainstream critique of post-Pinochet Chile, which is Meller (1996: 269, Cuadro 3.34).
mentioned in Chapter 7 of this book. 14. Yurasek was appointed by Pinochet under the influence of Carlos Caceres, then
9. For a discussion of the field of political discourse, see Wilson (2003). Minister of Finance, who, in turn, afterwards during the 1990s, would be nomi-
10. For antecedents of income inequality in the Chilean model, see Chapter 5 of this nated director of many of those privatized enterprises, becoming one of the most
book. well-paid executives in Chile (ibid.: 201).
11. I restrict the use of symbolic forms to a text (oral discourse translated in written 15. This was not the only case in which the person in charge of the process of privati-
discourse), which is produced by individuals (Chilean political elites) and recog- zation became the owner of the enterprise privatized. Other cases are the Bank of
nized by them and others as a meaningful construct. Chile, Bank of Santiago, Holding CAP and Holding Soquimich (ibid.: 200, 277 &
12. See the discussion that Thompson makes on this point in Thompson (1990: 68). 289).
268 Notes Notes 269

16. The political opposition, particularly the leaders of the Christian Democrat Party, 13. For an analysis of Salvador Allende's government from a perspective of the tradi-
did not really believe so much in this demonstration. For a description of the tional Right, see Vial (2005).
organization of the 'Protesta', see Cavallo etal. (1997: 341). 14. The first time that the gremialistas won the FEUC presidency was in 1968
17. However, these figures found by Portes and Hoffman (2003: 56-8) to 1990 are followed by re-election every year until 1973 (Pollack 1999: 35).
not totally comparable to those found by Portes (1985: 17) to 1980 because the 15. For additional antecedents of the radicalization of the political discourse of the
dominant class in 1985 was taken from the category of 'high administrators and gremialistas, particularly of Jaime Guzman, which included his participation in
executives' offered by the International Labour Office, which excludes independ- the extremist group Patria y Libertad, see Moncada Durruti (2006: 50-1).
ent entrepreneurs and includes some administrative personnel below top com- 16. The myths of the historical stability of Chilean democracy have been extensively
mand positions. countered by Portales (2005) and Salazar (1990).
18. Pinochet was defeated in a Plebiscite on October 5, 1988, when he obtained 43 17. It is worthwhile stressing, however, that this balance was actually made by
percent in favor and 54.7 percent against. Most of the entrepreneurs openly sup- Altamirano in 1975 during the meeting of the exiled central executive of the
ported Pinochet in this Plebiscite (Cavallo etal. 1997: 481). ChSP that took place in the Havana, Cuba, in April 1975; see on this point Arrate
and Rojas (2003: 226-48).
18. In fact, this thesis has also been defended by the 'Document of March 1974'
6 The Discourse of Class Struggle (Partido Socialista de Chile 1974).
19. For a view of the impact that caused the detention of Luis Corvalan L. among
1. Due to a lack of data, the review presented in this Chapter 6 tends to concen- Chilean communists, see the book of testimonies written by Labarca (1976).
trate on the leadership of the political parties, while in the research presented
in Chapter 7 the analysis includes a wider notion of political elites, including 20. See also Corvalan (1980).
entrepreneurs, union leaders, civil society leader, intellectuals, economists repre- 21. For antecedents of the transformation of social structure in Chile in the 1980s,
sentatives of the army and politicians. see Chapter 5.
22. The letter was published in newspapers in Chile and also in The Washington Post
2. See, for instance, the article 'Los Pobres' (The Poor) written by Valentin Letelier in (1974, November 24).
1896 or 'El capital y el Trabajo' (Capital and Labor) written by Victor J. Arellano 23. See section: 'The Dilemma of the Christian Democrat Party' in this chapter.
in 1896, reproduced in Grez Toso (1995: 425-35 and 437-55, respectively). 24. See the interview with Claudio Orrego of May 31, 1981, quoted in Fleet (1985:
3. For a more official history of the first years of the ChCP (1922-31), see the classic 199).
book of Ramirez Necochea (1965: 181-317). 25. For a round-table discussion on the Acuerdo Nacional, including Sergio Molina,
4. See for instance the articles written by Luis Corvalan: 'Lo mas revolucionario es Jose Zabala, Edgardo Boeninger, Angel Flisfisch, Oscar Godoy and Jaime Guzman,
luchar por el exito del gobierno popular' and 'F,l Gobierno Popular', both pub- see Avetikian (1985).
lished in Corvalan (1971: 383-402 & 405-27, respectively). 26. For a deep account of the intrigue surrounding preparation for the coup and
5. For antecedents of this assertion, see the next section in this chapter: 'The those sectors of the Right that actively participated in its organization, see
"Isolationism" of Communists'. Gonzalez (2000).
6. For a historical and doctrinarian account of the Falange and the CDP, see Grayson 27. In particular, they exerted rhetorical influence on the Declaration de Principios of
(1968: 165-90, Section V, for the Falange; 329-74, Section X, for the CDP). the military junta (Pollack 1999: 54).
7. On the problems of what it means to be a Christian Democrat, see the ethno- 28. For an account of the gremialistas, see above the section of this chapter: 'The
graphic research presented by Lomnitz and Melnick (2000: 113-39). Radicalization of the Oligarchical Parties'.
8. For a detailed analysis of the doctrinal base of the CDP, see Wayland-Smith (1969). 29. For antecedents of the structural transformations of the first nine years of
For a critical analysis from the Left of the doctrinarian sources that inspired the Pinochet's regime, see Chapter 5 of this book.
emergence of the Falange and thereafter the CDP, see Vitale (1964: 53-75); and 30. See Chapter 5 for an analysis of these processes.
Vuskovic(1968: 111-27).
9. Jaime Castillo Velasco prefers to talk about communitarianism rather than 'com-
munitarian socialism', meaning a rejection of both individualism and collectiv- 7 The Ideological Discourse in Post-Pinochet Chile
ism; see Castillo Velasco (1971: 36).
10. Frei has been one of the main sources of the mainstream CDP doctrine, which 1. See Chapter 4 for an explanation and justification of these criteria.
has been developed through his books: Frei (1937); (1940); (1951); (1956); and 2. See Chapter 6 for details of this process of renovation of ideological paradigms.
(1958). For an analysis of these books, see Wayland-Smith (1969: 2/2). For a his- 3. See Chapter 6 on this point.
torical analysis of Frei's political career, see Moulian and Guerra (2000). 4. See Chapter 5 for antecedents of the regressive character of the neo-liberal model
11. Frei's position was imposed by a narrow majority over the purists, with the leftists implemented by Pinochet.
finishing third (Fleet 1985: 66). 5. See Chapter 5 for antecedents.
12. In the congressional election of 1965 the Conservative and the Liberal parties 6. See Chapter 6 for antecedents.
only gained 5.2 percent and 7.3 percent of the votes, respectively; see Correa 7. It is worthwhile clarifying that trauma is here assumed as 'an event of such vio-
(2004: 265). lence and with such unexpected effects that it produces a stream of excitation

_
270 Notes

strong enough to block some fields of the symbolical universe of individuals,


arbitrarily (and in an unacknowledged way) excluding possibilities of meaning B i b l i o g r a p h y
that in a non-traumatized stage would explicitly be considered amongst the set
of options available' (Dwyer & Santikarma 2007).
8. See Chapter 4 for details of this methodology.
9. See Chapter 6 for antecedents.
10. See also the section 'Income Inequality in a "Successful" Economy?' ahead in this Abercrombie, N., S. Hill & B. Turner (1980) The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London:
chapter. AllenfitUnwin).
11. This is also the position adopted by most of the economists interviewed, such as Adorno, T. W. (1973) Negative Dialectic (New York: Seabury).
Osvaldo Rosales (interview 2005n), Alicia Fmhnian (interview 2005o) and Raul Adorno, T. W., H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. PilotfitK. Popper (1969) Der
Saez (interview 2005p). Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Berlin: Luchterhand).
12. For a critique of this distinction, see Harvey (2005: 39). (1976) The Positivist Dispute in Gemian Sociology (London: Heinemann).
13. For more antecedents of income inequality in post-Pinochet Chile, see Chapter 5 Agger, B. (1998) Critical Social Theories, An Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview
of this book. Press).
14. See also the declarations in the same tone made by other entrepreneurial lead- Althusser, L. (1971) 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes towards an
ers, such as Brunno Philippi, Alfredo Moreno, Jorge Awad and Fernando Canas, Investigation)' in L. Althusser (ed.), Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London:
reproduced in Fazio (2006: 30-1). New Left Books).
15. For the shortcomings of the model on social inequality, see Taylor (2006: 136-9; (1976) Essays in Self Criticism (London: New Left Books).
172-96). See also Chapter 5 of this book. (1990) Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, and Other Essays
16. During 2011 a huge student and social mobilization, demanding free and public (London St New York: Verso).
education, took place in Chile, making more evident the shortcomings of com- (2001) 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus. Notes towards an Investigation'
placent statements such as that presented by Ernesto Ottone. For an analysis of in L. Althusser (ed.), Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly
this 'Student Revolution', see Camargo 2012. Review Press).
17. In the same line this argument is made by Ratil Saez, a senior economist at the (2005) 'Marxism and Humanism' in L. Althusser (ed.), For Marx (London &
Ministry of Finance (interview 2005p). New York: Verso).
18 This view is shared by other entrepreneur leaders, such as Ronald Bown (inter- (2005) 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' in L. Althusser (ed.), For Marx
view 2005t) and Roberto Fantuzzi (interview 2005y). (London and New York: Verso).
19 This is a point raised by Genaro Arriagada, the chief of the first round of Lagos's Althusser, L.fitE. Balibar (1970) Reading Capital, trans, by Ben Brewster (London: New
presidential campaign (interview 2()05f). Left Books).
20. I will extensively develop this argument in the conclusion of this chapter. (1979) Reading Capital (LondonfitNew York: Verso).
21. For an analysis of Habermas's communicative rationality, see Chapter 3. Aristotle (1996) 'The Politics' in S. Everson (ed.) Aristotle: The Politics and the
Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Audi, R. (2003) Epistemology, a Contemporary Introduction to Theory of Knowledge,
2nd edn (New YorkfitLondon: Routledge).
St Augustine (1992) St Augustine Confessions, H. Chadwick (trans.) (New York: Oxford
University Press).
Barth, II. (1976) Truth and Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Bell, D. (1988) The End of Ideology, On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Bernstein, J. M. (1991) 'Introduction' in T. W. Adorno (ed.) The Culture Industry,
Selected Essays on Mass Culhtre (London: Routledge).
Birnbaum, N. (1960) 'The Sociological Study of Ideology 1940-1960', Current Sociology,
9, 91-172.
Boudon, R. (1989) The Analysis of Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
(1997) The Art ofSelf-Persuasion: The Social Explanation ofFalse Beliefs (Cambridge:
Polity).
Bowie, A. (2003) Introduction to German Philosophy from Kant to Habermas (Cambridge:
Polity Press).
Butler, J. (2000) 'Competing Universalities' in J. Butler, E. Laclau fit S. Zizek (eds)
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (LondonfitNew York: Verso).

