Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co v WCC

Facts:

Pablo, a mechanic of IDECO, was killed on Jan 29, 1960 by a certain Martin Cordero 20 meters away from the main IDECO gate. The
motive of the killing remained unknown since Martin was also killed before he could be tried for the case. At the time of the killing,
Pablo was accompanied by Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who also finished overtime work (like Pablo) at 5:02pm.

The claim for benefits filed by Pablos wife was granted by the WCC. IDECO was then ordered to pay the wife and WCC with
regards to Pablos death.

However, IDECO is contesting that WCC erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in
presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was
an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Issue:

WON ablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of the phrase "arising out of" and "in the course of employment."

Held:

An injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a
place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.

Exception: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is
about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3)
where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment,
with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.

The Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something,
not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries,
it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed
to exist. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way
to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private
conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the
employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his
return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee
is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified,
dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.

Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to
be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or
implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death
was in the course of employment. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief
to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act
comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.
Belarmino v ECC

Facts:

On Jan 14, 1982 at 9aam, while in the performance of her duty as a public school teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th
month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She then started complaining of abdominal pains and
stomach cramps which persisted for several days.

11 days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl a home. Her abdominal pains persisted even
after delivery. She was brought to the hospital where they found out that she was suffering form septicemia post partum due to
infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently
recovered but she died three (3) days later.

Her husband filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS but was denied.

According to GSIS, 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing
that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have
precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home"

The ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS stating that, Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium
resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the blood,
degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in
school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in
the working conditions of the deceased.

Issue:

Held:

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational
disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is
compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result.

The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with
tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of
post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an
unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the
medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post
partum and death, are compensable. Septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have
occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.

Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts
measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it.
Hinoguin v ECC

Facts:

On Aug. 1, 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Besas to
go on an overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their
issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " that is, it had peace and order problems due
to the presence of elements of the New People's Army.

When they arrived at Aritao, they preceeded to Dft. Alibuyogs parents to have lunch and at 4pm the three of them along with a
civilian had some gin and beer. At around 7pm they boarded a tricycle to return to their headquarters.

Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16
rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched
the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. Sgt.
Hinoguin died on Aug 7, 1985.

After investigation it was found that The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here
proved beyond reasonable doubt the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either against Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin. The Board
after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of
Duty. The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given.

Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits but was denied by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place
nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

The WCC sustained the decision of GSIS stating that the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment. Clearly, the facts
showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just
came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion,

Issue:

WON the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

Held:

We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation
leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves
if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA
elements as they might encounter.

As pointed out above the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that
the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is
really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call
and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which
Sgt. Hinoguin was not).

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft.
Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.
GSIS v CA and F. Alegre

Facts:

On Dec. 6 1994, SPO2 Florencio Alegre was driving his tricycle around Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio,
Jr. Confronted him regarding his tour duty. Alegre ignored Tenorio and cursed at him. They got into an argument which led to the
fatal shooting of SPO2 Alegre.

Private respondent (Alegres wife) filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS but was denied on the ground that SPO2 Alegeres
death was done while in the performance of a personal activity which was not work-connected. This was appealed to the ECC but
they merely affirmed the decision of GSIS.

However, the CA reversed their decision when it ruled that Alegeres death was work-related and, therefore, compensable.
According to the CA, policemen, by the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.

GSIS then filed this petition for certiorari reiterating that Alegeres death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is,
that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

Issue:

WON the death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

Held:

ECC Compensability guidelines: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer

As stated in the cases of Hinoguin, Nitura and P/Sgt. Alvaran, the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits merely on account
of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise
attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the
incident that led to his death.

The matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically
private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. There is no
justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines.That he may be called upon at any time
to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not
change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority
and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. The
24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only
to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.
Valeriano v. ECC and GSIS

Facts:

Celerino Valeriano, a fire truck driver at San Juan Fire Station, met with Alexander Agawin. They then decided to have dinner at
Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA.

At around 9:30pm, on their way home, they got into a car accident which severely injured petitioner.

He then filed for income benefits with GSIS which the latter denied on the ground that the accident did not directly arise or result
from the nature of his work.

The ECC sustained the decision of GSIS ruling that the absence of a causal link between the contingency for which income benefits
are being claimed and his occupation as fireman, his claim under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course.

The CA likewise agreed with the findings of the ECC. The CA denied the petitioners invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin stating that
in Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are presumed to be on official duty 24 hours a day. In the case at bar,
petitioner is a fireman with a specific tour of duty.

