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DOI 10.1007/s13162-016-0084-1
COMMENTARY
What makes a good theory practical?
Bobby J. Calder 1 & Alice M. Tybout 1
Received: 1 August 2016 / Accepted: 31 August 2016
# Academy of Marketing Science 2016
Abstract This paper builds upon Zaltmans call for greater
imagination in theory and practice by exploring the role of imag-
ination in building and applying good theories. It begins by jux-
taposing everyday associations to the concept of imagination
with scientists goal of developing theories that are objectively
grounded in data. In research, imagination must focus on
explaining why an effect may have occurred. Then, the practical
value of such theorizing is explored. It is argued that good theo-
ries, though imagined, should to be viewed as real in that they
offer a valuable viewpoint for solving practical problems. They
expand the real world of the practitioner rather than existing in
some ivory tower outside that world. A different sort of imagi-
nation, however, is required to move from an abstract theory to
an intervention that can be implemented in the real world. Good
theory can be highly practical but it requires separating research
designed to build and test theory from research designed to eval-
uate the efficacy of theory-inspired interventions to real world
problems.
Keywords Imagination . Theory . Applied research .
Interventions . Practitioners . Realism
Overview
For many the well-known dictum the title alludes to carries with
it an inherent tension. James Maxwells BThere is nothing more
* Alice M. Tybout
amtybout@kellogg.northwestern.edu
Bobby J. Calder
calder@kellogg.northwestern.edu
1
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL, USA
practical than a good theory^ and Kurt Lewins BThere is nothing
so useful as a good theory^ are more than matched by the phrase
BIt's only a theory.^ The latter reflects a sentiment that while often
implicit may well be even more common. In his analysis of this
state of affairs, Zaltman (2016, p. 2) proposes that Bthe relative
absence of theory construction among academics and relative
lack of bold, deep thinking among practitioners suggests a ne-
glect of imagination.^ Zaltman stresses that BImagination is a
process of thinking about something that is missing and filling
the blank space using available cues (p. 46).^ Imagination is
crucial for research in that Bignorance is the garden within which
science plays (p. 45).^ And in applied settings: BA firm oriented
toward detecting and filling spaces by encouraging sense-making
about its external environment is more likely to develop radical
innovations (p. 39).^
We entirely agree that theories are created by researchers,
and indeed out of the imagination of researchers, to fill the
blank spaces, and that this is precisely what can make them
practically useful in the real world of actual events. Here we
expound on Zaltmans thesis by examining in detail what
makes a good theory practical in this way. Specifically, we
seek to answer the question: If theories are products of imag-
ination, how could they be of practical value in the real world?
Zaltman (2016) sought to allay the tension many feel be-
tween imagined theory and practical value by pointing out that
the role of imagination in theory development is not some-
thing that should be feared but rather welcomed. He observes
that imagination is a basic human capacity integral to every-
day life but this capability is neglected or, at a minimum,
sorely underleveraged in the context of both academic and
practitioner marketing research. He suggests that researchers
shun imagination for many reasons, including: they errone-
ously believe they lack the capacity to be imaginative, they
surround themselves with like-minded others, and they work
in organizations that instill a fear of being wrong. Zaltman
seeks to demystify imagination by documenting its

pervasiveness in ordinary life, exploring its social and cogni-
tive roots, and illustrating the role that metaphors can play in
imaginative thinking.
Again, we share Zaltmans view that imagination has a
critical role to play in marketing, and agree with the connec-
tion that he identifies between imagination and theory. We
begin from the observation that theory and imagination are
inextricably intertwined because theories are about abstract
rather than observed relationships. Nevertheless, it is our ob-
servation that, generally speaking, researchers are often un-
comfortable with theorizing that employs imagination to any
significant degree; they question theorizing that is not closely
linked to observed phenomena. Imagination is distrusted be-
cause researchers fear it compromises objectivity, where ob-
jectivity implies the primacy of empirically observed effects.
Imagination, or too much of it, distracts and detracts from
objectivity that is at the heart of science.
Though we agree with Zaltmans analysis of the impor-
tance of imagination, we do not believe it will fully resolve
the unease many have with imagination in the context of the-
ory. The question remains: If a good theory is different from
observed effects, and that imagination plays a critical role in
developing theory, then what makes theory practical?
In seeking to answer this question we first consider the
nature of the role of imagination in theoretical research. It
might be thought that theory is suspect precisely because it
is based on imagination. If theory belongs to the same creative
world as works of art, then how can it be relevant to the real
world? But this concern fails to consider the role imagination
actually plays in research versus other creative endeavors. In
addition, we consider the practicality of theory in terms of
what a researcher takes to be the goal of research and whether
theoretical constructs are considered as real. We argue that the
goal of research has to be understood not as objective justified
knowledge of empirical effects but as the best conjectural
theoretical explanation of effects. And although constructs
are imagined they should nonetheless be considered as real.
