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TITLE

On the Role of Concepts in Learning

and Instructional Design
AUTHOR

David H. Jonassen

ABSTRACT:

The field of instructional design has traditionally treated concepts as

discrete learning outcomes. Theoretically, learning concepts requires
correctly isolating and applying attributes of specific objects into their
correct categories. Similarity views of concept learning are unable to
account for all of the rules governing concept formation, patterns of
concepts, and concepts-in-use. Probabilistic-prototype and exemplar
views have accommodated some of the inherent fuzziness of concepts.
Concepts can only be fully understood as processes of conceptual change,
the reorganization of conceptual frameworks. Although very little
research has focused on assessing conceptual change, the theories of
conceptual change recommend assessing patterns of concepts and
concepts-in-use. Descriptions of pertinent assessment methods are
presented.

Keywords: Concept learning, conceptual change, assessment, knowledge rep-

resentation

Concepts are mental representations of categories of objects, events, or

other entities. People daily recognize and communicate thousands of con-
cepts. Concepts are the basis for meaning making and communication. Imag-
ine trying to communicate without using concepts. In trying to describe a
robin, it would be necessary to describe every characteristic of a robin, because
to say that a robin is a bird, which therefore conveys all of the characteristics of
a bird (has wings; flies; walks; lives in nests; eats bugs, etc.), would have no
meaning. In fact, you could not even use the concept robin. You would have to
describe each example of a robin that you encountered. However, that would
be impossible, because you would need to use numerous other concepts (e.g.,
wings, nests, walking, flying, red breast) in order to describe the concept robin.
Communicating without concepts is impossible.

ETR&D, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 177196, 2006

2006 Association for Educational Communications and Technology. 177
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178 JONASSEN

Concepts play essential roles in human reasoning, including categorization,

learning, memory, deductive inference, explanation, problem solving, gener-
alization, analogical inference, language comprehension, and language pro-
duction (Thagard, 1992). More than anything, concepts promote cognitive
economy (Rosch, 1978). By partitioning the world into classes, concepts
decrease the amount of information that we must learn, remember, communi-
cate, and reason about. Concepts enable humans to economically store infor-
mation about categories of objects, events, or entities that can be used to
describe and reason about every instance of the category.
What are concepts? Plato thought that concepts are the essences of things
and, as such, they are abstract, unworldly, and eternal. At the other extreme,
neuroscientists describe concepts as patterns of synaptic connections. Psycho-
logically, there are many views of concepts. Most of these views describe con-
cepts as discrete psychological phenomena. After reviewing these different
views or conceptions of what concepts are, I will make a case for a theory-based
view of concepts-in-use. That is, meaning for concepts derives from the theories
(conceptual organizations, mental models) that they are part of. The current
emphasis on conceptual change avers that meaning derives from concepts-in-
use, and that understanding is constructed from conceptual reorganization of
personal theories of the world, of which concepts are the cognitive components.
Why is this analysis relevant? What purpose does it serve for instructional
designers? Most instructional design theories and models treat concepts as
discrete objects of learning. Numerous models have been promoted and con-
tinue to anchor instructional design theory (Gagn, 1966, 1968; Merrill, 1983,
1987; Merrill, Reigeluth, & Faust, 1979; Merrill, Richards, Schmidt, & Wood,
1977; Merrill, Tennyson, & Posey, 1992; Montague, 1983). These prescriptions
have assumed that concepts represent a primary learning outcome, without
necessarily considering how the concepts are used. Learning hierarchies
(Gagn, 1968, 1973; Gagn & Briggs, 1979), which conceive of concepts as
building blocks of higher-order skills, are an exception. Additionally, many
instructional design researchers have conducted a significant body of research
on the effects of different instructional design variables on the acquisition of
concepts (Canelos, Taylor, & Altschuld, 1982; Carrier, Davidson, & Williams,
1985; Hicken, Sullivan, & Klein, 1992; Jonassen, 1978, 1986; Newby, Ertmer, &
Stepich, 1995; Tennyson, 1978; Tennyson, & Buttrey, 1980; Tessmer, & Driscoll,
1986), without necessarily considering how the concepts will be used. All of
these prescriptions and studies have assumed that concepts are formed based
on the attributional similarity of all of the members of the category described
by the concept name. That is, examples of any concept are similar to each other
because they share essential characteristics, properties, or attributes. All of
these prescriptions and most of the research assume a classical, similarity view
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 179