Issue:

WON the petitioners injuries are work-connected

WON firemen, like soldiers, can be presumed to be on 24-hour duty.

Held:

For injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting
disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be
proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act
reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.

Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had
suffered. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the
scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Hence, petitioners injury are not work-connected and thus not
compensable.

While the nature of a firemans job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire
alarms which may occur anytime of the day, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was
neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important
justification for the Courts stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act
of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work
as a firetruck driver.
Alano v ECC

Facts:

Dedicacion de Vera worked as a principal of Salinap Community School. On Nov 29, 1976, at 7:00am, 30 minutes before her duty,
while waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee on the way to school, she was bumped and run over by an overspeeding mini-bus which
resulted to her death.

Her brother, herein petitioner, filed for death benefits with GSIS on behalf of Dedicacions children but was denied on the ground
that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed
by law."

The ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS stating that the deceaseds accident did not meet the conditions set up by ECC. First, the
accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her
workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions
as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

Upon petition with the SC, petitioner argues that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment..
The ECC reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided
in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at
the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer."

Issue:

WON the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an
employment accident.

Held:

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he
is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not
disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the
school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. The
petitioners claim for death benefits should then be granted.
Lazo v ECC

Facts:

Petitioner Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines. His usual duty hours were 2:00pm to 10:00pm
but on June 19, 1986, the security guard set to relieve him failed to arrive and so he remained on duty until 5:00am. He then asked
permission from his supervisor to leave early in order to take home to Rial his sack of rice.

On his way home, the jeepney he was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. He sustained injuries and was taken to the
hospital where he was confined until July 25.

He then filed a claim for disability benefits but was denied by the GSIS as the injuries sustained were not at his work place while
performing his duties when the incident occurred. It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. The
ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

Issue:

WON the petitioners injuries come within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase arising out of and in the course of
employment.

Held:

As ruled in IDECO v WCC, If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from
his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect
a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because
the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home.
There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in
the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still
subsists.This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'
Enao v ECC

Facts:

On Aug 1 1975, Emelita Enao, a public school teacher, together with others, was on her way from Sergio Osmena Sr, Zamboanga del
Norte to Dipolog City to purchase school supplies. On their way, they were ambushed by armed men believed to be NPAs.

Petitioner was hospitalized due to the injuries she sustained in the said attack.

It should be noted that classes were not held on this day pursuant to a District Memorandum and that classes were instead held
back in July 26.

She then sent a notice of claim of injury with the Sec of Educ and Culture. She also filed for income benefits for disability with the
GSIS which the latter denied on the ground that said accident happened outside her time and place of work, not to mention the fact
that she was not in the performance of your official functions when it happened.

The ECC sustained the decision of GSIS stating that the conditions set forth by the Commission was not satisfied namely: First. the
day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an off-day. Second, petitioner incurred injury while outside
the school premises where she normally discharges her official functions. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified in an affidavit
that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and
training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more credible-that is, the
appellant was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated.

On the other hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's witnesses, are only prima facie
evidence of weak probative force and are in themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation
of a future litigation.

Issue:

WON the petitioners injuries are compensable considering the place where the incident occurred was outside of her workplace.

Held:

The Court did not agree with the ECCs reasoning that the findings made by the ECC in its decision that the statements of
Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or
support such a conclusion. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would
suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained are definitely work-connected.

The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving declaration of her witnesses
"in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would
resist her claim.

Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular circumstance, render
untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the
time to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place
of residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.

It can be rightfully ruled that the petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether
such task which petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the
petitioner's place of work.

What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so.
Davao Gulf Lumber v. Del Rosario

Facts:

On Sept. 29, 19767, Vicente Soriano, the truck driver of Davao Gulf and Lumber Corporation was killed, along with his son, when
the truck he was driving overturned on the road.

His widow then filed a claim for compensation on Nov 11 but was denied as they found Vicente to be guilty of notorious negligence.
Upon appeal, the Chairman of WCC reversed the decision as they found no such negligence and awarded compensation. Davao Gulf
then moved for reconsideration 15 days after.

However, such reconsideration was denied as it was filed out of time pursuant to Sec. 3. Disposition of Appeal. The
Commissioner to whom an appealed case is assigned by the Chairman shall decide the same on its merit. Either appellee or
appellant, or both, may seek the reconsideration of the decision of a Commissioner by the Commission en banc within 10 days
from receipt of said decision.

Davao Gulf then moved filed a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner to decide its motion on the merits.

