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LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2017

BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDISTAN

NGO(PEW) v. THE STATE OF ANGA PRADESH

MR.OZAN v. THE STATE OF ANGA PRADESH &


SPEAKER OF ANGAPRADESH
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

MR.HOBART v. THE SPEAKER & THE LEGISLATIVE


ASSEMBLY OF ANGA PRADESH

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART.32&136 OF


THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAN

___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIPS
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDISTAN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................................... 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 9

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ........................................................................................................ 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................ 13

ARGUMENT ADVANCED ....................................................................................................... 15

ISSUE 1 : WHETHER THE RULES WHICH PROHIBIT THE LIVE TELECAST OF


PROCEEDINGS OF BUSINESS OF HOUSE IS AGAINST THE BASIC FEATURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND IMPUGNED ACTIVITIES i.e. LIVE TELECAST OF
SPEECH IS A PART OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA OR NOT?
....................................................................................................................................................... 15

[ 1.1] That the live telecast of speech is a part of freedom of speech and expressio..15

[1.2] Restrictions to the freedom of speech and expression16

[1.3] That the rules prohibiting the live telecast of speech are against the basic feature of the
constitution i.e. Democracy....17

ISSUE 2 : WHETHER THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE


WAS WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW OR NOT ? .................................................... 19

[2.1]The search and seizure conducted by police is not as prescribed by law..19

[2.2] That the information obtained by police from ISP constitutes search prescribed by
law.23

[2.3] That the search and subsequent seizure is excluded due to legislative privileges as
afforded to members of the legislature..24

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ISSUE 3 : WHETHER THIS COURT CAN PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRIT TO THE


STATE IN THE PETETION AND ISSUES RAISED BY NGO-PEW SEEKING
ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 243T TO THE EXTENT OF RESERVING 1/3rd OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS TO BE FILLED BY THE DIRECT ELECTION IN
EVERY MUNICIPALITY FOR WOMEN OR NOT? .................................................... 26

[3.1]That the 74th amendment act is not any act of the parliament and is not violative of the
special status.27

[3.2]That provisions of the article 371 are no where attracted ...28

PRAYER ...................................................................................................................................... 30

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Paragraph

& And

A.I.R. All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Art. Article

Corp. Corporation

Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure

F.I.R First Information Report

Govt. Government

Honble Honorable

H.C High Court

IBS Internet Based Services

i.e. That is

IP Internet Protocol

ISP Internet Service Provider

JAC Joint Action Committee

N.G.O. Non-Governmental Organization

No. Number

Ors. Others

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LIST PEW Participation and Emancipation of OF


Women
P.U. Punjab University

R.T.I. Right to Information

S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

SEBI Securities Exchange Board of India

SLP Special Leave Petition

U.O.I. Union of India

v. Versus

W.B. West Bengal

w.w.w. World Wide Web

ABBREVIATIONS

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS

1.M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (6th ed., 2010)

2. Dr.S.C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India (1st ed., 2008)

3. A.P. Datar, Commentary on the constitution of India (2nd ed., 2007)

4. H.K. Saharay, The Constitution of India (4th ed. ,2012)

5. N. Kumar, Constitutional law of India (9th ed. ,2015)

6. R. Tandon, The Code of Criminal Procedure (16th ed., 2005)

7. S.N. Mishra, The Code of Criminal Procedure (17th ed., 2010)

8. S.C. Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure (2nd ed., 2010)

9.R. Jethmalani & D.S. Chopra, The Code of Criminal Procedure (1st ed., 2015)

10. P.K. Das, The Right to Information Act (2nd ed., 2009)

STATUTES

1. The Constitution of India

2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860

4.The Right to Information Act, 2005

5.The Information Technology Act, 2000

6.The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of The Nagaland Legislative Assembly

DICTIONARIES

1. Websters New International Dictionary (1926)


2. Bryan A. Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2001)

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LEGAL WEBSITES
1. http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in

2. http://www.indiankanoon.org

3. http://www.manupatra.com

4. http://www.jstor.org.

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TABLE OF CASES

1. All India Bank Employee Association v. AIR 1962 SC 17 18


National Industrial Tribunal
2. Anandan Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to the A.I.R.1952 M.P. 11 27
Govt. of Madras
3. Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney (1912) AC571(583) 29
General for Canada
4. Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 884 19
5. Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1976 Cr LJ 713 23
6. Court on its motion v. State of Haryana (2006) Cr LJ 3472 24
(P&H)
7. Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India (1997) 4 SCC 306. 19
8. G.M. Agadi v. The Commercial Tax Officer, (1973) 32 STC 243 25
Belgaum (Kar) .
9. Gandhinagar v. State 2012 29
10. Ghosh O.K. v. Joseph E.X A.I.R. 1963 SC 812 18
11. Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank Of India, AIR 1999 SC 1149 30
(1159).
12. Govt. of A.P. v. P.L. Devi AIR 2008 19
13. H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 24
14. I.C. Golaknath and Ors. v. State Of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 1642. 29
15. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861 18
16. K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 26
And Ors., W. (Supreme Court,
24/08/2017) .
17. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela AIR 1973 SC 1461 29
18. Mahant Baba Madhav Das v. State of (1998) C.r.L.J. 4341 22
Rajasthan (Raj.)

