Philosophical Review

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Immorality by Ronald D. Milo
Review by: Robert K. Fullinwider
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), pp. 592-594
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185421
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 BOOK REVIEWS

self-assessment. With the exception of the discussion on pride, tho

do not in the end feel that our understanding of these emotions has
much enhanced. Moreover, except for her discussion of pride, ther
just too little appreciation for the rich literature that bears directly
the topics which she takes up. Still, because her book is well writt
the arguments are subtle, display considerable analytical skill, and
nicely crafted, Taylor very much succeeds in engaging one. Needle
say, that is no small feat. 13
LAURENCE THOMAS

Oberlin College

131 am very grateful to the Book Review Editor for instructive comments which
saved meThe
from several mistakes
Philosophical and infelicitous
Review, Vol. XCVII,expressions. Work1988)
No. 4 (October on this review
was supported in part by a 1987-88 Research Status appointment from Oberlin
College.

IMMORALITY. By RONALD D. MILO. Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univer-

sity Press, 1984. Pp. vii, 273.

This book is highly recommendable to those with an interest in its topic

-but the topic is much narrower than casual observation might suggest.
592
The book's aim is to set out a typology of immorality and to "study . .. the
causes of immorality" (p. xi), which Milo identifies as three: lack of con-
cern, bad preferences, and lack of self-control. But in identifying and dis-
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 BOOK REVIEWS

Because of the agent's lack of concern with the interests of others he has
developed no moral convictions at all (on a range of conduct), or is wholly
unmotivated by the beliefs he does possess. Negligence and weakness re-
sult from lack of control. Either the agent didn't take sufficient care to
assure himself his act wasn't wrong, or he couldn't carry through on his
desire to avoid wrongdoing. Both perverse and preferential wickedness
reflect bad preferences. The agent acts on false or bad principles, or
prefers some other end to avoiding doing wrong.
The identification and elaboration of the types of immorality take up
only a small part of the book. Most of the discussion centers around a
number of issues in metaethics generated by the typology. For example, if
moral indifference involves knowing that an act is wrong but not caring,
how can this be logically possible on a view that makes having an over-
riding con-attitude a necessary feature of believing something to be mor-
ally wrong? For each of the types of immorality, Milo is able to show that
one or another metaethical view finds it difficult to digest conceptually.
Thus, we are led through familiar disputes about cognitivist and non-cog-
nitivist accounts of moral belief, internalist and externalist accounts of
motivation, and material versus formal definitions of morality. We en-
counter such old friends as the naturalistic fallacy, prescriptivism, and the
moral point of view.
The discussion of the metaethical views is lucid and full. This book will
be especially valuable to teachers and graduate students who are working
their way through controversies that dominated moral philosophy for a
significant part of this century. Milo has specific views about the contro-
versies, and develops them against the backdrop of his typology.
Milo opts for a cognitivist account of moral belief, an externalist account
of moral motivation, and a material (or content-based) definition of mo-
rality. These positions make sense of his typology which, in turn, best or-
ganizes, he thinks, our "preanalytical" or "pretheoretical" intuitions about
immorality (p. 17).
There is a certain elusiveness about how intuitions enter into Milo's
project. At specific junctures, he relies on his intuitions to find against the
non-cognitivist or internalist: something doesn't ring true, sounds absurd,
is not obvious, or whatever. At the same time, however, Milo acknowledges
that appeal to intuition is not conclusive on these matters by any means
(pp. 53-54). This is what we should expect. Whereas many people have
clear and definite intuitions about moral matters, few have firm and reli-
able intuitions about such abstract matters as whether it is logically impos-
sible to believe that X is morally wrong without having an aversion to
doing X. The strength of Milo's book is that, though individual arguments
may rest on inconclusive appeal to intuition, everything fits together into
one unified account so that each part can draw strength from the whole.

593

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 BOOK REVIEWS

The ordinary person's convictions about immorality are captured by the

typology, and the typology requires a cognitivist, externalist, material ac-
count of morality. By carefully and persuasively showing that such an ac-
count doesn't run into the philosophical problems commonly attributed to
it, Milo is able to be generally convincing despite the absence of firm and
uncontroversial intuitions at the metaethical level.
At the end of his book, Milo is tempted to reduce his three causes of
immorality to one: lack of concern. The direct cause of indifference and
amorality, lack of concern also underlies the lack of control that is mani-
fested in negligence and weakness (pp. 132, 137) and the bad preferences
that lead to wickedness (p. 238). Milo claims that "lack of concern consti-
tutes the essence of immorality in general" (p. 81; see also pp. 238-240).
Clearly much of immoral behavior can be traced to lack of concern,
especially the behavior that is rooted in selfishness and self-seeking, which
is the form, Milo seems to think, that lack of concern will most commonly
take (p. 236). But there seems to be ample immorality in the world that
results not from too little concern but from too much. The passionate
concern of the terrorist to redress or relieve the oppression of his people
leads him to kill or maim or terrify innocents; the zealotry of the ideo-
logue in power keeps the firing squads busy and the concentration camps
full.
The terrorist is not amoral or indifferent; he has moral beliefs and is
motivated by them. He is not preferentially wicked because he believes his
course of action not immoral all things considered. He is not weak since he
acts on his beliefs, and he is not morally negligent since he may have
mulled over the injustices against his people at length and considered in
detail the effects of his actions on world opinions. Desperate situations call
for desperate deeds. Nor is the terrorist perversely wicked, since he is not
necessarily ignorant of any important substantive principle. It is not bad
principles that underlie his immorality, but monstrous conclusions. His
conclusions are unbalanced by the intensity of his concerns for some
persons. This dimension of immorality seems not easily captured either by
Milo's typology or by the underlying emphasis on lack of concern; nor is it
an insignificant dimension. In a world full of zealots determined to estab-
lish the reign of justice even if it kills us, we might be safer if people were
uniformly venal, corrupt, and selfish. Such people can never do us too
much harm since they can always be bought off.

ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER

Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy

University of Maryland

594

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