271

I
272 Bibliography Bibliography 273

Calhoun, C. (1995) Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of DifferenceHabermas, J. (1970) 'Technology and Science as Ideology' in J. Habermas (ed.) Toward
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers). a Rational Society, Student Protest, Science, and Politics (London: Beacon Press).
Callinicos, A. (1976) Althusser's Marxism (London: Pluto Press). (1971) 'Technology and Science as Ideology' in J. Habermas (ed.) Toward a
(2006) The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press). Rational Society, Student Protest, Science, and Politics (London: Beacon Press).
Camargo, R. (2011) El Sublime Re-torno de la Ideologia. De Platon a Zizek (Santiago: (1975a) Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press).
Ediciones Metales Pesados). (1975b) 'A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests', Philosophy of the Social
Camargo, R. (2007) 'The Social from the Concept of Illusion in Plato, Aristotle, Science, 3, 157-89.
Machiavelli and Bacon', Cinta de Moebio, 28, 29-38. (1976) 'What is Universal Pragmatics?' in J. Habermas (ed.) Communication and
Castillo Velasco, J. (1973) Teorfa y prdctica de la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago: the Evolution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Editorial del Pacifico). (1978) Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann Educational
Cohen, G. A. (1978) Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton: Princeton Books Ltd).
University Press). (1982) 'A Reply to My Critics' in J. B. Thompson St D. Held (eds) Habermas
Cox, R. W. (1996) 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Critical Debates (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd).
Relations Theory' in R. W. Cox fit T. J. Sinclair (eds) Approaches to World Order (1991) 'A Reply' in A. Honneth and 11. Joas (eds) Communicative Action: Essays on
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Critchley, S.fitP. Dew (1996) Deconstructive Subjectivities (New York: State University (1996) Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press).
of New York Press). (1999a) 'The Normative Models of Democracy' in J. Habermas (ed.) The Inclusion
Derrida, J. (1988) Limited Inc., S. WeberfitJ. Mehlman (trans.), G. Graff (ed.) (Evanston, of the Other, Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press).
IL: Northwestern UP). (1999b) 'On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy' in
(2001) Writing and Difference (LondonfitNew York: Routledge Classics). J. Habermas (ed.) The Inclusion of the Other, Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge:
Drake, P. St Jaksic, I. (1999) 'El Modelo Chileno, Democracia y Desarrollo en los Polity Press).
Noventa' in P. Drakefit1. Jaksic (eds.) El Modelo Chileno, Democracia y Desarrollo en (1999c) 'The European Nation-States: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
los Noventa (Santiago, Chile: Lom Ediciones). Citizenship' in J. Habermas (ed.) The Inclusion of the Other, Studies in Political Theory
Eagleton, T. (1991) Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso). (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Engels, P. (1975) 'Letter to Friedrich Mehring, 14 July 1893' in K. Marx St F. Engels (2001a) 'Truth and Society: The Discursive Redemption of Factual Claims to
(eds) Selected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers). Validity' in J. Habermas (ed.) On The Pragmatics of Social Interaction, Preliminary
Festenstein, M. fit M. Kenny (2005) Political Ideologies: A Reader and Guide (Oxford: Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Oxford University Press). (2001b) TTie Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Freeden, M. (1996a) Ideologies and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (2001c) 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory
(1996b) 'Editorial', Journal of Political Ideologies, 1(1), 5-13. Principles?' Political Theory, 29(6), 766-81.
(2004) 'Editorial: Essential Contestability and Effective Contestability', Journal of (2003) 'On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative
Political Ideologies, 9(1), 3-11. Pluralism"', Ratio Juris, 16, 187-94.
Frisby, D. (1972) 'The Popper-Adorno Controversy: The Methodological Dispute in (2004) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 St 2 (Cambridge: Polity Press).
German Sociology', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2, 105-19. Hahn, L. E. (ed.) (2000) Perspectives on Habermas (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open
(1974) 'The Frankfurt School: Critical Theory and Positivism' in J. Rex (ed.) Court Publishing Company).
Approaches to Sociology: An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology (London: Hallward, P. (2001) 'Translator Introduction' in A. Badiou (ed.) Ethics, an Essay on the
Routledge). Understanding of Evil (London St New York: Verso).
Foucault, M. (1980) 'Truth and Power' in C. Gordon (ed.) Power and Knowledge: (2003) Badiou, a Subject to Truth (London St Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77: Michel Foucault (Brighton: Harvester Press).
Press). Hegel. G. W. E (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method (London: Continuum). Held, D. (1980) An Introduction to Critical Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Gasche, R. (2004) 'How Empty Can Empty Be?' in S. Critchley St O. Marchart (eds) Heller, A. (1978) 'The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War
Laclau: A Critical Reader (London: Routledge). Theory', New German Critique, 15, 49-56.
Geuss, R. (1975) 'Reviewed Work(s): Negative Dialectics by Theodore W. Adorno', The Hirst, P. Q. (1975) Problems and Advances in the Theory of Ideology (Communist
Journal of Philosophy, 72(6), 167-75. University of Cambridge Pamphlet).
(1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (1976) 'Althusser's Theory of Ideology', Economy and Society, 5(4), 385-412.
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Holub, R. C. (1991) Jurgen Habermas, Critic in the Pubic Sphere (London: Routledge).
Press). Homer, S. (2005) Jacques Lacan (London St New York: Routledge).
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the 'Prison Notebooks' (London: Lawrence St Honing, B. (2001) 'Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas's "Constitutional
Wishart). Democracy"', Political Theory, 29(6), 792-805.
274 Bibliography Bibliography 275

(2006) 'Dead Rights, Live Futures: On Habermas's Attempt to Reconcile (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics
Constitutionalism and Democracy' in L. Thomassen (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas (London: Verso).
Reader (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press). (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics,
Horkheimer, M. (1974) Eclipse of Reason (New York: Seabury Press). 2nd edn (London St New York: Verso).
Horkheimer, M. St T. W. Adorno (1972) Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: The Laclau, E. St L. Zak (1994) 'Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics' in E. Laclau (ed.)
Seabury Press). The Making of Political Identities (London St New York: Verso).
Howarth, D. (2004) 'Hegemony, Political Subjectivity, and Radical Democracy' in Larrain, J. (1979) The Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson University Library).
S. Critchley St O. Marchart (eds) Laclau: A Critical Reader (London St New York: (1983) Marxism and Ideology (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd).
Routledge). Lenin, V. I. (1963) What is to be done? (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Howarth, D. St Y. Stavrakakis (2000) 'Introducing Discourse Theory and Political (1975) What is to be done? (Peking: Foreign Languages Press).
Analysis' in D. Howarth, A. J. Norval St Y. Stavrakakis (eds) Discourse Theory and Lichtheim, G. (1967) 'The Concept of Ideology' in G. Lichtheim (ed.) The Concept of
Political Analysis (Manchester St New York: Manchester University Press). Ideology and Other Essays (New York: Random House).
Jakubowski, E (1976) Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism (London: Lukacs, G. (1971) History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press).
Allison St Busby Limited). Malesevic, S. (2002) 'Rehabilitating Ideology after Poststructuralism' in S. Malesevic St
Kay, S. (2003) Zizek: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press). I. MacKenzie (eds) Ideology After Poststructuralism (London: Pluto Press).
Kennedy, E. (1978) A 'Philosophe' in the Age of Revolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origin Mannheim, K. (1936) Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace St World).
of'Ideology' (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society). (1991) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, L. Wirth St
Lacan, J. (1992) The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Edward Shils (trans.), B. S. Turner (ed.) (London is. New York: Routledge).
(London: Routledge). Marcuse, H. (1972) One Dimensional Man (London: Abacus Edition).
Laclau, E. (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books). Martin, J. (197.3) The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little Brown).
(1980a) 'Populist Rupture and Discourse', Screen Education, 34 (Spring), 87-93. Marx, K. (1909) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3. The Process of Capitalist
(1980b) 'Democratic Antagonisms and the Capitalist State' in M. Freeman fit Production as a Whole (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr St Co.).
D. Robertson (eds) The Frontiers of Political Theory (Brighton: Harvester). (1972) Theories of Surplus-Value, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence St Wishart).
(1980c) 'Tesis acerca de la forma hegemonica de la politica', Paper presented (1974a) 'Theses on Feuerbach' in K. Marx St E Engels (eds) The German Ideology,
to the Seminar 'Hegemonia y Alternativas Populares en America Latina', Morelia, 2nd edn (London: Lawrence 8c Wishart).
Mexico. (1974b) Capital, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence St Wishart).
(1983) 'Transformations of Advanced Industrial Societies and the Theory of (1975) 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' in L. Colletti (ed.) Early Writings
the Subject' in S. Hanninen fit L. Paldan (eds) Rethinking Ideology: A Marxist Debate (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
(Berlin: Argument-Verlag). Marx, K. St F. Engels (1974) The German Ideology, 2nd edn (London: Lawrence St
(1987) 'Class War and After', Marxism Today, April, 30-3. Wishart).
(1988) 'Metaphor and Social Antagonisms' in C. Nelson St L. Grossberg (eds) (1976) 'The German Ideology' unabridged version in K. Marx St E Engels,
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Illinois: University of Illinois Press). Marx-Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5 (London: Lawrence St Wishart).
(1990) New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London St New York: McCarney, J. (1980) The Real World of Ideology (Brighton: Harvester Press).
Verso). McCarthy, T. (2004) 'Translator's Introduction' in J. Habermas (ed.) The Theory of
(1993) 'Discourse' in R. E. Goodin St P. Pettit (eds) The Blackwell Companion to Communicative Action, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell). McDonough, R. (1978) 'Ideology as False Consciousness: Lukacs' in Centre for
(1996a) 'Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?' in E. Laclau (ed.) Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology (London: Hutchinson).
Emancipation(s) (London St New York: Verso). McLellan, D. (1987) Ideology (Buckingham: Open University Press).
(1996b) 'Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject' in E. Laclau (ed.) Emancipations) (1995) Ideology (Buckingham: Open University Press).
(London St New York: Verso). McLennan, G., V. Molina St R. Peters (1978) 'Althusser's Theory of Ideology' in Centre
(1996c) 'The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology', Journal of for Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology (London: Huntchinson).
Political Ideologies, 1(3), 201-20. Mill, J. S. (1925) A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Deductive, Being a Connected View of
(2000) 'Constructing Universalities' in J. Butler, E. Laclau St S. Zizek (eds) the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (London: Longman,
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (London St New York: Verso). Green, St Co).
(2005) OAI Populist Reason (London St New York: Verso). Miller, K. B. (1971) Ideology and Moral Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press).
(2009) 'Laclau en debate: postmarxismo, populismo, multitud y acontecimiento Morrice, D. (1996) Philosophy, Science and Ideologies and Political Thought (Basingstoke:
(entrevistado por Ricardo Camargo)', Revista Ciencia Politka, 29(3), 815-28. Macmillan).
Laclau, E. St C. Mouffe (1982) 'Recasting Marxism: Hegemony and New Political Morris, M. (2004) 'Jurgen Habermas (1929-)' in J. Simons (ed.) Contemporary Critical
Movements', Socialist Review, 12, November, 91-113. Theorists, From Lacan to Said (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
276 Bibliography Bibliography 277