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19. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI AIR 1978 SC 597. 20, 28


20. OConnor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 790 (1987, 26
Supreme Court of the
United States) .
21. Pakala Narayan v. Emperor 1939)41 BOMLR 428 29
22. Prem Lata v. State of H.P (1987) Cr LJ 1539 23
23. PUCL v. UOI AIR 2008SC 2363 20
24. R v. Cole (2012) 3 SCR 34 26
(Supreme Court of
Canada)
25. R v. Spencer (2014) SCC 43 26
(Supreme Court of
Canada)
26. R v. Ward (2012) ONCA 660 26
(Court of appeal for
Ontario, Canada)
27. Radha Kishan v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 822 23
28. Radha Krishna Singhari v. State of Orissa (1995) Cri LJ 3083 23
(Ori.)
29. State of U.P. v. Ram Swaroop (1998 Cri LJ 3083) 23
30. Romesh Thapar v. State Of Madras A.I.R. 1950 SC 124 19
31. Rosemary Dzuvichu v. State Of Nagaland (Civil) No.147 of 30
2011(Guwahati
HC,21/10/2011).
32. S.N. Sharma v. Bipin Kumar AIR 1970 SC 786 24
33. S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574. 17
34. Sahara v. SEBI AIR 2012 SC 3825 20
35. Sakal Papers v. U.O.I. AIR 1962 SC 305 17
36. Secretary, Ministry of Information and AIR 1995 SC 1236 18,20
Broadcasting v. Cricket Association, Bengal

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37. Shri Temjenkaba and Ors. v. Shri AIR 1992 Gau 8 31


Temjenwati and Ors.
38. Smt. Shanti Devi v. State Of Haryana & Ors (1996). 29
39. Speiser v. Randal 357 U.S. 513 17
40. State of Assam v. Gopi Kishan Taperia (1985) 1 Guwahati 23
L.R.19
41. State Of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi AIR 1952 SC 329 18
42. State of H.P. v. Sudarshan Kumar (1989) Cri LJ 1492 23
43. State of M.P. v. Ram Prakash (1989) Cri. LJ 1585 23
(M.P)
44. State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1995) (1) JIC 382 (SC) 23
45. State of Rajasthan v. Rahman AIR 1960 SC 210 22
46. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain 1975 SC 865 20
47. Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram AIR 1960 SC 633 19
Manohar Lohia
48. Surendra v. Nabhakrishna A.I.R. 1958 Orissa 168 20
49. Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab 1996) East Cri Case 58 . 23
50. Trustee of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust (2000) Cri LJ 3689 24
v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
51. U.O.I. v. Association for democratic AIR 2002 SC 2112 20
reforms
52. U.O.I. v. Motion Picture Association, ( SC 15/07/1999) 19
53. U.O.I. v. Naveen Jindal Civil Appeal No. 2920 19
of 1996 (SC 23/ 01/
2004)
54. Wason v. Walter L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868 , 20
Court of Queen Bench)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioners has approached the Honble Supreme Court under the writ jurisdiction of Art. 32
and special leave petition under Art.136 of the Constitution of Indistan which have been stated
herein under:

Article 32, Constitution of Indistan Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution
Article 136, Constitution of Indistan Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, and sentence or order
passed or made by any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

INDISTAN AS A COUNTRY

1.The Constitution of Indistan establishes it as Union of States and is considered to be one of the
most progressive Constitutions of the World based on the principles of Federalism, Liberal
Democratic Governance. The Constitutional, legal and policy framework of Indistan is pari
Materia to the Republic of India.

2.The state of Anga Pradesh is in north eastern part of India, inhabited by 13 major unique and
distinct tribes. Under the Art. 371A of the Constitution, the State of Anga Pradesh has been
guaranteed Autonomy to conduct their own affairs. The Constitution also provides autonomy for
the administration of such areas through the tribal advisory council.

3.Anga Pradesh is known as Land of Happiness. Literacy rate is exceptionally high in the state
i.e. 95% and typical gender discrimination in Social and Economic realm is almost absent and it
remains as example for the rest of Indistan.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION BY NGO-PEW

4.In January, 2017 there was general election in the state of Anga Pradesh and the party led by
Mr.Yohanan stormed to power winning 57 seats out of 70 seats. He promised the implementation
of part IX A of the Constitution of Indistan. The cabinet chaired by him approved an ordinance to
be promulgated by the governor of Anga Pradesh seeking immediate implementation of women
reservation to the tune of 33% in the municipalities

5.As news spread, all tribal leaders under the banner of joint action committee made a
representation to the Governor asking to refrain from giving his assent to the ordinance. It
reminded the special status of Anga Pradesh in terms of Art. 371A of the Constitution, and that it
has no application to the religious practices of tribes or tribal customary law and procedure.

6.The protests and blockade continued for several weeks and has serious impact on law and
order jeopardizing the human life and dignity in worst manner. The Governor citing his special
responsibility under Art. 371A of the Constitution is not giving his assent to the ordinance
approved by cabinet. A NGO named PEW Participation & emancipation of women) preferred a
Writ Petition against the Governor seeking enforcement of Art. 243T of the Constitution.

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WRIT PETETION BY MR. HOBART

7.Mr. Hobart is a veteran legislator, who has distinction of having been elected consecutively for
6th time to the State Assembly of Anga Pradesh. He made a passionate speech on the floor of the
house on womens participation, representation in tune with long traditions, values and customs
for peaceful co-existence. While, making speech, he got live on his Facebook page using the
internet services of the legislative assembly.

8.The speaker received complaints from the opposition against him for breach of ethics and rules
of procedure of house. He also got this incident examined by the ethics committee and thus,
suspended Mr. Hobart for 6 weeks. Mr. Hobart submitted that his unintentional act enhances
Open and Responsive Democracy, Freedom of Speech and Expression and Right of
Citizenry to Know. He sought a review of the decision but the speaker disposed of the Petition.
He has challenged this decision in a writ petition and declares the rules prohibiting live telecast
pf proceedings as Unconstitutional.

