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between t(i) and r(j) is Gij hij . That is, due to a signal of G
33
power Pi transmitted by the sender of link i, the receiver t3
G
43
= G44
0.4 implies that [xfdi (sx)]1/2 for all positive s are absolutely sub-
homogeneous. We will next define absolute subhomogeneity
0.2
and point important implications of this property.
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 A. Absolutely Subhomogeneous Functions
x A formal definition of absolute subhomogeneity proposed
Fig. 2. An example of objective reduction factor fdi by Nuzman [9] is:
SIRobj such that SIRiavg SIRobj ensures that the outage Definition 1: A real valued function g is called absolutely
objective is reached [13]. From (3), we choose SIRobj such subhomogeneous (AS) if the following inequalities hold for
th
that exp SIRobj = 1Oobj . We start by the rather simplistic all x R+ and arbitrary a
utility given below: e|a| g(x) g(ea x) e|a| g(x)
SIRobj
ui = (4) Absolutely subhomogeneous (AS) functions involve a sense
SIRiavg
of smoothness observed in limited rate of change. If value
It can be deduced by a quick investigation that the game in
of the function increases (as its argument is increased), the
which users non-cooperatively maximize the utility in Eq. (4)
rate of increase is less than linear. If the value decreases, its
has an inefficent NE: Each user transmits with power Pmax
absolute rate of decrease is smaller than reciprocal of linear.
in NE. Hence, a more sophisticated utility function that leads
A collection of useful results in [9] about AS functions
to a cooperative mechanism is required.
are presented in the next theorem.
In [8], we proposed that node i cooperates by reducing its
SIR objective with a factor fdi . User is reaction to interfering Theorem 1: Let P(t + 1) = F (P(t)) be MSS and
power is shaped by fdi (.). The factor fdi (.) is basically a non- let H(P) = (F (P)). If vector function is in the
increasing continuous function defined from non-negative form (x1 , x2 , ..., xK ) = [1 (x1 ), 2 (x2 ), ..., K (xK )] with
real numbers into the range [0, 1]. An example function fdi (.) i (xi ) absolutely subhomogeneous, then P(t+1) = H(P(t))
is illustrated in Fig.2. In general, we assume that fdi is first has a unique fixed point.
order differentiable except at some points, the set of which Theorem 1 suggests that if an AS function is applied to each
has finite cardinality. component of an MSS update algorithm, then there exists a
The concept of objective reduction factor will be central unique fixed point of the new algorithm. This result justifies
to the development of the utility function here too, albeit the choice of fdi such that Hi are AS (see [8]).
with a difference: here, a unit price pi is subtracted from Continuity will be main assumption in our analysis. We
utility to obtain a net utility. It will be observed later in the present a useful implication of AS property under continuity
paper although users reduce their objectives as interference in the next lemma.
escalates, inefficency in NE is not alleviated unless this price
Lemma 1: Let g : + + be a bounded continuous
term exists. The net utility function N Ui is the following:
SIRobj fdi (Ii ) absolutely subhomogeneous function and let r(x) = g n (x)
N Ui (P) = pi (5) for some positive integer n. Subdifferential of r, r(x)
SIRiavg
Our net utility function employs a linear price, combined with satisfies: r(x) r(x)
r(x) [n ,n ]
an explicit objective reduction factor whereby SIR objectives x x
are effectively reduced in response to increasing interference. Proof: Assume that g(.) is differentiable at point x with
This is akin to the approach of [3], [6] where, reduction of a positive derivative and let x + h = ea x. For h < 0, a < 0
objectives is not explicit, but adaptation to interference is and for h > 0, a > 0. Using the right inequality of AS
made within a price coefficient. In fact, if net utility were definition, we have,
defined as below, the resulting equilibria would be identical: dr(x) r(x + h) r(x) (en|a| 1)r(x)
= lim lim
SIRobj 1 dx h0 h a0 (ea 1)x
N Ui = i pi (6)
SIRiavg fd (Ii ) Hence, provided a positive derivative, dr(x) dx n r(x)
x . If
This point will be made clearer during the analysis of reaction we had a negative derivative, we can use a similar argu-
curves in the next section. We will devise a distributed ment and left inequality of AS definition to conclude that
dr(x)
mechanism by setting up the power control problem as dx n r(x)x . The results straightforwardly extend for