of concepts. After reviewing similarity-based conceptions of concepts, I claim

that they are useful only for advising the direct teaching and assessment con-
cepts as discrete, decontextualized learning outcomes. I argue that concepts
should be learned and assessed in the context of conceptual organizations fos-
tered by the development of personal theories of the world and the conceptual
change that facilitates those processes. That conception of concepts-in-use will
be more useful for advising the design of more complex and problem-centered
learning environments.

SIMILARITY VIEW OF CONCEPTS

Classical-Attribute Isolation View of Concepts

The most prominent view of concepts is the classical view (Ross & Spaulding,
1994), otherwise known in the instructional design literature as the attribute
isolation view (Merrill et al., 1992). In this Aristotelian view, concepts are rep-
resentations of classes of objects, symbols, or events that are grouped together
based on common properties or attributes. Those properties are essential and
sufficient to categorize an instance. In the classical view, a person has learned
a concept when he or she can correctly isolate and apply attributes of specific
objects into their correct categories.
In the classical view, what is learned is a set of attributes that learners use to
generalize class membership to all instances of that concept while discriminat-
ing instances between classes. When the learner encounters new instances, he
or she analyzes that instance in terms of the attributes of probable classes in
order to determine the class to which it belongs. The process is complicated by
variable attributes that are shared by some, but not all, class members. They
are not necessary, while critical attributes are necessary. That is, if an instance
does not exhibit a critical attribute, it cannot be considered a class member.
The classical view of concepts prescribes a set of instructional strategies for
teaching concepts. For example, component display theory (Merrill, 1983,
1987) prescribes a sequence of instruction that defines the attributes, presents
example-nonexample pairs of examples of the concepts, followed by practice
in classifying new instances.
A number of limitations to the classical view have been argued. First, spec-
ifying defining properties that exclude all nonmembers while capturing all
properties of members is easier said than done, even for common concepts
(Ross & Spaulding, 1994). For example, try identifying the essential properties
of the concept chair. The divergence in chair styles precludes all properties as
required, except perhaps a horizontal surface. For every essential characteris-
tic, there is almost always an exception. It is nearly impossible to find defining
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conditions for any nonmathematical concepts (Thagard, 1992). Another prob-

lem is goodness of examples effect (Ross & Spaulding). Some examples are
more or less typical of the category than others. The classical view of concepts
is an essentialist view. Essentialism holds that among the properties that make
up this stable knowledge, what makes an entity a particular thing is the exis-
tence of essential properties. However, concepts-in-use renders nearly all attri-
butes exceptional. The goodness of example effect gave rise to probabilistic
views of concepts, which describe characteristics probabilistically rather than
essentially.

Prototype or Probablistic View of Concepts

The probabilistic view of concepts represents a shift from concepts having

essential properties to the idea that concepts are based on properties that are
characteristic or typical of category (Medin, 1989). Both classical and probabi-
listic views assume that categorization is driven by similarity among examples
of any category. In a prototype or probabilistic view of concepts, however,
instances are classified more loosely using a probabilistic account of features
rather than necessary and sufficient properties (Ross & Spaulding, 1994). Con-
cepts are represented as prototypes in memory, that is, contextual entities with
common attributes that are most typical of category membership (Tennyson &
Cocchiarella, 1986). That is, certain members of classes are more representative
of the category than others. A robin is more prototypic of the category bird
than are penguins, hawks, or emus. So, instances of concepts that are more
similar to the prototype (often judged to be the nearest neighbor) are easier to
classify. In separate studies, Tennyson, Youngers, and Suebsonthi (1983) and
Jonassen (1986) showed that students learning concepts via prototypes classi-
fied better on immediate and delayed tests of classification.
The prototype view of concepts addresses some of the limitations of the clas-
sical view (Ross & Spaulding, 1994). Rather than seeking essential, defining
characteristics, the prototype view seeks more typical instances that have more
of the characteristics associated with that category. They argue that a robin may
function as a prototype (a standard or typical example) of the concept bird (it
flies; lives in nest; lays eggs, eats bugs; etc.). It is much more typical based on
the characteristics that describe it than, say, a penguin. Concepts that have
high family resemblance will maximize similarity within categories while
minimizing similarity between categories. Members of a category that are
highly similar to prototype are classified faster or similar to each other.
Among the problems with the prototype view of concepts is its difficulty in
explaining combinations of concepts (Grdenfors, 2000). Concept combina-
tions such as red book are not hard, but more improbable combinations, such as
striped apple or porcelain cat are difficult to explain with prototype theories.
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 181