SPECIAL LEAVE PETETION BY MR. OZAN

9.Two ministers namely Mr. Savadi and Mr. Ozan were allegedly watched on the television
camera watching child porn on mobile phone during Assembly proceedings. It was the mobile
phone of Mr. Savadi and when this news was flashed by major news channels, he admitted
watching child porn. The speaker received a memorandum of complaint from the leader of
opposition against both of them demanding an investigation and FIR against them.

10.That Next day the speaker expelled Mr. Savadi and suspended Mr. Ozan for 6 weeks from the
legislative assembly. FIR was registered in the incident against Mr. Savadi. Pursuant to FIR, police
started the investigation and sought access to the mobile phone of Mr. Savadi to which he denied
claiming protection under fundamental rights against illegal search and seizure in absence of
proper warrant and jurisdiction. The Superintendent of Police sought permission of speaker to
inspect and search their offices and access to their computers and other internet based services in
the premises of legislative assembly.
11.On search and seizure, Police could not find any incriminating material from computers and
internet based services of Mr. Savadi but they found that the official computer of Mr. Ozan had
been used to access various child porn sites and store them through an internet file sharing

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program. That Mr. Ozan contends that there is political conspiracy against him as he has supported
the bill seeking reform providing reservation to women. He stated that permission from speaker is
pre-planned and an attempt to legitimize illegal acts of police.
12.He challenged the proceedings in High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition. Then Mr. Ozan preferred Special Leave Petition to Supreme
Court of Indistan against the judgment of High Court raising substantial question of law as to
interpretation of Constitution of Indistan.
CLUBBING OF PETITIONS
13. The Supreme Court of Indistan has clubbed three petitions, first the writ by Mr. Hobart, PIL
by PEW and SLP by Mr. Ozan and posted for hearing on 7th -8th October.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I

WHETHER THE RULES WHICH PROHIBITS THE LIVE TELECAST OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BUSINESS OF HOUSE IS AGAINST THE BASIC FEATURE OF CONSTITUTION AND THE IMPUGNED
ACTIVITIES I.E. LIVE TELECAST OF SPEECH IS A PART OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA OR NOT?

ISSUE II
WHETHER THE SEARCH & SEIZURE AS CONDUCTED BY POLICE IS WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE
LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAN AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW OR NOT?
(I) WHETHER THE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY POLICE FROM THE INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDER CONSTITUTE A SEARCH PRESCRIBED BY LAW OR NOT?
(II) IF SO, WHETHER THE SEARCH AND SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE IS EXCLUDED DUE TO
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES AS AFFORDED TO MEMBERS OF LEGISLATURE OR NOT?

ISSUE III
WHETHER THIS COURT CAN PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRIT TO THE STATE IN THE PETITION AND
ISSUES RAISED BY NGO PEW (PARTICIPATION & EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN) SEEKING
ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 243T TO THE EXTENT OF RESERVING 1/3RD OF TOTAL NUMBER OF
SEATS TO BE FILLED BY DIRECT ELECTION IN EVERY MUNICIPALITY FOR
WOMEN OR NOT?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.WHETHER THE RULES WHICH PROHIBITS THE LIVE TELECAST OF


PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS OF HOUSE IS AGAINST THE BASIC FEATURE
OF CONSTITUTION AND THE IMPUGNED ACTIVITIES i.e. LIVE TELECAST OF
SPEECH IS A PART OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA OR NOT?
That the live telecast of the proceedings of the business of the house encourages and are
in favour of open and responsive democracy.
That the impugned activities i.e. live telecast of speech falls within the ambit
Fundamental Right of Speech and Expression under Art.19 of the Constitution.
That the rules prohibiting the Live Telecast of proceedings are unconstitutional.

II. WHETHER THE SEARCH & SEIZURE AS CONDUCTED BY POLICE IS


WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAN AND
PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BYTHE LAW OR NOT?

That the F.I.R. was not registered against the Petitioner and also reasonable grounds were
not recorded to initiate the proceedings.
Despite of the fact that no search warrant was issued in the name of Petitioner the
provisions of Sec.165 were not followed.
That Sec.100 & 102 of Cr.P.C. which deals with search & seizure was not followed in
toto.

[2.1] Whether the information obtained by police from the ISP constitute a search
prescribed by law or not?
That the act of police falls within the definition of search.
That the Petitioner has reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter searched by police.

[2.2] If so, whether the search and subsequent seizure is excluded due to legislative
privileges as afforded to members of Legislature or not?

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That the rules of the procedure and conduct of the business of the assembly of Anga
Pradesh grants privileges to the members of the house.
That since the permission of the speaker was not given for search it directly leads to
breach of parliamentary privileges.

III. WHETHER THIS COURT CAN PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRIT TO THE


STATE IN THE PETITIONAND ISSUES RAISED BY NGO PEW (PARTICIPATION
& EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN) SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 243T TO
THE EXTENT OF RESERVING 1/3RD OF TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS TO BE
FILLED BY DIRECT ELECTION IN EVERY MUNICIPALITY FORWOMEN OR
NOT?

That Art.243T is not any Act of Parliament rather a Constitutional provision and hence, is
binding on the State of Anga Pradesh.
That no tribal customary practice or belief is being violated due to the enforcement of the
women reservation to the extent of 1/3rd of the total no. of the seats in Municipalities.
That the autonomy and Special Status of the State under Art.371A of the Constitution of
Indistan is nowhere interfered and infringed.

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE RULES WHICH PROHIBIT THE LIVE TELECAST OF


PROCEEDINGS OF BUSINESS OF HOUSE IS AGAINST THE BASIC FEATURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND IMPUGNED ACTIVITIES I.E. LIVE TELECAST OF
SPEECH IS A PART OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA OR NOT?