a non-cooperative game and analyze the properties of the points where the derivative is undefined which can only be
resulting equilibrium. In particular, selection of fdi functions due to inequality of left and right limits. We use the definition
is key to the equilibrium and dynamic of the system. In the of subdifferential in terms of left and right derivatives and a
analysis, the function H i (x) = xfdi (x) plays an important similar treatment of the problem yields
role. H i (x) is continuous and piecewise continuously dif- r(x) r(x)
r(x) [n ,n ]
ferentiable. Optimum values of H i (x) will be used in the x x
IV. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NASH and N Ui
Pi < 0 at Pi = Pmax . As NE is the intersection
EQUILIBRIUM of reaction curves, these necessary boundary conditions can
be expressed in terms of reaction curves. In order not to
By assumed properties on reduction factor fdi (.), the have an equilibrium on the boundary, we must have Pmin <
net utility function N Ui (P) in Eq. (5) is continuous and ri (Pi ) < Pmax . Pluging the value, we reach a condition for
piecewise continuously differentiable with respect to its argu- an inner NE:
ments. In particular, the derivative of N Ui (.) with respect to SIRobj
Pmin < [ Ii fd (Ii )]1/2 < Pmax
Pi is continuous while there may be discontinuities at some Gii
The following two boundary conditions are assumed to hold
breaking points in the derivative of N Ui with respect to Pj ,
in the rest of the paper,
j 6= i. Assumption 1:
The game is = [U, {Si }, {N Ui }] where Si =
[Pmin , Pmax ] and each users optimization is SIRobj Hmini
SIRobj Hmax
i
2 > 1 and 2
<1
Gii Pmin Gii Pmax
max N Ui (Pi , Pi ) (7)
Pi Si We state our findings about NE of the game in the
By direct evaluation of the second derivative, we have following theorem
Theorem 3: If boundary conditions in assumption 1 hold
2 N Ui SIRobj Ii fd (Ii ) and if [Hi (x)]1/2 are AS i, then the game has a unique
2 = 2
Pi Gii Pi3 inner NE.
Proof: The existence of NE is guaranteed. Unique-
and except some points at which derivative is not defined,
ness result follows from Theorem 1. It is well known that
we have
Pi (t + 1) = eIi (t) =: Fi (P(t)) where e is a positive
2 N Ui SIRobj Gji constant, is an MSS update algorithm. After a few algebraic
= [Ii fd (Ii ) + fd (Ii )]
Pi Pj Gii Pi2 manipulations, one can show that the reaction curve in Th. 2
Note that N Ui is strictly concave with respect to its action can be expressed as
2
variable Pi as PN Ui
< 0. Hence, there exists a solution to ri (Pi ) = min{Pmax, max{Pmin , Pbi }}
2
Pi (t) = Pmin or Pi (t) = Pmax . Hence, the power levels of User i reacts to interference level higher than Li1 by
users always reside inside the set [Pmin , Pmax ]. decreasing its objective. The decreasing region of fdi is
A candidate Lyapunov function V : K is to be constrained by absolute subhomogeneity assumption of
guessed now in order to establish sufficent conditions for [xfdi (x)]1/2 . An optimal way of cooperation under AS as-
stability of the system in Eq. (11): sumption can be described using least AS upper bound [9]
XK of the reaction that decreases to zero sharply at interference
V (P) = 2i (P) (12) level Li . One can show that the decreasing region of least AS
i=1 upper bound of sharp decrease is proportional to 1/x3 . The
Note that V (P) is actually defined in [Pmin , Pmax ]M . Since
proportionality constant is determined such that the function
NE is inner and unique, i (P) = 0 i if and only if
is continuous.
P = P . Hence,. V (P) is positive for all P other than NE.
The condition V (P) < 0 is sufficent for stability of NE, if A further constraint on the decreasing region is proposed
satisfied at points other than NE and if the derivative is well as each user must stay in the system. Users reaction to
defined3 . interference is imposed to be higher than its reaction to the
i i
. minimum interference it experiences: Hmin = Imin .
We begin the analysis by calculating V (P) and then 1
bounding it The region decreasing with proportion to x3 stops when
the reaction level reaches H i (Ii ) = Imin . The interference
3 If derivative is not well defined, analysis can be extended using subdif- level Ii at which H i (Ii ) = Imin is Li2 . fdi decreases
ferentials proportional to 1/x and H i (Ii ) = Imin for all Ii > L2i .
i
The general form of fd is as follows: The threshold SINR is set to th = 9 dB for all experi-
i
1, Imin < x < Li1 ments. The particular value of the threshold is chosen since
i
L it guarantees a certain communication quality5 . Users goals
fdi (x) = ( x1 )3 , Li1 < x < Li2 (13)
i1 )3 1 , Li < x < I i .