However, the Court has chosen to act in accordance with the second alternative of the petition and to regard it as a petition for
review of the compensatory award.

Davao Gulf argues that there is indeed negligence on the part of Soriano because:

1. Preceding the accident the truck was running 40 to 50 kilometers per hour;

2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep slope and the curve of the road was very near the accident;lawphil.net

3. That the machine of the truck was very defective as the truck that met the accident has no more brakes at the time it was
going down at a distance of 5 kms;

4. That the trip in question was personal to meet the relative of the wife of the deceased and the loading of the lumber on that
day SUNDAY was never authorized by the respondent nor any of its representatives. (Pp. 3-2 s.t.n.) (P. 8 s.t.n.)

5. That the trip was made solely at the instance of the deceased;

6. That the dump truck that met the accident was not registered in the Motor Vehicle Office as the same must be utilized only
in carrying slabs inside the sawmill compound; so that its brakes are not in good condition and unworthy to be taken to the
public highway;

7. That despite the defective condition of the truck the deceased (Vicente Soriano Sr.) still drove the truck until he met the
accident;

8. That the members of his family were all seated in the front seat and immediately preceding the accident his Jr. jump into
his arms as a consequence of which he lost control of the steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post.

Issue:

WON there is negligence on the part of Soriano

WON respondent spouse is entitled to death benefits

Held:

In our opinion, the truck was running fast just before overturning because it was then on a slope, and (as declared by the
Commission) the "gear of the truck went out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would not function." As
to the fourth and fifth circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says the Company consented to or authorized the trip.

Concerning the non-registration of the truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective condition there is no finding that the
driver knew this at the time of driving. Registration of the vehicle was not his concern.

As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not certain
that it caused the accident. 1Indeed, as his wife and children were present, this driver must have been extremely careful not
reckless. What happened must have been unforeseen, it may only be blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor transport
or to "accident," for which the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of the deceased's regular duties as
driver.

The death was, consequently, compensable.

Meez v. ECC

Facts:

Petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan
at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was
assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with
respondent Government Service Insurance System.

Respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not
occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work.

Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27,
1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and
work-connected

Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among
the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended

Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that

(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused
by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides:

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.

Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:

(c) Only inquiry or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be
compensable under these Rules.

Issue:

WON petitioner is entitled to compensation

Held:

Rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein
petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains and
stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular
or non- academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding
superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is
situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the
heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby.

In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as
well as dust and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area.

These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public
high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's
occupation as such public high school teacher.

Petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after
being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and
work-connected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111,
Section 1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules."

It must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically
incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner
was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory
retirement age of 65.

Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the effects of the physical and
nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws.
Orate v. CA

Facts:

On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular machine operator. On
March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed with breast cancer Consequently, she underwent modified radical mastectomy on June 9,
1995. The operation incapacitated her from performing heavy work, for which reason she was forced to go on leave and,
eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.

On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits with the Social Security System (SSS), but the
same was denied on the ground that her illness is not work-related.

Her motion for reconsideration was denied. The SSS, however, reiterated its denial of petitioners claim for benefits under the
Employees Compensation Program. Instead, it approved her application as a sickness benefit claim under the SSS, and classified
the same as a permanent partial disability equivalent to a period of 23 months.

the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and granted petitioners claim for compensation benefit under the
Workmens Compensation Act (Act No. 3428). It held that petitioners breast cancer must have intervened before the effectivity of
Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing
law on petitioners claim for compensation benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of compensability, and not
the provisions of the Labor Code on employees compensation.

Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Labor Code should apply to her circumsatance rather than the
Workmen Compensation Act. The motion was denied.

Issue:

WON petitioner should be entitled to compesation under the Labor Code or under the Workmens Compensation Act.

WON petitioners disability is compensable

Held:

Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmens Compensation Act, took effect on June 10, 1928. Under said act, the employee
need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the
course of employment.

On November 1, 1974, the Workmens Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). On
December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. The law as it now stands
requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. It discarded, among others, the concepts of presumption of compensability and aggravation
and substituted a system based on social security principles.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented
as to when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the
governing law.

The presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioners
claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer.

For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two
things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants working
conditions. Cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease.

Petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her working
conditions. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her working
conditions. In the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting
of heavy objects increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her job in the winding
department exposed her to cancer-causing dyes used in coloring threads.

