Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

Participant Code: C30

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

CONCOURS, 2016

Before,

THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS

HIGH SPARROW.................................................................................................PETITIONER
V.

UNION OF WESTEROS.....................................................................................RESPONDENT
CLUBBED WITH

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS

GUTHRUM............................................................................................................PETITIONER
V.

UNION OF WESTEROS.....................................................................................RESPONDENT
CLUBBED WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS

WESTROS TRADING COMPANY..................................................................PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF WESTEROS AND STATE OF MEREEN............................. RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

- THE UNION OF WESTEROS

1|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..02

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.04

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS06

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........07

STATEMENT OF FACTS08

ISSUES RAISED09

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...10

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...12

[ISSUE 1] : THAT THE SECTION 39 OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

(PREVENTION) ACT, 1967 AND THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION
(AMENDMENT ) ACT, 2015 ARE NOT VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION
OF WESTEROS..12

[1.1] Freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental right under article 19 of

constitution of Westeros12

[1.2] Unlawful activities (prevention) act,1967 and Unlawful activities prevention

(amendment) act, 2015 put reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression , thus it
does not violate article 19 of constitution of Westeros..14

[ ISSUE 2] : THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORISED

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO CURB TERRORISM ,2015 OR ANY ACTION TAKEN

2|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

THEREUNDER IS NOT A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

WESTEROS.17

[2.1] Right to privacy is a fundamental right under article 21 of constitution of

Westeros17

[2.2] Memorandum of procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism

,2015 doe not violates right to privacy under article 21 of constitution of
Westeros.18

[ISSUE 3] : THAT THE HIGH COURT OF MEREEN WAS JUSTIFIEDTO HOLD THAT
THE CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE STATE OF MEREEN WAS MAINTAINABLE IN THE
VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED UNDER SECTION 86 OF THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE...21

[3.1] Section 86 of code of civil procedure gives the procedure of filing civil suit against
foreign ruler, envoys etc. ..21

[3.2] The civil suit filed is maintainable as Westeros trading company cannot be equated with
the government of Septonland, therefore prior permission of central government was not
required before filing the suit 23

PRAYER...25

3|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Attorney General v Amratlal Parjeevandas AIR 1994 SC 2179. ............................................................... 15

Bannari Amman Sugar Ltd. v C.T.O (2005) 1 SCC 625. ............................................................................ 14

Board of Revenue , Madras v R. S. Jhavar AIR 1968 SC 59...................................................................... 20

Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129. ....................................................................................... 15

Collector of Customs v Sampathu Chetty AIR 1962 SC 316. ..................................................................... 16

Dulerai And Co. v Pokerdas Mengraj AIR 1952 Bom 335. ....................................................................... 21

Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narayana Saboo AIR 2011 SC 3495............................................................ 22

Govind v State of MP AIR 1975 SC 1378. ........................................................................................... 17, 18

Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v Unique Erecters (Gujarat)Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 973. .... 12

Hardatt Sharma v Jaikishen Shamlal and Sons AIR 1965 SC 1718. ......................................................... 24

In Re : Comr. For Workmens v Unknown AIR 1951 Mad 580. ................................................................ 22

In Re Comr. For Workmens v Unknown AIR 1951 Mad 880.................................................................... 21

Indrajeet Singhji v Rajendra Singhji AIR 1932 Lah 136............................................................................ 23

Kartar Sungh v State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569. ................................................................................... 23

Kedarnath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955. ................................................................................. 15

Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873. .................................................................. 15

M.P. Sharma v Satish Chandra AIR 1954 SC 300. .................................................................................... 18

Maharaj Bahadur of Rewa v Siva Saran lal AIR 1921 Pat 23. .................................................................. 24

Mr. X. v Hospital Z. AIR 1999 SC 495. ...................................................................................................... 18

Narayan Mothood v Cochin Sirkar ............................................................................................................. 22

4|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v Veb Deutfracht Seereederei AIR 1983Cal 225. ................................... 23

PUCL v Union of India AIR 1997 SC 568. ................................................................................................ 19

PUCL v Union of India and Others AIR 1997 SC 568............................................................................... 17

R. M. Malkani v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157. ......................................................................... 18

R. Rajagopal v State of Tamilnadu AIR 1995 SC 264................................................................................ 17

Ramesh Thapar v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124. ............................................................................... 12

Ramji Lal Modi v State of UP AIR 1957 SC 620. ...................................................................................... 16

Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd.v SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603. ............................................................... 13

State of Bihar v Shrimati Shailbala Devi AIR 1952 SC 329. ..................................................................... 13

State of Madras v V. G. Rao AIR 1952 SC 196. ......................................................................................... 14

Virendra v State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 896. ........................................................................................... 16

Yusuf Ali Ismail Nagree v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157. .......................................................... 19

5|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. AIR All India Reporter

2. SC- Supreme Court

3. SCC Supreme Court Cases

4. Ltd. Limited

5. Pvt. Private

6. PUCL Public Union of Civil Authorities

7. MP Madhya Pradesh

8. Bom. Bombay

9. Mad Madras

10. Co. Corporation

11. Cal.- Calcutta

12. Lah Lahore

13. Pat - Patiala

6|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for the Respondent humbly submits before the Honble Supreme Court of
Westeros, the memorandum on behalf of the respondent, Union of Westeros.

The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments

in the present case.

7|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACT

I. After coming into power in 2014, central cabinet of SDA proposed amendment of Unlawful
Activities Prevention Act 1969, the object being to prevent the propaganda war conducted by
various terrorist organizations which are endorsed by people on various platforms, even though
they did not engage in actual killings or terrorist activities. Opposition alleged the bill to be
violation of freedom of speech and expression. Despite the opposition, the bill was passed .

II. In February, 2016 while campaigning for university elections in Kings Landing University,
one of the candidates, Mr. High Sparrow asked the believers of FAITH to rise up against the
coalition forces acting in Mereen to establish peace. Two days later, a violent uprising was held
in Mereen which was led by Guthrum. The state government of Mereen arrested Guthrum along
with few individuals. It was revealed that Guthrum was linked to an organization Hand which
was sponsored by Westeros Trading Company in which substantial investments are made by the
government of neighboring country, Septonland. The government of Westeros declared Hand as
a terrorist organization. Meanwhile Mr. Sparrow started posting Hands propaganda on internet.

III. Mr. Sparrow was arrested under section 39 of Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1969. Mr.
Sparrow filed a petition under article 32 of constitution challenging the validity of the act. After
the publication of conversations officers of NIA and ministry of home affairs regarding the
searching of every email Guthrum also filed a petition under article 32 alleging action of
government being violative of his right to privacy.

IV. Government of Mereen also filed a civil suit against Westeros Trading Company for damage
caused to the government establishments during the protest. Civil court dismissed the case on the
ground that prior permission of central government was requires before filing the suit under
section 86 of CPC which was not taken by the plaintiff. The state government appealed in the
high court who allowed the suit sating that matter to be an exceptional case .Now, the company
has filed a special leave petition challenging decision of high court.

8|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

ISSUES RAISED

I. WHETHER SECTION 39 OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT ,1967 AND

THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIE4S PREVENTION (AMENDMENT) ACT ,2015 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

II. WHETHER THE MEMORANDUM OF PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORISED

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO CURB TERRORISM, 2015 OR ANY ACTION
TAKENUNDER IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTUION OF
WESTEROS.

III. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF MEREEN WAS JUSTIFIED TO HOLD THAT THE
CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE STATE OF MEREEN WAS MAINTAINABLE IN VIEW OF
THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED UNDER SECTION 86 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

9|Page
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THAT THE SECTION 39 OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT, 1967

AND THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2015 ARE
NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

Freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental right under article 19 of constitution of

Westeros. Section 39 of Unlawful activities (prevention) act, 1967 and Unlawful activities
prevention (amendment) act, 2015 put reasonable restrictions over their freedom of speech and
expression. The act put forth that anyone with the intention of further the activities of a terrorist
organization by providing material support or resources or disguises the nature of material
support or resources. Under the term material support the act has included any property, service
expert advice or assistance etc. Therefore it has put the restrictions over the freedom of speech
and expression for public order and social peace, thus making the restrictions reasonable as the
constitution say that the fundamental rights are not absolute. Restrictions can be put over them
for the maintenance of public order.

II. THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORISED

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO CURB TERRORISM, 2015 OR ANY ACTION
TAKEN THEREUNDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF CONSTITUTUION
OF WESTEROS.

