Rule 115 Cases 45-58

RULE 115
Rights of Accused
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled
to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the
trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the
court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused
under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent
trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right
without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence
be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse
party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 1

[G.R. No. L-6216. April 30, 1954.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMANDO AUSTRIA, Defendant-

Appellee.
Agripino Rabago for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION. Where the information is not merely defective but it
does not charge any offense at all, technically speaking, that information does not exist in
contemplation of law.
2. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY. If an information is dismissed and the accused discharged on a
demurrer, or on petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on the courts own motion, because the
information or complaint is either void or fatally defective, or what amounts to the same thing, when
it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the consequent discharge of the accused is
not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
3. ID.; ID.; VOID INFORMATION CAN NOT BE VALIDATED BY PRESENTING EVIDENCE. It is true
that the motion to quash was interposed by counsel for the accused after the prosecution had
presented its evidence and that a portion of that evidence tended to prove that the weapon for which
the accused was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm had been used in killing his victim in the
homicide case, to which evidence, as the record shows, the accused, or his counsel, did not interpose
any objection. This fact, however, cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or of
proving an offense which does not legally exist.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Amando Austria was accused before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in two separate
information, one of murder and the other of illegal possession of firearm. Because the weapon used
by the accused in killing the deceased in the crime of murder is the same unlicensed firearm for which
he was charged in the case for illegal possession of firearm, the two cases were tried jointly by
agreement of the parties and with the approval of the court.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, counsel for the defense filed an oral motion to
dismiss the case for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute an offense, invoking in support thereof Republic Act No. 482 which
exempts from criminal liability persons found in possession of unlicensed firearms unless they are
used or carried in the person of the possessor. The court denied the motion. With this denial, trial was
resumed with the defense presenting its evidence in both cases. And when the case were submitted
for decision, the court convicted the accused in the case of homicide but dismissed that for illegal
possession of firearm on the ground that the information does not charge an offense under Republic
Act No. 482.
Later, another information was filed against the accused also for illegal possession of firearm where in
it was alleged for the first time that the accused carried the firearm in his person and used it in killing
one Alejo Austria. Counsel for the accused filed a written motion to quash this information pleading
double jeopardy in his behalf. This motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Flores, then presiding the
court but, on motion for reconsideration, Judge Antonio Belmonte, who took over the court, sustained
the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that if it be continued it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. Not satisfied with this order, the fiscal took the present appeal.
The issue posed in this appeal is: Is the dismissal of the information filed in the first case for illegal
possession of firearm against the accused a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense?
It should be noted that the court dismissed the first case for illegal possession of firearm upon the
sole ground that the information did not contain facts sufficient to constitute an offense. Bear in mind

that information was filed in connection with Republic Act No. 482 which exempts from criminal
liability persons found in possession of unlicensed firearms unless the firearm is used or carried in his
person by the possessor. And we already held in a recent case that in order that an information under
that Act may be deemed sufficient it must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or
carrying it in his person at the time he was caught by the authorities with the unlicensed weapon
(People v. Santos Lopez y Jacinto, * G.R. No. L-1603, November 29, 1947). And these essential
allegations not having been averred in the information, the court rightly dismissed the case on the
ground that the information did not allege facts sufficient to constitute an offense.
With this background, it is evident that the plea of double jeopardy cannot be entertained either
under our rules or under our jurisprudence. Thus, section 9, Rule 113, expressly provides that the
dismissal of a case against the defendant can only be considered as a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense when the case against him is dismissed "upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction." And elaborating on the
scope of this provision, we find the following rulings: As a general rule, one is not put in jeopardy if
the information under which he is tried is entirely void because it charges no offense at all known to
law. (16 C.J. sec. 379, p. 243; U.S. v. Balmori, 1 Phil., 660.) Accordingly, if an information is
dismissed and the accused discharged on a demurrer, or on petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on
the courts own motion because the information or complaint is either void or fatally defective, or
what amounts to the same thing, when it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the
consequent discharge of the accused is not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense. (U.S. v.
Montiel, 7 Phil., 272; People v. Nargatan, 48 Phil., 470; People v. Mirasol, 43 Phil., 860; 16 C.J., pp.
241-6; Hopt. v. Utah, 104 U.S., 631; Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S., 155; U.S. v. Openheimer,
24 U.S., 85, 61 Law Ed. 161.)
It is true that the motion to quash was interposed by counsel for the accused after the prosecution
had presented its evidence and that a portion of that evidence tended to prove that the weapon for
which the accused was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm had been used in killing his victim
in the homicide case, to which evidence, as the record shows, the accused, or his counsel, did not
interpose any objection. This fact, however, cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or
of proving an offense which does not legally exist. Such is the situation that obtains in the present
case. The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically
speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in the cases of Serra v. Mortiga, 11 Phil., 762, U.S. v.
Estraa, 16 Phil., 520, and United States v. Destrito and De Ocampo, 23 Phil., 28, cited with approval
in the case of People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil., 744, wherein this court held that "Any defect in the
accusation other than that of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be cured by good and
sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution, and admitted by the trial court, without any
objection on the part of the defense, and the accused may be legally convicted of the crime or offense
intended to be charged and so established by the evidence." But this doctrine does not apply to our
case because we are concerned here with an information which charges no offense at all, and not with
one which is merely defective.
The present case should be likened to one where, "When the offense proved is more serious than,
and includes the offense charged, as when the offense charged is less serious physical injuries and
the offense proved is serious physical injuries the accused may be convicted of the former but not of
the latter offense of which he has not been informed." (U.S. v. De Guzman, 8 Phil., 21), or to the rule
which requires that "a qualifying circumstance which constitutes one of the essential elements of the
offense like alevosia in murder should be pleaded, otherwise it should be considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance if proved (U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil., 368). The philosophy behind this ruling
is that an accused cannot be convicted of a charge of which he has not been informed.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, without costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
The defendant-appellee was charged in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte with the crime of

illegal possession of firearm under Republic Act No. 482, in an information which failed to allege that
the firearm was used by or carried in the person of the appellee. After the prosecution had presented
its evidence tending to show that the firearm had been used by the appellee in killing one Alejo
Austria, to which evidence the appellee or his counsel did not interpose any objection, a motion to
quash was filed on the ground that the information did not contain facts sufficient to constitute an
offense, in that it failed to allege that the firearm was used or carried by the appellee. This motion
was denied and the defense accordingly presented its evidence. The court thereafter rendered a
decision dismissing the information for the reason that it did not charge an offense under Republic Act
No. 482.
Subsequently another information was filed against the appellee for the same illegal possession of
firearm, it being now alleged that he carried said firearm in his person and used it in killing Alejo
Austria. Counsel for the appellee filed a written motion to quash, based on double jeopardy. This was
denied by the then presiding Judge Jose P. Flores but, on motion for reconsideration, the next
presiding Judge, Antonio Belmonte, sustained the motion and dismissed the case on the ground
invoked by the appellee. The fiscal has appealed.
I am of the considered opinion that the appealed order is correct. The information in the first case
was valid, although fatally defective for failing to allege an essential element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm; but as said fatal defect was supplied by necessary evidence during the trial;
without objection on the part of the defense, the court below could have rendered a judgment of
conviction against the appellee. As already held in People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil., 744, "any defect
in the accusation other than that of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be cured by good
and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution, and admitted by the trial court, without any
objection on the part of the defense, and the accused may be legally convicted of the crime or offense
intended to be charged and so established by the evidence." This Court cited with approval the
decision in U.S. v. Estraa, 16 Phil., 520, in which the accused was prosecuted for the crime of
perjury in an information which failed to allege that the false testimony involved was material, this
allegation being an essential element of the crime of perjury under section 3 of Act No. 1687; but as
no objection to the sufficiency of the complaint was raised during the trial, this Court held that the
fatal defect could have been supplied by competent testimony. To quote:
The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an allegation that the testimony,
alleged to be false, was material to the issues involved in the murder case. Our statute (section 3 of
Act No. 1687, supra) specifically makes materiality an essential element of the crime of perjury and
without this the crime can not legal]y exist. As no objection to the sufficiency of the complaint was
raised this fatal defect could have been supplied by competent testimony on the trial. (United States
v. Estraa, 16 Phil., 520, 529.)
The case at bar is on all fours with the case of U.S. v. Estraa, in that in both cases the information
failed to allege an essential element of the offenses respectively charged therein: in the first, that the
appellee carried or used the firearm; and in the second, that the alleged false testimony was material.
I vote, therefore, for the dismissal of the appeal.
Montemayor, J., concurs.
LABRADOR, J.:
I concur in the dissent of Chief Justice Paras. The grounds upon which the majority decision are based
are too technical to subserve the ends of justice.

G.R. No. L-6216 (April 30, 1954) PEOPLE VS AUSTRIA
FACTS:
Amando Austria was accused before the CFI of Ilocos Norte in two separate information, one of
murder and the other of illegal possession of firearm.Because the weapon used by the accused in
killing the deceased in the crime of murder is the same unlicensed firearm for which he was charged
in the case for illegal possession of firearm, the two cases were tried jointly by agreement of the
parties and with the approval of the court.
So, the court "CFI convicted the accused in the case of homicide but dismissed that for illegal
possession of firearm on the ground that the information does not charge an offense under Republic
Act No. 482, which exempts from criminal liability persons found in possession of
unlicensed firearms unless they are used or carried in the person of the possessor.
Later, another information was filed against the accused also for illegal possession of firearm for
killing Alejo Austria. Counsel for the accused filed a written motion to quash this information pleading
double jeopardy in his behalf. This motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Flores because the essential
allegations to prove that the accused violated Republic Act 482 were not averred in the information.
Upon filing of the motion for consideration, Judge Antonio Belmonte, dismissed the case on the
ground that if it be continued it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Not satisfied with this
order, the fiscal took the present appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Is the dismissal of the information filed in the first case for illegal possession of firearm against the
accused a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. (DOUBLE JEOPARDY)
2. Is a void information can be validated by presenting evidence?
RULING:
1. No. It should be noted that the court dismissed the first case for illegal possession of firearm
because the information did not contain essential facts sufficient to constitute an offense in
connection with Republic Act No. 482. For the information under that Act may be deemed
sufficient, it must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in
his person at the time he was caught by the authorities with the unlicensed weapon.
Section 9, Rule 113, expressly provides that the dismissal of a case against the defendant can only be
considered as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense when the case against him is
dismissed "upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction."
As a general rule, one is not put in jeopardy if the information under which he is tried is
entirely void because it charges no offense at all known to law.
Accordingly, if an information is dismissed and the accused discharged on a demurrer, or on

petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on the courts own motion because the information
or complaint is either void or fatally defective, or what amounts to the same thing, when it
does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the consequent discharge of the
accused is not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
2. No, a void information cannot be validated by presenting evidence. It is true that the motion to
quash was interposed by counsel for the accused after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
that a portion of that evidence tended to prove that the weapon for which the accused was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm had been used in killing his victim in the homicide case, to
which evidence, as the record shows, the accused, or his counsel, did not interpose any objection.
This fact, however, cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or of proving an offense
which does not legally exist.

G.R. No. L-43833 November 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SOTERO NAVARRETE Y LUCERO,

defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Sotero Navarrete was charged on September 5, 1972 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, for
having raped his own daughter, Elizabeth Navarrete, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in the third week of August, 1972, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
by means of force and intimidation to wit: by then and there pulling the arms of Elizabeth Navarrete y
de Guia, taking off her clothes and panty, forcibly laying her on bed and touching and kissing her
private parts, threatening to kill her with a sharp pointed instrument should she resist, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Elizabeth Navarrete y de
Guia, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law (Exh, C, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).
Upon arraignment on September 15, 1972, the accused entered a plea of "not guilty."
The Trial court, presided then by Honorable Juan L. Bocar, after due trial, rendered its judgment on
February 13, 1973, the dispositive portion of which is worded thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs (p.
13, rec.).
From this judgment, the accused Sotero Navarrete inter-posed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On
May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which reads in part as follows:
We find that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 335 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Act,
this Court has no jurisdiction to impose this penalty.
WHEREFORE, let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for final
determination. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to certify the case immediately to the Supreme
Court (p. 113, rec.).
In accordance with the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to this
Court and the same was submitted for decision on May 26, 1976.
It must be noted at the outset that in the case of People vs. Daniel (L-40330, 86 SCRA 511,
November 20, 1978), the Supreme Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, declared
that:
... Henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said court, with a comprehensive
written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and
explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to
this court for review (emphasis supplied).
In that case, the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal on the accused for the crime of
rape. The Court of Appeals, however, recommended that the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be

imposed and certified the case to this Court. The accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua by this Court.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated May 3, 1976, affirmed the decision of
the trial court finding the accused guilty of the crime charged but certified the case to this Court with
the recommendation that the penalty of reclusion perpetua be imposed. The case was submitted for
decision on May 26, 1976.
While the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in consonance with the procedural ruling of this
Tribunal in People vs. Daniel, nevertheless We assume jurisdiction rather than demand the case to
the Court of Appeals because the case was decided and certified to this Court on May 3, 1976, before
the ruling in the case of People vs. Daniel was made interpreting Section 34 of the Judiciary Act.
Besides, this would avoid the unnecessary and time-wasting shuttling of the case between the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals especially so if the right of the accused to speedy trial is to
be considered.
The ruling in People vs. Daniel should therefore be given prospective effect so that beginning
November 20, 1978, should the Court of Appeals in criminal cases pending before it be of the opinion
that the penalty of death orreclusion perpetua should be imposed where the penalty meted by the
trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, it should follow the directive of this Court in the Daniel case
as aforequoted. On the other hand, those certified criminal cases already pending decision before this
Court, like the present case, at the time People vs. Daniel was decided on November 20, 1978, should
be outrightly decided, rather than remanded to the Court of Appeals.
(Note: However, in People vs. Traya [89 SCRA 274 (1979)], a certified criminal case, decided on
March 30, 1979, per Justice Guerrero, this Court [1st Division], invoking the directive in People vs.
Daniel, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for rendition of the proper judgment. In that case,
the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal On appeal, the Court of Appeals, believing that
the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, refrained from rendering judgment and certified the case to
this Court. As per records, the case was certified by the Court of Appeals on April 3, 1978 and
submitted for decision on April 12, 1978; hence before the directive in the Daniel case).
II
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Elizabeth Navarrete the rape
victim Caridad de Guia, the mother of the victim, Pat Vifedio Guillen, and Dr. Abelardo V. Lucero, the
Medico-Legal Officer, and Exhibits "A", the crime report; "A-1", the booking sheet and arrest report;
"A-2", the sworn statement of Elizabeth Navarrete; "B", medical certificate issued by Dr. Abelardo
Lucero; "C". complaint signed by Elizabeth Navarrete; "C-1", the signature of Elizabeth Navarrete
appearing on the complaint "C-2", the signature of Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles before whom the
complaint was sworn by the victim; "D", the Medico Legal report of Dr. Abelardo Lucero; "E", the
marriage contract of Sotero Navarrete and Caridad de Guia; and "E-1", the marriage license. The
evidence for the defense rested mainly on the testimony of the accused, Sotero Navarrete.
From the evidence, it appears that Elizabeth Navarrete is the daughter of the accused, Sotero
Navarrete and his wife, Caridad de Guia. Elizabeth, who was a first year high school student, was only
15 years old when she became the victim of the crime alleged in the complaint. At the time of her
birth, her parents were merely living together in common-law relationship although they subsequently
got married on November 20, 1957 (Exh. "E", p. 36, Folder of Exhibits). Sometime in 1959, two years
after their marriage, Elizabeth's parents separated. Her mother was then pregnant and later gave
birth to her other sister, Emma Navarrete. Thereafter, Elizabeth and her sister lived with their mother
at 310 Antipolo Street, Sampaloc Manila, while their father, the accused, lived somewhere in Balic-
Balic, Sampaloc, sometimes with his friends and sometimes with his parents (pp. 9-11, 13, t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972; p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 10, 1972). It appears also that the accused was convicted of
homicide sometime in 1959, for which he was imprisoned for eleven (11) years [pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Dec.
8, 1972; p. 3, t.s.n. Jan. 29, 1973]. When he was released from prison in 1970 (p. 8, t.s.n., Dec.
8,1972), he discovered that his wife was living with another man (p. 4, t.s.n., Jan. 29, 1973), but this
notwithstanding, he occasionally visited his two daughters, E Elizabeth and Emma (pp. 11, 13, t.s.n.
November 3, 1972).
The evidence further revealed that in one of his visits which took place on or about the third week of
August, 1972, the accused invited his daughter Elizabeth to a birthday party somewhere in Loreto
Street: Sampaloc, Elizabeth gladly accepted the invitation and willingly went with her father,
unmindful of his evil designs. They rode in a passenger jeepney but they did not go down in Loreto
Street and instead proceeded to Quiapo. Upon reaching their destination, they got off the jeepney and
the accused brought his daughter to the New Star Hotel in Quiapo. When asked why they were
entering that hotel, the accused told his daughter that he was going to fetch a friend who is waiting
for him and who will also attend the party. Believing her father, Elizabeth followed him in going up
the stairs inside the hotel. Then the accused paid a Chinese woman after which he entered a room
and asked his daughter to come inside. Once inside, Elizabeth asked her father why they were there.
She also asked him about his friend whom he was going to fetch. Her father did not say anything but
simply laughed. After closing the door, the accused started to remove his clothes. At this point,
Elizabeth became apprehensive already. When the accused had removed his clothes, he approached
Elizabeth and told her to undress but she refused to do so. The accused became angry and
threatened to kill her, her sister and mother if she did not do as she was told. Then the accused held
her arms and pulled her towards the bed and removed her dress. Elizabeth cried and she lost her
strength and composure. The accused fondled her body and kissed her cheek, neck, breast and her
private parts. She struggled and resisted her father's advances but she could not do anything because
he was holding her hands. Elizabeth just kept on crying. He succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with his daughter and she felt pain in her private parts. Soon thereafter, he withdrew his private part
from hers when she continued to cry. Then both of them dressed up without talking to each other and
the accused brought his daughter back home. Elizabeth narrated the harrowing incident to her aunt,
Estrelia Navarrete, the next day. Her aunt, who is a half-sister of her father and only 16 years old,
could only shake her head. Elizabeth asked for advice but her aunt was also afraid because the same
thing might happen to her (pp. 13-17, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972; pp. 3-6, t.s.n., Dec. 4, 1972).
The accused visited Elizabeth on August 28, 1972 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening to ask if she
had informed anybody about the incident at the hotel and she answered in the negative. The accused
came again the next day at about 5:30 in the afternoon to inform Elizabeth that he was going to rent
a room so that he will not pay anymore for a hotel room. In the afternoon of the following day, the
accused came back to tell his daughter that he had rented a place near the Balic-Balic church and
invited her. He threatened his daughter that something drastic will happen to her if she will not come
to his place. That same afternoon, Elizabeth and her sister, Emma, went to the aforesaid place
accompanied by the accused. Arriving at the place, the accused and his two daughters cleaned the
surroundings. Afterwards, he brought them home and asked them to come again on the 31st of
August (pp. 18-20. t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).
At about 10:30 in the evening of August 31, 1972, the accused fetched his two daughters and
brought them to his place. When the two were already asleep, Elizabeth was awakened by her father
as he was getting up and later she felt that he was inserting his hand inside her T-shirt. She stood up
and her father told her that he was again feeling the sex urge. The accused held her by the arm and
pulled her to a wooden bed. He undressed himself and Elizabeth started to cry knowing what her
father would do to her again. Then the accused removed the T-shirt and underwear of his daughter.
Thereafter, he held her hands and placed himself on top of her and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse. Elizabeth tried to resist by closing her legs but the accused was able to open her legs by
means of his legs also, Moreover, she could not do anything because she was afraid of the knife that
was shown to her by the accused and placed on top of the table. Elizabeth just kept on crying
throughout her ordeal. After satisfying his lust, the accused fell asleep and Elizabeth dressed up and
waited for morning. That following morning, Elizabeth and her sister were able to go home (pp. 20-
23, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).
The accused invited Elizabeth again to his place and succeeded in abusing her in the afternoon of
September 1, 1972. As in the previous occasion, she went to his place because she was told that
something drastic would happen to her if she did not come. Subsequently, on September 3, 1972 at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused came and asked his daughter to go to his place but
she refused. He became mad and left. At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of September 4,
1972, he returned drunk and with a companion. The accused asked Elizabeth why she did not like to
sleep anymore in his place. She told him that she was already having difficulty or moral conflict
because of what he was doing to her. But he told his daughter that he would come and drag her to
this place if she did not come at about 8:30 in the evening of that day. Then Elizabeth started crying.
Her mother noticed her but did not talk to her at that moment. When morning came, her mother
asked her why she was crying and she finally narrated what her father did to her. Upon learning what
happened, her mother became sad and declared that if it were not only a sin she would kill the
accused. In the afternoon of that day, September 4, 1972, Elizabeth and her mother went to Police
Precinct No. 3 to file a complaint. Elizabeth gave her statement in writing (pp. 23-26, t.s.n.,

November 3, 1972). She was later physically examined by Dr. Abelardo Lucero, Medico-Legal Officer,
who submitted his findings, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Newly healed laceration in the hymen at 6:00 o'clock position. The edges are thin and reversible.
(3) Introitus vagina admits one adult finger easily but could hardly admit 2 fingers (Exhs. "B", "D",
pp. 35, 20, Folder of Exhibits).
The appellant, in his brief filed by his counsel de officio, Atty. Virgilio S. Castro, alleged that the trial
court committed an error in finding him guilty of the crime of rape.
There is no question that the appellant had carnal knowledge with his daughter, Elizabeth Navarrete;
but in avoidance, he claims that there was no force or intimidation employed and therefore he is not
guilty of the crime charged.
The contention of the appellant does not find support in the evidence on record. There is sufficient
evidence to establish the fact that the accused employed force in having sexual intercourse with his
daughter. The offended daughter testified in direct examination as to the manner the sexual
intercourse was consummated and the pertinent portions of her testimony are quoted below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q After your father had removed his clothings what happened next?
A He asked me to undress.
Q What did you tell your father when he asked you to do this?
A I refused to undress.
Q When you refused to undress, will you tell the Court what your father did?
A He became angry.
Q Did he say anything when he became mad'?
A He told me if I will 'not do as I tell you,' he will be going to kill me and also my sister and my mother.
Q At the time he said this, do you know whether he was holding anything?
A No, sir.
Q Now what did you do after your father gave or made this threat to you and your family?
A He held me by the arm and pulled me.
Q To what direction or place were you pulled you father?
A To the bed.
Q And what happened to you when your father pulled you towards the bed?
A He forced me.
Q What do you mean. Will you tell the Court what you mean by your father forcing you?
A He undressed me. He removed my clothes.
Q While your father was undressing you, what did you tell him, if you told him anything?
A I was crying.
Q Did you not ask why he was doing this to you'?
ATTY. GAPUZ
Very leading.
COURT
The witness may answer.
WITNESS
A I lost my composure.
FISCAL
Q What happened after this?
A Then he started fondling my body.
Q When your father was doing this, to you, were you already undressed?
A I am still dressed.
Q What were you doing at the time when he was as you said fondling your body?
A Nothing.
Q Then what happened next?