While we sustain petitioners claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case, we are nonetheless constrained to rule that
under the same code, her disability is not compensable.
NFD International Manning Agents v. Illescas

Facts:

Respondent Esmeraldo Illescas entered into a contract of employment with Petitioner NFD Intl. The contract stipulated that the
respondent was to be employed as Third Officer of M/V Shinrei for a period of 9 months.

Respondent started working on October 6, 2002. On May 16, 2003, 7 months since respondent has boarded the ship and started
working, respondent was ordered by the Captain to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the engine workshop to the deck to refit the
caps. While carrying a heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back with pain that radiated down
to the left side of his hips. He was advised to take pain relievers and for a while the pain was tolerable but it became severe after a
few days.

On May 27, 2003, while the vessel was in Japan, respondent was taken to a hospital and was diagnosed with lumbargo and spain.
He was advised to wear a corset and to avoid heavy lifting. However, on June 13, 2003, was reffered to a doctor upon arrival of the
vessel to Australia. The doctor declared that respondent was unfit for work.

Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on June 14, 2003. Dr. Alegre recommended that he undergo laminectomy and
disectomy. On Aug 27, 2003, respondent underwent said surgeries at St. Lukes Medical Center. He was discharged on Sept. 6, 2003,
but there was still restriction in his truncal mobility and the lifting power of his trunk.

As his condition did not improve he sought the expertise of Dr. Almeda. Dr. Almeda found that respondent sustained partial
permanent disability with an impediment Grade of 11 (14.93%), described as slight rigidity or one-third loss of motion or lifting
power of the trunk under the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers. Dr. Almeda declared that respondent was unfit to work at sea
in any capacity as a seaman.

Respondent sent a letter demanding the payment of disability benefit to the petitioner. Respondent likewise filed a complaint with
the arbitration branch of the NLRC.

Petitioners offered to pay $16,795 equivalent to Grade 8 disability. Respondent refused this offer on the ground that the injury
sustained by him was caused by an accident, which was compensable in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

In his position paper, respondent stated that Sec 2.0(B.6) of the POEA Contract for Seafarers states that In case of permanent total
or partial disability of a seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits
arising from the illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or
disease was contracted. However, since he is a member of the Associated Marine Officerss and Seamens Union of he PH
(AMOSUP), which has a CBA with petitioners, he is entitled to a higher disability benefit in the amount of $90,000 since his
disability resulted from an accident while aboard the vessel.

Petitioners countered that the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers and not the CBA that governs. Accident was defined as an
unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event. They argued that respondent's disability was not the result of
an accident, as respondent was merely performing his normal duty. Petitioners argued that, since no accident took place, the
disability benefits under the CBA do not apply to this case.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent. The Labor Arbiter held that the injury suffered by respondent was the result of an
accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment while carrying the heavy fire hydrant caps, and that his injury was
unexpected and unforeseen by him.

Upon appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC modified the decision as it awarded respondent disability benefits under Sec 32, of the POEA
Standard Contract for Seafarers. The NLRC held that the injury sustained by respondent was not the result of an accident, although
it arose out of his work. It stated that the task of carrying hydrant caps was not a fortuitous, unusual or unforeseen event, or a
marine peril.

A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA by the respondent. The CA granted his petition and ordered the petitioners to pay
petitioner $90,000. The CA held that respondents disability resulted from an accident as the injury was unforeseen and happened
without any fault on his part.

Issue:

WON the disability suffered by respondent was caused by an accident

WON the disability is compensable under the CBA

Held:

Art. 13 (Compensation for Death and Disability) of the CBA

If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own, suffers permanent disability as a result of an

accident while serving on board or while traveling to or from the vessel on Company's business or due to
marine peril, and as a result, his ability to work is permanently reduced, totally or partially, the Company
shall pay him a disability compensation which including the amounts stipulated by the POEA's Rules and
Regulations Part II, Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000.00 for ratings and US$90,000.00 for officers.
Xxx
 A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled
to a 100% compensation.

Accident has been defined as: A fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the
person to whom it happens

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent from carrying
the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an
accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the performance of a
duty.

Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable under Article 13 of the CBA.

Dr. Alameda stated in her report that respondent had a a partial permanent disability with Grade 11 Impediment based on the
POEA Contract as he is now three months post surgery but still continues to have back pain. There is still on and off pain and
numbness on his left thigh. He is also unable to tolerate prolonged standing and walking. With his present complaints, Mr. Illescas
cannot withstand the demands of his previous work at sea.