[1.] It is humbly submitted before this Honble Bench that Live telecast of Speech is
undoubtedly a part of Art. 19 of the Constitution and the Rules that prohibit Live Telecast of
Proceedings of the House are against the basic feature of the Constitution.

[1.1] THAT LIVE TELECAST OF SPEECH IS A PART OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND


EXPRESSION.

[2.] Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution provides the freedom of Speech and Expression to every
Citizen of the Country. In the present case, Mr. Hobart was exercising his Fundamental Right
under Art. 19 of the Constitution by presenting his views to the general Public. The right of free
speech is indispensable for preservation of free society in which govt. is based on consent of an
informed citizenry.1 As it has been held in a catena of Judgments that Freedom of Speech and
Expression includes propagating ones ideas, opinions through any media that is available.

[3.] The Supreme Court has held that Freedom of Speech under Art. 19(1) (a) means right to
express ones opinion by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures or in any other manner. It
would thus include Freedom of Communication and their right to propagate or publish opinions.
The communication may be made through any medium, newspaper, magazine, movie, radio or
TV2. In the case of Sakal Papers v. UOI3 , SC held that Art. 19(1) (a) carries with it right to
propagate and circulate ones own opinion and ideas.

1
. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513.
2
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
3
Sakal Papers v. U.O.I., AIR 1962 SC 305.

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[4.] In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association,
Bengal4, it was held that the Right to freedom of speech and expression includes right to
communicate through any media that is available.SC, in this case made an important innovation
and held that a Citizen had under Art. 19(1)(a) a right to telecast , broadcast to viewers through
Electronic media , TV or radio , any important event and government will have no monopoly over
it . There are certain parts of the Constitution including Art. 19 which constitutes the core values
which if allowed to be abrogated would change completely the nature of the Constitution.5
Freedom of Speech in Art. 19(1) (a) means Freedom to speak so as to be heard by others and
therefore to convey ones ideas to others6. Mr. Hobart has right to freedom of speech and
expression and thus, his speech is a part of Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

[1.2] RESTRICTIONS TO THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION


[5.] The speech made by Mr. Hobart cant be termed as to be excluded from the ambit of Art.
19(1) (a) until & unless his freedom falls under any of the restrictions mentioned in Art. 19(2). As
it was held in Ghosh O.K. v. Joseph E.X.7 , Court must strike down any law which imposes a
restriction upon Freedom of Speech or Expression or Assembly unless it falls within any of the
grounds specifies under Art. 19(2). As per Art. 19(2), the restriction to this Freedom of Speech
and Expression are: security of the state, public order, foreign relations, decency and morality,
incitement to an offence, contempt of the Court, defamation and sovereignty or integrity of the
Country. Clearly, the speech made by Mr. Hobart doesnt fall under any of the restrictions as
mentioned. The speech cant be termed as to be against the Security of the state as the expression
Security of the State refers to the serious and aggravated forms of Public disorder, such as
rebellion, waging war against the state, insurrection.8 Mr. Hobart is affecting neither Sovereignty
nor Public Order, rather he is making an effort to maintain Public Order in the State by specifying
in his speech about his motive of peaceful co-existence between the customs of tribal groups and
Constitutional provisions.

4
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association, Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 1236.
5
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
6
All India Bank Employee Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 171.
7
Ghosh O.K. v. Joseph E.X., AIR 1963 SC 812.
8
State Of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, AIR 1952 SC 329 .

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[6.] The expression public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility 9
Anticipatory action to prevent public disorder has been held to be within the ambit of Art. 19(2) 10
Mr. Hobart being a Veteran Legislator, is trying to draw out an equilibrium in both the parties by
making such statement. His one statement can bring both the parties i.e. JAC and PEW at peace
with each other and maintain public order. So, his speech doesnt fall under any of the restrictions
mentioned in Art. 19(2). Thus, the impugned activity i.e. Live telecast of speech is certainly a
part of Art. 19 of the Constitution.

[1.3] THAT THE RULES PROHIBITNG THE LIVE TELECAST OF SPEECH ARE
AGAINST THE BASIC FEATURE OF THE CONSITUTION i.e. DEMOCRACY.
[7.] It is most humbly submitted before this Honble Bench that the rules that prohibit live
telecast of speech is against the basic feature of the Constitution. Freedom of speech and
expression has been held to be basic and indivisible for a Democratic polity11 . It is said to be a
cornerstone of functioning of the Democracy12 . It is the foundation of a Democratic society13 .
This right is imperative for a Democratic Country like ours. As it was held in Romesh Thapar v.
State of Madras14 , freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic
organizations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper
functioning of the process of popular government, is possible. An aware citizenry is sine qua non
for a democratic country.

[8.] The common people have the right to know and participate in the affairs concerning public
interest. In Dinesh Trivedi v. UOI15, SC dealt with right to freedom of information and observed
In modern Constitutional democracies it is axiomatic that citizens have the right to know about
affairs of government, which having been elected by them seek to formulate sound policies of
governance aimed at their welfare. The concept of open Government is said to be the direct
emanation from the right to know which seems to be implicit in the right of freedom of speech and

9
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
10
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884.
11
Govt. of A.P. v. P.L. Devi, AIR 2008 SC 1640.
12
U.O.I. v. Naveen Jindal, Civil Appeal No.2920 of 1996, (Supreme Court, 23/01/2004).
13
U.O.I. v. Motion Picture Association, AIR 1999.
14
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
15
Dinesh Trivedi v. UOI, (1997) 4 SCC 306.

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expression16.Moreover, Art. 361A of the Constitution provides for protection of publication of the
proceedings of Parliament and the State Legislatures.

