Chapter 2

Various Types of Social Dilemma

In order to examine the pragmatic methods of solving social dilemmas, it is

important to understand the logical structure of dilemmas that underpin actual
real-life problems. To this end, and also to facilitate the basic understanding of
social dilemmas, the categories and types of representative social dilemmas will be
reviewed in the following section. Incidentally, note that these categories are not
exclusive to each other, but include areas of overlap. Moreover, refer also to
Komorita and Parks (1994) and Yamagishi (1989) for more detailed descriptions on
the categories of these dilemmas.

2.1 Prisoners Dilemma

The prisoners dilemma (or PD game) is perhaps one of the simplest ways to
express a social dilemma.
Two friends are arrested, and as prisoners they are kept in solitary connement;
periodically they are interrogated separately; they have no way of communicating
with each other. Their interrogator then puts a proposal to them: If you confess that
your buddy is the ringleader, then you will be regarded as his sidekick and will
receive a short sentence. The jail terms are 15 years for the ringleader, and one year
for the sidekick. But if both of you confess that the other is the ringleader, then we
regard both of you as equally guilty, and you will be imprisoned for 10 years.
However, if both of you keep silent, you will be imprisoned for 3 years. The
interrogators offer is shown in Fig. 2.1. Then, each prisoner may assess their sit-
uation as follows:
What happens if my buddy is tempted by the interrogators proposal and makes a con-
fession? If I then confess, it means that as both of us have confessed, since there is no
ringleader or sidekick, we will both receive 10 years in jail. If I do not confess, I will be
regarded as the ringleader anyway and will receive the heavier penalty of 15 years. That
means it is better for me to make a confession.

Springer Japan 2017 11

S. Fujii, Prescription for Social Dilemmas, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55618-3_2
12 2 Various Types of Social Dilemma

Choices o f Prisoner A

Keep silent Make a confession

(cooperation) (defection)

Choices 3 years (R) 1 year (T)

of Keep silent
Prisoner
(cooperation ) 3 years (R) 15 years (S)
B

15 years (S) 10 years (P)

Make a

confession 1 year (T) 10 years (P)

(defection)

Fig. 2.1 Example of the game matrix of prisoners dilemma and its basic structure

On the other hand, what happens if my buddy does not make a confession? If I confess, I
will be the sidekick and my buddy the ringleader, and I will be imprisoned for only a year.
However, if I do not confess, it means that both of us are keeping quiet, which means
imprisonment for 3 years. So it is better for me to make a confession. At the end of the day,
whether or not my buddy confesses, it is always better for me to confess.

Of course, it is not only this prisoner who thinks in this way, if his counterpart is
also rational enough, he will also come to the same conclusion that it is better to
make a confession. If both make a confession, their term of imprisonment will be
10 years.
If both do not confess and keep quiet their term of imprisonment will only be
3 years each.
In sum, the prisoners dilemma game is a game with the following prot
structure: if each prisoner gives priority to their own private benet and thinks
rationally about making a confession, the result is a decrease in the private benet
of each. In contrast, if each prisoner does not give priority to their own private
benet and stays quiet, the result is an increase in the private benet of each.
Incidentally, there are four letters R, P, T, and S inserted in Fig. 2.1 to explain
the general prot structure of the prisoners dilemma game. They stand for the
weight of the punishment as in
R = Reward
P = Punishment
T = Temptation
S = Suckers payoff
Having provided the prot structure as such, the game is dened as the pris-
oners dilemma game if the following two conditions are met.
2.1 Prisoners Dilemma 13

Condition 1: T < R < P < S

Condition 2: 2R < (T + S)
Of course, the inequality signs should be opposite, if it expresses not the weight
of punishment but the size of prot. Additionally, if you consider the sum of the
two prisoners prot the latter Condition 2 shows that the most rational situation is
when both keep quiet.

2.2 N-Person Prisoners Dilemma

The social dilemma already explained as Denition A in this book is actually based
on the denitions of n-person prisoners dilemma. It expands the way of thinking of
the prisoners dilemma game to include three or more participants. When Dawes
proposed the concept of social dilemma, he dened it as the situation of n-person
prisoners dilemma (Dawes 1980). Thus, the denition of social dilemma in this
book which attempts pragmatic solutions is an expansion of the denition given by
Dawes. Although the later-mentioned public goods dilemma, commons dilemma,
social trap, and social fence are included in the denition of social dilemmas in this
book, but not in that of Dawes.
In n-person prisoners dilemma, people must make a choice between cooperation
and defection. And the prot gained by choosing a cooperative behavior and a
defective behavior changes according to the number of cooperators, namely, how
many out of n persons is choosing the cooperative behavior, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
However, despite the number of cooperators, you still gain higher prot if you take
the defective behavior rather than choosing the cooperative behavior.