A I was struggling.
Q Why were you struggling?
A Because I don't like what he was doing.
Q Why, what was your father doing when you were struggling?
A He was holding my body, my hands.
Q And what followed next after he was holding your two arms?
A He was able to succeed his desire.
FISCAL
Q Please tell the Court how he was able to get what he wanted'.
A He forced me.
Q How did he force you; in what manner?
A He hold my two hands and then he inserted his private part on mine.
Q Will you tell the Court how he was able to do this when at the time you had still your clothes on?
A He removed my clothes.
Q And after he was able to remove your clothes, what else did your father do to you?
A He kissed me.
Q In what part of the body were you kissed?
A On the cheek; on the neck; and then on the breast, and then on my private part.
Q When your father was doing these things to you, will you tell the Court what you did, if any?
A I was crying.
Q Did you tell him anything?
A None, sir.
Q Will you tell the Court why you were not able to say anything while your father was doing these things to you?
A Because I lost my composure.
Q Now after your father had done those things that you said to the Court of caressing you in the different parts of
your body, what did he do next?
A When he saw me crying, he removed his private part from mine,
FISCAL
I would ask, your Honor, that the question be repeated to the witness, because the (answer) is not responsive.
Q After your father had kissed you on different parts of your body, I ask you what did he do to you?
A He inserted his private part on mine.
Q And at the time that you said you felt the pain in your private part, will you tell the Court what was the position of
your father?
A He was on top of me.
Q Now as you said when your father saw you crying, he stood up and removed his private part from your organ.
What did you do when he did this?
A He dressed up and I also dressed up.
Q Did you notice anything on your private part as you were crying?
A None, sir.
Q Was there blood?
A There was.
Q Was there any conversation that transpired at the time that you were dressing and your father was dressing too?
WITNESS
A No, sir (pp. 15-17, t.s.n., November 3, 1972).
From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleaned that there was an appreciable degree of force
employed by the appellant upon his daughter. It appears that the appellant did not rebut in the court
below the testimony of his daughter because he denied having committed the act imputed to him. He
did not, therefore, deem it necessary to present at the trial any evidence at all to show that the act of
sexual intercourse was voluntary on the part of his daughter. On appeal, however, the appellant
apparently has abandoned the defense of denial interposed by him in the court below, and now
impliedly admits having had sexual intercourse with his own daughter; but he contends that the
prosecution has not shown satisfactorily that the same was done through force or intimidation. Not
having presented any evidence that the act of sexual intercourse was voluntary, the unrebutted and
uncontradicted testimony of the offended daughter now assumes more weight and importance and to
which We give full credence. This sudden change of attitude on the part of the appellant militates
against his claim of innocence.

Moreover, the fact of sexual intercourse was substantially corroborated by the medical report and
testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero who examined the offended party and found a newly healed
lacerated hymen. He opined that the offended party could have had sexual intercourse with a man
sometime during the month of August up to September 1, 1972 as alleged by her (pp. 29-31, t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972).
It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the
degree of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties
involved have no relationship at all with each other; because the father exercises strong moral and
physical control over his daughter. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its May 3, 1976
decision certifying the case to Us, "indeed the kind of force and intimidation as between father and
daughter need not be of such nature and degree as would be required in cases where the parties
have no family relationship at all" (p. 5, C.A. decision, p. 111, rec.). And appellant admitted that "the
relationship between the complainant and the appellant herein has ample importance to show that
there was some kind of moral pressure on the complainant" (p. 21, Appellant's Brief; p. 72, rec.).
Likewise, this Court has ruled that: "The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative
term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other" (People
vs. Daniel, L-40330, 86, SCRA 511, 529, Nov. 20, 1978; People vs. Sarile, 71 SCRA 593, 58 [1976];
People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320, 328 [1974], citing 75 C.J.S 475; emphasis supplied).
The claim of the appellant that his daughter practically submitted herself to him is hard to believe, for
no daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own father unless there was
force or intimidation, as a sexual act between father and daughter is so revolting. It must be noted
that appellant himself admitted that consent was not previously given by the offended party to the
sexual intercourse (p. 17, Appellant's Brief: p. 68, rec.).
While it may be true that the resistance established in evidence by the prosecution may be wanting in
comparison with the resistance offered by victims in other rape cases that have reached this Court,
the fact is, there was resistance, and such, for purposes of this case, is sufficient to qualify the sexual
act as rape, considering that the offender is her own father, whose ruthless assertion of parental
authority accompanied by threats subjugated her will to resist. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General: "In the present case, Elizabeth was not only afraid of her father. She must have also been
shocked into submission by an experience that was unnatural and uncommon and certainly not
normally supposed to happen to persons so closely related" (p. 9, Brief for the Appellee; p. 100, rec.).
In addition, in a crime of rape, it is not necessary that the force used by the accused upon the victim
be irresistible. What is important is that through force, the accused is able to accomplish his evil
design. In the instant case, the appellant succeeded in the consummation of the sexual act against
the will of the victim and in spite of her resistance. As We have repeatedly declared:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of
rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character
as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view (People vs. Daniel, supra; People vs. Sarile, supra;
People vs. Savellano, supra, citing United States vs. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434 L-1905]).
Along the same line, this Court has held that: "When force is an element of the crime of rape, it need
not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point" (People vs. Daniel, supra;
People vs. Sarile supra, citing People vs. Momo 56 Phil. 86, 87 [1931]).
It must also be noted that the offended party was intimidated by the threat of the appellant to kill
her, her mother and sister and create a real fear in her mind considering that the offended was an ex-
convict and she was just an immature teenager, let alone the fact that the offender is her own father.
This fear weakened whatever resistance she could muster at the time of the assault. It has been held
that: "Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety" (People vs. Daniel, supra;
People vs. Garcines, 57 SCRA 653 [1974]). And it is an accepted rule that: "Force or violence
threatened for the purpose of preventing or overcoming resistance, if of such character as to create
real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm or such as in any manner to
overpower the mind of the victim so that she does not resist, is in all respects equivalent to physical
force actually exerted for the same purpose" (People vs. Gan, 46 SCRA 667, 677 [1904]).

Furthermore, women may have different reactions when confronted with such heinous act. Some
would probably fight, while others inay assume a silent and fearful attitude because not all women
are of the same mettle (People vs. Olden, 47 SCRA 45,52 [1972]).
The appellant attempted to exculpate himself by showing that his daughter Elizabeth might have
denounced him as the perpetrator of a very serious crime committed upon her person because he told
her that he would take her and her sister Emma away from their mother (p. 6, t.s.n.. Jan. 29, 1972).
The motive alleged is not strong enough to make a fifteen-year-old girl with a fair degree of
education, like Elizabeth who is a high school student, invent a charge that would only bring shame
and humiliation upon her and her family and make her an object of gossip among her classmates and
friends. It cannot be denied that she commenced the present case, impelled by the enormity of the
crime and solely for the purpose of stating the truth.
Counsel for the appellant also presents a starting allegation in his brief, thus:
..., the acts of the herein appellant and his daughter, complainant herein, can be ascribed to the
permissive character of the times and the circumstances which surround their own society. It must be
noted that appellant had spent already the substantial portion of his life in jail for a previous crime.
His moral education was molded by an abnormal atmosphere. His hunger of the loins is stronger than
his moral self-control, if he has any. While the complainant herein, in submitting herself freely to the
will of appellant as one is wont to believe, can be best explained by her own parents morality where
from she derives her own and which she has been subjected. It cannot be expected therefore that the
moral standard to which a free society imposed on its members can be applicable to appellant and his
daughter (pp. 23-24, Appellant's Brief; pp. 74-75, rec.).
Such an allegation is unwarranted under the circumstances and it is a disgrace to the Bar and an
affront to this Court. A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. He should therefore be warned for making such cavalier statements.
The records further disclose that the information charges only one crime of rape committed sometime
in the third week of August. However, the evidence presented by the prosecution established two
other separate sexual intercourses on two subsequent dates.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information because the
Constitution guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right ... to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him ..." (Section 19, Art. IV, Bill of
Rights, 1973 Constitution). Likewise, "... it matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, an accused person cannot be convicted in the courts of these Islands of any offense,
unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial ..." (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461 [1975], citing U.S. vs. Campo, 23
Phil. 396 [1912]). Consequently, the appellant herein may only be convicted of one crime of rape. In
the case at bar, the offended girl is a daughter of the appellant, and because of the nature of the
crime, this relationship is an aggravating circumstance in accordance with Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, WE HEREBY FIND APPELLANT SOTERO NAVARRETE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AND HEREBY SENTENCE HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA, TO INDEMNIFY THE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF P12,000.00 AND
TO PAY THE COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54881 July 31, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO QUIBATE, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
EN BANC
Accused Rodolfo Quibate appeals the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Prima Baltar-Quibate.
Around 4:00 in the early morning of July 22, 1978, the accused-appellant stabbed his wife Prima
Baltar to death in a fit of jealousy. The couple's ten-year old daughter, Imelda Quibate, testified that
her father stabbed her mother to death with a knife while the two were quarreling in the balcony of
their house at Aranguel, President Roxas, Capiz. The daughter stated that the quarrel arose from her
father's jealousy of "Gabi" their neighbor. Imelda ran to the house of her uncle, Alberto Baltar who
immediately went to his sister's house. Alberto saw his sister already dead, the accused-appellant
drumming the death weapon against the window sill. When the police arrived at the scene, Quibate
was still holding the knife. The accused tried to kill himself with the knife pointed at his chest but
when Corporal Calixto Morales fired a shot with his revolver, the accused surrendered the knife.
The wounds suffered by the deceased were stated by Dr. Manuel Buenvenida, rural health physician
of President Roxas, Capiz, in his autopsy report as follows:
l. Incised wound at the left side of the chest above nipple, perforating, 1" wide.
2. Incised wound at the right side of the chest below the nipple, perforating, 1" wide.
3. Incised wound at the left side of abdomen, at the iliac side, 4" below the navel, perforating, 1"
wide.
4. Incised wound at the medial and posterior aspect of the left forearm, 1 cm. wide, gapping, (sic)
involving the skin.
5. Abrasions-hematoma at the right arms and forearms.
The deceased died of shock secondary to profuse hemorrhage.
The accused-appellant raised two assignments of errors in this appeal, namely
I. THE COURT ERRED IN MOTO PROPRIO CANCELLING THE PROMULGATION OF DECISION OF MARCH
4, 1980.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.
The trial court promulgated its decision on March 4, 1980 sentencing the accused to an indeterminate
period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum to 17 years maximum. However, immediately after
promulgating it on that day, the court had second thoughts and issued the following order:
After the promulgation of this case, the court moto proprio cancels the promulgation upon noting that
the regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused
refused to sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there was a typographical error
in the decision consisting of the wrong penalty and the court noting further that the decision have not
been filed.
Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is hereby set for March 20,
1980.
It may be noted that apart from cancelling the promulgation, the court ordered that the accused and
his missing counsel be notified of the new date of promulgation which was set for March 20, 1980.

On March 20, 1980, the counsel de oficio was again absent so the court appointed a well-known
practitioner in the area, Atty. Jose Alovera, to assist the accused in the promulgation and to
coordinate with the other counsel Atty. Antonio Bisnar. Promulgation was re-set to April 1, 1980.
On March 27, 1980, Atty. Alovera filed a motion to advance the date of promulgation to March 31,
1980 as counsel had to leave for Iloilo City on April 1, 1980. The motion to advance the date of
promulgation was considered on April 1, 1980. Promulgation was re-set to April 11, 1980.
On April 11, 1980, an oral motion to quash promulgation was made. No memorandum in support of
the motion was filed and the records fail to indicate the grounds relied upon by counsel. On June 9,
1980, the motion to quash promulgation was denied. The promulgation was reset to June 13, 1980 on
which date the questioned decision imposing reclusion perpetua instead of the earlier indeterminate
period of imprisonment of 12 years as minimum and 17 years as maximum was rendered.
We resolve the second assignment of error first. The allegation that the marriage of the accused-
appellant and the deceased was not established has no merit.
The marriage contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the marriage solemnized on May 16, 1954 was
introduced in evidence. Father Gaudioso Tropico of the Roman Catholic church testified that he
solemnized the marriage of the accused and Prima Baltar and that the newly married couple, the
witnesses, and himself signed the said marriage contract in each others presence. True, the contract
shows that Prima Baltar was married to "Teodulfo" Quibate but defense witness Atty. Jose Azarraga
testified that the accused used the name "Teodulfo" when they were classmates. The accused himself
admitted that he used to be called "Teodulfo". On the fact of marriage, Alberto Baltar testified that he
was present in church when his sister and the accused were married. Father Gaudioso Tropico, on re-
direct examination was asked to go around the courtroom and identify the "Teodulfo Quibate" whose
marriage he solemnized. He did so and picked out the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant did
not deny the marriage but admitted during trial that he and his late wife were married, that they were
married by Father Tropico who testified in the case.
The appellant raises no issue in this appeal regarding his main defense during the trial below that
the acted in self-defense. We have nonetheless examined the records on this point because of the
serious nature of the crime. We find no error in the court's rejecting this defense. The allegation of
self-defense has no basis.
The accused-appellant testified that two months before the fatal incident, he caught his wife having
sexual intercourse with their neighbor "Gabi" or "Gabe" and that he called her to come up their house.
He was so angry that he boxed her. Gabi was not only bigger than the accused, but he also had a
gun. Yet when he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she refused. When he insisted, she
still refused. According to the accused, he begged for almost two hours to have sex with his wife but
she refused. Later on, he noticed that she took a knife from a "baul" or clothes trunk by her side and
tried to stab him. They grappled for the knife and she was hit. The trial court found the story of self-
defense not believable. We agree. The accused-appellant, in a fit of jealousy, stabbed his wife
inflicting the four separate incised wounds described in the autopsy report, which resulted in shock,
profuse hemorrhage, and death.
The appellant states in his first assignment of error that the lower court erred in cancelling the March
4, 1980 promulgation because the grounds given by the court do not warrant such a cancellation.
The appellant questions the cancellation and resetting of promulgation stating that the counsel did not
have to be present during the promulgation of judgment and that there was no need to nullify a
promulgation already effected simply because the accused refused to sign. According to the
appellant's brief, the appellant refused to sign because he did not know how to write.
It is not required that counsel for the accused must be present when judgment is promulgated for it
to be valid and effective. However, considering the level of intelligence of the accused and the serious
nature of the offense, the Court had reason to require counsel's presence during promulgation. The
court, however, followed a manifestly strange procedure when it pronounced the sentence of
conviction and then immediately afterwards, reconsidered and cancelled the whole thing on the
ground, among others, that the lawyer was not present. On noticing that there was no lawyer for the
accused, the Court should have deferred the promulgation of the decision if it wanted counsel to be
around.

It is obvious from the appealed decision that the presiding Judge had conflicting feelings in his mind
when the date for promulgation arrived. If so, he should have resolved them before going ahead.
The decision reads, in part:
The Court finds in accordance with Art. 13, of the Revised Penal Code, mental weakness, and
voluntary surrender. Likewise, the Court considers the history of infidelity of the victim's wife, coupled
with her refusal to perform her marital duties, after accused had begged for two (2) hours,
immediately preceding the stabbing, as analogous to an aggression and should also be considered
mitigating. The Court believes that the attitude and behaviour of the accused, such as the tenderness
he showed to his daughter Imelda after the latter's testimony, shows remorse and lack of real malice.
In view thereof, the Court recommends Executive Clemency, such as would reduce the imprisonment
to a lesser period.
The procedure followed by the lower court is not the most appropriate under the circumstances but it
does not constitute a ground to nullify the decision later promulgated.
The second reason about the refusal to sign may have been insufficient to warrant postponement of
promulgation of judgment but, under the circumstances, it is not a basis to set aside or modify the
appealed decision.
Regarding the last ground for the first assignment of error, it is unlikely that the imposition of a
sentence of 12 to 17 years imprisonment instead of reclusion perpetua would be a typographical
error. It was not. It was an error of hasty judgment based on a misapprehension of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code applicable to the facts of the case. The lower court made a mistake and it
should have taken immediate steps to rectify it instead of waiting for more than three months.
The more serious questions arising from the facts of this case are not raised in the appellant's brief
but the Court has decided to resolve them considering that a man's liberty is at stake and the lower
court itself has recommended executive clemency for the appellant.
What was the effect of the cancellation of promulgation on March 4, 1980? Did the decision whose
promulgation was cancelled become final and executory fifteen days later on March 19, 1980? Did the
court have jurisdiction to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua on June 13, 1980?
Under Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set
aside by the court rendering it before the judgment becomes final or an appeal is perfected. In the
instant case, no appeal had been perfected when the trial court set aside its judgment and cancelled
its promulgation. But had the judgment become final? The cited section provides:
A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal.
In the case at bar, the judgment of conviction and its promulgation were set aside on the very day
that the judgment was promulgated. At that time, the period for perfecting an appeal had not lapsed;
and the accused had not waived his right to appeal. Only if he were deemed to have commenced
service of his sentence could the judgment be deemed final.
The law gives the accused 15 days after promulgation of a judgment of conviction within which to
decide whether he will take an appeal or not; and unless he has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal or has voluntarily commenced service of his sentence, the accused may yet take an appeal
within the 15-day period. (See People vs. Valle, 7 SCRA 1025; Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 245). The accused was returned to the same detention cell where he
was confined pending trial. He never intimidated acceptance of the judgment or that he would no
longer appeal.
From the above considerations, it follows that when the trial court cancelled the promulgation it had
just concluded, it were as if no decision had been rendered and no judgment had been imposed. The
promulgation or the entire process had been set aside to be effected on a future date. The decision
promulgated on June 13, 1980 would not merely be an amendment of the sentence imposed earlier

but would be the decision itself being promulgated in the case. Consequently, there was no judgment
to become final and executory except from June 13, 1980. If the court had decided to commit the
accused to jail on March 19, 1980, there would have been no basis for the execution of judgment and
the commitment as the decision promulgated earlier had been cancelled and set aside. The accused
could not have accepted a judgment or commenced to serve a sentence based on a cancelled and,
therefore, non-existent promulgation.
We find in this case an opportune occasion to remind an trial courts to devote a little more time to the
study of the penalty provisions of the Revised Penal Code immediately before promulgating each
decision, to obviate the necessity of issuing amended or "repromulgated" decisions increasing
sentences of imprisonment. Trial courts should likewise note the dictum in Flores v. Dalisay (84 SCRA
46, 48).
What the trial court should have done was to have categorically asked the counsel de oficio of the
accused (who was not the counsel de oficio who handled the defense of the accused) whether or not
he would appeal. Because the accused did not file any notice of appeal immediately after the
judgment was promulgated, the trial court jumped to the conclusion that he had no intention of
taking an appeal. ...
Considering the factual circumstances of this case, the low intelligence of the accused, and the gravity
of the offense of parricide, it was the duty of the lower court on March 4, 1980 to ascertain whether
or not the detention prisoner whose sentence of conviction had just been read intended to appeal.
Upon the answer would have depended its power to modify the decision but within the period for the
taking of an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Prima Baltar Quibate in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la
Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
Judge Oscar Leviste's decision dated March 3, 1980 was promulgated on the following day, March 4,
in the absence of accused's counsel, Antonio Bisnar. The accused (a registered voter who studied at
the Elizalde Academy) refused to sign on the original copy of the decision as proof that he received a
copy of the decision.
It is stated in the handwritten minutes of the incident that "when this case was called for
promulgation of decision, the court interpreter read the whole decision and after which the dispositive
part of the decision was translated to the accused. The Court sentences the accused (to) 12 years to
17 years. Later, the Court discovered that Atty. Bisnar, counsel de oficio for the accused, was not
present in court. The Court appointed Atty. Jose Brotario as counsel de oficio for the purpose of
promulgation. The dispositive portion of the decision was read to the accused. "
The said minutes were signed by the court interpreter. The deputy clerk of court executed a
certification as to the promulgation and the refusal of the accused to affix his signature on the original
copy .
A few hours later on that same day, March 4, 1980, Judge Leviste issued an order cancelling the
promulgation (1) due to the absence of Bisnar, the regular counsel de oficio, (2) the refusal of
accused to sign as proof that he received a copy of the decision, (3) the imposition of the wrong
penalty and (4) the fact "that the decision has not been filed".
In fact, the said decision is in the record but it contains numerous handwritten corrections made by
Judge Leviste. It was retyped. The retyped decision, imposing reclusion perpetua, dated March 5,

1980, and the original decision of March 3, 1980 (with corrections) were both refiled in court at 4:30
p.m. on March 5,1980.
Later, or on April 11, 1980, there was an oral motion to quash the second promulgation. It was
denied by Judge Leviste in his order of June 9, 1980.
The corrected decision of March 5, 1980 was promulgated on June 13, 1980. The accused and his
counsel signed the original copy of the said decision. The clerk of court certified to the promulgation
on June 13, 1980. This was also signed by the accused
(pp. 126-7, Record).
Written notices of the decision were sent to the fiscal, the warden and Bisnar on June 16, 1980.
Bisnar filed his notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The minutes of the proceeding on June 13, 1980 show that Bisnar objected to the promulgation of the
corrected decision and insisted that the promulgation of the first decision was valid.
Judge Leviste had the power and jurisdiction to correct his decision of March 3, 1980 which was not
yet officially filed. He corrected it on the same day and filed the corrected copy on March 5, 1980
together with the original decision of March 3, 1980.
A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment
has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. (Sec. 7, Rule
120, Rules of Court.)
The accused or his counsel should expressly inform the court that he does not want to appeal or is
going to start serving his sentence. In the absence of such manifestation, the judge can change his
decision within the reglementary fifteen-day period. It is not right to conjecture from the silence of
the accused-detainee in the absence of his counsel that he started to serve his sentence. (People vs.
Espaol, G.R. No. 57597-99, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 911.)
In this case, counsel de oficio's absence during the first promulgation rendered it uncertain whether
or not the accused was going to appeal. The fact that he was a detention prisoner does not justify the
conjecture that he did not appeal and that he had started the service of his sentence on March 4,
1980.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
Appellant herein assigns two errors, one of which is the following:
I. The Court erred in motu proprio canceling the promulgation of decision on March 4, 1980.
I dissent from the resolution of the said assigned error.
On March 4, 1980, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting herein appellant of the crane of
parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum to 17
years maximum. Thereafter, on the same date, the same court issued the following order:
After promulgation of this case, the court motu proprio cancels the promulgation upon noting that the
regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused refused to
sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there was a typographical error in the
decision consisting of the wrong penalty and the court noting further that the decision has not been
filed.
Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is hereby set for March 20,
1980.
After several subsequent resetting of the promulgation date, on June 13, 1980, the lower court
promulgated a revised decision maintaining the conviction, but sentencing appellant to suffer the
greater penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.