It is only from this perspective that one fully appreciates why
theory can have practical value. Finally, we discuss how the-
ory can be used effectively in applications and interventions.
Theoretical imagination
Tolstoy begins his great novel Anna Karenina with this sen-
tence: BAll happy families are alike: each unhappy family is
unhappy in its own way.^ Because this is a work of art we
know that this statement is a foreshadowing device to set the
stage for what comes next- the artists rendering of a particu-
larly unhappy marriage that ends in a tragedy. Tolstoy was not
advancing a hypothesis about variances in samples of different
kinds of families. His was an act of artistic imagination, not an
act of scientific imagination. It is important to keep the
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distinction clearly in mind when thinking about the role of
imagination in research.
Imagination versus theoretical explanation
The discomfort that researchers experience with the role of
imagination in the context of developing a theoretical expla-
nation has roots in confusion about what kind of
Bimagination^ is at issue. A generally accepted definition of
imagination is:
B. the mental capacity for experiencing, constructing
or manipulating mental imagery (quasi-perceptual ex-
perience). Imagination is also regarded as responsible
for fantasy, inventiveness, idiosyncrasy, and creative,
original and insightful thought in general and, some-
times, for a much wider range of mental activities deal-
ing with the non-actual, such as supposing, pretending,
seeing as, thinking of possibilities, and even being
mistaken (Thomas 2004).^
Thoughts and images that are fanciful, idiosyncratic and
potentially mistaken may be acceptable, perhaps even lauded,
in the realm of artistic expression.
However, these characteristics are likely to be viewed as
contrary to the goal of research. In the context of tracing the
history of imagination as a concept, Thomas (2004) observes:
B for many intellectuals, Bimagination^ remains a
term of great cultural significance, but one whose pri-
mary association is with aesthetic theory rather than
epistemology, and which is most naturally first
approached through the study of literary figures such
as Coleridge.^
By contrast, consider the following definition and discus-
sion of theory. A theory isBan idea or set of ideas that is
intended to explain facts or events (Merriam Webster
Dictionary 2016).^
BAny scientific theory must be based on a careful and
rational examination of the facts. Facts and theories are
two different things. In the scientific method, there is a
clear distinction between facts, which can be observed
and/or measured, and theories, which are scientists ex-
planations and interpretations of the facts (Bradford
2015).^
It should be obvious both from the definitions above, and
from Zaltmans treatment of the topic, that imagination is a
broad concept encompassing idiosyncratic self-expression. It
is this very broadness that is valued in artistic endeavors and
this can seem inconsistent with research that aims to be
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grounded in observations. Thus, it is not surprising that many
research theories seem to lack significant imagination. Often
they are not concerned with explaining an underlying process
and instead are slightly abstracted descriptions of the phenom-
ena observed. We argue that greater imagination in explana-
tions would result in theories that are richer in the insight they
provide and, thereby, more broadly applicable.
Imagination and explanation
When it comes to theory, to use Zaltmans (2016) terminology,
imagination must have the quality of Baboutness.^ A theory
provides an explanation for some observed effects by imagin-
ing abstract constructs and the causal relationship between
them. In this realm, imagination is in the service of explana-
tion, making it constrained in a way that it is not in the realm
of artistic expressions. Imagination takes the form of a thesis
about why a particular effect occurs.
To appreciate the kind of role that imagination plays in
creating theoretical explanations, consider the following sce-
nario. A researcher is interested in how the media context in
which print ads appear affects their persuasiveness. There are
infinite dimensions on which the media context may vary,
including the substance of the editorial content, the inclusion
of visuals, the font type and the page layout, so the researcher
must begin with some initial hypothesis about which dimen-
sions are likely to be influential. Such a hypothesis may be
based on observed covariation in the natural world, grounded
in prior research findings or wholly the product of the re-
searchers imaginationperhaps even coming to her in a
dream! Imagination can run free in creating a hypothesis
(though a hypothesis that is at odds with existing data is un-
likely to gain credence with scholars).
Suppose the researcher observes that people enjoy good
stories and posits that when the medias editorial content pre-
sents a well-crafted story, one that is deeply engaging, re-
sponses to associated advertising will be more favorable than
when the story is poorly crafted. However, this effect is only
expected to occur when it follows the story rather than inter-
rupts it. An experiment such as the one conducted by Wang
and Calder (2006) could be conducted to test this hypothesis.