Mouffe, C. (1979) 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci' in C. Mouffe (ed.) Gramsci Sharpe, M. (2006) "The Aesthetics of Ideology or "The Critique of Ideological
and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge St Kegan Paul). Judgment" in Eagleton and Zizek', Political Theory, 34(1), 95-120.
Naess, A. M., J. A. Christophersen St K. Kvalo (1956) Democracy, Ideology, and Sloterdijk, P. (1987) The Critique of the Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of
Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy Minnesota Press).
(Oslo: The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities [by] Soil, I. (1969) An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago St London: The University
University Press). of Chicago Press).
Nobus, D. (2007) 'Beware of the Anacoluthon! On Zizek's Ideology' in E Vighi Stern, R. (1990) Hegel, Kant and The Structure of the Object (London St New York:
St H. Feldner (eds) Did Somebody Say Ideology? On Slavoj Zizek and Consequences Routledge).
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing). Taylor, C. (1975) Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Norval, A. J. (2000a) 'The Things We Do with Words - Contemporary Approaches to Thomassen, L. (2006) '"A Bizarre, Even Opaque Practice": Habermas on
the Analysis of Ideology', The British Journal of Political Science, 30, 313-46. Constitutionalism and Democracy' in L. Thomassen (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas
(2000b) 'Trajectories of Future Research in Discourse Theory' in D. Howarth, Reader (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press).
A. J. Norval St Yannis Stavrakakis (eds) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis Thompson, J. B. (1982) 'Universal Pragmatics' in J. B. Thompson St D. Held (eds)
(Manchester St New York: Manchester University Press). Habermas Critical Debates (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd).
(2005) 'Theorising Hegemony: Between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis' in (1984a) Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge: Polity Press).
L. Tonder St L. Thomassen (eds) Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and (1984b), 'Universal Pragmatics' in J. B. Thompson (ed.) Studies in the Theory of
Lack (Manchester St New York: Manchester University Press). Ideology (Cambridge: Polity Press).
(2007) Aversive Democracy, Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (1990) Ideology and Modern Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press).
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (Oxford: Blackwell
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books). Publishers Ltd).
O'Sullivan, N. (1989) 'The Politics of Ideology' in N. O'Sullivan (ed.) The Structure of Vighi, EfitH. Feldner (2007) Zizek beyond Foucault (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
Modern Ideology (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited). Vincent, A. (1995) Modern Political Ideologies, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell).
Parker, I. (2004) Slavoj Zizek, A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press). (2004) The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Pfaller, R. (2005) 'Where is Your Hamster? The Concept of Ideology in Zizek Cultural Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Oxfordshire:
Theory' in G. Boucher, J. Glynos St M. Sharpe (eds) Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Princeton University Press).
Responses to Slavoj Zizek (Adershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd). Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Plamenatz, J. (1970) Ideology (London: Macmillan). Zizek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology (London St New York: Verso).
Poulantzas, N. (1972) 'The Problem of the Capitalist State' in R. Blackburn (ed.) Ideology (1994) 'Introduction' in S. Zizek (ed.) Mapping Ideologies (London fit New York:
in Social Science: Reading in Critical Social Theoiy (London: Fontana/Collins). Verso).
(1973) Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books St Sheed St Ward). (2005) 'Between Symbolic Fiction and Fantasmatic Spectre: Towards a Lacanian
(1980) State, Power, Socialism (London St New York: Verso). Theory of Ideology' in R. Butler St S. Stephens (eds) Slavoj Zizek: Interrogating the Real
Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London St New York: Continuum).
(London: Routledge). (2006) The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
Porter, R. (2006) Ideology, Contemporary Social, Political and Cultural Theory (Cardiff: Zizek, S. St G. Daly (2004) Conversations with Zizek (Cambridge: Polity Press).
University of Wales Press).
Rehmann, J. (2007) 'Ideology Theory', Historical Materialism, 15(4), 211-39. Bibliography of the case study
Resch, R. P. (2005) 'What if God is One of Us - Zizek Ontology' in G. Boucher, J. Glynos
St M. Sharpe (eds) Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Zizek (Adershot: Agacino, R. (1994) 'Acumulacion, Distribucion y Consensos en Chile' Working
Ashgate Publishing Ltd). Paper, Santiago, Chile, http://www.sepiensa.cl/comunidad_sepiensa/actividades/
RIcoeur, P. (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and ciclo_de_cine/4to_ciclo/panelistas/rafael_agacino.html, date accessed November 1,
Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2007.
Rosen, M. (1996) On Voluntary Servitude, False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology (1996) Crecimiento y Distribucion Funcional del lngreso en la Industria Chilena.
(Cambridge: Polity Press). Un Andlisis Sectorial, Research Report (Santiago: CONYCIT St PET), http://www.
(2000) 'The Marxist Critique of Morality and the Theory of Ideology' in E. Harcourt sepiensa.cl/comunidad_sepiensa/actividades/ciclo_de_cine/4to_ciclo/panelistas/
(ed.) Morality, Reflection and Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). rafael_agacino.html, date accessed November 1, 2007.
Rorty, R. (1991) Consequences of Pragmatism (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf). (2003) 'Chile Thirty Years after the Coup: Chiaroscuro, Illusions, and Cracks in a
Saussure, E ([1913] 1995) Cours de linguistiquegenerate (Paris: Payot). Mature Counterrevolution', Latin American Perspectives, 30(5), 41-69.
Schroyer, T. (1973) The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Agosin, M. (2001) 'Reformas comerciales, exportaciones y crecimiento' in R. Ffrench-
Theory (New York: Braziller). Davis St B. Stallings (eds) Reformas, Crecimiento y Politicas Sociales en Chile desde 1973
Seliger, M. (1976) Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen St Unwin Ltd). (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
-

278 Bibliography Bibliography 279

Almeyda, C. (1964) 'Nota Preliminar' in L. Vitale (ed.) Esencia y apariencia de la Barton, J. R. St W. E. Murray (2002) 'The End of Transition? Chile 1990-2000', Bulletin
Democracia Cristiana (Santiago, Chile: Arancibia linos). of Latin American Research, 21(3), 329-38.
(1967) 'Dejar a un lado el llusionismo Electoral', Punto Final, 42, November 22, Boeninger, E. (1986) 'Bases de un orden economico para la futura democracia en
29. Article collected in Documentos Claves de la Izquierda Chilena (1969-1973)', Chile', Estudios Publicos, 22, 81-113.
Estudios Publicos, 91 (Invierno 2003), 318-20, http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_ (1997) Democracia en Chile, Lecciones para la gobernabilldad (Santiago, Chile:
3207_1503/rev91_documento.pdf, date accessed March 1, 2008. Editorial Andres Bello).
(1987) Reencuentro con Mi Vida (Santiago, Chile: Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco). Bosworth, B. P., R. Dornbusch St R. Laban (eds) (1994) The Chilean Economy: Policy
Altamirano, C. (1977) Dialectka de Una Derrota, 2nd edn (Mexico, Espana, Argentina St Lesson and Challenges (Washington, DC: Brooking Institutions).
Colombia: Siglo Veintiuno Editores). Burbach, R. (2003) The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice (London St
Angell, A. (1972) Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile (London: The Royal New York: Zed Books).
Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press). Burnham, J. (1942) The Managerial Revolution (New York St London: Putman).
(2007) Democracy after Pinochet: Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile (London: Biichi, 11. (1993) La Trasformacion Economica de Chile, Del Estatismo a la Libertad
Institute for The Study of The Americas). Economica (Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia: Grupo Editorial Norma).
Angell, A. St B. Pollack (1990) 'The Chilean Election of 1989 and the Policy to Cademartori, J. (2003) 'The Chilean Neoliberal Model Enters into Crisis', Latin
Transition to Democracy', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 9(1), 1-23. American Perspectives, 30(5), 79-88.
(1995) 'The Chilean Election of 1993: From Polarisation to Consensus', Bulletin Calderon, F. (ed.) (2003) /,Es Sostenible la Globalization en America Latina?, Debates con
of Latin American Research, 14(2), 105-25. Manuel Castells, vol. I and II (Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura Economica).
(2000) 'The Chilean Election of 1999-2000 and Democratic Consolidation', Camargo, R. (2012) 'La Revolution Estudiantil Chilena 2011: Apuntes desde la
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19(1), 357-78. Teoria Politica Contemporanea, para una lucha en desarrollo', Debates y Combates,
Angell, A. St C. Reig (2006) 'Change or Continuity? 'The Chilean Elections of 2 (March-April), 129-41.
2005/2006', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25(4), 481-502. Campero, G. (2000) 'Respuestas del Sindicalismo ante la Mundializacion: El Caso de
Arancibia, P., C. Arancibia St I. de la Maza, (2002) Jarpa: Confesiones Politicas (Santiago, Chile', Documento de Trabajo (Ginebra: Institute Internacional de Estudios Laborales).
Chile: La Tercera-Modadori). Casanueva, V. E St C. M. Fernandez (1973) El Partido Socialista y la lucha de clases en
Arancibia Clavel, P. (2006) Cita con la Historia (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Biblioteca Chile (Santiago, Chile: Empresa Editora Nacional Quimantu Ltda).
Americana). Castells, M. (1974) La Lucha de Clases en Chile (Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno Editores S.A.).
Arellano, J. P. St R. Cortazar (1982) 'Del Milagro a la Crisis: Algunas reflexiones sobre (2005) Globalization, desarrollo y democracia: Chile en el contexto mundial (Santiago:
el momento economico', Coleccion Estudios de Cieplan, 8 (July), 43-60. Fondo de Cultura Economica).
Arellano, J. P., R. Cortazar, R. Downey, N. Flano, A. Foxley, R. Ffrench-Davis, J. Marshall, Castillo Velasco, J. (1963) Las Fuentes de la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago, Chile:
P. Meller, O. Munoz St E. Tironi (1982) Modelo Economico Chileno, Trayectoria de una Editorial del Pacifico).
Critica (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Aconcagua). (1971) Individualismo, Colectivismo, Comunitarismo (Santiago, Chile: Instituto de
Arrate, J. (1983) El Socialismo Chileno: Rescate y Renovation (Barcelona: Ediciones del Estudios Politicos).
Institute para el Nuevo Chile). (1973) Teoria y prdctica de la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico).
Arrate, J. & E. Rojas (2003) Memorias de la Izquierda Chilena, Tomo 2 (1970-2000) Cavallo, A. (1992) Los Hombres de la Transition (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Grijalbo S.A.).
(Santiago, Chile: Javier Vergara Editor). (1998) La Historia Oculta de la Transicion (Santiago, Chile: Grijalbo).
Arriagada, G. (1998) Por la Razon o la Fuerza (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Cavallo, A., M. Salazar St O. Sepiilveda (1997) La Historia Oculta del Regimen Militar
Sudamericana). (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Grijalbo S.A.).
(2004) Los Empresarios y la Politka (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones). Cerda, C. (1972) El Leninismo y la Victoria Popular (Santiago, Chile: Editora Quimantu
Avetikian, T. (ed.) (1985) 'Acuerdo Nacional y Transicion a la Democracia', Estudios Ltda).
Publicos, 21, 1-93. Corghi, C. St M. Fini (1973) Nuovo Cile, una Lotta per il Socialismo (Milan: Feltrinelli).
Aylwin, P. (1994) Crecimiento con Equidad, Discursos Escogidos 1992-1994 (Santiago, Correa, S. (2004) Con las Riendas del Poder, La Derecha Chilena en el Siglo Veinte
Chile: Editorial Andres Bello). (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana).
Barrett, P. (2000) 'Chile's transformed party system and the future of democratic Corvalan, L. (1961) 'Acerca de la Via Pacifica', Principios, 77 Oanuary).
stability', Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(3), 1-32. (1965) Chile Hoy, La Lucha de los Comunistas Chitenos en las Condiciones del
(2001) 'Labour Policy, Labour-Business Relations and the Transition to Gobierno de Frei (Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo).
Democracy in Chile', Journal of Latin American Studies, 33, 561-97. (1971) Camino de Victoria (Santiago, Chile: Sociedad Impresores Horizontes Ltda).
Barton, J. R. (2002) 'State Continuismo and Pinochetismo: The Keys to the Chilean (1973) 'Convocatoria del XV Congreso Nacional del PCCh', Principios, 151
Political Transition', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 21(3), 358-74. (May-June), 126-43.
Barrueto, V. (2005) 'La Concertacion en una Nueva Era' in E. Aguila (ed.) Los Desafios (1978) Algo de Mi Vida (Barcelona: Editorial Critica).
del Progresismo, Hacia un nuevo Ciclo de la Politka Chilena (Santiago, Chile: Editorial (1979) Nuestro Proyecto democrdtico (Our Democratic Project) (London: Taller
Catalonia). Ricardo Fonseca).
280 Bibliography Bibliography 281