The majority opinion sustains this second promulgation. That is double jeopardy.
The promulgation of March 4, 1980 was a valid promulgation. The reasons advanced by the trial court
for its cancellation has no basis in law and in fact. The order of cancellation was issued in abuse of
discretion, which this Court should not countenance.
The discrepancy in the penalty imposed under the first and under the second promulgation can hardly
be considered a typographical error.
That the decision promulgated on March 4, 1980 had not as yet been filed, is not by itself a ground
for withdrawing or canceling the first promulgation, which was a valid and effective promulgation.
Even an oral promulgation of an unwritten decision is valid (Cinco vs. Cea, 96 Phil. 131; Catilo vs.
Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014).
The promulgation of March 4, 1980 complies with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
The judgment is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant
and any judge of the court in which it is rendered. The defendant must be personally present if the
conviction is for a grave offense; if for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his attorney or representative. And when the judge is absent or outside of the province or
city, his presence is not necessary and the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant
by the clerk of court.
If the defendant is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment of conviction may
be promulgated by the judge of the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention upon the request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have the authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bond.
Clearly, it is not necessary that defendant's counsel be present at the time of promulgation of the
judgment. Where the judgment is one of conviction for a grave offense, all that is required is that the
defendant be personally present in court at the time of promulgation. Where the judgment is one of
acquittal, the presence of the defendant during promulgation is not at all required in any case (Cinco
vs. Cea, L-7075, November 18, 1954, 96 Phil. 131). Here, all that is required is that a copy of the
judgment be served on said acquitted defendant (Ibid.). This notwithstanding, it is noted from the
records of this case that a counsel de oficio for the purpose of promulgation (Atty. Jose Brotarlo) was
in fact afforded the defendant prior to the promulgation of judgment conducted on March 4, 1980 (p.
108, CFI rec.).
Finally, there is no hint from the above-cited provision that the defendant's signature evidencing
receipt of a copy of the decision is necessary to effect a valid promulgation of judgment. In the case
at Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden (44 No. 11 O.G. 4326), this Court upheld the validity of a
promulgation of a verbal judgment of conviction. Failure on the part of the court to comply with
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and the Constitution did not divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction acquired over the offense and the petitioner (Ibid.). By inference, the lack of defendant's
signature evidencing receipt of a written copy of a decision does not render invalid and inefficacious
the promulgation thereof.
Concededly, under Section 7 of the same Rule, "a judgment of conviction may be modified or set
aside by the court rendering it before judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected." But
such "discretion" afforded a judge means sound discretion exercised, not arbitrarily or wilfully, but
with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the
judge's reason and conscience to just result (12A Words and Phrases 344). Evidently however, the
order of cancellation issued by the trial court above does not conjure with the circumstances of and
the law pertinent to the case as above described. The discretion granted by the Rules, having been
exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, the order of cancellation being clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts as are found, this Court should reverse the same (1 Words and Phrases
341). The order of cancellation is null and void for having transpired from an improvident exercise of
discretion.
It is noted that the discretion provided the court under Section 7 of Rule 120 cannot be exercised in
case of a valid promulgation of a judgment of acquittal (Catilo vs. Abaya, No. L-6921, May 14, 1954;
94 Phil. 1014). The promulgation therein cannot be cancelled even on the ground of
misrepresentation of facts and misappreciation of evidence. Here, the first jeopardy is terminated,
and a subsequent modification of the said judgment would result in double jeopardy.
Cabarroguis vs. Judge San Diego (G.R. No. L-19517, November 30, 1962, 116 Phil. 1184) does not
apply to the present case to validate the second promulgation of June 13, 1980. In Cabarroguis, the
respondent judge dictated in open court her order of acquittal even before the direct testimony of the
lone witness for the prosecution could be completed. Upon prompt oral motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution, the court "withdrew" its order. Thereupon, direct examination resumed. Counsel for
the defendant afterwards cross examined the witness. During the day's proceedings, no objection
thereto was heard from the defendant's counsel. Thus, as ruled by this Court, "petitioner's failure to
object, at that time, to the taking of said evidence for the prosecution, and the cross examination of
complainant by counsel for the petitioner amounted therefore, to a waiver of her constitutional right
against double jeopardy "(People vs. Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; 14 Am. Jur. 958).
Petitioner did not invoke such right until about a week later, or on March 7, 1962, when the hearing
resumed for the reception of the evidence for the defense. The objection then made by her came too
late in view of her aforementioned waiver (Ibid.).
In the present case, however, the promulgation of judgment on March 4, 1980 was conducted after
both the prosecution and the defense had rested their case. Defendant, assisted by a counsel de
oficio (although not his regular counsel de oficio), was present during the promulgation. Thereafter,
said defendant promptly returned to his cell. Upon receipt of the court's order canceling said
promulgation, Atty. Bisnar, defendant's regular counsel de oficio, promptly and vehemently objected
to the same. He reiterated his objections to said order of cancellation and second promulgation on
June 13, 1980. Clearly, having promptly invoked his right against double jeopardy, defendant should
benefit therefrom.
Perforce, the promulgation of judgment on March 4, 1980 stands undisturbed by the trial court's
subsequent cancellation thereof. Fifteen days after said date, and no appeal having been taken by the
defendant, the judgment thereby promulgated became final.
Some discussion was focused on whether or not the defendant, by returning to his detention cell after
promulgation of judgment on March 4, 1980, commenced to serve the sentence under said
promulgation. Consonant with OUR basic criminal law doctrine that doubts should be interpreted in
favor of the accused, the equivocal gesture of the accused should be interpreted as an act to
commence the service of his sentence. The penalty imposed under the promulgation of March 4, 1980
was clearly lighter than what is prescribed by the law. To immediately submit to it, doubtless, would
favor the accused.
This dissent notes the oral motion to quash the second promulgation of Atty. Antonio Bisnar, regular
counsel de oficio of the accused, on April 11, 1980 (p. 121, CFI rec.), and his subsequent objection to
said second promulgation on June 13, 1980 (p. 129, CFI rec.). These facts support the position that
the accused returned to his cell after the promulgation of March 4, 1980 with the intention to
commence the service of his sentence.
Nonetheless, the incontrovertible fact under the circumstances is that 15 days after the promulgation
of March 4, 1980, with the defendant not having taken an appeal from the decision promulgated, the
same became final. Thereafter, the trial court lost its control and jurisdiction over the case, and the
trial judge could no longer modify nor set aside the judgment rendered therein (U.S. vs. Vayson
[1914], 27 Phil. 447). The subsequent promulgation of a revised decision on June 13, 1980, three
months after the first promulgation, is null and void.
By sustaining the second promulgation, this Court countenances a second jeopardy cutting deep into
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. There is no question that a first jeopardy
attached. The same was terminated 15 days after judgment thereon was promulgated on March 4,
1980. Any substantial modification by increasing the penalty decreed in such decision after March 19,
1980 would amount to double jeopardy (Gregorio vs. Director of Prisons, 43 Phil. 650).
Teehankee, J., concurs.
ESCOLIN, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The records disclose that after the promulgation of the first decision on March 4, 1980,
petitioner did not manifest his desire to appeal and was therefore committed to jail; that the 15-day
period to appeal lapsed without petitioner having perfected his appeal; and that before the
promulgation of the new decision on June 30, 1980, he vehemently objected to the cancellation of the
March 4, 1980 promulgation as well as the promulgation of the new judgment. Surely, any doubt as
to the conclusion to be drawn from this factual setting should be resolved in favor of the petitioner's
posture that he immediately commenced service of sentence after the promulgation of the first
decision, and that therefore the same became final in accordance with the rule that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final when the sentence has been partially served. [Section 7, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court].
Teehankee, J., concurs.

[G.R. No. L-37933. April 15, 1988.]
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, Petitioners, v. HON. RAMON E.

NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA,
JR., Respondents.
The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; HOW ACQUIRED. In criminal cases,

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in
court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUES UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE CASE. Jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. Where the accused
appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the
court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape
from the custody of the law.
3. ID.; ID.; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; REQUISITES. A trial in absentia may be had when the following
requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been
notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT DUTY BOUND TO RULE UPON EVIDENCE ON TERMINATION THEREOF.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To
allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on
trial in absentia.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; NOT VIOLATED BY

RENDITION OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL IN ABSENTIA. The contention of the respondent judge
that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to
him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the
evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
6. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED WHERE THE ACCUSED HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity
to be heard.
7. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF, WAIVED IN
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA. An escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and
protection, may be waived by him. An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to
present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified
against him.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first
is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned,
escapes from the custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains
his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him.

The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and
the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E.
Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the
acused including private respondent, were duly informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention
center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the
petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case
against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking
the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but
nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he
shows up in court. 1
After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case
against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.
The dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and
Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is
hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving
other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August
30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the
jurisdiction over his person. 2
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-
quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on
"trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated
November 22, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein
petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the
private respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses
for the prosecution and present his evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that under the same
provision, all accused should be presumed innocent. 4Furthermore the lower court maintains that
jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to
cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is
reacquired. 5
We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-
private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not

guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by
appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the
law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the
custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in
absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an
arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to
do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show,
the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not
guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is
evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified
copy of the Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation
for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence
of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent
and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of
reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because
of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment
of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental
law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society
and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
9
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment
of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived.10 In the
same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and
protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the
intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an
accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to
have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in
regained....
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentiawaives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him.11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so
far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is
reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the
innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the
evidence adduced and the applicable law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Gimenez vs. Nazareno
Facts:
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and
Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and
each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon.
Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused
were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped
from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals
handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower
court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be
tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant
to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless
gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After
due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the
other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On
16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the
dispositive portion of the court's decision on the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by
the lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the
accused before the court.
Held:
The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia"
may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was
arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed
of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature
on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter
that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in
any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the
other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de
la Vega and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in
absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait
for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present
his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused
remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be
no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his failure to
appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to
present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right
to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified
against him.
Doctrine:

The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate
conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against
them

[G.R. No. L-19052. December 29, 1962.]
MANUEL F. CABAL, Petitioner, v. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA, Respondents.
Francisco Carreon for Petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T . Reyes for respondents City of Manila.
SYLLABUS
1. ANTI-GRAFT LAW; FORFEITURE OF UNEXPLAINED WEALTH; NATURE OF FORFEITURE AS PENALTY.

The purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of
property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
2. ID.; EXEMPTION OF DEFENDANTS FROM OBLIGATION TO BE WITNESS AGAINST THEMSELVES.

Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witness against themselves are applicable
thereto.
3. ID.; FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE

OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; CASE OF
BOYD v. U.S. and THURSTON v. CLARK, CITED. In Boyd v. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it
was held that the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of
the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect
a criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a witness against himself.
Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston v. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40
pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all
cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but
to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is an
action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with this object in
view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . .
4. ID.; ID.; CASE OF ALMEDA v. PEREZ, DISTINGUISHED. In Almeda v. Perez, L-18428 (August
30, 1962) the theory that, after the filing of respondents answer to a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of
criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil
in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has
no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the
Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding
in Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as the
whole proceedings in said criminal case.
On or about August 2, 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of
National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel F. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct
unbecoming of an officer and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets

and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts." On September 6, 1961, the President of
the Philippines created a committee of five (5) members, consisting of former Justice Marceliano R.
Montemayor, as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals
Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At
the beginning of the investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of
complainant, Col. Maristela, ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as
witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon,
petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the
aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to
refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully
refused to be sworn to as a witness or take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated
September 18, 1961, the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such
action as he may deem proper. On September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a "charge" reading as follows:
"The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt under section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code in relation to sections 1 and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, committed as
follows:
That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation conducted at the U.P. Little Theater, Padre
Faura, Manila, by the Presidential Committee, which was created by the President of the Republic of
the Philippines in accordance with law to investigate the charges of alleged acquisition by respondent
of unexplained wealth and composed of Justice Marceliano Montemayor, as Chairman, and Justices
Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug and Generals Basilio Valdez and Guillermo Francisco, as
members, with the power, among others, to compel the attendance of witnesses and take their
testimony under oath, respondent who was personally present at the time before the Committee in
compliance with a subpoena duly issued to him, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
contumaciously, without any justifiable cause or reason, refuse and fail and still refuse and fail to
obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the witness stand, be sworn and testify as witness in
said investigation, in utter disregard of the lawful authority of the Committee and thereby obstructing
and degrading the proceedings before said body.
"Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the
Presidential Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court by imprisonment until such
time as he shall obey the subject order of said Committee."
This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned to Branch XVIII
thereof, presided over by respondent Judge. On October 2, 1961, the latter issued an order requiring
petitioner to show cause and/or answer the charge filed against him within ten (10) days. Soon
thereafter, or on October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the
charge and/or order to show cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority
nor personality to file said charge and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been
filed without a preliminary investigation, and, if civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in
respect of civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged
constitute no offense, for section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is
based, violates due process, in that it is vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined
and the fine imposable therefor and that it fails to specify whether said offense shall be treated as
contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court; (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the
contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as
contempt of a superior court and as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court; (4)
that the Committee had no power to order and require petitioner to take the witness stand and be
sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates
petitioners constitutional right against self-incrimination.
By resolution dated October 14, 1961, respondent Judge denied said motion to quash. Thereupon, or
on October 20, 1961, petitioner began the present action for the purpose adverted to above, alleging
that, unless restrained by this Court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for contempt, and
that such action would not be appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the
Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied

upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations (Section 38-C, Republic Act No. 409, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580,
of the Revised Administrative Code, contempt against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as
contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that, under
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may refuse, not to take the
witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Whartons Criminal Evidence, pp.
1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the
proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does
not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise, conceded that the purpose of the
charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
"In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence

of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus
defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the
lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the
legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense.
The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the
sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599) (Emphasis ours.)
"In Blacks Law Dictionary a forfeiture is defined to be the incurring of a liability to pay a definite
sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply
with some requirement of law. It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of
duty." (Com. v. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence,
the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves
are applicable thereto.
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or
imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are
criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful
possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be
so far in the nature of criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information
is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the
property appears, are so far considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. . .
." (23 Am. Jur. 612; Emphasis ours.)
"Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the later decisions are to the effect that suits for
forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are so far of a quasi-criminal
nature as to be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of . . . that portion of the
Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . . It has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the
various State Constitution that a witness or party called as a witness cannot be made to testify
against himself as to matters which would subject his property to forfeiture. At early common law no
person could be compelled to testify against himself or to answer any question which would have had
a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture, or to form a link in a chain of evidence for that
purpose as well as to incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection against
compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to a forfeiture, such protection was
claimed and availed of in some early American cases without placing the basis of the protection upon
constitutional grounds." (23 Am. Jur. 616; Emphasis ours.)

"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in
rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or
reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for
penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for
all the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . The proceeding is one against the
owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to
establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368;
Emphasis ours.)
"The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him
exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer
would tend to expose him to a . . . forfeiture . . . (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 43, p. 48; Emphasis ours.)
"As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the
stand as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings,
including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an
offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, . . ." (58
Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49; Emphasis ours.)
"The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a
question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition
of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to criminate but, where a
witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the
reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.
"The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer one and all questions." (98 C.J.S., p. 252; Emphasis ours.)
"A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any
question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or
forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.
"In general, both at common law and under a constitutional provision against compulsory self-
incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness which would
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in an action against him for a penalty.
"The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture is recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of
the public justice of the state, as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a
municipal ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a
criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to an ordinary civil
remedy." (98 C.J.S., pp. 275-6.)
Thus, in Boyd v. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding
to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though
technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for penalties
and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was
held, in Thurston v. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said
portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish,
recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission
of public offenses" and "a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of
the criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it
is still a criminal case . . .." This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees v. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151).
Hence, the Lawyers Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent
cases, concludes that said constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely
remedial", or intended "as a redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of
duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in a like manner . . ."

We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in
which the theory that, after the filing of respondents answer to a petition for forfeiture under
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from
proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so
ordered.

MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to
investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the
witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of
his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee,
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take
the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take
the witness stand.
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper.
The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to
obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of
respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was
denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
HELD: Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the
Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been
held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property
are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition
against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-
criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil
or remedial in nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a
question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition
of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where
a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the
reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.
Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

MANUEL F. CABAL vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA
FACTS:
Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-
complaint (Col. Maristela) charging petitioner Manuel F. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an
officer and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in
1958 and other equally reprehensible acts. The President of the Philippines created a committee of
five (5) members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint
and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation,
the Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner
objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the aforementioned
order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to
answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused
to be sworn to as a witness or take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated the
Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem
proper.
The City Fiscal filed with the CFI of Manila a charge praying respondent be summarily adjudged
guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee..
Respondent filed a motion to quash upon the ground that the Committee had no power to order and
require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as
witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioners constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
The judge denied said motion to quash. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition
in the SC.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the
Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
HELD: CRIMINAL
It seems conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is not seek the removal of
petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the AFP. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. But
apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of
a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE

OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION;
CASE OF BOYD vs. U.S. and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29
L. ed., 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain
property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, though technically a civil proceeding, is in
substance and effect a criminal one, and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason
of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of
the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a witness against
himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal.
285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies
to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil
rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses and a criminal
case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with this
object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . .

CASE OF ALMEDA vs. PEREZ, DISTINGUISHED. In Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30,
1962) the theory that, after the filing of respondents answer to a petition for forfeiture under

[G.R. No. 32025. September 23, 1929.]
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District,
and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for Petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT FISCALS
INVESTIGATIONS; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO WRITE FROM DICTATION. The fiscal under section
1687 of the Administrative Code, and the competent judge, at the request of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in
refusing to write down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose of verifying his
handwriting and determining whether he had written certain documents alleged to have been
falsified, seeks protection his constitutional privilege.
2. ID.; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT; TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. The right was

promulgated, both in the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 and in paragraph 3, section 3
of the Jones Law, which provides (in Spanish); "Ni se le obligara (defendant) a declarar en contra
suya en ningun proceso criminal," and recognized in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58)
in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56. The English text of the Jones Law reads as follows; "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," thus, the prohibition is not
restricted to not compelling him to testify, but extends to not compelling him to be a witness.
3. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE. "The rights intended to be protected by the
constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is
strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in
favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there
is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral
testimony, but embraced as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth,
the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., par. 20,
page 434, and notes.)
4. ID.; ID.; CASES INAPPLICABLE. There have been cases where it was lawful to compel the
accuse to write in open court while he was under cross-examination (Bradford v. People, 43 Pacific
Reporter, 1013), and to make him write his name with his consent during the trial of his case
(Sprouse v. Com., 81 Va., 374, 378); but in the first case, the defendant, in testifying as witness in
his own behalf waived his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as witness; and in the
second, he also waived said privilege because he acted voluntarily.
5. ID.; ID.; PREPARATION AND CREATION OF EVIDENCE BY TESTIMONIAL ACT. This constitutional
prohibition embraces the compulsory preparation and creation by a witness of self-incriminatory
evidence by means of a testimonial act. "For though the disclosure thus sought" (the production of
documents and chattels) "be not oral in form, and thought the documents or chattels be already in
existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the
person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as
a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or
authenticity or origin of the articles produced." (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 864, 865, latest edition.) IN
the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is
not purely mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing means for
the petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against himself.
6. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF CRIMES; PRIVILEGE, REASON FOR EXISTENCE OF. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioners handwriting
is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. The petitioner is a municipal treasurer, and it should
not be difficult for the fiscal to obtain a genuine specimen of his handwriting by some other means.
But even supposing that it is impossible to secure such specimen without resorting to the means
herein complained of by the petitioner, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right

guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading
the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison detre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
7. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN VILLAFLOR-SUMMERS CASE AND CASE AT BAR. The difference
between this case and that of Villaflor v. Summers (41. Phil., 620, is that in the latter the object was
to have the petitioners body examined by physicians, without being compelled to perform a positive
act, but only an omission, that is, not to prevent the examination, which could be, and was,
interpreted by this court as being no compulsion of the petitioner to furnish evidence by means of a
testimonial act; all of which is entirely different from the case at bar, where it is sought to make the
petitioner perform a positive testimonial act, silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a
sample of his handwriting for comparison.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the
latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which the
instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and
on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States vs. Tan
Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the
respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in
question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order
against which these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.
As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law,
which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with
a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the
United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a
common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the
constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the
witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or
by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings

have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that
conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so
great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts
liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps
tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional
inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of
evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by
the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the
defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the
defendant to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned here
with the defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the
supposed falsification, and still less as it a question of the defendant on trial testifying and under
cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it.
And let it further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act
voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was
obtained before the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs.
Molineux (61 Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse vs.
Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant's right to
decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said
decision referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):
The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to accede to the latter's
request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus produced can be excluded from
the case. (Emphasis ours.)
For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199),
that the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.
He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his having signed papers not in the case, and
was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior to the note in suit, and
whether he would not write his name there in the court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on
objection, and it is of these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the questions was to bring

into the case extrinsic signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think that the
judge was correct in ruling against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is the removal or replacement
of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than
requiring him to move his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens
of handwriting. We note that in the same paragraph 2265, where said authors treats of "Bodily
Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled upon,"
he cites many cases, among them that of People vs. Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have
seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the defendant voluntary gave specimens of
his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and has even instituted these prohibition
proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents
or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our
mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work
cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (
i.e. as a person appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for
truthtelling), may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded.
(And he cites the case of People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119; 38 N.E., 1003)
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this
reason the same eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of
documents and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of
the person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him
as a witness; because in virtue it would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or
authenticity or origin of the articles produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should
be remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could
certainly do.
The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, maybe waived by
any one entitled to invoke it. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and cases noted.)
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), were the defendant
did not opposethe extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to
rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason
of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which
could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein
to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any
positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the
examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case,
where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen
of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it
was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with
something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare,
or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may
seriously incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United States vs. Ong Siu
Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was not compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to
take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a
witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his
own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take
down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as
ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the
prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also
argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue:
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to
obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult
matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is
no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in
some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and
do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.