They varied whether a story was presented in a linear, fluid
manner or in a disjointed manner, achieved by scrambling
paragraphs from the linear story, and measured reactions to
an advertisement that was inserted either in the middle of the
story or at the end of the story. The findings were consistent
with the hypothesis; readers were more persuaded by an ad-
vertisement that followed a well-crafted story than when either
the story was poorly crafted or the advertisement appeared in
the middle of the story.
How might these findings be explained? Wang and Calder
(2006) employ the conceptual construct of Btransportation,^
originally conceived by Green and Brock (2000) to explain
audience engagement with stories. Wang and Calder propose
that when editorial content presents a well-crafted story, the
reader becomes caught up in the narrative and is more per-
suaded by subsequent advertising than when either the poor
narrative structure or the placement of the ad impedes trans-
portation. This explanation involves imagination in that it ab-
stracts from experimental manipulations of story structure and
ad placement to an unobserved concept, transportation. Even
so, the account stops short of explaining why transportation
enhances persuasion and when this effect might fail to occur.
Speculation about the underlying process, an act of greater
imagination, is needed to increase the value of the explanation
(Wang and Calder 2009). What is needed is an explanation
that goes beyond the one that merely evokes the concept of
transportation. An explanation needs to provide an
information-processing account of how reactions to media
context may influence responses to advertisements. This pro-
cess should account for the findings observed but is not lim-
ited to them. It should be an explanation of the impact of
contiguous information and not just a specific effect. The ex-
planation that is more imaginative is also more practical, not
the least because it suggests a wider range of real world
applications.
So imagination in the realm of theoretical explanation is
constrained; it must account for the effects, the data at hand,
and do so without unneeded complexity. And if there are
equally plausible explanations for the effectssay that vicar-
ious experiences usurp cognitive resources that might other-
wise be devoted to counter-arguing contiguous advertising
messages versus information-processing that leads to positive
affect transfer, then further data may be needed to distinguish
between the explanations and choose the best one. More often
than one might think, however, one explanation may emerge
as the best yet imagined. In the case of Wang and Calders
(2006) findings, the affect transfer explanation might be
viewed as superior to the resource limitation explanation giv-
en the observation that readers were less rather than more
persuaded when the advertisement interrupted the story versus
when it followed the story. Presumably, fewer rather than
more resources are likely to have been available to process
the advertisement when it interrupted the story.
A second example reinforces the value of greater imagina-
tion in explanation. Salespeople have long employed a tech-
nique called BFoot-in-the-Door,^ whereby a prospective buyer
is first induced to agree to a small request and then asked to
make a more substantial commitment (Freedman and Fraser
1966). For example, when shopping for a car, customers are
typically first urged to simply test drive a car and subsequently
are asked to make a purchase. Likewise, organizations pro-
moting causes or seeking charitable donations often request
prospects for a verbal endorsement initially and then ask for a
financial donation. The technique is popular because it is ef-
fective; making an initial small request has been found to

increase compliance with a later, larger request when com-
pared to only making the larger request. One might say that
this is all we need to know, and we will discuss this point-of-
view later. If one asks, why does this strategy work?, consid-
erable imagination is needed. The Foot-in-the-Door effect is
not intuitively obvious, we must imagine why it might occur.
One explanation of the effect might be that making multi-
ple requests serves to wear down peoples resistance. This
account evokes the concept of resistance but it remains little
more than a restatement of the phenomenon. Without more
insight into the process, it is difficult to anticipate when the
effect will occur and when it might backfire. After all, it seems
implausible that making multiple requests will always be more
effective than making a single request.
By contrast, Bems (1972) Self-Perception Theory pro-
vides an explanation for the Foot-in-the-Door effect and iden-
tifies the conditions under which it is likely to emerge. Self-
Perception Theory begins with the premise that, rather than
attitudes guiding behavior as is frequently assumed, people
often lack well-formed attitudes toward issues and instead
infer their attitudes from their behavior; behavior guides atti-
tudes rather than the reverse. In this view, the Foot-in-the-
Door technique is effective because people agree to the initial
small request and then reflect on their behavior, inferring that
it implies a favorable attitude toward the object of their action.
This inference, in turn, leads them to agree to the subsequent
large request. This explanation is better than one based on
overcoming resistance because it specifies a process and, in
so doing, identifies circumstances when the effect is likely to
occur and when it will not. The Foot-in-the Door effect should
be observed when people lack a well-formed attitude toward a
product or issue and they perform an initial positive behavior
toward that product/issue without an obvious external incen-
tive. The effect should not occur when people have well-
developed attitudes, reject the initial request or agree with
the initial request but do so under conditions (e.g., a significant
financial reward) that undermine the inference that the behav-
ior is an indicator of favorable attitude (Tybout et al. 1983).