Most concept theorists believe that probablistic views are more descriptive of
the ways that people actually encode concepts in memory, however, they still
treat concepts as isolated and unconnected entities.

Exemplar View of Concepts

Another view of concept formation claims that humans learn concepts primar-
ily by inducing concept descriptions from examples or by combining pre-
viously existing concepts. That is, people generalize concepts based on their
cooccurrence or similarity to each other. People store examples in memory, but
those new examples are classified by computing prototypes and determining
the similarity of the novel example to the newly constructed prototypes
(Medin, 1989; Tessmer, Wilson, & Driscoll, 1990). Example-induced concepts
are necessarily fuzzier, denying that there is a single summary representation
of what any concept is (Medin). The exemplar view of concept formation is
more similar to the prototype view than the classical view. Therefore, exem-
plar theories can account for the same results as prototypes because that
accounts for the role of context in classification.
Relative to prototype models, exemplar models are more conservative
about discarding information that facilitates predictions, because the exemplar
view does not say why we have the categories that we do. Nor does it assume
that the same representation is used to classify all members. That is, concepts
may consist of multiple representations, and any one may be used to classify
new instances (e.g., many concepts can be used to convey fatigue: tired, beat,
frazzled, wasted, burned out, etc.).
The exemplar view of concepts is also referred to as a relational view (Gil-
bert & Watts, 1983). The relational view is intermediate between classical and
actional (described later) views. It claims that concepts contain probabilistic
and exemplar components, where instances are judged in terms of their degree
of membership in a concept. Rather than treating concepts as discrete entities,
concepts are judged in relationship to other concepts. The relational view of
concepts is similar to semantic network theories (Norman, Gentner, & Steven,
1976; Quillian, 1968), which stress the importance of relational organization of
concepts within a network of related concepts. Meaning for concepts results
from the patterns of spreading activation within the network.

PROBLEMS WITH SIMILARITY VIEWS OF CONCEPTS

Similarity views of concepts assume:

Similarity between instances increases as the number of features or

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182 JONASSEN

properties they share increases, and decreases as a function of

mismatching or nonessential attributes.

Features that determine similarity are at the same level of

abstractness.

Similarity features are sufficient to describe conceptual structure, so

a concept is equivalent to its list of features (Medin, 1989).
Numerous conceptual problems are associated with concepts that are
learned in isolation based on the similarity of their properties. According to
Wittgenstein (1953), the meaning of a word is not inherent to the word. Nor is
it derived from the objects or events that it stands for. Rather, concepts become
meaningful in their rule-governed use in language. The rules that govern their
uses are called language games, which govern the acceptable uses of words. It is
important to realize that our knowledge of concepts is much more than just
arbitrary lists of features. Our concepts must be connected to underlying
knowledge of relations among features and concepts in order to be useful in a
variety of tasks in which concepts play a role (Ross & Spaulding, 1994, p.
134).
Another limitation of the similarity view of concepts is their inability to
account for concepts in use. Similarity views deal only with issues of organiza-
tion within categories but not with relations between concepts or why
instances are classified at one level or another (Ross & Spaulding, 1994).
Default relations between concept relations are usually hierarchical (subordi-
nate, superordinate), however, conceptual relationships are heterarchical.
Relationships such as causality provide much better coherence among con-
cepts (Murphy & Medin 1985), because causal relationships are goal oriented
and the root of many kinds of reasoning. Those causal linkages convey deeper
properties to concepts. The problem is that similarity views pay no attention to
the goals of the categorizer. The goals of the categorizer significantly affect the
process of categorization. Opposing categorizations reflect dramatically dif-
fering goals. That was the proven hypothesis of an Anderson and Pritchert
(1978) study in which recall of details in the same passage was affected by dif-
ferent titles (burglar or home buyer).
Similarity views also lack coherence. Grdenfors (2000) attempted to bridge
the symbolic manipulation and neural network views of cognition by assert-
ing a geometric theory of conceptual representations. Concepts are not easily
represented symbolically, and the granularity level of neural nets is so small as
to be imperceptible. The conceptual space surrounding a concept is defined by
dimensional vectors, each describing a different quality of the concept. For
example, the concept red is described most exactly by the qualitative dimen-
sions of hue, saturation, and brightness. Qualitative dimensions are not neces-
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 183