(1980) 'La Rebelion se abre paso en Chile, Discurso del Secretario General del Faletto, E. St E. Ruiz (1970) 'Conflicto Politico y Estructura Social' in A. Pinto,
Partido Comunista de Chile, Luis Corvalan', unpublished manuscript, Moscow, S. Aranda, A. Martinez, O. Caputo, R. Pizarro, E. Faletto, E. Ruiz, J. Chonchol,
September 3. V Brodersohn, T. Vasconi, I. Reca St A. Dorfman (eds) Chile Hoy (Mexico: Siglo XXI
Cumsille, G. St M. A. Garreton (2000) Percepciones Culturales de la Desigualdad, Editores).
Report of Qualitative Research (Santiago, Chile: MIDEPLAN-Universidad de Chile), Fazio, H. (1996) El Programa Abandonado (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
http://www.mideplan.cl/admin/docdescargas/centrodoc/centrodoc_197.pdf, date (1997) Mapa Actual de la Extrema Riqueza en Chile (Santiago, Chile: Lom-Arcis).
accessed May 2, 2007. (2005) Majm de la Extrema Riqueza al aho 2005 (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
Cristi, R. (2000) El Pensamiento politico de Jaime Guzman, Autoridad y Libertad (Santiago, (2006) Lagos: El Presidente 'Progresista' de la Concertatidn (Santiago, Chile: Lorn
Chile. Lorn Ediciones). Ediciones).
Cruzat, X. St E. Deves (eds) (1985) Recabarren: Escritos de prensa: (1898-1924), vol. 4 Fenner, R. (1975) 'Consideraciones Sobre el Golpe Militar en Chile' in P. Vuskovic (ed.)
(Santiago, Chile: Nuestra America, Terranova), http://www.memoriachilena.cl/ El Golpe de Estado en Chile (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica).
mchilena01/temas/documento_detalle.asp?id=MC0000122, date accessed December Fernandez, S. (1994) Mi Lucha por la Democracia (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Los Andes).
15, 2007. Ffrench-Davis, R. (1982) 'El Experimento Monetarista en Chile: Una sintesis Critica',
Chilcote, R. H. (1990) 'Post-Marxism: The Retreat from Class in Latin America', Latin Coleccion Estudios CIEPLAN, 9 (December), 5-40.
America Perspective, 17(2), 3-24. (2005) 'Crecimiento con Equidad: Los Desafios Actuales' in E. Aguila (ed.)
Dahl, R. A. (1961) Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press). Los Desafios del Progresismo, Hacia un Nuevo Ciclo de la Politka Chilena (Santiago:
Dahrendorf, R. (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London: Routledge Editorial Catalonia).
St Kegan Paul). Ffrench-Davis, R. St B. Stallings (2001) 'Introduction' in R. Ffrench-Davis St
Dahse, F. (1979) Mapa de la Extrema Riqueza. Los Grupos Econdmicos y el Proceso de B. Stallings (eds) Crecimiento y Politicas Sociales en Chile desde 1973 (Santiago, Chile:
Concentration de Capitales (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Aconcagua Coleccion Lautaro). Lom-CEPAL).
Debray, R. (1971) Conversations with Allende (London: New Left Books). Fleet, M. (1985) The Rise and Fall of the Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton, NJ:
De la Cuadra, S. St D. Hachette (1991) 'Chile' in D. I'apageorgiou, M. Michaely St Princeton University Press).
A. M. Choksi (eds) Liberalizing Foreign Trade: The Experience of Argentina, Chile and Fernandes Fafe, J. (1973) 'Entrevista com Pablo Rodriguez Grez' in J. Fernandes Fafe
Uruguay (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell). (ed.) A Experiencia Chilena (Lisboa, Portugal: Iniciativas Editoriais).
Delano, M. St H. Traslavina (1989) La Herencia de los Chicago Boys (Santiago, Chile: Las Fontaine Aldunate, A. (1988) Los Economistas y el Presidente Pinochet (Santiago, Chile:
Ediciones del Ornitorrinco). Editorial Zig-Zag).
DIVEST (1998) lnforme Mensual DIVEST (July) (Santiago: Division de Estudios del Foxley, A. (1982a) Experimentos Neoliberales en America Latina (Santiago, Chile:
Ministerio Secretaria General de la Presidencia). Coleccion Estudios Cieplan).
Dooner, P. (1985) Cronica de Una Democracia Cansada, El Partido Democrata Cristiano (1982b) 'Cinco Lecciones de la Crisis Actual', in J. P. Arellano, R. Cortazar,
durante el Gobierno de Allende (Santiago, Chile: Institute Chileno de Estudios R. Downey, N. Flano, A. Foxley, R. Ffrench-Davis, J. Marshall, P. Meller, O. Munoz St
Humanisticos). E. Tironi (eds) Modelo Economico Chileno, Trayectoria de una Critica (Santiago, Chile:
Drake, P. St I. Jaksic (1999) 'El Modelo Chileno, Democracia y Desarrollo en los Editorial Aconcagua-Coleccion Lautaro).
Noventa' in P. Drake St I. Jaksic (eds) El Modelo Chileno, Democracia y Desarrollo en Frank, V. K. (2002) 'The Labor Movement in Democratic Chile, 1990-2000', Working
los Noventa (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones). Paper, 298 0une), The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University
Duran-Palma, E, A. Wilkinson St M. Korczynski (2005) 'Labour Reform in a of Notre Dame, http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/298.pdf,
Neo-Liberal "Protected" Democracy: Chile 1990-200T, International Journal of date accessed March 2, 2008.
Human Resource Management, 16(1) (January), 65-89. Frei Montalva, E. (1937) Chile Desconocido (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Ercilla).
Dwyer, L. Si D. Santikarma (2007) 'Post Traumatic Politics: Violence, Memory and (1940) La Politka y el Espiritu (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Ercilla).
Biomedical Discourse in Bali' in L. J. Kirmayer, R. Lemelson St M. Barad (eds) (1951) Sentido y Forma de una Politka (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacifico).
Understanding Trauma, Integrating Biological, Clinical and Cultural Perspectives (1956) La Verdad tiene su Hora (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacifico).
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (1958) Pensamiento y Action (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacifico).
Editores Contemporaneos (1983) Conversando en Voz Alta, Seis Dias en Chile con Jaime (1975) El Mandato de la Historia y las Exigencias del Porvenir (Santiago, Chile:
Gazmuri (Santiago, Chile: Editores Contemporaneos). Editorial del Pacifico).
Enriquez-Ominami, M. St C. Ominami (2004) Animates Politicos (Santiago, Chile: Friedman, M. (1975) Milton Friedman en Chile (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones de la
Editorial Planeta). Fundacion de Estudios Hipotecarios del Banco Hipotecario de Chile).
Escalona, C. (1999) Una Transition de dos Caras, Cronica, critica y autocritica (Santiago, Fuentes, C. (1996) El Discurso Militar en la Transicion Chilena (Santiago: FLACSO).
Chile: Lorn Ediciones). (2000) 'After Pinochet, Civilian Policies towards the Military in the 1990s Chilean
Escobar, P. (2003) 'The New Labor Market: The Effects of the Neoliberal Experiment in Democracy', Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 43(3), 111-42.
Chile', Latin American Perspectives, 30(5), 70-8. Furci, C. (1983) 'The Crisis of the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh) in 1979', Working
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press). Paper, 11, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London.
282 Bibliography Bibliography 283

(1984) The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History ofNeoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ltd). Hecht Oppenheim, L. (2007) Politics in Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism, and Market
Garces, J. E. (1976) Allende y la Experiencia Chilena (Barcelona, Caracas St Mexico: Democracy, 3rd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).
Editorial Ariel). Held, G. St L. F. Jimenez (2001) 'Liberalization, crisis y reforma del sistema bancario:
Garcia Naranjo, F. (1997) Historias Derrotadas, Option y Obstinacion de la Guerrilla 1974-99' in R. Ffrench-Davis St B. Stallings (eds) Reforma, Crecimiento y Politicas
Chilena (1965-1988) (Morelia, Mexico: Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolas de Sociales en Chile desde 1973 (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
Hidalgo). Herreros, E (2003) Del Gobierno del Pueblo a la Rebelion Popular (Santiago, Chile:
Garreton, M. A. (1983) El Proceso Politico Chileno (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Editorial Siglo XXI).
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales). Hofmeister, W. (1995) La Option por la Democracia, Democracia Cristiana y Desarrollo
(1984) Dictadura y Redemocratizacion (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana Politico en Chile 1964-1994 (Santiago, Chile: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung).
de Ciencias Sociales). Hojman, D. E. (199.3) Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democracy in the
(1989a) La Posibilidad Democrdtka en Chile (Santiago, Chile: Facultad 1990s (Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press).
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales). Hojman, D. E. (ed.) (1995) Neoliberalism with a Human Face? The Politics and Economics
(1989b) The Chitean Political Process (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman). of the Chilean Model (Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of
(1995) Hacia una Nueva Era Potitica: Estudios sobre las Democratizaciones (Mexico Liverpool).
City: Fondo de Cultura Economica). (1996) 'Poverty and Inequality in Chile: Are Democratic Politics and Neoliberal
(1999) 'Chile 1997-1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization', Inter- Economics Good for You?' Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(2/3),
national Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 75(2) (April), 259-67. Special Double Issue: Poverty and Inequality in Latin America (Summer-Autumn),
(2003) 'Chile: La democratization incompleta y los desafios del futuro', 73-96.
Vanguardia, Dossier 4 Oanuary-March), Barcelona. Howarth, D. St Y. Stavrakakis (2000) 'Introducing Discourse Theory and Political
Garreton, O. G. (1985) Propuesta para un Nuevo Chile (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Fragua). Analysis' in D. Howarth, A. J. Norval St Y. Stavrakakis (eds) Discourse Theory and
Gaudichaud, E (2004) Poder Popular y Cordones Industriales. Testimonios sobre la Political Analysis (Manchester St New York: Manchester University Press).
dindmica del movimiento popular urbano durante el gobierno de Salvador Allende Huneeus, C. (2001) El Regimen de Pinochet (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Sudamericana).
(Santiago, Chile: Lom-DIBAM). (2003) Chile un Pats Dividido (Santiago, Chile: Catalonia Ltda.)
Gazmuri, J. (1977) Aprender las lecciones del pasado para construir el futuro (Roma: Isla, J., S. Tarud St L. Jorquera (1978) Estadistkas Sindkales, Departamento de Estudios de
Editorial Barco de Papel). Relaciones del Trabajo y de las Organizaciones (DERTO) (Santiago, Chile: Universidad
Gindling, T. H. St D. Robbins (2001) 'Pattern and Sources of Changing Wage de Chile).
Inequalities in Chile and Costa Rica During Structural Adjustment', World Jobet, J. C. (1971) EI Partido Socialista de Chile, vol. I (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Prensa
Development 29(4): 725-45. Latinoamericana S.A.)
Godoy, O. (1999) 'La Transicion Chilena a la Democracia Pactada', Estudios Publicos, Jocelyn-Holt, A. (1999) El Peso de la Noche, Nuestra Frdgil Fortaleza Histarica (Santiago,
74, 79-106. Chile: Editorial Planeta).
Gonzalez, G. (1958) La Lucha por la Formation del Partido Comunista de Chile (Santiago, Johnson, D. L. (ed.) (1973) The Chilean Road to Socialism (Garden City, NY: Anchor
Chile: Editorial Austral). Press.)
(1971) 'Informe al Decimo Congreso del Partido Comunista de Chile', Principios, Joignant, A. (1998) El Gesto y la Palabra (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones/Universidad
September-December, 141-2. Arcis).
Gonzalez, M. (2000) Chile, La Conjura, Los Mil y un Dias del Golpe (Santiago, Chile: Kaufman, R. R. (1972) The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970 (Cambridge, MA:
Ediciones B, Grupo Zeta). Harvard University Press).
Grayson, G. W. (1968) El Partido Democrata Cristiano Chileno (Buenos Aires-Santiago Kingston, P., S. Langlois, Y. Lemel St H-H. Noll (2002) 'Inequality: The Structuring Effects
de Chile: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre). of Social Class in Four Societies' in Y. Lemel St H-H. Noll (eds) Changing Structures of
GrezToso, S. (1995) La 'Cuestion Social'en Chile, Ideas y Debates Precursores (1804-1902) Inequalities: A Comparative Perspective (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press).
(Santiago, Chile: Centro de lnvestigaciones Diego Barras Arana). Korol, C. (2003) Gladys Marin (Buenos Aires: Ediciones America Libre).
Grugel, J. (1992) 'Populism and the Political System in Chile: Ibanismo (1952-1958)', Kriegal, A. (1968) Las Internationales Obreras (Barcelona: Ediciones Martinez Roca).
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 11(2) (May), 169-86. Kurtz, M. (2001) 'State Developmentalism without a Developmental State: The Public
Grusky, D. B. St J. B. Sorensen (1998) 'Can Class Analysis be Salvaged?' American Foundations of the "Free Market Miracle" in Chile', Latin American Politics and
Journal of Sociology, 103 (March), 1187-234. Society, 43(2) (Summer), 1-25.
Guzman, J. (1992) Escritos Personates (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Zig Zag). Labarca, E. (1976) Vida y Lucha de Luis Corvalan (Mexico: Ediciones de Cultura Popular).
Halperin, E. (1965) Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Lagos, R. (1993) Despues de la Transicion (Santiago: Ediciones B, Grupo Zeta).
Press). Larranaga, O. (2001) 'Distribution de Ingresos 1958-2001' in R. Ffrench-Davis St
Harberger, A. (1975) Economia Chilena (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones de la Fundacion de B. Stallings (eds) Reformas, Crecimiento y Politicas Sociales en Chile desde 1973
Estudios Hipotecarios del Banco Hipotecario de Chile). (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
284 Bibliography Bibliography 285