Right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution of westeros under article
21. The memorandum of procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism, 2015
does not violates their right to privacy. Under the above memorandum, the government of
Westeros checked content of every email going in and out of Westeros and covertly tracked and
stored telephone conversation of people recently arrested in relation to the attacks in Mereen.
Thus the surveillance is limited to group of people who are known to cause disturbance to state
security and public order, thus it does not violates the fundamental right to privacy as the
restriction put is reasonable.

10 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

III. THAT THE HIGH COURT OF MEREEN WAS JUSTIFIED TO HOLD THAT
CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE STATE OF MEREEN WAS MAINTAINABLE IN THE
VIEW OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED UNDER SECTION 86 OF CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Section 86 of the code of civil procedure provides that except with the consent of central
government , certified in writing by a secretary to that government, no suit can be filed against
the property of any foreign state. Westeros trading company is a company in which substantial
investments are made by the government of Septonland but it cannot be equated to government
of Septonland. Also it is an exceptional case being related to terrorism. So, it does not comes
under the definition of foreign ruler given in section 86. As a result the suit filed by the state of
Mereen is maintainable as prior consent of the central government was not required. Therefore,
High court was justified in its decision of allowing the suit.

11 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THAT THE SECTION 39 OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT,

1967 AND THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2015
ARE NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court of Westeros that the section 39 of
Unlawful activities (prevention) act, 1967 and the Unlawful activities prevention (amendment)
act, 2015 are not violative of freedom of speech and expression under article 19 of the
constitution of Westeros as it includes support to a terrorist organization with the intention to
further its propaganda and thus causing threat to the security of state and public order under the
term material support and prescribes the provision of arrest for the same.

[1.1] FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER

ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

Articles 19-22 of the constitution are grouped together under the heading right to freedom.
Certain specific freedoms are guaranteed under article 19 which can be subjected to reasonable
restrictions by the law. Article 19 (1) (a) guarantees to every citizen right to freedom of speech
and expression. These rights are important in as much as they are at the root of a democratic
society and are vital to the functioning of a democratic political system.

In Ramesh Thapar v. State of Madras 1Supreme court held that freedom of speech and
expression includes the freedom of supporting an idea, propagation of ideas, their publication
and circulation.

Also in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erecters (Gujarat)Pvt. Ltd. 2 court
held that the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19 are not absolute and the same are
subject to reasonable restrictions to be imposed against enjoyment of such rights. Such

1
Ramesh Thapar v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124.
2
Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v Unique Erecters (Gujarat)Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 973.

12 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

reasonable restrictions seeks to strike a balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the
clauses under article 19 (1) and social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6).

Similarly, in case of Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd.v. SEBI3 Supreme court observed that
the right to freedom of expression is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions so as to
ensure orderly conduct of a democratic society.

Therefore it is well established that the right to freedom of speech and expression is not an
absolute right. Restrictions can be put upon it so as to ensure the security of state and to maintain
public peace and order.

In a much similar case of State of Bihar v. Shrimati Shailbala Devi4 the constitutionality of
section 4 (1) (a) of Indian Press Act, 1937 was challenged. The court held that The Indian Press
Act, 1937 was not unconstitutional as the restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and
expression by the said section were solely directed against the undermining of the security of the
state or overthrow of it and were within the ambit of article 19 (2) of the constitution.

In the light of the above stated case laws it can be concluded easily that the freedom of speech
and expression is a fundamental right but it is not an absolute right. It can be put to certain
restrictions according the article 19 (2) of the constitution of the union of Westersos. The only
condition to be checked out here is the reasonableness of the restriction imposed.

3
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd.v SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603.
4
State of Bihar v Shrimati Shailbala Devi AIR 1952 SC 329.

13 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

[1.2] UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT ,1967 AND THE UNLAWFUL

ACTIVITIES PREVENTION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2015 PUT REASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS OVER FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, THUS IT DOES NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court of westeros that the Unlawful
activities prevention act, 1967 and the unlawful activities prevention (amendment) act, 2015 put
reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. In the present case Mr. High
Sparrow was arrested for his expression of support to the ideas of the terrorist organization
HAND.

The clauses (2) (6) of article 19 give the grounds for restrictions on the right to freedom given
in the clause (1) of the article. The restrictions have to be reasonable and the question of
reasonableness of a restriction is a justiciable issue.

The Supreme court has said that there are no general formulae for determining the
reasonableness of restrictions and that the decision in each case depend upon the facts of the
case.5

Also in case of Bannari Amman Sugar Ltd. v. C.T.O.6 Supreme court held that the
reasonableness of the restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the stand
point of the interest of the general public not from the stand point of the interest of the person
upon whom restrictions are to be imposed. A restriction cannot be said unreasonable merely
because it operates harshly.

