Leonardo V.
CA A project of partition was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
*barrier rule*
FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and was survived by two
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of
her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944,
while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner
Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed
a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said
deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have
the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned
between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all
the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accountingshall have been made, delivering to him his share therein
with legal interest. Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles
asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the
other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, has
legal right to inherit by representation.
RULING: No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals,
he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged fathers first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
(Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
Corpus Vs Administrator
Barrier Rule
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila at the age of seventy-seven years. His will
was probated in the CFI.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were
o (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco,
o (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco,
o (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his
half brother, Pablo Corpus, and
o (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. ()
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R.
Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the
will does not contain an institution of heir.
The Probate court approved the project of partition. Appeals were taken by
Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis
R. Yangcobut were dismissed after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreements.
In the compromise the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the
heirs of Pio V. Corpus, peaches, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita
Corpus (Tomas Corpus). Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement and
received from the Yangco estate P2,000as settlement of his full share.
But, subsequently, Tomas Corpusfiled an action to recover her (Juanitas)
supposed share in Yangco intestate estate.
He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions are void since it was a perpetual
prohibition on alienation and an intestacy be declared.
TC dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches.
CA endorsed the case to the SC since it covers real property valued at more
than 50k.
Issue: WON Tomas Corpus may inherit from TeodoroYangco [NO, because his
mother (Juana Corpus does not have the right to inherit via intestacy from his half-
blood brother]
Ruling:
Trial Court: Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a
legitimate child. Itwas proven in the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael
Yangco.
Court presumed that there was a marriage between Ramona and Tomas (first
family).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate
and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate
child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery
of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
OCC 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives"
article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child".
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged
natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to
its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it
share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated
children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with
the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters."
 Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco'shalf brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent. The natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of
her natural mother
Trial Court Affirmed.
MANUEL V. FERRER
G.R. NO. 117246, AUGUST 21, 1995
FACTS: The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio
Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-
marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from which Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel,
the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the
marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name.
He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple
were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so
raised her as their own daughter.
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died
intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza
Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation
and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to
the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These
acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before
the Regional Trial Court, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
instruments.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to contest the actions of
Modesta.
RULING: No. Petitioners, not being the real parties-in-interest in the case, had
neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
Although inn her answer to the complaint, Modesta admitted that she was not an
intestate heir of Juan Manuel because she was adopted without the benefit of formal
or judicial adoption and therefore was neither a compulsory nor a legal heir, the court
still reiterated the following rules:
a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no
right to the formers inheritance
b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child
c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of
the legitimate grandparent
d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a
legitimate brother of her natural father
e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father
TOLENTINO v. PARAS G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
1. While still married to the petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, (celebrated on July
31, 1943), Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with Maria Clemente
(defendant) at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948.
2. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan,
3. Amado pleaded guilty and served the prison sentence imposed on him.
4. After serving his sentence, he continued to live with Maria Clemente
(respondent) till he died on July 25, 1974.
5. Since Amados death certificate carried Maria Celemente as his surviving
spouse, in Special Proceeding no. 1587-M, Serafia (petitioner) sought to correct the
name of the surviving spouse to her name.
6. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites
under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
7. Petitioner, then, filed a case against private respondent and the Local Civil
Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse,
and the correction of the death certificate of Amado.
8. Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the
respondent court due to the following reasons:
a. the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship
b. the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under
Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a
case like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication
c. in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in
Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of
the proper requisites under the law.
9. Serafia filed a petition for review on certiorari for dismissing her suit to
declare her as Amados surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is Amados surviving spouse and whether or not her name
should be placed on the death certificate instead of private respondent?
RULING:
Since Amado pleaded guilty of bigamy, it is proof then that the marriage between
Amado and the petitioner does exist. This makes the second marriage of Amado with
the private respondent null and void and of no force and effect from the very
beginning. (No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage.) Therefore, Petitioner is the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado and
not the private respondent. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the
Local Civil Registrar should be made.
G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21, 1973,
dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said petition,
subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a
plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of
Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged between
the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint stipulation of facts
(p. 9, rec.).
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the.
legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of
the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN
THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last September
12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court.
That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO are
the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL
ROSARIO.
Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be determined by the
court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on the basis of
the facts stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent portions of
which read:
A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed under the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a deceased person, whether he died
testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to
appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of
an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice
which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons
as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment
of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the
will, if any there is, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in
the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts
of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgment made or rendered in the course thereof
shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it
involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office.
While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is allowed under the
aforequoted provision of the rules, the same rule specifically limits the action to
estates the gross value of which does not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition,
however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties alone left by the
deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over and
above-the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the
petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the
requirements provided by law for the same has not been complied with. Based on the
foregoing observation alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.
But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition as an exercise (of)
the powers of a probate Court in determining and declaring the heirs of the deceased
as prayed for in the, aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate
succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the
adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession, ...
The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case finds
no basis for 'the said article is applicable in cases where there are no other concurring
intestate heirs of the adopted child. ...
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being included as intestate heir
of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over the
properties sought to be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69
in re action to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be
commenced or instituted by the party in interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES THE
PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS (pp, 10-12, rec.).
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal
bond (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.).
I Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending direct line.
WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs.
Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs, De
la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910) and Gutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R.
No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held that for the court to
acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the rules, the
requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10,000,00
(P6,000.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional.
In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty left by the
deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of P33,000.00 which, as the
court a quo correctly found, is obviously "over and above the value allowed under the
rules."
II
However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the court a quo
in the sense that once wholly sustained, said holding would preclude petitioner from
re-filing the proper action a consequence which, on the ground of equity and fair
play, We cannot allow to befall on petitioner We deemed it essential, for the
guidance of the parties especially herein, petitioner, to point out the demerits of the
appealed verdict.
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343
on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New
Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case:
A
The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil Code gername
to the instant case:
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopted;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted;
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the parents and the other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343 of the New
Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an
adopted person. the latter shall not have more successional rights than an
acknowledged natural child.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which gives an adopted
child the same rights and duties as though he were a legitimate child. The reason for
this is that:
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance in facor of an
adopted person (Report of the Code Commission, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related
artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to
him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased
adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of
the law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or
ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not
necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of
the New Civil Code which states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, did not evidently appear on the face of the record on appeal, the defect or deficiency
the surviving spouse shall have a right to onefourth (only) of the hereditary estate. is not fatal.