In light of the benefits of greater imagination in explana-
tion, why do researchers hesitate to offer more imaginative
accounts for the effects they seek to explain? We believe that
there are factors in addition to the ones detailed by Zaltman
(2016). They pertain to a general misconception about the
relationship between an effect and its explanation. When con-
structing an explanation, researchers often emphasize map-
ping observed variables onto more abstract unobserved con-
structs. How well a story is crafted is abstracted to the notion
of the degree to which the story transports the reader, the
number of requests is abstracted to peoples ability to resist
demands made by others and so on. Although assumptions
about what variables represent at a more abstract level may
be needed to tie the explanation to the effect and thereby
assess its plausibility, these assumptions are themselves
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ephemeral. Any variable can represent multiple constructs
and any construct can be represented by multiple variables.
Whether a story is well or poorly crafted may influence the
degree to which the reader is transported but it also may in-
fluence the effort required to understand the story and these
constructs might have different effects on advertisements as-
sociated with the story. Conversely, the degree to which trans-
portation occurs might be influenced by variables beyond how
well the story is crafted, such as whether it includes visuals,
the mood of the reader etc. An explanation that merely maps
variables to constructs is not a good theory because there is no
basis for assuming this mapping will hold beyond the setting
examined.
Both the key, and the difficulty, in developing a good ex-
planation is to recognize that the explanation may be inspired
by and should account for the effect but will always remain
separate from itit lies on a more abstract plane, a different
world if you will. Popper (1994) in fact depicts this in terms of
three different worlds (see Fig. 1). World 1 is the real world of
material things. World 2 is the personal world of individual
subjective experience. Interaction between these two worlds is
imperfect at best. By using World 3, made up of the collective
products of human imaginative thinking, it is possible to in-
teract with World 1 via World 3. Theory belongs to World 3 as
a way of interacting indirectly with World 1.
The power of a theoretical explanation lies in the insight it
provides in regard to how and why abstract constructs are
related. Imagination disciplined by data leads to such insight
but the explanation must go beyond the data and can never be
fully represented in it. However, researchers and reviewers
alike, no doubt in an effort to be scientifically objective, are
often suspicious of explanations that cannot be mapped on
measures in an isomorphic manner. The result is explanations
that reflect little insight or imagination.
Practicality, the goal of research, and realism
One might grant that a theory must go beyond the data we
wish to explain and that this requires imagination. And one
World 3
THEORY
World 2 World 1
SUBJECTIVE PHYSICAL
EXPERIENCES
THINGS
Fig. 1 Theory as an Objective World 3 Product of Collective
Imagination that Enables Interaction with the Real World (following
Popper 1994)
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might grant that you imagine explanations about data and that
are constrained by data, so that theoretical explanation should
not be confused with artistic imagination. Even so, we suspect
that many would still be leery of the practicality of theory that
incorporates imagination. This is because the goal of research
is most often taken to be the production of knowledge. And
knowledge is taken to be objective and proven. How can
something like theory, something that necessarily has a basis
in imagination, be considered objective proven knowledge?
And if it is not, how then can it be of any practical value?
The important issue here is the assumption that the goal of
research is objective proven knowledge. This is knowledge
such that the researcher not only believes that something is
true but that she is justified in that belief. The question of
course is what constitutes justification?
Philosophically many researchers embrace an extremely
empiricist view of justification. If an observed effect found
in data can be replicated across studies, the finding constitutes
knowledge. Justification comes from induction- observing an
effect across enough studies establishes it as empirically jus-
tified knowledge. On the face of it this reasoning seems log-
ical: If this, then this. According to this view of inductive
justificationism, it is the empirical generalization of the effect
that constitutes knowledge. Note that this view does not iden-
tify theory as knowledge. What is known is the empirical
effect. The researcher is of course free to speculate about
(imagine) explanations for the effect and one might view this
as useful as an intellectual exercise, one that might even stim-
ulate further research. But the goal of research is knowledge
and theory does not constitute knowledge. This view is encap-
sulated in that oft-heard phrase, BIts only a theory.^ It also
underlies much more considered examinations of research
(e.g., Alba 2012; Lynch 1982; Lynch et al. 2012). The view
is often implicitly accompanied by what philosophers refer to
as the Bpessimistic meta-induction from falsity of past
theories.^ A simple version is that because many successful
theories are now considered false, current successful theories
cannot be considered true. The empirical justification view of
research thus limits the role of theory and gives precedence to
observed effects as true knowledge. On this view, it follows
applications of research should be based on knowledge and
hence generalizable effects, and whereas theory may have
some value, it does not have practical value. This desire for
empirical justification appears to underlie just the sort of aver-
sion to bold thinking described by Zaltman (2016).