[9.] People of our Country have full right to know what the people elected by them are doing on
their behalf. The advantage to the community from the publication of proceedings is so great, that
the occasional inconvenience to some individuals arising from it must yield to general good17.In
Surendra v. Nabakrishna18, it was held that there were many advantages to public, which has
deepest interest in knowing what passes in Parliament, if true report of proceedings is published.
People are guaranteed the right to know under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Art. 19(1) (a) not
only guarantees freedom of speech and expression, it also ensures and comprehends right to citizen
to know, the right to receive information regarding the matter of public concern19. Supremacy of
the Constitution and republican and democratic reforms of the government constitutes the basic
structure of the Constitution.20

[10.] It is said that A successful democracy posits an aware citizenry 21.Bhagwati J. had
emphasized on significance of Freedom of Speech and Expression in these words Democracy is
based essentially on free debates and open discussions, for that is the only corrective of
government action in a democratic setup. If democracy means government of people by people, it
is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in democratic process and in order to
enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of
public matters is absolutely essential22. A matter regarding women reservation is certainly an
issue of public interest and public should have a right to participate in its decision making. True
democracy cant exist unless all citizens have right to participate in the affairs of Polity of the
Country. The right to participate in the affairs of Country is meaningless unless citizens are well
informed on all sides of the issues, in respect of which they are called upon to express their views23.
So, it is most humbly submitted that the rules prohibiting the live telecast of proceedings of
Legislative assembly are anti-democratic.

16
Sahara v. SEBI, AIR 2012 SC 3825.
17
Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868, Court of Queens Bench)
18
Surendra v. Nabakrishna, AIR 1958 Orissa 168
19
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, 1975 SC 865 ; S.P. Gupta v. U.O.I., AIR 1982 SC 149.
20
PUCL v. UOI, AIR 2008 SC 2363.
21
U.O.I. v. Association for democratic reforms, AIR 2002 SC 2112.
22
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597.
23
Supra 4 at pg. no.16.

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ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE


WAS WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BY THE LAW OR NOT?
[2.1] THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONDUCTED BY POLICE IS NOT AS
PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
[11.] It is humbly submitted before this Honble Bench that search conducted by police is against
the procedure established by law. The Petitioner has approached the honble Supreme Court in
peculiar circumstances, wherein, various actions taken by Respondent neither follow any mandate
of law nor the procedure established by law. Further they are in violation of privileges given to
members of legislature and the fundamental rights of the Petitioner guaranteed under the
Constitution24.

[12.] In the facts of the case it has been clearly stated that the F.I.R. was registered only against
Mr. Savadi but the police initiated investigation against Mr. Ozan also. It is further submitted that
for that purpose a search without warrant was initiated & the provisions dealing with such search
has been given under Sec.165 of Cr.P.C. that states:

(1).Whenever an officer in charge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation


has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purpose of an investigation
into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place with the limits of
the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot
in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording in
writing the grounds of his belief & specifying in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for
which search is to be made, search, or cause search to be made, for such thing in any place within
the limits of such station.

[13.] It is submitted that Search without warrant25 requires any magistrate to direct a search of
a place however, if during investigation if there is no time to obtain a search warrant and immediate
search is necessary for the purpose of investigation a senior investigating officer can conduct a
search without warrant. Howsoever, in the present case no such condition was prevalent.

24
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indistan.
25
S.165, The Criminal Procedure Code,1973.

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[14.] To assume that it is a search without warrant, there needs to be fulfilment of some conditions
like, the police officer must have reasonable grounds for the necessity of investigation & must
record the grounds of his belief as to its necessity. But these conditions were not recorded as
grounds of doubt were not reasonable and it was malice on the part of police authorities. The act
of peeping by Mr. Ozan was not intentional but was out of curiosity. Mere allegation that the
petitioner was involved in such offence of child pornography didnt serve as a sound footing or
reasonable grounds for initiating the investigation. In the case of Mahant Baba Madhav Das v. State
of Rajasthan26, it was held that, it is not as if on a vague allegation which is not accompanied by a
statement of facts showing the commission of a cognizable offence can be a sufficient basis of
commencing the investigation. Hence, investigation on mere allegation on the petitioner is
violative of the procedure established by law.

[15.] Grounds of belief regarding necessity of search must be previously recorded. If the grounds
are not recorded the search will be illegal27. Henceforth, the search in case of the petitioner was
illegal. Also, it was stated in the aforesaid judgement that reasonable grounds must exist for
believing that the thing required will be found in a place but there was no prior information or
evidence as to search a particular place in lieu of investigation.

[16.] Sec.100 (1) of Cr.P.C. states: whenever any place liable to search or inspection under this
chapter is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, such place, shall, on demand of
the officer or other person executing the warrant, and on production of the warrant, allow him
free ingress thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for search therein.

The police did the search of IBS without following the procedure established by law as the consent
of the speaker to the same was not given. The rules of procedure and conduct of business of the
legislative assembly are as follows:

Rule 175. A legal process, civil or criminal shall not be served within the precincts of the house
without obtaining the permission of Speaker

The rules in addition with sec. 100(1) of Cr.P.C. clearly points the flaw in the procedure undertaken
by the police to investigate the offence.

26
Mohant Baba Madhav Das v. State of Rajasthan (1998) C.r.L.J. 4341 (Raj.).
27
State of Rajasthan v. Rahman, AIR 1960 SC 210.