sarily sensory, but rather can be defined functionally or socially. Because con-
cepts vary so much within class, they can only be described in terms of their
place in multidimensional space. Among the reasons for describing concep-
tual spaces, Grdenfors rejected the theory that concepts cohere within classes
because of their similarity.
Perhaps the most important limitation of similarity views of concepts is
their inability to account for the varying functions of concepts. If one examines
the functions that concepts play, the limitations of similarity views of concepts
become even more obvious. Whereas a central function of concepts is classifi-
cation (Ross & Spaulding, 1994), another main function of concepts is to sup-
port inferences for understanding, explaining, and predicting. Using relevant
knowledge of concepts in order to interpret a situation and make inferences
requires understanding of the dynamic relationships that concepts may have
between each other. As stated previously, Thagard (1992) claimed that in addi-
tion to classification, concepts are essential to all kinds of learning, memory,
deductive inference, explanation, problem solving, generalization, analogical
inference, language comprehension, and language production. All of these
functions of concepts rely on conceptual combinations or propositions, how-
ever, those functions are not supported by similarity approaches to concept
learning.
Concepts are also used to construct new concepts. Concepts are the build-
ing blocks from which we construct new, more complex concepts. That con-
struction process assumes heterarchical relationships among concepts. The
coherence of that construction depends on the goal of the conceptualizer.
The most common function of concepts, according to Spaulding and Ross
(1994), is communication. Words typically refer to the same classes and ideas
(common knowledge). We use words to refer to concepts in order to commu-
nicate without having to describe everything. However, communication relies
on coherent relationships among concepts, depending on purpose. The bear ate
the porridge from the bowl makes sense only in the context of fairy tales in which
the purpose of the author is to entertain through fantasies. None of the bears
that I have ever encountered were eating porridge from a bowl. Perhaps if they
had been, I wouldnt have avoided them so carefully. Conceptualization is a
form of mapping of the topography of local domains of understanding. Simi-
larity views of concepts cannot account for concepts-in-use, and concepts-in-
use is the only rationale for learning concepts.

OTHER VIEWS OF CONCEPTS

The limitations of similarity views of concepts have resulted in alternative views

of concepts, including actional views and theory-based views of concepts.
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Actional View of Concepts

Gilbert and Watts (1983) described an actional view of concepts, where con-
ceptualizing is a kind of doing. They claimed that concepts are active, con-
structive, and intentional. Concepts are ways of organizing our experiences.
All learning involves some degree of reconceptualizing our knowledge, a pro-
cess known as conceptual change. According to Kellys (1963) personal con-
struct theory, conceptual development can be seen as a continuous, active,
creative process of differentiation and integration. Nothing is static and
unchanging. Concepts change meaning over time, in different contexts, and
for different purposes. The actional view of concepts is similar to other theory-
based views of concepts.

Theory-Based Views of Concepts

Theory-based views of concepts claim that concepts are organized by theories.

