Macadangdang v. CA
W/N finding of the CA that respondent and her husband were separated
Petitioner: ANTONIO MACADANGDANG
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH
MEJIAS
Ponente: J. MAKASIAR
Short Facts and Doctrine/s:
Respondent is a married woman. She alleged that due to the affair with
petitiner, she and her husband separated. 7 months or 210 days following
the illicit encounter, she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando.
She then filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner. The
SC in reversing the decision of the CA held that the finding of the CA that
respondent and her husband is separated is based solely on the testimony
of respondent which is self-serving. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the
child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of
respondent and her husband. The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow
the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be
the father of the child. The separation between the spouses must be such as
to make sexual access impossible. This may take place when they reside in
different countries or provinces. In this case, respondent failed to overthrow
such presumption of legitimacy.
Facts:
Elizabeth Mejias is married with Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had
intercourse with petitioner Macadangdang. She also alleges that due to
the affair, she and her husband separated. 7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter, she gave birth to a baby boy who was
named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites in 1967. The records
also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent filed a complaint for
recognition and support against petitioner with the CFI of Davao.
Macadangdang filed his answer opposing plaintiff's claim and praying
for its dismissal.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Mejias appealed before the
CA, wherein the latter reversed the lower courts decision and thus
declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Macadangdang.
Issues:
1.
in 1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this
Court.
2. W/N the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.
Ruling:
1. NO.
2. YES.
Ratio:
1. The finding of the CA that respondent and her husband is separated is
based solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in
the records shows that her statement was confirmed or corroborated by
another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record
or that which is based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by
her own husband, who was not impleaded.
The findings of facts of the CA are conclusive on the parties and on the SC,
unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant
and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record
Since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province,
the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each
other.
2. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. The baby
boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7)
months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse
between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from
their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of
March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children;
hence, they had been married years before such date. The birth of Rolando
came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of
the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation
between aforenamed spouses.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial
sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the
said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a
normal full-term baby.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and
her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the
first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by
only one evidence the physical impossibility of access between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was
impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as
could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where
sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken to be
the father of the child. To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore,
there must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife
during the period of conception. The law expressly refers to physical
impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations
improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it may be
proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
access.
countries or provinces, and they have never been together during the period
of conception. Or, the husband may be in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through corrupt
violation of or allowed by prison regulations.
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains,
notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart,
unless the contrary is shown and this includes children born after the
separation .
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery
on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy
of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband. It
has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the
point would be unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals
immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may have on
the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer
thereby. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain; she can only contest the Identity of the child.
Disposition:
Decision of the CA was reversed.

The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual

access impossible. This may take place when they reside in different