Beltran v. Samson G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
Right Against Self Incrimination: Writing
FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is not
entitled to the remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of
any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,
seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General
Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving
or furnishing of evidence.
ISSUES:
Whether the violates the petitioners right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
compelled to write for the purpose of comparing the petitioners handwriting and determining whether
he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
HELD: YES.
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination, write in open court
in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. Here the
witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not
exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it
is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is
not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. In the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil.,
718), it does not appear that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal
against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their
constitutional privilege. The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when
claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it." The writ of prohibition was GRANTED and it
is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.

[G.R. No. L-12990. January 21, 1918. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAZARO JAVIER ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G.N. Trinidad for Appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. THEFT OF LARGE CATTLE; PROOF. A carabao, seen in the possession of the accused and later
found tied in front of a house, was identified as the carabao, which had been taken from the corral of
Doroteo Natividad. Held: That the accused having offered no satisfactory explanation for their
possession of the carabao, they can properly be convicted of the crime of theft.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. There are two principal reasons for
the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." The first reason is the right of cross-
examination, and the second is that the tribunal may have before it the department and appearance
of the witness while testifying.
3. ID.; ID. Exhibit B of the prosecution is the sworn statement before the justice of the peace of
the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas, of the sergeant, now deceased, who was the
leader of the patrol of the Constabulary which encountered the accused, and whose signature was
identified. Held: That Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
MALCOLM, J.:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his
corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the
following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and
that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November
following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading
the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the
following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola
in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo
Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by
the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases
of this character is that, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not
recognized at the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal
is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no
satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S.
vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that
one of the Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely,
that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn
statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated
on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall
be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."
With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of
the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the accused
in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused

an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon
deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition
is that a tribunal may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying. (
U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provisions on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S.
vs. Tamjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz [1908],
12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the
protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave
the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony
of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating to the same
matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure
and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of
Presa a dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of
authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.])
occurring in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol under
oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost
all opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it
was the opinion of both courts that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the defendant
not being present when they were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-
examination." Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of
the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the case is
not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting the statement will
not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to
be reversible error and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would
gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal
Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and
one day of presidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third
part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has not
already been done. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, and Avancea, JJ., concur.

United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918]
Facts:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his
corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the
following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and
that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found the
carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of
San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his
corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of
Javier. Javier was charged for stealing the carabao before the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of sergeant Presca, now
deceased, was presented in court by the prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was
identified. Javier alleged that the lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence.
Issue:
Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now deceased, is inadmissible
inasmuch as the accused is not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.
Held:
The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section
15 (5), states taht "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at
the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill
of Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise
of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa was not
made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore
inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former
action between the same relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by
section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower
court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a
former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, the
sworn statement was improperly received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the Court
could find this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a new trial. The Court
however is convinced that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the
owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on
behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[G.R. Nos. 112178-79. April 21, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIDA HONRADA, Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT, DEFINED. "Recruitment and placement" is

defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement"
2. ID.; ID.; RECRUITMENT, WHEN ILLEGAL AND WHEN COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE. Recruitment
is deemed illegal when carried out by a person or entity not licensed to engage in such activity. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.
3. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
Private complainants, all residents of Cavite, transacted only with appellant in relation to their
application for work in Japan. It was appellant who gave them the details of the job opportunities in
Japan. She was the one who decided on the work each of the complainants would be assigned to
perform there. She informed complainants about the nature of the job, their salary and the other
terms of their contract. Appellant even accompanied some of the complainants to a clinic in Ermita for
their physical examination. Appellant provided all the particulars relative to their possible employment
and informed them about the required fees. All the foregoing acts of appellant constitute recruitment
as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. She held herself out as capable of sending them
abroad for overseas employment. None of the complainants ever met Mrs. Baluran or Mrs. Manzano
whom appellant points as the persons responsible for recruiting complainants. All throughout the
recruitment period, complainants transacted only with appellant. Their recruitment would not have
been consummated were it not for the direct participation and assistance of appellant in the
recruitment process. The fact alone that she did not keep the money in her possession is of no
moment. The evidence disclose that she actively and directly participated in the recruitment of
complainants and that, for her efforts, she was promised a service fee in the amount of P26,000.00.
Moreover, by her actions and declarations, appellant, beyond doubt, gave private complainants the
impression that she was capable of providing them work abroad, which is basically the essence of the
crime of illegal recruitment.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES. In the case of People
v. Feist, No. 12203-R, July 16, 1955, 51 O.G. 12, 6264, the Court held that" (t)here is no law making
compulsory the presentation of a complainant as witness. Confrontation applies only to witnesses who
actually testify in a trial against the accused." The charge against appellant is illegal recruitment in
large scale. Under Article 39 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, this crime can be proved if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. The evidence shows that five
(5) complainants testified how they were illegally recruited by appellant. Ciellane Gregorio
categorically testified that she, together with her friends and co-complainants (viz: Rowena Leuterio,
Susan Ramirez, Baby Ruth Pagkaliwangan and Leonora Posadas), personally went to appellants
residence and were induced by appellant to apply for overseas employment. In other words, as per
the testimony of Ciellane Gregorio, complainants Leuterio, Ramirez, Pagkaliwangan and Posadas were
recruited by appellant under the same circumstances. Thus, any other testimony would only serve to
corroborate the testimony already made by complaining witness Ciellane Gregorio.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant AIDA HONRADA appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 17, Cavite City, convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale and four (4)
counts of estafa.

The Information for illegal recruitment in large scale 1
reads:
That in (sic) or about and during the month(s) of January 1991 up to April 1991, prior and/or
subsequent thereto, at Barangay Tejeros Convention, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to gain and by means of misrepresentation and false manifestation, by pretending herself (sic) that
she has influence and power to recruit, contract and secure employment abroad to (sic) the following
persons, herein stated to wit:
1 Susan Ramirez P8,650.00

2 Baby Ruth Pagkaliwangan 7,500.00
3 Rowena Leuterio 7,500.00
4 Angelize Porterta 8,500.00
5 Noralyn Paras 4,500.00
6 Felicidad Barreyro 6,500.00
7 Ciellane Gregorio 8,650.00
8 Rommel Garcia 13,120.00
9 Rustico Narvaez 9,350.00
10 Frederico Dinco 9,350.00
11 Edwin Lallana 12,120.00
12 Enrico Sugatan 14,120.00
13 Celso Cesa 13,620.00
14 Ruel Ditan 9,350.00
as factory workers in Japan, accused herein, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
for a fee of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY (P132,830.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, recruit and promise to secure employment abroad to the above-named persons,
without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment, thereby resulting to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainants/victims in the
total amount of P132,830.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon the other hand, the four (4) separate 2 Informations for estafa 2 were filed against appellant by
individual private complainants, namely: Edwin Lallana, Celso T. Cesa, Enrico M. Sugatan and
Rommel M Garcia. Except with respect to the name, date and amount involved in each case, the
Informations were similarly worded, representative of which is Criminal Case No, 131-91, which
reads:
That on or about January 23, 1991 to April 8, 1991, prior and/or subsequent thereto at Barangay
Tejeros Convention, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud and by means of deceit,
with false manifestation and misrepresentation, by pretending herself (sic) that she has power and
influence to recruit workers abroad (Japan), received and obtained from one ROMMEL R. GARCIA the
amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (P13,120.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
with an understanding and obligation that said ROMMEL GARCIA would be given an employment
abroad as factory worker, but said accused, once in her possession the aforementioned sum of
P13,120.00, far from complying with her obligation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid amount to her own use and benefit
and despite demands made for the return of said amount of P13,120.00, accused herein failed and
refused to do so, thereby resulting to non-employment of said ROMMEL GARCIA and to his damage
and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
The five (5) cases were tried jointly.

The prosecution presented only five (5) of the fourteen (14) private complainants, namely: Angelize
Porterta Ciellane Gregorio, Rommel Garcia, Rustico Narvaez and Edwin Lallana. Each testified as
follows:
ANGELIZE PORTERTA testified that she came to know appellant through her friend Ciellane Gregorio,
also one of the complainants in this case. Gregorio learned that appellant was recruiting factory
workers for Japan. Porterta asked Gregorio to accompany her to appellant's residence in Tejeros
Convention, Rosario, Cavite. They went to appellant's house on the last week of December 1990. 3
During their meeting, appellant confirmed that she recruit workers for Japan. She represented to
Porterta that she was a coordinator of the Low Income Filipino Entrepreneurs (LIFE) Foundation which
sends workers for employment in Japan. Appellant explained that as a coordinator, she facilitates the
processing of the applicants' papers at the Philippine Overseas Employment Association (POEA ) and
the Japanese Embassy. 4
Appellant further informed Porterta that there were job openings for factory workers at Nissan
Company in Japan, with a salary of $700.00 per month. The contract would be for term of two (2)
years. However, appellant told her that if she wanted to apply, she must submit the necessary
papers, such as passport, biodata, NBI clearance and physical examination results. She was also
informed that she has to shell out P8,000.00. Five hundred pesos (P500.00) would cover her
membership fee in the LIFE Foundation, P5,000.00 will be paid to the POEA, and the rest would be for
the documentation of her papers. 5
Porterta expressed interest in appellant's proposal. She asked her friend, Ciellane Gregorio, to submit
her papers to appellant for processing. On the last week of January 1991, she received word from
appellant that payment of the P8,000.00 should be made on February 5, 1991. On said date, Porterta
accompanied by her friends, Ciellane Gregorio and Susan Ramirez, gave appellant the P8,000.00 at
the latter's house in Cavite. As proof of said payment, appellant issued to her a receipt. 6
On the same date, appellant handed to her another receipt, dated January 1, 1991, 7 signed by one
Lucita Baluran, as proof of her payment of the P500.00 membership fee with the Life Foundation. 8
When she noticed that the receipt was signed Baluran she inquired from appellant about the latter's
identity. Appellant informed her that Baluran was one of the officers of the Foundation.
After paying the required fees, appellant promised she could leave for Japan on February 15, 1991.
However, nothing came out of said promise. She went back to appellant's office and was told that the
delay in her departure was due to the failure of the POEA to release her papers. Again, appellant
promised her that she would be able to leave for Japan on the last week of February or on the first
week of March 1991. Still, the promise was not realized. She demanded from appellant the return of
her money and papers. Appellant gave back her biodata, passport NBI clearance and the results of
her physical examination. However, she did not refund her money. Appellant told her that the money
was used in processing her papers. She was not swayed by appellant's explanation. She alleged that
appellant made no effort at all to process her papers for she was able to immediately get them all
back when she demanded for their return Insofar as her passport was concerned, she already had
one even before she applied for employment with appellant.9
To secure a refund, Porterta kept going back to the office of the Life Foundation in Tejeros, Cavite,
where appellant was reporting for work. When her efforts failed, she filed a complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation(NBI). 10
For her part, prosecution witness CIELLANE GREGORIO testified that her friend Rowena Leuterio, also
one of the complainants in this case, introduced her to appellant. Leuterio, in turn, learned from her
neighbor, Mrs. Palompo, that appellant was engaged in recruiting workers for employment abroad. 11
Accompanied by Rowena Leuterio, Susan Ramirez, Baby Ruth Pagkaliwangan and Leonora Posadas,
Ciellane Gregorio went to appellant's residence. She personally sought appellant's confirmation
regarding the latter's capacity to send workers for overseas employment. Claiming to be a coordinator
of the LIFE Foundation, appellant represented to Gregorio that she could send them for work to
Japan.12
As in the case of Angelize Porterta, appellant informed them that she was recruiting factory workers
for Nissan Motors Company in Japan. They were promised a two-year contract with a salary of

$700.00 per month. They were also required to submit a passsport, NBI clearance, biodata, pictures
and to submit themselves to a physical examination.13
Gregorio inquired from appellant where exactly in Japan they were supposed to work. Appellant was
ambivalent. She told them there were several Nissan companies in Japan and she was not sure of the
exact address of their employer. Appellant assured them she would personally attend to the
processing of their papers. She further guaranteed their money back should they change their mind.
14
Prior to her application with appellant, Ciellane Gregorio has been a technical trainee in Japan. During
her testimony, she disclosed that she did not find any reason to doubt appellant's representations
because she demanded compliance with the same requirements her previous Japanese employer
asked from her.
Appellant asked them to pay P8,000.00 to cover the expenses of their medical examination and for
the processing and documentation of their papers. She initially paid the sum of P3,500.00 on January
16, 1991 and a receipt (Exhibit "C"), signed by appellant, was issued to her. For the P500.00
membership fee, appellant handed to her an undated receipt singed by Baluran. Appellant explained
that Baluran was also a member of the Foundation.
On January 17, 1991, Gregorio paid an additional P150.00 for her medical examination. However,
appellant, who was then in a hurry to leave, did not give her a receipt. Thereafter, Gregorio, together
with the other applicants, 15were accompanied by appellant to a medical clinic in Ermita for their
physical examination. 16
On February 5, 1991, Gregorio made a final payment to appellant in the amount of P5,000.00 at the
latter's residence. 17
Initially appellant promised them that they would be able to leave for Japan either on the last week of
January or the first week of February 1991. However, appellants promise did materialize. Finally,
appellant assured them that they would definitely be able to leave on the last week of February, at
the latest. Again, they failed to leave on the day promised. 18 Gregorio kept visiting appellant at the
latter's office in Cavite to follow-up her application. During her visits, Gregorio disclosed that
appellant's place of work was the office of the LIFE Foundation in Cavite where a billboard hangs,
indicating thereon that appellant was the coordinator of the Foundation.
Exasperated at appellant's repeated failure to keep her promise, they demanded that appellant return
their money. Appellant, however, told them that their monies were spent for the documentation
expenses of other applicants. They were asked to wait until these other applicants have paid in full.
They decided to abandon their application and to get back their papers. Appellant was able to return
only her passport. Gregorio thus filed a complaint with the NBI. 19
The third prosecution witness, ROMMEL GARCIA, came to know appellant through his friend Cris
Pascua. Pascua informed him that appellant was recruiting workers for Japan. He, together with
Edwin Lallana, also a complainant in this case, asked Pascua to accompany them to appellant's
residence.
When they met appellant at her house in Cavite, they sought confirmation from her if she was
recruiting workers for Japan. Appellant confirmed. She told them that there were positions open for
technical trainee mechanic at the Nissan Company in Japan. They then inquired about the
requirements. She directed them to submit their biodata and pictures and pay P10,000.00. 20
Garcia complied and made a total payment of P12,500 for the processing of his passport and
documentation. of his papers. All these amounts were paid to appellant at her house in Cavite. Except
for the P1,620.00 he paid for travel tax all his payments were evidenced by corresponding receipts
issued by appellant. 21 On the third week of January 1991, he submitted himself to a physical
examination at a clinic in Ermita, Manila.
Initially, appellant promised that he would be able to leave by February 15, 1991. The promise,
however, did not materialize. Appellant claimed that there was a "problem" with his papers at POEA.
For more than two (2) months after his last payment, he followed-up his application with appellant at
the latter's house and office. Weeks passed but Garcia still failed to leave for Japan. He never did. 22

The fourth witness RUSTICO NARVAEZ, testified that appellant was introduced to them by Tasya
Palompo, a friend of appellant. Palompo told them that appellant was recruiting factory workers far
Japan.
On January 8, 1991, Narvaez, together with his cousins Rowell Ditan and Federico Dinco, went to
appellant house, accompanied by Palompo. Appellant told them that she was recruiting workers for
Japan.
Appellant also informed them that Nissan Motors in Japan was in need of factory workers. The
monthly salary for said position was $800.00, exclusive of food allowance. However, appellant
required them to become members of the Foundation by paying the P500.00 membership fee. They
were also asked to undergo a physical examination and submit their NBI clearance, passport, diploma
and picture. Appellant also suggested that, to minimize their expenses, they should obtain their own
passport and submit it to her. 23
On January 21, 1991, he gave to appellant, the money for the membership and physical examination
fees. On the same date, appellant accompanied them to a clinic in Ermita where they underwent
medical examination. For the payments he made, appellant issued to him a
receipt, 24 dated March 6, 1991, for P8,850.00.
Appellant promised that they would be able to leave for Japan on March 30, 1991. On said date,
however, they were informed by appellant that the coming elections in Japan affected their departure.
Appellant thus committed that they would be able to leave on April 15, 1991. Again, nothing came
out of said promise. They tried to get in touch with appellant but she was nowhere to be found.
Neither were they able to get a refund of their payments. 25
Narvaez's two (2) cousins, Ruel Ditan and Federico Dinco, also applied for work in Japan. Narvaez
testified that he saw his cousins pay appellant for the processing of their papers. His cousins paid on
the same dates he did and for the same amounts. 26
EDWIN LALLANA came to know appellant through his, friend Cris Pascua who asked him whether he
wanted to apply for an overseas job with appellant. Wanting to work abroad, he went to appellant's
house, together with Pascua's wife, and his friend Rommel Garcia. 27
Appellant informed them about the requirements for employment abroad. Representing that she was
a coordinator of the LIFE Foundation, appellant directed them to prepare P4,500.00 for the processing
of their papers. She promised them jobs as technical trainee at Nissan Motors, Japan, with allowance
and free board and lodging. As with the other applicants, appellant required that they be members of
the LIFE Foundation before their applications could be entertained. 28
Lallana paid the total amount of P12,500.00 to appellant for the processing of his papers. 29 Despite
his payment of the fees, appellant failed to fulfill her promise of employment abroad. Hence he filed a
complaint with the NBI. 30
SOCORRO LANDAS, senior overseas employment officer of the POEA, identified the certification issued
by their agency, attesting that neither appellant nor the LIFE Foundation was licensed to recruit
workers for employment. 31
Upon the other hand, appellant totally disclaimed liability. She denied recruiting or promising private
complainants employment in Japan. She claimed that she herself was an applicant with the LIFE
Foundation for an overseas job and that private complainants were her co-applicants. Allegedly, Mrs.
Lucita F. Baluran, the manager of the Foundation, convinced her to become a member. She was told
that, the Foundation could lend her money and help her start a small business, Baluran also promised
that her money would be returned if she could not get a job abroad. 32
Appellant further testified that her sister, brother and two cousins also, applied with the Foundation.
She herself was asked to pay the P500.00 membership fee. She paid a total of P7,500.00. Her
brother also paid the same amount. 33Significantly, no receipt was presented by appellant to prove
her alleged payment.34
Appellant, admitted that the complainants gave her some money to answer for the service fee. 35 She
admitted that she received the payments made by complainants but claimed that she turned them

over to Noralyn Paras, who in turn remitted the money to Mrs. Baluran. Appellant further testified
that Mrs. Baluran was serving a sentence of life imprisonment at the correctional after having been
convicted of illegal recruitment. 36 Appellant charged that Mrs. Baluran was the one engaged in illegal
recruitment and that private complainants filed the cases against her when they failed to get a refund
from Mrs. Baluran. 37
On cross-examination, appellant insisted that she was asked by Mrs. Baluran to coordinate with the
other applicants in her province and to receive the payments to be made by complainants. As a
coordinator, appellant claimed that she did not receive, any remuneration or allowance. She remitted
the money she received from the other applicants to Mrs. Basilia Manzano and Mrs. Baluran. She
recalled that it was in December 1990 when she applied with the Foundation as factory worker. 38 She
was then with her sister, brother and two cousins who also applied for the same position. 39 Appellant
also declared that Noralyn Paras was with her when she remitted the money to Mrs. Baluran. 40
During her re-direct examination, appellant stood pat on her claim that she remitted the money she
received from complainants to Mrs. Manzano and Mrs. Baluran. She presented two (2) receipts 41
signed by the two. She also presented her certificate of membership (Exhibit "9") at the Foundation,
signed by Mrs. Baluran. 42
Appellant thereafter sought to present Mrs. Lucita Baluran as her witness. The court asked the
defense about the nature of Baluran's testimony. The defense declared that its purpose was to prove
that appellant remitted the money and payments made by complainants to Baluran. To dispense with
her
presence, 43 the prosecution agreed to stipulate on her testimony.
After trial on the merits, Presiding Judge Rolando D. Diaz rendered a decision, 44 dated June 18, 1993,
finding accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aida Honrada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment on a (sic) Large Scale as defined in Sec. 38 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1920 and 2018 in Crim. Case No. 117-91 and she is
ordered to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100,000.00, to indemnify the offended parties in
the following amounts:
1 Susan Ramirez P8,650.00