Thus it can be concluded that the restriction imposed cannot be held to be unreasonable just
because it has been imposed on such an important right like freedom of speech and expression.
Certain other factors are there which should be taken into consideration like the intention of
imposing the restriction, the prevalent condition of that time etc.

5
State of Madras v V. G. Rao AIR 1952 SC 196.
6
Bannari Amman Sugar Ltd. v C.T.O (2005) 1 SCC 625.

14 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

As the objective behind putting the restriction over the right to freedom of speech and expression
by the Unlawful activities prevention act, 1967 and the Unlawful activities prevention
(amendment) act, 2015 is the maintenance of public peace and order and security of the state.

In the case of Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh7 Supreme court held that a restriction
which promotes a directive principle of state policy is regarded as reasonable. The directive
principle of state policy being promoted by the unlawful activities prevention act, 1967 and the
unlawful activities prevention (amendment) act, 2015 is the promotion of international peace and
security which says that the State shall endeavor to (a) promote international peace and
security; (b) maintain just and honorable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for
international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another;
and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

Also the restrictions put by the state to maintain the security of the state has been stated to be
reasonable by the courts in various cases.

In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi8 court pointed out that the concept of security of state was
very much allied to the concept of public order and the restrictions on freedom of speech and
expression could validly be imposed in the interest of public order.

Also in case of Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar9 the supreme court held that the section 124 A
put restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression but the restrictions are in
the interest of public order and are within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with
the fundamental rights.

In Attorney General v. Amratlal Parjeevandas10, Supreme court said security of state can also be
threatened by economic instability. The most relevant restrictions on article 19 will be those
which punish espionage, instigating the people to wage war against government of India to
overthrow a government established by law.

7
Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873.
8
Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129.
9
Kedarnath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955.
10
Attorney General v Amratlal Parjeevandas AIR 1994 SC 2179.

15 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

Thus the restriction put over by the Unlawful activities prevention act, 1967 and the Unlawful
activities prevention (amendment) act, 2015 are reasonable as they prohibit the expression of any
kind of support to any terrorist organization and the propagation of its ideas, which have a
tendency to cause a disturbance in the law and order situation of the state. It may cause public
disorder and may be a threat to the security of the state.

Also while taking into consideration the reasonableness of the restrictions prevailing condition at
the time when restrictions have been imposed should be taken into consideration.

As in Virendra v. State of Punjab11 , the constitutionality of prior restrain on freedom of press

was upheld by the court by taking note of the tension prevailing in the state as a result of
language. The court said that in determining the reasonableness of the restrictions, prevailing
conditions at the time here to be taken into account.

Also in Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty12 Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
a very drastic restriction on right to acquire, hold and dispose off property because of the large
scale smuggling in gold prevailing at the time.

The conditions during which the arrest of Mr. Sparrow was made was a different position. At
that time the security and integrity of the state was in danger, therefore, the state has the power to
put restrictions over freedom of speech and expression to restore the peace and to maintain the
security of the state.

The arrest of Mr. Sparrow can be held to be reasonable by seeing the observation of the court in
the case of Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP13 that in order to make a restriction on free speech
reasonable under article 19(2) it was enough that the speech has a tendency to create disorder
because of phrase used in article 19 (2) is in the interest of public order and not for the
maintenance of public order.

Thus it can be established now that the unlawful activities prevention act, 1967 and the unlawful
activities prevention (amendment) act, 2015 are not in violation of article 19 of the constitution.

11
Virendra v State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 896.
12
Collector of Customs v Sampathu Chetty AIR 1962 SC 316.
13
Ramji Lal Modi v State of UP AIR 1957 SC 620.

16 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

II. THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORISED

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO CURB TERRORISM, 2015 OR ANY ACTION
TAKEN THEREUNDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF CONSTITUTION
OF WERSTEROS.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court of Westeros that the Memorandum of
procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism or any activities thereunder are
not violative of Right to privacy given under article 21 of the constitution of Westeros.

[2.1] RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF

CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court that the Right to Live in article 21 also
include Right to privacy and it has been established by various judgments of Supreme court.

In R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamilnadu14 Supreme court held that the right to privacy though not
expressly mentioned in the constitution, was inferred from the guarantee of right to live under
article 21. The expression personal liberty also include right to privacy.