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[17.] As Sec.165(4) of Cr.P.C. states the provisions of this code as to search warrants & the
general provisions as to search contained in sec.100 shall, so far as may be, apply to a search
made under this sec. when applied in accordance with sec.100(4) that states before making a
search under this chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more
independent & respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate or of any
other locality if no such inhabitant of the said locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the search,
to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. The
police didnt call for two independent respectable witnesses for the legality of the search
undertaken. The purpose of this provision is to avoid false implication at the hands of official
witnesses28 .This clearly depicts the illegality of the procedure followed by the police in conducting
the search. It is the duty of the officer to call two or more independent and respectable inhabitants
of the locality and failure to perform the duty must be deemed to vitiate the search made in
violation29. No attempt made to secure independent witnesses to the search & seizure & no material
to show that independent witnesses were not available makes search & seizure discarded30.

[18.] It is clearly stated in an ample of apex Court rulings that non-compliance with the provisions
of sec. 100(4) of the Cr.P.C. leads the prosecution shaky31 & the accused gets entitled to benefit
of doubt on the facts & circumstances of the case as procedure of sec.100 is not followed32.The
Apex Court observed that the violation of sec.100 & sec.165 of Cr.P.C. amounts to irregularity
which have to be taken into consideration while appreciating the evidence on record33. Henceforth,
a search made in contravention of sec.100 & sec.165 of Cr.P.C. can be resisted34 & search made
in the absence of two witnesses vitiates the search35 unless explanation is furnished by the officer
concerned to justify the violation36.

28
Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) East Cri Case 58.
29
State of M.P. v. Ram Prakash, (1989) Cri. LJ 1585 (M.P).
30
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,1976 Cr LJ 713.
31
Prem Lata v. State of H.P., (1987) Cr LJ 1539.
32
State of H.P. v. Sudarshan Kumar, (1989) Cri LJ 1492.
33
State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1995) (1) JIC 382 (SC).
34
Radha Kishan v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 822; Radha Krishna Singhari v. State of Orissa (1995) Cri LJ 3083
(Ori.); State of U.P. v. Ram Swaroop (1998 Cri LJ 3083).
35
Supra 29.
36
State of Assam v. Gopi Kishan Taperia (1985) 1 Guwahati L.R.193.

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[19.] Sec. 102(1) of Cr.P.C. states Any police officer, may seize any property which may be
alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which
create suspicion of the commission of any offence. It is clear that conditions satisfying the
procedure of seizure has not been met and hence the seizure conducted by police is
unconstitutional and irregular. It is further submitted that seizure should not be unjustified and
the grounds for the formation of opinion to do such seizure must be clearly established & failure
to form such basis of opinion makes the seizure invalid.37
[20.] Sec. 156(1) of Cr.P.C. states: Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the
order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence which a Court having jurisdiction over
local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the
provision of chapter XIII read with sec.157 (1) which states If an officer in charge of a police
station has a reason to suspect commission of an offence he shall forthwith send a report of the
same to a Magistrate provides that in the instant case, no such report has been sent to the
concerned magistrate. The Apex Court in such matters has clearly stated that any failure to
investigate the offence properly or with irregularity violates such investigation if the same results
in prejudice to the accused.38
[21.] The procedure established by law in the sections aforesaid has not been followed by the
investigating authorities. Therefore, it clearly vitiates the search undertaken by the police & thus
search and subsequent seizure is unconstitutional and illegal. In case of malafide exercise of power
in investigation by the police the remedy is to invoke the writ jurisdiction as held by the apex
Court.39 Similarly in the present case the police authorities maliciously extended their area of
investigation which served as prejudice to the Petitioner. In cases of suspicion of cognizable
offences police are given unfettered powers to investigate all case but in appropriate cases an
aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of H.C under Art.226 of the
Constitution under which the H.C could be convinced that the power of investigation has been
exercised by a police officer malafide and the H.C may issue writ of mandamus restraining police
officer from misusing his legal powers.40The police malafide powers can thus be curbed.41

37
Trustee of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2000) Cri LJ 3689.
38
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196.
39
S.N. Sharma v. Bipin Kumar, AIR 1970 SC 786 .
40
Ibid
41
Court on its motion v. State of Haryana (2006) Cr LJ 3472 (P&H).

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[22.] All the sections above stated, the rules of procedure of legislative assembly & the provisions
of the Constitution have been violated which in turn has infringed the procedure established by
law.

[2.2] THAT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY POLICE FROM INTERNET


SERVICE PROVIDER CONSTITUTES A SEARCH PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
[23.] It is humbly submitted that the term search has been defined in Corpus Juris Secundum
(79 CJS). The term search as applied to searches and seizures, is an examination of a mans house
or other buildings or premises, or of his person, with a view to the discovery of contraband or illicit
or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of criminal action for
some crime or offence with which he is charged42. As used in this connection, the term implies
some exploratory investigation or invasion & quest, a looking for or seeking out. The quest may
be secret, intrusive or accomplished by force, & it has been held that a search implies some sort of
force, either actual or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hidden places for
that which is concealed and that object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the
way. Acc. to Websters New International Dictionary, search is subject to a thorough inspection
for article or articles presumably concealed.

[24.] It is submitted on the basis of above mentioned arguments that something which is open for
inspection does not constitute a search but looking & investigating into hidden files does constitute
a search. The computer and internet records are something which are not easily available on a mere
inspection but they are hidden facts which have to be investigated out. In the instant case, the
process undertaken by the police does constitute a search as it is the investigation for the discovery
of some hidden facts & hence the same falls within the ambit of search.

[25.] It is recognized that individuals may have an interest in anonymity on that should be taken
into account in determining whether law enforcement should have warrantless access to subscriber
information as associated with IP addresses. The subscriber has reasonable expectation of privacy
when he/she shares information with the ISP & in such cases anonymity is the foundation of
privacy of interest. Informational privacy equates with secrecy & confidentiality and hence
disclosing it is something as equivalent to revealing hidden facts which clearly points that search
is constituted in the process which the police have undertaken to obtain information from ISP.