That is, the organization of concepts is driven by personal theories of the
world (Medin, 1989). The attributes of a concept that are noticed are deter-
mined by the underlying principles that describe relationships among con-
cepts. Rather than focusing only on the attributes of individual concepts, our
instruction should focus on the attributes plus explicitly represented relations
of attributes and concept combinations. The inferential processes required to
do that are supplied by the underlying principles. Concepts are represented in
networks of concepts that are formed by causal and explanatory links, as well
as sharing of properties picked out as relevant. The properties of concepts and
their interrelationships vary with different contexts of purposes. They are
formed by different personal theories of the world that are built and reorgan-
ized through the process of conceptual change. If we accept that similarity
views of concepts are limited in their ability to frame different kinds of com-
plex learning, then we need a more complex and integrative view of concepts
that is provided by different theories of conceptual change.

CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE

From an early age, humans naturally build intuitive theories to explain their
world. Through experience and reflection, humans add concepts as they learn.
Concepts and categories serve as building blocks for human thought and
behavior (Medin, 1989, p. 1469). Concepts are the components of cognition
(Strike & Posner, 1985), manifesting strength, coherence, and commitment to
their existing theories. Humans accommodate concepts only if they are com-
prehensible and coherent with existing conceptualizations and theories. The
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 185

cognitive process of adapting and restructuring these theories is conceptual

change (Vosniadou, 1999).
Conceptual change occurs when learners change their understanding of the
concepts they use and how they are organized within a conceptual frame-
work. The process and pace of conceptual change varies, according to different
theories. For some researchers (Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993; Siegler,
1996), conceptual change is an evolutionary process of conceptual aggrandize-
ment and gradual transformation of knowledge states. This model of concep-
tual change is Piagetian, where learners gradually accommodate existing
knowledge into more coherent and better-organized knowledge structures. As
concepts are assimilated, children attempt to synthesize what they are learn-
ing with their own naive mental models (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). The syn-
thesis results in inconsistencies that the children must reconcile through
conceptual change, that is, adaptations to their conceptual framework. In this
kind of evolutionary conceptual change, novices gradually shift toward
experts (Carey, 1985).
Other theories of conceptual change are more revolutionary (Thagard,
1992) resulting from cognitive conflict (Strike & Posner, 1985). That is, when
information to be understood is inconsistent with personal beliefs and presup-
positions (Vosniadou, 1994), revision of conceptual frameworks is necessary.
Conceptual change is perceived necessary by the learners when current con-
ceptions are unable to interpret personal experiences or incapable of solving
problems (Strike & Posner). Dissatisfaction with existing conceptions occurs
because they cannot interpret or explain personal experiences, cannot solve
problems, and violate epistemological standards.
Cognitive conflict is not always sufficient for engaging conceptual change.
When faced with anomalous or discrepant data or events, students often
ignore, reject, exclude, or reinterpret anomalous data or they hold it in abey-
ance (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). In addition, conflict is not enough for conceptual
change because it needs to be mediated by knowledge-building activities
(Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997). Knowledge building as a mediator of conflict
highlights the importance of constructive activity. Conceptual change also
depends on metacognitive, motivational, and affective processes (Sinatra, &
Pintrich, 2003). The synthetic and cognitive conflict theories of conceptual
change are but two of several competing theories of conceptual change.

Implications of Conceptual Change for

Concept Learning and Assessment

Although theoretical accounts of conceptual change are replete (Limon &

Mason, 2002; Schnotz, Vosniadou, & Carreter, 1999; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003),
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186 JONASSEN

there is very little literature that addresses how to effectively assess conceptual
change. The most common methods used for theory building and research
include analyzing student interaction protocols while engaged in problem solv-
ing or explaining (Hogan & Fisherkeller, 2000), structured interviews (Souther-
land, Smith, & Cummins, 2000), and the use of concept maps (Edmundson,
2000). Notwithstanding the lack of empirical research, the implications of con-
ceptual change theories for concept learning and instructional design are obvi-
ous. First, rather than assessing individual concepts, meaningful learning must
be assessed by examining patterns of concepts. Second, the meaning for con-
cepts should be assessed in different contexts, that is, concepts-in-use.

Implications for Assessment: Propositions

Rather than assessing acquisition of individual concepts through classification

of new instances, conceptual change theory suggests assessing the structural
relationships among groups of concepts, that is, structural knowledge
(Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993). There are numerous methods for convey-
ing and assessing structural knowledge, however, a few hold particular prom-
ise for assessing changes in patterns of conceptual relationships.