(L are to stay below an outage probability of Oobj = 10%,
(Li2 )2 x 2 max
which corresponds to SIRobj = 18.7 dB or SIRobj = 75 in
We allow the non-cooperative region to be as large as possi- normal scale.
2
Gii Pmax
ble, hence Li1 = SIR i
obj . Note that L1 are set proportional In the simulated system, suppression level of users are
to the direct channel gain Gii . This way, users having around Si = 15 dB. Note that the exact values of channel
higher direct channel gains favor the network resources more gains and noise power are not important in terms of operation.
and thus a network opportunistic mechanism is established Gii takes arbitrary value in the interval [1, 2] for all i and
and throughput efficiency of the network is supported. For exact values of Gij are chosen randomly (say distributed
Li uniformly in a relatively small interval than its mean value) so
continuity, Li2 = (I i 1)1/3 . Introduction of the third region
min
in definition of fdi brings a notion of fairness to the control that around 15 dB suppression is maintained. Throughout the
algorithm as it maintains users remaining in the system. simulations, we set maximum transmit power as Pmax = 1
Hence, by defining fdi as in (13), users react to interference and noise power as 2 = 0.001. P
ForPthe simulated setting, maxi j6=i Gji = 0.034,
with a balance between throughput efficiency and fairness.
There may be exceptional cases that require modification mini j6=i Gji = 0.024, maxij Gji = 0.01, maxi Gii = 1.5
in the general form of fdi given above. If Imin i
> Li1 , then and mini Gii = 1. Interference suppression capability Si
i 1
fd would have only the x decreasing region and the reaction ranges from 30 to 60. Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of the
would be a constant for all interference levels. In this extreme system is P F = 0.0227, which implies that SIRobj = 75
case, though user i transmits with Pmin + , it is not allowed is not feasible. Actually, users can achieve a common SIR
to control its power and is in a sense discarded from the level of at most P1F = 43 in normal scale.
i In the first experiment, we investigate the NE by means of
system4 . Another exception occurs if Imin < Li1 but Imax
i
<
convergence of iterating reaction curves. Transmitters have
Li2 . In this case, x1 decreasing region does not appear. Note
i i instantaneous access to the perfect information of interfer-
that the imposed condition Hmin = Imin is satisfied in both
ence level at the intended receiver. Minimum power is taken
cases. Possible reaction curves in several different cases are
as Pmin = 0.3. Evolutions of power level of transmitters and
depicted in Fig. 3.
Pmax Pmax
achieved SIR level in their corresponding receivers are shown
in Fig. 4. Convergence is observed in about 5 iterations.
1 80
NE
r2 (P1 ), P2
r2 (P1 ), P2
NE 0.9 70
0.8 60
Power
0.7 50
SIR
0.6 40
0.4 20
Pmax Pmax
0.3 10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Iterations Iterations
Fig. 4. Evolutions of power and SIR are illustrarted for Pmin = 0.3.
r2 (P1 ), P2
r2 (P1 ), P2
0.9
70 cooperation mechanism which serves to improve overall
0.85 60 network performance. Each users reaction to interference is
0.8
assumed to be absolutely subhomogeneous so that a unique
Power
50
SIR
0.75
0.7
40 Nash equilibrium of the game is guaranteed. Iterative power
0.65 30
update algorithms based on gradient optimization techniques
0.6
20
have been investigated and convergence conditions have been
0.55
0.5 10
derived. Finally, power updates are considered as the result
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
50
SIR
0.6
CDMA as a non-cooperative game, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
40 Wireless Networks, vol. 8, pp. 659670, 2002.
0.5
30
[4] C. U. Saraydar, N. B. Mandayan, and D. J. Goodman, Efficient power
0.4
control via pricing in wireless data networks, IEEE Transactions on
0.3 20 Communications, vol. 50, pp. 291303, February 2002.
0.2 10
[5] J. Huang, R. Berry, and M. Honig, Distributed interference com-
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2006.
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0.95
70
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0.8
Power
50
0.75 [12] J. Papandriopoulos, J. Evans, and S. Dey, Optimal power control in
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0.7 CDMA networks with constraints on outage probability, in in Proc.
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