This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted child and
the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is clear, and a
contrary view cannot be presumed.
If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on time, it should not
throw out but assume jurisdiction over it. After all, that procedural requirement is only
intended to enable the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its
jurisdiction and nothing more (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220,
emphasis supplied).

It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant with the
cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the New Civil Code
must be reconciled and given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased
adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which
is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". Consequently , the respective
shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined
by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are
left, the ascendants shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half
shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that
such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children
the other fourth.
B October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of Appeals,
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize
that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data rule in that
It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower
court in disregard of the requirment of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that
the record on appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time.
From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of notice of
the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the expiry date to file
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is December 14, 1973. Petitioner filed
her notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on July 10, 1973 or still
very much within the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. And although this is
not mentioned in the record on appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the
record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity of which this COURT
does not doubt.
Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules of
Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.
The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends of
substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimental, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475;
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et al., L-40495,
Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.
WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IS A
COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule, whenever
circumstances and substantial justice warrant.

The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28, 1973
(53 SCRA 228) and Villanueva vs. Court of Appeal (No. L-29719, Novemner 28, 1975,
68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point.

In Villanueva, WE held:

The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in the case of Government of the Philippines
vs. Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization that
after all what is of vital importance in the requirement fo Section 6, Rule 41 of the
Rules of court is that the Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal was really
perfected within the reglementary period. If it could ascertained from the record of the
case that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, although such fact