The empirical justification view of theory certainly casts
doubt on the Bnothing so practical^ dictum. It goes well be-
yond the commonsense concerns about theory and imagina-
tion by pointing to empirical generalization as the real goal of
research. It clearly prioritizes attention to effects over theory,
especially when it comes to application. Theory is only imag-
inative speculation about the data. It is the data that are real,
and empirical generalization is the path to application.
We have argued the case against this empirical justification
view elsewhere (Calder et al. 1981, 1982, 1983; Calder and
Tybout 1999). The problem is that it is based squarely on
induction. Induction is not a matter of logicclearly true pre-
mises can yield false conclusions. Defenses of induction in
fact use induction to justify itself; it works because it has
worked in the past. Induction provides no guidance about
how many replications are necessary for justification. Very
importantly, it misses the fact that without theory there is no
basis for making one observation over another or being able to
say what constitutes a replication of an effect. The alternative
view is that the real goal of research is to call into question
theories that fail to obtain empirical support. Research does
not produce objectively true knowledge; only theory that has
so far escaped refutation attains this goal. Research is a pro-
cess of inferring the best explanation (in the sense of Lipton
2004) that can be conjectured for empirical results at a point in
time.
Our purpose here, however, is not to debate the goals of
research. If one is convinced of the empirical justification
view, then one should be skeptical of the practical value of
theory over effects generalization. What we want to specifi-
cally point out is that, if one does view theory as the goal of
research, in contradistinction to the empirical justification
view, then this should lead one to think about the role of
imagination in theory quite differently. It should lead to a
realist view of theory, the essence of which is that theoretical
constructs, though imagined, should be considered real, ver-
sus being part of some imaginary world. An example from the
history of science helps to illustrate the nature of scientific
realism.
An illustration of scientific realism
One of the most celebrated acts of theoretical imagination is
Newtons conception of gravity. The mythology is that while
seated under a tree Newton was hit on the head by an apple
and led to wonder why the apple should fall perpendicular to
the ground. From this he imagined a force that draws it toward
the center of the earth. The story is by no means substantiated.
Newton evidently told it as anecdote later in life and others
added the part about the apple hitting him on the head (Fara
2015). Whatever the mythology, it is clear that Newton imag-
ined a theory about motion involving the attraction at a dis-
tance between the centers of material bodies. He called the
force gravity. He did not observe the attractive force, nor
was it observable. He conjectured a mathematical theory
about observed effects including falling objects and planetary
orbits. Gravity belongs to the world of theory. But for the
scientific realist, for all its imagined quality, it is real.
Before Newton, Aristotle knew the earth was round and
wanted to explain why things move the way they do. Others
knew that things fell and thought that Bthats the way things

are^ or Bstuff happens.^ Aristotle imagined a theory where all
solid objects that were terrestrial (and not celestially fixed)
strove to move toward their natural place at the center of the
universe which was the earth. Now this theory was wrong, it
invoked teleology and Hellenistic view of the universe. But it
was a good theory at the time in that it explained movement
with the idea of attraction. And for the scientific realist, this
attraction though unobservable was real.
What this illustration points up is that a theory does not
have to be Bcorrect.^ much less considered proven, to have
constructs that can be taken as real. It is this realness that must
be taken into account in practical applications, taken into ac-
count as much as seemingly observably real things.
Newtons construct of the force of gravity was real enough
to eventually guide space exploration. Of course it was also
wrong. Newton had envisaged gravity as operating through-
out space, which came to be considered a Bgravitational field^
analogous to the electromagnetic force field. Einsteins imag-
inative leap was to see that this field does not exist across
space but that effects are better explained by a theory in which
the gravitation field is space and material objects shape that
space in a way that affects the motion of material bodies. This
is the reality of gravity on which applications like GPS
depend.
Einsteins was not the last to imagine what gravity is.
Actually we will never know what gravity is in an objectively
observable sense. But this does not mean that we should not
take theoretical constructs at a point in time as real and realis-
tic for practical purposes.
The debate over realism
The above illustration captures the stance of scientific realism
with regard to the status of theoretical explanations. We
should consider constructs as real, even if unobserved or un-
observable, and use them accordingly. Theory is useful be-
cause it is the best version of reality we have at a point in time.
If Self-Perception Theory is the best explanation we have of
the Foot-in-the-Door effect, it should be considered as real in
designing research applications.