Benefit

Each persons
benefit when Each persons benefit when
everyone cooperated Benefit of noncooperator everyone cooperated = C n
= Cn

Benefit of cooperator
Each persons
benefit when
everyone did not
cooperate = D 0

The number of cooperators

0 1 n-1 n
persons person persons persons

Fig. 2.2 Benet structure of n-person prisoners dilemma

14 2 Various Types of Social Dilemma

This is shown in Fig. 2.2 by the way that the prot function of a noncooperator
is located higher than that of a cooperator. Incidentally, this is equivalent to
Condition 1 in Denition A. However, each persons prot is higher when
everyone is the cooperator, compared to when everyone is the noncooperator. This
relationship is shown as Cn > D0 in Fig. 2.2. This is equivalent to Condition 2 in
Denition B. If these conditions are met, such a social situation is dened as the n-
person prisoners dilemma. In this dilemma, if people aim to increase their private
benet, everyone becomes a noncooperator, according to the above Condition 1. As
a result, the level of each persons prot becomes lower than when everyone is
choosing the cooperative behavior, according to Condition 2. A situation inclusive
of such a dilemma is deemed as n-person prisoners dilemma.

2.3 Commons Dilemma

This is a social dilemma pointed out by Hardin in his essay Tragedy of the
Commons published in the magazine Science (Hardin 1968). It illustrates the
Tragedy of the Commons as follows; Suppose that a pasture is shared by several
shepherds. Each shepherd lives by raising sheep, and can decide the number of
sheep in their flock. Now, imagine that there is a rational shepherd who wishes to
maximize his prot. He will try to increase the number of sheep as much as
possible, since he can obtain a greater amount of milk and wool. Likewise, if all
shepherds are rational, they will all try to increase the number of sheep as much as
they can. However, the amount of grass provided by the pasture is limited.
Therefore, all the sheep will die before the next spring comes. And all shepherds
will totally lose their livelihoods.
After all, given the limited resources, if everyone is sufciently self-centered and
rational, the sustainability of society as a whole will be lost. Hence the commons
dilemma is also known as the resource dilemma. Another name for this dilemma is
the take-some game, since it is a game to take some amount from a specic
resource.

2.4 Public Goods Dilemma

Let us think of a typical example of public goods, such as a bridge or a road, which
offer equal convenience to everyone in society. In order to supply such public goods
to society, a certain amount of cooperation by people is needed, such as the
agreement to pay taxes or use a particular system. Namely, in this case it requires
an action to pay some of the cost out of ones own pocket. However, whether or
not the public goods are actually supplied, it is more benecial for each individual
not to engage in such cooperative behavior, i.e., not to pay out of ones own
pocket. It is because if other people are offering enough of the needed cooperative
2.4 Public Goods Dilemma 15

behavior to provide the public goods, your own cooperation or defection does not
matter to ensure the supply of the public goods.
In other words, each person faces a temptation to free ride on the cooperative
behavior of others. Such a situation is also referred to as the the free rider problem
of public goods (Olson 1965) which is often discussed as problematic in the eld
of public economics. If everyone is tempted to free ride, in the end the public goods
will not be supplied. However, if each person cooperates for the sake of a certain
public consideration, even if some cooperation ends up wasted, the public goods
will still be supplied, and everyone will be able to receive benet. Incidentally, in
contrast to the commons dilemma, the public goods dilemma is a game to explore
how much of each individuals resources are to be provided to the public. Thus it is
also known as a give-some game.

2.5 Social Trap and Social Fence

The social trap is a kind of social dilemma proposed by Platt (1973). Its denition is
a situation in which conducting a certain behavior (defection) contributes to
increasing the private benet in the short term, but not conducting the behavior
(cooperation) contributes to the higher benet in the long term. The simplest form
of social trap is demonstrated by someone on a diet. The person has to make a
choice between eating or not eating that cake; they are tempted to increase their
private benet in the present by eating the cake, or to refrain from eating the cake to
achieve the long-term goal of the diet. In this case, if you succumb to your desire to
eat the cake your attempt to diet will fail. Of course, such a social trap for only a
single person is usually not dened as a social dilemma, but for example, the global
environment issue mentioned in Sect. 1.3 above can also be dened as a social
trap. That is to say, if each person uses their car frequently since they are so
convenient, global warming will be the result in the long term. In this case, con-
tinuing to use cars without considering the long-term impact can be said to be a
form of the social trap.
Now, the characteristic of a social trap is that it emphasizes the time axis. That is,
in the many dilemmas discussed up to now, such as n-person prisoners dilemma, it
is possible to dene cooperation without consideration for future public benet.
However, the social trap denes cooperation as considering the future benet, as
shown in Fig. 2.3.
Platt also proposed the social fence as a counterpart to the social trap; in the
social fence a certain behavior brings about a higher prot in the long term, but its
execution is accompanied with a loss in the short term. For example, it is not much
fun to study for an exam, but if you do, you can get a better grade; for an individual
such a situation is a social fence. By the same token, in the problem of accepting a
road pricing policy that imposes car usage charges, if you are short-term-sighted,
16 2 Various Types of Social Dilemma