Eliciting Conceptual Patterns

In order to represent learners conceptual structures, information about the

structural relationships must be elicited from the learners. Three primary
methods are used: free word associations, similarity ratings, and card sorts
(Jonassen et al., 1993).

Free word associations. A common means for eliciting a learners structural rela-
tionships is by having learners generate word association lists. For each con-
cept in a knowledge domain, say Newtonian mechanics, students generate a
list of associated words that immediately come to mind when presented with
each concept in a domain as a stimulus (Jonassen, 1987). For instance, when
asked to free associate to the term speed, they might respond with a list that
includes velocity, acceleration, distance, and so forth. The concepts that are elic-
ited first are assumed to have the strongest conceptual relationship to the tar-
get concept. A correlation matrix relates the frequency and sequence of
cooccurrence of the same concepts. The more overlap between the two word
lists, that is, the more words that each pair of lists has in common, the more
strongly related are the two words. Relatedness coefficients that quantify the
degree of relatedness be tween two concepts must be calculated, resulting in a
correlation matrix describing the strength of relationships between each pair
of concepts being tested.
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Similarity ratings. Similarity ratings essentially ask individuals to rate in terms

of a constant scale the degree of similarity between pairs of concepts or ideas.
This method identifies a group of related concepts, asking the respondent to
rate the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between each of the pairs of con-
cepts. These ratings are summarized in a distance matrix that depicts the
degree of similarity or dissimilarity for all pairs of concepts.

Card sort. A typical card-sort exercise involves presenting learners with a

group of cards on which single concepts are written. The learner sorts the con-
cept cards into different piles according to their similarity of meaning and
labels the piles. The exercise maybe modified by restricting the learner to a
fixed number of piles or by providing prenamed piles. Analyzing the concep-
tual structure entails examining the similarity of the groups to some standard.
A very useful computer-based card-sorting program is contained in the Intel-
ligent Training Suite provided by the Training Performance Laboratory
(Harper et al., 2003; tpl.ucf.edu). The card-sort program provides for auto-
mated scoring in the form of an adjacency matrix, which can be statistically
analyzed using a variety of statistical procedures, such as cluster analysis.
Evans, Hitt, and Jentsch (2001) found that individual and multiple users struc-
tures were consistent over repeated trials. Card sorts provide a simple but
powerful formalism for assessing knowledge structures.

Representing Conceptual Patterns

In order to statistically and visually represent the structures underlying correla-

tion matrices that were elicited using free-word associations, similarity ratings, or
card sorts, a variety of statistical methods may be used. The two most prominent,
cognitive maps and Pathfinder networks, are briefly described next.

Cognitive maps. Based on the assumption that more semantically related con-
cepts will appear closer in geometric representations of cognitive space, cogni-
tive maps are produced by using multidimensional statistical analysis (most
commonly cluster analysis or multidimensional scaling) to visually represent
patterns of concepts. Figure 1 illustrates a two-dimensional representation of a
pattern of concepts being studied by an electrical engineering student. This
representation is qualitatively analyzed by examining the clusters of concepts
(those closest together) and the meaning implied by each of the two dimen-
sions. This representation may also be quantitatively analyzed by using the
Cartesian coordinates of each concept in various statistical analyses. Note that
the best solution may be multidimensional, reflecting the underlying complex-
ity of conceptual patterns. However, multidimensional solutions (e.g., six-
dimensional) are difficult to comprehend.
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188 JONASSEN

Pathfinder networks. Pathfinder networks are configurations in which concepts

(objects, events, actions, or entities) are represented as nodes and relationships
as links connecting the nodes (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985). They are derived
from an algorithm that transforms a proximity matrix into a network structure
in which each concept or object in the matrix is represented by a node and the
proximities are represented by how closely the objects are linked. The algo-
rithm searches through the nodes to find the closest indirect path between
objects. The algorithm retains only the links with a minimum-length path
between two concepts, so in the resulting net, not all of the concepts are
directly connected to all of the other concepts. Figure 2 illustrates a Pathfinder
network of the same concepts as those represented in Figure 1 by the same stu-
dents. The number of links in the network indicates a highly integrated pattern
of concepts.