Scientific realism is not without controversy. The other side
is commonly referred to as the instrumentalist position. It
adopts the position that only observable variables and the
observed effects of these variables are real. This position leads
to an empirical justification view of the goal of research as
much as it follows from such a view. An instrumentalist con-
tends that theories are imaginary fictions that help in
predicting observable effects. Theories are instruments or de-
vices for categorizing observed variables and grouping like
effects together. They may also be useful in computing pre-
dictions. It would be a mistake, however, to treat theoretical
constructs as real. Theory may thus be pragmatically useful
for research purposes, but not for larger practical purposes.
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Instrumentalists often support their position with the
Bunder-determination of data by theory^ argument. Many the-
ories will often be available to account for data. Thus the
constructs of any one theory cannot be real, only instrumental.
Realists object that if there are alternative good explanations,
this reflects the provisional status of the theories rather than an
argument against realism per se.
The main objection to instrumentalism is the Bmiracles
argument.^ It holds that it would be a miracle for so many
theories to be successful if constructs were not real. We would
have no other explanation for the apparent success of theories.
The instrumentalist can respond to this with the pessimistic
meta-induction from falsity of past theories that questions
conclusions based on the past success of theories (though this
is inconsistent with under-determination). Aristotles account
of gravity was successful but later rejected, Newtons was
successful but rejected, Einsteins was successful but research
goes on. As the saga of gravity illustrates, for the realist, the-
ories may be replaced but at any point in time these theories
should rightly be taken as real.
In the end realism versus instrumentalism remains a subject
of debate. One solution is that they may not be contradictory.
We can conceive of a real world that we cannot ever know.
Relative to this world, theories are instrumental. But since we
can never know this real world our theories are real relative to
the world as-wecan-know-it. In any case, just as with taking
empirical justification as the goal of research, adapting an
instrumentalist view of theory carries with it the implication
that it is observed effects that are useful for practical purposes.
If one takes a realist stance, however, it follows that a good
theory should be really useful. The theory comes out of sci-
entific imagination but results in real application. As Popper
(1994) puts it, commenting on the status of theory as a World
3 creation, as visualized in Fig. 1, BI call it real because it
interacts with us and with physical things (p. 17).^
Applying theory
We have sought to identify when it makes sense to believe that
nothing is so practically useful as a good theory. It is necessary
for theory to be the goal of research, with recognition of the
role of imagination in theory and with adoption of a realist
stance toward theoretical constructs. Otherwise, aphorisms
aside, theory may be considered to have value in the research
process but should not be expected to be of practical value.
The question then becomes, how can theory actually produce
value when applied to practical issues or problems? This ques-
tion has received surprisingly little attention. Advocates of
theory most often seem to assume its value rather than con-
sider how it can be of value. So let us consider the world of
practical issues and problems.
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Practitioners often say that they must deal with things in the
Breal world.^ In this regard, and especially with behavioral
science, many express reservations about anything
Btheoretical^ and Bacademic.^ Some researchers see this as a
reason for empirical justification and instrumentalism. Others
find it at best blinkered. To consider how theory can actually
produce value we need to move beyond this.
The real world
Practitioners must make something or do something that
actually works in the Breal world.^ To them this means
they work with the world as they know it, the real world.
Note that this leaves plenty of room for creativity in hav-
ing an insight, as to how they can use something they
know something about, to accomplish their ends in a nov-
el way.
Consider a problem (and not an uncommon one) from the
real world. Some years ago, a rumor circulated among con-
sumers that McDonalds was making its burgers with red
worm meat. Not surprisingly sales at the fast food chain suf-
fered (Greene, 1978). We have a real world problem requiring
a real world solution. McDonalds came up with a logical and
creative solution. Given its communication resources, it
sought to counter the rumor with TV and print advertising
messages denying the rumor. In a fairly creative twist they
used credible spokespeople who disputed the rumor, including
one representing the FDA, who testified that the hamburgers
were made with pure beef. Even more creatively they used
messages logically refuting the rumor by noting that it would
not make economic sense to substitute worm meat for ground
beef because worms were more expensive. Despite these per-
suasive messages sales continued to suffer. This was especial-
ly galling because surveys indicated that many people viewed
the rumor as implausible.
This failure led us to wonder if interventions using theory
might have been more successful than the companys response
(Tybout et al. 1981). First, we realized that theory could shed
light on why spokesperson testimonial adverting might be
ineffective. As noted in our discussion of the Wang and
Calder (2006) research, theorizing about information process-
ing suggests that affect associated with an unrelated object or
issue that is activated when an advertisement is encountered
may transfer to an advertised brand. In the context of the
rumor, activating the concept of worms, which are unappeal-
ing to most, in association with the brand, McDonalds, may
have led to negative affect transfer even among people who
did not find the rumor credible. If so, McDonalds refutation
strategy would have reinforced rather than counteracted the
association between worms and McDonalds. The theory lets
us anticipate how the advertising might work in a way that is
not apparent from the companys real world perspective.