Leighton, B. (1945) Nuestro Tiempo 34, Santiago: Impr. Gutemberg. (1997) Chile Actual, Anatomia de un Mito (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones/
Leiva, F. I., J. Petras St H. Veltmeyer (1994) Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits Universidad Arcis).
to Electoral Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Books). Moulian, L. St G. Guerra (2000) Eduardo Frei M. (1911-1982), Biografla de un Estadista
Lomnitz, L. A. St A. Melnick (2000) Chile's Political Culture and Parties: An Anthropological Utdpico (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Sudamericana).
Explanation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press). Munk, G. L. (1994) 'Authoritarianism, Modernization, and Democracy in Chile', Latin
Maira, L. (1984) Chile: Autoritarismo, Democracia y Movimiento Popular (Mexico: Centro American Research Review, 29(2), 188-211.
de Investigation y Docencia Economicas). Munoz Goma, O. (2007) El modelo economico de la Concertatidn 1990-2005 ^Reformas
(1988) La Constitution del 1980 y la Ruptura Democrdtica (Santiago, Chile: Editorial o cambio? (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/
Emision). Catalonia).
MAPU (1972) El Cardcter de la Revolution Chilena, 2nd edn (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Naranjo, P., M. Ahumada, M. Garces St J. Pinto (2004) Miguel Enriquez y el proyecto
Unidad Proletaria). revolucionario en Chile (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones).
Martinez, G. (1999) 'Un Plan de Equidad para Chile. El Sentido Humanista del Desarrollo' Nunez, R. (2005) 'Los Partidos de la Concertacion y el Nuevo Ciclo Politico' in
in G. Martinez (ed.) Ponencias, 1996-1999 (Valparaiso, Chile: Carroza S.A.). E. Aguila (ed.) Los Desafios del Progresismo, Hacia un nuevo Ciclo de la Politica Chilena
Medhurst, K. (ed.) (1972) Allende's Chile (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon). (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Catalonia).
Meller, P. (1996) Un Siglo de Economia Politka Chilena (1890-1990) (Santiago, Chile: Oppenheim, L. H. (1989) 'The Chilean Road to Socialism Revisited', Latin American
Editorial Andres Bello). Research Review, 24(1), 155-83.
(1999) 'Pobreza y Distribucion del Ingreso en Chile (Decada de los Noventa)' in Oxhorn, P. D. (1995) Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for
P. Drake St I. Jaksic (eds) El Modelo Chileno, Democracia y Desarrollo en los Noventa Democracy in Chile (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press).
(Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones). (1999) 'Recent Research on Chile: The Challenge of Understanding "Success"',
Menendez-Carrion, A. St A. Joignant (eds) (1999) La Caja de Pandora: El retorno de la Latin American Research Review, 34 (1), 255-71.
transicion chilena (Santiago, Chile: Planeta). (2004) 'La Paradoja del Gobierno Autoritario: La Organization de los Sectores
Mesa-Lago, C. (2000) Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies (Baltimore St London: The Populares en los Ochenta y la Promesa de Inclusion', Politica, 43 (Spring), 57-83.
Johns Hopkins University Press). Palma, L. (1967) Historia del Partido Radical (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello).
Michels, R. (1958) Political Parties (Glencoe, IL: Free Press). Pareto, V (1935) The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt-Brace).
Millas, O. (1972) 'La Clase obrera en las condiciones del gobierno popular', El Siglo, Parkin, E (1972) Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin).
June 5. Collected in V. Farias (2000) La Izquierda Chilena 1969-1973: Documentos Parry, G. (1969) Political Elites (London: George Allend fit Unwin Ltd).
para su Lima Estrategica, vol. 4 (Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios Publicos). Partido Comunista de Chile (s.n., 192-) Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile, (Santiago:
Mizala, A. St P. Romaguera (2001) 'La Legislation Laboral y el Mercado del Trabajo: Impr. y Litografia Antares, s.n.), http://www.memoriachilena.ti/mchilena01/temas/
1975-2000' in R. Ffrench-Davis St B. Stallings (eds) Reforma, Crecimiento y Politicas documento_detalle.asp?id=MC0016905, date accessed December 15, 2007.
Sociales en Chile desde 1973 (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones). PDC (1967) 'Informe de la Comision Politico-Tecnica', Politka y Espiritu, 303
Moncada Durruti, B. (2006) Jaime Guzman, El Politico (Santiago, Chile: RIL Editores). (October), 27-123.
Monckeberg, M. O. (2001) El Saqueo de los Grupos Economicos al Estado Chileno Partido Socialista de Chile (1974) 'Al calor de la Lucha contra el fascismo, construir
(Santiago: Ediciones B). la fuerza dirigente del pueblo para asegurar la victoria', Documento (Santiago, Chile:
Montes, J. (1971) 'La Lucha del Partido Comunista de Chile por la Unidad del Pueblo', n. editor).
Principios, 141-2. Peppelenbos, L. (2005) The Chilean Miracle: Patrimonialism in a Modern Free-Market
Morley, M. St C. McGillion (2006) 'Soldiering On: The Reagan Administration and Democracy (The Netherlands: Marcelis van der Lee-Adu BV).
Redemocratisation in Chile, 1983-1986', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25(1), Perez Guerra, A. (2006) 'Las cuentas que no pagara Pinochet', Punto Final, 630
1-22. (December, 15-28), 8-9.
Mosca, G. (1939) The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill). Petras, J. (1967) Chilean Christian Democracy: Politics and Social Forces, Politics of
Moulian, T. (1981a) 'Por un Marxismo Secularizado', Chile-America 72-3, 100-4. Modernization Series, No. 4 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies,
(1981b) 'Critica a la critica marxista de las democracias burguesas' in II. P. Garcia University of California).
(ed.) America Latina 80: Democracia y movimiento popular (Lima: Centro de Estudios (1969) Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley St Los Angeles:
y Promotion del Desarrollo). University of California Press).
(1983a) 'La Crisis de la Izquierda' in M. A. Garreton, P. Chaparro, E Cumplido, (1990) The Metamorphosis of Latin America's Intellectual', Latin American
A. Varas, P. Vergara, J. Martinez, E. Tironi, J. Crispi, S. Gomez, R. Echeverria, Perspectives, 17(2), 102-12.
J. J. Brunner, H. Munoz, A. Valenzuela, S. Valenzuela St T. Moulian (eds). Chile Politica y Espiritu (1959) No. 222, Santiago.
1973-198? (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales). Pollack, B. fit H. Rosenkrantz (1980) 'Political Strategies and Mobilization in
(1983b) 'Una Reflexion sobre intelectuales y politica' in T. Moulian (ed.) Chile, 1963-1973' in B. Pollack (ed.) Mobilization and Socialist Politics in Chile,
Democracia y Socialismo en Chile (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Monograph Series 9 (Liverpool: Centre for Latin-American Studies, The University
Sociales). of Liverpool).
286 Bibliography Bibliography 287