2 Baby Ruth Pagkaliwangan 7,500.00
3 Rowena Leuterio 7,500.00
4 Angelize Porterta 8,500.00
5 Noralyn Paras 4,500.00
6 Felicidad Barreyro 6,500.00
7 Ciellane Gregorio 8,650.00
8 Rustico Narvaez 9,350.00
9 Frederico Dinco 9,350.00
10 Edwin Lallana 12,120.00
11 Enrico Sugatan 14,120.00
12 Celso Cesa 13,620.00
13 Ruel Ditan 9,350.00
In Crim. Case No. 131-91, she is found guilty of the offense of Estafa as defined and penalized under
Art. 315, paragraph 1 and she is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate term of Six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum to Four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
as maximum, to indemnify the offended party Rommel Garcia in the amount of P13,120.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs in both instances. In Crim. Cases Nos. 128-91,
129-91 and 130-91, accused is hereby ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal. Appellant avers that the trial court erred:
I
IN FINDING "THAT ALL THE COMPLAINANTS HEREIN WERE ENTICED WITH THE PROMISE OF A JOB
IN THE NISSAN MOTORS FACTORY IN JAPAN TO SEEK THE HELP OF HEREIN ACCUSED AND TO GIVE
HER THE MANDATE."
II
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE "FACT REMAINS THAT SHE (THE ACCUSED) IS THE COORDINATOR
OF LIFE FOUNDATION, THAT SHE ENTICED THE POOR COMPLAINANTS TO PART WITH THEIR HARD-
EARNED MONEY FOR THE PROMISE OF A BETTER LIFE AND JOB IN JAPAN."
III
IN ADOPTING FOR JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE POEA CERTIFICATION "THAT NEITHER THE LIFE
FOUNDATION NOR THE ACCUSED ARE (SIC) REGISTERED, RECRUITERS AND THEREFORE ALL THEIR
(SIC) ACTUATIONS IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE ALL FRAUDULENT."
IV
FOR WRONGLY AND INCORRECTLY APPLYING AGAINST THE ACCUSED AIDA HONRADA ITS FINDINGS
OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS BUT A SIMPLE MEMBER OF LIFE
FOUNDATION, INC., THE DULY-REGISTERED "FOUNDATION" ALLEGEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
ENTICING COMPLAINANTS TO BE MEMBERS THEREOF FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT ABROAD.
IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE SUMS OF MONEY WHICH COMPLAINANTS ALLEGEDLY GAVE
TO ACCUSED AIDA HONRADA WERE ALL TURNED OVER TO AND RECEIVED BY LUCITA BALURAN,
CHAIRPERSON OF LIFE FOUNDATION.
VI
IN FINDING THE "ACCUSED AIDA HONRADA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT ON A LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED IN SEC. 38 OF THE LABOR CODE, WHICH FINDING IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
VII
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED HONRADA GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315,
PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
We affirm the conviction, with modifications.
"Recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Recruitment is deemed illegal when carried out by a person or entity not licensed to engage in such
activity. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group. 45
In this appeal, appellant basically reiterates her defense that she was merely a coordinator of the
LIFE Foundation and that it was Mrs. Lucita Baluran who was responsible for the recruitment of herein
complainants. Further, she stresses that she herself was an applicant for a job in Japan.
Her defense is unmeritorious. The prosecution demonstrated with proof beyond reasonable doubt the
systematic scheme developed and adopted by appellant to lure her victims to apply for a sham
overseas job. The testimonial and documentary evidence showed that appellant advertised in her
province her capacity to send workers for overseas employment. Appellant reported for work at her
office in Rosario, Cavite where a billboard hangs promoting the name of the Foundation and
announcing her position therein as coordinator. 46 Private complainants, all residents of Cavite,
transacted only with appellant in relation to their application for work in Japan. It was appellant who

gave them the details of the job opportunities in Japan. She was the one who decided on the work
each of the complainants would be assigned to perform there. She informed complainants about the
nature of the job, their salary and the other terms of their contract. Appellant even accompanied
some of the complainants to a clinic in Ermita for their physical examination. Appellant provided all
the particulars relative to their possible employment and informed them about the required fees. All
the foregoing acts of appellant constitute recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code. She held herself out as capable of sending them abroad for overseas employment. None of the
complainants ever met Mrs. Baluran or Mrs. Manzano whom appellant points as the persons
responsible for recruiting complainants. All throughout the recruitment period, complainants
transacted only with appellant. Their recruitment would not have been consummated were if not for
the direct participation and assistance of appellant in the recruitment process.
Appellant's defense is unworthy of credence. She maintains that she herself was merely an applicant
at the Foundation and that her sister, brother and two cousins joined her in applying for a job abroad.
Noticeably, however, none of these people came forward corroborate her testimony.
Appellant also claims that she herself was an applicant for an overseas job with the Foundation and
that she paid a total of P7,500.00 for the Processing of her papers. 47 However, throughout the whole
trial, no mention was made that she exerted any effort to seek a refund of her money. Nor was it
alleged that she filed a complaint for illegal recruitment and/or estafa against the alleged recruiter
Mrs. Baluran. Her omissions and inactions do not bespeak of someone who had been duped into
believing that a job awaits her abroad, paying the necessary fees therefor. Indeed, the evidence
shows that appellant was a co-conspirator and active participant in the deceitful scheme adopted by
Baluran and company to lure innocent applicants for a fictitious overseas job.
Appellant maintains that the trial court failed to appreciate in her favor the fact that she turned over
to Mrs. Lucita P. Baluran and Mrs. Basilia Manzano the money she received from complainants. She
alleged too that she did not receive any remuneration or compensation for the services she rendered.
However, the fact alone that she did not keep the money in her possession is of no moment. The
evidence disclose that she actively and directly participated in the recruitment of complainants and
that, for her efforts, she was promised a service fee in the amount of P26,000.00. 48 Moreover, by her
actions and declarations, appellant, beyond doubt, gave private complainants the impression that she
was capable of providing them work abroad, which is basically the essence of the crime of illegal
recruitment. 49
Appellant, in her cross-examination, admitted that she told complainants she was the coordinator of
the Foundation and has the capacity to send workers abroad. In the next breath, however, she
declared that when her friend, Taciana Palompo, learned that she was applying for work abroad,
Palompo asked her if some of her friends could join her in her application with the Foundation.
Appellant recounted that she vehemently declined for she was afraid and instructed Palompo to just
go directly to Baluran. 50 This portion of appellant's testimony shatters her pretensions. For while
appellant maintained she was afraid (the reason not being readily apparent) she, nevertheless,
accepted the position of coordinator of the Foundation and received the money paid by the other
applicants.
Finally, appellant argues that of the fourteen (14) complainants in the illegal recruitment case, only
five (5) testified. Nevertheless the trial court found her guilty of illegally recruiting the other nine (9)
complainants. Appellant urges that by holding her guilty of illegal recruitment and liable to indenmify
the other nine (9) complainants, the trial court violated her constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against her.
We do not agree. In the case of People v. Fiest, 51 the Court held that "(t)here is no law making
compulsory the presentation of a complainant as witness. Confrontation applies only to witnesses who
actually testify in a trial against the accused." 52 Moreover, appellant overlooks that the charge
against her is illegal recruitment in large scale. Under Article 39 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, this crime can be proved if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as
a group. The evidence shows that five (5) complainants testified how they were illegally recruited by
appellant. Ciellane Gregorio categorically testified that she, together with her friends and co-
complainants (viz: Rowena Leuterio, Susan Ramirez, Baby Ruth Pagkaliwangan and Leonora
Posadas), personally went to appellant's residence and were induced by appellant to apply for
overseas employment. 53 In other words, as per the testimony of Ciellane Gregorio, complainants
Leuterio, Ramirez, Pagkaliwangan and Posadas were recruited by appellant under the same

circumstances. Thus, any other testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony already
made by complaining witness Ciellane Gregorio.
Be that as it may, the evidence also shows that, of these four, only SUSAN RAMIREZ presented
receipts 54 proving the payments she made to appellant (totaling P8,500.00) to facilitate the
processing of her papers. As regards complainants BABY RUTH PAGKALIWANGAN, ROWENA
LEUTERIO and NORALYN PARAS, there is no proof to show how much damage each sustained. No
receipt was presented to prove their alleged payments to appellant.
We come to the case of private complainants RUEL DITAN and FREDERICO DINCO. Complaining
witness Rustico Narvaez testified that his cousins Ditan and Dinco went with him to appellant's house
and likewise applied for possible work in Japan. Narvaez further declared that his cousins paid the
same amounts he did and on the same dates. However, this declaration cannot be given any
probative weight. There was no receipt presented proving the payments allegedly made by Ditan and
Dinco. Hence, for insufficiency of evidence, appellant could not be held liable to indemnify Ditan and
Dinco the amount of damage allegedly sustained by them.
We also take note of the case of complainant FELICIDAD BARREYRO. Although complaining witness
Ciellane Gregorio testified that she saw Barreyro hand over the amount of P3,500.00 to appellant for
the processing of her
papers,55 there was no testimony on record as to how precisely Barreyro was recruited by appellant.
Hence, there could be no basis for finding appellant guilty of illegally recruiting complainant Barreyro.
The same observation holds with respect to the case of complainants ENRICO SUGATAN and CELSO
CESA. There is insufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary, as to the exact
circumstances under which they were allegedly induced by appellant to apply for work in Japan and
the amounts each paid for said purpose.
Finally, in the estafa case (Criminal Case No. 131-91), we rule that the evidence on record56 supports
only the payment by the offended party ROMMEL GARCIA to appellant of the sum of twelve thousand
five hundred pesos (P12,500.00).
In sum, appellant was proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa. However, he could be held to indemnify only the following
parties for the amounts:
1. Angelize Porterta P8,000.00

2. Ciellane Gregorio 9,000.00
3. Rustico Narvaez 9,350.00
4. Edwin Lallana 12,500.00
5. Susan Ramirez 8,500.00
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we affirm appellant's conviction of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale
and estafa, subject to the following modifications as to the penalty:
1. In the illegal recruitment case, appellant shall be sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P100,000.00, and to indemnify the following parties in these amounts:
a. Angelize Porterta P8,000.00

b. Ciellane Gregorio 9,000.00
c. Rustico Narvaez 9,350.00
d. Edwin Lallana 12,500.00
e. Susan Ramirez 8,500.00
2. In the estafa case (Criminal Case No. 131-91), appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party,
ROMMEL GARCIA, the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P12,500.00) PESOS, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-47411. February 20, 1981.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUFEMIO CAPARAS Y PAEZ and

PATRICIO DIAMSAY Y GREGORIO, Defendants-Appellants.
Honorio Valisno Garcia and Rustico U. Nazareno for defendants- appellants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and
Solicitor Jesus O. Ibay for plaintiff- appellee.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants Diamsay and Caparas were accused of murder for the killing of Simeon. The prosecution
evidence showed that the victim was in front of his father-in-laws house when Diamsay, armed with
a shotgun, called him from the street. In retort to Simeons "You have a gun", Diamsay said "Yes, I
am going to kill you" and immediately thereafter fired his shotgun at Simeon, fatally hitting him. He
also fired at Pablo, Simeons brother, but missed him. The shotgun used by Diamsay belonged to
Simeons uncle, Caparas. A prosecution witness testified that due to a family dispute over certain
parcels of land, Caparas, at a meeting where he was present, had ordered Diamsay, then Caparas
overseer of the land formerly managed by Simeons father, to kill Simeon. Still another witness
testified that she overheard the appellants plotting to kill the victim. On the other hand, Diamsay
pleaded self-defense. He admitted having shot Simeon because the latter and Pablo, armed with a 45
caliber pistol and a bolo, respectively, had blocked him on his way home and Simeon had said "Ticio,
get ready; this is your time." The trial court found the prosecution version more credible and
convicted the appellants of murder, sentencing Caparas to reclusion perpetua and Diamsay to an
indeterminate sentence in view of his voluntary surrender. On appeal, the appellants assailed the
rejection of the defense of self-defense and the finding of conspiracy.
The Supreme Court had that the evidence is clear that appellant Diamsay was the aggressor so that
he cannot validly plead self-defense; and that the finding of conspiracy had been satisfactorily
established by the direct testimony of witnesses which had not been successfully impugned by the
defense.
Judgment affirmed with modification as to the minimum of the penalty imposed upon Diamsay to
comply with the provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SELF-DEFENSE; BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTED ON PERSON WHO

ADMITS THE KILLING; CASE AT BAR. On his own admission, appellant Diamsay killed Simeon Paez.
He thus shifted to him the burden of proving the justifying circumstance she has invoked, that of self-
defense, which he must discharge with clear and convicting evidence, and not rely merely on the
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution to gain acquittal.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; SELF-DEFENSE; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, AN

ELEMENT THEREOF; CIRCUMSTANCE IN CASE AT BAR SHOWING APPELLANT WAS REAL AGGRESSOR.
The first element of self-defense is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim against the party
pleading self-defense. In the case at bar appellant Diamsay may therefore not validly plead self-
defense because he was shown to be the real aggressor, thus: (1) Diamsay was under orders by
Caparas to do away with the victim (2) Diamsay could not have aroused such intense resentment
even on the part of the victim as to be driven to the urge, or even just to entertain an intent, to kill
Diamsay; (3) Diamsays testimony that he short the victim because the latter and his brother, armed
with a .45 caliber pistol and a bolo, respectively, had blocked his away in a daringly aggressive
stance, is of self extremely doubtful, if not wholly incredible, being entirely different from what hold
the police investigator and the tricycle driver who took him to town to surrender; ($) it is incredible
that seeing his adversary with a shotgun, the victim would tell the former to get ready, as is the story
of appellant in making out his plea of self-defense, instead of firing at once and catching his intended
victim unprepared; (5) appellants act was not merely defensive as shown when he also fired at Pablo
after shooting down Simeon; and (6) Diamsays profession of lack of motive to kill. Simeon, cannot
be believed in the face of evidence of previous agreement to kill the victim in which he had definite
orders from his employer, appellants Caparas, similar to what the state witness received, with an
offer of monetary reward.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESS; FAILURE OF
DEFENSE TO FULLY EXAMINE PROSECUTION WITNESS IN CASE AT BAR WHICH IS NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROSECUTION, NOT A GROUND TO DISCARD WITNESS TESTIMONY. The
testimony of Laureano Salvador which would actually make appellant Caparas a principal by
inducement by proving conspiracy may not be discharged on the ground that Salvador was not fully
cross-examined by the defense-counsel. It appears that the failure of fully cross-examine witness was
not because of the fault of the prosecution, for the witness, although unable to be present on three
previous hearings, subsequently appeared, ready to be cross-examined but defense counsel asked for
postponement which the court denied and declared a waiver on the part of the defense to further
cross-examine the witness. At any rate, this witness had already been cross-examined on the
material facts testified to.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; NEGATIVE TESTIMONY IN CASE AT BAR DOES NOT
NECESSARILY DISPROVE A POSITIVE ONE. The testimony of Lydia Posadas may not be impugned
with the testimony of her sister Priscilla who denied having with her at the haystack where, unseen by
appellants, they are supposed to have heard said appellants plot the killing of Simeon Paez. As
between the conflicting testimonies of the two sisters, the testimony of Lydia against appellant
Caparas is the real truth. The two sisters jointly executed on February 9, 1971 their affidavit shortly
after the killing on February 5, 1971, after the body of the deceased had been interred on February 7,
1971, at the instance of Pedro, father of Simeon. If this was manufactured evidence, Pedro Paez
would have known better that to involve two persons to testify falsely where one would have served
the same purpose with less risk of the falsehood being discovered. Moreover, Priscilla merely testified
that she did not go with her sister Lydia to the haystack on January 27, 1971. This is a mere negative
testimony that does not necessarily disprove the fact that Lydia went there without Priscilla knowing it
a case of a negative testimony yielding to a positive one.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS FOR MURDER. Conspiracy having

been satisfactorily established, appellant Caparas is equally liable as appellant Diamsay, the actual
perpetrator of the dastardly killing.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; DULY PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR.

The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation alleged in the information and which has
qualified the killing into murder was sufficiently proven by the testimony of Laureano Salvador and
Lydia Posadas, both credible witnesses, the former being particularly so, as he had absolutely no
motive to testify against appellants, specially against appellant Caparas, who offered to give him land
to till, as he was seeking to obtain from said appellant. His testimony is also against his own interest,
as it tends to implicate him as one of the conspirators, and is therefore, of immense weight and value
as evidence.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Patricio Diamsay y Gregorio and Eufemio Caparas y Paez were charged in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija (Branch IV, Guimba) with, and convicted of murder, under the facts, as proved by the
evidence of the prosecution, narrated in the People's brief as follows:
This is the tragic story of two first cousins, accused Eufemio Caparas and the deceased Simeon
Paez, one of whom planned the killing of the other because of conflicts over proprietary rights.
The story began in 1967 when accused Eufemio Caparas, his sister Perpetua and his uncle Pedro
Paez, father of the deceased Simeon Paez, purchased from the Cebreros several parcels of
agricultural lands in Quezon, Nueva Ecija, with an aggregate area of seventy hectares (p. 6, t.s.n.,
February 13, 1974). Perpetua Caparas and Pedro Paez each bought ten hectares while Eufemio
Caparas paid for fifty hectares (p. 7, Id.). Since the lots were covered by several titles, Eufemio
Caparas requested that all the lots be titled in his name alone so that after the subdivision of the
whole parcel each of them would have portions contiguous to each other (pp. 7-8, Id.). Everyone
agreed to the proposal and everything went along fine. From 1967 to 1970, Pedro Paez and his
sons Simeon and Pablo tilled their ten-hectare share of the land. On the latter date, the tenants of
the lots filed leasehold petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations. As a result, Eufemio Caparas
proposed to Pedro Paez that they sell the land to the government under the Land Reform Program
at P5,000.00 per hectare and he would give Pedro Paez the amount of P23,000.00 (pp. 8-9, Id).

Sensing that they would be prejudiced because the proceeds of the sale of the ten-hectare land
turn by them should be P50,000.00, the Paezes refused to agree to the proposal of Caparas. Hot
words ensued between Eufemio Caparas and his cousin Simeon Paez, the latter blurting out that
"what you are doing to us is not helping us but it is defrauding us." (pp. 9-11, Id.). From then on
relationship between the Caparas and the Paezes In April 1970, Caparas removed Pedro Paez as
overseer of his landholdings in Quezon, Nueva Ecija a position which he held from 1967, and
replaced him by accused Patricio Diamsay.
In June 1970, Eufemio Caparas had a portion of the land titled by the Paezes plowed, Simeon Paez
refused to allow encroachment; he also had it plowed and planted; Patricio Diamsay arrived, and
with a gun he sent away the planters (p. 12, Id.).
Because Caparas was his nephew and Simeon, his son, Pedro Paez wanted to have the case settled
amicably. He therefore had his uncle Atty. Pablo Paez called for a conference (p. 13, Id). The
conference did not take place because Caparas was not at home. However, Atty. Pablo Paez
assured Pedro Paez and his family that he would talk to Caparas and that they should just leave the
matter to him (p. 14, Id.).
On January 27, 1971, Lydia Posadas, wife of Pedro's son Pablo, arrived at the house of Pedro Paez,
in Quezon (p. 15, Id.). She was very pale. She reported to Pedro Paez that while she was gleaning
loose grains from the haytack, she heard a plan of Caparas to have Simeon killed (pp. 15-16, Id.)
Since earlier he had received a letter from his uncle Atty. Paez saying that the latter together with
Eufemio Caparas and Zaragoza mayor Francisco Ramirez, would arrive on February 6, to settle the
case. Pedro Paez told her daughter-in-law not to mention what she heard to Simeon because
matters might get worse. Pedro Paez further told her daughter-in-law, "you just say that I am
calling all you to town" (pp. 16-17, Id.). Pablo Paez and his wife Lydia and Simeon Paez went to
stay with Pedro Paez and the Paez family residence in the town of Quezon. Simeon's wife, however,
did not join them because she had just delivered (p. 18, Id.).
In the afternoon of February 4, 1971, there was a report that the newly born child of Simeon was
sick and the watchers could not sleep taking care of him, so Simeon left town and went to Sitio
Puten to see his son. Since Simeon did not return to town that night, Pedro Paez sent his son Pablo
to Sitio Puten to fetch Simeon (pp. 18-19, Id.).
In the early morning of the following day, February 5, 1971, Pablo Paez in compliance with his
father's order went to Sitio Puten to fetch his brother Simeon (p. 4, t.s.n., November 20, 1973).
Upon arrival Pablo told Simeon that he was sent by their father to fetch him and that he (Simeon)
must go home to town right away and if possible, to take his wife and his family along. Simeon
agreed to bring with him his family but he told Pablo that he would just fill his "Sibura" with
gasoline (p. 5, Id.). When Simeon was about to fill his vehicle with gasoline, somebody called him
from the street. Simeon looked at the direction where the voice came from and he saw Patricio
Diamsay holding a gun. Whereupon Simeon said, "You have a gun," to which Patricio Diamsay
answered, "Yes, I am going to kill you." Immediately after uttering his reply, Patricio Diamsay fired
his shotgun at Simeon (p. 6, Id.).
After Patricio Diamsay had shot Simeon, Pablo, who was about nine meters away from Diamsay,
ran out to call for a tricycle. When Diamsay saw Pablo, the former fired at the latter. Pablo was not
hit because he was able to hide behind an acacia tree. Instead, two pigs at his back were hit and
killed by the bullets from Diamsay's shotgun (p. 7, Id.). Diamsay tried to shoot Pablo when he
peeped behind the tree. Luckily Diamsay's gun jammed so Pablo ran away and hid in the house of
Hilario Julian (pp. 7-8, Id.).
As a result of the shooting, Simeon Paez suffered bullet .wounds in the chest and armpit which
caused his death (p. 9, Id; Exhs. A & B; pp. 6-7, t.s.n., June 2, 1973).
The shotgun used by Patricio Diamsay in shooting Simeon Paez belonged to Eufemio Caparas (pp.
11-12, t.s.n., November 20, 1973; pp. 37-38, t.s.n., July 30, 1974. (pp. 3-7, People's Brief; p. 216,
Rollo)
The dispositive portion of the judgment, which has been appealed direct to this Court reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
charged in the information, the Court sentences Eufemio Caparas y Paez to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and Patricio Diamsay y Gregorio, taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor, the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years
four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal The accused are
likewise sentenced to suffer the accessories provided for by law to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Simeon Paez in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs. (pp. 2-3, Id.)
The first assignment of error of appellants relates to the rejection by the court a quo of the plea of
self-defense of appellant Diamsay. While the second relates to the finding of conspiracy by said court
by virtue of which appellant Caparas was also convicted for the killing of the victim.
The self-defense testimony of appellant Diamsay is to the effect that: In February 1971 he was the
overseer of appellant Caparas of the latter's lands located at Puten Sta. Rita, Quezon, Nueva Ecija,
having been such overseer since 1970, taking over from Pedro Paez, father of the victim, Simeon
Paez, causing ill-feeling on the part of the Paezes against him, as revealed by their provoking him to a
fight on many occasions, specially when they were armed with clubs. In the evening of February 4,
1971, he was in the house of appellant Caparas at Puten, Sta. Rita, having been guarding the water
pump, and left at 7:00 in the morning of February 5, 1971 for his house which was about 3
kilometers away, and had to pass by the house of Hilario Julian, father-in-law of Simeon Paez. While
he was on the road in front of Julian's house, Simeon Paez who was holding a gun, with his brother,
Pablo Paez who was holding a bolo, blocked his way. Appellant Diamsay was more or less 3 meters
from the brothers when he first saw them. Raising his gun, a .45 caliber pistol, Simeon Paez said:
"Ticio get ready; this is your time," and as he saw the action and heard the words of Simeon, he shot
first at the latter, and after this, Pablo tried to hack him with the bolo, so he fired again in the air and
Pablo ran away. After the incident, he went to town and surrendered to the police.
On his own admission then, appellant Diamsay killed Simeon Paez. He thus shifted to him the burden
of proving the justifying circumstance he has invoked, that of self- defense, which he must discharge
with clear and convincing evidence, 1 and may not rely merely on the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution to gain acquittal. 2
The first element of self-defense is unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. From the state
evidence, the appellant is clearly the aggressor. According to Pablo Paez, admittedly an eye-witness
to the incident, it was appellant who, upon hearing Simeon remark: "You have a gun," answered:
"Yes, I am going to kill you," and instantly fired his shotgun at Simeon. 3 Clearly in contrast to this
testimony of Pablo Paez is that of appellant who declared that it was Simeon who said: "Ticio get
ready, this is your time." As to which of the opposing testimony should be believed would furnish the
key to knowing who the real aggressor was.
It has been sufficiently proven that Diamsay was under order by appellant Caparas to do away with
Simeon. The testimony of prosecution witness Laureano Salvador reveals that in a meeting in the
middle of January, 1971, at the house of one Carlos Gregorio, in which he, the two appellants and
Carlos Gregorio were present, it was agreed that Simeon Paez should be killed, appellant Caparas
ordering this witness (Laureano Salvador) Carlos Gregorio and appellant Diamsay to perform the
killing, Salvador having been even offered P5,000.00 for the job because the land held by Simeon is
the very land he would give to Laureano Salvador to till. Diamsay, therefore, when he passed by the
house of the victim's father-in-law, armed with a shotgun, already had homicidal intent, obvious sly
aware of the presence of Simeon Paez in the house, and so he called him in order to accomplish his
evil purpose. The quickness with which he fired his gun would indicate that he had prepared it for
instant firing, to insure accomplishment of his mission without risk to himself from an attack the
intended victim might possibly make against him.
On the other hand, as a mere overseer, Diamsay could not have aroused such intense resentment on
the part of Simeon Paez as to be driven to the urge, or even just to entertain an intent, to kill
Diamsay as the latter had pictured Simeon Paez with his entirely uncorroborated testimony.
Appellant Diamsay's testimony is of itself extremely doubtful, if not wholly incredible. If as he