It has been further held in PUCL v. Union of India and Others.15 that the right to privacy by itself
has not been identified under the constitution. As a concept it may be too hard and moralistic to
define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case
would depend upon the facts of the said case.

In Govind v. State of MP16 court noted the difficulties in precisely defining the scope of privacy
interest and pointed out that as an interest in individual autonomy it was already protected as part
of individual liberty. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of
home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing.

From all the above cited cases, it can be clearly concluded that the right to life includes right to
privacy and which could not be curtailed away by simple legislations. Thus, right to life has a
status of fundamental right.

14
R. Rajagopal v State of Tamilnadu AIR 1995 SC 264.
15
PUCL v Union of India and Others AIR 1997 SC 568.
16
Govind v State of MP AIR 1975 SC 1378.

17 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

[2.2] MEMORANDUM OF PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORISED SURVEILLANCE

ACTIVITIES TO CURB TERRORISM, 2015 DOES NOT VIOLATES RIGHT TO PRIVACY
UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court that the memorandum of procedure for
authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism, 2015 does not violates the right to privacy
under article 21 of the constitution of Westeros. It interferes with the privacy of a person to a
reasonable extent and for a valid reason. The right to privacy just like other fundamental rights,
is not absolute.

In case of Govind v. State of MP17 where the petitioner had challenged the constitutionality of a
regulation of Madhya Pradesh police which provided for the police surveillance over habituated
offenders involving interference with ones living and movements. The court held that assuming
the right to privacy to be a constitutionally recognized right, it had to be balanced against other
compelling social interests. The regulation was allowed as it keep a view over the habitual
offenders who are a threat to the society.

In R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra18, appellants phone has been tapped to collect the
evidence of the fact that he was demanding bribery. The appellant raised the plea of violation of
his privacy interest. The objection was rejected on the ground that no right guaranteed in the
constitution including article 21 and right to privacy is absolute.

In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra19 Supreme has frowned upon the elevation of right to privacy
to the status of fundamental right, saying, when the constitution makers have thought it not to
subject such regulations to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to
privacy, analogous to American 14th amendment. We have no justification to import it into a
totally different fundamental right by same process of strained constitution.

Mr. X. v. Hospital Z.20 relates to the unauthorized disclose of information obtained in confidence.
Supreme court held that the right to privacy is not absolute and it may have to give way to other

17
Govind v State of MP AIR 1975 SC 1378.
18
R. M. Malkani v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157.
19
M.P. Sharma v Satish Chandra AIR 1954 SC 300.
20
Mr. X. v Hospital Z. AIR 1999 SC 495.

18 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

interests which have higher social values. Clearly, security of state and unity and integrity of
nation have higher social value than the privacy of an individual.

In Yusuf Ali Ismail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra21 supreme court was faced with the question
whether tapping of the appellants conversation without his consent offended his right under
article 21. Supreme court said that article 21 contemplates procedure established by the law with
regards to deprivation of life or personal liberty. The conversation of an innocent citizen would
be protected by courts. The protection is not for a guilty citizen against the efforts of police to
vindicate the law. No wrongful or unlawful method has been adopted by the police by tapping
the conversation of the accused persons.

In the light of the above cited case, if we see the memorandum of procedure for authorized
surveillance activities to curb terrorism, it talks about tapping the conversation of people arrested
with relation to the violent protest and attacks in Mereen. Thus it does not violates the right to
privacy since it is not tapping the conversations of innocent citizens but of persons guilty of an
offence.

Also the objection raised by the petitioners is that the memorandum in question here talks about
the checking the content of every email going in and out of the union of Westeros. It is humbly
submitted before the court that the records are being kept according to the guidelines issued by
the Supreme court of India.

In PUCL v. Union of India22 , it was contended that the section 5 (2) of Indian Telegraph Act,
1885, which authorized the government to tap private telephones conferred a kind of power
which was liable to be abused. It was concluded that the power could be used only to guard
public safety and in a situation of emergency. The supreme court of India issued certain
directives regarding this issue. The directive was that the phone tapping should be authorized by
home secretary at centre or in state. They can also delegate their power to joint secretary. A
regular record of all phones tapped should be maintained but the content of conversation be
immediately destroyed after it has ceased to be of any use.

21
Yusuf Ali Ismail Nagree v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157.
22
PUCL v Union of India AIR 1997 SC 568.