Pollack, B. St W. Suarez (1989) 'Cohesion and Performance in the Chilean y Sociales, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
Socialist Party' in B. Pollack (ed.) Mobilization and Socialist Politics in Chile, getdocument.aspx?docnum=841774, date accessed April 3, 2008.
Monograph Series 9 (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, The University Sapelli, C. (2003) 'The Political Economics of Import Substitution Industrialization',
of Liverpool). Working Paper, Santiago, Chile: Institute de Economia, Pontificia Universidad
Pollack, M. (1999) The new Right in Chile, 1973-1997 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd). Catelica de Chile, 257 (December), 1-33.
Portales, F. (2005) Los Mitos de la Democracia Chilena (Santiago, Chile: Catalonia). Serrano, M. St A. Cavallo (2006) El Poder de la Paradoja, 14 Lecciones Politicas de la Vida
Portes, A. (1985) 'Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change de Patricio Aylwin (Santiago, Chile: Grupo Editorial Norma).
during the Last Decade', Latin American Research Review, 20, 7-39. Silva, M. (1999) Los Cordones Industriales y el Socialismo desde Abajo (Santiago: n. editor).
Portes, A. St K. Hoffman (2003) 'Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition Silva, P. (1991) 'Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the
and Change during the Neoliberal Era', Latin American Research Review, 38(1), C1EPLAN Monks', Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(2) (May), 385-410.
41-82. (2004) 'Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Changes and Political
Posner, P. W. (2004) 'Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation Deactivation in Chile', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23(1), 63-78.
in Chile', Latin American Politics and Society, 46(3) (Fall), 55-81. Silva Solar, J. St J. Chonchol (1951) Hacia un Mundo Comunitario (Santiago, Chile:
Prebisch, R. (1950) The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems Editorial del Pacifico).
(New York: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America). Silva Solar, J. St J. Fran^osi (1948) {Que es el Socialcristianismo? (Santiago, Chile: n. p.)
Przeworski, A. (1988) 'Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts' in J. Elster St Scott, R. E. (1967) 'Elites in Latin America' in S. M. Lipset St A. Solari (eds) Elites in
R. Slagstad (eds) Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press).
Press). Shain, Y.fitJ. J. Linz (1992) 'The Role of Interim Government', Journal of Democracy,
(1991) 'Editorial', Punto Final, 259 (March 1-15), 3. 3(1) (January), 73-89.
Rabkin, R. (1992) 'The Aylwin Government and "Tutelary" Democracy: A Concept in Sheahan, J. (1987) Pattern of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression, and
Search of a Case?' Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34(4) (Winter Economic Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
1992-3), 119-94. Stallings, B. (2001) 'Las Reformas Estructurales y el Desempeno SocioEconomico' in
Ramirez Necochea, H. (1965) Origen y Formation del Partido Comunista de Chile R. Ffrench-DavisfitB. Stallings (eds) Reformas, Crecimiento y Politicas Sociales en Chile
(Santiago, Chile: Editora Austral). desde 1973 (Santiago, Chile: Lom Ediciones).
Ramos, J. (1986) Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin America, Taylor, M. (2006) From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation
1973-1983 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). in Chile (London: Pluto Press).
Ravines, E. (1957) La Gran Estafa (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacifico). Teitelboim, V. (1988) En el Pais Prohibido, Sin el Permiso de Pinochet (Barcelona: Plaza St
Rehren, A. (2004) 'Politics and Corruption, the Underside of Chilean Democracy', Janes Editores).
Harvard Review of Latin America, (Spring), 14-5. (2001) Noches de Radio (Escucha Chile), Una Voz Viene de Lejos (Santiago, Chile:
Reseller, N. (1993) Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Claredon Lom Ediciones).
Press). Tironi, E. (1984a) Tnventario' in E. Tironi (ed.) La Torre de Babel, Ensayos de Critica y
Reyes Alvarez, J. (1989) Los presidentes radicates y su partido. Chile 1938-1952 (Santiago: Renovation Politka (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Sur).
CEP). (1984b) 'La Nueva Coyuntura: Crisis del Modelo y Crisis del Regimen' in
Rodriguez de la Sotta, II. (1932) Crisis Politica, Economica y Moral (Santiago, Chile: E. Tironi (ed.) La Torre de Babel, Ensayos de Critica y Renovation Politica (Santiago,
Imp. Prisiones. Folletos). Chile: Ediciones Sur).
Rodriguez Grez, P. (1972) /ifre la Democracia y la Tirania (Santiago, Chile: Printer Ltda (1984c) 'Solo Ayer Eramos Dioses' in E. Tironi (ed.) La Torre de Babel, Ensayos de
C.P.A.). Critica y Renovation Politica (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Sur).
Rosenthal, G. (1996) 'On Poverty and Inequality in Latin America', Journal of Valdes, J. G. (1989) La Escuela de Chicago: Operation Chile (Buenos Aires: Grupo
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(2/3), Special Double Issue: Poverty and Editorial Zeta S.A.).
Inequality in Latin America (Summer-Autumn), 15-37. Valdivia Ortiz de Zarate, V. (2003) El golpe despues del golpe (Santiago, Chile: Lom
Ruiz Encina, C. (2006) VQue hay detras del malestar con la education?' Revista Ediciones).
Andlisis del Afio 2006, 33-72. Valenzuela, J. S. (1998) 'Labor Movement in Transition to Democracy: A Framework
Salazar, G. (1990) Violencia Politica Popular en las Grandes Alamedas (Santiago, Chile: of Analysis', Working Paper 104, University of Notre Dame, June.
Editorial Sur). Van Dijk, T A. (1998) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications),
Salazar, G. St J. Pinto (1999) Historia Contempordnea de Chile, Vol. 1, Estado, legitimidad, van der Ree, G. (2007) Contesting Modernities: Projects of Modernization in Chile 1964-2006
ciudadania (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones). (Amsterdam: Dutch University Press).
Salazar, M. St M. Valderrama (2000) Dialectos en Transition, Politica y Subjetividad en el Varios (1976) MIR, dos aims en la lucha de la resistencia popular del pueblo chileno 1973-1975
Chile Actual (Santiago, Chile: Lorn Ediciones/Universidad Arcis). (Madrid: ZERO S.A.).
Santibanez, C. (2006) 'Pobreza y Desigualdad en Chile: Antecedentes para la Vasconi, T A.fitS. Casal Sanchez (1990) 'Democracy and Socialism in South America',
Construction de un Sistema de Protection Social', Serie de Estudios Economicos Latin America Perspective, 17(2), 25-38.
288 Bibliography Bibliography 289

Veltmeyer, H., J. Petras St S. Vieux (1997) Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin (2007, May 5) 'Manifiesto oficialista reedita el debate entre "autoflagelantes" y
America: A Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment "autocomplacientes"'.
(Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan). El Mostrador (2007, March 10) 'Carlos Altamirano: Dirigentes socialistas del gobierno
Vial, G. (2005) Salvador Allende, El Fracaso de una Ilusion (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Allende hacen balance de La Moneda'.
Finis Terrae, Centro de Estudios Bicentenario). (2007, April 24) 'Escalona arremete contra Ominami y le recuerda gobierno de
Viera-Gallo, J. A. (1998) 11 de Septiembre, Testimonio, Recuerdo y Una Reflexion Actual Allende'.
(Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Chile America CESOC). Estrategia (1986, November 10).
Villalobos, S. (1989) Portales, una falsification historka (Santiago, Chile: Editorial La Nation (2005, May 8) 'Desigualdad: La Papa Caliente, Los Zigzagueos de los
Universitaria). Candidatos ante un Tema Boomerang'.
Vitale, L. (1964) Esencia y apariencia de la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago, Chile: (2005a, November 17) 'Michelle Bachelet, Que respondieron los candidatos'.
Arancibia Hnos.). (2005b, November 17) 'Sebastian Pinera, Que respondieron los candidatos'.
Vuskovic, P. (1973) 'The Economic Policy of the Popular Unity Government' in (2006, October 29) 'Un pais a lo pobre: La mayoria silenciosa en la ruidosa
J. A. Zammit (ed.) The Chilean Road to Socialism (Brighton: University of Sussex, opulencia'.
Institute of Development Studies). (2007, May 4) 'El polemico documento anti-neoliberal que remece a la
Vuskovic Rojo, S. (1968) Problemdtka D.C.: Propiedad, revolution, estado (Santiago, Concertacion'.
Chile: Editorial Austral). (2007, June 11) 'Jorge Arrate: La critica no es bienvenida en la Concertacion'.
Wayland-Smith, G. (1969) Tlie Christian Democratic Party in Chile (Cuernavaca, La Tercera (2005, March 13) 'Ricardo Lagos: No se si pase de lobo a cordero'.
Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentation, Sondeos 39). (2005, May 6) 'Joaquin Lavin, Lavin pide a Lagos: Deje que Michelle y Soledad
Wengraf, T. (2001) Qualitative Research Interviewing (London: SAGE Publications). se defiendan solitas'.
Wilson, J. (2003) 'Political Discourse' in D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen St H. E. Hamilton (2005, August 3) 'Juan Claro revela como la Sofofa decidio apoyar a Lagos en su
(eds) The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). peor momento'.
Winn, P. (ed.) (2004) Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the (2005, August 21) 'Los Recuerdos de Androniko Luksic sobre la Tierra de sus
Pinochet Era, 1973-2002 (Durham and London: Duke University Press). Origenes'.
Wright Mills, C. (1956) The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press). (2005, September 18) 'Te Deum: Cardenal Errazuriz llama a candidatos y
World Bank (2006) World Development Report: Equity and Development (London: World autoridades a superar desigualdad en Chile'.
Bank St Oxford University Press).
Yotopoulos, P. A. (1989) 'The (Rip) Tide of Privatization: Lesson from Chile', World (2005, September 25) 'Editorial: El fin de la transition y el debate que no se ha
Development, 17(5), 683-702. cerrado'.
Zahler, R. (1980) 'The Monetary and Real Effects of the Financial Opening Up of (2005, October 8) 'Editorial: Desigualdad en Chile: El otro consenso politico'.
National Economies to the Exterior: The Case of Chile, 1975-78', CEPAL Review, 10 (2005a, October 22) 'Editorial: La fortaleza del modelo economico'.
(April), 127-53. (2005b, October 22) 'Alabanzas de Somerville a Lagos desatan tension en la
(1983) 'Recent Southern Cone Liberalizations Reforms and Stabilization Policies: Corporation de Production y el Comertio'.
The Chilean Case, 1974-1982', Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (2006, June 1) 'Bachelet anuncia profundo plan de education en medio de
25(4) (November), 509-62. movilizaciones'.
Zammit, J. A. (ed.) (1973) The Chilean Road to Socialism (Brighton: University of L'Humanite (1974, September 4).
Sussex, Institute of Development Studies). The Economist (2005, March 31) 'Chile, Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin American
Zizek, S. (2007) 'The Uses and Misuses of Violence', Unpublished open lecture, The Success Story'.
Institute for the Humanities, Birkbeck College, February 26. The Wall Street Journal (1980, January 18).
Interviews
Newspapers and magazines Jose Joaquin Brunner (interview 2005a, Santiago June 21).
Ernesto Ottone (interview 2005b, Santiago June 22).
El Mercurio (2005, September 4) 'Encuesta ICSO-UDP, Datos Exclusivos, Crecer con Jaime Gazmuri (interview 2005c, Santiago June 1).
igualdad, la promesa que no se cumplio'. Enrique Correa (interview 200Sd, Santiago June 8).
(2005, October 23) 'Tomas Hirsch, El voto por Bachelet es blando, sin mistica, Hernan Larrain (interview 2005e, Santiago June 13).
sin conviction ...'. Genaro Arriagada (interview 2005f, Santiago June 16).
(2006, December 17) 'Gonzalo Mariner: Es cierto, los partidos de la Concertacion Joseph Ramos (interview 2005g, Santiago, June 1).
recibian recursos de gastos reservados'. Maria Rozas (interview 2005h, Santiago June 23).
(2006, December 19) 'Belisario Velasco: Oficialismo apela a "legalidad" hasta el Guillermo Teillier (interview 2005i, Santiago June 17).
ano 2003 para defenderse de las acusaciones'. Edgardo Boeninger (interview 2005), Santiago June 17).
290 Bibliography

Evelyn Matthei (interview 2005k, Santiago June 6).