claimed, Simeon was armed with a .45 caliber pistol and his brother Pablo, with a bolo, mention of
this fact to the policeman, who investigated him upon his surrender, Sgt. Ernesto Ramos, should have
been made, instead of telling the police investigator that he shot Simeon Paez because the latter
boxed him. 4 The daringly aggressive stance allegedly shown by Simeon Paez to him can neither be
believed with the undisputed fact that Diamsay was armed with a shotgun, a more effective weapon
for distance firing than a pistol, as in fact, the State witness Hipolito Supena, the tricycle driver who
brought Diamsay to town to surrender, testified that he saw Diamsay fire at Simeon from a distance
of 15 meters. This witness testified further that Diamsay told him, when asked about the shooting,
that his gun merely accidentally went off. According to Sgt. Ramos, the shooting also took place
inside the yard of the house of Simeon's father-in-
law, not on the road as was the testimony of Diamsay. Clearly, the testimony of these two State
5
witnesses is more deserving of credence than appellant Diamsay's testimony which had not a bit of
corroboration.
Likewise, even assuming that Simeon was armed with a pistol, he could not have been as daringly
aggressive, as if he was certain of killing Diamsay with such weapon. His adversary was armed with a
shotgun that could be used to kill him from a safer distance. It is thus incredible that seeing his
adversary with a shotgun, Simeon Paez would tell the former top get ready, as is the story of
appellant Diamsay in making out his plea of self-defense, instead of firing at once and catch his
intended victim unprepared.
That appellant's act was not merely defensive is shown when he also fired at Pablo Paez after
shooting down Simeon, as clearly attested to by the killing of two pigs behind Pablo, hit by appellant
Diamsay's firing at Pablo who was not hit because he hid behind an acacia tree. When the shotgun
jammed, Pablo ran into the safety of the house of Julian Hilarion.
Appellant Diamsay's profession of lack of motive to kill Simeon Paez, so much stressed by him to
bolster his plea of self-defense, cannot be believed in the face of the evidence of a previous
agreement to kill the victim in which he had definite orders from his employer, appellant Caparas,
similar to what the State witness Laureano Salvador received, with an offer of monetary reward, and
by Carlos Gregorio, who later was killed, evidently to silence him and prevent him from becoming a
witness to the conspiracy against Simeon Paez' life. In any case, motive is not essential to conviction
for murder where the Identity of the culprit is not in doubt. 6
The second assignment of error relative to the finding of the court a quo of the existence of
conspiracy is evidently intended for the sole benefit of appellant Caparas who would have to be
acquitted if no conspiracy existed to involve him in the killing with equal liability as the actual killer,
his co-appellant Diamsay.
The most damaging testimony against appellant Caparas is that of Laureano Salvador. It would
actually make him a principal by inducement. Conspiracy would thus be proven by direct evidence.
With the same effect is the testimony of Lydia Posadas who allegedly heard Caparas and Diamsay
talking on how to kin Simeon Paez by provoking him into a quarrel.
The testimony of Laureano Salvador is sought to be totally discarded by appellants on the ground that
this witness was not fully cross-examined by the defense counsel. It appears, however, that the
witness was not fully cross-examined not because of the fault of the prosecution, for the witness,
although unable to be present on three previous hearings, subsequently appeared, ready to be cross-
examined. But defense counsel asked for postponement which the court denied and declared a waiver
on the part of the defense to further cross-examine the witness. At any rate, this witness had already
been cross-examined on the material facts testified to. The case relied upon by appellants in their
effort to discard Laureano Salvador's whole testimony Ortigas vs. Lufthansa Airlines, 64 SCRA 610-
611 is thus not applicable because there, the witness disappeared and was never cross-examined
even partly.
The testimony of Lydia Posadas was, likewise, sought to be impugned with the testimony of her
sister, Priscilla, who denied having been with her at the haystack where, unseen by appellants, they
are supposed to have heard said appellants plot the killing of Simeon Paez.
How the appellants or the defense got to have Priscilla Posadas testify in their favor and so contrary
to the testimony of her sister who earlier categorically declared in court having gone to the haystack
where Diamsay's palay was threshed and while there, heard of appellants' sinister design to kill
Simeon Paez, is hard to imagine. Lydia Posadas declared in Court on July 14, 1973 while Priscilla
Posadas took the stand on March 27, 1974. Between these dates, as the cliche goes, much water has
gone under the bridge. There is every possibility for overtures to have taken place by way of saving
appellant Caparas at least, who is after all, closely related to the victim and the Paezes, from
complicity. For if the two sisters were made to jointly execute a false affidavit by Pedro Paez, Priscilla
could at least have been prevailed upon not to take the stand just so her sister Lydia would not be
unmasked as a liar. If she took the stand as a defense witness, it must have been because the
Paezes, realizing what a terrible fate would befall a close relative, appellant Caparas, who could have
soothed their aggrieved feelings with more than just an empty supplication for pity, were induced to
save Caparas from the grave punishment that he would suffer for the serious offense with which he
was charged.
At any rate, a keen sense of perception of human feelings and behaviour persuades Us that as
between the conflicting testimonies of the two sisters, the testimony of Lydia against appellant
Caparas is the real truth. The two sisters jointly executed on February 9, 1971 their affidavit shortly
after the killing on February 5, 1971, after the body of the deceased had been interred on February 7,
1971, at the instance of Pedro Paez, father of Simeon. If this was manufactured evidence, Pedro Paez
would have known better than to involve two persons to testify falsely where one would have served
the same purpose with less risk of the falsehood being discovered.
Moreover, Priscilla merely testified that she did not go with her sister Lydia to the haystack on
January 27, 1971. This is a mere negative testimony that does not necessarily disprove the fact that
Lydia went there without Priscilla knowing it a case of a negative testimony yielding to a positive
one. 7
Conspiracy having been satisfactorily established, appellant Caparas is equally liable as appellant
Diamsay, the actual perpetrator of the dastardly killing which was qualified into murder by evident
premeditation which is inherent in the conspiracy herein duly proven. This qualifying circumstance
alleged in the information was sufficiently proven by the testimony of Laureano Salvador and Lydia
Posadas, both credible witnesses, the former being particularly so, as he had absolutely no motive to
testify falsely against appellants, specially against appellant Caparas, who offered to give him land to
tilt as he was seeking to obtain from said appellant. His testimony is also against his own interest, as
it tends to implicate him as one of the conspirators, and is, there fore, of immense weight and value
as evidence. 8
WHEREFORE, We find the appealed judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence except
only as to the minimum of the penalty imposed on appellant Diamsay which should be reduced to 17
years of reclusion temporal, to comply with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Voluntary surrender of appellant Diamsay was properly appreciated in his favor to justify the lesser
penalty imposed upon him than that imposed on appellant Caparas. Accordingly, the judgment
appealed from, modified as herein indicated, is hereby affirmed, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Caparas
DOCTRINE:
The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading
questions which are so put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or
assertion of an examining consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question.
(There are more allegations and so on, but these are the only facts as well as issue relating to the
topic)
FACTS:
This case concerns the two motions for reconsideration for the decision dated 20 February 1980
convicting Caparas and Diamsay for the killing Simeon Patricio.
As regards appellant Caparas, the motions for reconsideration seek the review of the testimonies of
the two principal witnesses, Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas, upon which said appellant was
convicted, on ground of conspiracy between him and Diamsay. Caparas points out some facts and
circumstances which are alleged to impair the credibility of the aforesaid witnesses and thereby
leaves the fact of conspiracy unproven beyond reasonable doubt as it should be.
Thus, Caparas points out that Laureano's testimony was extracted through leading questions, and he
quotes:
Q Do you know the purpose of Carlos Gregorio in coming to your house?

A Yes, sir.
Q What was his purpose?

A Regarding the landholding I was farming and his help I requested.
Q Did you go to any place with Carlos Gregorio after that?

A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A To his house.
Q You are referring to the house of Carlos Gregorio?

A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived at the house of Carlos Gregorio, who were with you?
A Carlos Gregorio, sir.
Q Who were the persons, ff any, that you have seen at the house of Carlos Gregorio?
A Eufemio Caparas and Diamsay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you arrived in that house, what happened?

A We talked regarding the landholding, sir.
Q You said, 'we' to whom are you referring?

A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q What did you talk about that landholding?

A Regarding the landholding which he said would be given to me. He said there is already one.
Q And what did you answer when this was said to you by Eufemio Caparas?
A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he said that the land he was giving me had some trouble.
Q And what did you say?

A I said' that seems hard',but he said,'that is easy'.

Q What else transpired?
A I asked him what he meant by easy and he said 'it is easy under this condition', and I asked
him what condition, and he said you kill him.
Q During all that time, who were present inside that house?
A Tisio Diamsay.
Q Who else?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q Anybody else?
A Carting Gregorio, sir.
Q And you?
A I was present.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog Language that you have been testifying, you said, 'Patayin n'yo,
means plural, do you know to whom this word 'n'yo' referred to?
A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio Diamsay,sir.
Q Ordering to what?
A To kill.
Q To kill Simeon Paez?

A Yes, sir.
ISSUE:
W/N the testimony of Laureano may be appreciated in light of the leading questions
HELD: No.
We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracy was elicited
by means of leading questions, the probative value of which, according to accepted legal authorities,
is thus diminished or lessened.
The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading
questions which are so put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or
assertion of an examining consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question.
To make matters worse, the credibility of Laureano Salvador was further assailed by the court as it
noted that it is not without significance that he was not listed in the information to be among the
prosecution witnesses. Only during the trial on June 2, 1973, and after more than two years after the
commission of the crime, that he surfaced and testified on what he allegedly knew about the crime.
From his testimony, it would appear that he did not inform the authorities nor his relatives what he
knew about the crime, and that it was only to Pablo Paez that he told his story about the crime, but
only after almost two years after its commission. This fact in itself is contrary to human experience
because the natural reaction of one who has knowledge of the crime is to reveal it to the authorities,
except only if he is the author thereof. Indeed, as held in People vs. Basuel, the silence of the
witnesses for about two years detracts from their trustworthiness.
This witness, of course, explained that his silence was due to his fear for his life, for which reason he
went into hiding in Dupax Nueva Viscaya, where he allegedly worked at Diplong Sawmill. We cannot,
however, give credence to this explanation, since counsel for appellant was not given the opportunity
to cross examine Salvador Laureano on this matter. It appears that this witness testified that while
hiding in Dupax he worked in "Diplong Sawmill." But upon investigation by counsel for appellant, it
was found out that there is no Diplong Sawmill and because of this, counsel for appellant moved to
cross examine further the witness. But said witness failed to appear in the hearing despite summons,
until the court, after a third failure to appear, issued an order for his arrest. When the said witness
finally appeared, counsel for appellant requested to postpone the cross examination on a very valid
ground that he had another case which was earlier scheduled on the same date. The trial court,

however, refused to postpone the cross examination. This, in Our opinion, is a prejudicial error on the
part of the trial court, which should have granted the postponement. As it is, his testimony cannot but
create some doubts in Our mind, specially as on his own admission, he never went to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal to inform the government prosecutors that he would be a witness in this case.
In the case of People vs. Maisug, this Court held that the conduct such as shown by the witness is
unnatural and contrary to ordinary experience. Lawyers do not usually present witnesses without
informing themselves regarding the facts that they would prove by the testimonies they would
present in court.

[G.R. No. L-62810. July 25, 1983.]
EULALIA MARTIN, Petitioner, v. GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, Respondents.
Arturo V. Romero for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER A MILITARY PERSONNEL

EXTINGUISHED; UPON HIS DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION FROM THE MILITARY SERVICE; EXCEPTION.
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases
upon discharge or other separation From such service. This however is but a general rule. The Articles
of War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed to enhance discipline and goes order within the
military organization. Thus, court martial jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and misappropriation
of military hardware and other government property is not extinguished by discharge or dismissal
pursuant to the 95th Article of War. It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision. among
others, that this Court sustained the court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz v. Alcaraz, Et. Al. 99
Phil. 130 at 131-132 -after his reversion to inactive status, for misappropriation of public funds
committed white he was still in the active military service. The Supreme Court concludes that despite
his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to military law for the purpose of
prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military property, and his preventive detention thereunder
pending trial and punishment for the said offense committed when he was in the military service is
lawful.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS; APPLICABLE TO ALL PERSONS. The

fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons, including those subject to
military law. It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the
gravest national crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be the very
people to be singled out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.
3. ID; DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE ACCUSED; MERITS ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS. For denial of a constitutional right to the accused. the hearing tribunal may lose
its jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to obtain the
release of the accused.
4. ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; DENIAL IN THE CASE AT BAR NOT PRESENT. There was no such
denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: ". . . the test of violation of the right to
speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not
before the riling. The delay in the riling of the information, which in the instant case has not been
without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been
a denial of the right to speedy trial."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT RELATIVE; CONSISTENT WITH REASONABLE DELAYS AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EACH CASE WARRANTS. At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not
susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative,
consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. (Barker v.
Wingo, 33 L Ed 2d 101). The criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately resulted in the death
of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the handgrenades from the petitioner)
and very serious injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of charges and
prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents that
the delay complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at
all been challenged or denied by the petitioner.
DECISION
PLANA, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt. Francisco
Martin.

Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when he was still
in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which
exploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons, including
Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.
According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl. Lucio Tuppal, Philippine Army, having sold
the grenades to Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is denied by Pvt. Martin.
After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag City PC and INP authorities, a report was
submitted to the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to the Chief of Staff, AFP,
who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct another investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort Bonifacio
pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year, he was discharged from the
service effective as of May 5, 1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed. The
following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was charged for violation of the 85th and 97th
Articles of War, which read:
ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.Any soldier who sells
or wrongfully disposes of or willfully or through neglect injures or losses any horse, arms,
ammunition, accouterments, equipment, clothing, or other property issued for use in the military
service, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
ART. 97. General Article.Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
military service shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:
CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the Headquarters and Headquarters Service
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Philippine Army on or about 14 April 1981 at Laoag City wrongly
disposed of by sale to Rogelio Cruz two (2) grenades.
CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, ... on or about the month of April 1981 at Laoag City,
unlawfully and without authority had in his possession two (2) hand grenades thus committing an act
prejudicial to good order and military discipline and of a nature that will bring discredit to the military
establishment.
The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he is no longer subject
to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged were committed while he was still subject
to military law. He therefore, concludes that his continued detention pursuant to Article 70 of the
Articles of War (which authorizes the arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law who is
charged with an offense under the Articles of War) is illegal and he, accordingly, should be released.
This posture has no merit.
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases upon
discharge or other separation from such service. This however, is but a general rule. The Articles of
War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed to enhance discipline and good order within the
military organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and
misappropriation of military hardware and other government property is not extinguished by
discharge or dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.
ART. 95. Frauds Against the Government.Any person subject to military law ...
Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit or
wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing,

subsistence, stores, money, or other property of the Government furnished or intended for the
military service thereof ...
Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a

court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. And if any person, being guilty of any of
the offenses aforesaid while in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary receives his discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall continue to be liable to
be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and to the same
extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)
It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among others, that this Court sustained the
court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after his reversion to inactive status, for
misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military service. The Court,
thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said:
There is no question that although appellant had been reverted to inactive (civilian) status in the
reserve force of the Philippine Army, he is still amenable to investigation and court-martial under the
Artitles of War by the Philippine Navy for alleged acts of misappropriation of government funds
committed while he was still in the active military service. As correctly held by the Court below,
appellant's case falls within the provisions of Article 95 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended), which provides as follows: ...
The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin appellant's investigation by the naval
authorities on charges that he had misappropriated public property while he was still in the service of
the Philippine Navy, specially since petitioner admits that he is still a member of the Reserve Force."
(99 Phil. 130 at 131-132.).
We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to
military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military property, and his
preventive detention thereunder pending trial and punishment for the said offense committed when
he was in the military service is lawful.
Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming that the jurisdiction of the military authorities
to try and punish him was not abated by his discharge from military service, the denial to him of his
constitutional right to speedy trial (he having been confined from the date of his arrest on May 5,
1981 up to December 3, 1982 when he was formally charged a period of I year and 7 months)
entitles him to be released on habeas corpus.
The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons, including those subject to
military law, (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546; Cayaga vs. Tangonan, 66 SCRA
216; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429.) To quote Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:
The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances.
It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the gravest national
crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be the very people to be singled
out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.
For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its jurisdiction to
conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to obtain the release of the
accused. (Gumabon vs. Director, 37 SCRA 420; Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Flores vs. People, 61 SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487,
Ventura vs. People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile,
supra; Go vs. Olivas, supra.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trial
because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months after his arrest.
There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: "x... the test of violation
of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information

is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has
not been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there
has been a denial of the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)
At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable
delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. As expressed in Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L.
Ed 2d 101:
... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other
constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number
of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the
right must be asserted or considered waived ...
... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing test,
in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should
consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied ...
Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately resulted in the
death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the handgrenades from the
petitioner) and very serious injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of
charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of
respondents that the delay complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim
which has not at all been challenged or denied by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner seeking
his provisional release on bail from the military authorities or the Ministry of National Defense. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

EULALIA MARTIN vs.GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Facts:
(This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt. Francisco
Martin.)
Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio
Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which exploded during a picnic in Laoag City causing the death of three
persons.
After investigation the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to the Chief of Staff,
AFP, who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct another investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort Bonifacio
pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. The following year, he was discharged from the service.
He concludes that his continued is illegal because he is not a member of military at that time. He
claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trial because the charges against
him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months after his arrest.
Issue:
Was the respondent denied of the speedy trial?
Held:
We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to
military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military property, and his
preventive detention thereunder pending trial and punishment for the said offense committed when
he was in the military service is lawful.
It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the gravest national
crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be the very people to be singled
out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.
No. There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: "x... the test of
violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the
information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant
case has not been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining
whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at
236.)
At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable
delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.