19 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

Now if we see the memorandum of procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb
terrorism it says that :

1. The government may authorize the electronic surveillance to acquire intelligence information
secretary of the ministry of home affairs certifies in writing.

2. The electronic surveillance is solely directed at the acquisition of contents of communications

used between or among members of a terrorist organization and with an intention to further the
activities of the terrorist organization.

3.It is targeting a limited number of people reasonably believed to be engaged in terrorist

activities. The content should be destroyed when it ceased to be of any use.

Thus, the memorandum of procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism is in
accordance to the guidelines of the Supreme court and therefore it is not violative of the right to
privacy under article 21 of the constitution of Westeros.

Also in Board of Revenue , Madras v. R. S. Jhavar23 Supreme court held that the power of search
and seizure can be exercised by an administrative authority only when it is conferred by any
statute. The stipulations made by the statute in question regulating the power of search and
seizure must be observed by the authority concerned, otherwise search and seizure would be
declared illegal.

In the present case, the search is being observed by the ministry of home affairs and therefore it
cannot be held illegal.

In the light of all the cases cited above, it can be made out clearly that the memorandum of
procedure for authorized surveillance activities to curb terrorism is in accordance with the
guidelines issued by the high court and it does not violates the right to privacy under article 21 of
the constitution of westeros.

23
Board of Revenue , Madras v R. S. Jhavar AIR 1968 SC 59.

20 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

III. THAT THE HIGH COURT OF MEREEN WAS JUSTIFIED TO HOLD THAT THE
CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE STATE OF MEREEN WAS MAINTAINABLE IN THE
VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED UNDER SECTION 86 OF THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court of Westeros that the high court of
Mereen was justified in allowing the civil suit filed by the state of Mereen against the Westeros
Trading Company as in the company cannot be equated to the government of Septonland.
Therefore, the company doesnt come under the definition of foreign ruler given in article 86.
Therefore prior consent of the central government was not necessary before filing the suit against
the Westeros trading company.

[3.1] SECTION 86 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GIVES THE PROCEDURE OF

FILING THE CIVIL SUIT AGAINST FOREIGN RULERS, ENVOYS ETC.

Section 86 of the code of civil procedure provide that except with the consent of the central
government , certified in writing by a secretary to that government, no decree shall be executed
against the property of any foreign state.

Also in Dulerai And Co. v. Pokerdas Mengraj24 court held that the sanction required by the
section is necessary for all suits against a ruler of a foreign state whether in his private capacity
or in his sovereign capacity.

In In Re Comr. Workmens v. Unknown25 court said that one of the cardinal principle of
international law is that every sovereign state respects the independence of every other sovereign
state and as a consequence of this absolute independence and of this international comity which
underlies the relation between sovereign states, each state declines to exercise by means of any
of its courts, jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign state or ambassador or even over the
public property of any state.

Thus it can be held clearly that the section 86 of the code of civil procedure gives immunity to
the foreign rulers and even their property.

24
Dulerai And Co. v Pokerdas Mengraj AIR 1952 Bom 335.
25
In Re Comr. For Workmens v Unknown AIR 1951 Mad 880.

21 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

[3.2] THAT THE PRIVILEGE WAS WAIVED OFF BY THE STATE OF SEPTONLAND
AND THE WESTEROS TRADING COMPANY.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court of Westeros that the privilege under
section 86 of the code of civil procedure was waived off by the government of Septonland.

As said by the court in In Re : Comr. For Workmens v. Unknown26 that the privilege can be
waived by the ruler either expressly or impliedly. Here in this case, the privilege was waived off
impliedly when the government of Septonland signed the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism which clearly says that the state parties to this treaty
also commit themselves to the freezing and seizure of the funds intended to be used for terrorist
activities and to share the forfeited funds with all state parties. Thus, in the cases related to the
funding of terrorist organization the government of Septonland does not have the privilege as
given to the governments of all other countries under section 86 of the code of civil procedure.

Also in case of Ethiopian Airlines v. Ganesh Narayana Saboo27 Supreme court held that by
signing Warsaw convention and passing Carriage by Air Act, 1972, government of both, India
and Ethiopia waived off right to sovereign immunity under Carriage by Air Act, 1972. Hence,
held that the appellant airlines cannot claim sovereign immunity. Therefore, consent of central
government was not required to subject the airlines to the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. It
was also held in this case that the Carriage by Air Act,1972 which came long after the code of
civil procedure is more focused and specific statute and therefore should be held to supersede the
section 86 of the code of civil procedure.