Jose Antonio Guzman (interview 20051, Santiago June 8). I n d e x
Raul de la Puente (interview 2005m, Santiago June 22).
Osvaldo Rosales (interview 2005n, Santiago June 15).
Alicia Frohman (interview 2005o, Santiago June 3).
Raul Saez (interview 2005p, Santiago June 7).
Carlos Pena (interview 2005q, Santiago June 16). Adorno, Theodor, 7, 26, 264n9, 265n6 Brunner, Jose Joaquin, xii, 171, 177,
Hugo Fazio (interview 2005r, Santiago June 3). contextualist view, 63, 265n2, 265n4 219, 222-3, 225, 232, 241-2
Coral Pey (interview 2005s, Santiago June 9). instrumental rationality, 33 bureaucratic-technical class, 118,
Ronald Bown (interview 2005t, Santiago May 23). As critical theorist, 23, 33, 264nl2 128-9
Manuel Concha (interview 2005u, Santiago June 22). Agrarian Popular Unitary Movement,
Maria Luisa Brahm (interview 2005v, Santiago May 31). xiv, 162, 165-6, 172-3, 176-7, 179, Central Bank, 122, 131, 201, 239
Ana Bell (interview 2005w, Santiago June 9). 181, 187, 193, 197, 216 CDP
Hugo Baeirlein (interview 2005x, Santiago June 7). agrarian reform, 115, 118, 158, 165, 169 See Christian Democrat Party
Roberto Fantuzzi (interview 2005y, Santiago May 31). Alessandri, Jorge, 113-15, 149, 156, constitutional patriotism, 81-3, 261
Vittorio Corbo (interview 2005z, Santiago June 3). 168-70, 201, 231, 267nl See also Jurgen Habermas
Allende, Salvador, 97, 113-16, 121, 138, Chascones, 193
Web pages 146, 149, 156, 158, 162, 164-7, Chicago Boys, 119, 123, 130-1, 135-6,
170-3, 175, 184, 189-90, 192, 196, 138, 190, 194, 198-202, 267n9
ECLAC (1999 St 2001) The Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 198-9, 205, 214, 217, 234, 267nl, Chile
http://www.eclac.ci/deype/publicaciones, date accessed December 13, 2012. 267n2, 269nl3 Chilean political elites, xiii, 1, 7, 10-11,
LABORSTA INTERNET 2007, ILO, http://laborsta.ilo.Org/applv8/data/ssm7/e/CL.html, allusion, 38, 254 91-2, 94-5, 97-110, 113, 152-5,
date accessed October 26, 2007. See also illusion 204-12, 214-15, 225, 229, 236, 239,
Labour Overview 2000, Latin American and the Caribbean, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ almeydistas, 180-1, 188 240, 242-50, 253-8, 260, 266nll
americas/publicaciones, data accessed December 13, 2012. Altamirano, Carlos, 154-5, 158-9, 162, Chilean politics, 157, 167, 171, 204-5,
Labour Overview 2005, Latin America and the Caribbean (First Semester Advance 174-7, 181, 269nl7 219, 253
Report), ILO, http://www.ilo.org/americas/publicaciones/WCMS_186772/lang-en/ Althusser, Louis, 3, 18, 23, 37, 42, 43, political economy model, 1, 7, 10, 92,
index.htm, date accessed December 13, 2012. 48, 54, 56, 264nl2, 265n5 94-5, 97, 99-102, 109-10, 113, 152,
Statistics Compendium, Ministry of Labour, Chile (2005), http://www.dt.gob.ti/ Althusserianism, 3, 42, 58 206, 229, 243, 245-7, 249, 253
documentacion/1612/w3-propertyvalue-22777.html, date accessed December 13, Althusser and Balibar, 8-9, 43, 55-7, Pre-Pinochet, 113
2012. 95,215 Post-Pinochet, 1, 7, 10-11, 91-102,
Althusser's theory of Ideology, 37-40, 106-10, 113, 130, 141, 144, 148,
57 151-2, 206-7, 223, 226, 229, 232,
as Marxist theorist, 17, 36, 40 237-8, 242-60, 266n6, 266n8,
Ideological State Apparatuses, 38-9, 267nl3, 270nl3
43, 45, 57, 79 ChCP
Symptomatic Reading, 8-9, 95, 215 See Chilean Communist Party
Angelini group, 123, 137-8 Christian Democrat Party, xiii, 156,
Archimedean true point, the, 41, 43-5, 162-7, 170, 176, 179, 180-7,
84-5, 88 190-6, 204-5, 209, 216, 268n6,
Arriagada, Genaro, xii, 209, 211, 221, 268n8, 268nl0, 268nl6, 269n23
225, 230-1, 237-8, 270nl9 Chilean Communist Party, xiii, 155-7,
Aylwin, Patricio, 102, 149, 167, 173, 160-3, 170, 172, 176, 180-93,
176, 180, 189-92, 195, 209, 212, 204-5, 210, 212-13, 216, 268n3
214, 216-17, 227, 230, 266n6 Chile's Manufacturers' Association, xiv,
168, 233
Bachelet, Michelle, 172, 179, 206, 217, Chilean political elites, xiii, 1, 7, 10-11,
219, 236, 240 91_2, 94-5, 97-110, 113, 152-5,
Boeninger, Edgardo, xii, 195, 212, 215, 204-12, 214-15, 225, 229, 236, 239,
238, 269n25 240, 242-50, 253-8, 260, 266nll

291
292 Index Index 293

Chilean political elites - continued Concertacion de Partidos por la Deep hermeneutic matrix, 7-8, 11, 93-4, Foucault, Michel, 58
Political discourse, 106-9, 152-3, 159, Democracia 98, 110, 113, 153,253-5 Archimedean point of truth, 3
246, 249 See Coalition of Parties for the Derrida, Jacques, 4, 56, 58-9, 87, 89, notion of discourse, 100
Modes of justification, 10, 100, 10.3-5, Democracy 265nl as post-structuralist, 3, 42, 44, 58
107-9, 152-3, 206-10, 243-9, 254 Confederation de la Production y del discourse, 2, 11, 51, 54, 58-62, 69, 72, Foucault's notion of ideology, 4, 42,
Strategies of symbolic construction, Comertio 81-2, 84, 93, 96, 99-100, 242 52,67
10,94, 100, 103, 152 See Confederation of Industry and discursive analysis, 93-5, 110, 208, FPMR
Chilean Socialist Party, xiii, 154-62, 170, Trade 249, 253 See Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
172, 193, 204, 211, 216-19, 219, Confederation of Industry and Trade, discourse of class struggle, 94, 100, FRAP
269nl7 xiii, 214, 235-6 103-8, 153-61, 163, 166-7, 170-1, See Popular Action Front
as Marxist-Leninist Party, 154-62, 175, consensus 173-8, 181-2, 188, 196, 204, 208, Freeden, Michael
216 Chilean political elites, 1, 7, 11, 91-2, 215, 217-18, 242-3, 246-7, 249-50, "illusory certainty", 50-1
socialist renovation, the, 173-82, 187 95, 97-100, 102, 106-10, 152-3, 253-9 marxist's theory of ideology, 46, 48,
socialist intellectual, 219 172-3, 194-6, 205-10, 214-15, 218, discursive strategies, 10, 94, 99-100, 52
ChPEs 220, 242-54, 258-61 103, 153, 253-4, 260 methodological approach to ideology,
See Chilean political elites the notion of, 100-1 46-7, 53
Christian Left, 166, 173, 176, 180 rational consensus, 72, 74, 80, 262 Economic Commission for Latin morphological conceptual approach,
ChSP theory of truth, 71 America and the Caribbean, xiii, 4, 49, 51, 252
See Chilean Socialist Party Conservative Party, 154, 163, 167-9 114, 133, 172 non-marxist's theory of ideology, 47
CL CORFO F.CLAC notion of ideology, 4, 50-2, 55, 66-7,
See Christian Left See Production Development See Economic Commission for Latin 265n2
class struggle, 10-11, 40, 57-8, 88, 94, Corporation America and the Caribbean positive segregation, 24
103, 162, 173-4, 177, 185, 216, 226, Corporation de Fomento de la Production Enlightenment, 15, 34, 176 Frei Montalva, Eduardo, 97, 113, 118,
245, 248-50, 253-4, 260 de Chile Empirical research question, 95, 99-100, 156, 163-4, 170, 191, 198, 201,
discourse of, 100, 10.3-6, 110, 153-61, See Production Development 103, 107, 110, 246 231
16.3, 166-7, 170-1, 173-4, 177-8, Corporation ERQ Freistas, 166, 190, 192-3
181-2, 188, 196-7, 204-5, 208, 215, Corporativism, 153, 155, 170 See Empirical research question Frente de Action Popular
217-18, 242-7, 249-50, 253, 255-9 Corpora tivists, 165, 170 See Popular Action Front
as the Real, 100, 103-4, 106-8, 110 Correa, Enrique, 181, 212, 216, 221, Facultad Latino-Americana de Ciencias Frente de Liberation Nacional
the denial of, 108-10 226, 228-9, 235, 237, 242 Sociales See National Liberation Front
See also Social Antagonism Coup d'etat, 102, 106, 119, 159, 170, See Latin American Faculty of Social Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez
Coalition of Parties for the Democracy, 257 Sciences See Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
189, 206 CPC Falange Nacional, 163 Frente Popular
Coalition of Parties for the NO, 189 See Confederation of Industry and Fantasy, 76, 79, 80, 87 See Popular Front
communicative action theory, 252, Trade Chilean Political Elites' discourse, 212,
254 Critical Theory, 16, 31-4, 36-8, 77-8, 240-1 Gazmuri, Jaime, 172, 176-7, 211, 219,
Concertacion, the, 99, 152, 180-1, 189, 244, 264n3, 265n2 See also Slavoj Zizek 221, 225, 231, 235
200, 206-7, 209, 211-19, 228, 232, the Frankfurt School, 7, 23, 36, 63, 77, Fascism, 16, 31, 155, 185 GDP
238 264n3, 264nl2, 265n4 Federation Estudiantil de la Universidad See Gross Domestic Product
consensus, 1, 94, 97-100, 102, theorists of the, 23, 26, 264nl2 Catdlica german idealism, 48
108-10, 113, 152, 172, 194, 205, Critique of Ideology, 3-5, 9, 21, 31, 33, See Union Student of the Catholic GNI
207, 210, 214, 218, 220, 243-50, 36, 41, 51-2, 62-3, 66, 67, 84-92, University See Gross National Income
253-61 110, 252, 256-8, 264nl, 265n2 FEUC GNP
elites, 209, 212, 218-33, 236, 240-1 New ideology critique, 5, 92-3, 95-6, See Union Student of the Catholic See Gross National Product
governments, 97, 102, 139, 172, 179, 98-9, 109-10, 253-4, 258, 262-3 University Gonzalez Videla, Gabriel, 157, 160, 168,
205, 208, 213-28, 233 See also ideology, ideological FLACSO 182,216
'growth with equity', 206-7, 217, CUT See Latin American Faculty of Social Gramsci, Antonio, 24
219-21, 225, 232, 237, 259 See Workers' United Center of Chile Sciences Gramsci's influence on Chilean
Concertacion de Partidos por el NO Cynicism, 76 Formal analysis politics, 176, 187
See Coalition of Parties for the NO See also Slavoj Zizek See discursive analysis Gramsci's influence on Laclau, 58
294 Index Index 295