G.R. No. L-28025 December 16, 1970
DAVID ACEBEDO Y DALMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and THE PROV. FISCAL OF PAMPANGA, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court not so long ago reaffirmed the doctrine that where a dismissal of a criminal prosecution
amounts to an acquittal, even if arising from a motion presented by the accused, the ban on being
twice put in jeopardy may be invoked, especially where such dismissal was predicated on the right to
a speedy trial.1 The specific question then that this certiorari and prohibition proceeding presents is
whether on the undisputed facts, an order of dismissal given in open court by respondent Judge falls
within the operation of the above principle, precluding its reconsideration later as the defense of
double jeopardy would be available. Here respondent Judge did reconsider, and his actuation is now
assailed as a grave abuse of discretion. As will be made apparent, petitioner has the law on his side.
The writs should be granted.
It was shown that on August 3, 1959, respondent Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against
petitioner and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were no further proceedings in the meantime,
petitioner on May 19, 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent Judge was not in
agreement as shown by his order of denial of July 10, 1965. Then, after two more years, came the
trial with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet been fully
cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for June 7, 1967 such witness did not show up.
The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for petitioner, however, not only objected but
sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. Respondent Judge
this time acceded, but would likewise base his order of dismissal, orally given, on the cross-
examination of complainant not having started as yet. Later that same day, respondent Judge did
reconsider the order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-
examination of the complainant had already started.
On the above facts, there can be no dispute as to the applicable law. It is not to be lost sight of that
the petition on its face had more than its fair share of plausibility, thus eliciting an affirmative
response to the plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, duly issued by this Court. For it was all too
evident that petitioner could rely on his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For more than six years
the threat of his being subjected to a penal liability did hang over his head, with the prosecution
failing to take any step to have the matter heard. He did ask that the case be dismissed, but
respondent Judge turned him down. When the trial did at long last take place after two more years
and again postponement was sought as the complainant was not available for cross- examination,
petitioner, as could have been expected, did again seek to put an end to his travail with a motion for
dismissal grounded once more on the undeniable fact that he was not accorded the speedy trial that
was his due. This time respondent Judge was quite receptive and about time too. The order of
dismissal given in open court had then the effect of an acquittal. For the respondent Judge to give
vent to a change of heart with his reconsideration was to subject petitioner to the risk of being put in
jeopardy once more. Nor could respondent Judge's allegation that he could do so as he acted under a
misapprehension be impressed with the quality of persuasiveness. The decisive fact was the absence
of that speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution. This petition then, to repeat, possesses merit.
1. The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.2
The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case.3
In the first Supreme Court decision after the Constitution took effect, an appeal from a judgment of
conviction, it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years. When the
trial did finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities. While ordinarily the remedy would have
been to remand the case again for a new trial, the appealed decision of conviction was set aside and
the accused acquitted. Such a judgment was called for according to the opinion penned by Justice
Laurel, if this constitutional right were to be accorded respect and deference. Thus: "The Government
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is

the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused
came to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law."4
Conformably to the above ruling as well as the earlier case of Conde v. Rivera,5the dismissal of a
second information for frustrated homicide was ordered by the Supreme Court on a showing that the
first information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was set for trial, the
private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire
calendar for the month it was supposed to have been heard. As pointed out in such decision: "The
right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried." 6 It did not matter that in this case the
postponements were sought and obtained by the private prosecution, although with the consent and
approval of the fiscal. Nor was there a waiver and abandonment of the right to a speedy trial when
there was a failure on the part of the accused to urge that the case be heard. "Such a waiver or
abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and
obtained [by him]". 7 A finding that there was an infringement of this right was predicated on an
accused having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace
court as a result of which he was arrested three times, each time having to post a bond for his
provisional liberty. Mandamus to compel the trial judge to dismiss the case was under the
circumstances the appropriate remedy. 8
In Mercado v. Santos, 9 the second occasion Justice Laurel had to write the opinion for the Supreme
Court in a case of this nature, the transgression of this constitutional mandate came about with
petitioner having in a space of twenty months been arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his
deceased wife's will, the first two complaints having been subsequently withdrawn only to be refiled a
third time and thereafter dismissed after due investigation by the justice of the peace. Undeterred the
provincial fiscal filed a motion for reinvestigation favorably acted on by the Court of First Instance
which finally ordered that the case be heard on the merits. At this stage the accused moved to
dismiss but was rebuffed. He sought the aid of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari but did
not prevail. It was then that the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court which reversed the Court
of Appeals, the accused "being entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed." It was
stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest
opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable
length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It is
not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution every
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts
required on the part of the prosecutor or the court." 10 The opinion likewise considered as not decisive
the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed charging the accused
with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by
the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once
a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced." 11
2. More specifically, this Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the
denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an accused
being twice put in jeopardy. The extensive opinion of Justice Castro in People v. Obsania noted earlier
made reference to four Philippine decisions, People v. Diaz, 12People v. Abano, 13 People v. Robles, 14
and People v. Cloribel. 15 In all of the above cases, this Court left no doubt that a dismissal of the
case, though at the instance of the defendant grounded on the disregard of his right to a speedy trial
was tantamount to an acquittal. In People v. Diaz, it was shown that the case was set for hearing
twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or giving any explanation failed to appear.
In People v. Abano, the facts disclosed that there were three postponements. Thereafter, at the time
the resumption of the trial was scheduled, the complaining witness as in this case was absent; this
Court held that respondent Judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the defense and
that the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place the accused twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. People v. Robles likewise presented a picture of
witnesses for the prosecution not being available, with the lower court after having transferred the
hearings on several occasions denying the last plea for postponement and dismissing the case. Such
order of dismissal, according to this Court "is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount
to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense." 16 This is a

summary of the Cloribel case as set forth in the above opinion of Justice Castro: "In Cloribel, the case
dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from September 27, 1958 when the information
was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at
the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon
motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held 'that the dismissal here complained of
was not truly a 'dismissal' but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistense on
their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the
date of trial.' (Emphasis supplied.)" 17There is no escaping the conclusion then that petitioner here
has clearly made out a case of an acquittal arising from the order of dismissal given in open court.
3. Respondent Judge would rely on Cabarroguis v. San Diego 18 to lend support to the reconsideration
of his order of dismissal. The case is not applicable; the factual setting is different. The order of
dismissal set aside in that case arose from the belief of the court that the crime of estafa was not
committed as the liability was civil in character. At no stage then was there a plea that the accused
was denied his right to a speedy trial. The reconsideration was granted as there was documentary
evidence to show that the intention to defraud on the part of the accused could be shown. Under such
circumstances, this Court saw no grave abuse of discretion in the actuation of the trial judge. To
repeat, the proceeding now before this Court is anything but that. Petitioner not once but twice did
seek to have the prosecution for damage to property against him terminated as the matter was
pending for at least six years, the first time he sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial stage
was reached, the complaining witness testified on direct examination but made no appearance when
his cross-examination was to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was
thus made out. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration
could therefore be had without offending the provision on double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling the order of respondent Judge of June 7, 1967
reconsidering his order of dismissal and reinstating the criminal case against petitioner. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Judge and respondent Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga being
restrained and precluded from continuing with this case against petitioner, now adjudged definitely
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.

Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December 1970]
Facts:
It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against David
Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were no further proceedings in the
meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Judge Malcolm G.
Sarmiento was not in agreement as shown by his order of denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two
more years, came the trial with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not having
as yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for 7 June 1967 such witness did
not show up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for Acebedo, however, not only
objected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. The
Judge this time acceded, but would likewise base his order of dismissal, orally given, on the cross-
examination of complainant not having started as yet. Later that same day, the Judge did reconsider
the order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination
of the complainant had already started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Acebedo is entitled to have the case dismissed based on the right ofteh accused to speedy
trial.
Held:
The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.
The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case.
The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried. An accused person is entitled to a
trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for
an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is
necessarily delayed. It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from
the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected
or extraordinary efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. The Constitution does not
say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is
commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by
private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
More specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the denial
of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing
the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an accused being twice
put in jeopardy. Herein, Acebedo not once but twice did seek to have the prosecution for damage to
property against him terminated as the matter was pending for at least 6 years, the first time he
sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the complaining witness testified
on direct examination but made no appearance when his cross-examination was to be continued. A
clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of
dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had without offending
the provision on double jeopardy.

G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Two constitutional rightsspeedy trial and freedom from double jeopardyare interposed as defenses
by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch
V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right
to speedy trial was allegedly violated.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary
investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence,
the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Cases Nos.
16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and 16057
(0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.
The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June
26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for
postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused
verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to
present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first
reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however, the Investigating Fiscal motu
proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel and re-
set the date for December 21, 1967.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the
reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.
In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before the
court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.
The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to the
new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter of
the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.
On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment
and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records,
[0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).
On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and
requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further
reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The accused
and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for June 2,
1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within which to file a
written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense of the latter, subject to
the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.

Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without
anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for
arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for
postponement.
When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not
guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for
September 29, 1970.
On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel
for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the
prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained
silent during the proceedings.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage
of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the
cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional rights
of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:
I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent Court correct in
dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial?
II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the
dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means
that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being
to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See Andres v.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)
[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were
caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and
for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our
Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the
trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements
and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if
the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to
frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or
abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]
In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a speedy trial in the first
case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained several postponements of the trial: first, when
they asked for the deferment of the arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not
present; second, when they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the
ground that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the case;
and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing set for November 28,
1968 to January 4, 1969..
The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that
his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order denying the
motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned orders, they are
consequently null and void.
Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last
requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued
without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no
jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases
amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In the case of
People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:
Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be
appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. That is
the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent
Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No
double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia v.
Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are divested Through it, no rights can be attains & Being
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither binds nor bars anyone. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717,
722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526,
[1974]). ...
We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress consent
of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of
the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722; People
v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).
If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been
impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the
accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the
defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the
principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The
doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the
attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of
the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.
The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: -
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor,...
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.
As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like
the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.

Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21,
1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos 69 Phil. 406 [1940]).
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many forms. They include
such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled
hearing so that the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin
supra) asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit,
(Nueno v. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from
prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974) employing dilatory tactics to frustrate
satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA
748) prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and
compel him to submit out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30,
1968) and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the
false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43757, July 30,
1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v.
Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for
disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)
The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are hereby
SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M are
reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in these
cases.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., concur.
Plana, J, concur in the result.
Teehankee, Actg. CJ, took no part.
Separate Opinions
RELOVA, J., concurring:
For the reason that the dismissal was with the express consent of the accused, he was not in
jeopardy.

[G.R. Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988.]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN,

Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DELAY OF THREE YEARS IN THE
TERMINATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A VIOLATION THEREOF. We find the long delay
in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee
of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LONG DELAY IN FILING OF INFORMATIONS AGAINST

ACCUSED WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASES. We are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay
in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501,
10502 and 10503 should be dismissed.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985,
and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of
the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes,
former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department
of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his
resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979,
Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the
petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of
Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by
complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the
following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3
(e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable
under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also
denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the
Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April

1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the following informations
be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation
controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the Sandiganbayan against
the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand
and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for
printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein
the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds for said
project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on
May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement
of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the Tanodbayan on
June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South
East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the
Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and operating
expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of Public Information as it was
organized to undertake research, projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the
funds advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his
assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer.
June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn
statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every public officer.
June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the
informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;

2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities
for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and
10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for Violation of
Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501 (for Violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash,
stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation,
namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have already prescribed and
criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For failure to file Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA
538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period
of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980
and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975,
respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan
has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period has
not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal
has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets
of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the
networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and officials to submit a
statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and
distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said
informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary
investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to
resolve the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion
to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's "Consolidated Motion to
Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one
which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information
to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged from January 31, 1974
toSeptember 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the
commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.

On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985
assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due
course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary
restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said resolution, the
respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions of
Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public respondents were concerned, which
requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action or position taken by his
predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are
not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to
pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any
event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the
filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a
manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the new
Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-
evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in question
be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has
been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion
for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to
resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan
had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the
petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of prima facie
evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned
informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process"
and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation
and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged
commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the
informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the
applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be
premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the
proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof
without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable
proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due
process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out
at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings before
the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due
to certain factors which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or
elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking
an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this respect, We
are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the
resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary
investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in
said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language in
Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may
be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the
performance of its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion.
Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure
on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed
rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully
threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such
a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-cocious or summary
evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the
Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of
the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare
the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has
been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed.
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel
of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations
of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report"
was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan
acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's
resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to
the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former
Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that
a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal
informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint
came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require
the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to
involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the
suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being
used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly,
without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or
mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of
the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on
the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor
to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not
be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that
the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years
in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by
giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back
time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it
unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on
October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988
Facts:
Antonio de los Reyes, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command
(PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public
Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report. Five years later, it became
publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which
was subsequently accepted by President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint with the
same charges.
An investigation took place, and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of charges for graft
and corrupt practices against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him,
claiming immunity, but was denied.
Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Tatad. A motion to
quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law
and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived
petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him.
Held:
YES. Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
found to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process; Undue delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation can not be corrected.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant
and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
Security Command for finding investigation and report. The long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No.
911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation
by him from its termination. Though the period fixed by law is merely "directory," it cannot be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel
of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations
of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report"
was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which
was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring
the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16,
1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft
and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner
Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation
controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00
from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his
failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A
motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied
hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While
we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close
to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 145851 November 22, 2001
ABELARDO B. LICAROS, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SPECIAL

PROSECUTOR, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On July 6, 1982, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor) filed an Information for robbery with the
Sandiganbayan docketed as Crim. Case No. 6672 against the persons allegedly responsible for the
robbery of the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank. Petitioner Abelardo B. Licaros, who was then
the Vice Chairman and Treasurer of the Home Savings Bank, the bank where the principal accused
tried to deposit the stolen money was charged as an accessory to the crime. After trial, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on June 20, 1990. Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten (10)
years after the case was deemed submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the
Decision. Hence, the present petition. According to petitioner, the unexplained failure of the
Sandiganbayan to render the Decision for more than ten (10) years violated his constitutional right to
due process and to a speedy disposition of the case.
The Supreme Court upheld the contention of petitioner. According to the Court, petitioner had been
assertively and assiduously invoking his right to a speedy disposition even before the case was
submitted for decision on June 20, 1990. He filed several motions: an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, a
Motion to Resolve and a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution, all of which have fallen on deaf ears
in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which
was deemed submitted for decision more than ten years. And though such failure or inaction may not
have been deliberately intended by respondent court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused
just as much vexation and oppression, in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of
his case. The criminal case against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan was dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES;

ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE OR INACTION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY INTENDED BY
RESPONDENT COURT, ITS UNJUSTIFIED DELAY HAS NONETHELESS CAUSED JUST AS MUCH
VEXATION AND OPPRESSION, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE. In the instant Petition, however, the accused had been assertively
and assiduously invoking his right to a speedy disposition even before the case was submitted for
decision on June 20, 1990. In fact, he has already filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to
Resolve and a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution, all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, in the light of the foregoing circumstances, he cannot be said to have slept on
his rights, much less waived the assertion thereof. Quite the contrary, he has been persistent in his
demand for the eventual disposition of the criminal case against him. Indeed, petitioner has been
kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which was deemed submitted for decision more
than ten years ago. And though such failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended by
respondent court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused just as much vexation and oppression,
in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Hence, his reliance on the
aforementioned cases for the dismissal of the criminal case against him may be sustained, not so
much on the basis of the right to a speedy trial, but on the right to a speedy disposition of his case,
which is of broader and more appropriate application under the circumstances.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL SOUGHT BY PETITIONER IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE

CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN DELA PEA
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN. In Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr., the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a speedy disposition has
been violated, as follows: "The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay." As earlier discussed, more than ten
years has lapsed since the subject case has been deemed submitted for decision. The delay cannot at
all be attributed to petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor undertaken any procedural
device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been continuously pushing for the
resolution of his case even during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it is undeniable that
such delay has caused much prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner, whose career as
bank executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved criminal
prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles' sword over his head for more than a decade. We need
not stress the consequences and problems inherent in this pending litigation and/or criminal
prosecution which include the prospects of unrealized business transactions, stagnant professional
growth, hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting
that petitioner has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact due to his being a senior
executive of the bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly then, the
dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in accordance with the
guidelines set forth in the above-cited case.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioner for violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following
circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) petitioner
has suffered vexation and oppression by reason of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right
and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4) he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in
the resolution of his case, (5) he did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or
raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any
valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted that the case was one of those that got
"buried" during its reorganization, and (7) petitioner was merely charged as an accessory after the
fact. For too long, petitioner has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the ultimate
resolution of his case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is completely attributable to the
Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now time to
enforce his constitutional right to speedy disposition and to grant him speedy justice.
4.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN'S

INORDINATE DELAY IN DECIDING THE CASE AMOUNTED TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
JUSTIFYING THE COURT'S ACTION OF SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN DISCRETION WITH THAT
OF RESPONDENT. Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a
ministerial but not of a discretionary duty. More specifically, persons or public officials may be
directed to act with or to exercise discretion, but not as to how that discretion should be exercised.
However, our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions in this matter. Thus, it has been held that in a
case where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the
writ may be issued to control precisely the exercise of such discretion. As discussed above, the
Sandiganbayan's inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case prejudiced the right of
petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Such undue delay can be characterized as no less than
a grave abuse of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of petitioner. In view of these
circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and will justify this Court's action
of substituting the discretion of respondent with that of its own.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The unreasonable delay of more, than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the
part of the accused and despite his earnest effort to have his case decided, violates the constitutional
right to the speedy disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege
applies not only during the trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted for
decision.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to compel
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to dismiss Criminal Case No. 6672 against herein petitioner, who is
charged as an accessory.
The Facts
Undisputed by the special prosecutor2 and the Sandiganbayan3 are the material facts as narrated by
petitioner in this wise:
"4.1 On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in
the amount of P19,731,320.00.
"4.2 In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to herein petitioner), one of the
principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks a substantial portion of the
stolen money to the Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had its
offices, of which herein petitioner was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery was made on
representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr., then
Chairman of the Bank and father of herein petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from
some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; that Governor Licaros left
for the United States on May 28, 1982 for his periodic medical check-up, so left to his son, herein
petitioner, to attend to the proposed deposit.
"4.3 Even the prosecution admits in their Reply Memorandum that from the evidence presented, that
in the evening of June 8, 1982, herein petitioner attempted to report the incident to General Fabian
Ver but he could not get in touch with him because the latter was then out of the country; that it was
only the following day, June 9, 1982, when herein petitioner was able to arrange a meeting with then
Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson, and Central Bank
Chief Security Officer, Rogelio Navarete, to report his suspicion that the money being deposited by
Modesto Licaros may have been stolen money. With the report or information supplied by herein
petitioner, then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI Director Jolly Bugarin and soon after the
meeting, the NBI, Metrocom and [the] CB security guards joined forces for the recovery of the money
and the apprehension of the principal accused.
"4.4 All the aforesaid Central Bank officials executed sworn statements and testified for herein
petitioner, particularly CB Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson and
CB Director of [the] Security and Transport Department Rogelio Navarette, and were one in saying
that it was the report of herein petitioner to the authorities that broke the case on 9 June 1982 and
resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and the arrest of all the
principal accused.
"4.5 On July 6, 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor) filed
an Information for robbery with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Crim. Case No. 6672 against two
groups of accused:
Principals:
(1) Modesto Licaros y Lacson, [P]rivate [I]ndividual
(2) Leo Flores y Manlangit, CB [S]ecurity [G]uard
(3) Ramon Dolor y Ponce, CB Assistant Regional Cashier
(4) Glicerio Balansin y Elaurza, CB Security [G]uard
(5) Rolando Quejada y Redequillo, Private Individual
(6) Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres, Private Individual
(7) Mario Lopez Vito y Dayungan, Private Individual
(8) Rogelio De la Cruz y Bodegon, Private Individual
Accessory After the Fact:
(1) Abelardo B. Licaros, Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Home Savings Bank and Trust Co. (HSBTC),
Private Individual.
"The Tanodbayan did not adopt the recommendation of the NBI that Abelardo B. Licaros be charged
as principal apparently because no one of those whose statements were taken including the above
principal accused ever testified that he participated in the planning or execution of the robbery so that
he could be held also in the conspiracy' as alleged by the NBI.
"4.6 On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended Information naming the same
persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory, together with

private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros. De la Cruz died on November 6, 1987 as per manifestation by
his counsel dated and filed on November 17, 1987.
"4.7 On November 29, 1982, the accused were arraigned including herein petitioner, who interposed
the plea of not guilty.
"4.8 On January 7, 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a 'Motion for Discharge' of
herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness which was granted in a Resolution dated February
11, 1983. The Supreme Court, however, on petition for certiorari filed by accused Flores, Modesto
Licaros and Lopez Vito, annulled the discharge because it ruled that the Sandiganbayan should have
deferred its resolution on the motion to discharge until after the prosecution has presented all its
other evidence.
"4.9 At the close of its evidence, or on July 23, 1984, the prosecution filed a second motion for
discharge of herein petitioner to be utilized as a state witness but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated September 13, 1984 denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does not furnish
any cue or suggestion on what petitioner will testify in the event he is discharged and placed on the
stand as state witness.
"4.10 Meanwhile, as of March 8, 1983, the prosecution has presented ten (10) witnesses. Among
those who testified were NBI Agents Victor Bessat and Apollo Sayo, who took and identified the sworn
statements of accused Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Rogelio de la Cruz, Mario Lopez Vito and Modesto
Licaros; M/Sgt. Raynero Galarosa, who took and identified the sworn statement of accused Pio Flores
and the sworn supplemental statement of accused Glicerio Balansin; Sgt. Eliseo Rioveros, who took
and identified the sworn statement of accused Glicerus Balansin; and CIS Agent Maria Corazon
Pantorial, who took the sworn statement of accused Rolando Quejada. None of these witnesses, nor
any of the principal accused who executed the sworn statements implicated herein petitioner to the
crime of robbery directly or indirectly.
"4.11 On September 17, 1984, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. In a
Resolution dated October 1, 1984, the Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence covered by said formal
offer and the prosecution [was] considered to have rested its case.
"4.12 In a Resolution dated June 25, 1985, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's motion to
reopen the case to allow its witness Lamberto Zuniga to testify on the conspiracy and to identify a
sworn statement given before the NBI on June 15, 1982. Having been established that petitioner was
not part of the conspiracy, the testimony had no materiality nor relevance to the case insofar as
petitioner is concerned.
"4.13 On January 14, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion for Separate Trial contending that the
prosecution already closed its evidence and that his defense is separate and distinct from the other
accused, he having been charged only as accessory. The [Motion] was granted in an Order dated
January 17, 1986.
"4.14 Thereafter, herein petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. Aside from his
testimony and that of his late father, former Central Bank Governor-Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioner
presented the top officials of the Central Bank namely then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya,
then Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel C. Singson, then Central Bank Security and Transport Dept.
Chief Rogelio M. Navarette who identified their sworn statements taken before the investigators and
who testified that it was the petitioner's report on June 9, 1982 that broke the case and resulted in
the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and the apprehension of the principal
accused.
"4.15 On August 8, 1986, petitioner filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On August 14, 1986, petitioner
filed his Memorandum praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the offense charged.
"4.16 In a Resolution dated August 26, 1986, the Sandiganbayan, through Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the EDSA revolution), admitted all the exhibits covered by
said Formal Offer of Exhibits at the same time, ordering the prosecution to file its Reply
Memorandum, thereafter the case was deemed submitted for decision.