The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda in his Medical Report for declaring respondent unfit to work in any
capacity as a seaman. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the CBA.
Vda. De Inguillo v. ECC

Facts:

Enrique Inguillo worked as a janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo. He was in the govt service for 31 year.s On June
5, 1978, he was confined at the Veterans Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid,
accompanied by chest pains difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." He died on 20 June 1978, at the age of 52, the
cause of death being attributed to "Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone and
Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia"

His wife, herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on the ground that the cause of
death, cancer of the esophagus, is not an occupational didease. The ECC affirmed the GSIS descion.

Petitioner argues that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule on controversion, the
presumption of compensability, and the principle of aggravation.

Issue:

WON the petitioners cause of death, cancer of the esophagus and pneumonia, is compensable

Held:

Cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a
person's employment appears to have no relevance. respondent ECC failed to adequately take into consideration that there was
another cause of death, which was "pneumonia." Under the same Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation,
pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational disease "under all the following conditions:"

(a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment, also industrial
injury to the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious substances in
the place of work.

(b) There must be a direct connection between the offending agent or event and the worker's illness.

(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should
at least be twenty-four (24) hours after the injury.

(d) The patient must present one of the following findings within a few days of the accident:

(1) Severe chill and fever.

(2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side.

(3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration.

(4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales

The decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of
breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by itself
can also be a killer disease . Further, a review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that they included the regular
use of "deleterious substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of
toilet bowls and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections.

The deceased also performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors, with the
resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs,
as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing him to occasional "wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains.

The combination of all these, coupled with the fact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area
characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of
pneumonia. The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an
additional condition for compensability.
Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management

Facts:

In 1992, petitioner was hired by Denholm (manning agency) to work as a messman on board on of the international vessels of
Denklav.According to the CBA entered into by AMOSUP and Denholm, his contractual work was considered terminated after every
contract and that the duration of his service was for 9 months. His last assignment was from Nov 4, 1999 to July 16, 2000 on board
MV Leopard.

After the expiration of his contract with MV Leopard, petitioner was lined up for another assignment but was disqualified for
employment and declared unfit for sea duty after he was diagnosed to have varicose veins.

Petitioner then demanded from respondent the payment of disability benefits, separation pay and reinbursemnt of medical
expenses.

His demands with both respondent and AMOSUP were both denied.

He then filed with the LA a complaint for payment of disability benefits, medical expenses, separation pay, damages and attys fees.
But this was likewise denied.

On appeal, the NLRC reveresed the LAs decision and ordered the respondent to pay petitioner his disability compensation.

When the case was elevated to the CA, the CA set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the LA. The CA
explained that since having varicose veins was not among those listed as occupational diseases under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
626, petitioner bore the burden of proving that such ailment was brought about by his working conditions. His mere claim that his
employment with respondent company was the cause of his varicose veins hardly constituted substantial evidence to convince a
reasonable mind that his ailment was work-related or the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions with
respondent company.

Petitioner claims that :

(1)the burden of proving his illness is not work-related rests on the respondent pursuant to the provisions of the POEA-SEC.
He claims that illmesses not listed therein are disputably presumed work-related. As it is not listed, he is relieved from the
trouble of proving the work-relatedness of the illness because it is already disputably presumed by law.

(2)he was engaged by respondent company as a seafarer for nine (9) years covering seven (7) contracts with their vessels;
that he was medically screened in every contract; and that he was found fit to work up to his last contract on board the vessel
MV Leopard.

(3)he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because his varicose veins have rendered him permanently
incapacitated to return to work as a seafarer.

Respondent argues that:

(1)the 2000 POEA-SEC took effect on July 2002. Since petitioners contract with MV Leopard was from Nov 1999 to July 2000,
it is the provisions of the 1996 POEA-SEC that should govern and not the 2000 POEA-SEC.

(2)Petitioner was discovered to have varicose veins in March 2001, or months after his last employment contract with
respondent company ended in July 2000. So, it is difficult to conclude that his varicose veins can only be attributable to his
previous employment with the company.

(3)there is no showing that petitioners varicose veins caused him permanent disability. While affliction with varicose veins
may bring pain and discomfort to the body of a person, the illness is not permanent as it can actually be treated, either
through self-help or medical care.

Issue:

WON the respondent has the burden of proving that petitioners illness is not work related.

WON the petitioners illness is work related entitling him to disability benefits.

Held:

It is worth noting that the provision found in the 2000 POEA-SEC in which petitioner seeks relief is not found in the 1996
POEA-SEC. And since he his contract with MV Leopard was contracted in 1999, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC that is applicable to his
case.