It was also held by the court in the case of Narayan Mothood v. Cochin Sirkar28 that an objection
to the jurisdiction is enough to show that there was a voluntary submission by the defendant to
the jurisdiction of the court and the court have no jurisdiction over foreign sovereign unless he
submits to the jurisdiction.Thus, it can be established that the government of Septonland has
waived off their privilege to right to sovereignty by becoming a signatory party of the
international convention of suppression of funding to terrorism.

26
In Re : Comr. For Workmens v Unknown AIR 1951 Mad 580.
27
Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narayana Saboo AIR 2011 SC 3495.
28
Narayan Mothood v Cochin Sirkar

22 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

[3.3] THAT THE WESTEROS TRDING COMPANY DOES NOT COME UNDER THE
DEFINITION OF FOREIGN RULER GIVEN IN SECTION 86 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme court of westeros that the High court of
Mereen was justified in its decision to allow the suit filed by the state of Mereen as the Westeros
trading company does not come under the definition of foreign rulers under the section 86 of
the code of civil procedure and therefore prior permission of the central government in written
was not required here.

In the case New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Veb Deutfracht Seereederei29 , the court held that a
plain reading of section 86 of the code of civil procedures indicate that the consent is required to
institute suits against foreign states and it does not appear that such restriction applies also to the
organs of any foreign state or body or any institute which is even a part of the foreign state.

Also in Indrajeet Singhji v. Rajendra Singhji30 it was held by the court that a suit against a
corporation will not be within the section 86 of the code of civil procedure unless the enterprise
of the corporation is a department of foreign government.

Here, the Westeros trading company was a private commercial company not an organ of the
government of Septonland. Therefore the company does not come under section 86 of the code
of civil procedure.

In the case Kartar Sungh v. State of Punjab31 it was held that to decide whether corporate body
is a foreign state, consideration should be as to whether said corporate body is a part of
government machinery of that state. Is the corporate body is not a part of government machinery
it would not liable to the privilege of immune sovereignty under section 86 of the code of civil
procedure.

29
New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v Veb Deutfracht Seereederei AIR 1983Cal 225.
30
Indrajeet Singhji v Rajendra Singhji AIR 1932 Lah 136.
31
Kartar Sungh v State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569.

23 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

Also in Maharaj Bahadur of Rewa v. Siva Saran lal32 court held that where an insufficient
consent has been obtained by the plaintiff, the defendant may by his conduct waive the defect, so
notwithstanding the absence of a valid consent under this section the suit can be heard and
determined on its merits.

Therefore, section 86 should not be applied here in this case because the Westeros trading
company was a commercial company. It was not an organ of the state of Septonland or not a
machinery of government of the Septonland. Therefore, it does not come under the definition of
foreign ruler under section 86 of the code of civil procedure.

It was said by the opposing party that the substantial investments were made in the company by
the government of septonland, therefore, it can be said that the company is working on behalf of
the government of Septonland.

In case Hardatt Sharma v. Jaikishen Shamlal and Sons33 it was held that the section 86 of the
code of civil procedure does not apply to the cases where the suit is against a firm and the ruler is
only one of the partners. In such a case decree can be executed against the other partners.

Thus, just by the mere fact that in the westeros trading company substantial investments have
been made by the government of septonland, it does not become an organ of the government and
therefore does not come under section 86 of the code of civil procedure.

32
Maharaj Bahadur of Rewa v Siva Saran lal AIR 1921 Pat 23.
33
Hardatt Sharma v Jaikishen Shamlal and Sons AIR 1965 SC 1718.

24 | P a g e
 Memorial On Behalf of Respondent

PRAYER

Therefore in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited this Honble court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that :

In the case of High Sparrow v. Union of Westeros :

1. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the Unlawful Activities Prevention
(Amendment) Act, 2015 are not violating article 19 of the constitution of Westeros.

In the case of Guthrum v. Union of Westeros:

1. The Memorandum of Procedure for Authorised Surveillance Activities to Curb Terrorism,

2015 is not violating their right to privacy as guaranteed under article 21 of constitution of
Westeros.

In the case of Westeros Trading Company v. Union of Westeros :

1. The High court was justified in its decision of allowing the civil suit filed by the state of
Mereen.

And pass any other order in favor of the respondent that it may deem fit in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience.

SD/-

Counsel for Respondent.

25 | P a g e