"4.17 On September 26, 1986, the prosecution filed its Reply Memorandum. Petitioner also filed his
Reply Memorandum on September 29, 1986 praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the
offense charged.
"4.18 In a Resolution dated October 8, 1986 copy of which was received by petitioner on October 15,
1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the decision of the case regarding herein petitioner 'until after the
submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused.'
"4.19 Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 1986, but the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated December 16, 1986 and promulgated on January 6, 1987 denied the same, the
dispositive portion of which read(s):
'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by accused Abelardo B. Licaros is
denied.
'The decision as to the accusation against him will be rendered together with the accusation against
the other accused without relating the evidence separately presented at the separate proceeding held
for the separate sets of accused one way or the other.'
"4.20. As admitted by the prosecution in its Comment on the Omnibus Motion dated March 31, 2000,
the 'case was submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.'
"4.21 As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the case was submitted for decision, the
Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision.
"4.22 The Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision even while the proceedings involving herein
petitioner as an accessory in a separate trial were terminated as early as October 8, 1986, while
those against all the principal accused were deemed submit[t]ed for decision on June 20, 1990.
"4.23 As early as October 16, 1986, herein petitioner already invoked his constitutional right to
speedy justice when he filed a Motion on said date praying for, among other things, that the
Sandiganbayan reconsider its Resolution dated October 8, 1986 deferring the decision of the case
against herein petitioner 'until after the submission of the case for decision with respect to the other
accused' and that a judgment of acquittal be rendered.
"4.24 The Honorable Sandiganbayan has not also rendered a resolution on herein petitioner's
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss filed on March 23, 2000 which was deemed submitted for resolution on
May 5, 2000, the last pleading having been filed on said date. In the said Omnibus Motion, petitioner
prays for the dismissal of the case insofar as it involves herein petitioner for violation of his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case. Sad to say, even this Motion to Dismiss has not
been acted upon.
"4.25 On 15 August 2000, herein petitioner filed his Motion to Resolve. This was followed by
Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on September 21, 2000.
"4.26 Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed submitted
for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision. Hence, this petition."4
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
"The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the decision for more than ten (10) years
after the case was deemed submitted for Decision is tantamount to gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority.

"The unexplained failure of the SANDIGANBAYAN to render the Decision for more than ten (10) years
violated herein petitioner's constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case.
"Recent Decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court mandate the immediate dismissal of the case
against herein petitioner."5
In brief, the main issue is whether petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case
has been violated. We shall also discuss, as a side issue, the propriety of mandamus as a remedy
under the circumstances in this case.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.6
Main Issue:
The Right to a Speedy Disposition
On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was deemed submitted for the decision of the
Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the violation of his right to a speedy
disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not been ruled upon by public respondent.
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case
from the time it is deemed submitted for decision. Considering that the subject criminal case was
submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it is obvious that respondent court has failed to
decide the case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we were to consider the period provided
under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12 months from the submission of
the case for decision, the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform its mandated
duty to render a decision on the case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then, the decision in
this case is long overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long expired.7
Even more important than the above periods within which the decision should have been rendered is
the right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition of one's case before any judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative body.8 This constitutionally guaranteed right finds greater significance in a
criminal case before a court of justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of justice
for the accused altogether. Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied" is by no means a
trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the
dispensation of justice.
Indubitably, there has been a transgression of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his
case due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither that court nor the special prosecutor
contradicted his allegation of a ten-year delay in the disposition of his case. The special prosecutor in
its Comment9 even openly admitted the date when the case had been deemed submitted for decision,
as well as respondent court's failure to act on it despite petitioner's several Motions to resolve the
case. The special prosecutor stated as follows:
"With the termination of presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the principal accused in this
case, the same was deemed submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.
"Alleging violation by respondent court of his right to speedy disposition of the case, petitioner on
March 23, 2000 filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. His motion was deemed submitted for resolution
by the respondent court on May 5, 2000.
"On August 15, 2000, petitioner filed before the respondent court a Motion to Resolve and a month
thereafter a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution. No decision has yet been rendered by respondent
court."10
For its part, the Sandiganbayan candidly admitted that the said criminal case had not been ruled upon
all this time, because it "was one of those cases that got buried"11 in the archives during the

reorganization in that court. Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena's explanation (contained in his
Comment) is quoted in full hereunder:
"1. The factual narrative by the petitioner in the instant matter is substantially correct;
"2. Indeed, originally petitioner Licaros had filed a Motion for Resolution of his portion of the case
after he submitted his evidence separately;
"3. Eventually, the instant case was submitted for decision;
"4. Indeed, it would have been ripe to resolve the instant case including that portion which pertained
to petitioner Licaros;
"5. The matter was duly assigned for drafting of the decision (not the undersigned).
"6. Sometime in 1995, a draft of the Decision was submitted for consideration by the other justices of
the Division;
"7. In the meantime, movements took place in the composition of the justices who constituted the
First Division later.
"8. In 1997, the entire Court was re-organized with the addition of two (2) new Divisions and six (6)
new justices;
"9. At this time, the cases in the Sandiganbayan, whether in progress or submitted were re-
distributed from the original Divisions to which they had been raffled to the new Divisions;
"10. The instant case remained with this Division;
"11. While the burden of each Division has considerably lightened, the new justices had to undergo an
orientation in this Court;
"12. Not all cases were immediately re-assigned to the different members. The instant case was one
of them;
"13. Then, this Court relocated to its present premises which required not only packing and crating
the records but the problem of not being able to unpack them very easily due to the absence of an
adequate number of shelves and cabinets available;
"14. Due to the difficulty in funds, the Philippine Estate Authority which was supposed to have
provided new furniture including shelves and cabinets out of the payments made to it, was unable to
do so;
"15. To this date, the three original Divisions do not have all the needed shelves and many records
remain in cardboard boxes both in chambers and in the offices of the Division Clerk of Court. (In the
library and in the Archives, the boxes for books and old records remained unopened.);
"16. In all this, the instant matter was one of those that got 'buried';
"17. Significantly, when the records of this case were returned to the undersigned, the records of this
case were not logged in the record book through some oversight of his staff which the undersigned
cannot explain so that it did not appear in the tracking process of the records of this office;
"18. At this time, work is being done on the case for the preparation and finalization of the decision
which the undersigned has taken upon himself.
"19. Insofar as this Division is concerned, the responsibility for this situation belongs exclusively to
the undersigned, both in his capacity as chairman and as Presiding Justice;
"The undersigned respectfully reiterates: there is indeed fault and the fault is exclusively that of the
undersigned for which the undersigned begs for the kindness of this Honorable Court and humbly
submits to its wisdom and judgment."12

Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,13 Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman14 and Roque v. Office of the
Ombudsman,15petitioner claims that he is entitled to a dismissal of the criminal case against him. An
unreasonable delay of three years in the disposition of a case violates the accused's constitutional
rights, as the Court explained in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:
"Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee
of 'speedy disposition' of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A
delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar."16
Because of an inordinate delay of more than six years in the disposition of Angchangco Jr. v.
Ombudsman, the High Court ordered its dismissal, as follows:
"After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the
inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
against petitioner to be violative of his constitutional guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to
the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan . x x x "17
More recently, in Roque et. al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court dismissed the criminal cases
against petitioner therein, on the following explanation:
"Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it
violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases filed against them.
Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review
the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost
six years for the latter to resolve the Complaint."18
On the other hand, the special prosecutor contends that the above-cited rulings of the Court should
not apply to the present case, because what was involved in those cases was a delay on the part of
the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) with
respect to the holding of a preliminary investigation. He argues that the case against herein petitioner
has already been proven by the ombudsman with the filing of the corresponding Information before
respondent court. Moreover, the prosecution has already fully discharged its mandated duty to
present evidence against the accused. In other words, the special prosecutor is of the view that the
accused's right to a speedy disposition of his case is not violated when the prosecution aspect of the
case has already been duly performed.
We cannot accept the special prosecutor's limited and constrained interpretation of the
constitutionally enshrined right to a speedy disposition of cases. It must be understood that in the
ordinary course of a criminal proceeding, a court is responsible for the ultimate disposition of the
case. This is true irrespective of the prosecution's punctual performance of its duty. Hence,
notwithstanding the filing of the information, the presentation of evidence and the completion of the
trial proper, the eventual disposition of the case will still depend largely on the timely rendition of
judgment by a court. And where it does not act promptly on the adjudication of a case before it and
within the period prescribed by law, the accused's right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as
much prejudiced as when the prosecution is prolonged or deferred indefinitely. Accordingly, with all
the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be looked upon with care and
caution when that case has already been submitted to the court for decision.
In Abadia v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court had the occasion to rule on the nature and the extent as
well as the broader protection afforded by the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a case,
as compared with the right to a speedy trial. Thus, it ratiocinated as follows:
"The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive
fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights.
Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases
to cases 'before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.' This protection extends to all
citizens, x x x and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection
than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial."20 (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held that a breach of the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case may
have consequential effects, but it is not enough that there be some procrastination in the
proceedings. In order to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established that the
proceedings have unquestionably been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.21
In the case before us, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of
more than ten years after it was submitted for decision involves more than just a mere
procrastination in the proceedings. From the explanation given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that
the case was kept in idle slumber, allegedly due to reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of
logistics and facilities for case records. Had it not been for the filing of this Petition for Mandamus,
petitioner would not have seen any development in his case, much less the eventual disposition
thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now, with only respondent court's assurance that at this
time "work is being done on the case for the preparation and finalization of the decision."22
In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court denied a Petition seeking to dismiss a criminal case
grounded on an alleged violation of the accused's right to a speedy disposition. However, the accused
in the said case was deemed to have slept on his rights by not asserting them at the earliest possible
opportunity. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:
"In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan
City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered
on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after
the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's
absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of
safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
xxx xxx xxx
"In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume
that he would have just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting to laches had the
respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of
ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case, The matter could have taken a
different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum
and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a
motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe the stenographic
notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his, silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of
such right."24
In the instant Petition, however, the accused had been assertively and assiduously invoking his right
to a speedy disposition even before the case was submitted for decision on June 20, 1990.25 In fact,
he has already filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss,26 a Motion to Resolve27 and a Reiterative Motion
for Early Resolution,28 all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the Sandiganbayan. Thus, in the light of
the foregoing circumstances, he cannot be said to have slept on his rights, much less waived the
assertion thereof. Quite the contrary, he has been persistent in his demand for the eventual
disposition of the criminal case against him.
Indeed, petitioner has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which was deemed
submitted for decision more than ten years ago. And though such failure or inaction may not have
been deliberately intended by respondent court, its unjustified delay has nonetheless caused just as
much vexation and oppression, in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his
case. Hence, his reliance on the aforementioned cases for the dismissal of the criminal case against
him may be sustained, not so much on the basis of the right to a speedy trial, but on the right to a
speedy disposition of his case, which is of broader and more appropriate application under the
circumstances.
In Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan,29 penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., the Court laid down
certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as
follows:

"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay."30
As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed since the subject case has been deemed
submitted for decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to petitioner, who has neither utilized
dilatory tactics nor undertaken any procedural device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact,
he has been continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even during the early stages of the
prosecution. Moreover, it is undeniable that such delay has caused much prejudice, distress and
anxiety to herein petitioner, whose career as bank executive and businessman has suffered the
stigma of being shackled to an unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles'
sword over his head for more than a decade. We need not stress the consequences and problems
inherent in this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which include the prospects of
unrealized business transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a
besmirched reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner has been charged merely as an
accessory after the fact due to his being a senior executive of the bank where the principal accused
tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified
under the circumstances and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above-cited case.
Procedural Issue:
Mandamus as an Appropriate Remedy
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution.31 To reiterate, the
right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental
law. Correlatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution, to speedily
dispose of the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the
Constitution, expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.32
Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a
discretionary duty.33More specifically, persons or public officials may be directed to act with or to
exercise discretion, but not as to how that discretion should be exercised. However, our jurisprudence
is replete with exceptions in this matter. Thus, it has been held that in a case where there is "gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the writ may be issued to
control precisely the exercise of such discretion.34
As discussed above, the Sandiganbayan's inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case
prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Such undue delay can be
characterized as no less than a grave abuse of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of
petitioner. In view of these circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and
will justify this Court's action of substituting the discretion of respondent with that of its own.
In the very recent case Lopez Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman et al.,35 the Court deemed it
appropriate to dismiss directly the criminal suit before the Sandiganbayan in the interest of the
speedy disposition thereof. Thus, it ruled as follows:
"x x x [T]his Court applying the ruling in the Roque case, citing Tatad, likewise resolves to directly
dismiss the informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioner 'in the interest of
the speedy disposition of case' "
We find that the circumstances obtaining in the action cited above are similar to those in the instant
Petition and thus warrant the same course of action; namely, dismissal of the case against herein
petitioner. However, no administrative sanction against respondent court or its members can be
meted out in the present proceedings. Due process requires that before such penalty can be imposed,
the proper administrative proceedings must be conducted, as in fact one is already being undertaken
in AM No. 00-8-05-SC entitled "Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan."
Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to a
speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the
resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by
reason of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4)
he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5) he did not
employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to
delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay
and even admitted that the case was one of those that got "buried" during its reorganization, and (7)
petitioner was merely charged as an accessory after the fact.
For too long, petitioner has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the ultimate resolution of
his case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is completely attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No
fault whatsoever can be ascribed to petitioner or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his
constitutional right to speedy disposition and to grant him speedy justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and, as against petitioner, Criminal Case No. 6672
pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 145851, 22 November 2001]
Facts:
On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the
amount of P19,731,320.00. In the evening of 6 June 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to Abelardo
B. Licaros), one of the principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks a
substantial portion of the stolen money to the Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home
Savings Bank had its offices, of which Abelardo Licaros was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The
delivery was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank Governor Gregorio
Licaros, Sr., then Chairman of the Bank and father of Abelardo, that the money to be deposited came
from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; that Governor
Licaros left for the United States on 28 May 1982 for his periodic medical check-up, so left to his son,
Abelardo, to attend to the proposed deposit. Abelardo attempted to report the incident to General
Fabian Ver but he could not get in touch with him because the latter was then out of the country. It
was only the following day, 9 June 1982, when Abelardo was able to arrange a meeting with then
Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson, and Central Bank
Chief Security Officer, Rogelio Navarete, to report his suspicion that the money being deposited by
Modesto Licaros may have been stolen money. With the report or information supplied by Abelardo,
then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI Director Jolly Bugarin and soon after the meeting, the NBI,
Metrocom and the CB security guards joined forces for the recovery of the money and the
apprehension of the principal accused. All the aforesaid Central Bank officials executed sworn
statements and testified for Abelardo, particularly CB Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB Senior Deputy
Governor Gabriel Singson and CB Director of the Security and Transport Department Rogelio
Navarette, and were one in saying that it was the report of Abelardo to the authorities that broke the
case on 9 June 1982 and resulted in the recovery of the substantial portion of the stolen money and
the arrest of all the principal accused.
On 6 July 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor) filed an
Information for robbery with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 6672) against two groups of accused:
(a) Principals: Modesto Licaros y Lacson (Private Individual), Leo Flores y Manlangit (CB Security
Guard), Ramon Dolor y Ponce (CB Assistant Regional Cashier), Glicerio Balansin y Elaurza (CB
Security Guard), Rolando Quejada y Redequillo (Private Individual), Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres
(Private Individual), Mario Lopez Vito y Dayungan (Private Individual), and Rogelio De la Cruz y
Bodegon (Private Individual); and (b) Accessory After the Fact: Abelardo B. Licaros (Vice Chairman
and Treasurer, Home Savings Bank and Trust Co. (HSBTC), Private Individual). On 26 November
1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended Information naming the same persons as principals, except
Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory, together with Abelardo. De la Cruz died on 6
November 1987 as per manifestation by his counsel dated and filed on 17 November 1987. On 29
November 1982, the accused were arraigned, including Abelardo, who interposed the plea of not
guilty. On 7 January 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Discharge" of
Abelardo to be utilized as a state witness which was granted in a Resolution dated 11 February 1983.
The Supreme Court, however, on petition for certiorari filed by accused Flores, Modesto Licaros and
Lopez Vito, annulled the discharge because it ruled that the Sandiganbayan should have deferred its
resolution on the motion to discharge until after the prosecution has presented all its other evidence.
At the close of its evidence, or on 23 July 1984, the prosecution filed a second motion for discharge of
Abelardo to be utilized as a state witness but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated 13 September
1984 denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does not furnish any cue or suggestion
on what petitioner will testify in the event he is discharged and placed on the stand as state witness.
Meanwhile, as of 8 March 1983, the prosecution has presented 10 witnesses. None of the witnesses,
nor any of the principal accused who executed the sworn statements implicated Abelardo to the crime
of robbery directly or indirectly. On 17 September 1984, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence. In a Resolution dated 1 October 1984, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
evidence covered by said formal offer and the prosecution was considered to have rested its case. On
14 January 1986, Abelardo filed a Motion for Separate Trial contending that the prosecution already
closed its evidence and that his defense is separate and distinct from the other accused, he having
been charged only as accessory. The motion was granted in an Order dated 17 January 1986.
Thereafter, Abelardo commenced the presentation of his evidence. On 8 August 1986, Abelardo filed
his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On 14 August 1986, Abelardo filed his Memorandum praying that
judgment be rendered acquitting him of the offense charged. In a Resolution dated 26 August 1986,
the Sandiganbayan, through Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the
EDSA revolution), admitted all the exhibits covered by said Formal Offer of Exhibits at the same time,

ordering the prosecution to file its Reply Memorandum, thereafter the case was deemed submitted for
decision. On 26 September 1986, the prosecution filed its Reply Memorandum. Abelardo also filed his
Reply Memorandum on 29 September 1986 praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the
offense charged. In a Resolution dated 8 October 1986 copy of which was received by Abelardo on 15
October 1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the decision of the case regarding Abelardo until after the
submission of the case for decision with respect to the other accused. Abelardo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration on 16 October 1986, but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated 16 December
1986 and promulgated on 6 January 1987 denied the same. The case was submitted for decision on
20 June 1990. More than 10 years after the case was submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has
not rendered the Decision. On 15 August 2000, Abelardo filed his Motion to Resolve. This was
followed by Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on 21 September 2000. Abelardo filed a
petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Abelardos case is warranted by the guarantee on speedy trial or speedy
disposition of the case.
Held:
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case
from the time it is deemed submitted for decision. Considering that the subject criminal case was
submitted for decision as early as 20 June 1990, it is obvious that the Sandiganbayan has failed to
decide the case within the period prescribed by law. Even if the Court was to consider the period
provided under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12 months from the
submission of the case for decision, the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform
its mandated duty to render a decision on the case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then,
the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long
expired.
Even more important than the above periods within which the decision should have been rendered is
the right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition of one's case before any judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative body. This constitutionally guaranteed right finds greater significance in a
criminal case before a court of justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of justice
for the accused altogether. Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied" is by no means a
trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the
dispensation of justice. Indubitably, there has been a transgression of Abelardo's right to a speedy
disposition of his case due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither that court nor the
special prosecutor contradicted his allegation of a ten-year delay in the disposition of his case. The
special prosecutor in its Comment9 even openly admitted the date when the case had been deemed
submitted for decision (i.e. 20 June 1990), as well as Sandiganbayan's failure to act on it despite
Abelardo's several Motions to resolve the case. It has been held that a breach of the right of the
accused to the speedy disposition of a case may have consequential effects, but it is not enough that
there be some procrastination in the proceedings.
In order to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established that the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Herein, the failure of the
Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of more than 10 years after it was submitted
for decision involves more than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings. From the explanation
given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle slumber, allegedly due to
reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics and facilities for case records. Had it not been
for the filing of the Petition for Mandamus, Abelardo would not have seen any development in his
case, much less the eventual disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now, with only
the Sandiganbayan's assurance that at this time "work is being done on the case for the preparation
and finalization of the decision."
Hence, the dismissal of the criminal case against Abelardo for violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the
resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) Abelardo has suffered vexation and oppression by
reason of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4)
he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5) he did not
employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to
delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay
and even admitted that the case was one of those that got "buried" during its reorganization, and (7)
Abelardo was merely charged as an accessory after the fact. For too long, Abelardo has suffered in
agonizing anticipation while awaiting the ultimate resolution of his case. The inordinate and
unreasonable delay is completely attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be
ascribed to Abelardo or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his constitutional right to speedy
disposition and to grant him speedy justice.

Rule 115 Cases 45-58

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Rule 115 Cases 45-58

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RULE 115

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 1

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMANDO AUSTRIA, Defendant-

Agripino Rabago for Appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 2

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 3

I vote, therefore, for the dismissal of the appeal.

Montemayor, J., concurs.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 4

2. Is a void information can be validated by presenting evidence?

Accordingly, if an information is dismissed and the accused discharged on a demurrer, or on

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 5

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SOTERO NAVARRETE Y LUCERO,

Contrary to law (Exh, C, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 6

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 8

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 9

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 10

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 11

WHEREFORE, WE HEREBY FIND APPELLANT SOTERO NAVARRETE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 12

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO QUIBATE, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

5. Abrasions-hematoma at the right arms and forearms.

The deceased died of shock secondary to profuse hemorrhage.

The accused-appellant raised two assignments of errors in this appeal, namely

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 13

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 14

The decision reads, in part:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 15

AQUINO, J., concurring:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 16

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

Appellant herein assigns two errors, one of which is the following:

I dissent from the resolution of the said assigned error.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 17

Teehankee, J., concurs.

ESCOLIN, J., dissenting:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 19

Teehankee, J., concurs.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 20

FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, Petitioners, v. HON. RAMON E.

The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Victor de la Serna for Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; HOW ACQUIRED. In criminal cases,

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; NOT VIOLATED BY

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 21

Hence, this petition.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 22

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 24

(1) that there has been an arraignment

(2) that the accused has been notified;

(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 25

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 26

Francisco Carreon for Petitioner.

Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T . Reyes for respondents City of Manila.

1. ANTI-GRAFT LAW; FORFEITURE OF UNEXPLAINED WEALTH; NATURE OF FORFEITURE AS PENALTY.