This theoretical insight led us to imagine how the rumor
might be countered effectively. Research suggested the fol-
lowing theoretical possibility.
BIndividuals exposed to a rumor linking the object,
McDonalds to an attribute, worms, store this associa-
tion in memory. Subsequent evaluation of the object
requires retrieval of object-relevant thoughts from mem-
ory. Among the thoughts retrieved is the one produced
by the rumor and possible others related to the attribute
specified by the rumor. Because these thoughts are less
positive than those that would have been retrieved in the
absence of the rumor, the evaluation of the object is less
favorable. Consumers are affected because they process
the rumor, not because they necessarily believe it
(Tybout et al 1981, p 74).^
This theory allowed us to see something that a practitioner
would not be able to see. We imagined a theory about
information-processing involving things unknown to the prac-
titioner. And from a realist perspective we could say that this is
a real possibility. Of course from the practitioners perspective
the theory might seem outside of their real world and therefore
not real, only imagined, Bonly a theory.^
If we can get beyond the fact that the theory talks about
something that is not known in the practitioners real world,
this theory could have practical value. The value of the theory
lies in letting us see things that are going on or could be going
on that could be of use. The theory points to the storage of
information in memory as a critical (though unobserved)
event. It likewise identifies the retrieval of information as a
critical event. Once one realizes this, we can imagine ways to
take advantage of it.
One solution for reducing the likelihood that the concept of
Bworms^ will be retrieved along with the concept of
BMcDonalds^ would be to encourage the activation of brand
associations unrelated to hamburgers. For example, messag-
ing might prompt consumers to think about the McDonalds
they visited most recently and the enjoyable time they had
there. Another solution would involve storage. The linkage
between worms and McDonalds could be weakened by asso-
ciating worms with some other favorable food category, such
as French cuisine, think escargot. Whereas the theory does not
tell us exactly how to do this, it allows us to imagine the
Brecent visit^ retrieval strategy and the BFrench food^ storage
strategy.
As Tybout et al (1981) point out and illustrate, it might well
be worth conducting an evaluation study as a check on our
solution. The goal of such research would be applied in that it
would not be intended as a strong test of the theory per se, but
rather as a preliminary test of the imagined solution before
some larger implementation. Our study was conducted in a
setting that, while not representative of the real world,

introduced noise and variability that might swamp or interfere
with the effectiveness of the interventions. It was analogous to
a Bstress test,^ in an engineering context. Participants were
recruited to watch and evaluate a television show in a group
setting and the rumor was introduced in a seemingly sponta-
neous manner when a McDonalds ad appeared during a com-
mercial break by enlisting a confederate who posed as a re-
search participant. In response to the rumor, the researcher
conducting the study either said nothing, refuted the rumor
using the facts delivered in McDonalds press releases, or
employed one of the two information processing theory-
based interventions described above. As part of evaluating
the TV show, participants were also asked their opinion of
the brands that advertised during the show, including
McDonalds. The findings replicated the negative impact of
a rumor that McDonalds hamburgers were made with worm
meat, and the ineffectiveness of the direct refutation strategy
McDonalds employed. Further, it was demonstrated that the
strategies grounded in information-processing theory were ef-
fective in countering the negative effect of the rumor on peo-
ples attitudes toward McDonalds.
Applied research
We emphasize that the Tybout et al (1981) evaluation study
could have been conducted in many ways to suit practitioners
perceived level of risk regarding the proposed intervention.
The larger point is that the practical value came from the
theory. Applied research is only as valuable as the theory
being used.
Let us underscore this point with a final example illustrat-
ing how theory and theoretical imagination differs from the
role of imagination in crafting interventions. Brian Wansink
and his collaborators have a substantial body of research in
which they draw upon theoretical explanations to design
interventions that nudge consumers toward healthy eating. In
one set of studies, Biswas et al (2016) focus on a theoretical
link between mental alertness and decision-making; greater
mental alertness leads to more mindful decision-making.
This theory led the authors to an intervention based on the
insight that brighter ambient light often is associated with
greater mental alertness and prompted them to vary ambient
light and observe whether consumers presented with healthy
and unhealthy food options chose more of the healthier
options when the lighting was brighter. The levels of
lighting were selected to be within a range deemed normal
in real world casual dining restaurants and the tests included
one conducted in the field with the cooperation of the
Hardees restaurant chain. The consistent finding was that
brighter lighting was associated with greater choice of
healthy foods.