Gramsci, Antonio - continued Ibanez del Campo, Carlos, 114, 156-8, Kant, Immanuel, 19, 59, 87 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, xiii,
Gramsci's theory of ideology, 29-30, 169, 182, 196, 216 post-Kantianism, 264n3 188-9
46,55 Idea knowledge MAPU
theory of hegemony, 29-30, 56 notion of, 18-24 as cogito, 4-5 See Agrarian Popular Unitary
neo-Gramscian theory, 55 ideology as connaissance, 38 Movement
Greater Santiago, 127-8, 146, 147, 149 as an epistemological problem, 19, 27 as logos, 3, 18, 21 Marin, Gladys, 186-7
Gremial Movement of the Catholic critique of, 3-5, 21, 31, 33, 36, 41, definitive knowledge, 41, 49, 84 Marx, Karl
University, 170 51-2, 62-3, 66-7, 84-5, 87-92, 110, non-knowledge, 77 historical materialism, 18-20, 36
gremialistas 251-2, 256-8, 264nl, 265n2 objective knowledge, 27, 77 ideology, notion of, 2, 10, 15-24, 27,
See gremials classic theories of, 4 theory of, 37 29-33, 40, 42, 48-9, 55, 62
gremials, 170 contemporary theories of, 20, 22, 30, non-Marxist, 46-7, 55
Gross Domestic Product, x, xi, xiv, 114, 40, 251 'Labor plan', 125-7 Marx's dialectic, 19-20, 32, 40, 43,
116, 121, 124, 131-5, 137, 146-7, descriptive sense, 24-7, 55, 257 Lacan, Jacques 48, 251
149, 199, 207, 227 end of, 32-3, 42, 47 Lacanian Real, 61-2, 103, 105, 260 Marx and Engels, 19-20, 22, 48
Gross National Income, xiv, 127-8 false consciousness, 21-2, 29, 36, 62 Zizek's reading, 4, 6, 66-8, 76, 78-9, Marxism, 29, 42-3, 48, 52, 55, 57, 62,
guatones, 193-4 negative sense, 31, 34-6, 40, 257, 260 86-8, 92, 96, 99, 105, 252 154, 157, 177, 184, 187
Guzman, Jaime, 170-1, 200, 202-3, positive sense, 24, 28, 30, 257 Laclau, Ernesto Marxisant Schools, 48
269nl5, 269n25 post-critique of, 9 and Althusser's influence, 57-8 Marxist science, the, 40
theory of, 1-4, 17, 22, 37, 40, 42-8, and Marxist theory, 62-4 Marxist tradition, 22, 29, 42, 48-9
Habermas, Jurgen 55-9, 63-7, 76, 83, 91, 244, 251-2, and post-structuralism, 58-9 post-Marx, 10, 16, 23, 29, 85
as critical theorist, 34, 37, 63, 257, 266n9 class identity, 60 post-Marxist, 23, 77, 187
264nl2 ideological critique of ideology, 62-3, 66, 252 Marxist-Leninist, 166, 174-5, 188
communicative rationality, 6, 10, delusion, 6, 39, 70, 78, 81, 91, 252, discourse theory, 55, 58 Matrix
74-5, 80-2, 93, 98, 225, 243-4, 260 non-essentialist notion of ideology, deep hermeneutic, 7-8, 11, 93-4, 98,
270n21 extra-ideological place, 6, 67, 90, 92, 55-6, 62-3, 66 110, 113, 153,253-5
consensus theory of truth, 71, 74-5 96, 99, 105, 252 non-ideological sphere, 62 Matte group, 123, 137, 139
constitutional patriotism, 81-3, 261 Ideological States Apparatuses, 38-9, theory of hegemony, 4, 57-65, 177-8, Minimum employment program, xiv,
false consciousness, 22 43, 57 252 122, 135
instrumental action, 68, 72-4, 76 non-ideological, 1-2, 4-6, 11, 20-1, Laclau and Mouffe, 59-60, 178, MIR
notion of truth, 10, 68-76, 84 40, 44, 62, 67, 81, 85-91, 106-7, 263nl3 See Revolutionary Left Movement
post-Habermas, 6, 68, 91, 96 110,252-3,257-8,263 notion of ideology, 62-3, 252 MJ
rational agreement, 7, 72-3, 80-1, 91 illusion, 3-6, 17, 19, 21-2, 31, 34, 38, Lagos, Ricardo, 102, 138, 149, 172, See Modes of justification
rational community, 75 40, 50, 65, 68, 78-80, 85-90, 160, 209-10, 212, 218-9, 227, 234-6, Modes of justification, xiv, 10, 100,
theory of communicative action, 11, 251, 254, 256-7, 259 270nl9 103-9, 152-3, 206-10, 225, 243-4,
66-7, 89, 252, 260, 265n5 See also allusion Latifundios, 115-17 247, 249, 254
theory of knowledge, 37 imaginary, the, 4, 38, 86-7, 89 Latin America, x, 7, 97-8, 113-14, Mouffe, Chantal, 56
Hegel, Georg Wilhem Friedrich, 75, Import Substitution Industrialization, 117-19, 125-8, 141-3, 161, 171, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 178
266n8 xiii, 114-15, 117-20, 137, 152, 208, 178, 197, 219, 222, 227-30, 234, Laclau and Mouffe, 59-60, 178,
dialectic tradition, 90 267n3 236, 250, 266n5, 267n3 263nl3
influence of Marx's theory, 18-21 Independent Democrat Unity, xiv, 202 Latin American Faculty of Social Movement of National Unity, The, xiv,
reality/illusion, 34 Infrastructure, 42-3, 56 Sciences, xiii, 171, 177 202-3
hegemony ISAs Law of protection for democracy, 160, 216 Movimiento de Action Popular
Gramsci's theory of, 29-30, 56 See Ideological State Apparatuses Lenin, 23, 29, 31, 190 Unitario
Laclau's theory of, 4, 57-65, 177-8 ISI model Leninist, 175-6, 180 See Agrarian Popular Unitary
theory of, 30 See Import Substitution Ley de defensa de ia democracia Movement
historical materialism, 3, 18, 20, 36, Industrialization See law of protection for democracy Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
39 Izquierda Cristiana Liberal Party, 167-9 See Revolutionary Left Movement
Horkheimer, Max See Christian Left Lukacs, Georg, 29 Movimiento Gremial de la Catdlica
as critical theorist, 23, 264nl2 Izquierda Unida notion of ideology, 29, 31, 264nl0 See Gremial Movement of the
instrumental rationality, 33, 36 See United Left Luksic group, 123, 137-40 Catholic University
296 Index Index 297

Movimiento de Union Nacional POJH Renovation Nacional Sociedad de Fomento Fabril


See The Movement of National Unity See Program for Heads of Family See The National Renewal See Chile's Manufacturers'
MUN Popular Action Front, 156, 161 RN Association
See The Movement of National Unity Popular Front, 155, 157, 160, 162, 168 See The National Renewal Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura
Popular Unity, xiv, 114, 116, 171, 174, RP See National Society of Agriculture
nacionalistas 177, 179, 182-5, 189-94, 204, 215, See Radical Party Sociedad Nacional de Mineria
See nationalist 217 Rationales Einverstdndnis See National Mining Corporation
National Liberation Front, 160 Popular Socialist Party, 157, 161 See Jurgen Habermas, rational socio-historical analysis, 93, 110
National Mining Corporation, xiv, 168 Populism, 153, 169, 238 agreement SOFOFA
National Renewal, The, xiv, 203-4, 213, Populist, 156-7, 165, 169, 238 Real, the See Chile's Manufacturers' Association
227 protestas and class struggle, 11, 88, 105-8 SONAMI
National Society of Agriculture, The, See social protests fictional notion, 6-7, 10, 67, 89-90, See National Mining Corporation
xiv, 168 PSP 92, 96, 99 SSCs
nationalism, 83, 153 See Popular Socialist Party Lacan's notion of, 67, 86-90 See strategies of symbolic
nationalist, 170-1, 188, 198 positivism, 16, 25-8, 31, 35-6 Zizek's notion of, 4, 7, 76, 86-90 constructions
nazism, 31, 36 post-Authoritarian process, 97 reality, 3-6, 16-24, 27-8, 32-3, 38, 40-1, Stalinism, 31, 184
neo-liberalism post-communicative action, 92, 99 48-9, 62, 67-8, 74-9, 85-90, 106, strategies of symbolic constructions, xiv,
in Chile, 114, 119, 136, 195, 224 post-modernism, 36, 223 109, 154, 162-3, 247, 251, 255-60, 10, 94, 100, 103-5, 107-8, 152-3,
in Latin America, 97, 114, 266n5 Post-Pinochet 265n6 206-10, 242-50, 254
non-rational, 4-5, 22, 30, 54, 80, 99 Chile, 91, 98, 102, 152, 237, 242-6, objective reality, 41, 49-51, 258 subject, 8, 16-22, 27, 32, 34, 38-42,
notables, 166 259-60, 266n6, 266n8, 267nl3, social reality, 47-8, 53, 62, 77, 88, 55-62, 71, 76-87
270n3 104 inter-subjective, 4, 68-76, 101
Object petit a, 86 Chilean elite, 106, 110, 243-56, 260 symbolic reality, 88 success
objectivity, 8, 27-28, 62, 75 democracy, 99, 106, 113, 130, 141, rebeldes, 165-6 recognition of, 101
Oficialistas, 164-5 144, 147, 151-2, 206-7, 232, 257, renovados superstructure, 3, 16, 30, 42-3, 56-8,
Ottone, Ernesto, xii, 172, 210, 212-13, 260 See renovators 175, 265n5
223-4, 228, 230, 241-2, 270nl6 political economy model, 1, 7, 10-11, renovators, 179, 180-1, 187-8 symbolic, the, 4, 75, 79, 86-90, 256,
95, 100, 106-9, 152, 206, 223, 226, repression, 38, 71, 86, 88, 104, 109, 258, 266n6, 270n7
PEM 229, 238, 243-56, 260 122-3, 126, 17.3-4, 182-6, 190, 192, symptomatic
See minimum employment program regime period, 92, 94-5, 97, 102, 110 218, 243, 247, 249, 255 reading, 8-9, 95, 215
Pinochet, Augusto, 97, 99, 101-2, 113-14, post-structuralism, 3, 58-9, 84, 264n3 See also Primordial repression interpretation/re-interpretation, 94-5,
119, 125, 130, 135, 140-1, 149, 152, power, 45-6, 51-3, 66, 80, 91, 113-14, Rios, Jose Antonio, 163, 168 110, 253
173, 179-204, 208-31, 244-5, 248, 120, 126, 130, 135-7, 155, 158-9,
250, 254, 257, 259, 267nl0, 267nl4, 160-1, 170, 172, 176-7, 183, 185, SNA terceristas, 165-6, 193
268nl8, 269n4, 269n29 189, 191, 193, 199, 202, 208-9, See National Society of Agriculture theory of communicative action, 1, 6,
See also Post-Pinochet 218-19, 223-4, 233, 240, 253, social antagonism, 56, 60, 105-6, 109, 11, 66-7, 89, 252, 260, 265n5
plebiscite 267nl2 153, 178, 190, 242-9, 255, 266nl3 See also Jurgen Habermas
of 1980, 185, 193 "battle of power", 204 social crisis, 154-5 Thompson, John B., 7-8, 15, 22-3, 32,
of 1988, 152, 180-1, 189, 195, 202-4, economic power, 123, 137, 158 social protests, 127, 135 35, 70, 75, 80, 93-5, 103, 264nl,
209, 214, 268nl8 electoral power, 168-70 Socialism 264n2, 264n7, 265n5, 266nl,
political Analysis, 1, 5-7, 10-11, 66, 91, primordial repression, 88, 104, 109 as ideology, 173, 184 266nl2
93, 98, 182-3, 250-1, 254-6, 259, 263 proletarian, 29, 155, 158, 159, 163, 172, as model of democracy, 97, 114, 189, deep hermeneutic, 7-8, 93
political economy, 93-4 180 193-4, 266n2 totalitarianism, 33, 47
the Post-Pinochet model, 1, 7, 10, 92, proletariat, 29, 31, 56-60, 125-7, 152, as party, xiii, 154-62, 170, 172, 193, tabula rasa, 83, 213, 244, 250
94-102, 109-10, 113, 152, 206, 223, 158, 184, 267n5 204, 211, 216-9, 219, 269nl7 Tracy, Destutt de, 15
229, 243, 245-9, 253 PU "communitarian socialism", 164, trauma, 269n7
political theory, 11, 15, 24, 44, 49, 81, 263 See Popular Unity 268n9 of Chilean Political Elites, 172,
politics, 2, 32, 44-5, 51, 58, 60, 65, 100, "Socialist Republic", 155 208-18, 244-5
103, 106, 156, 158, 161, 171, 174, Radical Party, xiv, 154, 156-63, 168, socialist renovation , 106, 172-80, of the coup d'etat, 102, 109, 173, 176,
185, 192-3, 204, 221 176, 196, 201 187 210-11, 214-15
298 Index

trauma - continued Union Student of the Catholic


of discourse of class struggle, 104, 182, University, xiii, 170-1, 269nl4
215-17,243 United Left, 180-1
of social division, 104, 109
of social destabilization, 214 Weber, Max, 32
traumatic events, experiences, 97, post-Weberian, 26
102, 173, 182, 214-15, 253-4 Workers' United Center of Chile, xiii,
traumatized memory, 210 122, 125,211,213,227
Truth
Archimedean point of truth, 2-5, 9-11, 16,Zizek, Slavoj
24-5, 28, 31, 36, 39-40, 43-4, 51, 55, Archimedean point of truth, 85,
66, 85, 89-90, 251-2, 257-8, 262 89-90
consensus theory of, 71 critical theory of ideology, 6, 78
truthfulness, 69 non-ideological, 81, 85-91
universal notion, 5-7, 10, 67-8, 73, cynicism, notion of, 74-8
84-5, 89-91 inter-subjective rationality, 4, 76
fantasy, notion of, 74-8
UDI Real, notion of, 85-90, 109-10
See Independent Democrat Unity theory of ideology, 6, 10, 24, 83, 91
undecidability, 265n9 truth, notion of, 7, 74-6, 99
Unidad Popular Zizekian critique of Habermas theory,
See Popular Unity 4, 67-76, 81-6
Union Democrata Independiente Zizekian reading of Lacan, 4, 85-90,
See Independent Democrat Unity 92, 96-8, 103-5

You might also like