Concept Maps

Concept maps, also known as semantic networks, are spatial representations

of concepts and their interrelationships that are intended to represent a pattern
of concepts. Using a variety of computer-based tools (Haller, 2004), learners
can construct concept maps without having to statistically analyze relation-
ships among concepts. In order to construct concept maps, learners must iden-
tify important concepts, arrange those concepts spatially, and specify
relationships among those concepts. Concept maps have been used exten-
sively for assessing learning outcomes. Ruiz-Primo and Shavelson (1996)
reported that no fewer than 21 separate combinations of assessment proce-
dures had appeared in the literature on concept mapping. A review of that lit-
erature is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that assessing
concept maps can be difficult. While cognitive maps and Pathfinder nets pro-
vide clear statistical metrics, concept maps may be assessed both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. The primary unit of analysis is the proposition (two
concepts and the labeled link connecting them), rather than individual con-
cepts. Propositions should be assessed for comprehensiveness, organization,
and accuracy (Besterfield-Sacre, Gerchak, Lyons, Shuman, & Wolfe, 2004).
Additionally, concepts maps may be assessed for the number of levels of hier-
archies, how interconnected the concepts are, which concepts are the most
embedded (connected directly and indirectly), and many other criteria
(Jonassen, 2000). Most of these forms of assessment are not automated, making
the use of concept maps for assessment more problematic. However, concept
maps are easy for learners to produce, and they provide extensive information
about the patterns of concepts that learners have included in their conceptual
frameworks.
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 189

Figure 1 Multidimensional scaling representation of a pattern of electrical

engineering concepts.

Figure 2 Pathfinder network representation of a pattern of electrical

engineering concepts.
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Implications for Instruction: Propositions

Structural knowledge tools, such as concept maps, are being used increasingly
to assess conceptual understanding (Edmundson, 2000; Jonassen, Reeves,
Hong, Dyer, & Peters, 1997; Liu, in press). This is because conceptual under-
standing relies on a coherent, integrated set of concepts. From a schema-the-
oetic perspective, learning is a change in structural knowledge in order to
correspond more closely with the content structure or the teachers knowledge
structure (Shavelson, 1972; Thro, 1978). So the ability to reason from any set of
concepts depends on the viability of the propositions that are formed by com-
binations of concepts. The integratedness of Pathfinder nets (a form of concept
map) has been shown to be a significant discriminator of experts and novices
(Cooke & Schvaneveldt, 1988; Schvaneveldt, Dearholt, & Durso, 1988). When
asked to classify the nature of the links generated in the concept maps, advanced
learners were better able to classify the nature of the relationships than were nave
and novice learners. Experts have more coherent structural knowledge, which
means that they interrelate concepts more accurately than novices.
Another reason for focusing on propositions instead of links is that the pro-
cess of linking two concepts by a descriptive relationship enables the two most
basic forms of human reasoning: comparison-contrast and causal. Rather than
teaching concepts as discrete learning outcome, instructional designers might
be better advised to teach propositions, including combinations of concepts
and linking relationships. Propositions constitute the building blocks of prin-
ciples that are recognized by traditional instructional design theory (Gagn,
1966, 1968; Merrill, 1983, 1987). However, rather than being prerequisite to
principles, the implication of structural knowledge is that concepts should be
taught in the context of domain-relevant principles. How can students learn to
integrate knowledge structures?
Jonassen, Strobel, and Gottdenker (2005) illustrated that conceptual change
is most acutely affected by model-based reasoning. Model-based reasoning is
fostered by learner construction of qualitative and quantitative models of the
content or phenomena they are studying using technology-based modeling
tools. They argued that model building is perhaps the most powerful strategy
for engaging and supporting conceptual change in learners because the mod-
els that they build scaffold and externalize their mental models by providing
multiple formalisms for representing conceptual understanding and change.
Building models of domain content, problems, systems, experiences, or think-
ing processes using different representational formalisms represent different
kinds of conceptual understanding that foster different kinds of conceptual
change. Jonassen et al. (2005) have used the systems modeling tool, Stella,
extensively to construct models that integrate domain concepts in complex
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 191

and testable propositional representations of conceptual domains. Figure 3

illustrates a model of a conceptual change process that they were studying.
Tools such as this require learners to represent the integration of concepts into
meaningful propositions, rather than focusing on concepts as discrete entities.