Even assuming that the provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B)
does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be
entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have
existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent
company. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the
injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarers employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not
sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be
shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work for which he had been
contracted.
 Unfortunately for petitioner, he failed to prove that his varicose veins arose out of his employment with respondent company. He
likewise failed to particularly describe his working conditions while on sea duty. He also failed to specifically state how he
contracted or developed varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his working conditions aggravated it. Neither did he
present any expert medical opinion regarding the cause of his varicose veins. No written document whatsoever was presented that
would clearly validate his claim or visibly demonstrate that the working conditions on board the vessels he served increased the
risk of acquiring varicose veins.

There is also no proof that petitioners varicose veins caused him to suffer total and permanent disability. The Pre-Employment
Medical Examination (PEME) he underwent cannot serve as enough basis to justify a finding of a total and permanent disability
because of its non-exploratory nature. Besides, it was not expressly stated in his medical diagnosis that his illness was equivalent
to a total and permanent disability. Absent any indication, the Court cannot accommodate him.
GSIS v. Calumpiano

Facts:

Aurelia Y. Calumpiano was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court of First Instance ofSamar from January 5, 1972 until
her retirement on March 30, 2002.

On March 7, 2002, she filed before the Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailments,
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim, she submitted the medical
certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are Opthalmologists at
Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certificate of] which x x x
was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved her application for disability retirement, under
Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).

Respondents disability claim was forwarded to GSIS, but the latter denied her claim for the reason that hypertension and
glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work-related

The ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS.

Petitioner argues that hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of increased risk; that although
essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it is not compensable per se as the conditions should be satisfied; that
hypertension is compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart,eyes and brain, resulting
in permanent disability;"19 that since respondent did not suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that respondents other illness glaucoma is
not compensable

Respondent contests that the "increased risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided cases;22 that in
disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of the employees earning capacity

Issue:

WON the increased risk theory applies in the present case

WON repondent is entitled to compensation

Held:

Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, "her duties were no doubt stressful and the
same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension" which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CAs
pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply again,
contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is required.

Essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain,
resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c)
blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan. medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondents attending
physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits.

Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The fact that the essential hypertension of
respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration
for its compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher employment, and any non-work related factor
that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.

Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which
leads the Court to conclude that respondents glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension. the pressure difference
between blood entering the eye and IOP. Its clear that three forces OPP, IOP and blood pressure are interconnected in the
glaucoma disease process. The mechanics of that relationship, however, remain ambiguous.

It must be stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases.
GSIS v. Jum Angel

Facts:

On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was fetched/invited from his post by a certain Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez (Capt. Lamerez) of the
Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army to shed light on his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning case being
investigated by the Philippine Army.

On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation.

The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his
neck. According to the Autopsy Report conducted by the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the cause of
death was asphyxia by strangulation.

Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her
husband was murdered and named the elements of Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects.

On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have
died in line of duty.

On 15 March 2000, the Philippine Army through Chief of Staff Brig. General Pedro V. Atienza, Jr., issued General Order No. 270
declaring the line of duty status in favor of Sgt. Angel.

Respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

The GSIS denied the respondents claim on the ground that Sgt. Angels death did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

On appeal before the ECC, they likewise denied the claim for want of merit.

A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA, the CA reversed the ECC decision and granted the petition. The CA pointed out that
Sgt. Angel was manning his post at the Army Support Command when invited by Capt. Lamerez of the Intelligence Service Group to
undergo an investigation concerning a gunrunning/pilferage case in the Philippine Army. Sgt. Angel was never arrested; he went
with Capt. Lamerez to shed light on the investigation. It was never shown that Sgt. Angels subsequent detention was a punishment
for any wrong doing. Furthermore, the appellate court recognized the peculiar nature of a soldiers job as decided by the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

WON the death of Sgt. Angel is compensable under PD 626 (ECSIF)

Held:

For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides: Section 1. Grounds.
(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment.
Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his
official functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
The term accident has been defined in an insurance case. Thus, An accident is an event which happens without any human agency
or, if happening through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to
whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured
without his design, consent, or voluntary cooperation.
As provided for in Article 172 of the law, Presidential Decree No. 626. Thus:
Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the employee or his
dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employees intoxication, willful intention to injure or
kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this title.
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an accident which is compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting
death from the coverage of the State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court
of Appeals, veered away from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and, instead, focused on the
requirement that the death must arise out of or in the course of employment.
The circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck
taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of foul play negate respondents claim of murder of her
husband and of compensability of such death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.