42
G.M. Agadi v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Belgaum, (1973) 32 STC 243 (Kar).

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There is reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information & hence it constitutes a
search.43 The mere fact that the information is held by a third party doesnt mean that the person
about whom the information relates has no expectation of privacy in that information.44

[26.] In order to determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is


necessary to determine the subject matter of search. A person will have an expectation of privacy
if search was of core biographical data revealing intimate & private information. The Petitioner,
in this case, have reasonable expectation of privacy related to the information he had shared with
the ISP & any investigation into such private hidden information thus constitute a search which
violates the privacy, a fundamental right of the citizens.45

[27.] Moreover, the search was made in the premises of the legislative assembly. His official
computer was searched .Govt. employee can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
workplace46.It was ruled that the employees can expect a reasonable expectation of privacy in
connection with the personal information stored on a workplace computer47.All the instances
aforesaid clearly leads to the conclusion that the petitioner has reasonable expectation of privacy
with the information he had shared with the ISP and hence any investigation to reveal such
information leads to recovery of hidden facts which directly refers to search. Privacy is, therefore,
part & parcel to convert an inspection into search. It is further submitted that for the purpose of
fulfilment & validity of search, the authenticity of evidence should be taken into account & if the
evidence lacks such authenticity then that doesnt fall within the ambit of search. In the instant
case, taking the information from ISP thus, constituted a search.

[2.3] THAT THE SEARCH AND SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE IS EXCLUDED DUE TO


LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES AS AFFORDED TO MEMBERS OF LEGISLATURE
[28.] It is humbly submitted that the act of search and seizure is not excluded due to legislative
privileges as afforded to members of the legislature. Referring to the rules of procedure and
conduct of business, Rule 175 states that A legal process, civil or criminal shall not be served
within the precincts of the house without obtaining the permission of speaker. Hence, for the

43
R v. Spencer, (2014) SCC 43 (Supreme Court of Canada).
44
R v. Ward, (2012) ONCA 660 (Court of appeal for Ontario, Canada).
45
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors, W.P. (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 (Supreme Court,
24/08/2017).
46
OConnor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 790 (1987, Supreme Court of the United States).
47
R v. Cole, (2012) 3 SCR 34 (Supreme Court of Canada).

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initiation of any proceedings in the house, prior permission of the speaker is an inevitable part in
such proceedings. Whereas, in the present case the search and seizure was not proper as the speaker
didnt allowed them categorically to search the IBS. This was directly in violation of the procedure
established by law as well as the procedure established by the house.

[29.] It is submitted that the facts when linked with rules of the house clearly forms an
unbreakable chain to raise a point that search & subsequent seizure was totally against the
procedure of the law. It has been given the immunity to the members of legislative assemblies that
any proceedings against them whether legal, civil or criminal will not be initiated unless due
permission from the speaker has not been taken by the investigating authorities. The police acted
maliciously and extended the limits of their investigation illegally. In the instant case, the
Investigating authorities on their own whims and fancies initiated an investigation which not only
violates the procedure established by law but also the fundamental rights like privacy48 guaranteed
under the Constitution.49

[30.] From abovementioned arguments, it is quite clear that the immunity guaranteed to the
members of legislative assembly was not all respected. As under the parliamentary privileges it
has been clearly stated that prior permission of speaker was necessary but the permission of
speaker was not given to the search & subsequent seizure hence, it clearly vitiates the investigation
ab initio.

[31.] There are various instances which clearly states that not following the rules established by
the house for its members amounts to breach of privilege. For e.g., a police officer attempted to
execute a warrant of arrest against a member of Punjab Vidhan Sabha within the precincts of the
house, without first obtaining the leave of the house. The house held the police officer guilty of
breach of privilege & the latter had to tender an unqualified apology which the house accepted50.In
other cases, also the principle held was that parliamentary privileges gives immunity in certain
proceedings. Guarding the privileges of the members is the foremost priority of the concerned
authorities51. It is submitted that there was breach of privileges of members.

48
Supra 22 at pg no. 19
49
Art.21, The Constitution of Indistan.
50
P.V.S.D., vol. I, no.1917 March 1959, p.22 (1).
51
Anandan Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Madras, A.I.R.1952 M.P. 117.

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ISSUE 3: WHETHER THIS COURT CAN PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRIT TO THE


STATE IN THE PETETION AND ISSUES RAISED BY NGO-PEW SEEKING
ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 243T TO THE EXTENT OF RESERVING 1/3RD OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS TO BE FILLED BY THE DIRECT ELECTION IN EVERY
MUNICIPALITY FOR WOMEN OR NOT?
[32.] It is humbly submitted before the honble Court that an appropriate Writ be passed seeking
enforcement of Art. 243T to the extent of reserving 1/3rd of total number of seats to be filled by
the direct election in every municipality for women since it is a Constitutional mandate and causes
no interference with the provisions granted to state under Art. 371A of the Constitution of Indistan.
Art.243T (3) may be quoted here which reads as under:

(3) Not less than one third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct
election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by
rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.

[33.] The State of Anga Pradesh has been provided a Special Status and Autonomy under the
Art. 371A which reads as under;

371A. Special provision with respect to the State of Nagaland

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,

(a) No Act of Parliament in respect of

(i) religious or social practices of the Naga,

(ii) Naga customary law and procedure,

(iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary
law,

(iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless
the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides

The status was accorded to the State to preserve its uniqueness and distinctive character. In the
matter herein, the Ordinance seeking the reservation of 1/3rd of the total number of seats in
municipalities is not in violation of such special status granted to the State.