Time
Future Scope of benefit considered for cooperation
in a social trap/social fence

Scope of benefit considered for cooperation

in n-person prisoners dilemma

Present Social distance

Complete other Yourself Complete other

Fig. 2.3 Example of scope of benet considered in cooperation of social trap/social fence and n-
person prisoners dilemma. Note The scope of benet shown here is just an example. In n-person
prisoners dilemma, it is also possible to dene cooperation considering the time axis. Likewise, in
a social trap, it also is possible to dene cooperation considering the presence of others in a wider
scope. This gure expresses that in n-person prisoners dilemma, the time axis does not always
need to be considered, and in a social trap/social fence, many individuals (or people other than
yourself) do not always need to be considered.

you will tend to disagree as it incurs a cost. But even taking into account the
additional cost, if the policy is accepted, congestion will be mitigated, which brings
about long-term benet. From this point of view, the issue of accepting a road
pricing policy can be regarded as a social fence.

2.6 Chicken Dilemma

This is a social dilemma with the structure of the chicken game in game theory. The
chicken game resembles the prisoners dilemma game, but the difference is that
when both parties choose a defective behavior, each persons prot becomes
minimal. In other words, if one follows the denition in Fig. 1.1, the prisoners
dilemma game is in a relationship of

Temptation [ Reward [ Punishment [ Suckers payoff

But instead of this relationship, if the following relationship is realized, it is

called a chicken game.

Temptation [ Reward [ Suckers payoff [ Punishment

Incidentally, this inequality sign is based on dening each variable as a prot.

What is shown by this relational expression of prot is that if others are choosing a
cooperative behavior, the larger private benet is provided if you choose a defective
2.6 Chicken Dilemma 17

behavior, but if others are choosing the defective behavior, the larger private benet
is provided if you choose the cooperative behavior. Hence the chicken game has a
characteristic that a choice to bring about the larger private benet depends on the
action of the counterpart. This is the difference between the prisoners dilemma in
which a larger private benet is provided if you choose a defective behavior,
regardless of the action of the other party. Therefore, in the chickens dilemma,
even for an individual who aims to maximize their self-centered benet, the
expectation of what behavior others choose will have a great impact on ones own
behavior.

2.7 Step-Level Dilemma and Volunteers Dilemma

This refers to a type of social dilemma with a structure in which each individuals
benet declines sharply when the ratio of cooperators in society falls beneath a
certain level. Many of the commons and public goods dilemmas are step-level
dilemmas. For example, let us think of a public goods dilemma where a bridge is to
be constructed by donations from residents in a village. If the donations reach the
required amount, the bridge will be built. If this happens, all residents can receive
the benet of the bridge. However, if the donations are below the amount, the
bridge will not be built, and the village will not benet from the bridge. Similarly,
let us consider road congestion. In general, road congestion occurs when the
demand for transportation exceeds the capacity of a certain stretch of road.
Naturally if demand is lower than the road capacity, congestion does not occur. If
congestion occurs, there will be a sharp increase in traveling time. Even in a section
of road which you can drive through in just 5 min before congestion, once the road
is congested, it may take more than 20, or even 30 min to escape the trafc jam. In
this way, the step-level dilemma has a prot structure in which the prot received
by an individual changes rapidly and discretely, such as a bridge can or cannot be
constructed, or congestion does or does not occur.
The volunteers dilemma is a special type of the step-level dilemma (Diekmann
1985). It is a dilemma with a prot structure in which each individuals prot
changes rapidly depending on whether there is one cooperator or not. Many helping
behaviors have a step-level dilemma structure. The most representative example is
whether someone helps a person who has collapsed in a crowded place. In this case,
only one individual needs to offer help, but if no one steps forward, the person may
die. Other cases are whether someone cleans a public area such as a park or a school
research lab, or who is taking the leadership in organizing a festival or a sports
event. They can all be regarded as the volunteers dilemma, since they are all
situations in which if there is just one volunteer, the public benet increases greatly.
18 2 Various Types of Social Dilemma

References

Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169193.

Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteers dilemma. Journal of conflict resolution, 29, 605610.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 12431248.
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641651.
Yamagishi, T. (1989). Main theoretical approaches of social dilemma study. Japanese
Psychological Review, 32(3), 161194. (in Japanese with English abstract).
http://www.springer.com/978-4-431-55617-6