Implications for Assessment: Concepts-in-Use

Another important implication of a conceptual change perspective for instruc-

tional design is to assess learners conceptual frameworks; that is, concepts (the
meanings that learners ascribe to concepts while they are applying the concepts)
are assessed in use. Concepts-in-use convey dynamic relationships that are diffi-
cult to assess using any of the methods for assessing patterns of concepts
described before. A few of the more prominent methods for assessing concepts-in-
use are described below. In order to assess meaning for concepts using these
methods, it is necessary to use some form of discourse, protocol, or conversation
analysis (Mazur, 2004). Again, a detailed description of these methods is beyond
the scope of this article. The process entails constructing and using coding
schemes to analyze utterances, revealing patterns of conceptualization.

Semistructured Interviews

The most commonly used empirical method for assessing concepts-in-use in

research on conceptual change is the semistructured interview, where genera-
tive questions are asked. Vosniadou (1994) presented different pictures of a
stone and a stick figure and asked such questions as, Is there a force exerted
on the stone, and why? She would also ask younger learners to describe the
shape of the earth. In explaining their reasoning, students reveal more infor-
mation about their conceptual frameworks than can be depicted in any kind of
concept map.

Think-Aloud Problem Solving

An alternative to interviews requires learners to think aloud while they are

solving problems. The process is cumbersome, because most learners do not
explicate their reasoning while engaged in complex activities. Therefore, a more
systematic method that can produce extensive information about learners con-
ceptual frameworks is thinking aloud paired problem solving (Whimby &
Lockhead, 1999). Working in pairs, one student thinks aloud while solving any
problem. Thinking aloud requires the problem solver to vocalize as many as
possible of the assumptions, methods, inferences, or conclusions that he or she
is constructing or recalling while solving a problem. The listener hears the prob-
lem solvers vocalizations and continually checks the accuracy of the problem
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192 JONASSEN

Figure 3 Stella model of conceptual change process.

solvers actions or assumptions. Catching errors requires the listener to follow

and understand every step that the problem solver takes.

Implications for Instruction: Concepts-in-Use

Interviews and think-aloud protocols most often query meaningful activity.

The most meaningful activity that humans engage in is problem solving. Prob-
lem solving is among the most authentic forms of human activity (Jonassen,
2004). In their everyday lives, people constantly solve ill-structured problems.
Problems provide a purpose for learning. Without an intention to learn, mean-
ingful learning is very unlikely. Finally, problem solving provides a conceptual
anchor. Knowledge constructed while solving problems (knowledge-in-use) is
more meaningful, more integrated, better retained, and more transferable than
from any other activity. Concepts that are learned in order to solve a problem
are more meaningful.
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CONCEPTS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION DESIGN 193

SUMMARY

Instructional design research and practice has traditionally treated concepts as

distinct learning outcomes. Treating concept learning only as the ability to
classify new instances belies the underlying complexity of concepts embedded
in personal theories and reorganized by conceptual change. In the processes of
conceptual change, the meanings of concepts and their relationships with
other concepts change in substantive, functional ways. The most legitimate
study of concepts should focus on changes in meaning of concepts with con-
ceptual frameworks resulting from conceptual change, because concepts are
the cognitive tools for representing ideas and testing relationships, not the
object of instruction. Concepts learned in isolation will lack coherence and
therefore be less useful than concepts-in-use in thought construction pro-
cesses. In the processes of conceptual change, the meanings of concepts and
their relationships with other concepts change in substantive, functional ways.
In order to capture the complexity of conceptual frameworks, concept learning
must be assessed in patterns and in use. In order to engage and support learn-
ers in meaningful concept learning, students should learn how to use a variety
of tools to build models of what they are learning and to engage in solving
complex and ill-structured problems.

David Jonassen [Jonassen@missouri.edu] is Distinguished Professor in the Learning

Technologies and Educational Psychology programs at the University of Missouri.

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