Here again, a theoretical explanation served as a platform
for designing an effective intervention. Focus centered on
AMS Rev
solutions that might heighten mental alertness and ambient
lighting was chosen because it could be easily used in settings
where food choices are frequently made and because it had the
potential to have the desired effect without provoking the re-
sistance that might occur with a more obtrusive intervention.
The focus was on whether the lighting intervention worked,
and there was also interest in the magnitude of its effect.
Although the researchers took pains to establish that the light-
ing manipulation varied mental alertness and not something
else, such as self-presentation, this is not necessary in applied
research that is not primarily concerned with testing theory
(though it is very much a concern with theory testing re-
search). The fact that brighter lighting might not only make
consumers more alert but also more concerned about how they
appear to others is an asset if both prompt greater choice of
healthy foods. This work thus highlights the different roles for
imagination in constructing and testing a theoretical explana-
tion versus applying an explanation to the design of
interventions.
The quality of the theoretical explanation being applied
does matter, however. The richer the explanation, the more
likely it is to yield effective interventions. And if interventions
repeatedly fail, they may prompt further consideration about
the theorizing upon which they were based. Returning to the
relationship between mental alertness and decision-making,
greater theoretical insight about the nature of the process
would be valuable (and more fruitful than focusing only on
whether ambient light influences mental awareness.) Does
increasing mental alertness lead to increased arousal and
greater cognitive resources being allocated to decision-mak-
ing? Is the relationship linear or might it be non-monotonic? If
very high levels of mental alertness lead to extreme arousal,
this could be an unpleasant state and a distraction in terms of
decision-making. One can imagine that, at very high levels,
arousal might inhibit mindful processing and result in more
indulgent, unhealthy food choices.
Although imagination is fundamental in both building
and applying good explanations, the type of imagination
required differs. When constructing an explanation, re-
searchers must imagine abstract constructs and how they
are related. In the end, this type of imagination is judged
by how well it accounts for the data available. When
applying an explanation, the researcher must imagine so-
lutions that will work best in the real world situation in-
formed by the theory. The criteria for judging applied
research is thus (1) whether it is based on a theory that
extends insight into the real world issue or problem and
(2) whether the intervention has the desired impact in the
real world. As a result, theory application should be viewed
as a two-step process. One study cannot simultaneously
build/test theory and explore how theory might be translat-
ed to a particular strategy designed to address a real
world problem. Individual studies should be optimized for
AMS Rev
one task or the other with the recognition that different criteria
apply to judging each.
We wish to emphasize that applied research need not
and should not be atheoretical. In our view applied re-
search must be based on theory. And this in no way dis-
qualifies its applied value. Theory that fully realizes the
theoretical imagination provides the foundation for ex-
tending the practitioners view of the real world and
opening up the possibility of new creative solutions.
Partnerships between academics and practitioners that
Zaltman (2016) envisions are most likely to be fruitful
when approached in this way.
Concluding note
Is nothing so practically useful as a good theory? It depends
on what is meant by good theory.
Good theory, as we hope is apparent from our discus-
sion, has more to do with ignorance than knowledge.
Science indeed plays in the garden of ignorance. The
study of ignorance, or agnotology, has recently become
a subject of much interest. Scholars like Deutsch (2011)
and Firestone (2012) point out that ignorance is the main
driver of science. Research asks questions and fills in
answers with provisional theories. And this increases our
understanding of our ignorance and leads to more ques-
tions for which we do not have answers. Importantly re-
search is not about achieving certainty with answers but
dealing with our uncertainty. And uncertainty is all about
the unobserved and the unobservable. Theory is a way of
recognizing that our real world understanding pales in
comparison to our ignorance. Good theory pushes back
the curtain of ignorance and allows us to imagine how
the world might work. Good theory is not a matter of
being right. It is a way of coping with ignorance.
We offer a parable for sake of concreteness. A builder in
ancient Greece wants to hang a lantern on a wall. His solution
to the problem is to drive a nail into the wall and hang the
lantern by a hook he has attached to it. The nail supports the
lantern; the job is done. The builder is comfortable with this
solution, but he happens to have a friend named Aristotle who
tells him about his theory- objects strive to move to the center
of the earth. Without Aristotle and his theory, the builder
would be left to his ignorance. (Sure he has observed other
hanging objects but he only knows that Bstuff happens.^)
Aristotles theory is the builders only way of seeing that over
time the lamp could put additional pressure on the nail. And
thus the theory could lead him to imagine a solution. The
solution could be as simple as a stronger nail; it is only limited
by his design imagination once theory has filled in the blank
space. Today we have newer theories but the value of a good
theory is the same.
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