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[3.1] SEVENTY FOURTH AMENDMENT ACT IS NOT ANY ACT OF PARLIAMENT


AND IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE SPECIAL STATUS.
[34.] It is submitted that in the present matter there is no Act of Parliament involved and the
statute on the face of it shows that the contention of the Joint Action Committee is of no avail and
without any basis as well.

[35.] When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves
with supposed intentions.52 In the Interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitution,
founded upon a written organic instrument, if the text is explicit, it is conclusive alike in what it
directs and what it forbids53.The word Notwithstanding employed in the aforesaid Art.,
according to Black laws dictionary is defined as in spite of or instead. This means in spite of
whatever the Constitution must declare as binding on its citizens, any Act of Parliament would not
create any legal implications on the State of Amga Pradesh unless the Legislative Assembly so
decides by a Resolution.

[36.] Reservation for women, SC and ST under Art. 243T is a Constitutional Requirement.
Moreover, Chapter IX A of the Constitution was introduced to make municipal councils to function
as a vibrant unit of Local Administration54. By 74th amendment of the Constitution the Parliament
declared the Municipalities to be the institution of self-government and at the same time provided
for Constitutional reservation in favour of SC, ST and women.55 Therefore, it can safely be
concluded that the Art. 243T is not any Act of Parliament rather a Constitutional Provision and
does not involve any such interference from the Parliament.

[37.] There is no denying the fact that the Constitution is the creation of the Sovereign which
reflects the will of the people and is fountain-head of all the Statutes56. No Authority under the
Constitution is Supreme; and all the Authorities Function under the Supreme law of Land. 57 All
the functionaries be they Legislators, members of Executive or the Judiciary take oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and derive the Authority and Jurisdiction from its Provisions58. Normal rules

52
Pakala Narayan v. Emperor., (1939)41 BOMLR 428
53
Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada ,(1912) AC571(583).
54
Gandhinagar v. State (2012).
55
Smt. Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1996).
56
Supra at 54
57
I.C. Golaknath and Ors. v.State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 1642.
58
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461.

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of interpretation bow down to the requirement of the Constitution since the Constitution is
Supreme and the Statute shall have to be in accordance therewith and not de hors the same59.
Therefore, it is submitted that in the present matter strict implementation to the provisions of the
Art. 243T should be made by the respondent state The Honble SC in a case held that disobedience
to the Constitutional mandate is the disobedience to the Constitution itself and would result in
breaking down the federal policy leading to a Constitutional impasse. Constitutional Court has a
duty and an obligation to alert the Government of the state of its disobedience and the possible
consequences of its non- compliance.60

[38.] It is therefore humbly submitted that Art. 243T, inserted in the Constitution through 74th
Amendment which ensures the fair representation of womanhood, scheduled casts and scheduled
tribes in the political life of local governance is applicable in the state with full force and vigour.

[3.2] PROVISIONS OF THE ARTICLE 371 ARE NOWHERE ATTRACTED AND


VIOLATED
[39.] It is submitted before the Honble Court that each tribal group has their own laws and
procedure, hierarchy of councils etc. The customary law is nowhere codified in their Code of
Conduct. No such tribal custom, usage, practice or religious belief had either been indicated earlier
or had been surfaced as an inhibition against such reservation. Moreover, reservation for women
the Village Development Boards which reads as:

Village Development Boards Model Rules, 1980 framed under Section50(1) of the Nagaland
Village and Area Council Act, 1978

Clause 4 (b) thereof prescribed that 25% of the members of the Managing Committee of such
Board was to be women, is in itself evident of the fact that it does not conflict with any customary
practice prevalent in the state.

[40.] In Rosemary Dzuvichu v. State of Nagaland 61the apex Court upheld the judgment of
Guwahati High Court in the year 2011 and cleared the way for women reservation provided by the
Art.243T of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that it is needless to state that no act of

59
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank Of India, AIR 1999 SC 1149 (1159).
60
supra
61
Rosemary Dzuvichu v. State of Nagaland. (Civil)No.147 of 2011(Guwahati HC,21/10/2011).

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parliament is involved in the instant case and provisions of Art.371A are nowhere attracted and
violated.

[41.] The Limitation Act, 1963 was made applicable in the state of Nagaland even though any
resolution hadnt been passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Nagaland. The Honble Court
held that no such customary laws and procedure are affected in the matter62.

[42.] Moreover, customary laws undergo changes in their content, interpretation and enforcement
in response to the situations that a society has lived with. Some changes are progressive and others
are retrogressive. If a society stagnates and is unable to deal with changes, it gives its law a rigid
interpretation especially if the customs continue when its social base disappears. It then justifies
its continuance or avoidance by attributing it to its ancestors. It is to be understood that customs
are not static they evolve and cannot be against Public Policy.

[43.] It is therefore submitted that the Reservation of the 1/3rd of the total seats in Municipalities
is nether in violation of any customary practice prevalent nor it undermines the sanctity of the
Art.371A of the Constitution of Anga Pradesh.

62
Shri Temjenkaba and Ors. v. Shri Temjenwati and Ors., AIR 1992 Gau 8.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
counsel for the petitioners most humbly and respectfully pray before the Honble Supreme Court
of Indistan that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare-

1. That the Art. 243T is enforceable in the state of Anga Pradesh and the court may pass a
writ directing the state to enforce the same.
2. That the rules prohibiting the Live Telecast of the proceedings are unconstitutional and
the impugned activities i.e. Live Telecast is a part of Art.19 of the Constitution of
Indistan.
3. That the information obtained by the police constitutes a search and does not come
under the permissible limits of the Constitution of Indistan and is not prescribed by the
law.

Pass any other order, writ or direction as this honble court deems fit and proper, in the interest
of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

And for this act of kindness the petitioner shall as in duty bound ever pay.

-Sd-

Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners

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